Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
4526290
label
Commencement Address, National War College, Ft. Lesley J. McNair, June 5, 1970
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
4526290
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Commencement Address, National War College, Ft. Lesley J. McNair, June 5, 1970
citationUrl
collections
Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
Speeches
subjects
Cambodia
Soviet Union
Department of Defense. 9/18/1947-
Federal budget
National security
Nuclear weapons
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
4526290
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1970-06-30
month
6
year
1970
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1970-06-01
month
6
year
1970
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
26caf6b6dcd70a80
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box D29, folder "Commencement Address, National
War College, Ft. Lesley J. McNair, June 5, 1970" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press
Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D29 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE,
FT. LESLEY J. MSNAIR, 9:30 A.M.
FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 1970.
COMMANDANT GEN. KELLY, DEPUTY
COMMANDANTS, MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY,
GRADUATES, AND FRIENDS.
THIS IS THE 24TH GRADUATING
CLASS TO HAVE GATHERED HERE AT THE NATIONAL
WAR COLLEGE FOR COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES.
AND WE NEED ONLY LOOK AT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE YOU TO FULLY
APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS
OCCASION.
I HAVE IN MIND THE 47 MILITARY
GRADUATES WHO ATTAINED FOUR-STAR RANK AND
THE 75 CIVILIAN GRADUATES WHO SUBSEQUENTLY
BECAME AMBASSADORS. THIS IS A TESTIMONIAL
NOT ONLY TO THE INDIVIDUALS CITED BUT ALSO
LIBRARY
TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE ITSELF.
-2-
CERTAINLY IT TELLS OF THE SUPERB
SCHOOLING RECEIVED HERE BY THE GENTLEMEN
FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO BE NUMBERED AMONG
THE WAR COLLEGE'S STUDENTS.
I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE COURSES
YOU HAVE PURSUED DURING YOUR MONTHS OF
STUDY HERE, AND IT IS TO ONE OF THOSE
COURSES THAT I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE MY
REMARKS TODAY-THE ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICIES.
I WOULD OBSERVE FIRST OF ALL
THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH YOU
PURSUE YOUR STUDIES IS FAR DIFFERENT FROM
THAT OF THE SOVIET STUDENT OF MILITARY
STRATEGY. BY THAT I MEAN THAT THE SOVIET
STUDENT DOES NOT SUFFER FROM THE SAME
INHIBITIONS YOU DO--INHIBITIONS THAT ARE
PLACED UPON YOU BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
WE LIVE IN AN OPEN SOCIETY, AND
THAT SOCIETY HAS BEEN ENGAGED FOR MANY
-3-
YEARS IN A NATIONAL DEBATE OVER THE USE
OF MILITARY POWER.
THE RESULT OF THAT DEBATE HAS
BEEN TO PLACE GREAT RESTRAINTS ON THE
EFFECTIVE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER
IN THE PURSUIT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES.
WE SPEAK REPEATEDLY OF THE
BALANCE OF POWER, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT
A BALANCE-OF-POWER POLICY MUST DEPEND
UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF A NATION TO USE
ITS POWER EITHER DIPLOMATICALLY OR IN
WAR. AND WE KNOW FURTHER THAT THE IMPACT
OF A NATION'S DIPLOMATIC MOVES ARE
DIRECTLY TIED TO ITS MILITARY STRENGTH
AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO USE THAT STRENGTH
IF NEED BE.
IN 1945 WE DEVELOPED THE WORLD'S
FIRST ATOMIC BOMB AT ALAMAGORDO, N.M.,
AND DROPPED IT ON HIROSHIMA, JAPAN,
-4-
ON AUGUST 6 AND ON NAGASAK! ON AUGUST 9.
WE COULD HAVE MADE NUCLEAR
muchmore
WEAPONS A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1945 TO 1955.
BUT WE DID NOT EVEN EMPLOY OUR NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AS A CREDIBLE DIPLOMATIC THREAT
DURING THIS PERIOD -- CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO
PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM MAKING
TERRITORIAL GAINS AND FROM BUILDING A
our own
NUCLEAR ARSENAL NOW RIVALLING OURS.
WE ARE STILL DEBATING THE USES
OF POWER. AND WHEN WE HAVE WAGED WAR
SINCE 1945 WE HAVE GENERALLY ACTED AS
THOUGH OUR STAGGERING ARRAY OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DID NOT EVEN EXIST. IN SHORT,
it can be arguid
WE HAVE NOT KNOWN HOW TO USE THE "NON-USE"
OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL STRATEGY.
THE REASON OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FORD
less potent
GERALD
LIBRARY
BECAME DIPLOMATICALLY USELESS WAS THAT
-5-
THE SOVIET UNION QUICKLY REALIZED WE HAD
NO INTENTION OF EXPLOITING THE ADVANTAGE
WE HELD.
WE CAN POINT TO ONLY TWO
EXCEPTIONS TO THIS NUCLEAR INERTNESS.
