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MIA/POW - Proposed Presidential Board or Commission
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MIA/POW - Proposed Presidential Board or Commission
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The original documents are located in Box 22, folder "MIA/POW - Proposed Presidential
Board or Commission" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 22 of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Rcm
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 10, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
COUNSELLOR MARSH
THRU:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
GENERAL LAWSON
@
SUBJECT:
MIA/POW
Since 9 August 1974, an increasing amount of pressure has been
applied by the various constituents of the MIA/POW. The desires
of these groups and individuals vary - however, in general, they
are requesting intentions, actions and plans of the Ford admin-
istration in support of the MIA/POW objectives. Out of these
letters, telegrams and thru a series of meetings with various
individuals and groups, a rough consensus is beginning to appear.
Broadly stated, it is the desire of the majority that some type of
a group be appointed by the President to review activities of the
various branches of the government as they have supported MIA/POW
interest in the past, to review the planning and activities on-going
in support of the program now and to make recommendations to the
President where appropriate.
Of course, there are a number of specific actions pertaining to
the program which are being pushed by each of the organizations
and/or individuals. The general mood, as I have determined it
to be, is that now is the time for the administration and Congress
to jointly develop their plans with regard to the MIA/POW program.
I believe that all groups now understand that the President cannot
accommodate their goals without strong legislative support. Such
issues as trade restrictions, redesignation actions, United Nation
resolutions, as well as agreements with other countries in support
of MIA/POW objectives, almost dictate unified actions by the
government.
GERALD
-2-
In response to a specific request by the Board of Governors of
the National League of Families, Mr. Frank Sieverts, Dr. Roger
Shields and I met with their Board of Directors for approximately
3 1/2 hours on 5 October 1974. I believe we clarified a number
of issues raised by that group. In addition, we carefully reviewed
the oft stated request of the League with regard to a meeting with
the President. As a result of that review and discussion, it is
the desire of the League that we review a request which they have
forwarded to me regarding the establishment of a Presidential
task force. I have attached a copy of the various features of the
task force as they see it. It is apparent that the membership
has used the President's amnesty commission as a model for
this study group, however, I would also add that other individuals
have quickly joined with the League in supporting the designation
of such a group -- reference the press release from Senator
Cranston of California, which I have attached.
In my judgment, the time has come for some action by the
President in response to requests from the National League of
Families. The Presidential task force idea would seem to offer
a vehicle to air many of the problems inherent in the program
today. I would quickly add that there are also some very real
problems associated with the designation of such a group. On
balance, I think the idea deserves careful study by all agencies
concerned. Dr. Shields, Mr. Sieverts and I believe that a
properly charted task force, manned by competent personnel
of sufficient stature, could significantly influence the direction
of the program. While I realize the hazards, I believe that
anything short of this type of action will leave most of the
families with a bad taste in their mouths. Further, I would
personally recommend that the President meet with the families
within the month. It is apparent to me that they have regained
their balance, and their desires for the meeting are now based
primarily on their desires to hear his personal views regarding
the program. Specifically, they will ask what is the current
program, what are the future plans, and how long it will take to
accomplish those plans. As you can see, the questions are quite
simple - the answers to the questions could be a brief review of
the current situation, followed by the announcement of plans per-
taining to the establishment of a Presidential study group.
I would like to discuss this issue with you at the earliest convenience.
I
THE WHITE HOUSE 50m 50mm MA
WASHINGTON
October 15, 1974
TO:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT B
I have already mentioned to you and
Ted Marrs my reservations about this
course of action. I still think we must
be very sure where we will end up
before we undertake a program of
this nature.
/
I I agree!
HK
H/K Next + ?
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 628-6811
September 30, 1974
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE -- POW/MIA
I. Why a Task Force?
The responsibility for obtaining a successful resolu-
tion of the POW/MIA issue should be centralized. Previously the
issue has been a concern of the Executive Branch including State
Department, Defense Department, and the Congress. It has lacked
the cohesiveness that a commission directly responsible to the
President would have. Therefore, it seems desirable--even
imperative--that a Presidential Task Force be established.
II. Make Up of Task Force
Of course the President would determine the make up.
But, because we so fervently desire an acceptable determination
of the fate of our men, we are bold enough to make these suggestions:
1. Someone from the Executive Branch to chair
the commission.
2. Senate representation.
3. House representation.
4. State Department representation.
5. Department of Defense representation.
6. National League of Families representation.
7. Members of other agencies could be used as
consultants as the need arises; i.e., Justice
Department, J. C. R. C. Team, Four Party
Joint Military Team, Red Cross, etc.
III. Purpose, Objectives, and Responsibilities of Task Force
1. Very simply to develop, coordinate and execute a
plan for obtaining an honorable resolution of the POW/MIA issue
as quickly as possible.
2. It is easy to state simply and succinctly the
purposes and objectives. The difficulty is in developing a plan
and then in executing such a plan. This will require diligent
- 2 -
thinking and rethinking, but the following might be used as a
base which may be altered and enlarged upon as we proceed towards
the goal.
The Task Force, as an arm of the government and directly
responsible to the President shoud:
2.1 Seek ways to bring world-wide attention to the
fact that the government of North Vietnam and the leaders of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) are not abiding
by international agreements which were witnessed by and attested
to by other governments.
2.2 Use the United Nations and other world forums to
call upon other governments of the world that are signatory to the
Geneva Convention, to demand publicly and through official govern-
ment channels that the DRV and PRG abide by international agreements.
2.3 Observe closely the coalition government in Laos
and use all the means available to us to get cooperation and
assistance in obtaining an acceptable accounting and return of
all POW's according to the Laotian protocols.
2.4 Use all available means to obtain an acceptable
accounting and return of all POW's who may be in areas outside
of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. These would include
but not be limited to Red China and Cambodia.
2.5 Study the possibility of applying economic pressure
in obtaining an acceptable accounting, not only to North Vietnam
but to any country that has not to our government's satisfaction
pressured the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and Khner Rouge to honor
their commitments.
2.6 Send a high ranking U. S. envoy to Southeast Asia
to go from capital to capital (from Saigon to Phnom Penh to
Vientiane to Hanoi to Peking) to try to gain entry into areas
presently controlled by Communists for our J. C., R. C. Team, the
International Red Cross, or neutral countries, so such teams
could search out crash and incident sites, talk with natives,
and try to obtain the honorable accounting we desire.
2.7 Seek out governments from neutral countries that
would volunteer to send in teams to inspect crash and incident
sites if such arrangements could be negotiated.
2.8 Work closely with our J. C. R. C. Team, the Four
Party Joint Military Team, and other existing agencies engaged in
Southeast Asia that could help in the POW/MIA issue.
