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The original documents are located in Box D14, folder "Sarnoff's Program for Cold War,
May 10, 1955 (not a Ford speech)" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and
Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D14 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Release: Tuesday, May 10, 1955
SARNOFF SUBMITS PROGRAM FOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM TO WIN "COLD WAR"
A firm and open decision "to win the Cold War, as the
"surest way to prevent a Hot War," was urged upon our Government
by Brig. General David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of the Radio
Corporation of America, in a Memorandum presented to the White
House on April 5, 1955, and made public today.
Pointing out that the Kremlin's fixed goal is world
dominion by means short of an all-out war -- propaganda, fifth-
column subversion, civil strife, terror and treacherous diplomacy --
General Sarnoff declared:
"Logically we have no alternative but to acknowledge the
reality of the Cold War and proceed to turn Moscow's favorite
weapons against world Communism. Our political counter-strategy
has to be as massive, as intensive, as flexible as the enemy's.
"The question, in truth, is no longer whether we should
engage in the Cold War. The Soviet drive is forcing us to take
counter-measures in any case. The question, rather, is whether we
FORD & LIBRAR GERALD
of
-2-
should undertake it with a clear-headed determination to use all
means deemed essential, by governments and by private groups, to
win the contest."
General Sarnoff's Memorandum, entitled "Program for a
Political Offensive Against World Communism," grew out of his
discussion of the subject with President Eisenhower in Washington
on the morning of March 15, and announced at the time by James
Hagerty, White House Press Secretary.
The same afternoon, at the President's request, General
Sarnoff conferred with Nelson Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the
President on psychological warfare, and officials from the U. S.
Information Service and the Central Intelligence Agency. At the end
of the meeting he undertook to submit his views on the subject and
a suggested program of action.
The result was this Memorandum, in which he emphasized
that "we must go from defense to attack in meeting the political,
ideological, subversive challenge. The problem," he said, "is one
of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and
continuity of action. The expanded offensive with non-military
means must be imbued with a new awareness of the great goal and a
robust will to reach it."
People everywhere, and especially behind the Iron Curtain,
General Sarnoff recommended, should be told that "America has
decided, irrevocably, to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is,
in concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive power of
Soviet-based Communism."
FORDO i LIBRARY GERALD
-3--
General Sarnoff declared that his proposals "should not
be construed as a substitute for adequate military vitality," both
in the newest weapons and balanced conventional forces.
"But short of a blunder that ignites the Third World
War which nobody wants," he added, "the immediate danger is the
debilitating, costly, tense war of nerves that is part of the Cold
War. The primary threat today is political and psychological."
If we allow ourselves to be defeated in the cold struggle,
he warned, "we will have bypassed a nuclear war -- but at the price
of our freedom and independence. We can freeze to death as well as
burn to death."
Existing organization for fighting and winning the Cold
War must be "adjusted and strengthened in line with the expanded
scale and intensity of operations," General Sarnoff said. He
proposed a "Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side,"
functioning "directly under the President, with Cabinet status for
its head."
The conflict on the political front, he said, "is not a
preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the loser may
not have a second chance. It must therefore be carried on with the
same focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willingness
to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would involve."
The specific activities cited as examples in the
Memorandum would be carried out not only by official agencies but by
private groups such as labor unions, veterans' organizations,
BERALD, FORD
-4-
churches, youth and women's groups. The Soviet-controlled
countries, it showed, are extremely vulnerable to precisely the
kind of psychological pressures the Communists are using against
free nations.
In outlining a vastly enlarged propaganda effort, General
Sarnoff drew attention to opportunities opened up by new technical
developments in communications. For instance, "mobile big-screen
television units in black-and-white and in color" would be effective
in non-Communist regions where "their very novelty will guarantee
large and attentive audiences."
"Vast regions in Asia and elsewhere, where illiteracy bars
the written word and lack of radios bars the spoken word," General
Sarnoff explained, "could thus be reached."
His plan also included mass distribution of "cheap and
lightweight receivers tuned to pick up American signals.' In
addition, "a simple, hand-operated phonograph device costing no more
than a loaf of bread" and "records made of cardboard and costing
less than a bottle of Coca-Cola" could be made available by the
million in critical areas.
"Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end in
itself -- it is a preparation for action," the Memorandum stated.
"Words that are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds,
lose their impact."
The arena of action is the whole globe, General Sarnoff
believes. We must aim, he said, "to achieve dramatic victories as
swiftly as possible, as token of the changed state of affairs."
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
T
-5-
He saw great possibilities for encouraging and guiding "passive
resistance" by individuals, with a minimum of risk, in the Soviet
empire.
At the same time he took note of the fact that "pockets
of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states,
China, Albania and other areas. " These "must be kept supplied with
information, slogans and new leadership where needed and prudent."
"We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's
chain of power, General Sarnoff declared. "The country adjudged
ripe for a break-away should receive concentrated study and planning.
A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be a body
blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to resistance
elsewhere."
Among the specific activities discussed in the Memorandum
were intensive collaboration with emigres and escapees from
communist countries and special schools to train personnel for
political-psychological warfare.
(NOTE: The full text of the Memorandum is attached. See
especially the Summary of proposals on pages 40-42 and
the 8 "Guidelines for Political Offensive" on pages 20-21).
O
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
PROGRAM FOR A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM
A MEMORANDUM BY DAVID SARNOFF
APRIL 5, 1955
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
PROGRAM FOR A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM
A MEMORANDUM BY DAVID SARNOFF
APRIL 5, 1955
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
3
INTRODUCTION
I How the Communists Wage Cold War
4
Our best and surest way to prevent a Hot War is to
II We Dare Not Lose the Cold War
13
win the Cold War. Individual democratic leaders have
III To Prevent a Hot War, We Must Win the
long been aware of this truth, but it has not yet been fully
Cold War
15
grasped by the free world.
Because the label is of recent coinage, many people
IV The Message of Freedom
22
assume that the Cold War is a new phenomenon. Actu-
ally it has been under way ever since the Bolsheviks,
V Toward Cold War Victory
25
entrenched in Russia and disposing of its resources,
38
launched the Third or Communist International.