WE KNOW THAT THE LATE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
THREATENED TO STRIKE COMMUNIST CHINA
WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE KOREAN
WAR, AND THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DECISIVE IN
TRANSFORMING THE KOREAN CONFLICT INTO AN
UNEASY ARMISTICE. THIS AND OUR FACEDOWN
OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS ARE THE ONLY APPARENT DIVIDENDS
FROM OUR TREMENDOUS INVESTMENT IN THE
CRUSHING NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY WE ONCE
1
ENJOYED.
WE ARE A GLOBAL POWER. YET WE
FIND IT ABHORRENT TO TAKE THE GREAT RISKS
INVOLVED IN ACTING LIKE A GLOBAL POWER.
THE SOVIET UNION SUFFERS FROM NO SUCH
-6-
INHIBITIONS AND THEREFORE THE ARCHITECTS
OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY HAVE A FAR FREER
HAND.
TODAY WE ARE DISCOVERING JUST
HOW GREAT IS THE ABHORRENCE OF SOME
AMERICANS TO THE WORLD POWER STRUGGLE.
WE FIND THAT SOME AMERICANS ARE LITERALLY
REFUSING TO LIVE IN THE WORLD OF GLOBAL
POLITICS. THIS IS A MOST DISTURBING
DEVELOPMENT WHEN WE CONSIDER THAT THE
STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF A PEOPLE'S WILL
DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS.
I HAVE NOTED HOW A REFUSAL TO
FULLY ACCEPT THE REALITIES OF GLOBAL POWER
POLITICS HAS INHIBITED THIS NATION IN THE
EFFECTIVE USE OF POWER.
THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A
STEADY GROWTH IN PACIFIST SENTIMENT WHICH
HAS HAMPERED U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
-7-
INTERFERED WITH THE RESPONSE OF SUCCESSIVE
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS TO HOSTILE
SOVIET CHALLENGES. IT HAS ALSO GREATLY
SHARPENED DOMESTIC DIVISIONS.
VON CLAUSEWITZ WROTE THAT THE
PURPOSE OF WAR IS NOT THE PHYSICAL
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY BUT THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S WILL TO RESIST.
THE VIETNAM WAR IS NOT A
CONVENTIONAL WAR -- NOT AS THE UNITED
STATES HAS FOUGHT IT. WE HAVE NEVER
FOUGHT THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE CLASSICAL
CLAUSEWITZ SENSE. THE PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF GRADUALISM
CERTAINLY WAS NOT CALCULATED TO DESTROY
THE ENEMY'S WILL TO RESIST.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
LIVING IN A DREAM -- LIVING UNDER THE
DELUSION THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN
CRISIS ENDED THE THREAT OF SOVIET
-8-
AGGRESSION AND THAT SINCE THEN WE HAVE
BEEN AT PEACE WITH THE COMMUNIST POWERS.
THE TRUTH IS THAT IN VIETNAM WE HAVE
BEEN AT WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION BY
PROXY, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS
SOUGHT TO MAKE VIETNAM A COMMUNIST
BRIDGEHEAD FROM WHICH NEW OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS COULD BE LAUNCHED AGAINST
NON-COMMUNIST STATES.
THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE HAS ALWAYS
BEEN THE SAME -- IN VIETNAM, IN CUBA AND
ALSO IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- TO DESTROY
THE UNITED STATES WILL TO RESIST.
IT IS IN INDOCHINA THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAS COME THE CLOSEST TO
DESTROYING THE U.S. WILL TO RESIST. WE
HAVE SEEN A RISE IN PACIFIST SENTIMENT,
SKILLFULLY EXPLOITED BY AMERICAN
SUBVERSIVES AND REVOLUTIONARIES. WE HAVE
DEPARTMENT
SEEN CONTINUING DEMANDS THAT U.S. MILITARY
-9-
SPENDING BE CUT BELOW THE POINT OF
MARGINAL RISK.
MOST IMPORTANTLY, INCREASING
NUMBERS OF OUR PEOPLE ARE TAKING THE
ATTITUDE THAT MATTERS MILITARY SMACK OF
EVIL, THAT THERE IS INDEED A CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND INDUSTRY TO
SPEND THE NATION INTO BANKRUPTCY, AND
THAT MILITARY SPENDING SHOULD BE
MERCILESSLY SLASHED SO THAT WE CAN SPEND
THESE FUNDS ON OUR SOCIAL PROBLEMS.
INSERT
THESE AMERICANS DO NOT ASK
WHETHER THERE IS A POINT BELOW WHICH
MILITARY SPENDING CANNOT SAFELY BE CUT.
THEY TAKE THE POSITION THAT THERE NEED
BE NO LIMIT TO MILITARY REDUCTIONS.
THIS ASSAULT ON THE MILITARY
AND ON NATIONAL SECURITY IS CARRIED ON
BY INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEM COMPLETELY
OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT THE
-10-
INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER APPEARS TO
BE SHIFTING IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION.
THEY EITHER DO NOT KNOW OR DO NOT CARE.