- 3 -
IV. Funding
The Task Force should be specially funded for a given
period of time say four months. During this time the Task Force
yould exert maximum effort in developing and executing a plan.
me 120 days would end about January 27, 1975, which is the
second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements.
V. Reporting
The Task Force should issue reports periodically, the
first report to be issued within one month from its organizational
meeting and monthly thereafter or more frequently if deemed
necessary. The final report should be given approximately
January 27, 1975, at which time the commission could assess the
situation and recommend that the Task Force be disbanded or con-
tinued depending on the situation at that time.
PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN - TASK FORCE
NATIONAL
SENATE
HOUSE
LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
STATE
DEFENSE
ECM:dib
SEP 3 0 1974
OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON
Press Contact: Lu Haas
11000 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, Cal 90024
Phone: 213/824-7755 or
824-7844
September 25, 1974
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
U.S. Senator Alan Cranston announced today that he will ask President
Ford to create a special board of inquiry to review all existing government pro-
cedures and policies relating to Americans still missing-in-action in Southeast
Asia.
Cranston said that if the President cannot create such a board by executive
order, he will initiate legislation establishing the board.
"Many Americans, " said Cranston, "have already begun to forget the war
in Vietnam. But for wives and families of those men whose fate is still uncertain,
the memory of that cruel and tragic conflict is very fresh indeed. For them, the
anguished uncertainty continues day after day."
"I believe that a board of inquiry would be able to make badly-needed
comprehensive recommendations as to what the federal government can do to'
settle once and for all the question of the fate of those Americans who are still
missing and unaccounted for.
"The board should include in its review of existing policies and procedures
a thorough examination of Department of Defense practices with regard to MIAs
and POWs, as well as recommendations for needed legislative and executive
action.
"Specifically, the board should:
"1. Determine if the State Department is actively seeking an end to the war
in Vietnam so that search teams may conclude--by examining crash and grave
sites--whether any Americans remain alive in Communist-controlled territory.
"2. Review Department of Defense policies ard regulations on determining
the status of missing-iu-action.
"3. Recommend to the Administration and the Congress any legislation
needed to correct current problems regarding DOD policies and regulations."
Cranston noted that the Senate Committee on Finance has adopted, as
Title IV of the Trade Reform Act, language which reflects amendments offered by
more
MIAs--add one
Senators Chiles and Gurney of Florida conditioning the extension of most-favored-
nation treatment and government credits to non-market economies upon a
Presidential determination that such countries had undertaken to obtain the
cooperation of the pertinent governments in Southeast Asia in locating U.S.
personnel missing in action, repatriating those who are alive, and in recovering
the remains of those who are dead,
Earlier the Senate adopted, as part of the Military Construction Authoriza-
tion Act, a provision-of which Cranston was the prime cosponsor--stating that:
No change in the status of any member of the uniformed services who is in
a missing status may be made unless and until two provisions have been fulfilled.
First, the President must determine and notify the Congress in writing that all
reasonable actions have been taken to account for such members, and that all
reasonable actions have been made to enforce the provisions of Article 8 (b) of the
Paris Peace Accord. Second, the service Secretary concerned must notify that
person's next-of-kin in writing of the proposed change in status. The next-of-kin
then has 60 days after receipt of notification of the proposed change in status to
file an objection to the change.
"These are important steps toward resolving the question of MIAs and
POWs fairly and compassionately, " Cranston said.
"Creation of a board of inquiry would be another important step toward
demonstrating to the long-suffering relatives of our men that the government is
giving priority to this tragic problem. "
- 0 -
the
17 August 1974
Mrs. Jerry Bonin
317 Lackland Drive West
Biloxi, Mississippi 39532
President Gerald A. Ford
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear President Ford:
CS'2A
I am the local campaign coordinator for the National
MIA Awareness Campaign - WE THINK IT'S IMPORTANT as an
interested citizen rather than as an immediate family member of
of a MIA. On behalf of those MIA families, I request your
support of this campaign by:
(1) setting a National Day of Awareness for mailing
American soil to Hanoi or some other appropriate
nationwide special day of support;
(2) speaking with Secretary of State Kissinger about
putting more pressure on the North Vietnamese
through diplomatic channels or another trip to
Hanoi;
(3) supporting Amendment Number 1194 of the Trade
Reform Act now lodged in the Senate Committee
on Finance;
(4) and most urgently, agree to a meeting with members
of the National League of American Prisoners and
Missing in Southeast Asia.
Please help these families in this heart breaking
situation.
In closing, may I share an adage an Ohio mother of a
MIA used in a slide documentary she prepared to help make
Americans aware of this national tragedy:
Poor is the nation who has no heroes,
Shameful is the one, who, having them, forgets.
WE THINK IT'S IMPORTANT !
Sincerely,
MRS. Mrs. JERRY Jerry BONIN Bonin
Local Campaign Coordinator
State
333-51
SETH C. GALBRAITH, JR.
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
15035 HEMLOCK POINT ROAD
CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO 44022
September 27, 1974
President Gerald R. Ford
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
C/S2A
Dear Mr. Ford:
Today, Mrs. Maureen Dunn appeared on NBC television on behalf of her
organization for men Missing in Action. For some time I have been dis-
turbed at our Government's lack of aggressive action in this area, and if
you lead us into a state of mind in which Americans can condone the
abandonment of their fellows to the enemy, you have done us a dis-service
indeed.
I blushed with humiliation and embarrassment at the spectacle of this brave
girl pleading with us for some help in her plight.
In view of all the assorted characters you have had time for since your
inauguration, this situation would hardly seem to be excusable. (I cannot
even bring myself to mention the amnesty matter).
In closing, if you are too busy to have any time for this gracious lady, you
are indeed TOO BUSY.
Sincerely,
S.
SCG:b
J. JAMES EXON
GOVERNOR
STATE OF NEBRASKA
October 2, 1974
The Honorable Gerald Ford
President of the United States
JF OCT 1 RECD
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
First, let me respectfully call your attention to the attached letter
I
from the Arnold Air Society which is self-explanatory. A few pictures
are provided of the recent commemorative event referred to in the letter.
On behalf of the MIAs and unaccounted-for prisoners of war, I am proud
to add my name in a further appeal for immediate action for all of these
men.
I know that you share our concern in this area.
I am sure that we will all concur that possibly we have our priorities
somewhat mixed up in America today. We are in the process of granting
amnesty to draft evaders and deserters even before we have forced the
enemy to account for these men.
I respectfully appeal to you to give priority consideration to the requests
and suggestions made in my letter herewith and the attached letter from
the Amold Air Society.
