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Intelligence Oversight Board - Status
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1668621
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Intelligence Oversight Board - Status
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White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files
Legislation Case Files
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). Intelligence Oversight Board. (2/19/1976 - 1/20/1977)
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "Intelligence Oversight Board -
Status" of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.
Digitized from Box 1 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:01 PM, EST
February 17, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
GERALD
AMERIA
For over a year, the Nation has engaged in exhaustive investigations into
the activity of the CIA and other intelligence units of our government.
Facts, hearsay, and closely held secrets all have been spread out on
the public record.
We have learned many lessons from this experience, but we must not
become obsessed with the deeds of the past. We must act for the future.
Tonight, I am announcing plans for the first major reorganization of the
Intelligence Community since 1947:
First, I am establishing by Executive Order a new command structure
for foreign intelligence. Henceforth, overall policy directions for in-
telligence will rest in only one place: the National Security Council,
consisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense. Management of intelligence will be conducted
by a single new committee. That committee will be chaired by the Director
of Central Intelligence, George Bush.
To monitor the performance of
our intelligence operations, I am creating a new independent Oversight
Board to be made up of private citizens. Former Ambassador Robert D.
Murphy will chair the Board and two other distinguished citizens --
Stephen Ailes and Leo Cherne will serve as members. All three of
these units the National Security Council, the Commitee on Foreign
Intelligence and the Oversight Board will be responsible to me, so that
the President will continue to be ultimately accountable for our intelligence
activities.
Second, to improve the performance of the intelligence agencies and
to restore public confidence in them, I am issuing a comprehensive set
of public guidelines which will serve as legally binding charters for our
intelligence agencies. The charters will provide stringent protections
for the rights of American citizens. I will soon meet with Congressional
leaders to map out legislation to provide judicial safeguards against
electronic surveillance and mail openings. I will also support legislation
that would prohibit attempts on the lives of foreign leaders.
Third, tomorrow I will send to the Congress special legislation to
safeguard critical intelligence secrets. This legislation would make it a
crime for a government employee who has access to certain highly
classified information to reveal that information improperly.
In taking these actions, I have been guided by two imperatives.
As Americans, we must not and will not tolerate actions by our government
which abridge the rights of our citizens. At the same time, we must
maintain a strong and effective intelligence capability in the United States.
I will not be a party to the dismantling of the CIA and the other intelligence
agencies.
(MORE)
(OVER)
-2-
To be effective, our foreign policy must be based upon a clear under-
standing of the international environment. To operate without adequate and
timely intelligence information will cripple our security in a world
that is still hostile to our freedoms.
Nor can we confine our intelligence to the question of whether there will
be an imminent military attack. We also need information about the
world's economy, about political and social trends, about food supply
and population growth, and certainly about terrorism. To protect our
security diplomatically, militarily and economically, we must have a
comprehensive intelligence capability.
The United States is a peace-loving nation, and our foreign policy is
designed to lessen the threat of war and of aggression. In recent years,
we have made substantial progress toward that goal in the Middle East,
in Europe, in Asia and elsewhere around the world. Yet we also recognize
that the best way to secure/the peace is to be fully prepared to defend our
interests. I believe in peace through strength.
A central pillar of our strength is, of course, our armed forces. But
another great pillar must be our Intelligence Community - the dedicated
men and women who gather vital information around the world and carry
our missions that advance our interests in the world.
The overriding task now is to rebuild the confidence and capability of our
intelligence services 80 that we can live securily in peace and freedom.
That is my goal.
# # #
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FEBRUARY 18, 1976
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
GEORGE BUSH, DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
EDWARD H. LEVI,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
JOHN O. MARSH,
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT,
AND
MICHAEL DUVAL,
ASSISTANT TO THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
BERALD FORD LICKARY
450 EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
11:05 A.M. EST
MR. NESSEN: I think you have had by now the Executive
Order and fact sheet, I hope, long enough to read it and make
some sense out of it. As you know, that material and this
briefing are embargoed for noon release, the time at which the
material will be delivered to Congress.
For the briefing today, we have Jack Marsh, Counsellor
to the President, who coordinated the President's efforts to
study and reorganize the intelligence community; Attorney
General Levi, Brent Scowcroft, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs; Mike Duval, who was the
Executive Director of the group here at the White House which
studied the matter and proposed options for reorganizing the
intelligence community; and George Bush, the Director of
Central Intelligence.
The first thing we would like to do is to give you
precisely what the President gave to the Members of Congress
last evening at 6 o'clock without removing anything but
showing you exactly the presentation that he made to the
Members of Congress.
Now this requires the presentation of some slides
on the screen and a narration by Jack Marsh. We will do that
first and then I think open it up for your questions.
MR. MARSH: Thank you, Ron.
What I would like to do is to give you a sort of
a summary of the package that you have. This is the
presentation that Ron mentioned that was given to Members
of the Congress last evening in positions of leadership
under jurisdiction of the committee. This is the same presentation
that was given to the Members of the House and Senate last
evening.
MORE
(OVER)
- 2 -
This is also the same presentation that the President
gave--substantially the same as he gave to members of the
intelligence coordinating group which, of course, included
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Director of the
CIA, Attorney General and other members of that committee.
The objectives, as are noted on the slide there,
the twofold objectives -- one to strengthen the United States
intelligence community and at the same time observe these
traditional constitutional liberties -- were the two overriding
considerations that were part of the President's program.
The President decided to try and do this principally
through the means of the Executive Order as opposed 'to a major
emphasis on legislation. Traditionally, in the intelligence
community, a great deal of the management of the intelligence
community has been achieved by internal memorandum, by
Executive Orders and this was the approach that the President
decided that he would use.
He also would set out in the Executive Order, which
I am sure you have noticed, a portion of that which we refer to
as the restrictions order that provides the guidelines and also
states the prohibitions of those things the community. are not
supposed to do.
In there, as a part of this Omnibus Executive Order
is the new command structure which he mentioned last evening.
It is significant to note also that he has charged the NSC to
conduct semi-annual reviews of the intelligence operation and
particularly as to the adequacy of the intelligence problem.
Also, significantly. he decided to go outside of
BERALD FORD
Government, to go outside of the Administration and set up
a three member Intelligence Oversight Board. Those are
the three individuals chaired by former Ambassador Robert
Murphy, former Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, and Leo
Cherne, who serves on the PFIAB. These three individuals
will also be members of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
Now, in order for you to have an understanding of
just what was being addressed, it is frequently not known
as to what is the American intelligence community. The
intelligence community of the United States is made up of the
agencies you see on the slides -- the CIA the Department of
Defense. It has four subordinate subdivisions in the intelligence
area: one, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Agency; third, the various intelligence agencies of
the respective services -- those that you have in the Army,
Navy and the Air Force -- and then the special offices for
reconnaissance in the Department of Defense.
MORE
- 3 -
The Department of State has an intelligence capability
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as does the Department
of Justice; of course we know, particularly in the field of
counter-intelligence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
There is an intelligence capability in the Department of Treasury
and also one that is likely to be overlooked in the field of the
nuclear energy, ERDA, which has a responsibility for atomic and
nuclear intelligence.
In order to address the intelligence matter, the
President decided in September that he would establish an
Intelligence Coordinating Group. The mission of that group would
be twofold: One, to deal in a day-to-day manner with the requests
and requirements of the Select Committees that were investigating
and holding hearings on the intelligence community, and, secondly,
while it was engaged in that process, to also begin a second
try to develop a management program to address a number of
the areas that he has addressed in the Omnibus Executive
Order.
The members of the Intelligence Coordinating Group
were the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
the Director of OMB, the Counsel to the President, the
Counsellor to the President as Chairman, and as the
Executive Director, Michael Duval.
This group met quite frequently and at times back in
October and November and December almost on a daily basis.
The principals did not always attend, but very frequently they
would, particularly the Attorney General, who attended many
of those meetings or they were represented, if they were not
there, by one of their principal deputies.
The President's Executive actions really encompass
three broad areas of action -- his Omnibus Executive Order that
provides both guidelines and restrictions, a new command
structure, and an oversight mechanism.
He also will suggest a minimum of legislation
principally aimed at protecting the security or secrecy of
classified information, He will endorse legislation that would
prohibit assassination of foreign leaders in times of peace and
he will also ask the Congress and meet with them to discuss
legislation that will relate to two areas: One, electronic
surveillance, and, secondly, the unauthorized opening of
mail.
He is also suggesting to the Congress a form of
oversight to hopefully reduce the proliferation of Congressional
committees that do address themselves in the intelligence
area.
It is interesting, his decision was that he felt there
should be a summary of the activities of the departments and
agencies in the intelligence area and to that extent has
proposed a type of policy guidelines or modified charters for
publication in order not only that the American people would
know what these agencies are and what their general missions were,
but, secondly, that the agencies themselves would have certain
parameters that would be the areas of their principal
responsibilities.
MORE
- 4 -
Now, let's look at the first major area that the President
has addressed and this is in the NSC. The NSC does continue
and will continue to have the principal responsibility for the
integration of domestic and foreign policies and military
policies as they relate to the national security. It has its
four statutory members with whom you are familiar, but it will
conduct now,at the direction of the President, a semi-annual
review:
One, as to the needs of policymakers for adequate
intelligence as to whether it is timely, whether it addresses
the problem as to its quality; secondly, the NSC will be charged
to be certain that the intelligence community is operating
both effectively and efficiently in the collection of intelligence
and also they will review the appropriateness of ongoing covert
types of operations and other sensitive collection missions
that may have been authorized.
The Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Brent Scowcroft, will have the principal responsibility
for the conduct of the semi-annual reviews.
Now this is an area that should be of considerable
interest. It is an effort that has been made by the President
to address the question of management and resource control or
resource allocation inside the intelligence community. For the
purpose of budget review and control and resource allocation
the President has established a three member committee.
The Chairman of that committee will be the Director of Central
Intelligence. The other two members of that committee will
be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth, who will
have a principal authority in the Department of Defense for
intelligence, and the third member will the Deputy Assistant
to General Scowcroft, Bill Hyland.
This three member committee will have budget
preparation, they will prepare the budget before it goes to
OMB for review. Also, they will handle re-programming
requests. They will establish the management policies inside
the community and they will carry out the NSC policy decisions.
Now, in the event there is disagreement inside
the three member committee chaired by Director Bush, they
may make an appeal from a decision of the three member committee;
the committee itself may make an appeal, or any member of the
NSC, and particularly the Secretary of Defense, who is a member
of the NSC, if he has a question about a decision of that three
member committee, they may pull the decision into the NSC on an
automatic review.
Now over in the field of the production of intelligence,
the production of the intelligence after it is collected, this
remains the principal responsibility, however, of the DCI.
The Director of Central Intelligence will still have the
responsibility for doing that. The Director of Central
Intelligence, it is iterated and restated that he will be and
will continue to be the President's principal advisor in the
field of foreign intelligence.
MORE
- 5 -
The DCI, in undertaking his responsibilities, may
establish such committees or subcommittees as he deems
requisite.
Now, this is the old 40 Committee, a revamping
and a restructuring of the old 40 Committee, and there are
several areas that I think you will find of interest here.
One, the name of this group will be called the Operations
Advisory Group. The membership will be changed and the
membership will be principals. It will be the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of CIA,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and two observers -- the
Attorney General and the Director of OMB -- and in the latter,
two such individuals as they might designate to attend the
meeting.