THEY ARE EITHER IGNORANT OR BLIND OR
HOPELESSLY MISTAKEN IN THEIR BELIEFS.
A STRONG WAVE OF NEO-ISOLATIONISM
HAS SWEPT OVER A SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE -- NOTABLY MANY OF OUR COLLEGE
STUDENTS AND SOME MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS.
I RECOGNIZE THE BASIS FOR THAT
1970 VERSION OF ISOLATIONISM AND YET,
UPON FINAL ANALYSIS, I FIND IT IRRATIONAL.
THE BASIS FOR THE NEW
ISOLATIONISM IS THE GROWING FEELING AMONG
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THE GAME HAS
NEVER BEEN WORTH THE CANDLE IN VIETNAM.
AND THE REASON FOR THAT FEELING IS THE
st
mescalcutations
SERIES OF MISJUDGMENTS THAT MARKED
AMERICAN CONDUCT OF THE WAR DURING THE
GERALD LIBRARY
time
buld- 72 commettant Smith Unitran
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
IN VIETNAM WE COMMITTED OURSELVES
TO A CAUSE THAT BECAME DISPROPORTIONATE
TO THE COST, IN MEN AND MONEY, AS WELL AS
TO THE EFFECTS HERE AT HOME.
IF WE WANTED A TESTING GROUND
FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE
EARLY 1960's, WE CERTAINLY WERE NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SELECTIVE WHEN WE CHOSE
VIETNAM-OR AT LEAST A "MONDAY MORNING
QUARTERBACK" COULD SAY IT WAS A "BAD CALL."
THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
out
THAT OUR CIVILIAN LEADERS AT THE TIME
DID NOT SERIOUSLY CONSIDER OR DISCUSS THE
WAY IN WHICH AMERICAN POWER SHOULD BE
EMPLOYED IN VIETNAM.
OUR INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM HAS
BEEN CALLED "ARROGANCE OF POWER." MORE
ACCURATELY IT HAS BEEN A MISUSE OF POWER,
A MISAPPLICATION OF POWER, BECAUSE WE
-12-
IGNORED COMPLETELY THE VON CLAUSEWITZ
INJUNCTION THAT THE PURPOSE OF WAR IS TO
DESTROY THE ENEMY'S WILL TO RESIST.
WE WERE GRADUALLY PULLED INTO
VIETNAM, COMMITTING OUR POWER, PRESTIGE
AND HONOR UNDER THEORIES OF LIMITED WAR
AND SELECTIVE RESPONSE. AND WE APPLIED
OUR POWER IN A HALTINGLY GRADUAL WAY TO
SHORE UP A DEMONSTRABLY WEAK GOVERNMENT
THAT INITIALLY REFUSED TO STRENGTHEN
ITSELF.
THERE IS NO LOGIC IN BLAMING
THE MILITARY FOR THE TRAGEDY IN VIETNAM.
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRITICAL
MISJUDGMENTS IN VIETNAM IN THE SIXTIES
LIES WITH THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE
NATION. WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS THAT THEY
SET FOR THE MILITARY IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE
TO GAIN EARLY AND TRADITIONAL SUCCESS IN
THE VIETNAM WAR. IT BECAME AN AMERICAN
-13-
WAR AND YET SELECTIVE RESPONSE REMAINED
THE BASIC STRATEGY.
IN SHORT, WE ATTEMPTED TO GAIN
A NATIONAL OBJECTIVE WITHOUT EMPLOYING THE
APPROPRIATE MEANS AND WITHOUT FIRST
GETTING THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE
NOW WE FIND AN INCREASING
NUMBER OF AMERICANS URGING IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM. I KNOW THEY
HAVE NOT WEIGHED THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL. THE MESSAGE THAT
IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL COMMUNICATES TO THE
WORLD IS THAT SOME AMERICANS WOULD HAVE
US AGAIN ADOPT A POLICY OF ISOLATIONISM
AS WE DID IN THE THIRTIES.
THEY CRY OUT, "STOP THE WAR,"
BUT THEY NEVER DEBATE THE REAL ISSUE: CAN
RD
AMERICA BE ISOLATIONIST AND SURVIVE ?
GERALD
LIBRARY
I DON'T THINK THE VIETNAM WAR
-14-
HAS PROVEN THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
ABANDON ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE WORLD.
IT HAS ONLY DEMONSTRATED THAT WE SHOULD
BE MORE SELECTIVE AS TO HOW WE EMPLOY
OUR POWER IN MEETING THE THREAT OF
3
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.
I THINK WE HAVE PROPERLY EMPLOYED
OUR POWER IN ATTACKING THE COMMUNIST
SANCTUARIES IN CAMBODIA. THIS IS THE
KIND OF USE OF POWER THAT THE COMMUNISTS
UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT. NO LONGER WILL
THEY THINK THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS
ENGAGING IN MEANINGLESS RHETORIC WHEN
HE TALKS OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO
THE OTHER SIDE'S FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH
US IN OUR SEARCH FOR AN END TO THE VIETNAM
WAR.