Sincerely yours
James Exon
Governor
JJE:fw
AIR FORCE RUIC DET. 465
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68508
SOCIETY
1 Oct 74
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We, as members of Arnold Air Society, a nationally recognized honorary
service organization of Air Force ROTC cadets, would like to solicit
your aid.
In the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict, over 1,000 American service-
men are still listed as Missing in Action. Also, 54 men are still listed
as Prisoners of War by our Government, who were known to be captured,
have neither returned nor been listed as dead by the Communists.
Arnold Air Society is concerned about this situation, and is trying to
call public attention to the uncertain fate of these men and the plight
of their families. North Vietnam has shown itself to be responsive to
public opinion.
Last April, at the Veteran's Rest Stop on Interstate 80, we planted a
Freedom Tree, dedicated to the memory of all MIA's and honoring a
Lincoln man missing in action, Larry A. Zich. Special guests included
Lt. Governor Frank Marsh, representing Governor Exon, George Koster,
Executive Secretary of the State Highway Commission, Major Ernest
Phillip, a POW debriefer from Offutt AFB, and Larry Zich's wife and
parents. Enclosed are three photographs of the event. The MIA issue
received great publicity from this project, and also from Governor
Exon who proclaimed that week "MIA Awareness Week".
However, we are painfully aware that much, much more is needed. You,
as President of the United States, can help the families of these men
discover the truth about their loved ones. We ask you to, request leg-
islation from Congress dealing with this issue, to help inform the
world public about this tragic situation, to urge all countries having
diplomatic relations with North Vietnam to help resolve this problem,
or to take other measures you see as appropriate.
The MIA - POW cause has not changed since the peace treaty; only the
numbers have changed. Let us show the world that we still care about
our missing servicemen.
AIR FURCE RUIC DEI. 405
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68508
SOCIET
pg. -2-
On behalf of the families of these men, thank you and God bless you.
Respectfully yours,
Lynn P. Hineman
LYNN P. HINEMAN, Commander
Arnold Air Society
Eugene French
EUGENE M. FRENCH
Operations Officer
Bruce M. Wurster
BRUCE M. WURSTER
Information Officer
THE WHITE HOUSE 50m
Joch 10/29 March to WASHINGTON Jo courine doing
We'l it will we conh
like help
if familit
An every Til
we
A 17/4 MA/Pow NB
GREAT TORD LIGH FORD (IBR
,
MEMORANDUM
M
jad
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MAJOR GENERAL LAWSON
SUBJECT:
Update on MIA/POW Activities
On 2 September 1974, you asked to be kept fully informed regarding
the activities and requests of the various MIA/POW interest groups.
Since that date, we have continued to receive a substantial volume
of mail, telegrams and telephone calls regarding this subject. We
have also received some specific requests for actions and meetings
with you. The general thrust of these communications is that
current actions and programs of the Government are not producing
the desired objectives -- "the proper accounting of the missing
and the return of the remains of the dead. " -- in accordance with
the Paris Peace Agreement.
As I indicated to you in our last discussion, the MIA/POW families
were very concerned that the amnesty program was initiated prior
to the realization of what they refer to as "an honorable resolution
of the MIA/POW issues. " The families were counselled that the
issue of amnesty and MIA/POW should not be joined -- indeed,
that it was counter-productive to attempt to get support for the
MIA/POW program by demonstrating against the amnesty effort.
MIA/POW demonstrations against amnesty peaked within two
days after your announcement of the establishment of the Amnesty
Commission. Your statement following the release of Mr. Emmet
Kay muted some of the protest. Perhaps more important, the
members of the MIA/POW governing body began an organized
search for a responsible means of illuminating their issue.
After careful and intense study, they have now come forward
with a request for the establishment of a "Presidential MIA/POW
Task Force", modeled along the lines of the Presidential Amnesty
Commission.
-2-
I have attached a copy of the formal request for the establishment
of the task force, which was forwarded to me by the National
League of Families. They feel that such a group could do much
to review, clarify, and coordinate current MIA/POW activities
and perhaps could develop recommendations which would realize
some measure of success. They cite a number of issues which
require a coordinated effort between the various departments
of the Executive Branch (i.e., the potential use of foreign trade
restrictions, the legal requirements for status change, and the
development of a program designed to bring pressure against
those governments currently obstructing efforts to obtain
acceptable accountings.) The MIA/POW committees are pressing
hard for immediate action on the proposal. On November 11, they
plan a "Gigantic Display of Concern" here in Washington, where
they hope to achieve some publicity for their requests. They
have indicated that they would appreciate hearing your views on
this subject, in addition to your evaluation of the entire MIA/POW
issue.
We have completed a series of meetings with members of the
League of Families, Congress, the Departments of State and
Defense, and various other interested individuals. As might
be expected, the task force proposal is viewed with mixed
reactions. Of course, the families are very optimistic about
its value and, in addition, some members of Congress have
already issued public announcements calling for adoption of the
proposal. While State and Defense have indicated an interest,
they have also advised that certain aspects of the program will
require careful study prior to implementation (i.e., the scope
of the charter given to the organization, the duration of the
study effort and the selection of the membership of the task
force group.) A steering group is now examining the task force
proposal. You will be advised of the results of that review, along
with amending comments and/or recommendations. Subsequent
to that action, and with your concurrence, a meeting with the
Board of the National League of Families is being considered.
POW-MIA
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 628-6811
September 30, 1974
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE -- POW/MIA
I. Why a Task Force?
The responsibility for obtaining a successful resolu-
tion of the POW/MIA issue should be centralized. Previously the
issue has been a concern of the Executive Branch including State
Department, Defense Department, and the Congress. It has lacked
the cohesiveness that a commission directly responsible to the
President would have. Therefore, it seems desirable--even
imperative--that a Presidential Task Force be established.
II. Make Up of Task Force
Of course the President would determine the make up.
But, because we so fervently desire an acceptable determination
of the fate of our men, we are bold enough to make these suggestions:
1. Someone from the Executive Branch to chair
the commission.
2. Senate representation.
3. House representation.
4. State Department representation.
5. Department of Defense representation.
6. National League of Families representation.
7. Members of other agencies could be used as
consultants as the need arises; i.e., Justice
Department, J. C. R. C. Team, Four Party
Joint Military Team, Red Cross, etc.
III. Purpose, Objectives, and Responsibilities of Task Force
1. Very simply to develop, coordinate and execute a
plan for obtaining an honorable resolution of the POW/MIA issue
as quickly as possible.