It is anticipated, however, that the meetings will be
attended by principals. The meeting will be chaired by
Brent Scowcroft, this particular group will be chaired by
Brent Scowcroft, and it is expected the principals will attend
unless, for some reason, they are out of the city or there is
some other conflict that they have that makes it impossible for
them to be there.
MORE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
- 6 -
They shall undertake these duties that are assigned
here. They will consider and make recommendations together
with dissents to the President on the proposals for covert
operations and all sensitive collection systems, and they
will make a periodic review and submit a report to the
NSC of these ongoing operations and missions. They will
meet as a group and will conduct formal meetings as a group
in the consideration of their efforts.
Now this is a schematic diagram of the American
intelligence community as it exists today. Now I will
show you a diagram of the new system, but under the old
system the American intelligence community has operated
on a series of interlocking committees, executive committees,
that sought to achieve a number of things that the President
has sought to accomplish by this streamlined system and
focusing into the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. This
is the old schematic diagram and the next slide will show
you the new schematic diagram.
As I mentioned, a part of this operation is
right here, your three-member committee chaired by Director
Bush, and then you have our Advisory Operation Group here
which is the old 40 Committee.
I should point out that it is envisioned that
under this system it may be necessary, or Mr. Bush may
want to set up certain committees or subcommittees in
order to accomplish the functions that are necessary to
be achieved.
Now let's move over into the areas that focus
on some of the charters that we can read into your Omnibus
Executive Order. There are several points that I would
like to make.
The President is expecting that the senior officer
of each department or agency will be the responsible officer,
the accountable officer for the conduct of that agency
and its compliance with this Executive Order which includes
the restrictions that are set out in that order.
Director Bush and those who work with him will
have the responsibility to establish a system of Inspector
Generals for, not monitoring but auditing of the activities
of the community; and the NSC, the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence and the Intelligence Oversight Board will also
have a responsibility as to the strengthening of those
Inspector Generals systems inside the departments and
agencies.
As I mentioned to you, the President felt that
it would be helpful to make a disclosure, to the extent
that it could be done, of the role and function and duties
of the various components of the intelligence community.
MORE
- 7 -
There will, of course, still remain some areas
in which there will be classified instructions or matters
that relate to their activities and functions, but this
is probably the first time that there has been laid out
for public disclosure an establishment of certain parameters
and modified guidelines or policy charters that we have
had in the intelligence community today.
I will not go through these because they are
set out there for you more fully in the material that you
have, but we will run through them just very quickly.
The areas you will see--the State, the Treasury--
will be over in the field of economic intelligence, State
through its Bureau of Intelligence and research -- these
FORD
are spelled out more fully.
GERALD
LIBRARY
I would want to point out the defense. You will
find in your Executive Order a discussion of the role and
function and mission of the National Security Agency.
Additionally set out are the duties and functions of the
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been set out
itself publicly at an earlier time; ERDA, which I mentioned
to you; the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In this area
we are principally talking in terms of their role in
espionage and sabotage and collecting foreign intelligence
in the United States.
Now let me give you a little background here
when you read into your Restrictions Order. The Restrictions
Order is one of the most complex documents that you will
read. It represents literally months and months of work,
interdepartmental staff work. The restrictions that are
there are the joint product of the departments and agencies
represented in the Coordinating Group -- that is, Defense
and State and CIA -- and this chart here simply in a very
generic way assigns the areas addressed but you have to
go into the Restrictions Order and read it precisely to
identify each of these subjects.
But it restricts or prohibits in the following
areas -- the collection of analysis and information on
domestic activities of United States citizens, and it
points out there how that can be done through either as
authorized by law and with the procedures established by
the Attorney General and I am sure there may be questions
here that he will want to respond to--and it does address
the question of unconsented physical searches of electronic
surveillance of U.S. persons; it reiterates the prohibition
against illegally obtaining Federal tax returns in order
to obtain information; it places restrictions in reference
to the infiltration of groups to influence or report on
them and severely prohibits that activity to the CIA except
in a very narrow exception of where the members of the
group are principally non-U.S. persons and where that group
is believed reasonably to be controlled by a foreign power.
MORE
- 8 -
Experimenting with drugs on humans without
informed consent is prohibited unless the consent is obtained
voluntarily in the presence of a third party and that
research is conducted according to standards established
by the Commission on Biomedical Research. The correct
name of that Commission is more fully set out.
It does spell out and limit the manner in which
information might be shared internally in the intelligence
community. It places restrictions on the assignment of
personnel, in that personnel in the intelligence community
cannot be assigned without disclosures being made as to
who those individuals are and also places certain restraints
on what they may report back to their parent agency.
It sets up prohibitions against providing assistance
to law enforcement agencies in violation of law unless
authorized by statute and with the approval of the Attorney
General.
It places severe limitations on the testing of
electronic surveillance equipment in the United States
unless authorized by law and with procedures established
by the Attorney General. As you read through this, you
will see in many, many instances the words "as established,"
"procedures established by the Attorney General," and it
makes reference to U.S. statutes.
The exceptions there are also set out. They
are quite limited on the collecting of information on
activities of U.S. persons and in many instances I think
you will find that these relate to the employees of, for
example, the Central Intelligence Agency or the contractors
or people who might be seeking to deal with them, and also
the question of counterintelligence and counterespionage
activities which, of course, moves over into the field of
the FBI.
It should be pointed out here that in those
particular areas where there are normal law enforcement
responsibilities of an agency -- for example, there are law
enforcement responsibilities in Treasury and in the Department
of Justice, through the FBI -- in that particular area
these restrictions are not applicable. These are
restrictions on foreign intelligence agencies and activities.
Now the President has mentioned to you his
Oversight Board that will be separate and apart, This
sets out in general terms what he expects that Board to do.
It is spelled out more fully in the materials that you
have, but he does expect them to receive and consider
reports of the IGs about questionable activities that are
either improper or illegal, to make periodic reports either
to the Attorney General and, in certain instances, to the
Attorney General and to the President, and hey will
receive their staff report from the Executive Office of
the President.
MORE
- 9 -
The President is also seeking in the Executive
Branch that individuals in the Executive Branch who
receive classified information would be required to sign
what we would call a secrecy agreement against non-disclosure
of classified information.
In his requests to the Congress, first to point
out to them the areas that he has sought to address, many
of these things that he has done are based on the inputs of
the Rockefeller Commission, the Murphy Commission; it is
drawn from the discussions and the hearings of the Select
Committees of the House and Senate, from discussions that
have occurred in the media on the question of intelligence
from outside witnesses and experts who have given advice
to the Executive Branch and also from his own personal
knowledge because you should recall the President did serve
as a Member of the Appropriations Committee on the subcommittee
that did handle the intelligence oversight.
He is asking the Congress to consider a form of
Congressional oversight that hopefully would be a joint
type of committee to reduce the proliferation of the
number of committees. He is asking that they consider
rules that would insure the safeguard of intelligence, the
materials there, and establish procedures there that would
also protect the requests of the President when he indicates
that the information that is sent is sensitive.
FORD
He also expects to keep that committee apprized
of the information that they need in the exercise of their
legislative function and he would like that the Hughes
Act or Hughes amendment, section 662, be appended on the
reporting requirement to reduce the number of reports that
you would have to make pursuant to that statute.
I would also point out on the proposed legislation
the secrecy of intelligence sources and methods. This
statute goes to those who unlawfully disclose information;
it does not apply to people who receive information. It
is not, of course, intended to be directed toward the
Fourth Estate. It applies to people in Government who
would disclose information and that would be similar in
criminal penalties in reference to that. It is not an
official secrets act.
As I mentioned earlier, he has endorsed the
proposal to prohibit, in times of peace, assassination and
he does expect to meet with Members of the Congress to
discuss further electronic surveillance and mail opening
and legislation to address that area.
MR. NESSEN: That, as I said, was the presentation
made to the Members of Congress last night. I don't think
any of the others here have any opening statements.
Do you, Mr. Attorney General?
MORE
- 10 -
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No.
MR. NESSEN: Brent?
GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.
MR. NESSEN: George?
MR. BUSH: No.
MR. NESSEN: Why don't we get right on to the
questions.
Q
Could I ask a question of the Attorney
General?
Mr. Attorney General, since there is no
proposal to change the original legislation of 1947 and since
the original legislation makes no reference to covert
operations, under what legal basis can covert operations
continue to be conducted?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think there are
Constitutional powers that are sufficient to justify the legal
basis for covert actions as well as the frequent appropriations,
so it is not a subject which Congress has not recognized
through statutory authorization.
Q
Mr. Attorney General, I wonder if you could
say a couple of things on the secrecy legislation. The
secrecy legislation uses the phrase "intelligence sources
and methods and classified" and various other phrases. In
your opinion, would it be a crime under that statute for
someone to inform the press of the fact that the United
States is giving arms and money to a faction in Angola?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No, I don't think SO. I
don't think that would be covered by that.
Q
Another question on that. You have said
the press is exempt from the coverage. Just to be sure,
does that mean that no injunction would lie against the
press under the injunctive provision of the statute?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: As the legislation is
drafted it would not lie against the press but the injunction
might prohibit the person who was going to reveal the
information to the press from revealing it.
Q
Now if the press in fact published something
that was regarded as a violation of the statute, would it
not, however, be possible for a grand jury to call the
publisher, editor or reporter involved with the story and
ask for the source of information since it would have been
a crime in view of this statute, and to require an answer
and in failure of an answer to punish the person who attempted
it?
MORE
- 11 -
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think that would be
possible under this statute and under the present statute.
Q
Mr. Attorney General, could a Member of
Congress or a Member of a Congressional committee be put
in jail or fined for disclosing secrets unlawfully or
illegally?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Not under this proposed
section.
Q
Could I follow up on an earlier question?
Are you saying that if this law is passed and it is a crime
for a Government employee or a contractor to divulge a
secret that you would permit U.S. attorneys to call before
grand juries reporters to whom secrets had been leaked
and to require that they answer and if they failed to charge
them with contempt?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No, I didn't say that.
That was not the question that was asked me. The question
was whether the grand jury could call them. They could be
called now actually under a variety of statutes.
As you know, the Department of Justice operates
with the rule where the Attorney General's permission is
required and where there has to be a particular reason
for calling and where the effect on First Amendment right
or related rights is taken into account. We have been
very careful about that and we would continue to be careful
about that.
Q
I think what I am asking you is, would it
be your policy if you felt that the leak had been serious
enough to call the reporter and require him to answer
the questions?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, I understood the
question and I think that one would have to see what kind
of a case that is. We have been very careful in handling
the department's policy on this matter and we have not
called many reporters who were not willing, in fact, to
come before a grand jury. We have been very careful about
that and we would continue to be, but I do not want to
make the statement that there is no circumstance in which
we might not do it.
Q
I would like to follow up on questions on
covert operations.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes.
MORE
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
- 12 -
Q
Does the President envision approving
legislation which would allow this joint committee to
have the right of prior approval over covert operations?
Has he spelled out his thoughts within the Executive
Branch on that subject?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I doubt whether I am the
person to answer that. I could tell you something but I
am not going to do it. (Laughter)
Q
Would you sit down. He has not answered
the question.
MR, MARSH: The President's position is one that
is opposed to prior notification and that view has been
communicated to Members of the Senate Government Operations
Committee.
Q
Then I would like to ask the Attorney General
a Constitutional question.
Since we do have a Constitution which embodies
checks and balances as a method of controlling Government
activity and since the absence of Congressional checks on
Congress is widely interpreted to be a cause of abuses
that have taken place by the intelligence establishment --
that is, lack of oversight --
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Congressional checks on
Congress?