THE SHOCK AND OUTRAGE WITH WHICH
SOME AMERICANS GREETED PRESIDENT NIXON'S
CAMBODIAN INITIATIVE UNDERSCORES THE
-15-
UNWILLINGNESS OF SOME OF OUR CITIZENS TO
HAVE THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE A
MEANINGFUL ROLE IN GLOBAL POLITICS. THE
UNITED STATES MUST MAKE ITS POWER
CREDIBLE BY USING IT UNDER APPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES IF THIS NATION IS TO HAVE
ANY KIND OF CLOUT IN WORLD CRRCLES.
I
THINK PRESIDENT NIXON HAS RESTORED THAT
CREDIBILITY AND THUS HAS IMMEASURABLY
ADDED TO U.S. PRESTIGE. of influence.
THE PRESIDENT HAS RESTORED OUR
CREDIBILITY AT A TIME WHEN THE RAPID
BUILDUP OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MISSILES
THREATENS TO REDUCE THE UNITED STATES TO
SECOND RANK AS A MILITARY POWER, A TIME
WHEN WE ARE DEFERRING DECISIONS ON
EXPANDING THE U.S. OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR
ARSENAL TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE,
A TIME WHEN WE ARE ENGAGING IN STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS,
-16-
A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING
TO BROADEN AND MAKE PERMANENT ITS SPHERE
OF INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A TIME
WHEN SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WOULD HAVE
US HALT DEPLOYMENT OF THE SAFEGUARD
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.
ONE OF THE COSTS OF VIETNAM HAS
BEEN THAT WE HAVE POSTPONED THE ORDERLY
MODERNIZATION OF OUR ARMED FORCES. WE
HAVE POSTPONED THE DEVELOPMENT OR
DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AIRCRAFT, NEW MISSILES,
AND NEW TANKS. WE ARE ALSO FACED WITH THE
GROWING OBSOLESCENCE OF OUR NAVAL FLEET.
WE ARE IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION.
WE HAVE CUT OUR MILITARY BUDGETS AND
POSTPONED MODERNIZATION OF OUR DEFENSES.
WE DEBATE NATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE USES
OF MILITARY POWER. SOME OF OUR PEOPLE
FORD
TAKE THE HEAD-IN-THE-SAND ATTITUDE THAT THE
LIBRARI
UNITED STATES CAN UNILATERALLY DECLARE:
-17-
"GONNA MAKE WAR NO MORE."
THE FIRST DUTY OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IS THE DEFENSE OF THE NATION.
BLIND CUTTING OF OUR MILITARY BUDGET IS
COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL. YES, WE MUST HAVE
A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES -- BUT
DEFENSE MUST BE GIVEN ITS PROPER PLACE
ON THE SCALE.
AS THE PRESIDENT RECENTLY
REMARKED, WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE ALL
OF OUR OTHER GOALS WOULD BECOME MOOT.
INTERNATIONAL POWER POLITICS IS
UNPALATABLE TO MANY AMERICANS BUT IT
CANNOT BE AVOIDED. WE HAVE TO LEARN TO
LIVE WITH IT. WE HAVE TO LIVE IN THE
REAL WORLD, AND DRAWING PEACE SYMBOLS
ON SIDEWALKS, DOORS AND BUILDINGS WILL NOT
CHANGE THAT.
DO WE HAVE THE WILL TO RESIST
OF WHICH VON CLAUSEWITZ SPOKE ? IF WE DO NOT,
-18-
THE SOVIET UNION WILL WIN.
I KNOW OF NO AMERICAN WHO LOVES
WAR. ANYONE WHO DOES IS EITHER INSANE OR
A FOOL. BUT I AGREE WITH THE BRITISH
PHILOSOPHER JOHN STUART MILL WHO DESCRIBED
WAR AS "AN UGLY THING BUT NOT THE UGLIEST
OF THINGS."
SAID MILL. "A MAN WHO HAS NOTHING
WHICH HE IS WILLING TO FIGHT FOR, NOTHING
WHICH HE CARES ABOUT MORE THAN HE DOES HIS
OWN PERSONAL SAFETY, IS A MISERABLE
CREATURE, WHO HAS NO CHANCE OF BEING FREE
UNLESS MADE AND KEPT SO BY THE EXERTIONS
OF MEN BETTER THAN HIMSELF. AND AS LONG
AS JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE HAVE NOT
TERMINATED THEIR EVER-RENEWING FIGHT FOR
ASCENDENCY IN THE AFFAIRS OF MANKIND,
HUMAN BEINGS MUST BE WILLING, WHEN THE NEED
IS, TO DO BATTLE FOR THE ONE AGAINST THE
OTHER."
--END--
Distribution Full
Galleries 11:30 a.m. 6/4/70
maffice Copy
A COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY REP. GERALD R. FORD, R-MICH.
REPUBLICAN LEADER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AT GRADUATION EXERCISES OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
AT FT. LESLEY J. McNAIR
9:30 A.M. FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 1970
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Commandant Gen. Kelly, deputy commandants, members of the faculty,
graduates, and friends:
This is the 24th graduating class to have gathered here at the National
War College for commencement exercises. And we need only look at the
accomplishments of those who have gone before you to fully appreciate the
significance of this occasion.
