Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1563010
label
Fisheries Jurisdiction - Briefing Books (1)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1563010
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Fisheries Jurisdiction - Briefing Books (1)
citationUrl
collections
John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's General Subject Files
subjects
Territorial waters
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1563010
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1975-11-30
month
11
year
1975
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1975-11-01
month
11
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
05e42d1c443398ac
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 17, folder "Fisheries Jurisdiction - Briefing
Books (1)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 17 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S
November 12, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
The Deputy Secretary
The Under Secretary for Security Assistance
FROM:
D/LOS - John Norton Moore
Progress Report on the 200-Mile Bill
I. Status in the Foreign Relations Committee
The 200-mile bill is expected to be considered in
Executive Session by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee this Thursday, November 13. Voting will
take place then unless the Secretary agrees to testify
and we successfully obtain a postponement. If Senator
Case votes with us, we expect to be able to carry the
Committee; if not, we could lose. I believe that
under either of the following courses of action we
would probably keep Case with us and ensure a favor-
able vote:
1. Secretary Kissinger testifies before the
full Committee (with an immediate request
we may be able to obtain a full Committee
hearing on November 19 or possibly even
later). The Secretary's testimony would
have to indicate that under fisheries
agreements now in place we have turned
the tide on protection of coastal stocks;
or
2. The President releases the press statement
on opposition to the 200-mile bill and his
fisheries initiative and tells the White
House Congressional Office to move strongly
against the bill. This news must be conveyed
to the Committee before Thursday to be
effective.
Marking
1/8/86 Dy DAD
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Action memoranda on the above have been
submitted. Attached is a status report on the
Committee and our efforts to date, prepared by
Jack MacKenzie (H).
II. Status in the Armed Services Committee
We are continuing to rely on a referral to the
Armed Services Committee in addition to the Foreign
Relations Committee referral. Our present information
is that we probably will obtain the referral, although
this is not yet definite. If we obtain the referral,
our discussions, particularly with new Committee
members, lead us to believe that we will be able to
get a negative report from the Committee (we lost
8-6 last year).
III. Status in the Full Senate
We are concentrating our initial efforts on the
members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committee. When that is completed, however, we will
broaden our effort to the full Senate. Our efforts
will include:
1. A distribution of summaries concerning
reasons for opposition to all Senators.
2. Individual meetings with all Senators
to the extent possible.
3. Individual meetings with all staff.
To date we are encountering the same reaction in
the Senate that we did on the House side; that is,
most Senators are unaware of the serious implications
of the bill and when made aware, many are indicating
that they are changing their positions. These include
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
Humphrey, McGovern, Gravel, Taft and others. There
is also widespread feeling that the White House should
not sit this one out. This is key. With strong White
House opposition and a behind-the-scene understanding
of a veto we may be able to stop this bill in the
Senate. In any case, we can definitely prevent a
veto override.
IV. Most Effective Arguments
We have prepared new briefing material for us in
the Senate fight (you should already have a new
briefing book). We are also getting a sense of the
arguments that are most effective. These are:
1. Under agreements presently in force,
any "emergency" in protection of our
fish stocks of any consequence is now
under control.
2. The bill violates solemn treaty obliga-
tions of the United States.
3. The bill could seriously harm our
defense interests.
4. The bill would undermine the LOS
negotiations.
The first of these is crucial. We are now putting
together a memorandum on the state of fisheries stocks
off our coasts to support our position. Attached for
your quick review is a similar memorandum prepared by
the U.S. Committee for the Oceans (a private group).
Attachments:
1. Briefing Book
2. Status Report on Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
3. Summary of Status of Fish Stocks Under
Agreements Presently in Force Prepared
by the U.S. Committee for the Oceans
9PM
Drafted:D/LOS:JNMoore:ps
Concurrence: H - Mr. MacKenzie
x29098
11/11/75
CONF IDENTIAL
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Sparkman - visited by Moore and MacKenzie. Intends to
talk to Pell re scheduling full Committee briefing if
HK or Deputy agrees to appear. Not very alert to
foreign policy implications (Voted for in Committee and
on floor).
Staff--Dave Keaney - receives continuing information and
attention from Nordquist. Also, MacKenzie in constant
touch with Kuhl.
Mansfield - contacted by Amb. McCloskey; short conversation;
will give our position serious consideration. I feel he
will be receiving strong pressure from Magnuson. (Voted
against in Committee, no vote on floor.)
Staff--Frank Voleo - briefed by Moore and MacKenzie. In-
dicated support of position. However, suggested White
House involvement.
Church - to be contacted by Amb. McCloskey. However, he
has discussed the legislation with P. Dickey. He suggested
commitment to Magnuson but pleaded a lack of understanding
of any foreign policy problems. (Voted for in Committee
and on floor.)
Staff--Mick Wetherell, AA. He will be contacted by P. Dickey,
briefed and furnished back-up material. Further follow-up
by T. Leitzell, L/OES. Alsobeing contacted by outside group.
Symington - to be contacted by Maw. Also briefing by Moore
on November 12. (Voted for in Committee and on floor. Also
member of Armed Services Committee but did not vote in that
Committee.) Don Sanders, DOD feels that security arguments
should convince him.
Staff--David Raymond - to be contacted by Adm. M. Morris.
Will follow up if necessary. NOTE: Also being contacted
by "outside group. "
McGee - to be contacted by Amb. McCloskey. He is firmly in
support of our position. Staff has advised he will actively
work within Committee and on floor. (Voted against in
Committee and on floor.)
Staff--Dick McCall, on board, arranged briefing by Moore
and Morris for Senate legislative assistants.
- 2 -
McGovern - briefed by Moore and MacKenzie. Also has been
contacted by Amb. McCloskey. Advised Moore that he
appreciated our position; was not committed to Magnuson.
Every indication of supporting State's position. Also
gave favorable consideration to Amb. McCloskey arguments.
(Voted for in Committee and on floor.)
Staff--John Holum, LA, briefed by MacKenzie, said he was
surprised with last year's vote and felt Senator would
change his position.
Humphrey - briefed by Moore, MacKenzie, Dickey. Fully in
support of our position. Demands strong vibrations from
White House. Will fight for us in Committee and on floor.
A key if properly stimulated. (Voted for in Committee and
on floor.)
Staff--Dan Spiegel, working with MacKenzie on SFRC scheduling
and has been briefed and supplied with back-up material.
Clark - contacted by Amb. McCloskey. Advised he was strongly
against bill. He was briefed by Moore on Friday and indicated
full support and requested speech for SFRC meeting. (Voted
against on floor.)
Staff--Andrew Loewi, will be supplied with back-up material
by MacKenzie and briefed by Terry Leitzell, L/OES.
Biden - to be contacted by Amb. McCloskey. Probably subject
to strong fishing industry pressure. (Voted for on floor.)
Staff--Wes Barthelmes, Dale Lewis. Will be briefed by Leitzell
of L/OES along with fisheries stat. expert.
Case - has been thoroughly briefed by Moore and MacKenzie.
Philosophically is supportive of our position. He is one
of key members for successful opposition to bill in Senate.
He has made clear that he wants a positive sign of opposition
to unilateral action as well as Presidential endorsement of
interim measures reached by negotiation. With Case we will
win in Committee; without him it is going to be exceedingly
difficult. (Voted against both in Committee and on floor.)
Staff--Nordquist is in daily touch with Jack Vandenberg who
is cooperative and understands State's position.
- 3 -
Javits - has been briefed by Moore and MacKenzie. No
clear cut position but critical of Law of Sea delays. An
un-Javits like posture concerning negotiations VS. unilateral
action but can be held if we are convincing in our endorse-
ment of interim measures. Case lead will be significant.
(Voted against in Committee and on floor.)
Staff--Pete Lakeland was present during briefing. We are
keeping him informed and supplied with back-up material.
Scott - in an enigma on this issue. He has been generally
briefed by Mr. Ingersoll and MacKenzie. However, he seemed
confused over the position taken by Secretary Kissinger at
early October leadership meeting. He referred to heavy
political pressure which can only mean Sen. Stevens. Said
he would approach with open mind and talk to Sen. Case and
Sen. Beall before voting. (Voted against bill in Committee
and for on floor.)
Staff--Ken Davis and Bob Burton (SRFC Staff) supplied with
information. However, White House leadership essential
rather than substance argument.
Pearson -. this is a tough one. To be contacted by Mr. Maw.
Sen. Pearson is ranking minority on Senate Commerce Committee.
There is always a lot of back scratching among those Committee
members so he may be committed to Magnuson or Stevens. (Last
year he voted for in Committee SFRC and against on floor.)
Staff--Jerry Harper briefed by MacKenzie. Gave every indication
of sympathetic understanding. If there is any hope of negative
vote, he is probably the key. Went back to Harper with Moore
with more complete discussion of implication of unilateral action.
Percy - we are trying to set up briefing session for Senator
by Moore. (Voted against in Committee and on floor.)
Staff--Scott Cohen advised that Sen. Percy was firmly in
support of our position. Supplied with background material
by MacKenzie.
Griffin -- briefed by Moore, Morris, and MacKenzie. Indicated
total support and advised he would work actively. However,
as he has limited knowledge in area he recognized this as
limiting his effectiveness on the substance. But it goes
without saying his opposition politically will be helpful.
(Voted against in Committee and on floor.)
Staff--Bob Turner has been completely cooperative. Assisted
in setting up Senate staff briefing session on Friday, Nov. 7.
CAN U. S. COASTAL FISH BE CONSERVED WITHOUT NEW LEGISLATION?
Eight months ago, the answer seemed to be "No." A number of fish species already
were seriously depleted, or in imminent danger. Reducing overfishing by treaties nego-
tiated with other nations had fallen short of real success.