Q
No, Congressional checks on the intelligence
community -- how is it that in an effort to reform the
intelligence community the recourse is to stronger
Presidential action, if anything, unless there is Congressional
oversight and an absence of checks and balances? Would
you answer that on a Constitutional basis?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I don't think that is a
Constitutional question at all; it is a policy question.
The Constitutional implications are really moved in the
other direction; that is, as to what extent the management
of an enterprise can be carried on by the Congress rather
than by the Executive which has that function.
But, assuming that there is an interrelationship --
and that is what you are assuming -- you are asking me
the question as to why the President chose the particular
road that he did here in terms of Executive power and I
don't know whether the question specifically related to
covert action or not.
Q
Perhaps Director Bush or Mr. Marsh could
give us the rationale as to why you decided to go that route.
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MR. BUSH: On what aspect of it?
Q
Well, why can't you notify Congress of
covert activities? Why does he oppose that? That is what
the argument is going to be all about.
MR. BUSH: It is a policy decision of the
President.
Q
Well, I mean, does he have some reason for
it, Mr. Bush?
MR. BUSH: Let's look at it from the intelligence
end of it. I think that people have felt that operationally
it would be better to be under the inherent powers for
the President to retain the right to make these decisions.
I do think it is appropriate to note that there has been
a formalization of procedures of the old 40 Committee and
they have stepped up the level of the membership and
people are going to sign off on decisions and they are
going to meet to do it, and I think those should be
reported as I think progress over the way it has been in
the past.
Q
Mr. Bush, if Congress completely disagrees
with the President's proposals, do they have any recourse
whatsoever?
MR. BUSH: Congress has a lot of power, ma'am.
BERALO R.FORD LIBRARY
Yes, they have got a lot of recourse.
Q Would you tell us how this joint committee
would ever find out about what was going on?
Q Also, would you outline exactly how?
MR. BUSH: I feel an obligation to keep in close
touch with Congress and to inform them, and hopefully
simplified oversight procedures will mean more full
information going to the Congress certainly from our agency
and certainly from any part of the intelligence community
that I have something to say about.
Daniel?
Q
Mr. Bush, this question has to be addressed
peculiarly to you as Director of Central Intelligence.
The system that has been explained to us is one
in which lines of authority appear to have been smoothed
out, made somewhat more orderly but, if you would agree with
me, centralized much more in the President who has said
last night that he is ultimately accountable, but the record
in the investigations of the past year have, among other
things, raised the question of what happens when a secret
apparatus with the intelligence collection and capacity
for covert operations is misused by a President.
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If the centralization is carried on it places
a great problem on the one who is the Director of Central
Intelligence. I think one of your predecessors, Mr. Helms,
once said, "I serve only one President at a time."
Have you thought about the problems and
responsibilities -- not for you as a person nor for the
President as a person -- that happens when you increase
centralization and make the President almost solely
accountable? What happens to the one who serves him?
MR. BUSH: I think the President -- this President
and any President -- has been solely accountable to the
Congress for actions in the intelligence field. I have
read that this means that the Director of Central Intelligence
is now some kind of czar. Really what this program does,
and why I think it will be well received in the intelligence
community and I hope on the Hill and across this country,
is give the Director certain authority to go with
responsibility that has been there since the inception,
certainly since the 1971 letter. What it does is not
create a czar but it streamlines the machinery in such a
way that the Director can execute authority that he has had.
For example, in the whole field of resource
control on paper the Director has had a certain responsibility
for this but he has not had the authority to act. Now in
conjunction with the Deputy Secretary of the Defense
Department and in conjunction with General Scowcroft's
Deputy Assistant to the President you have a much more
orderly management system.
I respectfully suggest that that has not
increased the President's power or clutched to his breast
more power in the whole field of intelligence. What I
hope it does is result in a more effective intelligence
operation.
Q
Mr. Bush, if we can be more specific about
the role of Congress and the joint committee that the
President has proposed, I gather what it is effectively
is window dressing because you will go to that joint
committee only after a covert operation is already underway;
is that not correct?
MR. BUSH: Well, I don't know that that has been
determined. That will largely be determined, I think, by
the Congress. I think the President's suggestion would be
that he has the right -- and, Jack, you correct me because
this is a policy matter and that decision is the President's,
not the intelligence community's -- my view is, as the
President indicated yesterday, there would be prompt and
full disclosure to these proper oversight committees of
the Congress. So I don't think there is any effort here
to hold back. I just simply feel that in his view he
determined that you don't have to run the proposal by
Congress before it is enacted.
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Q
But that is the point. It will go to
Congress only after the decision has been made and theoretically
at least the operation is underway; is that not correct?
MR. BUSH: I think that is what the intention
is -- maybe not the operation underway because it depends
on how much lead time there is on these things.
Q
What, then, is the influence of that
committee in terms of oversight on intelligence activity?
MR. BUSH: Well, I think, one, you have to wait
and see what the Congress itself does and I think one
must input a certain amount of intention to fully inform
as these operations are approved and that would be my
intention to the degree I would have responsibility for
some of this information to Congress.
Q
As you see it as it has been outlined, what
kind of control then would that Congressional committee have
on the operation or on the intelligence policy?
MR. BUSH: They have a large control on the
budget of these operations for one thing, just as that is
the major control on all programs in the Government. So
they do have control there.
Q
Mr. Bush, I was wondering, in your oath,
as I recall, you said you defend the Constitution against
all enemies foreign and domestic. Does the term "domestic
enemy" in your judgment preclude all U.S. citizens?
MR. BUSH: Could I get help from the Attorney
General on this? I need legal help and I know it and so
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
please --
MR. NESSEN: I am not sure it is a question that
needs an answer.
Q
Wait a minute.
Q
Mr. Bush, would you ask Mr. Nessen if you
could answer the question?
MR. BUSH: All I know is when I get asked --
Q
Could I ask Mr. Levi?
MR. BUSH: Maybe this will give a little insight
into how I plan to run the intelligence community. When I
am asked a highly technical, and I feel appropriately good
question, that --
Q
Could I address the question to Mr. Levi?
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ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think the Constitutional
oath taken by the appointee of the President is not defined
in the jurisdiction of his office if I understand your
question and, therefore, it does not relate to the
jurisdiction in terms of the foreign intelligence.
Q
The reason I ask this, sir, is because
it says here "never aimed at our own citizens." Now does
that mean that the oath means that no U.S. citizen could
be a domestic enemy?
MR. BUSH: I don't think there is anything in
the language that I have seen that would prohibit the
Director from policing his own organization, you might say,
to be sure that people are not divulging classified
information, for example. Our employees sign a secrecy
agreement that I strongly support and I think they should
and they are willing to do it and I think it is an
important thing. I think I have responsibilities under the
1947 Act to protect sources and methods and I intend to do
it and I intend to live very carefully within what is mandated
and what will be legislated here.
Q Sir, in addition to your own organization,
if you suspect that there are U.S. citizens involved in
foreign espionage do you feel that you are not supposed
to or what?
MR. BUSH: I think the FBI takes over at that
point.
Q Mr. Levi, on page 5 of your fact sheet,
in subsection 3, Restrictions on Intelligence Activities,
it says "The Executive Order prohibits or severely
restricts the following activities by U.S. foreign
intelligence agencies," and then lists the 10 including
wiretapping and all these other worthwhile objectives.
My question, addressed to anyone who can answer
it, probably the Attorney General, is, it says, "foreign
intelligence agencies," and what about these restrictions
for the FBI and other agencies engaged in the domestic
matters? Will these restrictions be placed on domestic
activities at all?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: The general answer would
be that they are applicable. They are not covered by
this particular order in view of the foreign intelligence.
As I understand it, your question is that you
go beyond foreign intelligence, purely domestic intelligence --
for example, towards the regular FBI work.
Q Right. Is there any set of guidelines?
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ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: There are guidelines, as
you well know, being developed. Many of the items mentioned
here, however, are now in the statutory law.
MR. DUVAL: Could I just add one point, and that
is that the Executive Order requires the Attorney General
to issue regulations covering the domestic activities of
the FBI within 90 days.
Q
Mr. Marsh, on that secrecy protection
clause I just want to pin it down again. Does that apply
to the secrecy agreement for all Federal employees? Does
it apply only to the disclosure of sources and methods of
intelligence or also to substantive matters such as what
we think our foreign policy is or a factual situation
or only to sources and methods of intelligence?
MR. MARSH: The present plan is sources and methods.
The proposed legislation that we have in mind is sources
and methods.
Q
I am sorry, sir, not the legislation but
your requirement that all Executive Branch employees be
required to sign a secrecy agreement against what you
called non-disclosure of classified information. Precisely
what does that mean and how does it differ from where we
are now?
MR. MARSH: Secrecy agreements are required in
some agencies and not in others and it is felt that it should
be Government-wide and to impose it in areas where it is
presently not being imposed.
Q
All Executive agencies will have such an
agreement?
MR. MARSH: If it is an individual who is
authorized to receive classified information, if in the
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
nature of his duties he has to use that information,
before he receives it he signs a secrecy agreement.
Q
Is that a legally binding effect?
MR. MARSH: Yes, I think it is. I think it does
become enforceable.
Q
How would it become enforceable? Would
you explain that? Maybe the Attorney General could
explain it.
MR. MARSH: The agency uses that type of an
agreement now and it has been used and I think it has
been applied and tested in the courts--the Marchetti case.
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Q
How do you keep it from being abused? I
asked this question of the President last night and in
his statement today he says, "Moreover, this legislation
could not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties."
Now, as perhaps you know, the House Intelligence
Committee report strongly suggested that the Secretary of
State was guilty of abuse and improprieties of the
classified and security label system, as the news account
said, to cover up policy errors. Now, how are you going
to prevent this from being abused?
MR. MARSH: In two ways. Number one, this is
one reason that the President has directed that the
Inspector Generals system in the departments and agencies
be strengthened. Secondly, this is the reason that he
has established the Intelligence Oversight Board because
if an individual, if an employee, feels that something
has been arbitrarily classified in a manner to disclose
an impropriety or an illegality he can go to the IOB with
that, he can go to his Inspector General with it. The
purpose of this is if somebody has a highly sensitive piece
of information which is a regular publication, like one of
the daily reports from the Central Intelligence Agency,
he goes over to another department or agency where an
individual has it, and he is going to use that, he signs
a secrecy agreement against its non-disclosure. That is
the main purpose. It is not intended for the purpose of
concealing improper activity and, indeed, if it is, that
is the type of thing that you want brought into the IOB.
Q
It seems to me the net effect of what you
are doing, specifically with regard to reducing what you
call the proliferation of Congressional oversight committees,
is to indeed reduce the Congressional oversight centralizing
it, if you will, but nonetheless reducing Congressional
oversight and putting more and more power into the hands
of the Executive. If you would consider the example of
the previous Administration, wouldn't you consider that
a little risky?
MR. MARSH: The purpose on reducing the number
of oversight committees in Congress is simply for the
purpose of safeguarding the information that moves up to
the Hill. The situation that we find ourselves in now
frequently is that information has to be given to make 6
or 8 different committees and by the extension of risks of
that disclosure you are contributing to the public disclosure
of that information.
It is envisioned that the oversight committees
of the Congress that are established, whatever they may be,
whether it is a suggestion along the lines of the
Administration or whether it is the proposals of the
Congress, to furnish those committees with the information
that they need
to perform their oversight function.