VI Diplomacy Is a Weapon
World Communism has been making war on our
VII Summary
40
civilization for more than three decades. And the term
"war" is not used here in a merely rhetorical sense. It
has been a war with campaigns and battles, strategy
and tactics, conquests and retreats. Even the postwar
years, it should be noted, have seen Red retreats-in
Greece, Iran, Berlin, for instance-as well as victories;
but such retreats have occurred only when the West acted
awarely and boldly.
3
ally controlled and manipulated by Communists for
Soviet films are rated high in the Communist propa-
strictly Communist objectives.
ganda plans. Pure entertainment in films, of course, is
almost non-existent. The result is that any and all pic-
These false-front outfits are spawned continually,
tures made in the Soviet sphere, however disguised as
discarded when their purpose has been served. In the
art, contain a "message" which contributes to their
United States, where this technique has been widely
cumulative effort to brainwash the non-Soviet world.
practiced, they have run into scores. Every new situation
produces its organizational instrument. At times a front
2. INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION:
started for one purpose is shifted overnight to its op-
Through Communists, fellow-travelers and assorted
posite: thus fronts for keeping America out of the war
sympathizers, there is a systematic "colonization" of
during the life of the Moscow-Berlin pact were converted
governments, labor unions, educational and scientific in-
into fronts for putting America into the war after the
stitutions and social organizations. The goal is to weaken
Germans attacked Soviet Russia.
the infiltrated bodies or to use their leverage to influence
Besides creating these fifth-column devices, the Com-
public opinion and official policy in the Kremlin's direc-
munists also are expert at "capturing" organizations
tion; to undermine traditions and subvert loyalties which
started by others. By joining some existing society or
block the road to Communist thinking.
committee, acting as a disciplined minority bound by
In the infiltration of government agencies, espionage
caucus decisions, a dozen persons have frequently suc-
is by no means the chief purpose. Far more important
ceeded in taking effective control of organizations with
to the Soviets is the subtle pressure an infiltree can bring
thousands of members.
to bear upon the shaping of national policy and the in-
fluencing of national moods. The theft of secret docu-
4. SABOTAGE AND TERROR:
ments is routine. The subversion of a government's self-
The use of these weapons in time of war is familiar,
interest, the sowing of disunity, the careful sabotage of
but its systematic use in peace-time is the great Com-
policies unfavorable to Soviet interests-these require
and receive more polished methods.
munist innovation. In all free countries the main targets
of infiltration are defense industries, communications,
3. FIFTH COLUMNS AND FALSE FRONTS:
transport and police systems-all of which offer ample
opportunity for mischief affecting a nation's security.
Communist Parties, whether legal or proscribed, are
Strikes at strategic points and strategic times, as well
the primary fifth column. They function under direct
as overt physical sabotage, can slow up a country's
instructions from Moscow headquarters, usually under
preparations for defense or actual war-making capacity.
leaders assigned from outside.
In regions where it is useful and feasible, the Com-
But this is the beginning, not the end, of the ap-
munists do not disdain raw terror: incendiarism, kid-
paratus of power reaching into every corner of the free
napping, assassination. A special research section of the
world. Innumerable committees, congresses, leagues are
MVD (Soviet secret police) is devoted to developing
set up-outwardly devoted to legitimate and even noble
murder weapons, poisons and the like.
causes like peace, race equality, anti-fascism, but actu-
7
6
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
5. CIVIL STRIFE:
training of leaders for revolutions in the allied countries
Internal discontents and economic crises are stimu-
was not slackened.
lated and then systematically exploited to produce inner
7. PREPARATION OF RESERVES:
disunity, chaos and actual civil insurrection. Guerilla
forces under professional military leaders are frequently
The Communist high command does not depend only
reinforced by "volunteers" from outside.
on the faithful Communists. It attaches great value to
Para-military formations, underground organiza-
its peripheral "reserves"-groups of sympathizers or
tions of every variety in line with local conditions and
innocent collaborators willing to travel along the Com-
opportunities, are standard techniques. Genuine griev-
munist road part of the distance. These are mobilized
ances are channeled and exploited through local "nation-
and brainwashed through the false-front organizations,
alist" or "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperialist" move-
United and Peoples Fronts, the spread (as required) of
ments, either started by the Communists or infiltrated
pacifist or neutralist sentiment, doctrines of class strug-
gle, belief in the "inevitable" collapse of capitalism and
and captured.
free societies.
6. PREPARATION OF "CADRES":
In advanced countries like the United States, Britain,
France, some segments of the so-called "intelligentsia"
In Soviet Russia and now in its colonial states there
have proved especially vulnerable to Communist indoc-
are schools and universities of revolution. Students,
trination. Not only their self-doubts and frustrations
drawn from all countries, are taught the theory and
but their most generous idealistic instincts have been
practice of political warfare, sabotage, guerilla opera-
canalized and perverted to promote victory for the Soviets
tions, propaganda methods.
in the Cold War.
Virtually all heads of Red Satellite states and insur-
The turnover in these "reserves" is of course high.
rectionary movements in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin
Fellow-travelers by the thousand are likely to become
America are products of such institutions. Tito, Dic-
disillusioned with every new Soviet policy zigzag. But
tator of Jugoslavia; Ho Chi Minh, number one Com-
expert manipulation of public opinion serves to retrieve
munist of Indo-China; Rakosi, the top leader in Red
such losses.
Hungary; Bierut, President of Red Poland; Liu Shao-
8. TREACHEROUS DIPLOMACY:
Chi, Vice President of Communist China, and General
Liu Po-Cheng, one of the foremost military leaders of
In its Cold War operations the Kremlin enjoys the
Red China. The same is true of many leaders of Com-
advantage of working on two levels-as a conventional
munist Parties in non-Soviet countries.
State dealing with other states and as a conspiratorial
movement embracing the whole globe. In its guise of
The job of preparing cadres to implement the Cold
"just another government" the Politburo can make prom-
War and to provide generalship for civil conflicts and
ises and engagements which world Communism is under
other revolutionary actions has been going on since the
orders to violate.