THE NORTHEAST COAST
But an historic breakthrough occurred at the September meeting of ICNAF (the Inter-
natinnal Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries). The 17 nation agreement for
the area from Maine to North Carolina included:
**The overall fish catch quotas for foreign nations was reduced from 728,000
m etric tons to 420,000 metric tons in 1976, a reduction of 42.4%.
**The total of USSR and Polish quotas was reduced from 494,700 metric tons in
1974 to 253,750 metric tons in 1976, a reduction of 48.7%.
The U. S. quota was raised from 195,000 metric tons in 1974 to 230,000 metric
tons in 1976, an increase from 21.1% of the total quota to 30.8%.
**The total of all quotas was reduced from 923,900 in 1974 to 650,000 in 1976,
a decrease of 28.6% (41.7% decrease from the estimated catch of 1,115,000
metric tons of 1973
*Most of the Georges Bank area is closed to ground trawlers capable of catching
depleted stocks.
Informed fishery experts believe that this agreement, if lived up to, will allow
the total biomass of important fish species in this area to rebuild. Will the total
actual 1976 catch be close to the agreed quotas? Informed sources report that the to-
tal catches in 1974 and 1975 (the first years with total catch quotas) were reasonably
close to the agreed quotas. This augurs well for 1976.
How about enforcement under ICNAF? U. S. inspectors can board foreign fishing ves-
sels, inspect their catch, and report violations to their governments for punishment.
In some cases, this has been ineffective. A special ICNAF session will be held in Janu-
ary, at which the U. S. will make strenuous efforts to improve enforcement.
Will non-members of ICNAF who fish the area upset this agreement? No, catches by
non-members almost certainly will not be an important factor.
On balance, we believe that the fish conservation crisis off the U. S. northeast
coast, which was very real up to this year, is now being met effectively.
THE NORTH PACIFIC
The December 1974 agreement with Japan was a considerable step toward fish conser-
vation. The Japanese quotas for pollock in the E. Bering Sea was reduced from 1,500,000
metric tons to 1,100,000. Quotas for some other fish in specific conservation zones
were lowered. Additional protection was provided for halibut and Pacific Ocean perch
through area and time closures. The quotas for king and tanner crab are low, and
apparently Japanese fishing for king crab, at least, has ceased.
The July 1975 agreement with the USSR also represented some progress by reducing
quotas, instituting time closures, and eliminating trawling in certain areas.
However the Japanese and USSR pollock quotas in the E. Bering Sea total 1,310,000
metric tons, which still exceeds the estimated maximum sustainable yield of 1,000,000
metric tons.
Bristol Bay salmon are in serious trouble, due partially to bad weather and to Jap-
anese catch at sea, west of the 175 degree East abstention line. Whether the 200 mile
bill would be of much help is debatable. Other species still are in trouble.
This underscores the importance of the International North Pacific Fisheries Comm-
ission now meeting in Vancouver. Bilateral talks are scheduled with Japan in December,
and with the USSR after the first of the year 1976. Success at ICNAF augurs well for
real conservation progress at these sessions.
THE SOUTHEAST COAST
Here, mackerel appears to be the only commercial species to face imminent danger
of depletion due to foreign fishing. U. S. commercial fishing for this stock is of min-
or importance. There appear to be as yet no depleted commercial stocks in the Gulf of
Mexico, and only menhaden, which is protected by the 12 mile exclusive fishing zone is
in imminent danger of depletion, due entirely to U. S. overfishing.
THE SOUTHWEST COAST
Here, only Pacific hake appears to be depleted or in imminent danger due to foreign
fishing, and it is of little or no commercial value to the U. S.. California baracuda,
Pacific sardine, and Pacific bonito appear to be in trouble due to U. S. fishing.
OUR CONCLUSION: VIGOROUS NEGOTIATIONS, NOT UNILATERAL LEGISLATION
We conclude that it is no longer accurate to say that the choice is between wait-
ing for conclusion of the Law of the Sea treaty while important fish resources are wiped
out, and passing the 200 mile bills. The prospective 200 mile economic zone in the
Law of the Sea treaty, and pressure within the U. S. for a 200 mile bill, have made
foreign fishing nations more willing to accept effective limitations on their fishing
off U. S. coasts.
Under these conditions, we believe that vigorous negotiations now offer an accept-
able route for conserving the coastal fish off the shores of the United States.
S. R. Levering, Secretary
United States Committee for the
Oceans
November, 1975
245 2nd St. N.E. Washington, D. C.
TENTATIVE DRAFT: COMMENTS INVITED
20002 tel: 202 544 2312
POSSIBLE EFFECT OF S 981 AND HR 200 ON U. S. FISHERIES
Figures were obtained from the table on COMMERCIAL LANDINGS OF FISH AND SHELLFISH
BY U. S. CRAFT, pages 14-17, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974.
These have been divided by dollar value of landings, by species, into the following groups:
I. SITUATION PROBABLY UNAFFECTED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$286,193,000.
This group consists largely of (1) "shellfish et al"
caught within 12 miles of shore) except shrimp in the
South Atlantic and Gulf areas) and (2) menhaden & mullet.
These are caught almost exclusively by U. S. fishermen.
II. SITUATION PROBABLY IMPROVED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$234,909,000.
This includes all U. S. fisheries for finfish, except
salmon, off U. S. coasts, since catching of such stocks
beyond 12 miles by foreign fishermen may in some cases de-
crease the catch out to 12 miles. It also includes "shell-
fish et al" caught between 12 and 200 miles.
This possible improvement assumes foreign compliance with
the 200 mile legislation, which we consider most doubtful.
III. SITUATION PROBABLY DAMAGED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$316,986,000.
This includes all finfish and shellfish caught off foreign
coasts and shrimp caught off the S. Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts. These shrimpers probably would suffer from compet-
ition if the U. S. distant water shrimp fleet was forced
back home from waters off foreign coasts.
IV. EFFECT OF 200 MILE BILLS ON SITUATION DEBATABLE
$121, 312,000.
This includes salmon. If the 200 mile bills result in re-
pudiation of the present treaty prohibiting ocean fishing
for salmon east of the 175 degree East abstention line, the
U. S. salmon industry could be severely damaged. If, in
order to continue to harvest pollock and other groundfish,
the Japanese agreed to reduce their salmon fishery west of
this line, the U. S. salmon fishery, especially in Bristol
Bay Alaska would receive some benefit. It should be noted
that leading spokesmen for the salmon industry have opposed
the 200 mile bill.
OUR CONCLUSIONS
We believe that possible gains to U. S. fisheries by enacting the 200 mile
bills are at least matched by possible U. S. fishery losses. In our judg-
ment, possible gains are much less than possible losses to other broad U.S.
ocean interests including navigation, scientific research, environmental
protection, conservation of living resources, international trade, and broad
acceptance of orderly rules for ocean development.
Samuel R. Levering, Secretary
U. S. Committee for the Oceans
245 2nd St. N.E. Washington. D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 12, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Jack Marsh
Counsellor to the President
Mr. Max Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
SUBJECT: Needed Action on the 200-Mile Fishing
Bill - S. 961
Attached is a briefing book on the 200-mile
bill which summarizes the serious harm to our
national defense, oceans and foreign relations
interests from the bill.
I am also enclosing a summary prepared by a
private group working against the bill (The US
Committee for the Oceans) which points out that
under agreements now in force we do not have an
emergency in protecting fish stocks off our coasts
which would justify passage to the 200-mile bill in
violation of our solemn treaty obligations. The
real breakthrough was the historic ICNAF agreement
reached on September 28 which provides for an overall
quota under which principal stocks are expected to
increase in the key area from Maine through North
Carolina.
Soundings on the Hill indicate that we can stop
this bill if we take vigorous action. That action
should, I believe, include the following:
(1) we must obtain a negative report from
the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Case is key to this effort;
(2) we must obtain a referral and a nega-
tive report from the Senate Armed
Services Committee. A systematic
White House-DOD-State effort on the
Committee is key to this effort;
CONFIDENTIAL
Marking
Determined
Date
48.86
By
DAD
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
(3) both Committees must be persuaded on the
merits of the fishery case as well as
the foreign relations and defense argu-
ments. This is important in the thinking
of Senators Case, Stennis, and Thurmond,
among others;
(4) if at all possible the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of State should testify before
the full Foreign Relations Committee and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and a high DOD official should testify
before the full Armed Services Committee.
We should seek adequate time in all hearings;
(5) the President should immediately issue
a press release indicating the recent
success in the ICNAF meeting and his
commitment to improved protection for
fisheries through negotiations but stating
why he opposes a unilateral extension.
If done well this could be an opportunity
to point out:
- the success of the Administration's
negotiations in the fishery area
and the high priority to be given
the issue;
- the commitment of the Administration
to maintaining a strong defense posture;
and
- the importance of a leadership role for
the United States in pursuing cooperative
solutions to global problems.
(6) the White House must go to work on the Senate
and Republican leadership making clear that
the bill must be stopped and that there will
be no compromise by the Administration;
(7) if despite these actions the bill should pass
the Senate, the President must be prepared to
veto it. We can uphold a veto and it will
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
be broadly understood as an act of
statesmanship by the President. Major
editorial opinion is running against
the bill.
John John Deputy Norton Norton Special Moore Moore
Representative
of the President for the Law
of the Sea Conference and
Chairman, the NSC Interagency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea
Attachments:
1. Briefing Book on the 200-Mile Bill
2. Summary concerning coastal fish stocks
under agreements now in force
cc: Les Jenka
Denis Clift
CAN U. S. COASTAL FISH BE CONSERVED WITHOUT NEW LEGISLATION?
Eight months ago, the answer seemed to be "No." A number of fish species already
were seriously depleted, or in imminent danger. Reducing overfishing by treaties nego-
tiated with other nations had fallen short of real success.
THE NORTHEAST COAST
But an historic breakthrough occurred at the September meeting of ICNAF (the Inter-
natinnal Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries). The 17 nation agreement for
the area from Maine to North Carolina included:
**The overall fish catch quotas for foreign nations was reduced from 728,000
m etric tons to 420,000 metric tons in 1976, a reduction of 42.4%.