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There is no real problem with the disclosure
of the information to the Congress but we feel from the
standpoint of safeguarding the information that it is
to their benefit as well as ours and the Nation's to reduce
the number of committees that receive it.
Q
I want to ask the Attorney General about
the proposed legislation. Mr. Attorney General, last April
Mr. Colby, who was then Director of Central Intelligence,
made some proposals for legislation. Reading this draft
I see that it is rather tougher and more restrictive on
information than Mr. Colby's proposals. For example, it
omits a scienter requirement, a requirement Mr. Colby had
included, that the disclosure be knowing and it restricts
the right to an in camera proceeding to discover whether
the matter was lawfully classified and it removes the
clause allowing the parties to be represented in the in
camera proceeding.
Can you tell me why you would want something
more restricted than the Central Intelligence Agency Director
proposed?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I think this legislation is
extremely carefully protected. On the issues you raise,
for example, the classification has to be certified to
as appropriate before the case can be brought. If there
is an improper classification, that can be itself a bar
so that I do not find this a harsh statute.
FORD
As to a scienter requirement and as to whether
it applies to an accidental disclosure, I don't think it
GERALD
LIBRARY
applies to a disclosure which is entirely accidental.
Q
I want to clarify the security business.
Your law is directed, as you said earlier, to the disclosure
of sources and methods which is a term of art, the specific
sources and the specific methods, and that relates to
intelligence sources.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes.
Q
In this Executive Order on page 26, when
you are talking about restriction you talk about physical
surveillance which can be directed against employees, former
employees, protecting foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence sources or methods or national security
information. Now that is a much broader category so
does this permit investigation of the disclosure of national
security information under an Executive Order as against
the law?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: No. It is quite different.
The passage you just read means observing people as far
as I can --
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Q
Is what you are saying the Government now
can carry on observing as to an investigation under
this order?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, but the order
itself limits the forms of investigation. It is quite
different from the statute.
Q
But if it is not illegal under the law to
disclose national security information, how do you lawfully
surveil?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: I have to know what is
meant by "national security information."
Q
It is not in the Executive Order.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: But the Executive Order
would say, for example, that you can use electronic
surveillance only under certain conditions. If you are
going to have mail openings for some such purpose, it would
only be under statute and so on and so forth.
Q
The final one is, Mr. Bush has been charged
in the program with getting signed agreements to broaden
that to cover people who have access to classified
intelligence information. That is on page 36, which seems
to be another category.
Are there going to be any definitions of this?
The problem is, you are going to define what intelligence
is as against just normal classification programs that
are coming up?
MR. DUVAL: The answer is yes.
Q
Mr. Marsh, under this new streamline plan
where the President would have greater control and where
the Congress would have a smaller number of committees
on oversight, where secrets would be punishable if they
were released, where classified information could not be
released from the Congress without the President's
authority, could the Administration have continued to provide
covert aid to Angola?
MR. MARSH: Quite frankly, I can't respond to
a specific type of question like that but I can say this:
that it is envisioned that the oversight that the Congress
would have would certainly be as good as the oversight
that they currently have and, indeed, we would seek to
improve it.
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It should be remembered that there has been a
Congressional oversight in a number of committees over
a period of years. The Congress only last year has discussed
the improvement of that or they seek to make changes in
it themselves. They are going to make changes. We would
like to see them make those changes in a way that is
effective for them and effective for us.
The basic guideline is that we don't want the
intelligence community to engage in activities that are
beyond the reach of the Congressional authorization, and
we don't want to do the things that are not consistent with
our own form of Government, and I think that will be a
basic consideration in trying to cooperatively establish
a method of oversight that suits them and us and that the
American people are satisfied with.
Q
Mr. Marsh, on that same point, on page 7
of the fact sheet you refer to "there should be no require-
ment for prior notification of specific activities." Can
you tell me where I can find a more elaborate explanation
of that in the documents?
MR. MARSH: In the bigger document?
Where does that appear? What page?
He has asked for more elaboration on the --
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Q
Or even the same language.
MR. DUVAL: The message to Congress, page 3.
MR. MARSH: Mike says it is on page 3 of
the message to Congress.
Q
You have suggested but you never actually
said that the Intelligence Oversight Board has the power
to declassify. Does it, in fact?
MR. MARSH: No. That Board is directed more to
improprieties and illegal types of activities.
Q
I am curious, then, sir, since the
restrictions on Government officials are clearly more
severe than they have ever been in the past, who does have
the power to declassify and has that group been enlarged?
MR. MARSH: The declassification procedures
were established by an Executive Order, I believe in 1971
or 1972. The Director of Central Intelligence, I believe,
under this Executive Order is directed to implement the
operation of those declassification procedures and to
expedite them, if I am not mistaken.
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Q
Has that group been enlarged?
GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes. As a matter of fact,
there is an NSC review going on right now of the
classification procedures that were put into effect in
1972.
Q
Could I follow up on Tom Jarriel's question?
If everyone who has access to classified information has
the problem of a penalty for releasing it, how would the
public ever know what the CIA was doing and if there was
any abuse and not any abuse?
GENERAL SCOWCROFT: On the Angola question
specifically there would be nothing to prevent a Member
of the oversight committee or a Member of Congress from
moving to bar the expenditure of funds for Angola which
is in fact what happened.
Q
Wouldn't they be revealing a covert operation
by doing so?
'GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not necessarily. They would
not have to be with respect to anything ongoing as the
present law was.
Q
Could I just ask this one question?
From time to time officials have had off-the-
record briefings for the press, for responsible press. How
will this affect off-the-record background briefings in
the future?
MR. DUVAL: I think one important point is that
the President considered carefully whether to ask for
legislation covering all intelligence secrets, legislation
such as is embodied in S. 1. He rejected that course. He
went to the much more narrow sources and methods and that
should solve that problem.
Q
Mr. Bush, could I just ask you one more
question? It goes back to what I asked earlier.
Without making it personal, under this system,
what does a DCI do when a President says, "I want to know
what is going on in the headquarters of the other party,"
or "I want to help a friendly head of a foreign government
by organizing some covert operation that the State Department
and the Pentagon and others don't like"? What does a future
DCI do in order to do something about a President that
does not seem to him to be wise, judicious, legal or moral?
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MR, BUSH: Well, I cannot answer for other DCIs
but I answered that question, I think, to the satisfaction
of the Senate and that is simply that clearly the first
one is absolutely out and the second one without
authorization of this committee that has been set up
would be out as well. So I think you are referring to
this double track thing that has happened under different
Administrations in the past. I think that the machinery
that has been set up here eliminates any danger of that.
Hopefully, sir, I have the integrity that I would not be
approached on a double track.
Q I am not asking about you. I am asking
what is the institutional protection?
MR. BUSH: The institutional protection is the
formalization of the procedures of the old 40 Committee,
for one thing, and I think that is a very important step.
It is not gathering more power to the President. It seems
to me it is formalizing a necessary check, you might say,
before the operation gets to him. And it won't be done
without meetings of a higher level -- Special Operations
Committee, whatever it is called.
The operations will not be approved. So I do
think there are more safeguards for the American people
in this respect while keeping the right for the President
to approve operations.
GLRALD БОНД LIBRARY
Q
Mr. Bush, with all due respect --
MR. DUVAL: If I might, Mr. Schorr, could I just
expand for one second because it goes to a question that
I think Mr. Brokaw had also.
What the President did by putting into an Executive
Order what the agencies must do and importantly, specifically,
what they must not do, it has the effect of being binding.
It is public. It can't be changed unless it is changed
publicly. It establishes an iron clad process whereby
if you take the example you use, that would be a domestic
violation of the Restrictions Order. If such a command
went out, then under the procedures that President Ford
has put into Executive Order, anybody in the CIA would
have a command under Executive Order to report that to
the Intelligence Oversight Board made up of independent
citizens.
If, for example, a future Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency ordered his employees not to report it,
the simple fact of giving that order under the express
command of the Restrictions Order, the employee would have
to go to the Intelligence Oversight Board.
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So what you have done and what the President has
done is he has set up the commandments of what they must
not do in writing and in an Executive Order that cannot be
changed unless it is changed publicly. Then he has
established a mechanism for getting any deviation from
that to the Intelligence Oversight Board for its handling.
If it is against the law, that Board must report it to
the Attorney General.
Q
Mr. Levi, could I ask one question to
clarify something?
Q
Mr. Duval, could you specify just what the
procedures are by which the agency would inform the over-
sight committees of a covert action; that is, the timing and
also the procedures by which that would be done?
MR. DUVAL: Well, again I know it has taken Jack
and myself and all of us a long time to get to understand
and work out that Executive Order -- it is extremely complex.
The reporting to the Intelligence Oversight Board of abuses
is specified specifically, the procedures in the Executive
Order.
#
Q
These are on covert actions?
MR. DUVAL: On covert action. It is not the
Intelligence Oversight Board.
MR. BUSH: Congressional oversight committees
of Congress.
MR. DUVAL: Well, we start where we are, start
with the state of the law today.
Under the state of the law today you have section
662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the so-called Hughes-
'Brien amendment that sets out the reporting requirements.
What the President says in his message and what he said
to the leadership last night was centralize the committee
structure to perform so that you can bring together the
oversight at one place -- it will be better oversight.
We can provide it more information, full information. And
once you have done that then modify section 662 so that
the notification of any covert operations would be given
to that group.
Q
It now says "in a timely fashion" which
admittedly is ambiguous. Would that continue as the
governing?
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MR. DUVAL: The President again has set forth
certain principles. One of the principles that the Executive
Branch acting under Article 2 has to exercise is its
functions. The Congress is oversight. If Congress is
involved in specific operations and the decision-making
for specific operations, then who does the oversight? So
what he envisions is to find the ground rules for the
action, full notification to Congress after the action
and they conduct the oversight.
Q
Is there any place in these documents where
he spells that out? I mean, it seems like it is a fairly
critical point.
MR. DUVAL: Dick, he made a very strong point --
and I think Jack ought to get up here and rescue me on this --
and that is that when you are defining the specific
relationship, that point where the Executive functions and
the Congressional functions come together, that needs
discussion with the Congress and he has laid out principles
and guidelines but, as he told the leadership last night,
he wants to work with them in defining the specifics.
Q
Could I ask one question of the Attorney
General? I am still not clear on the legal effect of
this oath that all Executive Branch employees who have
access to classified information will sign.
Suppose a functionary in the State Department
having signed that oath then reveals classified information,
what is the effect of the oath? I mean, can he be sued?
Can he be prosecuted?
FOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Yes, a civil suit.
Q
A civil suit brought by whom?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, it can be brought
by the Government.
Q
But only a civil suit, not a criminal suit?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It does in itself
provide for the criminal remedy.
Q
But is a criminal remedy possible?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, not on the basis
of that agreement alone.
Q
Are there any limits to the amount of the
civil liability?
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The point is that although the claim has been
made that this is not an official secrets act, yet every
Executive Branch employee in the entire Government is
required to sign an oath stating that he will not reveal
classified information and, furthermore, action can lie
as a result of his failure to comply.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It would be one of the
few ways that the Government under present law might proceed
to enjoin the disclosure by that person of information.
I must say that the combination of that and the intelligence
methods and sources legislation which is proposed here,
which by the way was arrived at through an agreement between
Mr. Colby and myself and really was not a question of
one
running after the other to see who would be
tougher, it seemed to us to be the minimum steps if you
are going to have whatsoever any effective legislation
against any and all disclosures.
