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The original documents are located in Box 9, folder "Congressional Leadership Meetings
with the President - 6/6/75: Bipartisan" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 9 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1975
MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
Friday, June 6, 1975
8:00-9:00 a.m. (1 hour)
The Cabinet Room
From: Max L. Friedersdorf mf
I. PURPOSE
To report on the President's trip to Europe
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: The President returned from an important
foreign policy trip to Europe late on June 3, 1975.
A bipartisan leadership meeting was scheduled for the
next evening so the President could brief the leaders
on results of his talks. Due to late sessions in both
chambers of Congress, this meeting was postponed until
Friday, June 6.
B. Participants: See Tab A
C. Press Plan:
Announce to the Press as a Presidential report on the
European trip. Press and White House photographers.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. I am sorry we could not meet Wednesday evening as
scheduled, but with the extended business in both the
House and Senate, we rescheduled the leadership meeting
for today.
2. Because of your schedules, we will try to hold our discussion
to an hour in order to not detain the leaders longer than
necessary.
3. Now, we will give you a report on the trip to Europe.
(See Tab B)
FURD is BERALD LIBRARY
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
SENATE
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Bob Griffin
Frank Moss
Carl Curtis
Cliff Case
John Stennis
Strom Thurmond
HOUSE
Carl Albert
"Tip" O'Neill
John Rhodes
John McFall
Bob Michel
Phil Burton
"Doc" Morgan
Bill Broomfield
Bob Wilson
STAFF
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Phil Buchen
Bill Seidman
Alan Greenspan
REGRETS
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Sen. Sparkman
Jim Lynn
Rep. Anderson
Frank Zarb
Rep. Price
A
Dick Cheney
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
FORD
Brent Scowcroft
LIGHT
CONFIDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
A.
Introductory
By with , NARA, Date 11/28/00
1. The meetings of the past week were important and successful.
We clearly demonstrated the capacity of Western democracies to
deal with common problems. We reaffirmed our determination to
carry on cooperative programs to enhance our own abilities to over-
come collectively political, economic and defense challenges.
2. Of foremost importance, I reaffirmed our commitment to an
undiminished defense effort. I also had the opportunity in Brussels,
to review current issues with 14 Alliance and European colleagues;
and in the span of one week, I met with more than 20 foreign leaders.
3. The United States responded to the British initiative for a NATO
Summit meeting because of our desire to deal frankly with our
current problems and to chart a positive course for the future.
4. We did this against the background of the questions raised by
economic recession, the withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the internal
strains within the Alliance and the need for a more effective defense
effort.
B. NATO Summit
1. In my speech to my NATO colleagues, I underscored our
commitment to the Alliance and I put forward six major tasks.
-- maintenance of a strong and credible defense;
-- preservation of the quality and integrity of the Alliance
and I stressed the perils of partial membership;
improvement of the process of political consultation;
development of a productive and realistic agenda for
detente;
reinforcement of democratic institutions within the Alliance
and the related issue of associating Spain;
rededication of the Alliance to dealing with the challenges
of modern industrialized society, so that the skills of our
free system can benefit ourselves and others in the world.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
2. In the meeting at the Summit, the NATO allies gave increased
political impetus to our consultations on Cyprus, Portugal and the
Middle East. This meeting provided a necessary prelude to the
final stages of the CSCE talks in Geneva.
3. Prime Minister Trudeau proposed -- and I supported him --
regular summits as a political device to maintain a vital Alliance.
Brussels Bilateral Talks
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
1. We made a major effort to encourage the parties to move
toward a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem and an improvement
in Greek-Turkish relations, stressing the danger that a continuing
dispute would pose for broader Western interests.
2. In Brussels I met with Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis and
heard first-hand his views on developments in Greece, in Greek-
Turkish relations and on Cyprus. I stressed admiration for the
progress which Caramanlis has made in restoring democracy to
Greece, and I pledged our support to Caramanlis in his efforts.