**The total of USSR and Polish quotas was reduced from 494,700 metric tons in
1974 to 253,750 metric tone in 1976, a reduction of 48.7%.
**The U. S. quota was raised from 195,000 metric tons in 1974 to 230,000 metric
tons in 1976, an increase from 21.1% of the total quota to 30.8%.
**The total of all quotas was reduced from 923,900 in 1974 to 650,000 in 1976,
a decrease of 28.6% (41.7% decrease from the estimated catch of 1,115,000
metric tons of 1973
*Most of the Georges Bank area is closed to ground trawlers capable of catching
depleted stocks.
Informed fishery experts believe that this agreement, if lived up to, will allow
the total biomass of important fish species in this area to rebuild. Will the total
actual 1976 catch be close to the agreed quotas? Informed sources report that the to-
tal catches in 1974 and 1975 (the first years with total catch quotas) were reasonably
close to the agreed quotas. This augurs well for 1976.
How about enforcement under ICNAF? U. S. inspectors can board foreign fishing ves-
sels, inspect their catch, and report violations to their governments for punishment.
In some cases, this has been ineffective. A special ICNAF session will be held in Janu-
ary, at which the U. S. will make strenuous efforts to improve enforcement.
Will non-members of ICNAF who fish the area upset this agreement? No, catches by
non-members almost certainly will not be an important factor.
On balance, we believe that the fish conservation crisis off the U. S. northeast
coast, which was very real up to this year, is now being met effectively.
THE NORTH PACIFIC
The December 1974 agreement with Japan was a considerable step toward fish conser-
vation. The Japanese quota for pollock in the E. Bering Sea was reduced from 1,500,000
metric tons to 1,100,000. Quotas for some other fish in specific conservation zones
were lowered. Additional protection was provided for halibut and Pacific Ocean perch
through area and time closures. The quotas for king and tanner crab are low, and
apparently Japanese fishing for king crab, at least, has ceased.
The July 1975 agreement with the USSR also represented some progress by reducing
quotas, instituting time closures, and eliminating trawling in certain areas.
However the Japanese and USSR pollock quotas in the E. Bering Sea total 1,310,000
metric tons, which still exceeds the estimated maximum sustainable yield of 1,000,000
metric tons.
Bristol Bay salmon are in serious trouble, due partially to bad weather and to Jap-
anese catch at sea, west of the 175 degree East abstention line. Whether the 200 mile
bill would be of much help is debatable. Other species still are in trouble.
This underscores the importance of the International North Pacific Fisheries Comm-
ission now meeting in Vancouver. Bilateral talks are scheduled with Japan in December,
and with the USSR after the first of the year 1976. Success at ICNAF augurs well for
real conservation progress at these sessions.
THE SOUTHEAST COAST
Here, mackerel appears to be the only commercial species to face imminent danger
of depletion due to foreign fishing. U. S. commercial fishing for this stock is of min-
or importance. There appear to be as yet no depleted commercial stocks in the Gulf of
Mexico, and only menhaden, which is protected by the 12 mile exclusive fishing zone is
in imminent danger of depletion, due entirely to U. S. overfishing.
THE SOUTHWEST COAST
Here, only Pacific hake appears to be depleted or in imminent danger due to foreign
fishing, and it is of little or no commercial value to the U. S.. California baracuda,
Pacific sardine, and Pacific bonito appear to be in trouble due to U. S. fishing.
OUR CONCLUSION: VIGOROUS NEGOTIATIONS, NOT UNILATERAL LEGISLATION
We conclude that it is no longer accurate to say that the choice is between wait-
ing for conclusion of the Law of the Sea treaty while important fish resources are wiped
out, and passing the 200 mile bills. The prospective 200 mile economic zone in the
Law of the Sea treaty, and pressure within the U. S. for a 200 mile bill, have made
foreign fishing nations more willing to accept effective limitations on their fishing
off U. S. coasts.
Under these conditions, we believe that vigorous negotiations now offer an accept-
able route for conserving the coastal fish off the shores of the United States.
S. R. Levering, Secretary
United States Committee for the
Oceans
November, 1975
245 2nd St. N.E. Washington, D. C.
TENTATIVE DRAFT: COMMENTS INVITED
20002 tel: 202 544 2312
POSSIBLE EFFECT OF S 981 AND HR 200 ON U. S. FISHERIES
Figures were obtained from the table on COMMERCIAL LANDINGS OF FISH AND SHELLFISH
BY U. S. CRAFT, pages 14-17, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974.
These have been divided by dollar value of landings, by species, into the following groups:
I. SITUATION PROBABLY UNAFFECTED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$286,193,000.
This group consists largely of (1) "shellfish et al"
caught within 12 miles of shore except shrimp in the
South Atlantic and Gulf areas) and (2) menhaden & mullet.
These are caught almost exclusively by U. S. fishermen.
II. SITUATION PROBABLY IMPROVED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$234,909,000.
This includes all U. S. fisheries for finfish, except
salmon, off U. S. coasts, since catching of such stocks
beyond 12 miles by foreign fishermen may in some cases de-
crease the catch out to 12 miles. It also includes "shell-
fish et al" caught between 12 and 200 miles.
This possible improvement assumes foreign compliance with
the 200 mile legislation, which we consider most doubtful.
III. SITUATION PROBABLY DAMAGED BY 200 MILE BILLS
$316,986,000.
This includes all finfish and shellfish caught off foreign
coasts and shrimp caught off the S. Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts. These shrimpers probably would suffer from compet-
ition if the U. S. distant water shrimp fleet was forced
back home from waters off foreign coasts.
IV. EFFECT OF 200 MILE BILLS ON SITUATION DEBATABLE
$121, 312,000.
This includes salmon. If the 200 mile bills result in re-
pudiation of the present treaty prohibiting ocean fishing
for salmon east of the 175 degree East abstention line, the
U. S. salmon industry could be severely damaged. If, in
order to continue to harvest pollock and other groundfish,
the Japanese agreed to reduce their salmon fishery west of
this line, the U. S. salmon fishery, especially in Bristol
Bay Alaska would receive some benefit. It should be noted
that leading spokesmen for the salmon industry have opposed
the 200 mile bill.
OUR CONCLUSIONS
We believe that possible gains to U. S. fisheries by enacting the 200 mile
bills are at least matched by possible U. S. fishery losses. In our judg-
ment, possible gains are much less than possible losses to other broad U.S.
ocean interests including navigation, scientific research, environmental
protection, conservation of living resources, international trade, and broad
acceptance of orderly rules for ocean development.
Samuel R. Levering, Secretary
U. S. Committee for the Oceans
TENTATIVE DRAFT: COMMENTS INVITED
245 2nd St. N.E. Washington, D. C.
200-MILE FISHING LEGISLATION
Table of Contents
1. Summary Talking Points
2. Fact Sheet on Arguments For and
Against S.961
3. Recent Editorials on the 200-Mile
Fishing Legislation
4. Department of Defense Talking Points
5. A 200-Mile Fishing Limit: Is it Legal?
6. International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
7.
Excerpt From the Remarks of Secretary
of State Kissinger to the American Bar
Association, August 11, 1975
8. Testimony of The Under Secretary of
State for Security Assistance Carlyle E.
Maw and the Honorable John Norton Moore,
Chairman, National Security Council
Interagency Task Force on the Law of the
Sea Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subcommittee on Oceans and
International Environment, October 31, 1975
LIBRARY
I
Summary of Reasons for Opposition
to S.961 Which Would Unilaterally
Extend U.S. Fisheries Jurisdiction
Over the High Seas to 200 Miles
The Executive Branch strongly opposes S.961 or
other legislation that would unilaterally extend U.S.
fisheries jurisdiction over the high seas to a distance
of 200 miles. The reasons for that opposition are:
-- Such a unilateral extension whenever it
were to occur would violate the pledged
word of the United States given on
solemn treaty obligations including the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, and the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention. The
issue is SO clear that Philip C. Jessup,
a former Judge of the International Court
of Justice, writes: "I do not know any
responsible and qualified person who
maintains that such a claim (unilaterally
established 200-mile fisheries limit)
would be in accordance with international
law. Similarly, Professor Louis B. Sohn
of the Harvard Law School writes: "There
is no question in my mind that such an
extension would be invalid under inter-
national law and would violate the
rights of other states."
-- The avoidance of unilateral oceans claims
contrary to international law is a cardinal
tenet of United States oceans policy. The
U.S. consistently protests such claims by
other nations and passage of S.961 would
undermine our ability to prevent unilateral
claims by others which could be seriously
harmful to U.S. oceans interests. Such
claims by others would not be confined
to coastal fishing jurisdiction and could
include:
GENATO TURD LIBRARY
- 2 -
- claims asserting control over ship
construction or operation which
could endanger our navigational
freedom to transport vital oil
supplies. At current prices, the
value of petroleum imports by
sea into the U.S. in 1976 will
exceed $26 billion;
- claims asserting control over U.S.
oceanographic research ships. The
U.S. has a greater interest in
oceanographic research than any
other nation in the world;
- claims asserting control over
navigation and overflight through
vital straits, endangering the
mobility and secrecy of our general
purpose and strategic deterrent
forces.
-- Enforcement of a unilateral 200-mile fish-
eries claim against the Soviet Union,
Japan and other nations fishing off our
coasts would pose a risk of confrontation
or retaliation against U.S. economic
interests.
-- S.961 would seriously injure important U.S.
tuna, shrimp and other fishermen who fish
within 200 miles of other nations. The
value of tuna landings alone by U.S. fisher-
men off foreign shores exceeds $138 million
per year. Such a unilateral extension could
also endanger existing treaty arrangements
protecting our valuable salmon stocks, that
range beyond 200 miles (including the
Atlantic salmon moratorium and the agreements
with Japan and Korea and the understanding
with the Republic of China covering our
Pacific salmon).