The fact of the matter is that the present law,
except for the signing of the agreement in the Marchetti
case, is practically in that shape now. If one considers
that the best policy and program for this country, then
obviously one should have no legislation whatsoever. If
one assumes that some secrecy should be enforceable by
law, some minimum amount, our judgment was that this
was that minimum amount and certainly is, I think, much
less than one would find in any other country.
If one refers to the official Secrets Act, it
really would be fantastically different and it is fantastically
different than S. 1. So we thought this was a minimum
amount.
Q
Have any standards been applied to determine
when classified information is revealed by someone in an
unauthorized way when a civil suit would be brought? What
are the standards for which secrets will be let out?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: It is exactly the same
today as when these agreements are there. The most useful
thing about the agreement would be that if one knew that
a revelation was in process, one could get an injunction
against it.
Q
How do I insure the independence of an
Inspector Generalship when it is lodged within each of
the agencies? This is perhaps for Mr. Duval or Mr. Marsh.
Why did you go that route rather than an independent
Inspector General for intelligence where you would not
have these internal agency loyalties?
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MR. MARSH: Well, it was felt that ha ng the IOB
and giving them a very broad responsibility and requiring
the agency heads and their general counsels and inspector
generals to report to them and they could make recommendations,
too, that that will be far, far more effective to achieve
oversight than having a Government-wide Inspector General.
Q
Mr. Marsh, am I right in thinking that the
only substantive limit on the kind of covert operation
could be carried out, either proposed in the President's
message to Congress to be embodied in legislation or
included in the Executive Order as a prohibition on
assassinations? That is the only type of covert operation
that is, specifically excluded,
MR. MARSH: I think some of the collection
systems -- electronic surveillance systems -- are covert
types of surveillances, they are excluded.
Q
I was thinking of some of the foreign ones
we have learned about lately such as President Nixon's
order to the CIA or Mr. Helms' to carry out or encourage
a military coup in Chile, various things of that kind.
FORD
They would not be excluded under this proposal, or the
payment of bribes or subventions to foreign politicians
LIBRA
All of those would not be covered?
MR. MARSH: I think that the standards that you
would have in the Restrictions Order and the Congressional
oversight and the Inspector General's operation and the
IOB or the Oversight Board's examination of the activities
would quickly flush out and bring out any type of abuse
like that that would occur.
Q
Why is it an abuse? I don't find any language
in either the Executive Order or the legislation that leads
me to think it is regarded as an abuse. Could you point
me to any language that would lead a board of this kind you
describe to regard it as an abuse? I say I can only find
the reference to the assassinations.
MR. MARSH: Actually the Order is directed to
the foreign intelligence agencies in the manner in which
they conduct their operations and a provision for the over-
view of how they conduct it and the standards that they
will be tested by will be the standards of their own
Inspector Generals or the Attorney General and of the
Intelligence Oversight Board and those items that they find
that are abuses, that we should not be engaged in, they
will report those to the Attorney General. I think that
is the best oversight you can have because I don't think
you can anticipate some of the things that may occur in
this or any other type of operation.
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- 28 -
Q
How would that be an abuse?
MR. NESSEN: Why don't we have two more questions?
Q
Mr. Bush, I would like to ask this since
Mr. Colby has --
MR. NESSEN: Dick had a question half out of
his mouth, Les, and then Walt and then Ford and that
will be it.
Q
Thank you, Ron. I mean, I was standing and
I had a question half out of my mouth, too.
MR. NESSEN: Dick.
Q
I am just not clear from your answer,
Mr. Marsh. Would that be an abuse?
MR. MARSH: Would what be?
Q
The situation described in Chile, for
example? Under the President's Order, would that be an
abuse?
MR. MARSH: I can't say that I can answer that.
I would say this, that the standards that would be applied
in the covert operations will have to meet the standards
that are acceptable to the Intelligence Oversight Board and
there will be a question in my mind whether that would meet
the standards.
Q
Who sets those standards? The Board?
MR. MARSH: The Board themselves will set
standards and these are men --
Q
Do they have any experience in covert
operations? I mean, for example, don't some of these
members have some past experience with regard to covert
operations?
MR. MARSH: Yes, they do.
Q
Mr. Cherne was the first to be overseeing
on the President's Foreign Policy Advisorv Board, wasn't he?
It didn't seem to work very well.
These are not exactly fresh new faces. Ambassador
Murphy has been around this town for a little while.
MR. MARSH: That is right, and Mr. Ailes was the
Secretary of the Army.
HORE
- 29 -
Q
General Scowcroft, may I ask one question,
please, relative to national security leaks? I was
wondering, sir, if, in your experience at the White House,
you could give us an example of one or more leaks that
have damaged the national security and, if so, how and why?
GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, just offhand I don't
think of one specifically that I can tell you a), b), and c)
has damaged national security. I think, though, you have
to say that there has been at the very minimum a cumulative
effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of our
intelligence collection and our cooperation with other
intelligence organizations in the free world. Their
cooperation with us has, in some cases, been limited by
the fact that they do have some doubts about our ability
to safeguard the information that they have been willing
to share with us. That is one specific example.
MR. NESSEN: One last question.
Q
Could I ask a question of either Mr. Marsh
or Mr. Duval.
FORD
Sometimes we have short memories. The last
time we had a major scandal about spying inside of the
GERALD R
United States was by the military and out of that came
internal reforms which are not unlike these. They were not
Presidentially ordered but they were ordered by the
Secretary of Defense, called DIRK, in 1971 or 1970.
To what extent do these change DIRK -- some
of them seem stronger and some of them seem weaker. What
have you rescinded about the Defense Department's own
regulations restricting spying on Americans by the military?
Have you done a study on that?
MR. DUVAL: The Secretary of Defense has an
obligation under this Executive Order to insure that the
Defense Department regulations are consistent with the
prohibitions and the commands in that Executive Order.
The President faced up to this. He grabbed it straight
on and put it down in the Executive Order. So having it
out there, that is the point.
Now clearly the Secretary of Defense, as it states
in the order, must have internal regulations that implement
and are consistent with the President's restrictions.
Q
So is it your view that this does not rescind
any part of DIRK?
MR. DUVAL: That order in your hand supersedes
anything else in the Defense Department.
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- 30 -
THE PRESS: Thank you.
MR. NESSEN: Let Jack Marsh say one word here in
general terms about the President's views of covert
operations when they are conducted according to all
these restrictions and regulations when they have been
reviewed and approved by the appropriate bodies set up
here. I think some of you perhaps are leaving without
that point quite clear in your mind.
MR. MARSH: There are no restrictions on the
conduct of covert operations except those restrictions,
of course, that might be applied by the Congress or
decisions that are made internally in the Executive
Branch of Government as to whether it was a wise thing
to do or not to do. Other than the Congressional oversight
there are no restrictions in this Executive Order that
has been issued here that relate to covert operations.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END (AT 12:25 P.M. EST)
GERRALO FURD LIBRARY
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
February 18, 1976
UNTIL 12:00 Noon (EST)
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FOR
FACT SHEET
The President's Actions Concerning
the Foreign Intelligence Community
SUMMARY
The President has today taken the following comprehensive
actions to strengthen the United States foreign intelligence
departments and agencies: (1) issued an Omnibus Executive
Order establishing policy guidelines and restrictions for the
intelligence agencies and a new command structure and over-
sight mechanism for the intelligence community; (2) proposed
new legislation to protect the secrecy of particularly sensi-
tive intelligence information, announced that he will meet with
Congressional leaders to develop legislation concerning elec-
tronic surveillance and to prevent unauthorized opening of
mail, and he endorsed legislation to prohibit assassinations of
foreign leaders; and, (3) proposed a framework in which con-
structive Congressional oversight can be established without
disclosing intelligence secrets.
OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS
The President's actions are designed to insure that:
(1) The United States has a strong and effective capa-
bility to gather and evaluate foreign intelligence
and conduct necessary covert operations; and
(2) These activities are conducted in a Constitutional
and lawful manner and never aimed at our own citizens.
The President's actions will strengthen our foreign intelligence
capability and establish an effective process to prevent abuses
by:
(A) Setting forth in Executive Order, policy guidance for
the foreign intelligence agencies which define what
functions they are supposed to carry out and which
clearly states what they are not permitted to do.
(B) Creating a streamlined command structure for
intelligence community leadership which makes
specifically designated individuals accountable.
(c) Requiring the NSC to conduct semi-annual reviews
of the adequacy of the foreign intelligence
product and establishing the Intelligence
Oversight Board to monitor compliance with the
restrictions which have been placed on the
intelligence community's activities.
more
(OVER)
2
OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER
(1) Control and Direction of Intelligence Organizations
(A) Overall Policy Development
1.
The National Security Council (NSC) will con-
tinue to exercise overall policy control over
the foreign intelligence community.
2.
Statutory members are:
The President
... Vice President
-- Secretary of State
-- Secretary of Defense
3.
The NSC will conduct a semi-annual policy review
of foreign intelligence activities focused on,
but not limited to, the following:
Needs of government foreign policy-makers
and the responsiveness of foreign intelli-
gence to these needs, including the quality,
scope and timeliness of the intelligence
product,
The effective and efficient use of resources
in the collection of intelligence informa-
tion; and
The continued appropriateness of ongoing
covert operations and sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs will have staff responsibility
for the semi-annual policy reviews. Heads of the
departments and agencies which use foreign
intelligence will be consulted.
(B) Management and Resource Control
1.
Responsibility for management and resource control
of the foreign intelligence community is vested by
Executive Order in the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI), which reports directly to
the NSC.
2.
Membership of the CFI is:
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
Chairman
- Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
(NOTE: Staff support shall be provided by the
intelligence community staff.)
3.
The Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall:
Control budget preparation and resource
allocation for the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program (defined as excluding tactical
intelligence).
more
3
Establish management policies for the
Foreign Intelligence Program.
Carry out policy decisions of the NSC with
particular emphasis on collection and pro-
duction of national intelligence.
4.
Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the NSC
upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence
or any member of the NSC.
(C) Production of National Intelligence
1.
Responsibility for the production of substantive
national (i.e., not tactical or departmental)
intelligence is vested in the Director of Central
Intelligence. The DCI is the President's primary
advisor on foreign intelligence.
2.
To assist in developing national intelligence
requirements and priorities, and in developing
finished national intelligence, the DCI shall
establish such boards and committees (similar to
the former USIB) of the intelligence community
as will enable him most effectively to utilize
the talent of the community to produce the best
possible intelligence product.
(D) Covert Action and Other Special Operations
1.
Responsibility to review and advise the President
on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign
intelligence collection missions is assigned by
Executive Order to the Operations Advisory Group
(Operations. Group).
2.
New membership is:
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Chairman
-- Secretary of State
-- Secretary of Defense
-- Director of Central Intelligence
-- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
GERALD, FORD VIGRARY
Observers are:
Attorney General
Director of OMB
3.
The Special Intelligence Operations Group shall:
Consider and make recommendations to the
President on all proposals for covert
action and certain sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
Submit to the NSC a periodic review of
ongoing covert operations and sensitive
intelligence collection missions.