1920's. Even during the last war, while the Kremlin
Soviet diplomacy takes full advantage of the moral
ostensibly was on terms of friendship with its allies, the
code and "political naiveté" of some free countries and
8
9
especially of their eagerness for peace, sometimes peace
Accordingly they are being applied without stint to
at any price. It uses the threat of war as a species of
the conquest of the rest of mankind. For world Com-
blackmail, and is past master at playing off one country
munism, with its high command in the Kremlin in
against another. It appeals to the profit motives of com-
Moscow, the Cold War is not a temporary or holding
petitive economies, and in general exploits what it refers
operation, nor a prelude to a Hot War. It is the main
to as the "inner contradictions" of the free world.
bout, the decisive offensive, conducted on an unlimited
It can make the most of amorphous slogans like
scale, with total victory as its goal.
"peaceful coexistence"-a phrase coined by Lenin, re-
In a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court (Vol. 339,
peatedly used by Stalin and candidly defined in Commu-
May 8, 1950) an opinion written by the late Justice
nist literature as a "tactic" or "stratagem" to gain time,
Robert H. Jackson stated the case against Communism
deploy forces, undermine enemy vigilance.
in language that is clear and penetrating. He said:
In the arena of foreign relations the Kremlin can
blow hot or cold, inflame our fears or our hopes to any
"The goal of the Communist Party is to seize
required temperature, and use trickery to induce its
powers of government by and for a minority rather
enemies to drop their guard. Its announcements of policy,
than to acquire power through the vote of a free
electorate.
negotiations and talk of negotiations, tourists to Red
"
areas, artistic and cultural missions abroad-everything
It purposes forcibly to recast our whole social
is grist for the Cold War mills.
and political structure after the Muscovite model of
The Communist high command recognizes no re-
police-state dictatorship. It rejects the entire relig-
straints, no rules of fair play, no codes of civilized be-
ious and cultural heritage of Western civilization, as
havior. It regards its great "historical mission" as a
well as the American economic and political systems.
mandate which cancels out traditional values in the rela-
This Communist movement is a belated counter-revo-
tions between man and man or country and country. In
lution to the American Revolution, designed to undo
pursuance of that commitment it considers any cost in
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
life and substance to be justified. A system of power
and our Bill of Rights, and overturn our system of
which has not hesitated to "liquidate" millions of its own
free, representative self-government.
citizens cannot be expected to hesitate to wipe out lives
"Goals SO extreme and offensive to American tra-
anywhere else.
dition and aspiration obviously could not be attained
Moscow has brought one-third of the human race
or approached through order or with tranquility. If,
under its iron control by means short of a Hot War-by
by their better organization and discipline, they were
shrewd diplomacy, deception, propaganda, the blackmail
successful, more candid Communists admit that it
of threats, fifth-column subversion, guerilla forces and,
would be to an accompaniment of violence, but at
where expedient, localized shooting wars. These political
the same time they disclaim responsibility by blaming
and psychological methods-the Cold War-have paid off,
the violence upon those who engage in resistance or
at smaller risk and infinitely lower cost than a Hot War
reprisal. It matters little by whom the first blow
would entail.
would be struck; no one can doubt that an era of
10
11
violence and oppression, confiscations and liquidations
would be concurrent with a regime of Communism.
"Such goals set up a cleavage among us too fun-
II
damental to be composed by democratic processes.
Our constitutional scheme of elections will not settle
WE DARE NOT LOSE THE COLD WAR
issues between large groups when the price of losing
is to suffer extinction. When dissensions cut too
If we ignore these facts, or do not counteract them
deeply, men will fight, even hopelessly, before they
effectively in good time, we shall lose the Cold War by
will submit. And this is the kind of struggle projected
default. For the United States and other free nations,
by the Communist Party and inherent in its program.
defeat of this sort would be as catastrophic and as final
"
as defeat in a shooting war. Whether we freeze to
death or burn to death, our civilization would be equally.
"Violent and undemocratic means are the calcu-
finished.
lated and indispensable methods to attain the Com-
Were the Communists willing to settle for a perma-
munist Party's goal.
In not one of the countries
nently divided world, each half pledged not to interfere
it now dominates was the Communist Party chosen
with the other, they could readily arrange it. But they
by a free or contestable election; in not one can it be
are not interested in a stalemate. In the nature of their
evicted by any election. The international police state
has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion,
ideology and world-wide apparatus of action, they must
coup d' etat, terrorism and assassination. Not only
continue to drive relentlessly toward their ultimate
has it overpowered its critics and opponents; it has
objective. They are irrevocably dedicated to winning
usually liquidated them."
the Cold War. They prefer to attain world dominion
by non-military means because:
(a) They consider themselves masters of Cold War
techniques pitted against those whom they regard as
amateurs; their chances of victory seem to them incom-
parably greater than in a conventional military show-
down.
(b) Political warfare does not directly endanger
their own territories, industry, manpower and above all,
their mechanism of dictatorial power.
(c) Clear-cut victory in the Cold War would give
them access to our technology and resources, our great
cities and treasures, intact and ready for exploitation;
whereas a military victory would give them only the
ruins of nuclear devastation.
12
13
Now as in the past, they proceed in the conviction that
they can gain world hegemony by methods that, in the
phrase of Leon Trotsky, constitute "neither war nor
III
peace." For Moscow, the real alternative to a nuclear
showdown is not "peace" but political-psychological war-
TO PREVENT A HOT WAR, WE MUST
fare of a magnitude to weaken, demoralize, chip away
WIN THE COLD WAR
and ultimately take over what remains of the free world.
Political psychological offensives are not new. They
have frequently been employed in war-time, to supple-
ment ordinary military action. We used them ourselves
in both world wars. Their purpose has been to soften up
the enemy's will to resist, to win friends and allies in
hostile areas, to drive wedges between belligerent gov-
ernments and their citizenry.
The democracies are familiar with war-making in the
normal military sense and hence do not hesitate to make
huge investments and sacrifices in its name. They do
not shrink from the prospect of casualties. All of that
seems "natural." But they are startled by proposals for
effort and risk of such dimensions in the life-and-death
struggle with non-military means.
Under these circumstances it has become incumbent
upon our leadership to make the country aware that non-
military or Cold War is also terribly "real"-that the
penalty for losing it will be enslavement.
Hot War is always a possibility. It may come through
force of circumstances even if no one wants it. Limited,
localized wars are also a continuing threat. Nothing in
this memorandum should be construed as a substitute
for adequate military vitality. On the contrary, superior
physical force in being is the indispensable guarantee
for effective non-military procedures.