GERALD FORD
- 3 -
-- S.961 could seriously damage U.S. objectives
in the ongoing Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. If U.S. unilateral
action encourages a wave of such claims, the
incentive for agreement may be removed and
the Conference could collapse or be seriously
delayed. At the best, such a unilateral
claim would lessen the U.S. bargaining position
at the Conference and could harden positions
of other nations making their own unilateral
claims. Paradoxically, if we encourage the
negotiations to succeed, a comprehensive
treaty is virtually certain to include a
200-mile economic zone with the kinds of
protection we seek for coastal species and
salmon.
-- S.961 would undermine the establishment of
binding international measures for the
conservation and full utilization of ocean
protein supplies. Such measures must be
agreed through multilateral agreement and
cannot be achieved unilaterally. Unilateral
actions merely encourage the extensions of
national jurisdiction without the necessity
of agreeing to such conservation and full
utilization standards.
--- Needed additional protection for fish stocks
off the U.S. coast can best be provided through
bilateral and multilateral negotiations now
underway. These negotiations are in addition
to the Law of the Sea negotiations and within
the last year we believe we have turned the
tide with respect to protection of our fish
stocks. Results include:
- under the International Convention
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF) agreement reached on September
28 of this year, agreed quotas are at
a level to provide for a recovery of
the principal stocks in the important
area from Maine through North Carolina.
This was a historic breakthrough.
- 4 -
- during the past three years the total
allowable catch within the ICNAF area
has dropped by more than 40% while
the U.S. quota has more than doubled.
- the recently concluded agreement with
the Japanese contains the following
substantial reductions: for the
northeast Pacific, 20% in total
bottomfish, 75% in rockfish, and 63%
in bottomfish for certain specific
conservation zones. For the Eastern
Bering Sea, 27% reduction in pollock and
10% reduction in bottomfish. The
Japanese agreement also achieves a
substantial reduction in the catch of
crab, provides additional protection
for U.S. fishermen against gear loss,
and affords additional protection to
halibut and Pacific Oceans perch
through extensive area and time
closures.
- the recently concluded agreement with
the Soviets contains the following
reductions: for the Eastern Bering
Sea, 27% reduction in pollock and
12% reduction in herring. For the
Gulf of Alaska, 29% reduction in
pollock. For the states of Washington-
California, 60% reduction in rockfish
incidental catch. The Soviet agree-
ment also closes the southern
Washington, Oregon and northern
California coasts to all Soviet
trawling operations between November
1 and April 25 to protect rockfish,
flounder and sole and protect hake,
bottomfish and rockfish by eliminating
Soviet trawling off defined areas of
Oregon, Washington and California.
- 5 -
-- Last year the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and this year the House Inter-
national Relations Committee reported
unfavorably on bills to unilaterally
extend the U.S. fishing zone to 200 miles.
The International Relations Committee
report stated:
- in submitting this oversight report
the Committee on International
Relations is expressing its interest
in seeking the most effective means
of protecting all U.S. interests in
the oceans including fisheries, while
respecting international law and
treaty obligations.
- it is the considered judgment of the
Committee on International Relations
that H.R. 200 should not pass.
Department of State
November 7, 1975
2
Department of State - NSC Interagency Task Force
On the Law of the Sea
Fact Sheet on Arguments
For and Against S.961,
The Bill to Unilaterally
Extend U.S. Fisheries
Jurisdiction for 200 miles
on the High Seas
Argument: The 200-mile bill is needed as an
emergency measure to protect coastal
fish stocks against heavy foreign
fishing.
Response: It is true that many stocks off the United
States coasts have been depleted by foreign over-
fishing during the past 15 years. But the issue is
not whether stocks have been depleted by past over-
fishing; rather it is whether under agreements
presently in force and which can reasonably be antici-
pated there is an emergency situation threatening
serious depletion of stocks until a Law of the Sea
Treaty can be brought into force. On this point,
there is a real question as to the extent of the
threat to the stocks at levels of fishing permitted
under agreements now in place and those which can
be resonably expected in the coming months. For
example, under the latest ICNAF agreement, agreed
quotas are at a level to provide for a recovery of
the principal stocks in the important area from
Maine through North Carolina.
We should keep in mind that a unilateral exten-
sion of jurisdiction would not provide added protec-
tion for our major fisheries within 12 miles or for
continental shelf fishing resources, both of which
are already under U.S. fisheries jurisdiction.
We expect to be able to continue to reduce
foreign fishing through ongoing fishery negotia-
tions. Such negotiations, in the present negotia-
ting climate, are the best way to provide added
- 2 -
protection quickly. Though problems remain, recent
bilateral and multilateral agreements have
been much more effective in protecting stocks off
the United States. Moreover, such an approach
would not undercut our important interests in
tuna, salmon, and coastal species caught within
200 miles of other nations or run the risk of losing
international recognition of the 200 mile area with-
in the Law of the Sea negotiations.
Argument: The Law of the Sea Conference is
taking too long and we cannot wait.
Response: We are not relying on a Law of the Sea
Treaty to resolve our interim fisheries problems.
Rather we have within the last year greatly inten-
sified our efforts at bilateral and multilateral
fishing agreements. In two key negotiations,
ICNAF and the 1974 Japanese agreement, we have
had substantial success. We achieved a 23%
reduction in ICNAF, and last year the Japanese
agreed to more than a 25% decrease in their total
catch off our coasts.
The Law of the Sea Conference is, of course,
taking time and is not moving as fast as we would
like. It is not clear whether a treaty can be
completed in 1976 although we will make every effort
to do SO. We are, however, engaged in the most
complex and comprehensive multilateral negotiation
ever undertaken. Substantial progress is being
made as evidenced by the production of a single
negotiating text at the Geneva session of the
Conference last spring and an emerging consensus on
most major issues (including a 200-mile economic
zone with protection for our coastal and salmon
fishing interests). As long as substantial progress
is being made, because of the importance of the
issues at stake, including vital national security
interests, we should strongly support the Conference.
Most importantly, to make a major unilateral fish-
eries claim could undermine our ability to achieve
international agreement in a Law of the Sea Treaty
recognizing the very 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction
which we seek.
- 3 -
Argument: S.961 will strengthen the hands
of our Law of Sea negotiators.
Response: Although the existence (as opposed to
passage) of the 200-mile bill may strengthen the hands
of our bilateral fisheries negotiators, the bill is
seriously harmful to the broader Law of the Sea
negotiations. The reasons why the bill undercuts
rather than strengthens the hands of our Law of the
Sea negotiators include:
-- we have said that we could recognize a
200-mile economic zone only if our vital
interests were protected by a treaty. A
200-mile economic zone is one of the
major objectives of many coastal States
in the negotiations. For Congress to
enact such a zone would give those States
one of their principal objectives with-
out our achieving vital objectives in
return;
-- passage of the 200-mile bill even with a
delayed effective date could encourage
extremists to stall the negotiations and
wait until United States action validates
their long-standing claims;
-- if United States unilateral action
encourages a wave of more extreme uni-
lateral claims, the incentive for agree-
ment may be removed and the Conference
could collapse or be strung out indefi-
nitely;
-- at the least, such unilateral claims
could harden positions and make the
negotiations more difficult.
Argument: The United States has taken unilateral
action before without harm to our
interests.
Response: In 1945 President Truman proclaimed United
States jurisdiction over the resources of the conti-
nental shelf and in 1966 the United States extended
its fisheries jurisdiction from 3 to 12 miles.
More recently, in 1973 the United States declared
the American lobster a "creature of the continental
- 4 -
shelf" under the Continental Shelf Convention and
thereby subject to United States jurisdiction.
These unilateral United States oceans actions are
fundamentally different from a unilateral extension
of our fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. The
differences include:
-- none was made during the course of a
relevant multilateral Conference;
- in the case of the extension of our
fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles, many
nations, including the Soviet Union, had
a 12-mile territorial sea at the time;
-- it was evident at the time that there
would be few protests from the United
States action and this was borne out
in fact;
-- the latter two United States fisheries
claims were of minor significance
compared to an extension of fisheries
jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles.
Moreover, even these more innocuous actions
were not free from costs. Some states used the
Truman Proclamation to justify 200-mile terri-
torial sea claims. And the more recent claim to
include lobster as a "creature of the continental
shelf" has given rise to a fisheries dispute with
the Bahamas in which Florida-based spiny lobster
fishermen have been excluded from their traditional
fishing in the Bahamas. It may be instructive to
examine the balance sheet on this extension of
jurisdiction with respect to the American lobster
as a creature of the shelf. Gains in the United
States lobster fishery as a result of the United
States declaring lobster a creature of the shelf
have been slight. But invocation of the same
doctrine by the Bahamas has resulted in excluding
U.S. fishermen from the Bahamas spiny lobster
fishing at a substantial cost in financial and
human terms.
BERALD FORD CIBRARY
- 5 -
Argument: The 200-mile fishing bill provides
an opportunity for renegotiation of
of our fisheries bilaterals and as
such would not violate U.S. treaty
obligations or international law.
Response: Enactment of the 200-mile fishing bill
would violate solemn treaty obligations of the United
States and constitute a serious setback to develop-
ment of cooperation rather than conflict in the
oceans. Whatever the effect of the ambiguous pro-
visions concerning our bilateral fisheries agree-
ments, the bill would violate the fundamental 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, the 1958 Geneva
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, and the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention, to which the U.S.
is a party. The issue is so clear that Philip
Jessup, formerly a judge of the International Court
of Justice, has recently written: "I do not know
of any responsible and qualified person who main-
tains that such a claim (unilateral 200-mile
fisheries zone) would be in accordance with inter-
national law. Similarly, Professor Louis B. Sohn
of the Harvard Law School writes: "There is no
question in my mind that such an extension would
be invalid under international law and would
violate the rights of other states."