I have in mind the 47 military graduates who attained four-star rank and the
75 civilian graduates who subsequently became ambassadors. This is a testimonial
not only to the individuals cited but also to the National War College itself.
Certainly it tells of the superb schooling received here by the gentlemen fortunate
enough to be numbered among the War College's students.
I am familiar with the courses you have pursued during your months of study
here, and it is to one of those courses that I would like to devote my remarks
today--the assessment of national security policies.
I would observe first of all that the circumstances under which you pursue
your studies is far differenct from that of the Soviet student of military strategy.
By that I mean that the Soviet student does not suffer from the same inhibitions
you do--inhibitions that are placed upon you by the American people.
We live in an open society, and that society has been engaged for many years
in a national debate over the use of military power.
The result of that debate has been to place great restraints on the effective
use of American military power in the pursuit of American political objectives.
We speak repeatedly of the balance of power, and we recognize that a
balance-of-power policy must depend upon the willingness of a nation to use its
power either diplomatically or in war. And we know further that the impact of a
nation's diplomatic moves are directly tied to its military strength and its
willingness to use that strength if need be.
In 1945 we developed the world's first atomic bomb at Alamagordo, N.M., and
dropped it on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6 and on Nagasaki on August 9.
(more)
-2-
We could have made nuclear weapons a highly effective instrument of U.S.
foreign policy from 1945 to 1955. But we did not even employ our nuclear weapons
as a credible diplomatic threat during this period--credible enough to prevent the
Soviet Union from making territorial gains and from building a nuclear arsenal now
rivalling ours.
We are still debating the uses of power. And when we have waged war since
1945 we have generally acted as though our staggering array of nuclear weapons did
not even exist. In short, we have not known how to use the "non-use" of our nuclear
weapons as an instrument of foreign policy and national strategy.
The reason our nuclear weapons became diplomatically useless was that the
Soviet Union quickly realized we had no intention of exploiting the advantage we
held.
We can point to only two exceptions to this nuclear inertness. We know that
the late President Eisenhower threatened to strike Communist China with nuclear
weapons during the Korean War, and this may have been decisive in transforming the
Korean conflict into an uneasy armistice. This and our facedown of the Soviet
Union in the Cuban missile crisis are the only apparent dividends from our tremendous
investment in the crushing nuclear superiority we once enjoyed.
We are a global power. Yet we find it abhorrent to take the great risks
involved in acting like a global power. The Soviet Union suffers from no such
inhibitions and therefore the architects of its foreign policy have a far freer
hand.
Today we are discovering just how great is the abhorrence of some Americans
to the world power struggle. We find that some Americans are literally refusing
to live in the world of global politics. This is a most disturbing development
when we consider that the strength or weakness of a people's will determines the
outcome of international conflicts.
I have noted how a refusal to fully accept the realities of global power
politics has inhibited this nation in the effective use of power.
This has been accompanied by a steady growth in pacifist sentiment which has
hampered U.S. foreign policy and interfered with the response of successive National
Administrations to hostile Soviet challenges. It has also greatly sharpened
domestic divisions.
Von Clausewitz wrote that the purpose of war is not the physical destruction
of the enemy but the destruction of the enemy's will to resist.
(more)
-3-
The Vietnam War is not a conventional war--not as the United States has
fought it. We have never fought the Vietnam War in the classical Clausewitz sense.
The previous Administration's policy of gradualism certainly was not calculated to
destroy the enemy's will to resist.
The American people have been living in a dream--living under the delusion
that the resolution of the Cuban crisis ended the threat of Soviet aggression and
that since then we have been at peace with the Communist powers. The truth is
that in Vietnam we have been at war with the Soviet Union by proxy, and that the
Soviet Union has sought to make Vietnam a Communist bridgehead from which new
offensive operations could be launched against non-Communist states.
The Soviet objective has always been the same--in Vietnam, in Cuba and also
in the Middle East--to destroy the United States' will to resist.
It is in Indochina that the Soviet Union has come the closest to destroying
the U.S. will to resist. We have seen a rise in pacifist sentiment, skillfully
exploited by American subversives and revolutionaries. We have seen continuing
demands that U.S. military spending be cut below the point of marginal risk.
Most importantly, increasing numbers of our people are taking the attitude
that matters military smack of evil, that there is indeed a conspiracy between the
military and industry to spend the Nation into bankruptcy, and that military spendin.
should be mercilessly slashed so that we can spend these funds on our social
problems.
These Americans do not ask whether there is a point below which military
spending cannot safely be cut. They take the position that there need be no limit
to military reductions.
This assault on the military and on national security is carried on by
individuals who seem completely oblivious to the fact that the international
balance of power appears to be shifting in favor of the Soviet Union. They either
do not know or do not care. They are either ignorant or blind or hopelessly
mistaken in their beliefs.