We must maintain our lead, and accelerate the tempo
of progress, in the race for ascendancy in nuclear
weapons, guided missiles, air power, early warning sys-
tems, electronic know-how, chemical and bacteriological
14
15
methods of warfare. We must maintain adequate and
OUR COUNTER-STRATEGY:
well balanced forces for the ground, sea and air. These
Logically we have no true alternative but to acknowl-
conventional military forces must be ready and capable
edge the reality of the Cold War and proceed to turn
of deterring or meeting an outbreak of peripheral or
Moscow's favorite weapons against world Communism.
small-scale wars this side of a general showdown. They
We have only a choice between fighting the Cold War
will be indispensable in a general war, if one should be
with maximum concentration of energy, or waiting su-
fought without nuclear weapons. We must stockpile and
pinely until we are overwhelmed. Our political counter-
protect the sources of vital strategic materials.
strategy has to be as massive, as intensive, as flexible
But short of a blunder that ignites the Third World
as the enemy's.
War which nobody wants, the immediate danger is the
We must meet the Cold War challenge in our own
debilitating, costly, tense war of nerves that is part of
household and in the rest of the world, and carry the
the Cold War. Because there is no immediate sense of
contest behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. We must
overwhelming menace, no thunder of falling bombs and
seek out and exploit the weak spots in the enemy's armor,
daily casualty figures, we are apt to think of this period
just as the Kremlin has been doing to us these 30-odd
as "peace." But it is nothing of the sort.
years. We must make our Truth as effective and more
productive than Moscow's Lie.
The primary threat today is political and psycho-
logical. That is the active front on which we are losing
Our political strategy and tactics should be in terms
and on which, unless we reverse the trend, we shall be
of a major enterprise, on a scale for victory, with all the
defeated. Its effects are spelled out in civil wars in parts
inherent risks and costs. We cannot fight this fight with
of Asia, legal Communist Parties of colossal size in some
our left hand, on the margin of our energies. We have
European countries, "nationalist" movements under
to bring to its resources, personnel and determination to
Communist auspices, "neutralism" and rabid anti-
match the enemy's. This is a case where, as in a military
Americanism in many parts of the world-in pressures,
conflict, insufficient force may be as fatal as none at all.
that is to say, of every dimension and intensity short of
If obliged to make tactical retreats, moreover, we
a global shooting war.
must not bemuse ourselves that they are enduring solu-
Unless we meet this cumulative Communist threat
tions. To do SO would be to disarm ourselves and open
ourselves to new and bigger blows. This is a principle
with all the brains and weapons we can mobilize for the
purpose, the United States at some point in the future
of particular importance during intervals when negotia-
tions with Moscow or Peking are being discussed or are
will face the terrifying implications of Cold War defeat.
It will be cornered, isolated, subjected to the kind of
in progress.
paralyzing fears that have already weakened the fibre
The question, in truth, is no longer whether we should
of some technically free nations. We will have bypassed
engage in the Cold War. The Soviet drive is forcing us
a nuclear war-but at the price of our freedom and inde-
to take counter-measures in any case. The question,
pendence. I repeat: we can freeze to death as well as
rather, is whether we should undertake it with a clear-
burn to death.
headed determination to use all means deemed essential,
16
17
by governments and by private groups - to win the
order to undermine the Kremlin, exacerbate its domestic
contest.
problems, weaken its sense of destiny.
Our counter-measures and methods must be novel,
The nature of a malady can be deduced from the
unconventional, daring and flexible. They must, more-
medicine applied. In its fourth decade of absolute power,
over, be released from the inhibitions of peace-time, since
the Soviet regime is obliged to devote a major portion
it is peace only in outer forms.
of its energies, manpower and resources to keep its own
Almost against our will, in point of fact, we have
subjects and captive countries under control, through
launched more and more Cold War activities. But they
ever larger doses of terror. There we have the proof
that the Communists have failed to "sell" their system
have been piecemeal, on an inadequate scale and often
to their victims.
without the all-important continuity of action. Worst
Even a ruthless police-state does not maintain
of all, they have not been geared for total victory, being
treated as extras, as harassment operations while hop-
gigantic secret-police forces, special internal security
ing against hope that there will be no outbreak of war
armies, colossal networks of forced-labor colonies just
for the fun of it. These are measures of self-defense
or that there will be a miraculous outbreak of genuine
against actual or potential internal oppositions. After
peace.
all discounts are made for wishful thinking and error,
Our current posture shares the weakness inherent
ample evidence remains that in the Soviet sphere the
in all defensive strategy. The hope of a real compromise
West has millions of allies, tens of millions of potential
is a dangerous self-delusion. It assumes that Soviet Rus-
allies.
sia is a conventional country interested in stabilizing
Whether the potential can be turned into actuality,
the world, when in fact it is the powerhouse of a dynamic
whether the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed
world movement which thrives on instability and chaos.
to explosive intensity, depend in the first place on the
Our duty and our best chance for salvation, in the
policies of the non-Soviet world. Our potential fifth
final analysis, is to prosecute the Cold War-to the point
columns are greater by millions than the enemy's. But
of victory. To survive in freedom we must win.
they have yet to be given cohesion, direction and the
inner motive power of hope and expectation of victory.
THE ENEMY Is VULNERABLE:
No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal
The free world, under the impact of Moscow's Cold
Soviet stresses can reach a climax in insurrectionary
War victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet
breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax.
strengths while overlooking or discounting Soviet weak-
But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of
nesses.
mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen exist-
The Communists expertly exploit all our internal
ing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for
tensions, injustices and discontents. Yet within the
them.
Soviet empire the tensions are incomparably greater, the
For the purposes of our Cold War strategy it suffices
injustices and discontents more vast. Our opportunity,
that the potential for uprisings exists. Soviet economic
which we have failed to use SO far, is to exploit these in
conditions are bad, particularly in the domain of food
18
19
production. Nations which used to be exporters of bread
3. To sharpen by every device we can develop the
(Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for
fear of their own people that is already chronic in the
themselves. As Secretary of Agriculture Benson said
Kremlin. The less certain the Soviets are of the alle-
recently: "Failure of the Soviet system to provide for
giance of their people, the more they will hesitate to
the basic needs of its own people could be one of the most
provoke adventures involving the risks of a major show-
important historical facts of our time."
down.