3. The same morning, I met Turkish Prime Minister Demirel
who once again expressed the strong and injured feelings of Turkey
against the action of the American Congress in imposing an embargo
on Turkey.
4. I was able nevertheless to urge progress in the negotiations on
Cyprus and in improving relations with Greece.
5. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Brussels the
day after we left, and the positive communique issued appears to
indicate that progress may be possible. We will continue to work with
the parties and with the Cypriot communities who are neogiating in
Vienna.
Portugal
1.
In my discussions with other allied leaders and with Prime Minister
Concalves of Portugal, I expressed my deep concern about developments
in Portugal -- and the continuing evidence of Communist control in the
decision making process.
TORO
HUNTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
2. The Portuguese Prime Minister explained that the armed forces
movement was guiding the process in Portugal and that no political
party would not be allowed to interfere with Portugal's commitment
to NATO.
3. I said that there was an inconsistency in Communist membership
in the Government of NATO allies and the purposes for which NATO
was formed.
4. I informed the Prime Minister that we would maintain a hopeful
and watchful regard on developments there. Frankly, I am not
reassured and we continue to have a pessimistic assessment.
Other Bilaterals
1. In my meetings with Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Wilson
and President Giscard, the recession and related international
economic problems were a principle focus of discussion. I expressed
my confidence in the ability of the American economy to overcome the
current recession, while cautioning against overstimulation and a
resulting new round of inflation.
2. In sum. the visit to Brussels enabled me to meet personally
with the leaders of our allies, to state our firm resolve, and to
impress upon each Prime Minister our determination to work with
Europe on common problems.
D. Spain
1. At the NATO Summit, I raised the issue of recognizing Spain's
role in Western defense through its bilateral defense relationship
with the United States.
2. There is considerable opposition to such action while Franco is
in power. Frankly, I saw a disappointing double standard among the
Allies who are willing to go along with developments in Portugal, but
who bury their heads in the sand on Spain.
3. I described our efforts to gain recognition for this effort from
other members of the Alliance, and the Spaniards were appreciative.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
4. I stressed our interest in maintaining and developing our long-
time political, economic and security relations with Spain.
5. We agreed on the importance of a successful conclusion to our
current negotiations on U.S. facilities in Spain. Spain is in a period
of transition and therefore this is a particularly important time to
maintain close relations with the Spanish Government and people. A
political process has already started. I had a good talk with Juan
Carlos.
E. Meeting with President Sadat
1. The main problem in the Middle East is that if there is no progress
toward peace, there will be serious consequences for U.S. interests
and for the interests of our friends in the area:
-- another Arab-Israeli war is almost certain;
-- another war could trigger prolonged cutbacks in oil
production which would not only impose a major economic
burden on most of the nations of the world but would
sharpen tension between us and the Western Europeans and
Japan;
-- Polarization of the Middle East between the U.S. and the
USSR would again be sharpened, with the Soviets regaining
much of the influence they have lost since October, 1973;
-- there would be a renewed wave of anti-Americanism in the
Arab world which would make it almost impossible for the
moderate Arabs to go on working with us toward an Arab-
Israeli settlement, which is essential both for U.S. strategic
and economic interests in the area and for the survival of
Israel.
2. For all these reasons, there must be progress toward peace.
The strategy of pursuing peace which we followed since October, 1973,
permitted us to strengthen our relationships with both the Arabs and
Israel while at the same time acting in a way that is consistent with
the moderate Arabs' own interest in moving the USSR to the sidelines
in the Middle East.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
3. As I said before I left on this trip, there are essentially three
options for moving toward peace:
-- we could try to revive the negotiation of a series of
interim agreements. However, for the negotiations that
were suspended in March to be resumed, new ideas would
have to be introduced;
-- it might be possible to develop an interim agreement on
the basis of much broader terms of reference than were
being discussed in March;
-- the third approach would be to shift the focus now to
negotiations on an overall settlement, leaving open the
opportunity to segment those negotiations and to imple-
ment any agreements in stages.