2. It is easy to state simply and succinctly the
purposes and objectives. The difficulty is in developing a plan
and then in executing such a plan. This will require diligent
- 2 -
thinking and rethinking, but the following might be used as a
base which may be altered and enlarged upon as we proceed towards
the goal.
The Task Force, as an arm of the government and directly
responsible to the President shoud:
2.1 Seek ways to bring world-wide attention to the
fact that the government of North Vietnam and the leaders of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) are not abiding
by international agreements which were witnessed by and attested
to by other governments.
2.2 Use the United Nations and other world forums to
call upon other governments of the world that are signatory to the
Geneva Convention, to demand publicly and through official govern-
ment channels that the DRV and PRG abide by international agreements.
2.3 Observe closely the coalition government in Laos
and use all the means available to us to get cooperation and
assistance in obtaining an acceptable accounting and return of
all POW's according to the Laotian protocols.
2.4 Use all available means to obtain an acceptable
accounting and return of all POW's who may be in areas outside
of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. These would include
but not be limited to Red China and Cambodia.
2.5 Study the possibility of applying economic pressure
in obtaining an acceptable accounting, not only to North Vietnam
but to any country that has not to our government's satisfaction
pressured the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and Khner Rouge to honor
their commitments.
2.6 Send a high ranking U. S. envoy to Southeast Asia
to go from capital to capital (from Saigon to Phnom Penh to
Vientiane to Hanoi to Peking) to try to gain entry into areas
presently controlled by Communists for our J. C. R. C. Team, the
International Red Cross, or neutral countries, SO such teams
could search out crash and incident sites, talk with natives,
and try to obtain the honorable accounting we desire.
2.7 Seek out governments from neutral countries that
would volunteer to send in teams to inspect crash and incident
sites if such arrangements could be negotiated.
2.8 Work closely with our J. C. R. C. Team, the Four
Party Joint Military Team, and other existing agencies engaged in
Southeast Asia that could help in the POW/MIA issue.
- 3 -
IV. Funding
The Task Force should be specially funded for a given
period of time--say four months. During this time the Task Force
yould exert maximum effort in developing and executing a plan.
me 120 days would end about January 27, 1975, which is the
second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements.
V. Reporting
The Task Force should issue reports periodically, the
first report to be issued within one month from its organizational
meeting and monthly thereafter or more frequently if deemed
necessary. The final report should be given approximately
January 27, 1975, at which time the commission could assess the
situation and recommend that the Task Force be disbanded or con-
tinued depending on the situation at that time.
PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN - TASK FORCE
NATIONAL
SENATE
HOUSE
LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
STATE
DEFENSE
ECM:dib
PSW/MIA
Pow
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
mlg
November 8, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK CHENEY
FR OM:
JERRY JD ONES
SUBJECT:
Update on MIA/POW
Activities
The attached memo from General Lawson to the
President has been upstairs for a couple of weeks,
and the Aide's Office has called me to see if we
can get it back down with a decision.
I, frankly, think that the decision regarding
a
meeting can be made by Don rather than Nothering
the President with it.
March
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Air
October 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MAJOR GENERAL LAWSON
SUBJECT:
Update on MIA/POW Activities
On 2 September 1974, you asked to be kept fully informed regarding
the activities and requests of the various MIA/POW interest groups.
Since that date, we have continued to receive a substantial volume
of mail, telegrams and telephone calls regarding this subject. We
have also received some specific requests for actions and meetings
with you. The general thrust of these communications is that
current actions and programs of the Government are not producing
the desired objectives -- "the proper accounting of the missing
and the return of the remains of the dead. -- in accordance with
the Paris Peace Agreement.
As I indicated to you in our last discussion, the MIA/POW families
were very concerned that the amnesty program was initiated prior
to the realization of what they refer to as "an honorable resolution
of the MIA/POW issues. The families were counselled that the
issue of amnesty and MIA/POW should not be joined -- indeed,
that it was counter-productive to attempt to get support for the
MIA/POW program by demonstrating against the amnesty effort.
MIA/POW demonstrations against amnesty peaked within two
days after your announcement of the establishment of the Amnesty
Commission. Your statement following the release of Mr. Emmett
Kay muted some of the protest. Perhaps more important, the
members of the MIA/POW governing body began an organized
search for a responsible means of illuminating their issue.
After careful and intense study, they have now come forward
with a request for the establishment of a "Presidential MIA/POW
Task Force ", modeled along the lines of the Presidential Amnesty
Commission.
-2-
: have attached a copy of the formal request for the establishment
of the task force, which was forwarded to me by the National
League of Families. They feel that such a group could do much
to review, clarify, and coordinate current MIA/POW activities
and perhaps could develop recommendations which would realize
some measure of success. They cite a number of issues which
require a coordinated effort between the various departments
of the Executive Branch (i.e., the potential use of foreign trade
restrictions, the legal requirements for status change, and the
development of a program designed to bring pressure against
those governments currently obstructing efforts to obtain
acceptable accountings.) The MIA/POW committees are pressing
hard for immediate action on the proposal. They have indi-
cated that they would appreciate hearing your views on this
subject, in addition to your evaluation of the entire MIA/POW
issue.
We have completed a series of meetings with members of the
League of Families, Congress, the Departments of State and
Defense, and various other interested individuals. As might
be expected, the task force proposal is viewed with mixed
reactions. Of course, the families are very optimistic about
its value and, in addition, some members of Congress have
already issued public announcements calling for adoption of the
proposal. While State and Defense have indicated an interest,
they have also advised that certain aspects of the program will
require careful study prior to implementation (i.e., the scope
of the charter given to the organization, the duration of the
study effort and the selection of the membership of the task
force group.) Actions are now underway to finalize recom-
mendations to you regarding the proposal. This effort should
be completed by 1 November 1974 for your review. Subsequent
to that review, it is suggested that a meeting between you and
the National League of Families be scheduled.
Approve
Disapprove
Discuss
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 623-6811
September 30, 1974
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE -- POW/MIA
I. Why a Task Force?
The responsibility for obtaining a successful resolu-
tion of the POW/MIA issue should be centralized. Previously the
issue has been a concern of the Executive Branch including State
Department, Defense Department, and the Congress. It has lacked
the cohesiveness that a commission directly responsible to the
President would have. Therefore, it seems desirable--even
imperative that a Presidential Task Force be established.
II. Make Up of Task Force
Of course the President would determine the make up.
But, because we so fervently desire an acceptable determination
of the fate of our men, we are bold enough to make these suggestions:
1. Someone from the Executive Branch to chair
the commission.
2. Senate representation.
3. House representation.
4. State Department representation.
5. Department of Defense representation.
6. National League of Families representation.
7. Members of other agencies could be used as
consultants as the need arises; i.e., Justice
Department, J. C. R. C. Team, Four Party
Joint Military Team, Red Cross, etc.