Meet formally to carry out its responsi-
bility to make recommendations to the
President.
more
4
(E) The following existing committees or organizations
are abolished:
(1) United States Intelligence Board
(2) Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
(3) National Security Council Intelligence
Committee
(4) Executive Committee for resource control
of certain intelligence collection
activity
(5) 40 Committee
(2) Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community
(A) The Senior Official of each organization of the
intelligence community shall insure his organization
operates in accordance with the Executive Order. He
shall establish a system of independent inspection
within the organization and provide information to
the NSC, CFI and Intelligence Oversight Board. Other
responsibilities as designated in Section IV of the
Order.
(B) CIA is responsible, among other duties as defined
in Section IV of the Order, for:
Production of national intelligence
Maintaining and improving a national intel-
ligence analytic base
Collection by other than normal, overt means
Foreign counterintelligence activities
Undertaking activities defined in the
Executive Order necessary to implement
the above
(C) The Department of State is primarily responsible for
overt collection of foreign, non-military information.
Its Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall also
produce departmental intelligence and contribute
to national intelligence production.
(D) The Department of Treasury is responsible for overt
collection of foreign, economic information.
(E) The Department of Defense is responsible for:
Overt collection outside the United States
of foreign military and military-related
information.
Producing that intelligence required to fulfill
the responsibilities of DOD.
Managing the Defense Attache system.
Providing intelligence staff support to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
more
5
The National Security Agency is responsible for:
Full control over signals intelligence
collection activities.
Production and dissemination of signals
intelligence.
Providing communications security services
to the U.S. Government.
Research and development related to signals
intelligence.
(F) The Energy Research and Development Administration
is responsible for producing intelligence relating
to atomic and nuclear matters.
(G) The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible
for:
Making available to foreign intelligence
agencies foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence which it collects.
Conducting foreign counterintelligence
activities within the United States.
(3) Restrictions on Intelligence Activities
The Executive Order prohibits or severely restricts the
following activities by United States foreign intelligence
agencies:
Collection and analysis of information on the
domestic activities of United States citizens,
corporations and organizations and permanent
resident aliens (referred to as U.S. persons).
Physical or electronic surveillance or physical
searches of United States persons.
Opening of United States mail in violation of
law.
DERALO, FORD LIBRARY
Illegally obtaining federal tax returns or
information.
Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose
of influencing or reporting on them.
Experimentation with drugs on humans without the
subject's informed consent.
Sharing among agencies information on the
domestic activities of United States persons
except in compliance with stringent safeguards.
Assignment of personnel to other agencies.
Providing assistance to law enforcement agencies
in violation of law.
Testing of electronic surveillance equipment
within the United States.
more
6
Limited exceptions are permitted to allow the agencies
to meet the legitimate foreign intelligence needs of the
Nation. These narrow exceptions are expressed in detail
in the Order. They are designed to permit the following
activities under carefully defined circumstances:
Collection of information on the domestic activi-
ties of U.S. persons in order to: conduct security
checks on intelligence agency employees, contrac-
tors, people who are given access to classified
information and persons who may assist the agency
in the future. Overt collection of certain
foreign intelligence information from other
government agencies.
Counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.
(4) Oversight of Intelligence Activities
1.
Responsibility to assist the President, the
NSC and the Attorney General in overseeing
the intelligence community is assigned by
Executive Order to the Intelligence Oversight
Board (Oversight Board).
2.
New membership consists of three members from
the private sector designated by the President.
One of these will be designated by the President
to be Chairman. They will also be made members
of the PFIAB.
3.
The Board shall:
Receive and consider reports by Inspectors
General and General Counsels of the
intelligence community concerning activi-
ties that raise questions of legality or
propriety.
Review periodically the practices and
procedures of the intelligence community
Inspectors General and General Counsels
designed to assist the Oversight Board.
Report periodically and in a timely manner,
as appropriate, to the Attorney General
and the President on any activities that
raise serious questions about legality.
It shall report to the President on
activities that raise questions of pro-
priety of intelligence community activities.
Receive staff support from persons not
connected with the intelligence community.
(5) Secrecy Protection
All persons given access to information containing intel-
ligence sources and methods shall be required to sign an
agreement that they will not disclose that information to
persons not authorized to receive it.
more
7
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
(A) Message
Today the President sent a message to the Congress which:
(1) Advised the Congress of the actions he has taken
by Executive Order.
(2) Transmitted the legislative proposal as indicated
below.
(3) Urged Congress to establish effective oversight
consistent with the following general objectives:
The oversight functions should be centralized
in a Joint House-Senate Committee to provide
better security.
Both the House and Senate should adopt rules
to insure that secrets will not be improperly
disclosed.
The President's injunction of secrecy over
foreign intelligence information provided to
the Congress by the Executive Branch should be
respected.
The Executive Branch should keep the Joint
Oversight Committee fully informed of foreign
intelligence matters, but there should be no
requirement for prior notification of specific
activities.
(4) Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act should be
modified. This requires the intelligence agencies
to brief over six committees of Congress on covert
actions and has resulted in unauthorized disclosures
of classified information.
(B) Legislation
The President submitted the following proposed legislation:
Secrecy of Sources and Methods
This bill provides for:
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Criminal penalties for the disclosure
to unauthorized persons of information
relating to intelligence sources and
methods.
Limits its coverage to persons whose
access to such information arise out of
their relationship to the Government
(Government employees, contractors and
contractor employees).
Injunctive relief where unauthorized
disclosure is threatened and serious
damage to the intelligence collection
effort would result.
more
8
The President endorsed the objectives of the legislation
proposed by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
to prohibit the assassination of foreign officials in
peacetime.
The President also will meet with Congressional leaders
to develop acceptable proposed legislation to control
electronic surveillance in the United States and mail
openings for foreign intelligence purposes.
ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN
The following are examples of agency actions:
CIA directives implementing the recommendations of
the Rockefeller Commission and other reforms have
been issued internally.
NSA reform directives have been issued internally.
FBI guidelines are being drafted. Some have already
been made public.
# # #
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
February 18, 1976
UNTIL 12 P.M. (EST)
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER
UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, includ-
ing the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and
as President of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section
Description
Page
1
PURPOSE
2
2
DEFINITIONS
2
3
CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATIONS
4
(a)
National Security Council
4
(b)
Committee on Foreign Intelligence
5
(c)
Operations Advisory Group
6
(d)
Director of Central Intelligence-
7
4
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
11
(a)
Senior Official of Each Organi-
zation of the Intelligence
Community
12
(b)
Central Intelligence Agency
14
(c)
Department of State
16
(d)
Department of the Treasury
17
(e)
Department of Defense
18
(f)
Energy Research and Development
Administration
21
(g)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
22
5
RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
23
6
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
31
7
SECRECY PROTECTION
35
8
ENABLING DATA
35
2
Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order
is to establish policies to improve the quality of
intelligence needed for national security, to clarify
the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence
departments and agencies, and to establish effective
oversight to assure compliance with law in the manage-
ment and direction of intelligence agencies and depart-
ments of the national government.
Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this
Order, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms
shall have these meanings:
(a) Intelligence means:
(1) Foreign intelligence which means informa-
tion, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the
capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign
powers, organizations or their agents; and
(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means
activities conducted to protect the United States and
United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage,
subversion, assassination or terrorism.
(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following
organizations:
(1) Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) National Security Agency;
(3) Defense Intelligence Agency;
3
(4) Special offices within the Department
of Defense for the collection of
specialized intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(5) Intelligence elements of the military
services;
(6) Intelligence element of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation;
(7) Intelligence element of the Department
of State;
(8) Intelligence element of the Department
of the Treasury; and
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
(9) Intelligence element of the Energy
Resources and Development Administration.
(c) Special activities in support of national
foreign policy objectives means activities, other than
the collection and production of intelligence and related
support functions, designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad which are planned and
executed so that the role of the United States Government
is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.
(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means
the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
special offices within the Department of Defense for
the collection of specialized intelligence through recon-
naissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program,
and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence
Program and other programs of the departments and
agencies, not including tactical intelligence, desig-
nated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part
of the Program.
4
Sec. 3. Control and Direction of National
Intelligence Organizations.
(a) National Security Council.
(1) The National Security Council was
established by the National Security Act of 1947 to
advise the President with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security. Statutory members of the
National Security Council are the President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary
of Defense.
(2) Among its responsibilities, the National
Security Council shall provide guidance and direction
to the development and formulation of national intelli-
gence activities.
(3) The National Security Council shall
conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies
and of ongoing special activities in support of national
Foreign policy objectives. These reviews shall con-
sider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeli-
ness and quality of intelligence products and the con-
tinued appropriateness of special activities in support
of national Foreign policy objectives. The National
Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of
the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as
designated by the President as part of these reviews.
5
(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
(1) There is established the Committee on
Foreign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the
CFI), which shall be composed of the Director of
Central Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the
DCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs. The
CFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.
(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget prepara-
tion and resource allocation for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.
(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission
to the Office of Management and Budget, review, and
amend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
FORD j LIBRARY GERALD
(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules
governing the reprogramming of funds within this budget.
Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain
types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.
(ii) Establish policy priorities for the col-
lection and production of national intelligence.
(iii) Establish policy for the management of
the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
6
(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between
tactical and national intelligence; however, neither
the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for
tactical intelligence.
(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelli-
gence Community in order to ensure compliance with
policy directions of the NSC.
(3) The CFI shall be supported by the
Intelligence Community staff headed by the Deputy to
the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelli-
gence Community.
(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees
as it deems appropriate to ensure consultation with
members of the Intelligence Community on policies and
guidance issued by the CFI.
(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed
by the National Security Council upon appeal by the
Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the
National Security Council.
(c) The Operations Advisory Group.
(1) There is established the Operations
Advisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the Opera-
tions Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs; the
Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the
President. The Attorney General and the Director
7
of the Office of Management and Budget or their repre-
sentatives, and others who may be designated by the
President, shall attend all meetings as observers.
(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider
and develop a policy recommendation, including any
dissents, for the President prior to his decision on
each special activity in support of national foreign
FORD i LIBRARY 933470
policy objectives.
(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previ-
ously considered by the Operations Group.
(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelli-
gence collection operations as designated by the Opera-
tions Group.
(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive
intelligence collection operations.
(3) The Operations Group shall discharge
the responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c) (2) (i)
and (c) (2) (iii) of this section only after consideration
in a formal meeting attended by all members and observers;
or, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer
is unavailable, when a designated representative of
the member or observer attends.
(4) The staff of the National Security Council
shall provide support to the Operations Group.
(d) Director of Central Intelligence.
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,
8
pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall
be responsible directly to the National Security Council
and the President. He shall:
(i) Chair the CFI.
(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelli-
gence Community staff.
(iii) Ensure the development and submission of
a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program
to the CFI.
(iv) Act as the President's primary adviser on
foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials
in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence,
including National Intelligence Estimates; develop
national intelligence requirements and priorities;
and supervise production and dissemination of national
intelligence.
(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special
activities in support of national foreign policy
objectives.
(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety
of requests, and responses thereto, from the White House
Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to
the Intelligence Community.
(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are
developed which properly protect intelligence sources,
methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility
within the United States shall be limited to:
9
(A) Protection by lawful means against
disclosure by present or former employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees
of persons or organizations, presently or formerly
under contract with the Agency;
(B) providing leadership, guidance
and technical assistance to other government depart-
ments and agencies performing foreign intelligence
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
activities; and
(c) in cases involving serious or con-
tinuing security violations, recommending to the
Attorney General that the case be referred to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for further investigation.
(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade
and declassify foreign intelligence information as
appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.
(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector
General capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence
Community and that each Inspector General submits
quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report
which sets forth any questionable activities in which
that intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.