Argument: The bill would protect sportfishing
off the United States coasts.
Response: The vast majority of United States sport-
fishing for groundfish takes place within 12 miles,
an area already under United States exclusive juris-
diction. An argument can be made that foreign
fishing efforts outside of 12 miles have an effect
on sportfishing within this limit, but United States
commercial fishing operations have the same effect.
Sportfishing aimed at billfish and other migratory
species such as bluefin tuna, can only be protected
by regulations applying to the entire stocks, which
range far beyond 200 miles. Passage of the bill
could actually have an adverse effect on this seq-
ment of sportfishing if exclusive claims by Atlantic
- 6 -
coastal states, including Europeans and Africans,
resulted in abandonment of the effort to manage
these species through the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT).
Argument: The bill is needed to protect ocean
protein supplies.
Response: It is true that satisfactory fisheries
management requires an extension of jurisdiction
throughout the range of coastal species. For this
reason an extension to 200 miles is generally accepted
within the Law of the Sea negotiations as part of a
comprehensive oceans treaty. Protection of ocean
protein supplies, however, also requires establishment
of binding international measures for the conservation
and full utilization of ocean protein and special
treatment for anadromous species (salmon) and highly
migratory species (including tuna and whales). Such
measures can only be achieved through broad multi-
lateral agreement. Unilateral actions (with or
without such provisions) merely encourage the exten-
sion of national jurisdiction without the necessity
of agreeing to such conservation and full utilization
standards. If such action undermines the Law of the
Sea treaty, we will lose the best, and perhaps the
only opportunity, we have had to achieve binding
measures for the conservation and full utilization of
ocean protein.
Argument: Other nations already make such extended
claims over fisheries, why should't we?
Response: Only 15 nations (out of 125 independent
coastal states) claim a territorial sea or fisheries
jurisdiciton to 200 miles. None of these nations is
a major maritime power with a diverse range of
important oceans' interests. In contrast, the U.S.
has the largest oceans' interests of any country in
the world and its actions would have far greater
impact on the development of oceans' law than that
of smaller nations. The U.S. has, and must, exercise
its influence to promote an oceans' regime based on
cooperation and common interest rather than uni-
lateral national claims. A stable legal regime
- 7 -
for the oceans will contribute to ordered develop-
ment of the oceans, protection of the marine
environment, and avoidance of conflict among nations.
Argument: The nations of the world have already
agreed at the Law of the Sea Conference
on a 200-mile economic zone, so why not
anticipate the result?
Response: It is true that there is general agreement
within the Law of the Sea Conference on a 200-mile
eocnomic zone. The agreement, however, is predi-
cated on a comprehensive treaty in which the nations
agreeing achieve protection for their interests in
other areas; for example, guarantees of unimpeded
transit through and over straits used for international
navigation. To seek to anticipate the result could
undermine the package deal and the very consensus
needed to achieve international recognition of a
200-mile economic zone with full protection for our
fisheries interests. Many of those nations accepting
the 200-mile economic zone in the comprehensive
negotiations have told us flatly that they will not
accept a unilaterally imposed 200-mile fisheries zone.
E
Washington Post
November 4, 1975
Editorial
The Fishing Bill
Othe Philadelphia Unquirer
An Independent Newspaper
Published Every Morning by Philadelphia Newspapers, Juc.
400 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101
SAM S. McKEEL, President
DAVID GELSANLITER. General Manager
CREED C. BLACK, Editor
EUGENE L. ROBERTS JR., Executive Editor
Friday, October 24, 1975
Page 10-A
U.S. shouldn't go it alone
on 200-mile fishing limit
LOS ANGELES TIMES , 10/29/75
ROBERT C. LOBDILL, Vice President and General Counsel
VANCE L. STICKELL, Vice President- Sales
JAMES BASSETT, Associate Editor
ANTHONY DAY, Editor of the Ednorial Pages
ROBERT I DONOVAN, Associate Editor
FRANK P. HAVEN, Managing Editor
JEAN SHARLEY TAYLOR, Associate Lunor
6-Part =
WEDNESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 29, 1975
A Law for Some of the Seas
Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1975
P. 18
Congress Tackles a Fishy Problem
By ARLEN J. LARGE
A Execuently Fouggtten Point
Wall Street Journal
Oct. 23, 1975 P. 18
"Congress Tackles a Fishy Problem"
to
Department of Defense
THE EFFECT OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF A 200 MILE
FISHERIES ZONE BY THE UNITED STATES ON NATIONAL SECURITY
THE GENERAL EFFECT OF SUCH A DECLARATION-If the U.S. should
unilaterally claim a 200 mile fisheries jurisdiction, it
would lead other states to make unilateral claims of their
own which would in all probability not be limited to
fisheries. If these states witness the U.S. taking unilateral
action, they in turn would feel no constraints in regard to
taking similar action. Their reactions could run all the
way from claims of fisheries zones, to areas of strict
pollution control, to claims of territorial jurisdiction.
Multilateral action, such as is being developed through
the UN Law of the Sea Conference, could be an effective
antidote to such competing claims. The Conference is not
trying to prevent expansion of fishery and other jurisdictions,
but is only trying to control them so that such extensions
do not injure the interests of other states. Assuming
these negotiations are successful, if a state wished to
extend its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, this would
be done through a treaty mechanism. A clause would be
written into the treaty that such jurisdiction would not be
territorial, that it would allow unimpeded innocent passage
by vessels of other states. Passage beyond the territorial
limit of 12 miles would be safeguarded. A "divided juris-
diction" would be established under international law whereby
the jurisdiction of the coastal state would extend only to
fisheries, for example, assuring that other states would
retain all the rights of navigation of the high seas
currently granted them by international law.
Without such protection, a unilateral extension by an
influential state like the U.S., which in the past has
opposed all such unilateral extensions, would set off a
chain reaction by other states, acting to protect themselves
as quickly as possible. Anyone who doubts that this could
happen should remember that before the U.S. instituted a
12 mile fisheries zone in 1966, only 25 states had such
claims. Since the U.S. unilateral extension, about 55 states
have made similar claims. The example which would be set
by the U.S. would be too strong to ignore.
THE EFFECT OF 200 MILE TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS ON U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY-If all states with coasts and islands
claimed a territorial limit (or effective equivalent) of
200 miles, fully 36% of what is now high seas would become
territorial waters. This would effect the rights of passage
in these waters and would also result in the closing of every
international strait to free passage. This would have an
adverse impact on the national security of the U.S.
EFFECT ON U.S. NUCLEAR DEFENSE FORCES-The most important
impact would be in the area of our strategic nuclear defenses,
our system of nuclear deterrence. This system is based on
three types of weapons: airborne bombers and missile forces,
land-based ICBM's, and nuclear submarines carrying Polaris
and Poseidon missiles. These weapons systems are useful only
if they can survive a nuclear "first strike by enemy forces
and return a retaliatory "second strike." In this sense,
they provide our nuclear deterrence to war. Nuclear submarines
are the least vulnerable to a first strike because they can
cruise the oceans and seas of the world for months at a time
underwater, and are therefore impossible to locate.
If 36% of the world's high seas become territorial, and
if all the straits become territorial, U.S. nuclear submarines
would be easily monitored and located. This is due to
several factors. First, upon entering territorial waters,
a submarine must surface and show its native colors. Thus,
an enemy power would be able to know how many U.S. submarines
were in, for example. the Mediterranean, since they would
have to pass through a now "territorial" Strait of Gibraltor.
Second, the possibility exists that the entire Mediterranean
could be closed to U.S. submarines and surface vessels if
every littoral state enforced a 200 mile claim. This would
also apply to all of the seas in the area of the East Indies.
Thus, targeting areas for major cities in the U.S.S.R. and
People's Republic of China would be vastly reduced. This in
turn would reduce the cruising area of the nuclear submarines,
making them easier to find.
If submarines can be monitored, then they can be traced
and located. If their targeting areas are small, this also
aids in their location. A submarine which can be found is
vulnerable to a first strike. This would undermine the
entire U.S. system of deterrence and bring us one step closer
to nuclear holocaust.
EFFECT ON GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES-There would also be an
impact on our naval general purpose forces. These are forces
which are kept at the ready for a non-nuclear conflict. To
be effective these forces must be highly mobile. This
mobility would be greatly reduced if these ships have to
negotiate a route through a series of territorial waters in
order to get to where they were needed, or were forced to
detour. For instance, if there were a 200 mile territorial
sea, then the Seventh Fleet, in order to pass from the Pacific
to the Indian, would have to travel south of Australia, a
route four times as long as the present route. The situation
in the Middle East would be even more difficult. As was
2
mentioned previously, the Mediferranean could be cut off,
thus effectively eliminating the operating area of the
Sixth fleet. Aid to Israel, Turkey and other allies in the
area would be almost impossible.
EFFECT ON AIR FORCES-There would also be an impact on our
tactical air forces. All air space above territorial waters
is considered to be equally territorial. Permission is
needed to fly through it. Thus, air forces would be effected
the same as naval forces if any rerouting is necessary or if
any areas are made inaccessible to U.S. forces. In the
last Mideast conflict many states denied the U.S. permission
to use their air space. Increased territorial air space
could now totally cut off U.S. air support for its Mideast
allies.
The above are some of the factors which have influenced
President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, and the Foreign
Relations Committee to oppose a unilateral 200 mile extension
of fisheries jurisdiction by the U.S.
3
5
Department of State
A 200-Mile Fishing Limit: Is It Legal?
"I do not know any responsible and qualified person who
maintains that such a claim would be in accordance with
international law. Nor can the advocates of the proposed
law take the position that the United States should
abandon its historic position as a defender and upholder
of international law, sinking to the level of those other
countries which we denounce as law-breakers.'