III. Purpose, Objectives, and Responsibilities of Task Force
1. Very simply to develop, coordinate and execute a
plan for obtaining an honorable resolution of the POW/MIA issue
as quickly as possible.
2. It is easy to state simply and succinctly the
purposes and objectives. The difficulty is in developing a plan
and then in executing such a plan. This will require diligent
- 2 -
thinking and rethinking, but the following might be used as a
use which may be altered and enlarged upon as we proceed towards
the goal.
The Task Force, as an arm of the government and directly
responsible to the President shoud:
2.1 Seek ways to bring world-wide attention to the
fact that the government of North Vietnam and the leaders of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) are not abiding
by international agreements which were witnessed by and attested
to by other governments.
2.2 Use the United Nations and other world forums to
call upon other governments of the world that are signatory to the
Geneva Convention, to demand publicly and through official govern-
ment channels that the DRV and PRG abide by international agreements.
2.3 Observe closely the coalition government in Laos
and use all the means available to us to get cooperation and
assistance in obtaining an acceptable accounting and return of
all POW's according to the Laotian protocols.
2.4 Use all available means to obtain an acceptable
accounting and return of all POW's who may be in areas outside
of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. These would include
but not be limited to Red China and Cambodia.
2.5 Study the possibility of applying economic pressure
in obtaining an acceptable accounting, not only to North Vietnam
but to any country that has not to our government's satisfaction
pressured the DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and Khner Rouge to honor
their commitments.
2.6 Send a high ranking U. S. envoy to Southeast Asia
to go from capital to capital (from Saigon to Phnom Penh to
Vientiane to Hanoi to Peking) to try to gain entry into areas
presently controlled by Communists for our J. C. R. C. Team, the
International Red Cross, or neutral countries, so such teams
could search out crash and incident sites, talk with natives,
and try to obtain the honorable accounting we desire.
2.7 Seek out governments from neutral countries that
would volunteer to send in teams to inspect crash and incident
sites if such arrangements could be negotiated.
2.8 Work closely with our J. C. R. C. Team, the Four
Party Joint Military Team, and other existing agencies engaged in
Southeast Asia that could help in the POW/MIA issue.
- 3 -
IV. Funding
The Task Force should be specially funded for a given
period of say four months. During this time the Task Force
ould exert maximum effort in developing and executing a plan.
ne 120 days would end about January 27, 1975, which is the
second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements.
V. Reporting
The Task Force should issue reports periodically, the
first report to be issued within one month from its organizational
meeting and monthly thereafter or more frequently if deemed
necessary. The final report should be given approximately
January 27, 1975, at which time the commission could assess the
situation and recommend that the Task Force be disbanded or con-
tinued depending on the situation at that time.
PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN - TASK FORCE
NATIONAL
SENATE
HOUSE
LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
STATE
DEFENSE
ECM:dib
November 16, 1974
MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN O. MARSH, JR.
SUBJECT:
POW/MIAs
As you are well aware, the concern over the POW/MIA
situation is still unabated, with numerous overtures to
White House officials requesting action or assistance of
various types. The current effort centers on a suggestion
that the President establish a commission, somewhat
similar to the Clemency Board, to deal with this problem.
In his Veterans Day speech at Arlington National Cemetery
the President reiterated his concern about those who are
still carried as MIAs, which implied a continuing effort
on this difficult matter. I know that you have reservations
about where a Presidential commission may lead us, but I
would point out that DOD reports that Congressional momentum
seems to be building on this subject, with the possibility that
Congress may adopt legislation creating a statutory commission.
In light of this, his own personal interest, and also the fact that
he may be queried by press and others on his return from the
Fay East, I offer the suggestion that the President may wish to
valse the matter with Mr. Brezhauv to see If the Soviet Union
might offer any assistance or suggestions as to how to cause
Hanoi to be more responsive,
GREATE FORD AIBRARY
November 16, 1974
MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN O. MARSH, JR.
SUBJECT:
POW/MIA$
Ao you are well aware, the concern over the POW/MIA
situation is still unabated, with numerous overtures to
White House officials requesting action or assistance of
various types. The current effort centers on a suggestion
that the President establish a commission, somewhat
similar to the Clemency Board, to deal with this problem.
In his Veterans Day speech at Arlington National Cemetery
the President reiterated his concern about those who are
still carried as MIAs, which implied a continuing effort
on this difficult matter. I know that you have reservations
about where a Presidential commission may lead us, but I
would point out that DOD reports that Congressional momentum
seems to be building on this subject, with the possibility that
Congress may adopt legislation creating a statutory commission.
In light of this, his own personal interest, and also the fact that
he may be queried by press and others on his return from the
Fay East, I offer the suggestion that the President may wish to
raise the matter with Mr. Breshauv to see if the Soviet Union
might offer any assistance or suggestions as to how to cause
Hanoi to be more responsive,
GREAT FORD FIBRAUK
November 16, 1974
MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL BRENT SCOWGROFT
FROM:
JOHN O. MARSH, JR.
SUBJECT:
POW/MIAs
As you are well aware, the concern ever the POW/MIA
situation is still unabated, with awnerous overtures to
White House officials requesting action or assistance of
various types. The current effort centers on a suggestion
that the President establish a commission, somewhat
similar to the Clemeney Board, to deal with this problem.
In his Veterans Day speech at Astington National Cemetery
the President reiterated his concern about those who are
still carried as MIAs, which implied a continuing effort
on this difficult matter. I know that you have reservations
about where a Presidential commission may lead us, but I
would point out that DOD reports that Congressional momentum
seems to be building on this subject, with the possibility that
Congress may adopt legislation creating a statutory commission.
In light of this, his own personal interest, and also the fact that
he may be queried by press and others on his return from the
Fax East, I offer the suggestion that the President may wish to
valse the matter with Mr. to ... If the Seviet Union
might offer any assistance or suggestions as to how to cause
Hanoi to be more responsive,
JAN 14 1975
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL LAWSON
FROM:
DR. MARRS
This copy is for your files.
There seems to be, among MIA families, an almost
unanimous viewing of a Committee or Commission as
a desirable means of reassessing the MIA situation.
From a physicians point of view such perception is
often effective therapy. There is also value, on
occasion, in using a consultant to contribute wis-
dom, share responsibility or to give patients added
confidence.
Incidentally, this is the first expression of
appreciation I have heard in regard to the "efforts
being made by the Ford Administration to resolve the
problems of POW-MIAs in Southeast Asia." I assume
she is referring to your proposal of a Committee
and the pledge of the President in his Arlington
speech.