The Soviet peasants, still the overwhelming majority
4. To provide moral and material aid, including
of the Kremlin-held populations, are everywhere bitter
trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resist-
and restive. The Politburo knows that it cannot count
ance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia
implicitly upon the loyalty and allegiance of its subjects.
proper.
At the same time it has failed utterly to assimilate the
5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the
captive countries, SO that it has no allies but only sullen
Soviet sphere, millions in the aggregate, now living in
colonial puppets.
free parts of the world.
In the last war the USSR fought on two fronts—
against the foreign invaders and against its own people.
6. To appeal to the simple personal yearnings of
There is reason to believe that Hitler's psychological
those under the Communist yoke: release from police
blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples,
terror, ownership of small farms and homes, free trade
helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by its
unions to defend their rights at the job, the right to
own subjects. In the present Cold War, too, the USSR
worship as they please, the right to change residence
must maintain its fight against the Soviet citizenry, and
and to travel, etc.
at the same time deal with seething dissidence in the
7. To shatter the "wave of the future" aura around
subjected countries.
Communism, displacing the assumption that "Commu-
The basic conditions for successful Cold War
nism is inevitable" with a deepening certainty that "the
counter-strategy thus exist.
end of Communism is inevitable."
8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a
GUIDELINES FOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE:
feeling of moral dedication to the enlargement of the
Our guiding objectives in an all-out political offensive
area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, co-
are fairly obvious. They must include the following:
erced atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors.
1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the
spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and
This inventory of objectives is necessarily sketchy
sovereignty. If we allow that hope to expire, the Kremlin
and incomplete. But it indicates the indispensable direc-
tion of the Cold War effort.
will have perpetuated its dominion over its victims.
2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the
internal enemies of the Kremlin live-by making them
aware that, like the revolutionists in Tsarist times, they
have devoted friends and powerful allies beyond their
frontiers.
20
21
1. The struggle by means short of general war is not
a preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the
IV
loser may not have a second chance.
THE MESSAGE OF FREEDOM
2. It must therefore be carried on with the same
focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willing-
We must be quite certain of our destination before we
ness to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would
can begin to figure out means of transportation. There is
involve.
little point in discussing the how of it until a firm decision
3. In order to establish credence and inspire con-
for an all-out political-psychological counter-offensive is
fidence, our conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy
reached.
of freedom must embrace the whole of mankind; it must
In Hot War, you need a weapon and means of deliver-
not stop short at the frontiers of the Soviet sphere. Only
ing it to the target. The same is true in Cold War. The
this can give our side a moral grandeur, a revolutionary
weapon is the message; after it has been worked out, we
elan, a crusading spirit not only equal to but superior to
can develop the facilities for delivering it to the world at
the other side's.
large and to the Communist-captive nations in particular.
4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as
The essence of that message (and its formulation is
enemy-occupied territory, with the lifting of the occupa-
the critical first step) is that America has decided, irrev-
tion as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men every-
ocably, to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is, in
where. This applies not only to areas captured since the
concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive
war, but includes Russia itself. Any other policy would
power of Soviet-based Communism.
turn what should be an anti-Communist alliance into an
Once that decision is made, some of the means for im-
anti-Russian alliance, forcing the Russians (as Hitler
plementing it will become self-evident; others will be
forced them during the war) to rally around the regime
explored and developed under the impetus of the clear-cut
they hate.
goal. Agreement on the problem must come before agree-
5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept
ment on the solution.
clearly in view. Red guerillas in Burma, Communists in
"To be effective," as one student of the problem has
France or the U.S., the Huks in the Philippines, Red
put it, "our decision must be as sharp-edged and uncom-
agents in Central America - these are as much "the
promising as the Kremlin's; it must be spelled out as un-
enemy" as the Kremlin itself.
equivocally as the Communists have done in the works of
6. We must realize that world Communism is not a
Lenin and Stalin and the official programs of the Com-
tool in the hands of Russia - Russia is a tool in the hands
intern and Cominform."
of world Communism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed
Adjustment of our thinking in accord with such a
national interests in deference to world-revolutionary
decision to win the Cold War demands clarity on at least
needs. This provides opportunities for appeals to Russian
the following points:
patriotism.
22
23
7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more
than we do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their
political offensive. We, too, cannot avoid risks. (It might
V
become necessary, Mr. Dulles said recently, "to forego
TOWARD COLD WAR VICTORY
peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty.") The
greatest risk of all, for us, is to do less than is needed
1. ORGANIZATION:
to win the Cold War. At worst that would mean defeat
by default; and at best, a situation SO menacing to the
An organizational framework for fighting the Cold
survival of freedom that a Hot War may become in-
War already exists. It needs to be adjusted and strength-
evitable.
ened in line with the expanded scale and intensity of
Our present lead in the possession of nuclear weapons
operations.
and the ability to use them may be matched by the Com-
A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War
munists in the next few years. This is the view expressed
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military
by competent statesmen, scientists and military experts.
side, is suggested. It should function directly under the
If and when nuclear parity is reached, the enemy's fa-
President, with Cabinet status for its Head. Top repre-
natics (and there may be a powerful madman - a Hitler
sentatives of the State Department, the Defense Depart-
- among them) might be tempted to use them against
ment, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Informa-
us by throwing a sneak punch. Since our policy is not
tion Agency, should sit on this Board. Liaison on a con-
to throw the first nuclear punch but only to retaliate if
tinuous basis should be maintained with all other agencies
it is thrown against us, we may find as more horror-
which can play a role in the over-all effort.
weapons are unfolded, that to yield to the enemy the
initiative of the first offensive punch, is tantamount to
There will be various operations which the Board
national suicide. All this further emphasizes the vital
would undertake in its own name, with its own facilities.
need for winning the Cold War and preventing a Hot
But its primary function should not be operational. It
War.
should be to plan, initiate, finance, advise, coordinate and
check on operations by other groups and agencies, whether
already in existence or created by the Board for specific
undertakings.