A strong wave of neo-isolationism has swept over a segment of the American
people--notably many of our college students and some members of the United States
Congress.
I recognize the basis for that 1970 version of isolationism and yet, upon
final analysis, I find it irrational.
The basis for the new isolationism is the growing feeling among the American
people that the game has never been worth the candle in Vietnam. And the reason
(more)
-4-
for that feeling is the series of misjudgments that marked American conduct of the
war during the previous Administration.
In Vietnam we committed ourselves to a cause that became disproportionate
to the cost, in men and money, as well as to the effects here at home.
If we wanted a testing ground for counterinsurgency operations in the early
1960s, we certainly were not sufficiently selective when we chose Vietnam or at
least a "Monday morning quarterback" could say it was a "bad call."
There is overwhelming evidence that our civilian leaders at the time did
not seriously consider or discuss the way in which American power should be
employed in Vietnam.
Our intervention in Vietnam has been called "arrogance of power." More
accurately it has been a misuse of power, a misapplication of power, because we
ignored completely the von Clausewitz injunction that the purpose of war is to
destroy the enemy's will to resist.
We were gradually pulled into Vietnam, committing our power, prestige and
honor under theories of limited war and selective response. And we applied our
power in a haltingly gradual way to shore up a demonstrably weak government that
initially refused to strengthen itself.
There is no logic in blaming the military for the tragedy in Vietnam. The
responsibility for the critical misjudgments in Vietnam in the Sixties lies with
the civilian leadership of the Nation. Within the limitations that they set for
the military it was impossible to gain early and traditional success in the Vietnam
War. It became an American war and yet selective response remained the basic
strategy.
In short, we attempted to gain a national objective without employing the
appropriate means and without first getting the support of the American people.
Now we find an increasing number of Americans urging immediate withdrawal
from Vietnam. I know they have not weighed the consequences of precipitous
withdrawal. The message that immediate withdrawal communicates to the world is
that some Americans would have us again adopt a policy of isolationism as we did
in the Thirties.
They cry out, "Stop the war," but they never debate the real issue: Can
America be isolationist and survive?
I don't think the Vietnam War has proven that the United States should
abandon its leadership role in the world. It has only demonstrated that we should
(more)
-5-
be more selective as to how we employ our power in meeting the threat of Communist
aggression.
I think we have properly employed our power in attacking the Communist
sanctuaries in Cambodia. This is the kind of use of power that the Communists
understand and respect. No longer will they think that President Nixon is
engaging in meaningless rhetoric when he talks of an appropriate response to the
other side's failure to cooperate with us in our search for an end to the Vietnam
War.
The shock and outrage with which some Americans greeted President Nixon's
Cambodian initiative underscores the unwillingness of some of our citizens to
have the United States continue a meaningful role in global politics. The United
States must make its power credible by using it under appropriate circumstances if
this Nation is to have any kind of clout in world circles. I think President Nixon
has restored that credibility and thus has immeasurably added to U.S. prestige.
The President has restored our credibility at a time when the rapid buildup
of Russian nuclear missiles threatens to reduce the United States to second rank as
a military power, a time when we are deferring decisions on expanding the U.S.
offensive nuclear arsenal to meet the Soviet challenge, a time when we are engaging
in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets, a time when the Soviet Union
is seeking to broaden and make permanent its sphere of influence in the Middle East,
a time when some members of Congress would have us halt deployment of the Safeguard
antiballistic missile system.
One of the costs of Vietnam has been that we have postponed the orderly
modernization of our armed forces. We have postponed the development or deployment
of new aircraft, new missiles, and new tanks. We are also faced with the growing
obsolescence of our naval fleet.
We are in a period of transition. We have cut our military budgets and
postponed modernization of our defenses. We debate national strategy and the uses
of military power. Some of our people take the head-in-the-sand attitude that the
United States can unilaterally declare: "Gonna make war no more."
The first duty of the Federal Government is the defense of the Nation. Blind
cutting of our military budget is completely irrational. Yes, we must have a
system of national priorities--but defense must be given its proper place on the
scale.
As the President recently remarked, without an adequate defense all of our
other national goals would become moot.
(more)
-6-
International power politics is unpalatable to many Americans but it cannot
be avoided. We have to learn to live with it. We have to live in the real world,
and drawing peace symbols on sidewalks, doors and buildings will not change that.
Do we have the will to resist of which von Clausewitz spoke? If we do not,
the Soviet Union will win.
I know of no American who loves war. Anyone who does is either insane or a
fool. But I agree with the British philosopher John Stuart Mill who described war
as "an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things."
Said Mill: "A man who has nothing which he is willing to fight for, nothing
which he cares about more than he does his own personal safety, is a miserable
creature, who has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions
of men better than himself. As long as justice and injustice have not terminated
their ever-renewing fight for ascendency in the affairs of mankind, human beings
must be willing, when the need is, to do battle for the one against the other."
###
Full Distribution
Office Copy
A COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY REP. GERALD R. FORD, R-MICH.