4. My meeting with Sadat was not designed to produce concrete
results. As you know, I will be talking with Prime Minister Rabin
next week, and there is no way of reaching firm conclusions on a
course of action until we have had those talks.
5. The meeting with Sadat provided an opportunity for us to develop
a good personal relationship which should be important in the difficult
period which lies ahead. It also provided an opportunity for President
Sadat to explain the dilemma he faces:
-- on the one hand, his main goal is to make peace so that he
can tackle Egypt's basic economic problems;
-- on the other hand, he does not feel able to make a separate
peace with Israel as long as Israel still occupies Syrian and
Jordanian territory and nothing has been done to meet the
legitimate concerns of the Palestinians;
-- he is attempting an historic reorientation of Egyptian
policy away from the USSR and toward the U.S., but to
sustain that policy he needs to be able to demonstrate that
it produces results for Egypt and the Arab cause
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
6. Therefore, Sadat has a strong interest in progress in the
negotiations. Together we went through the options to see what
course he feels is most realistic.
7. Oh an overall settlement, Sadat stated his well-known position:
-- He explained why, in his judgment, such an agreement
can only be achieved on the basis of an Israeli agreement
to return to the 1967 boundaries, with minor, agreed
changes, and to allow for the creation of some sort of a
separate Palestinian homeland outside those boundaries.
-- He also confirmed his understanding that the Arabs, on
their part, would be expected to agree to recognize Israel's
right to exist in peace as an independent, sovereign state.
He supported the idea of strong security arrangements and
demilitarization as well as external guarantees, if the
parties want them, to ensure that a peace agreement will
be maintained. He made it clear that he accepts continued
strong U.S. support for Israel's survival and well-being
within this context.
S. Cu the question ui all inter in agreement, Sadai said he would we
prepared to review Egypt's position if Israel would do the same. That
is where we stand. I will be discussing the situation with Prime
Minister Rabin next week.
9. I should also say a word about the economic aspects of our talk.
Helping Egypt solve its economic problems is an important part of our
political strategy in the Middle East. President Sadat is trying to launch
a major attack or Egypt's fundamental human problems, and he has
concluded that he must shift away from the Soviet economic model to
achieve this. Thus he has turned to us -- as well as to the wealthier
Middle Eastern countries and the world Bank -- for advice and
assistance. This is a policy reorientation of historic significance.
10. This is why I promised Sadat that we will work with other interested
governments and the World Bank to help him meet his most pressing
short-term problems as well as to lay the basis for long-term growth.
I told him that we would be consulting with the Congress on the U.S.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
share of this multi-national effort. We intend to work very closely with
Saudi Arabia and Iran as the primary contributors, as well as with
Japan and West Germany and the World Bank and IMF. All of them
share our interest in seeing Egypt remain a stable, viable force for
peace and moderation in the Middle East, not subject to Soviet pressure.
All of them are willing to provide economic assistance to this end.
We will begin consulting with Congress soon on appropriate aid levels
for FY 76.
F. Rome
1. Following on the NATO Summit, my meetings in Rome yesterday
with President Leone and Prime Minister Moro permitted me to
emphasize the importance we attach to Italy's role in the Alliance,
the Mediterranean and the West.
2. While the visit was brief, it had a strong, positive impact. This
was evident in the words of the Italian leaders, and it is important at
a time when the Italian Communists are challenging the present pro-
West government in this month's elections.
G.
Conclusion
1. T return from Europe with the Atlantic Alliance the heart of
our foreign policy:
-- rededicated to maintaining our common strength and security;
-- agreeton the value of consultation;
-- basically agrees on the need to address all issues, political,
economic and military.
2. Our friends in Europe have a new, clear statement of our will
and our determination to succeed together.
3. This provides the United States with an exceptional opportunity to
move ahead on those issues requiring joint US-European attention.