One cannot, however, be too specific at this point
about the organizational forms. John Foster Dulles wrote
in 1948:
"We need an organization to contest the Com-
munist Party at the level where it is working and
winning its victories. We ought to have an organ-
ization dedicated to the task of non-military defense,
24
25
In all categories the arena of action is the whole
5. COMMUNIST TARGETS:
globe. Our Cold War targets are not only behind the
The Communist sphere must be ringed with both
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the
fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities, of a massiveness
United States included. In the battle for the minds of
to overcome jamming. The Voice of America will acquire
men, we must reach the Soviet peoples, our allies, and
larger audiences and more concentrated impact under
the uncommitted peoples.
the new approach. Its name, it is suggested, should be
The agencies involved will be both official and private.
expanded to "Voice of America - for Freedom and
The objectives must aim to achieve dramatic victories as
Peace." This slogan added to the name will, through
swiftly as possible, as a token of the changed state of
constant repetition, impress the truth upon receptive ears.
affairs. While the Kremlin has suffered some setbacks
Besides the official voice, we have other voices, such
and defeats, its record in the Cold War has been strikingly
as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are
one of success piled on success. This trend must be
other popular democratic voices that should make them-
reversed, to hearten our friends, dismay the enemy, and
selves heard those of our free labor movement, American
confirm the fact that Communist Power is a transient
war veterans, the churches, youth and women's organiza-
and declining phenomenon.
tions.
Already there is a minor flow of printed matter
4. PROPAGANDA:
across the Iron Curtain, especially aimed at the Red
If the weapon is our Message, one of its basic elements
occupation forces. The volume and effectiveness of this
is propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we
effort can be enormously enlarged. Magazines and news-
should not underestimate its inherent difficulties. Hot
papers which outwardly look like standard Communist
War is destructive: the killing of people, the annihilation
matter, but actually are filled with anti-Communist
of material things. Cold War must be constructive: it
propaganda, have brought results.
must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and
A greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion,
readiness for sacrifice. In the final check-up it calls for
is reported from Soviet Russia and its satellites. Pro-
greater skills to affect minds than to destroy bodies.
grams of a spiritual and religious character are indicated.
Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end
They should preach faith in the Divine, abhorrence of
in itself. It is a preparation for action. Words that
Communist godlessness, resistance to atheism. But in
are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds,
addition they can offer practical advice to the spiritually
lose their impact. The test is whether they build the
stranded - for instance, how to observe religious occa-
morale of friends and undermine the morale of foes.
sions where there are no ordained ministers or priests
No means of communication should be ignored: the
to officiate.
spoken word and the written word; radio and television;
The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea
films; balloons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret
of freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda
printing and mimeographing presses on Soviet controlled
should wherever possible get down to specifics. It should
soil; scrawls on walls to give isolated friends a sense
expose the weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies and
of community.
internal tensions of the Red masters; provide proof of
28
29
the existence of friends and allies both at home and
and attentive audiences. Vast regions in Asia and else-
abroad; offer guidance on types of resistance open even
where, where illiteracy bars the written word and lack
to the individual. It should appeal to universal emotions,
of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be reached.
to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity.
To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth ten
6. FREE-WORLD TARGETS:
thousand words."
The so-called backward parts of the world, particu-
The fighting front is everywhere. The program of
larly Asia, are under the most concentrated Communist
the U. S. Information Agency should be reappraised
psychological attacks. Of necessity the counter-offensive
with a view to improvement and expansion. "The Voice
must take this into account, and develop special tech-
of America - for Freedom and Peace" has tasks to per-
niques for reaching both the masses and the elite of
form in many nations of the free world second in im-
those areas.
portance only to those in the unfree world.
Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present
7. RADIO RECEIVERS AND PHONOGRAPHS:
effort, consider Finland - a country on the very edge of
Mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers
the Red empire and under the most concentrated Soviet
tuned to pick up American signals are now feasible. They
propaganda barrage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Fin-
should be made available by the million at cost or gratis,
land total over 43 hours weekly. A television station is
as expedient, to listeners in critical areas and behind the
now being built in Soviet Estonia which will be directed
Iron Curtain.
to a million potential viewers in nearby Finland. To
There are millions of persons in the world who do not
maintain their morale under this pressure, the Finnish
have electric power receptacles, electron tubes, batteries
people, still overwhelmingly pro-West and pro-American,
or any of the electrical and mechanical marvels which
have desperate need of our encouragement. Yet the
the free world has and takes for granted. A simple, hand-
Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue its
operated phonograph device costing no more than a loaf
daily half-hour broadcast to Finland to save $50,000
of bread, could be produced in quantities and supplied
annually.
gratis to millions of persons living behind the Iron and
We need in every country, newspapers; magazines;
Bamboo Curtains and in other critical areas.
radio and TV stations, consciously and effectively sup-
An unbreakable and intelligible record, made of card-
porting our side. Those that exist should be aided ma-
board and costing less than a bottle of Coca-Cola, could
terially to increase their range and vitality; others should
carry our messages to these people. Such records could
be started with our help. The strongest individual anti-
be dropped from the sky like leaflets and the messages
Communist voices must be provided with better facilities
they carried could not be jammed.
for making themselves heard in their own countries.
Mobile film units are already penetrating backward
8. USE OF FACILITIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES:
areas. The operation should be enlarged, its message
Nearly all European and many Asian countries
and appeal perfected. In addition, mobile big-screen
possess broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enlist
television units in black-and-white and in color can carry
their use to supplement and intensify American broad-
our message. Their very novelty will guarantee large
casting on a world-wide scale.
30
31
In some cases this could be negotiated on a quid pro
Special action programs of the type that do not re-
quo basis where we are providing military or economic
quire large organization - or at most units of two or
aid; in other cases we may have to buy the necessary
three - would be worked out and transmitted. Our
time for transmitting our message. Our friendly allies,
sympathizers in the Soviet orbit would feel themselves
such as Great Britain, have vast short-wave facilities of
part of an invisible but huge army of crusaders. Symbols
world-wide scope and range and have the same reasons
of protest would appear on a million walls. The rulers'
as we have for seeking to win the Cold War. We need
morale would be deliberately sapped by a multitude of
their help in this field. We are fully justified in asking
actions too small, too widespread, to be readily dealt
for such help and ought to receive it.
with.
Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes
The special value of passive resistance, aside from its
and exploits all other activities. Its successful use calls
direct effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feeling of
for imagination, ingenuity, continual technical research
power and readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be
and, of course, effective coordination with all other opera-
invaluable when the passive stage is transformed into
tions that bear on the problems of the Cold War.
more open opposition.