REPUBLICAN LEADER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AT GRADUATION EXERCISES OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
AT FT. LESLEY J. McNAIR
9:30 A.M. FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 1970
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Commandant Gen. Kelly, deputy commandants, members of the faculty,
graduates, and friends:
This is the 24th graduating class to have gathered here at the National
War College for commencement exercises. And we need only look at the
accomplishments of those who have gone before you to fully appreciate the
significance of this occasion.
I have in mind the 47 military graduates who attained four-star rank and the
75 civilian graduates who subsequently became ambassadors. This is a testimonial
not only to the individuals cited but also to the National War College itself.
Certainly it tells of the superb schooling received here by the gentlemen fortunate
enough to be numbered among the War College's students.
I am familiar with the courses you have pursued during your months of study
here, and it is to one of those courses that I would like to devote my remarks
today--the assessment of national security policies.
I would observe first of all that the circumstances under which you pursue
your studies is far differenct from that of the Soviet student of military strategy.
By that I mean that the Soviet student does not suffer from the same inhibitions
you do--inhibitions that are placed upon you by the American people.
We live in an open society, and that society has been engaged for many years
in a national debate over the use of military power.
The result of that debate has been to place great restraints on the effective
use of American military power in the pursuit of American political objectives.
We speak repeatedly of the balance of power, and we recognize that a
balance-of-power policy must depend upon the willingness of a nation to use its
power either diplomatically or in war. And we know further that the impact of a
nation's diplomatic moves are directly tied to its military strength and its
willingness to use that strength if need be.
In 1945 we developed the world's first atomic bomb at Alamagordo, N.M., and
dropped it on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6 and on Nagasaki on August 9.
(more)
-2-
MUCH MORE
We could have made nuclear weapons a highly effective instrument of U.S.
foreign policy from 1945 to 1955. But we did not even employ our nuclear weapons
as a credible diplomatic threat during this period--credible enough to prevent the
Soviet Union from making territorial gains and from building a nuclear arsenal now
OUR OWN
rivalling
We are still debating the uses of power. And when we have waged war since
1945 we have generally acted as though our staggering array of nuclear weapons did
IT CAN BE ARGUED
not even exist. In short we have not known how to use the "non-use" of our nuclear
weapons as an instrument of foreign policy and national strategy.
LESS POTENT
The reason our nuclear weapons became diplomatically
was that the
APPARENT
Soviet Union quickly realized we had no intention of exploiting the advantage we
held.
We can point to only two exceptions to this nuclear inertness. We know that
the late President Eisenhower threatened to strike Communist China with nuclear
weapons during the Korean War, and this may have been decisive in transforming the
Korean conflict into an uneasy armistice. This and our facedown of the Soviet
Union in the Cuban missile crisis are the only apparent dividends from our tremendous
investment in the crushing nuclear superiority we once enjoyed.
We are a global power. Yet we find it abhorrent to take the great risks
involved in acting like a global power. The Soviet Union suffers from no such
inhibitions and therefore the architects of its foreign policy have a far freer
hand.
Today we are discovering just how great is the abhorrence of some Americans
to the world power struggle. We find that some Americans are literally refusing
to live in the world of global politics. This is a most disturbing development
when we consider that the strength or weakness of a people's will determines the
outcome of international conflicts.
I have noted how a refusal to fully accept the realities of global power
politics has inhibited this nation in the effective use of power.
This has been accompanied by a steady growth in pacifist sentiment which has
hampered U.S. foreign policy and interfered with the response of successive National
Administrations to hostile Soviet challenges. It has also greatly sharpened
domestic divisions.
Von Clausewitz wrote that the purpose of war is not the physical destruction
of the enemy but the destruction of the enemy's will to resist.
(more)
-3-
The Vietnam War is not a conventional war---not as the United States has
fought it. We have never fought the Vietnam War in the classical Clausewitz sense.
The previous Administration's policy of gradualism certainly was not calculated to
destroy the enemy's will to resist.
The American people have been living in a dream--living under the delusion
that the resolution of the Cuban crisis ended the threat of Soviet aggression and
that since then we have been at peace with the Communist powers. The truth is
that in Vietnam we have been at war with the Soviet Union by proxy, and that the
Soviet Union has sought to make Vietnam a Communist bridgehead from which new
offensive operations could be launched against non-Communist states.
The Soviet objective has always been the same--in Vietnam, in Cuba and also
in the Middle East--to destroy the United States' will to resist.
It is in Indochina that the Soviet Union has come the closest to destroying
the U.S. will to resist. We have seen a rise in pacifist sentiment, skillfully
exploited by American subversives and revolutionaries. We have seen continuing
demands that U.S. military spending be cut below the point of marginal risk.
Most importantly, increasing numbers of our people are taking the attitude
that matters military smack of evil, that there is indeed a conspiracy between the
military and industry to spend the Nation into bankruptcy, and that military spendin,
should be mercilessly slashed so that we can spend these funds on our social
problems.
These Americans do not ask whether there is a point below which military
spending cannot safely be cut. They take the position that there need be no limit
to military reductions.