4. We should not miss this opportunity. We should dedicate ourselves
to working together to achieve our foreign policy goals.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1975
MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
Friday, June 6, 1975
8:00-9:00 a.m. (1 hour)
The Cabinet Room
From: Max L. Friedersdorf
mf
I. PURPOSE
To report on the President's trip to Europe
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: The President returned from an important
foreign policy trip to Europe late on June 3, 1975.
A bipartisan leadership meeting was scheduled for the
next evening so the President could brief the leaders
on results of his talks. Due to late sessions in both
chambers of Congress, this meeting was postponed until
Friday, June 6.
B. Participants: See Tab A
C. Press Plan:
Announce to the Press as a Presidential report on the
European trip. Press and White House photographers.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. I am sorry we could not meet Wednesday evening as
scheduled, but with the extended business in both the
House and Senate, we rescheduled the leadership meeting
for today.
2. Because of your schedules, we will try to hold our discussion
to an hour in order to not detain the leaders longer than
necessary.
3. Now, we will give you a report on the trip to Europe.
(See Tab B)
FORD
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
SENATE
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Bob Griffin
Frank Moss
Carl Curtis
Cliff Case
John Stennis
Strom Thurmond
HOUSE
Carl Albert
"Tip" O'Neill
John Rhodes
John McFall
Bob Michel
Phil Burton
"Doc" Morgan
Bill Broomfield
Bob Wilson
STAFF
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Phil Buchen
Bill Seidman
Alan Greenspan
REGRETS
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Sen. Sparkman
Jim Lynn
Rep. Anderson
Frank Zarb
Rep. Price
Dick Cheney
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Brent Scowcroft
GERALD FORD
CONF IDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
A.
Introductory
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By WHM , NARA, Date 11/28/00
1. The meetings of the past week were important and successful.
We clearly demonstrated the capacity of Western democracies to
deal with common problems. We reaffirmed our determination to
carry on cooperative programs to enhance our own abilities to over-
come collectively political, economic and defense challenges.
2.
Of foremost importance, I reaffirmed our commitment to an
undiminished defense effort. I also had the opportunity in Brussels,
to review current issues with 14 Alliance and European colleagues;
and in the span of one week, I met with more than 20 foreign leaders.
3.
The United States responded to the British initiative for a NATO
Summit meeting because of our desire to deal frankly with our
current problems and to chart a positive course for the future.
4. We did this against the background of the questions raised by
economic recession, the withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the internal
strains within the Alliance and the need for a more effective defense
effort.
B.
NATO Summit
1. In my speech to my NATO colleagues, I underscored our
commitment to the Alliance and I put forward six major tasks.
-- maintenance of a strong and credible defense;
-- preservation of the quality and integrity of the Alliance
and I stressed the perils of partial membership;
improvement of the process of political consultation;
-- development of a productive and realistic agenda for
detente;
-- reinforcement of democratic institutions within the Alliance
and the related issue of associating Spain;
rededication of the Alliance to dealing with the challenges
of modern industrialized society, so that the skills of our
free system can benefit ourselves and others in the world.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
2. In the meeting at the Summit, the NATO allies gave increased
political impetus to our consultations on Cyprus, Portugal and the
Middle East. This meeting provided a necessary prelude to the
final stages of the CSCE talks in Geneva.
3. Prime Minister Trudeau proposed -- and I supported him --
regular summits as a political device to maintain a vital Alliance.
C. Brussels Bilateral Talks
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
1. We made a major effort to encourage the parties to move
toward a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem and an improvement
in Greek-Turkish relations, stressing the danger that a continuing
dispute would pose for broader Western interests.
2. In Brussels I met with Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis and
heard first-hand his views on developments in Greece, in Greek-
Turkish relations and on Cyprus. I stressed admiration for the
progress which Caramanlis has made in restoring democracy to
Greece, and I pledged our support to Caramanlis in his efforts.
3. The same morning, I met Turkish Prime Minister Demirel
who once again expressed the strong and injured feelings of Turkey
against the action of the American Congress in imposing an embargo
on Turkey.