9. PASSIVE RESISTANCE:
10. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:
Pending the critical periods when active resistance
Pockets of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary,
the Baltic states, China, Albania and other areas. There
in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable,
full encouragement and support must be given to passive
is always the danger of activating them prematurely.
But their existence must be taken into the calculations
resistance. This refers to the things the individual can
do, with minimum risk, to create doubt and confusion in
and, in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must
the ranks of the dictatorship, to gum up the machinery
be kept supplied with information, slogans and new lead-
of dictatorship government.
ership where needed and prudent.
Many of these resistance groups are SO isolated that
The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the
they do not know of each other's existence. The simple
soldier in the barracks, the office worker are able to do
realization that they are not alone but part of a scattered
little things that in their millionfold totality will affect the
network will be invaluable; methods for establishing
national economy and the self-confidence of the rulers.
liaison, for conveying directions, can be developed.
It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples,
especially in countries with a long historical experience
11. INSURRECTIONS:
in opposing tyrants.
The uprisings in East Germany, the strikes and riots
Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful
in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, the dramatic mutinies inside
direction. In this concept the individual opponent of the
the concentration camps of Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic,
regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives,
are examples of revolutionary actions that failed. But
by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and
they attest that insurrection is possible.
instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be
We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's
haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.
chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a break-
FORD
32
33
GERALD
away should receive concentrated study and planning.
that the need is to stimulate defection on a selective
A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be
basis. Individual "prospects" in Soviet missions and
a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to
legations, in Red cultural and sports delegations, can be
resistance elsewhere. (That little country is geograph-
carefully contacted and developed. Types of individuals
ically isolated, ruled by a handful of puppets; able leader-
needed to man Cold War undertakings will be invited to
ship is available in the Albanian emigration.)
escape, assured of important work. Special approaches
Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its
can be worked out to encourage defection of border
revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and
guards, Army officers, secret-police personnel disgusted
Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now -
by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, etc.
whether the time to carry them out be in the near or
Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial
distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet
experience. They are taken into custody by some foreign
propoganda to make unification appear as the Com-
Intelligence Service, pumped for information, and some-
munist's gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that
times then left to shift for themselves. Their honest
belongs to West Germany and her allies.
patriotism is offended by the need to cooperate with for-
12. COLLABORATION WITH EMIGRES AND ESCAPEES:
eigners before they are psychologically ready for it.
Tens of thousands of self-exiled fugitives from Com-
It is suggested that emigre commissions be set up,
munist oppression emerge eager to plunge into move-
composed of trusted nationals of the various countries.
ments for the freeing of their homelands. When they
The fugitive would first be received by the commission
fail to find outlets for their zeal, disillusionment and
of his own countrymen. Only when found desirable and
defeatism set in.
prepared for the step, would he be brought into contact
Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral
with American or British agencies.
passion is indicated. They must be drawn into specific,
14. TRAINING OF CADRES:
well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organiza-
tions and activities; utilized for propaganda and other
The immediate and prospective activities of the Cold
operations; enabled, in some cases, to return to their
War offensive will require ever larger contingents of
native lands as "sleeper" leaders for future crises.
specialized personnel for the many tasks; to provide
Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps
leadership for resistance operations; to engage in propa-
groups of only a score to a hundred, but available for
ganda, subversion, infiltration of the enemy; even to
emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of
carry on administrative and civic work after the collapse
such nuclei of military power - a fact that will be widely
of Communist regimes in various countries, in order to
known - should help generate hope and faith among
stave off chaos.
their countrymen back home.
Already, limited as our political efforts are, there is
a shortage of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands
13. PLANNED DEFECTION:
of younger men and women among the emigres are being
Escapees have come, and will continue to come, spon-
lost to factories, farms, menial jobs. This amounts to
taneously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond
squandering of potentially important human resources.
34
35
We need a network of schools and universities de-
tion of Free Trade Unions (in which both the A. F. of L.
voted to training cadres for the Cold War. The objective
and the C.I.O. are active) is conducting important psy-
is not education in a generic sense, but specific prepara-
chological drives in many countries and offsetting the
tion for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar
mischief worked by the Moscow-controlled labor inter-
requirements of the ideological-psychological war.
national.
This training, of course, should not be limited to
Speaking as workers to workers, trade unionists
people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West Point" of
have a legitimate approach to the laboring masses in the
political warfare - analogous to the Lenin School
Soviet sphere. They have a special justification for ex-
of Political Warfare in Moscow - might be established.
posing and publicizing forced labor, onerous laboring
Staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek
conditions and laws, phony totalitarian "trade unions."
out likely young people willing to make the struggle
In many countries - France and Italy, for instance
against Communism their main or sole career.
- there are competing Communist-controlled and demo-
cratic unions. Free labor of all countries can throw its
The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly
valuable. Hundreds of foreign students go back home
moral and material support to the anti-Communist fed-
with a better and friendlier understanding of America.
erations. It can take the lead in breaking Moscow's grip
But beyond that, it is possible and necessary to educate
on influential segments of world labor.
invited young people from abroad, carefully selected,
Corresponding political campaigns should be mounted
along lines of more direct and specialized value to the
on a telling scale by other non-official, popular groups:
Cold War effort.
farmers'. organizations and peasant unions would con-
centrate on the evils of Red collectivization; great church
In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be
groups on the immoral and atheistic aspects of Com-
like the "professional revolutionaries" on the Communist
munist theory and practice; youth organizations on the
side. They would be equipped to operate openly or as
perversion of youth under Communism, etc.
secret infiltrees wherever the enemy's assaults need to
The scope of such focussed group and class appeals is
be neutralized. Trained anti-Communists from Asian
enormous. Some of them are being made already, but
areas, dedicated and knowledgeable, would be available
without the coordination of effort and continuity of
for countries under Red pressure, as today in Southeast
impact that is called for.