(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence
Community, of common security standards for managing
and handling foreign intelligence systems, information
and products, and for granting access thereto.
10
(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress
for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use
of foreign intelligence products by Congress.
(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by
the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common
concern to the Intelligence Community organizations,
including multi-discipline analysis, national level
intelligence products, and a national level current
intelligence publication.
(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identi-
fication, selection, and designation of relative prior-
ities for the transmission of critical intelligence,
and provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing
guidance as to the communications requirements of the
Intelligence Community for the transmission of such
intelligence.
(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors,
producers and users of intelligence to assist in his
conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.
(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelli-
gence, including the Departments of State, Treasury,
and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Energy Resources and Development
Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors,
to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of
the intelligence product.
11
(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in the supervision and direction of the Intelli-
gence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director
of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
is hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).
(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in the supervision and direction of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall, to the extent consistent with his statutory
responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of
the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403 (a) )
GLRALOR FORD LIBRARY
(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of
his responsibilities, the heads of all departments and
agencies shall give him access to all information
relevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United
States. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall
be provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps
to maintain its confidentiality.
Sec. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the
Intelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation
prescribed by this section of the Order relate to the
activities of our foreign intelligence agencies. In
some instances, detailed implementation of this Executive
order will be contained in classified documents because
of the sensitivity of the information and its relation
12
to national security. All such classified instructions
will be consistent with this Order. Unless otherwise
specified within this section, its provisions apply
to activities both inside and outside the United States,
and all references to law are to applicable laws of the
United States. Nothing in this section of this Order
shall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement
responsibility of any department or agency.
(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.
The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State,
Treasury and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall ensure
that, in discharging the duties and responsibilities
enumerated for their organizations which relate to
foreign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs
of the President, the National Security Council and
other elements of the Government. In carrying out their
duties and responsibilities, senior officials shall
ensure that all policies and directives relating to
intelligence activities are carried out in accordance
with law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:
(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities
of the other elements of the Intelligence Community in
order to achieve maximum efficiency.
(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility
to the national intelligence products produced under
auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.
13
(3) Establish internal policies and guide-
lines governing employee conduct and ensuring that
such are made known to, and acknowledged by, each
employee.
(4) Provide for a strong and independent
organization for identification and inspection of, and
reporting on, unauthorized activity.
(5) Report to the Attorney General that informa-
tion which relates to detection or prevention of possible
violations of law by any person, including an employee
of the senior official's department or agency.
FORD i LIBRARY 07V839
(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the CFI, the Operations Group, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence
Oversight Board all of the information required for
the performance of their respective duties.
(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the
provision of services of common concern as directed by
the Director of Central Intelligence and provide other
departments and agencies with such mutual assistance
as may be within his capabilities and as may be required
in the interests of the Intelligence Community for
reasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational
necessity.
14
(8) Protect intelligence and intelligence
sources and methods within his department or agency,
consistent with policies and guidance of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
(9) Conduct a continuing review of all classi-
fied material originating within his organization and
promptly declassifying such material consistent with
Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.
(10) Provide administrative and support functions
required by his department or agency.
(b) The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties
and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall be related to the foreign intelligence functions
outlined below. As authorized by the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,
and other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall:
(1) Produce and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence relating to the national security, including
foreign political, economic, scientific, technical,
military, sociological, and geographic intelligence,
to meet the needs of the President, the National Security
Council, and other elements of the United States
Government.
(2) Develop and conduct programs to collect
political, economic, scientific, technical, military,
geographic, and sociological information, not otherwise
15
obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in
accordance with directives of the National Security
Council.
(3) Collect and produce intelligence on
foreign aspects of international terrorist activities
and traffic in narcotics.
(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence
activities outside the United States and when in the
United States in coordination with the FBI subject
to the approval of the Attorney General.
(5) Carry out such other special activities
in support of national foreign policy objectives as
may be directed by the President or the National
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Security Council and which are within the limits of
applicable law.
(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community,
services of common concern as directed by the National
Security Council, such as monitoring of foreign public
radio and television broadcasts and foreign press
services, collection of foreign intelligence informa-
tion from cooperating sources in the United States,
acquisition and translation of foreign publications
and photographic interpretation.
(7) Carry out or contract for research,
development and procurement of technical systems and
devices relating to the functions authorized in this
subsection.
16
(8) Protect the security of its installations,
activities, information and personnel. In order to
maintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investi-
gations of applicants, employees, and other persons with
similar associations with the CIA as are necessary.
(9) Conduct administrative, technical and support
activities in the United States or abroad as may be neces-
sary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1)
through (8) above, including procurement, maintenance
and transport; communications and data processing;
recruitment and training; the provision of personnel,
financial and medical services; development of essential
cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into con-
tracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies
and institutions to provide classified or unclassified
research, analytical and developmental services and
specialized expertise; and entering into similar arrange-
ments with academic institutions, provided CIA sponsor-
ship is known to the appropriate senior officials of
the academic institutions and to senior project officials.
(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of
State shall:
(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political,
political-military, sociological, economic, scientific,
technical and associated biographic information.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1976
MEMO FOR MR. LINDER:
FROM: TOM JONES
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
SUBJECT: Attached Certificate for
Intelligence Oversight Board
From the material issued at the time this
Board was established (Executive Order,
President's statement and the press briefing
given at the time) I don't think there can
be much doubt that there was every intention
to make sure publicly that this Board was
to be independent in both its construction
and its operation.
Since it was set up as an independent part
of the government and the Executive Order
failed to state in no uncertain terms that it
was to be a part of the Executive Office of
the President, such as the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, OMB, OTP, Domestic
Council, etc., I think the issuance of such a
Certificate would not be in keeping, or correct,
with the public expression of the Board's
independence.
In the final analysis it certainly is not part
of the White House Office.
Could not the NSC staff and the Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board also expect something like this if
it is issued??
17
(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence relating to United States foreign policy as
required for the execution of his responsibilities
and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign
relations within the United States Government.
(3) Disseminate within the United States
GERALD LIBRARY GERALDR. FORD
Government, as appropriate, reports received from
United States diplomatic missions abroad.
(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central
Intelligence to ensure that United States intelligence
activities and programs are useful for and consistent
with United States foreign policy.
(5) Transmit reporting requirements of the
Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad
and provide guidance for their collection effort.
(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community
guidance for its collection of intelligence based on
the needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.
(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging
their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the
activities of all elements of their missions.
(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secre-
tary of the Treasury shall:
(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and
monetary information.
18
(2) Participate with the Department of State
in the overt collection of general foreign economic
information.
(3) Produce that intelligence required for the
execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental respon-
sibilities and the mission of the Department of the
Treasury.
(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance
required for the development of national intelligence.
(5) Disseminate within the United States
Government, as appropriate, foreign intelligence informa-
tion acquired.
(e) Department of Defense.
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:
(i) Collect foreign military intelligence inform-
ation as well as military-related foreign intelligence
information, including scientific, technical, political
and economic information as required for the execution
of his responsibilities.
(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate,
intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities
and intentions and scientific, technical and economic
developments pertinent to his responsibilities.
(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary
to fulfill national intelligence requirements as
determined by the CFI.
19
(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National
Security Agency, and national, defense and military
intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.
(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United
States Government, signals intelligence activities and
communications security.
(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of
Central Intelligence, within the United States Govern-
ment, except as otherwise approved by the CFI.
(2) In carrying out these assigned respon-
sibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to
utilize the following:
(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions,
authorities and responsibilities are currently publicly
assigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21)
to:
(A) Produce or provide military intelli-
gence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate,
non-Defense agencies.
(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense
intelligence collection requirements and manage. the
Defense Attache system.
(c) Establish substantive intelligence
priority goals and objectives for the Department of
Defense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence
matters to all major Defense intelligence activities.
20
(D) Review and maintain cognizance over
all plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic
intelligence functions of the Department of Defense.
(E) Provide intelligence staff support
as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions,
authorities and responsibilities shall include:
(A) Establishment and operation of an effective
unified organization for the signals intelligence activities
of the United States Government, except for certain opera-
tions which are normally exercised through appropriate
elements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.
(B) Exercise control over signals intelli-
gence collection and processing activities of the Govern-
ment, delegating to an appropriate agent specified re-
sources for such periods and tasks as required for the
direct support of military commanders.
(c) Collection, processing and dissemination
of signals intelligence in accordance with objectives,
requirements, and priorities established by the Director
of Central Intelligence.
(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence
to all authorized elements of the Government, including
the Armed Services, as requested.
(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense
as the central communications security authority of the
United States Government.
21
(F) Conduct of research and development
to meet the needs of the United States for signals
intelligence and communications security.
(iii) Special offices for the collection of
specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs,
whose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall
include:
(A) Carrying out consolidated programs
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
for reconnaissance.
(B) Assigning responsibility to the various
departments and agencies of the Government, according
to their capabilities, for the research, development,
procurement, operations and control of designated means
of collection.
(iv) Such other offices within the Department
of Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct
of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned
to the Secretary of Defense.
(f) Energy Research and Development Administration.
The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development
Administration shall:
(1) Produce intelligence required for the
execution of his responsibilities and the mission of
the Energy Research and Development Administration, herein-
after referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear
and atomic energy.
22
(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide
technical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence
Community organizations and be responsive to the guidance
of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee
on Foreign Intelligence.
(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community
agencies and departments in formulating collection require-
ments where its special technical expertise can contribute
to such collection requirements.
(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under
the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to
such regulations as the Attorney General may establish,
the Director of the FBI shall:
(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage,
subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf
of foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence
operations within the United States, including electronic
surveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.
(2) Conduct within the United States and its
territories, when requested by officials of the Intelli-
gence Community designated by the President, those lawful
activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized
by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney
General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelli-
gence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.
23
(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful
means within the United States and its territories when
requested by officials of the Intelligence Community
designated by the President to make such requests.
(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information which
it acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and
local law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign
governments.
(5) Carry out or contract for research,
FORD LIBRARY is SERALD
development and procurement of technical systems and
devices relating to the functions authorized above.
Sec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities.
Information about the capabilities, intentions and
activities of other governments is essential to informed
decision-making in the field of national defense and
foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire
such information should be responsive to the legitimate
needs of our Government and must be conducted in a manner
which preserves and respects our established concepts
of privacy and our civil liberties.
Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability
of government-wide direction which will ensure a proper
balancing of these interests. This section of this Order
does not authorize any activity not previously authorized
24
and does not provide exemption from any restrictions
otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the
provisions of this section apply to activities both
inside and outside the United States. References to
law are to applicable laws of the United States.
(a) Definitions. As used in this section of this
Order, the following terms shall have the meanings
ascribed to them below:
(1) "Collection" means any one or more of
the gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of
non-publicly available information without the informed
express consent of the subject of the information.
(2) "Counterintelligence" means information
concerning the protection of foreign intelligence or
of national security information and its collection
from detection or disclosure.
(3) "Electronic surveillance" means acquisition
of a non-public communication by electronic means,
without the consent of a person who is a party to, or,
in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly
present at, the communication.
(4) "Employee" means a person employed
by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United
States foreign intelligence agency.
25
(5) "Foreign intelligence" means information
concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities
of any foreign power, or of any non-United States
person, whether within or outside the United States, or
concerning areas outside the United States.