Philip C. Jessup
Former Judge
International Court of Justice
"In my view, H.R. 200, if enacted, would not be consistent
with the obligations of the United States under existing
international law. It is established, and the International
Court of Justice has recently reiterated (in the Icelandic
Fisheries Case) that a coastal state cannot extend its ex-
clusive fishing jurisdiction into the high seas at will,
against all."
Louis Henkin
Columbia University Law School
"There is no question in my mind that such an extension
would be invalid under international law and would violate
the rights of other states. It would be in particular in-
consistent with our various agreements on fisheries, especially
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention. Such countries
as the Soviet Union in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific
could validly argue that their rights have been grossly
violated by such action of the United States. Such legislation
would also constitute a violation of the United States obliga-
tions under the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, concluded in Geneva in 1958.
This Treaty provides various methods for safeguarding of a
coastal nation's interests. The proposed legislation does not
follow the detailed provisions of the Convention for dealing
with the problem.
"In addition, the proposed legislation disregards the basic
rule of international law, embodied in Article 2 of the Con-
vention on the High Seas of 1958, which provides that in
exercising its rights on the high seas each state must pay
reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their
exercise of the freedoms of the high seas, which include the
freedom of fishing."
Louis B. Sohn
Harvard University Law School
- 2 -
"On the other question, whether unilateral adoption of
a 200-mile exclusive-fisheries zone by the United
States would violate present-day international law,
it is my belief that the answer must be given, 'Yes,
there would be such violation' II
William Bishop
University of Michigan Law School
"H.R. 200 is thus not simply a case of doing now what
will ultimately be done anyway under the terms of the
treaty. In the words of the popular song of years ago
'It's not what you do but the way that you do it. There
is a world of difference between a generally agreed 200-
mile economic zone, with jurisdiction over the coastal
species, under the terms of a general international agree-
ment, and a unilateral grab of a 200-mile fisheries zone,
which would be the signal for other states to lay even
more sweeping claims over the 200-mile zone, up to and
including a 200-mile territorial sea claim.'
Richard R. Baxter
Harvard University Law School
6
EPARTMENT STATE
October 1, 1975
No. 510
CONCLUSION OF SEVENTH SPECIAL MEETING OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES
MINUTES OF THE MEETING
Satisfactory agreement was reached September 28 on all major United States
proposals before the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF). The Seventh Special Meeting of the Commission concluded
Sunday after a week of deliberations which were characterized as some of
the most successful in the Commission's 25-year history by David H. Wallace,
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation.
The special meeting of the 17 member nation body which deals with the
conservation of fish stocks in the Northwest Atlantic was called at the
request of the U.S. and Canada to resolve outstanding issues on the
reduction of fishing effort and quotas in the Convention Area which had not
been satisfactorily resolved at the Annual Meeting of the Commission in
June.
The Commission took positive action on U.S. proposals for a reduced 1976
overall catch quota for the entire fish biomass off the United States coast,
a closure of most of the Georges Bank area to vessels capable of catching
valuable and depleted groundfish species, a national system of vessel
registration, and more restrictive and enforceable exemption provisions
for trawl net fisheries conducted off the U.S. and Canadian coasts.
Opening ceremonies at the start of the special meeting on September 22
included an address by U.S. Under Secretary of State, Carlyle E. Maw, who
brought with him a message from the President of the United States of
America. The President's message to the Commission stressed the great
importance which the United States attaches to effective conservation
measures, efficient enforcement of those measures and the particular
importance of a successful ICNAF meeting at this critical time.
A principal U.S. objective at the Montreal meeting was to obtain a 1976 overall
fishing quota for the area off the U.S. coast which would allow a rapid
recovery of the depleted biomass. This "Second Tier Quota" is allocated
nationally to limit what each nation can harvest from the biomass as a
whole. It is imposed as a ceiling figure over the individual species
quotas and is less than the sum of the individual species quotas in order
to encourage the development of fishing methods which concentrate on the
target species and reduce the by-catch of other species. The second tier
system was first approved in 1973 for application in the 1974 fishing
season in an effort to substantially reduce overall foreign catches off
the U.S. coast. Second tier quota levels established for 1974 and '75
were designed to stabilize the biomass and the Commission had agreed that
the 1976 level would be set at an amount which would allow recovery of the
biomass to the maximum sustainable yield level. The June Annual Meeting
had agreed to what the United States regarded as an excessive level of
724,000 metric tons by excluding squids from the regulation. This had not
been the case in either 1974 or '75. Scientists estimated that at such a
level at least a full decade would be required for stock recovery. The
United States regarded this as unacceptable and filed a formal objection
For further information contact:
-2-
PR#510
to the regulation under the rules of the Commission. As a result of this
week's meeting, the Commission has agreed to set the 1976 level at
650,000 metric tons including squids. This level should provide a high
probability of recovery within seven years, according to U.S. fisheries
scientists.
No action had been taken at the June meeting on a U.S. proposal to limit
by-catches of valuable and seriously depleted yellowtail flounder and
haddock stocks on Georges Bank through closure of this area to vessels
using gear capable of catching these groundfish. Arguments had been
raised by others that such a regulation would seriously interfere with
fisheries for species such as cod and the hakes. At the Montreal meeting,
agreement was reached on a regulation closing a large area on Georges Bank
to such vessels throughout the year. Though slightly smaller than the
area originally proposed for closure by the U.S., the area is sufficiently
large to provide satisfactory protection for these important stocks.
Further progress in the critical area of improved international enforcement
was also a principal U.S. objective at the special meeting. This was
achieved to a significant extent with the approval of a U.S.-proposed
system of national registration for vessels engaged in fishing or fish
processing in the Convention Area. Such a system is designed to assist
member governments and international enforcement personnel in monitoring
fishing effort deployed throughout the area.
U.S. efforts at the Annual Meeting in June to secure approval of such a
system had not been successful. Additional progress in this area as well
as added control over by-catches of regulated species was achieved with
the approval of a more restrictive and more easily enforceable exemption
for trawl net fisheries conducted off both the U.S. and Canadian coasts.
Canada was successful in securing approval for a regulation designed to
substantially reduce fishing effort on groundfish stocks in five portions
of the Convention Area off the Canadian coast. The regulation provides
for reduction in fishing days for various fishing vessel tonnage and gear
categories ranging from 40 to 50 percent from that reported in the 1972 and
1973 periods.
The meeting concluded with an announcement by the Observer from Cuba that
action required for Cuba to become a member of the Commission would be
immediately initiated by his government. The Commission had approved
adjustments in quota allocations for a number of stocks providing the
specified catch allocations necessary for Cuba to fish within established
conservation regulations throughout 1976.
The next meeting of the Commission will be held in Rome, Italy, in January
1976. The meeting has been called to establish quotas for a number of
Northwest Atlantic herring stocks fished off both U.S. and Canadian coasts.
Additional proposals on enforcement, made by the United States, will also
be on the agenda.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 18, 1975
This special meeting of the International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries takes up the most
difficult problem in the Commission's twenty-five year
history. I send my warmest greetings and good wishes
to the participants.
It is imperative that the Commission succeed in estab-
lishing adequate conservation measures and enforcement
procedures to rebuild the important fishery stocks of the
Northwest Atlantic. If agreement cannot be reached on
reasonable conservation and enforcement measures, the
ability of the Commission to fulfill its stated purposes will
be called into question. For our part, I pledge the full
support of the United States to sound fisherics management
and conservation practices, based on scientific evidence
and implemented within the framework of internationally
negotiated agreements.
I am strongly opposed to unilateral claims by nations to
jurisdiction on the high seas. However, pressures for
PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIDDADV
unilateral measures do exist, and will continue to mount,
if international arrangements do not prove to be effective.
It is my carnest hope that the Commission will vindicate
the trust we place in it and fully justify our mutual efforts
to find cooperative approaches to fisheries conservation
and management for the benefit of all mankind. In this
spirit, I send you best wishes for a productive and reward-
ing session.
Herald John
7
Excerpt From an Address by Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger Before the American Bar Associa-
FORD
tion. Montreal, Canada
August 11, 1975
GERALD
LIBRARY
The urgency of the problem is illustrated by disturbing developments
which continue to crowd upon us. Most prominent is the problem of
fisheries.
The United States cannot indefinitely accept unregulated and indis-
criminate foreign fishing off its coasts. Many fish stocks have been
brought close to extinction by foreign overfishing. We have recently
concluded agreements with the Soviet Union, Japan, and Poland which
will limit their catch and we have a long and successful history of
conservation agreements with Canada. But much more needs to be done.
Many within Congress are urging us to solve this problem unilaterally.
A bill to establish a 200-mile fishing zone passed the Senate last
year; a new one is currently before the House.
The Administration shares the concern which has led to such proposals.
But unilateral action is both extremely dangerous and incompatible with
the thrust of the negotiations described here. The United States has
consistently resisted the unilateral claims of other nations, and
others will almost certainly resist OURS. Unilatoral legislation on
our part would almost surely prompt others to assert extreme claims
of their own. Our ability to negotiate an acceptable international
consensus on the economic zone will be jeophrdized. If every state
proclaims its own rules of law and seeks to impose them or. others,
the very basis of international law will be shaken, ultimately to our
own detriment.
We warmly welcome the recent statement by Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirm-
ing the need for a solution through the Law of the Sea Conference rather
than through unilateral action. He said, "Canadians at large should
realize that we have very large stakes indeed in the Law of the Sea
Conference and we would be fools to give up those stakes by an action
that would be purely a temporary, paper success.'
That attitude will guide our actions as well. To conserve the fish and
protect our fishing industry while the treaty is being negotiated, the
United States will negotiate interim arrangements with other nations to
conserve the fish stocks, to ensure effective enforcement, and to protect
the livelihood of our coastal fishermen. These agreements will be a
transition to the eventual 200-mile zone. We believe It is in the
interests of states fishing off our coasts to cooperate with us in this
effort. We will support the efforts of other states, including our
neighbors, to deal with their problems by similar agreements. We will
consult fully with Congress, our states, the public, and foreign govern-
ments on arrangements for implementing 2 200-mile zone by virtue of
agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference.