I would highly recommend that there be a ceremony of
the type Ann Howes proposes in the last sentence of
her penultimate paragraph, if you get State Department
(NSC) concurrence in the Committee idea.
Enclosure
CC: Mr. Marsh
Mrs. Hartmann
Mrs. Anderson
January 13, 1975
Dear Ms. Howes:
Thank you. Your thoughtful views were appreciated.
I hope your letter can be used productively.
May the New Year bring peace to you and yours.
Sincerely,
Theodore C. Marrs
Special Assistant to the President
Hs. Ann Howes
President
Forgotten Americans Committee
of Kansas, Incorporated
2233 South Wichita
Wichita, Kansas 67213
FURGUITEN
(FACK)
2233 South Wichita
Wichita, Kansas 67213
(316) 267-9176
18 December 1974
Dr. Theodore Marrs
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Dr. Marrs:
I sincerely appreciated the time you spent with me on 12 December 1974 and
I am further encouraged by theefforts being made by the Ford Administration
to resolve the problems of the POW-MIAs in Southeast Asia.
I was pleased to hear your evaluation of the MIA Commission and also feel
it would be a valuable tool in reassessing the American efforts to date
and determining new plans of action which would be reported to the nation
and the government. You have my support for such a Commission and, if
there is any way I can assist with this effort, I sincerely hope you will
call on me.
Feb of 28th 28th
As I stated to you on 12 December, it is my hope that the MIA Commission
establishment can be announced by President Ford on the Second Anniversary
of the signing of the Vietnam Agreement and that the families can be present
at the White House to participate in the announcement. Such a statement
on the Second Anniversary would notify the world that the United States
considers the POW-MIA issue a priority and having the families present
would certainly help to bridge the gap that has existed between the families
and the government for the past two years. In order to resolve this issue,
the families and the government will have to present a united front to the
world community, especially to the North Vietnamese. Unfortunately, more
time is now being spent fighting one another and we have lost ground and
time in the meantime. I am convinced that the inclusion of the families
in the announcement, not just family representatives, would be very
beneficial to our mutual efforts.
Again, I wish to thank you for meeting with me on 12 December 1974 and
for arranging the meeting with General Lawson. I hope you also felt our
meeting was beneficial.
Sincerely,
an Hewes Ann Howes
President
Sister-in-law, Presumed POW-SV
10 January 1970
STILL MISSING--POWs and MIAs
1/17
4:10 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Jack --
General Lawson advises that, after a
two-hour meeting, Brent Scowcroft is
"just about on board". He will stop up
to see you sometime Saturday morning
on his scheduling plans.
Russ -- -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Scorroft told them
to leave it above- -
their is no reason
\
to keep & soing
Kissinger
FORD is STUDED LIBRARY
Rumsfuld has
said no already -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
smouth / has told
Fully it was a
tead issue -
/. any mygerted
namely March
Marrs, Baroody
mill quals Jay
MIA-
Jones pret
also
1½ ago organized search- want same
means to set had acetg. -and someons
to say "this is the end" The idea of
n Communion came up, especially He the
advent of the alemency Board.
houson wants to has beater it
to death w/ all falls - has gotten
Brent scoeroft to the pourt where
Amslis of is to so in a little
while"
Wants to So to Pres. by FRI-
Acenerio -
Fri ≤ Never mm
Mm- 27 fan
TO YOURSO is
25-27 yan- 300 families well be
in D.C.-
Has talled to Meadly Jerry Warrey
they thank this will at least
neutralize the opporations Mart
Has big plan - Earl doem he
will read Epr. Order -
Metting but together-
1) DOD
) Marway
3)
houses
heatant- talk
w/ benoff again -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MAJOR GENERAL LAWSON
SUBJECT:
Designation of a Presidential Board
for MIA Matters
For several months the MIA families have been searching for a
responsible means of realizing their objectives. After careful
and intense study, they have come forward with a request for the
establishment of a "Presidential MIA Board", modeled along the
lines of the Presidential Amnesty Commission.
Upon receipt of the request, a study group was formed to eval-
uate the proposal. We have now completed a series of meetings
with members of the National Leaaue of Families, Congress, the
Departments of State and Defense, and various other interested
individuals. From these discussions, the following observations
were formulated:
(1)
Family members are generally optimistic about
the potential value of such a group. Although they are realistic
enough to understand that a Board cannot perform "acts of magic, "
they do believe that the combined power of the legislative and
executive branches of government united under a Presidentially
directed organization might achieve some measure of success.
At the minimum, they believe the activities of the Board would
-2- -
focus international attention upon the failure of the North Viet-
namese to comply with the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords.
(2)
Members of Congress have already issued state-
ments suggesting creation of either a Presidential Board or a
Congressional Committee to "investigate and make recommenda-
tions regarding the conduct of the MIA program. 11 Congressional
interest in the MIA issue has increased in the past six months.
Restrictive amendments to the Foreign Trade Bill and the Military
Construction Bill on this subject were initiated and only narrowly
missed enactment. Both State and Defense have registered concern
;
for the impact which such amendments could have had upon existing
programs.
(3)
The Supreme Court decision which upheld the lower
courts' actions in the McDonald versus McLucas case (permitting
the redesignation of certain MIA to that of Presumptive Finding
of Death [PFOD] ) gives the green light to service secretaries to
hold independent hearings and reviews on all MIA cases immediately
if they so desire. This issue is one of the most controversial
aspects of the entire MIA program. Currently, redesignation
hearings are only held when requested by a family member: Some
members (primarily wives) would privately prefer to have the
redesignation program proceed - but, they cannot bring themselves
to be the initiating factor. Others
DRAFT
-3- -
(primarily parents), have and will continue to use every possible
means of delay to obstruct redesignation action. By law, this
action cannot be held up much longer. A Board would be a most
useful means to publicly illuminate all aspects of this very diffi-
cult question, and to develop recommendations for the resolution
of the matter.
It is recognized that there are certain inherent dangers associated
with the establishment of Presidentially appointed commissions,
in that occasionally their recommendations tend to be narrowly
focused and cannot be implemented when viewed in the context
of national policy. However, in this case, the question does not
appear to be - "Will there be a Board?", but "Who will initiate
a Board?" The mood of Congress is quite clear. If the Executive
Branch does not initiate action fairly quickly, a Congressional
Committee will almost certainly be appointed to accomplish the
study. Neither the families nor the representatives of Defense
or State Departments favor that action. After serious considerations
of all aspects of the current situation, the study group has concluded
that the formation of a Presidential MIA Board is timely and would
serve an extremely useful function in the resolution of Vietnam erá
MIA matters. The Department of State and the Department of Defense
DRAFT
-4-
concur with this recommendation.