This assault on the military and on national security is carried on by
individuals who seem completely oblivious to the fact that the international
balance of power appears to be shifting in favor of the Soviet Union. They either
do not know or do not care. They are either ignorant or blind or hopelessly
mistaken in their beliefs.
A strong wave of neo-isolationism has swept over a segment of the American
people--notably many of our college students and some members of the United States
Congress.
I recognize the basis for that 1970 version of isolationism and yet, upon
final analysis, I find it irrational.
The basis for the new isolationism is the growing feeling among the American
people that the game has never been worth the candle in Vietnam. And the reason
(more)
-4-
for that feeling is the series of misjudgments that marked American conduct of the
war during the previous Administration.
In Vietnam we committed ourselves to a cause that became disproportionate
to the cost, in men and money, as well as to the effects here at home.
If we wanted a testing ground for counterinsurgency operations in the early
1960s, we certainly were not sufficiently selective when we chose Vietnam or at
least a "Monday morning quarterback" could say it was a "bad call."
Our intervention in Vietnam has been called "arrogance of power. More
accurately it has been a misuse of power, a misapplication of power, because we
ignored completely the von Clausewitz injunction that the purpose of war is to
destroy the enemy's will to resist.
We were gradually pulled into Vietnam, committing our power, prestige and
honor under theories of limited war and selective response. And we applied our
power in a haltingly gradual way to shore up a demonstrably weak government that
initially refused to strengthen itself.
There is no logic in blaming the military for the tragedy in Vietnam. The
responsibility for the critical misjudgments in Vietnam in the Sixties lies with
the civilian leadership of the Nation. Within the limitations that they set for
the military it was impossible to gain early and traditional success in the Vietnam
War. It became an American war and yet selective response remained the basic
strategy.
In short, we attempted to gain a national objective without employing the
appropriate means and without first getting the support of the American people.
Now we find an increasing number of Americans urging immediate withdrawal
from Vietnam. I know they have not weighed the consequences of precipitous
withdrawal. The message that immediate withdrawal communicates to the world is
that some Americans would have us again adopt a policy of isolationism as we did
in the Thirties.
They cry out, "Stop the war," but they never debate the real issue: Can
America be isolationist and survive?
I don't think the Vietnam War has proven that the United States should
abandon its leadership role in the world. It has only demonstrated that we should
(more)
-5-
be more selective as to how we employ our power in meeting the threat of Communist
aggression.
I think we have properly employed our power in attacking the Communist
sanctuaries in Cambodia. This is the kind of use of power that the Communists
understand and respect. No longer will they think that President Nixon is
engaging in meaningless rhetoric when he talks of an appropriate response to the
other side's failure to cooperate with us in our search for an end to the Vietnam
War.
The shock and outrage with which some Americans greeted President Nixon's
Cambodian initiative underscores the unwillingness of some of our citizens to
have the United States continue a meaningful role in global politics. The United
States must make its power credible by using it under appropriate circumstances if
this Nation is to have any kind of clout in world circles. I think President Nixon
has restored that credibility and thus has immeasurably added to U.S. prestige AND INFLUENCE.
The President has restored our credibility at a time when the rapid buildup
of Russian nuclear missiles threatens to reduce the United States to second rank as
a military power, a time when we are deferring decisions on expanding the U.S.
offensive nuclear arsenal to meet the Soviet challenge, a time when we are engaging
in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets, a time when the Soviet Union
is seeking to broaden and make permanent its sphere of influence in the Middle East,
a time when some members of Congress would have us halt deployment of the Safeguard
antiballistic missile system.
One of the costs of Vietnam has been that we have postponed the orderly
modernization of our armed forces. We have postponed the development or deployment
of new aircraft, new missiles, and new tanks. We are also faced with the growing
obsolescence of our naval fleet.
We are in a period of transition. We have cut our military budgets and
postponed modernization of our defenses. We debate national strategy and the uses
of military power. Some of our people take the head-in-the-sand attitude that the
United States can unilaterally declare: "Gonna make war no more."
The first duty of the Federal Government is the defense of the Nation. Blind
cutting of our military budget is completely irrational. Yes, we must have a
system of national priorities--but defense must be given its proper place on the
scale.
As the President recently remarked, without an adequate defense all of our
other national goals would become moot.
(more)
-6-
International power politics is unpalatable to many Americans but it cannot
be avoided. We have to learn to live with it. We have to live in the real world,
and drawing peace symbols on sidewalks, doors and buildings will not change that.
Do we have the will to resist of which von Clausewitz spoke? If we do not,
the Soviet Union will win.
I know of no American who loves war. Anyone who does is either insane or a
fool. But I agree with the British philosopher John Stuart Mill who described war
as "an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things."
Said Mill: "A man who has nothing which he is willing to fight for, nothing
which he cares about more than he does his own personal safety, is a miserable
creature, who has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions
of men better than himself. As long as justice and injustice have not terminated
their ever-renewing fight for ascendency in the affairs of mankind, human beings
must be willing, when the need is, to do battle for the one against the other."
# # #