Unilateral legislation would be a last resort. The world simply cannot
afford to let the vital questions before the Law of the Sea Conference
be answered by default. He are at one of those rare moments when man-
kind has come together to devise means of preventing future conflict
and shaping its cestiny rather than to solve a crisis that has occurred,
or to deal with the aftermath of war. It is a test of vision and will,
and of statesmanship. It must succeed. The United States is resolved to
help conclude the Conference in 1976 -- before the pressure of events
and contention places international consensus irretrievably beyond our
grasp.
8
TESTIMONY OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
CARLYLE E. MAW
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1975
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am
pleased to appear today on behalf of the Executive
Branch to testify on S.961, which proposes to extend
United States fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles off
our coasts. I am accompanied by John Norton Moore,
Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law
of the Sea and Deputy Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the Sea Conference, and
Rozanne Ridgway, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.
Mr. Chairman, the Administration believes that the
proposed 200-mile fisheries legislation could create
serious foreign policy problems.
Secretary Kissinger, in an address to the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association in Montreal on
August 11, stated that "unilateral action is both
extremely dangerous and incompatible with the thrust of
the (Law of the Sea) negotiations
He added:
- 2 -
"The United States has consistently resisted the
unilateral claims of other nations, and others will
almost certainly resist ours. Unilateral legislation
on our part would almost surely prompt others to assert
extreme claims of their own. Our ability to negotiate
an acceptable international consensus on the economic
zone will be jeopardized. If every state proclaims
its own rules of law and seeks to impose them on others,
the very basis of international law will be shaken,
ultimately to our own detriment. "
The Administration is also seriously concerned
about the depletion of many fish stocks off our coasts
as a result of overfishing. In the long run, we believe
that a Law of the Sea Treaty which is accepted by the
fishing nations of the world is the best way to con-
serve fish stocks and to protect our fishing interests.
The principal nations fishing off our coasts accept the
general consensus at the Law of the Sea Conference in
favor of a 200-mile economic resource zone that would
include coastal fisheries. They have stated that they
would not recognize such a. zone created by unilateral
action.
I agree with the proponents of S.961 that action
must be taken now to halt the depletion of fish stocks
off our coasts. Mr. Chairman, the Administration is
taking that action. I would like to outline for the
Committee this morning the measures we have recently
taken to reduce overfishing off our coasts and the
additional steps we will be taking in the immediate
future. These measures have become possible because
of the emerging consensus in the Law of the Sea
Conference, as I have mentioned.
Secretary Kissinger announced in his American Bar
Association speech that we would begin immediately to
negotiate new agreements with nations fishing off our
coasts to provide a transition to a 200-mile zone. To
carry out this program, an interagency group on fish-
eries negotiations has developed a plan to effectuate
a transition to a 200-mile coastal fisheries zone off
the U.S. coasts through bilateral and multilateral
negotiations as promptly as possible. I would like to
emphasize that this plan does not require us to wait
for the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference.
We have at least 11 bilateral fisheries agreements due
for renegotiation next year, as well as regular meetings:
of six multilateral fisheries commissions. In the next
few months, we will be renegotiating agreements with
Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union.
Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, this plan is based
on negotiations, not unilateral action.
- 4 -
In our negotiations, we intend to accomplish the
following objectives within 200 miles of our coasts:
-- establish an effective conservation regime
based on the best available scientific evidence;
-- create, consistent with such a regime, pre-
ferential harvesting rights for U.S. fishermen. This
will result in substantially reduced foreign catches
since only the surplus will be allocated among foreign
fishermen;
-- implement a standardized system for collecting
fisheries data from both foreign and domestic fishermen;
-- introduce more effective enforcement procedures;
and
-- implement satisfactory arrangements to resolve
gear conflicts and insure adequate foreign compensation
to U.S. fishermen in cases of negligence by foreign
fishermen.
We expect that most of our fisheries objectives
will be accomplished within two years. Mr. Chairman,
the central point I wish to make in my testimony this
morning is that I believe that under this negotiating
plan we can achieve the functional aspects of a 200-
mile fishing zone off the coasts of the United States
by agreement with the nations concerned. I believe
- 5 -
that we will be more successful dealing in an atmos-
phere of negotiation rather than in one of confronta-
tion. Consequently, we will achieve our ultimate
goal -- conservation of the fisheries stocks -- more
rapidly than could be accomplished by 200-mile legis-
lation.
It is fair to ask why this plan can succeed when
past negotiations have not been fully successful in
protecting the stocks. My answer, as I have indicated,
is that the widespread agreement in the Law of the
Sea Conference on a 200-mile coastal fisheries zone
has produced a new negotiating climate making these
negotiations possible. Prior to the development of
a consensus on a 200-mile economic zone in the, Law
of the Sea negotiations, we would not have been able
to demand in bilateral negotiations that other nations
fishing off our coasts recognize the objectives which
we now seek to establish. We believe that it is in the
interests of nations fishing off our coasts to cooperate
with us in negotiating a transition to an eventual 200-
mile zone. However, these same nations may feel obliged
to resist, as a matter of principle, a unilateral declar-
ation by the United States of a 200-mile zone, just as
we have felt obliged to resist similar claims made by
other nations.
- 6 -
The first test of our new negotiating plan occurred
at the September meeting of the International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in Montreal
last month. I addressed the opening session of ICNAF
and delivered a personal message to the delegates from
President Ford. The President said, and I quote:
"It is imperative that the Commission succeed
in establishing adequate conservation measures
and enforcement procedures to rebuild the impor-
tant fisheries stocks of the Northwest Atlantic
For our part, I pledge the full support of the
United States to sound fisheries management and
conservation practices, based on scientific
evidence and implemented within the framework
of internationally negotiated agreements.
"
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I offer my state-
ment and the statement of President Ford for inclusion
in the record.
I am pleased to report, Mr. Chairman, that on
September 28, 1975, the seventeen member nations of
ICNAF agreed to reduce their total 1976 fishing effort
off the U.S. coast from Maine to North Carolina from
850,000 metric tons to 650,000 metric tons. This
represents a 23 percent reduction from the 1975 quota
and more than a 43 percent reduction from the actual
- 7 -
catch of 1,154,000 metric tons in 1973, when there was
no quota. Mr. Chairman, the real significance of this
agreement cannot be seen from the numbers alone. Our
experts tell us that under these quotas, the principal
fish stocks with which the United States is concerned
will begin to increase rather than continue to decline
in the area from Maine to North Carolina. If these
experts are correct, and I hope and sincerely trust
they are, we have passed the crisis point and these
stocks will at long last be restored.
Two other very significant achievements emerged
from the September ICNAF meeting. ICNAF members agreed
to a U.S. proposal for closing a large area of George's
Bank off New England throughout the year to bottom
fishing in order to protect the valuable and seriously
depleted yellowtail flounder and haddock. Although the
closed area is slightly smaller than the area originally
proposed by the United States, it is sufficiently large
to provide satisfactory protection for these important
stocks.
ICNAF members also approved a U.S. proposed system
of national registration for vessels, which will mater-
ially assist member governments and international enforce-
ment personnel in monitoring fishing operations through-
out the area.
- 8 -
We believe that the decisions taken at ICNAF
indicate that other nations fishing off our coasts
are now concerned with conserving fisheries resources.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I offer for the
record the report of the U.S. Delegation to the ICNAF
meeting.
Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with our negotiations,
we are confident that other nations will be prepared
to negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements that
will permit their continued participation in coastal
fisheries. We also believe that the course of bilateral
and multilateral negotiations on which we are embarked
will permit negotiations on behalf of our shrimp and
tuna fleets that unilateral action on our part might
preclude.
Mr. Chairman, in your deliberations on S.961, I
believe that the essential question for this Committee
to consider is whether the rules governing uses of the
oceans are to be developed through international nego-
tiation and agreement, or whether such rules are to
be established by a pattern of inconsistent national
claims. The example set by the United States in the
oceans can encourage international cooperation; or it
can promote international disorder and conflict.
- 9 -
We are all agreed that we must take energetic action
to meet the legitimate, pressing concerns relating to
our fishing interests. We believe that the approach
to our bilateral and multilateral fisheries negotiations,
which I have outlined this morning, will create a system
of conservation and enforcement that will protect impor-
tant United States fisheries resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY BY THE HONORABLE JOHN NORTON MOORE
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
OCTOBER 31, 1975
Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of
the Administration in opposition to S.961, a bill which
would unilaterally extend United States fisheries juris-
diction to 200 miles. There is general agreement that
an extended 200-mile area of fisheries jurisdiction over
coastal fish stocks is desirable for the protection of
such stocks. The issue, however, is whether such an
extension should be unilaterally imposed in violation of
solemn treaty obligations of the United States or whether
it should be achieved through international negotiations
now underway. Few issues have presented a starker choice
for the future of our national oceans policy. How we
decide this issue may largely determine whether we move
forward to cooperative solutions to oceans problems or
precipitate a spiral of unilateral national claims lead-
ing to confrontation and conflict.
We have recently concluded a thorough evaluation
of our interim fisheries policy and have determined
strongly to oppose measures unilaterally extending our
fisheries jurisdiction. Factors which were weighed in
that determination include the following:
- 2 -
First, we are continuing to make progress toward
a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty which will pro-
vide balanced protection for all U.S. oceans interests
and particularly our fishery interests. The single
negotiating text prepared at the Geneva session of the
Conference provides for a 200-mile economic zone with
coastal State preferential rights and management re-
sponsibility over coastal species within the zone and
broad protection for our important anadromous stocks
within and beyond the zone. These provisions when
implemented will provide a sound basis for protecting
coastal and anadromous species on a world-wide basis.