NOTE:
An Executive Order establishing the MIA Board is attached at TAB A.
A listing of potential Board members is located at TAB B.
The second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords
is January 27, 1975. This date has assumed great significance
among all MIA groups. A large national meeting is planned here in
Washington beginning January 25 and ending with a "Candle-Light
Vigil" on January 27, 1975. It is recommended that you support
these activities by issuing a proclamation declaring January 27, 1975
as "National MIA Awareness Day" (See TAB C). This proclamation
should be issued on January 25 in order to permit appropriate
planning to occur. Further, it is recommended that you meet
publicly with the Family members on January 27, 1975 in order to
sign the Executive Order creating the Presidential MIA Board.
Approximately 300 family members and Congressmen can be
expected to attend such a signing ceremony.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
LET'S DISCUSS
DRAFT
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Establishing a Board on U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted
for in Southeast Asia.
By virture of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States,
I hereby order as follows:
Section 1.
Establishment of the Board. There is
hereby established in the Executive Office of the President a
board of
members, which shall be known as the
President's MIA Board. The members of the board shall be
I
appointed by the President, who shall also designate its Chairman.
Section 2.
Functions of the Board. The Board shall
examine and review the efforts that have been made to obtain an
accounting for U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted for in
Southeast Asia, and shall recommend to the President on means
to obtain an honorable resolution of this subject. Pursuant to the
realization of this objective, the following areas of interest are
identified as starting points for the Board's study:
2.1. Review and evaluate actions of the Executive
Branch of government in support of the national program on
U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.
DRAFT
-2-
2.2.
Describe and document the failure of the communist
authorities to account for the missing and to return the remains of
the dead, as provided in the Vietnam and Laos Agreements.
2.3. Consider what further actions can be taken to obtain
information on U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted for in
Southeast Asia, including the return of any Americans who may
still be alive.
2.4. Explore means by which search efforts can be
undertaken for crash and incident sites and other types of infor-
mation on U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted for in communist
controlled areas of Southeast Asia.
2.5. Review existing laws, regulations, and procedures
on U.S. personnel missing or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia
to insure their current suitability and effectiveness, and, if
appropriate, to recommend changes and deletions thereto.
Section 3.
Compensation of Board Members. Each
member of the Board, except any member who then receives other
compensation from the United States, may receive compensation
for each day he or she is engaged upon the work of the Board, not
to exceed the daily rate now or hereafter prescribed by law for
persons and positions in GS-18, as authorized by law (5 U.S. C. 5703)
for persons in the government service employed intermittently.
DRAFT
- -3-
Section 4.
Funding of the Board. Necessary expenses of
the Board may be paid from the Unanticipated Personal Needs Fund
of the President, or from such other funds as may be available.
Section 5.
Administrative Services and Support for the Board.
Necessary administrative services and support may be provided the
Board by the General Services Administration on a reimbursable
basis.
Section 6.
Informational and Technical Support of the Board.
All departments and agencies in the Executive branch are, authorized
and directed to cooperate with the Board in its work, and to furnish
the Board all appropriate information and assistance, to the extent
permitted by law.
Section 7.
Tenure of the Board. The Board shall
submit its final recommendations to the President not later than
June 30, 1975, at which time it shall cease to exist.
THE WHITE HOUSE
January 28, 1975
DRAFT
Announcing the designation of January 27, 1975 as National MIA
Awareness Day.
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
January 27, 1975 marks the second anniversary of the
signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
the Peace in Vietnam. Although that Agreement contains specific
obligations on accounting for the missing and the return of the
remains of the dead, the communist authorities have failed to
provide information on Americans missing in Southeast Asia, or
to complete the return of the remains of our dead. Over 2400
Americans are still unaccounted for -- some 900 of them still
listed as missing, the remainder declared dead with their bodies
never recovered. The families of these men continue to live with
the anguish of uncertainty about the fate of these loved ones.
NOW, THEREFORE I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the
United States of America, do hereby designate Monday, January 27,
1975 as National MIA Awareness Day, a day dedicated to the many
Americans who remain missing or unaccounted for in Indochina, and
to their families. I call upon all Americans to join in this occasion
DRAFT
-2-
in voicing the clear, continuing commitment of the American people
and their government to seek the fullest possible accounting for
Americans missing in Southeast Asia and the return of the remains
of those who died. As an expression of that commitment, I have
this day ordered the establishment of a Presidential Board on U.S.
personnel missing or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. It shall
be the responsibility of this board to review all aspects of our
national program on this subject and to develop and make recommenda-
tions for achieving our national goal as previously cited -- "the
1
fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in Southeast
Asia and the return of the remains of those who died. 11
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
twenty fifth day of January, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-five and of the Independence of the United States
of America the one hundred ninety ninth.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL LAWSON
FROM:
DR. MARRS
Dick - the attached letter from Ann Mills Griffiths
is characteristic of the thinking of a number of
families of MIAs. Few have been quite as reserved
however.
The establishment of a committee would be a welcome
indicator of interest to all - and announcement of
such before Christmas would be particularly appre-
ciated. By the way, December 27 or 28th is date
considered as MIA "anniversary."
As you know, prior to my opportunity to sample the
sincerity and depth of pained feelings in regard to
the Clemency Board I did not support such a Committee.
Now I am convinced it is a moral obligation.
If there is any way I can be of assistance let me
know.
I still cannot guarantee specific recommendations or
whitewash - and don't expect the latter. Good selec-
tion of the committee can preclude a disaster type
product.
Enclosure
CC: Mr. Marsh
Mr. Buchen
R-
Mr. Baroody
General Scowcroft
a
3
POW*MA-
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mrs. Ann Griffiths, State Coordinator, Southern California
6575 Christine Circle, Buena Park, CA 90620
November 14, 1974
Dr. Theodore Marrs
Special Assistant to the President
The Whitehouse
Washington, D.C.
Dear Dr. Marrs:
I wanted to thank you for taking the time to discuss what I know to
be our mutual concern of obtaining the accounting. I greatly
appreciated our very frank discussion of this situation and related
matters.
In attempting to convince the families that bitterness should not be
aimed at our current President, I have to say that most families feel
President Ford is the only one who actually can help us obtain the
information we must have in order to feel any real peace within our-
selves. It really would not matter who occupied the presidency, the
frustration would still be vented upon that person. They would con-
sider it irrelevant that President Ford was not initially to blame,
only that he can help us now and has not yet acted with the strength
and determination they feel is mandatory.