4. I was able nevertheless to urge progress in the negotiations on
Cyprus and in improving relations with Greece.
5. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Brussels the
day after we left, and the positive communique issued appears to
indicate that progress may be possible. We will continue to work with
the parties and with the Cypriot communities who are neogiating in
Vienna.
Portugal
1. In my discussions with other allied leaders and with Prime Minister
Goncalves of Portugal, I expressed my deep concern about developments
in Portugal -- and the continuing evidence of Communist control in the
decision making process.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
2. The Portuguese Prime Minister explained that the armed forces
movement was guiding the process in Portugal and that no political
party would not be allowed to interfere with Portugal's commitment
to NATO.
3. I said that there was an inconsistency in Communist membership
in the Government of NATO allies and the purposes for which NATO
was formed.
4. I informed the Prime Minister that we would maintain a hopeful
and watchful regard on developments there. Frankly, I am not
reassured and we continue to have a pessimistic assessment.
Other Bilaterals
1. In my meetings with Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Wilson
and President Giscard, the recession and related international
economic problems were a principle focus of discussion. I expressed
my confidence in the ability of the American economy to overcome the
current recession, while cautioning against overstimulation and a
resulting new round of inflation.
2. In sum, the visit to Brussels enabled me to meet personally
with the leaders of our allies, to state our firm resolve, and to
impress upon each Prime Minister our determination to work with
Europe on common problems.
D. Spain
1. At the NATO Summit, I raised the issue of recognizing Spain's
role in Western defense through its bilateral defense relationship
with the United States.
2. There is considerable opposition to such action while Franco is
in power. Frankly, I saw a disappointing double standard among the
Allies who are willing to go along with developments in Portugal, but
who bury their heads in the sand on Spain.
3. I described our efforts to gain recognition for this effort from
other members of the Alliance, and the Spaniards were appreciative.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
4.
I stressed our interest in maintaining and developing our long-
time political, economic and security relations with Spain.
5. We agreed on the importance of a successful conclusion to our
current negotiations on U.S. facilities in Spain. Spain is in a period
of transition and therefore this is a particularly important time to
maintain close relations with the Spanish Government and people. A
political process has already started. I had a good talk with Juan
Carlos.
E.
Meeting with President Sadat
1. The main problem in the Middle East is that if there is no progress
toward peace, there will be serious consequences for U.S. interests
and for the interests of our friends in the area:
-- another Arab-Israeli war is almost certain;
-- another war could trigger prolonged cutbacks in oil
production which would not only impose a major economic
burden on most of the nations of the world but would
sharpen tension between us and the Western Europeans and
Japan;
-- Polarization of the Middle East between the U.S. and the
USSR would again be sharpened, with the Soviets regaining
much of the influence they have lost since October, 1973;
-- there would be a renewed wave of anti-Americanism in the
Arab world which would make it almost impossible for the
moderate Arabs to go on working with us toward an Arab-
Israeli settlement, which is essential both for U.S. strategic
and economic interests in the area and for the survival of
Israel.
2. For all these reasons, there must be progress toward peace.
The strategy of pursuing peace which we followed since October, 1973,
permitted us to strengthen our relationships with both the Arabs and
Israel while at the same time acting in a way that is consistent with
the moderate Arabs' own interest in moving the USSR to the sidelines
in the Middle East.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
3. As I said before I left on this trip, there are essentially three
options for moving toward peace:
-- we could try to revive the negotiation of a series of
interim agreements. However, for the negotiations that
were suspended in March to be resumed, new ideas would
have to be introduced;
-- it might be possible to develop an interim agreement on
the basis of much broader terms of reference than were
being discussed in March;
-- the third approach would be to shift the focus now to
negotiations on an overall settlement, leaving open the
opportunity to segment those negotiations and to imple-
ment any agreements in stages.