(6) "Foreign intelligence agency" means the
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
and Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes
any other department or agency of the United States
GERALD R. LIBNARY FORD
Government or component thereof while it is engaged
in the collection of foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence, but shall not include any such department,
agency or component thereof to the extent that it is
engaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforce-
ment functions; nor shall it include in any case the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(7) "National security information" has the
meaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652,
as amended.
(8) "Physical surveillance" means continuing
visual observation by any means; or acquisition of a
non-public communication by a person not a party thereto
or visibly present thereat through any means which does
not involve electronic surveillance.
26
(9) "United States person" means United
States citizens, aliens admitted to the United States
for permanent residence and corporations or other organ-
izations incorporated or organized in the United States.
(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelli-
gence agencies shall not engage in any of the follow-
ing activities:
(1) Physical surveillance directed against a
United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance
conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head
of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against
any of the following:
(i) A present or former employee of such agency,
its present or former contractors or their present or
former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods
or national security information from unauthorized
disclosure; or
(ii) a United States person, who is in contact
with either such a present or former contractor or
employee or with a non-United States person who is the
subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify
such United States person; or
(iii) a United States person outside the United
States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf
27
of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist
or narcotics activities or activities threatening the
national security.
(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept
a communication which is made from, or is intended by
the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed
against United States persons abroad, except lawful
electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the
Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence
Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within
FORD LIBRARY & GFRALD
the United States, except for the purpose of testing
equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General
consistent with law.
(3) Unconsented physical searches within the
United States: or unconsented physical searches directed
against United States persons abroad, except lawful
searches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.
(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes
of mail in United States postal channels except in accord-
ance with applicable statutes and regulations.
(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax
information except in accordance with applicable statutes
and regulations.
(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation
within the United States in any organization for the
purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities
28
or members; except such infiltration or participation
with respect to an organization composed primarily of
non-United States persons which is reasonably believed
to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
(7) Collection of information, however
acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United
States persons except:
(i) Information concerning corporations or other
commercial organizations which constitutes foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence.
(ii) Information concerning present or former
employees, present or former contractors or their present
or former employees, or applicants for any such employ-
ment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods
or national security information from unauthorized
disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with
the foregoing or with a non-United States person who
is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence inquiry.
(iii) Information concerning persons who are
reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts,
but only for the purpose of determining the suitability
or credibility of such persons.
29
(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted
in compliance with Section 5 (b) (2) ; or foreign intelli-
gence acquired from cooperating sources in the United
States.
(v) Information about a United States person who
is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
foreign power or engaging in international terrorist
or narcotics activities.
(vi) Information concerning persons or activities
that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency
facilities or personnel, provided, that such information
is retained only by the foreign intelligence agency
threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.
(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this
section of this Order shall prohibit:
(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate
law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered
information indicating involvement in activities which
may be in violation of law.
(2) Storage of information required by law
to be retained.
(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence
agencies of information of the subject matter types
listed in Section 5 (b) (7) .
30
(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign
intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimenta-
tion with drugs on human subjects, except with the
informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinter-
ested third party, of each such human subject and in
accordance with the guidelines issued by the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for
Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.
(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall,
except as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services,
equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration or to State or local police
organisations of the United States or (ii) participate
in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United
States.
(2) These prohibitions shall not, however,
preclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence
agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the
purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of
the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or
other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized
equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other
Federal department or agency.
31
(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a
foreign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within
the Federal Government shall be responsible to the
host agency and shall not report to such employee's
parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except
as may be directed by the latter. The head of the
host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the
detailee's association with the parent agency.
(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of
the United States Government shall engage in, or con-
spire to engage in, political assassination.
(h) Implementation.
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LIBRARY
(1) This section of this Order shall be
effective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency
affected by this section of this Order shall promptly
issue internal directives to implement this section
with respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations.
(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety
days of the effective date of this section of this
Order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
Sec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.
(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence
Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Over-
sight Board.
32
(1) The Oversight Board shall have three
members who shall be appointed by the President and who
shall be from outside the Government and be qualified
on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of back-
ground and experience. The members of the Oversight
Board may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of
March 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board
shall have any personal contractual relationship with
any agency or department of the Intelligence Community.
(2) One member of the Oversight Board shall
be designated by the President as its Chairman.
(3) The Oversight Board shall:
(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors
General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Com-
munity concerning activities that raise questions of
legality or propriety.
(ii) Review periodically the practices and pro-
cedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels
of the Intelligence Community designed to discover and
report to the Oversight Board activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety.
(iii) Review periodically with each member of
the Intelligence Community their internal guidelines
to ensure their adequacy.
33
(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.
(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney
General and to the President any activities that raise
serious questions about legality.
(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President
any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.
(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within
the Intelligence Community shall:
(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports
of any activities that come to their attention that raise
questions of legality or propriety.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the Oversight Board on its findings concerning
GERALOR FORD LIBRARY
questionable activities, if any.
(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all informa-
tion requested about activities within their respective
departments or agencies.
(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion
on which they were directed not to report any activity
to the Oversight Board by their agency or department
heads.
(5) Formulate practices and procedures
designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board
activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or depart-
ments shall:
34
(1) Report periodically to the Oversight
Board on any activities of their organizations that
raise questions of legality or propriety.
(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate
fully with the Oversight Board.
(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and
General Counsels of their agency have access to any
information necessary to perform their duties assigned
by paragraph (4) of this section.
(d) The Attorney General shall:
(1) Receive and consider reports from the
Oversight Board.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the President with respect to activities of the
Intelligence Community, if any, which raise questions
of legality.
(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support.
No person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board
shall have any contractual or employment relationship
with any department or agency in the Intelligence
Community.
(f) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board established by Executive Order No. 11460 of
March 20, 1969, remains in effect.
35
Sec. 7. Secrecy Protection.
(a) In order to improve the protection of sources
and methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive
branch and its contractors given access to information
containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as
a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that
they will not disclose that information to persons not
authorized to receive it.
(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure
of information concerning sources or methods of intelli-
gence, the names of any persons found to have made
unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the
head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate
disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General
for appropriate legal action.
GERALOR FORD LIBRARY
(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized
disclosure of information concerning sources or methods
of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make
such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure
shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appro-
priate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial
order to prevent such disclosure.
(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide
protection for other significant areas of intelligence,
the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope
36
of agreements secured from those persons who, as an
aspect of their relationship with the United States
Government, have access to classified intelligence
material.
Sec. 8. Enabling Data.
(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and
the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for
detailed implementation of this Order by issuing
appropriate directives.
(b) All existing National Security Council and
Director of Central Intelligence directives shall be
amended to be consistent with this Order within ninety
days of its effective date.
(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential
Memorandum of November 5, 1971, on the "Organization
and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."
(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the
Intelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives
to their organizations consistent with this Order within
ninety days of its effective date.
(e) This Order will be implemented within current
manning authorizations of the Intelligence Community.
To this end, the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of
personnel positions. The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget will also assist in the allocation
of appropriate facilities.
GERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
FEBRUARY 18, 1976
UNTIL 12:00 NOON (EST)
Office of the White house Press Secretary
R: EQRO
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions
of law, I have today issued an Executive Order pertaining
to the organization and control of the United States
foreign intelligence community. This order establishes
clear lines of accountability for the Nation's foreign
intelligence agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines
to control the activities of these agencies and specifies
as well those activities in which they shall not engage.
In carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities to
manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the
Nation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best
possible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions
and activities of governments and other entities and in--
dividuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence
agencies of the United States play a vital role in col--
lecting and analyzing information related to the national
defense and foreign policy.
It is equally as important that the methods these
agencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate
needs of the government conform to the standards set out in
the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and
civil liberties of American citizens.
The Executive Order I have issued today will insure a
proper balancing of these interests. It establishes
government wide direction for the foreign intelligence
agencies and places responsibility and accountability on
individuals not institutions.
I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable
activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies
while at the same time permitting them to get on with their
vital work of gathering and assessing information. It is
also my hope that these steps will help to restore public
confidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to
appreciate the valuable contribution they make to our
national security.
Beyond the steps I have taken in the Executive Order,
I also believe there is a clear need for some specific
legislative actions. I an today submitting to the
Congress of the United States proposals which will go
far toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence
secrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence
collection in the United States.
My first proposal deals with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central
Intelligence is charged, under the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended with protecting intelligence sources
and methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no
authorities commensurate with this responsibility.
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Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose
criminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized
access to intelligence secrets and who willfully and
wrongfully reveal this information. This legislation
is not an "Official Secrets Act", since it would affect
only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to
whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislation
could not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties.
It would in no way prevent people from reporting ques-
tionable activities to appropriate authorities in the
Executive and Legislative Branches of the government.
It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and
dangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence secrets
be stopped. The American people have long accepted the
principles of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings --
such as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes
absolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our
intelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our
democratic society, but the American people have never
believed that it was necessary to reveal the secret war
plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think
they wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed
either.
I urge the adoption of this legislation with all
possible speed.
Second, I support proposals that would clarify
and set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activi-
ties of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular,
I will support legislation making it a crime to assassinate
or attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official
in peacetime. Since it defines a crime, legislation is
necessary.
Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of
Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with
a critical problem involving personal privacy --- electronic
surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the
Justice Department and other Executive agencies, we will
seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should
create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant
authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
I will also seek Congressional support for sound
legislation to expand judicial supervision of mail
openings. The law now permits the opening of United States
mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of
criminal investigations. We need authority to open mail
under the limitations and safeguards that now apply in
order to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence
information.
This would require a showing that there is probable
cause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent
of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or
terrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations,
those seeking authority to examine mail for foreign intel-
ligence purposes will have to convince a federal judge of
the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon
their authorization to examine the mail provided in the
order of the court.
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Fourth, I would like to share my views regarding
appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intel-
ligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the
Congress to organize itself to deal with these matters.
Certain principles, however, should be recognized by both
the Executive and Legislative Branches if this oversight
is to be effective. I believe good Congressional over--
sight is essential so that the Congress and the American
people whom you represent can be assured that the foreign
intelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of
their activities.
Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility
for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The
more committees and subcommittees dealing with highly
sensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I
recommend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence
Oversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional oversight
in one committee will facilitate the efforts of the
Administration to keep the Congress fully informed of
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foreign intelligence activities.
It is essential that both the House and the Senate
GERALD
LIBRARY
establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence
secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be
established a clear process to safeguard these secrets
and effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.
Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by
the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an
injunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed
without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the
Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no
individual member, nor committee, nor single House of
Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral
publication of classified information over the objection
of the President, by one committee or one House of Congress,
not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but
also effectively overrules the actions of the other House
of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses.
Finally, successful and effective Congressional over-
sight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual
trust between the Congress and Executive. Each branch must
recognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the
other if anything is to be achieved.
In this context, a Congressional requirement to keep
the Oversight Committee "fully" informed is more desirable
and workable as a practical matter than formal requirements
for notification of specific activities to a large number
of committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate
committee briefings, should be modified as recommended by
the Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be
limited to the new Oversight Committee.
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Both the Congress and the Executive Branch recognize
the importance to this Nation of a strong intelligence
service. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I
have outlined above to insure that America not only has
the best foreign intelligence service in the world, but
also the most unique --- one which operates in a manner fully
consistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.
GERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 18, 1976.
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