With your permission I would like to submit for the
record the relevant provisions of the single negotiating
text dealing with the fisheries issues. Although we have
been disappointed with the work schedule of the Law
of the Sea Conference we believe that we are approach-
ing the final sessions in this important and complex
multilateral negotiation. Paradoxically, unilateral
action to extend our fisheries jurisdiction could
endanger the best opportunity we have had to achieve
international recognition of the jurisdictional
arrangements adequate for the protection of U.S.
fishing interests on a world-wide basis.
- 3 -
Second, in the period between now and the conclu-
sion of a Law of the Sea Treaty, efforts to ensure
greater protection of fish stocks through unilateral
action in violation of international law could well
be seriously counterproductive. Such unilateral action
by the U.S. will not be accepted by states fishing off
our coasts and could result in a hardening of positions
impairing our ability to protect such stocks. In
contrast, efforts to ensure greater protection through
negotiations are making substantial progress as the
recent highly successful ICNAF agreement, discussed
by Under Secretary Maw, illustrates.
Third, a unilateral extension of fisheries juris-
diction such as that of S.961 would be a major;blow
to our foreign relations and oceans interests. The
serious costs of such action include:
-- Abandonment of a cardinal tenet of United
States oceans policy - the avoidance of unilateral
action contrary to international law. We have
consistently protested such unilateral oceans claims
by other nations. Such a major unilateral claim
would undercut our ability to prevent unilateral
- 4 -
claims by others, harming important U.S. oceans
interests. Such unilateral action could, for example,
lead to claims which:
- are contrary to our security interests;
- endanger our navigational freedom to
transport vital oil supplies. At
current prices the value of petroleum
imports by sea into the U.S. in 1976
will exceed $26 billion; or
- subject our oceanographic research
vessels to the control of coastal
nations.
-- Enforcement of a unilateral 200-mile United
States fisheries claim against the Soviet Union and
other nations fishing off our coasts could pose a
risk of confrontation or retaliation against United
States economic interests which would not be posed
by a negotiated solution.
-- Enactment of the 200-mile bill would seriously
undercut United States objectives in the Law of the
Sea negotiations.
-- Enactment of the 200-mile bill could undermine
the opportunity through the Law of the Sea Conference
to develop universal fisheries conservation obliga-
tions. It is not enough that coastal fisheries juris-
- 5 -
diction be extended. Sound conservation also requires
that coastal nations be subject to binding conserva-
tion obligations. Such obligations can only be
achieved through multilateral agreement.
-- Enactment of the 200-mile fishing bill would
violate solemn treaty obligations of the United States
and constitute a serious setback to development of
cooperation rather than conflict in the oceans. The
bill would at least violate the fundamental 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas to which the U.S.
is a party. The issue is so clear that Philip Jessup,
formerly a judge of the International Court of Justice,
has recently written: "I do not know of any responsible
and qualified person who maintains that such a claim
(unilateral 200-mile fisheries zone) would be in
accordance with international law."
--- A unilateral extension of United States fish-
eries jurisdiction would seriously injure important
United States tuna and distant water fishermen who
fish within 200 miles of other nations. The value
of tuna landings alone by U.S. fisheries off foreign
shores exceeds $138 million per year. Such a uni-
lateral extension could also endanger existing treaty
- 6 -
arrangements protecting our valuable salmon stocks
(including the Atlantic salmon moratorium and the
agreement with Japan covering our Pacific salmon)
throughout their range beyond 200 miles.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we note that S.961 is not
a narrowly drawn conservation measure aimed solely
at the prevention of depletion of stocks off the
U.S. coasts and applying in a non-discriminatory
way to both U.S. and foreign fishermen. Rather it
is a sweeping measure aimed at broad extension of
fisheries jurisdiction and preferential rights for
U.S. fishermen. We believe such objectives, which
we support, are best pursued through negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to indicating the
reasons for strong opposition to S.961 it may be
useful to analyze some of the arguments made by the
proponents of the bill in support of such unilateral
action.
(A) The 200-mile bill is needed as an
emergency measure to protect coastal
fish stocks against heavy foreign
fishing.
It is true that many stocks off the United States
coasts have been depleted by foreign overfishing during
- 7 -
the past 15 years. But the issue is not whether
stocks have been depleted by past overfishing; rather
it is whether under agreements presently in force
and which can reasonably be anticipated there is
an emergency situation threatening serious depletion
of stocks until a Law of the Sea Treaty can be brought
into force. On this point, there is a real question
as to the extent of the threat to the stocks at levels
of fishing permitted under agreements now in place.
For example, under the latest ICNAF agreement, agreed
quotas are at a level to provide for a recovery of the
principal stocks in the important area from Maine
through North Carolina.
We should keep in mind that a unilateral exten-
sion of jurisdiction would not provide added protec-
tion for our major fisheries within 12-miles or for
continental shelf fishing resources, both of which
are already under U.S. fisheries jurisdiction.
Most importantly, we expect to be able to con-
tinue to reduce foreign fishing through ongoing
fishery negotiations. Such negótiations, in the
present negotiating climate, are the best way to
provide added protection quickly. Though problems
- 8 -
remain, recent bilateral and limited multilateral
agreements have been much more effective in pro-
tecting stocks off the United States. Moreover,
such an approach would not undercut our important
interests in tuna, salmon, and coastal species caught
within 200 miles of other nations.
(B) The Law of the Sea Conference is taking
too long and we cannot wait.
We are not relying on a Law of the Sea Treaty to
resolve our interim fisheries problems. Rather we
have within the last year greatly intensified our efforts
at bilateral and limited multilateral fishing agreements.
In the two key negotiations, ICNAF and the 1974 Japanese
agreement, we have had substantial success. We achieved
a 23% reduction in ICNAF, and last year the Japanese
agreed to more than a 25% decrease in their total catch.
The Law of the Sea Conference is, of course,
taking time and is not moving as fast as we would like.
It is not clear whether a treaty can be completed in
1976 although we will make every effort to do SO. We
are, however, engaged in the most complex and compre-
hensive multilateral negotiation ever undertaken. But
despite the difficulties, substantial progress is being
- 9 -
made as evidenced by the production of a single
negotiating text at the Geneva session of the
Conference last spring and an emerging consensus on
most major issues (including a 200-mile economic
zone with protection for our coastal and salmon fish-
ing interests). As long as substantial progress is
being made, because of the importance of the issues
at stake, including vital national security interests,
we should strongly support the Conference. Most
importantly, to make a major unilateral fisheries
claim could undermine our ability to achieve inter-
national agreement in a Law of the Sea Treaty
recognizing the very 200 mile fisheries jurisdiction
which we seek.
(C) S.961 will strengthen the hands of our
Law of the Sea negotiators.
Although the threat of passage of the 200-mile
bill may strengthen the hands of our bilateral fisher-
ies negotiators, the bill is seriously harmful to
the broader Law of the Sea negotiations. The reasons
why the bill undercuts rather than strengthens the
hands of our Law of the Sea negotiators include:
-- we have said that we could recognize a
LIBRARY
200-mile economic zone only, if our vital
interests were protected by a treaty. A
- 10 -
200-mile economic zone is one of the
major objectives of many coastal States
in the negotiations. For Congress to
enact such a zone would give those
States one of their principal objectives
without our achieving vital objectives
in return;
-- passage of the 200-mile bill even with a
delayed effective date could encourage
extremists to stall the negotiations and
wait until United States action validates
their long-standing claims;
-- if United States unilateral action
encourages a wave of more extreme uni-
lateral claims, the incentive for agree-
ment may be removed and the Conference
could collapse or be strung out indefinitely;
-- at the least, such unilateral claims could
harden positions and make the negotiations
more difficult.
(D) The United States has taken unilateral
action before without harm to our interests.
- 11 -
In 1945 President Truman proclaimed United States
jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf
and in 1966 the United States extended its fisheries
jurisdiction from 3 to 12 miles. More recently, in
1973 the United States declared the American lobster
a "creature of the continental shelf" under the
Continental Shelf Convention and thereby subject to
United States jurisdiction. These unilateral United
States oceans actions are fundamentally different
from a unilateral extension of our fisheries juris-
diction to 200 miles. The differences include:
-- none was made during the course of a
relevant multilateral Conference;
--- in the case of the extension of our
fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles,
the Soviet Union recognized a 12-mile
territorial sea at the time;
-- it was evident at the time that there
would be few protests from the United
States action and this was borne out
in fact;
-- the latter two United States fisheries
claims were of minor significance
- 12 -
compared to an extension of fisheries
jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles.
Moreover., even these more innocuous actions were
not free from costs. Some states used the Truman
Proclamation to justify 200-mile territorial sea
claims. And the more recent claim to include lobster
as a "creature of the continental shelf" has given
rise to a fisheries dispute with the Bahamas in which
Florida-based spiny lobster fishermen have been
excluded from their traditional fishing in the Bahamas,
It may be instructive to examine the balance sheet on
this extension of jurisdiction with respect to the
American lobster as a creature of the shelf. Gains
in the United States lobster fishery as a result of
the United States declaring lobster a creature of
the shelf have been slight. But invocation of the
same doctrine by the Bahamas has resulted in excluding
U.S. fishermen from the Bahamas spiny lobster fishing
at a substantial cost in financial and human terms.
Mr. Chairman, we must not and will not sacrifice
the protection of fish stocks off our coasts. We
are committed to a 200-mile economic zone as part
of a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty and to the
immediate negotiation of a transition to the 200-mile
- 13 -
zone. A unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction,
however, would not be in the best interests of our
fisheries or of the overall oceans and political
interests of our nation.
From time to time there is an issue of transcendent
importance for national policy and the direction of our
foreign relations. This is such a time and such an issue.
It is imperative that we join together in reaffirming
cooperative solutions to our oceans problems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.