4. My meeting with Sadat was not designed to produce concrete
results. As you know, I will be talking with Prime Minister Rabin
next week, and there is no way of reaching firm conclusions on a
course of action until we have had those talks.
5. The meeting with Sadat provided an opportunity for us to develop
a good personal relationship which should be important in the difficult
period which lies ahead. It also provided an opportunity for President
Sadat to explain the dilemma he faces:
-- on the one hand, his main goal is to make peace so that he
can tackle Egypt's basic economic problems;
-- on the other hand, he does not feel able to make a separate
peace with Israel as long as Israel still occupies Syrian and
Jordanian territory and nothing has been done to meet the
legitimate concerns of the Palestinians;
-- he is attempting an historic reorientation of Egyptian
policy away from the USSR and toward the U.S., but to
sustain that policy he needs to be able to demonstrate that
it produces results for Egypt and the Arab cause
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
6.
Therefore, Sadat has a strong interest in progress in the
negotiations. Together we went through the options to see what
course he feels is most realistic.
7.
Oh an overall settlement, Sadat stated his well-known position:
-- He explained why, in his judgment, such an agreement
can only be achieved on the basis of an Israeli agreement
to return to the 1967 boundaries, with minor, agreed
changes, and to allow for the creation of some sort of a
separate Palestinian homeland outside those boundaries.
- - He also confirmed his understanding that the Arabs, on
their part, would be expected to agree to recognize Israel's
right to exist in peace as an independent, sovereign state.
He supported the idea of strong security arrangements and
demilitarization as well as external guarantees, if the
parties want them, to ensure that a peace agreement will
be maintained. He made it clear that he accepts continued
strong U.S. support for Israel's survival and well-being
within this context.
8. On the question of an interim agreement, Sadat said ire would be
prepared to review Egypt's position if Israel would do the same. That
is where we stand. I will be discussing the situation with Prime
Minister Rabin next week.
9. I should also say a word about the economic aspects of our talk.
Helping Egypt solve its economic problems is an important part of our
political strategy in the Middle East. President Sadat is trying to launch
a major attack or Egypt's fundamental human problems, and he has
concluded that he must shift away from the Soviet economic model to
achieve this. Thus he has turned to us -- as well as to the wealthier
Middle Eastern countries and the world Bank -- for advice and
assistance. This is a policy reorientation of historic significance.
10. This is why I promised Sadat that we will work with other interested
governments and the World Bank to help him meet his most pressing
short-term problems as well as to lay the basis for long-term growth.
I told him that we would be consulting with the Congress on the U.S.
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
share of this multi-national effort. We intend to work very closely with
Saudi Arabia and Iran as the primary contributors, as well as with
Japan and West Germany and the World Bank and IMF. All of them
share our interest in seeing Egypt remain a stable, viable force for
peace and moderation in the Middle East, not subject to Soviet pressure.
All of them are willing to provide economic assistance to this end.
We will begin consulting with Congress soon on appropriate aid levels
for FY 76.
F. Rome
1. Following on the NATO Summit, my meetings in Rome yesterday
with President Leone and Prime Minister Moro permitted me to
emphasize the importance we attach to Italy's role in the Alliance,
the Mediterranean and the West.
2. While the visit was brief, it had a strong, positive impact. This
was evident in the words of the Italian leaders, and it is important at
a time when the Italian Communists are challenging the present pro-
West government in this month's elections.
G.
Conclusion
1. I return from Europe with the Atlantic Alliance the heart of
our foreign policy:
-- rededicated to maintaining our common strength and security;
-- agreeion the value of consultation;
-- basically agrees on the need to address all issues, political,
economic and military.
2. Our friends in Europe have a new, clear statement of our will
and our determination to succeed together.
3. This provides the United States with an exceptional opportunity to
move ahead on those issues requiring joint US-European attention.
4. We should not miss this opportunity. We should dedicate ourselves
to working together to achieve our foreign policy goals.
FORD
CONPIDENTIAL
LISRARY