Asia; Latin Americans, Europeans, would serve similar
What a specialized group can achieve has been demon-
functions in their respective regions.
strated by the society of Free Jurists in West Berlin,
Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counter-
which indicts and condemns in absentia persons guilty of
offensive would gradually be transformed into a pro-
Communist crimes. Its work is sowing the fear of retri-
fessional undertaking.
bution in East Germany. Radio Free Europe has made
15. CAMPAIGNS BY SPECIAL GROUPS:
successful forays of the same order - identifying brutal
officials, exposing Red agents, etc. But the surface has
An American trade union in the clothing field played
only been scratched in this type of psychological pressure.
a major role in preventing Communist victory in the
Italian elections in 1948. The International Confedera-
36
37
nations should address themselves to the people in the
VI
Soviet empire over the heads of their masters; to the
people of free countries in terms of universal principles
DIPLOMACY IS A WEAPON
of morality and decency.
2. The measures of reciprocity should be strictly
The Kremlin treats foreign affairs as a primary arena
applied to Soviet diplomats, trade and other representa-
of ideological and psychological effort. It makes moves
tives. These should enjoy no more privileges, immunities,
on the diplomatic chessboard for their propaganda im-
access to information than is accorded to free-world
pact: to rally its friends in the outside world, to win over
representatives in Communist lands. Even socially they
a particular element in some country, to embarrass its
should be made aware of their status as symbols of a
opponents. In the measure that democratic diplomacy
barbarous plexus of power. The desire to belong, to be
fails to do likewise, it is defaulting in a vital area of the
respectable, is by no means alien to Red officialdom.
Cold War. Let us bear in mind:
3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade
1. Day to day conduct of foreign affairs is pertinent
can be turned into a powerful political weapon. The
to the struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance
stakes are too high to permit business-as-usual concepts
of protocol, in dealing with an enemy who recognizes
to outweigh the imperatives of the Cold War. Where
none of the traditional rules, can be self-defeating. We
acute distress develops in a Communist country, our
must make proposals, demands, exposés, publications of
readiness to help must be brought to the attention of the
official documents, etc. that are carefully calculated to
people as well as their bosses. If and when food and other
show up the true motives of the Kremlin, to put a crimp
relief is offered, it must be under conditions consistent
in Moscow political campaigns, to mobilize world opinion
with our objectives - to help the victims, not their rulers.
against Soviet crimes and duplicities.
4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist
For ten years we have made one-shot protests against
sphere there are large or small organizations devoted to
Soviet election frauds in satellite countries, against
combatting Communism, at home or abroad or both.
violations of treaties and agreements, against shocking
There is little or no contact among such groups - no
crimes in the areas of Human Rights as defined by the
common currency of basic ideas and slogans, no exchange
U.N. Charter. The archives are packed with these docu-
of experience. Without at this stage attempting to set
ments. These should be followed up through consistent
up a world-wide anti-Communist coalition, or Freedom
publicity, renewed protests, etc.
International, we should at least facilitate closer liaison
Even when nothing practical can be immediately
and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings al-
accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggres-
ready in existence.
sions, violations of Yalta, Potsdam and other agreements
must be kept continually before the world. Diplomacy
must champion the victims of Red totalitarianism with-
out let-up. At every opportunity the spokesmen of free
38
39
suitable name) be set up to function as the Cold
War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the
VII
military side. Top representatives of the State
SUMMARY
and Defense Departments, C.I.A. and U.S.I.A.,
should be members of this Board. Its activities
No claim is implied that the foregoing outline is com-
must be effectively coordinated with all Depart-
plete, or that all of it can or ought to be launched at
ments and Agencies of our Government concerned
once. The program here suggested should not be judged
with this effort. This new Strategy Board should
on the basis of this or that specific proposal but on the
function directly under the President and its
over-all concept and its underlying philosophy. As a
Head should have Cabinet status.
practical matter, methods flow from correct policies, the
5. Our decision to win the Cold War should be
availability of funds and trained manpower, the existence
communicated to the entire world as a fixed goal
of leadership and organization prepared to take advan-
of American policy. This will not rule out conven-
tage of unfolding events.
tional relations on the governmental level, where
Summarized, my observations and conclusions are:
the Kremlin, too, functions despite its clear com-
1. We are in the midst of a Cold War which
mitment to world revolution.
the Communists are prosecuting vigorously on all
6. The American public should be made
fronts in an unswerving determination to win.
promptly and fully aware of the nature of the
2. We dare not lose this Cold War, because de-
present Cold War, the importance of our winning
feat may be as fatal as would defeat in a Hot War.
it, the costs and sacrifices that this may entail.
We can freeze to death as well as burn to death.
The significance and urgency of the problem
3. Our best and surest way to head off a Hot
should be conveyed to the American people,
War is to win the Cold War which is already in
through discussion over Radio, TV, and in the
full blast all over the world. But for the reasons
Press.
mentioned, such as insufficient funds and inade-
7. The idea of our determination to win the
quate tools, our efforts in this decisive field are
Cold War must be presented for what it actually
strikingly little compared with the enemy's and
is: a project that can be carried through success-
are wholly inadequate to achieve victory. We must
fully and thereby prevent a general war that could
meet the political-psychological challenge of world
force a devastating nuclear showdown. Once
Communism fully and on a scale geared to winning
grasped, this prospect would help to offset the
the struggle.
fears and frustrations generated in the public
mind by constant emphasis on the horrors of
4. We should organize our efforts to win the
Atomic War. The alternative presented, is under-
Cold War on a basis comparable to our organiza-
standable and hopeful. Instead of concentrating
tion for winning a Hot War which we seek to pre-
on the perils of defeat, we can dwell on the pros-
vent. To this end it is recommended that a Strat-
pects for victory.
egy Board of Political Defense (or some other
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8. Key leaders in Congress should be drawn
into the philosophy and purposes of the Cold War
counter-offensive from the outset. No program
of the scope suggested here can be undertaken and
executed without adequate funds that only Con-
gress can appropriate. In addition to legislative
support the Congress can aid immeasurably by
stimulating united, patriotic effort as complete
and non-partisan as in a Hot War.
9. To wrest from the Communists the advan-
tages they gain through constant use in their
propaganda of the appealing word "peace" -
while casting us in the role of "war-mongers" - it
is recommended that the present name of the
"Voice of America" be extended to the "Voice of
America - for Freedom and Peace."
10. Our Diplomacy should be used as a weapon
against World Communism and our Message to
their captive peoples should contain the hope for
their eventual freedom. Our Message of Truth
should tell the world the truth about Communist
objectives, methods and practices as well as the
truth about ourselves.
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