I share your view that there is no person who can negotiate from a
position with nothing to offer. The leverage must be there. What can
we do to help our leaders gain the leverage? We must have suggestions
before we can attempt to help. So many of the families have already
waited SO long that their patience has worn quite thin. Almost to a
member, the families were relieved and happy when Mr. Ford became
the President and they all shared the expectancy that now, finally,
something would be done. It is imperative that we have an all-out
effort for a solution immediately, and I know you certainly share the
urgency we all feel.
We anxiously await further word from General Lawson on the formation of
a special committee of qualified persons who might be able to advise
the President in a positive manner. Until then I know we must maintain
patience in spite of the impatience which often engulfs us. Again, thank
you for your concern, efforts and time.
Sincerely,
an Mills Sriffitter
Ann Mills Griffiths
(714) 826-3110 or (714) 893-7531
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL LAWSON
FROM:
PHILLIP AREEDA
PA
SUBJECT:
MIA Presidential Board
There is no legal obstacle to the creation of the proposed board.
Of course, any Executive Order or Proclamation must be reviewed
in OMB and the Justice Department in accord with the usual
procedure.
I do believe, however, that it is presumptively unsound for the
President to create non-governmental boards to investigate the
workings of the Executive Branch. To be sure, there are exceptions,
such as the recent commission looking into the CIA. I do not see
a similar need here. I do not see why the Executive Branch itself
cannot do all that needs to be done in this area.
I understand, finally, that the Unanticipated Personnel Needs Fund
is more than exhausted by the Clemency Board and by the CIA
Commission.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3
January 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM
MAJOR GENERAL LAWSON
SUBJECT
Designation of a Presidential Board
for MIA Matters
For several months the MIA families have been searching for a
responsible means of realizing their objectives. After careful
and intense study, they have come forward with a request for
the establishment of a "Presidential MIA Board", modeled along
the lines of the Presidential Amnesty Commission.
Upon receipt of the request, a study group was formed to evaluate
the proposal. We have now completed a series of meetings with
members of the National League of Families, Congress, the
Departments of State and Defense, and various other interested
individuals. From these discussions, the following observations
were formulated:
(1)
Family members are generally optimistic about
the potential value of such a group. Although they are realistic
enough to understand that a Board cannot perform "acts of magic,"
they do believe that a Presidentially directed organization might
achieve some measure of success. At the minimum, they believe
the activities of the Board would focus international attention upon
the failure of the North Vietnamese to comply with the provisions
of the Paris Peace Accords.
(2)
Members of Congress have already issued state-
ments suggesting creation of either a Presidential Board or a
Congressional Committee to "investigate and make recommenda-
tions regarding the conduct of the MIA program. 11 Congressional
interest in the MIA issue has increased in the past six months.
Restrictive amendments to the Foreign Trade Bill and the Military
Construction Bill on this subject were initiated and only narrowly
missed enactment. Both State and Defense have registered concern
for the impact which such amendments could have had upon existing
programs.
-2-
(3)
The Supreme Court decision which upheld the lower
courts' actions in the McDonald versus McLucas case (permitting
the redesignation of certain MIA to that of Presumptive Finding of
Death [PFOD] - gives the green light to service secretaries to hold
independent hearings and reviews on all MIA cases immediately if
they so desire. This issue is one of the most controversial aspects
of the entire MIA program. Currently, redesignation hearings are
only held when requested by a family member. Some members
(primarily wives) would privately prefer to have the redesignation
program proceed - but, they cannot bring themselves to be the
initiating factor. Others (primarily parents), have and will con-
tinue to use every possible means of delay to obstruct redesigna-
tion action. By law, this action cannot be held up much longer.
A Board would be a most useful means to publicly illuminate all
aspects of this very difficult question, and to develop recommen-
dations for the resolution of the matter.
The study group recognized that there are certain inherent dangers
associated with the establishment of Presidential Boards.
(1)
Some recommendations of similar groups have
tended to be narrowly focused and could not be implemented when
considered in the context of total national policy. (This is a potential
problem in this case since one of the most frequent proposals from
the MIA community is the adoption of foreign trade restrictions
designed to force access for search and identification teams into
North Vietnam and other communist occupied areas.)
(2)
The recommendations of Presidential Boards seldom
satisfy everyone concerned with the issue. In this case, it is the
study group's conclusion that approximately 80% of the family mem-
bers will be satisfied with the recommendations of the MIA Board,
primarily because they know that their issue was carefully consid-
ered by the very top leadership of the nation.
(3)
The news media has sometimes postulated that the
very act of establishing a "Presidential Group", in itself, implies
the existance of a serious problem.
Despite the dangers cited above, the study group's final conclusion
was that the formation of a Presidential MIA Board is timely and
would serve an extremely useful function in the resolution of Vietnam
era matters.
-3-
This recommendation was primarily influenced by the following
observations:
(1)
The programs and actions taken on behalf of the
American MIA and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia have been
recognized by all nations as models of concern, interest and
coordinated governmental action. These programs should be
reviewed, analyzed and documented. Family members do not
have a concise, complete view of the total actions taken by their
government in support of the POW's, MIA's, and unaccounted for
personnel. This review would do much to mute those charges which
have been made that "the government doesn't care. 11
(2)
There is strong evidence that the question is not -
"Will there be a Board?", but, "Who will initiate the Board?'
The mood of Congress is quite clear. If the Executive Branch
does not initiate action within the immediate future, a Congres-
sional committee will almost certainly be appointed to accomplish
the study. Neither the families nor the representatives of the
Defense or State Departments favor that action.
(3)
As a result of modern communications and the
extended duration of the Vietnam Conflict, the families of the
POW, MIA and unaccounted for personnel became acquainted and
formed organizations for mutual support. These groups have
not dissolved as they have in the aftermath of previous conflicts.
Indeed the principal organizations seem to be stronger than ever.
They are well funded, have strong leadership, and they are now
achieving the autonomy of purpose which they seemed to lack in
the past. During the recent holiday season, over 65,000 Christmas
cards were addressed to the MIA's and mailed to various govern-
ment agencies, "to be delivered to addressee at current location. "
Marches and demonstrations are becoming more vocal and demon-
strative. They have come to believe that only in this manner can
they achieve their objectives. It is the considered, collective judge-
ment of the study group that these groups will not "go away" without
an overt action on the part of the government.
(4)
The responsible family members look to the estab-
lishment of the Presidential Board as the "Beginning of the End"
to their long vigil. Certainly they do hope that the activities of
the Board will focus international attention on their problem and
will result in a relaxation of restrictions on search and identifi-
cation team movements. However, none of them believe that
military force could or should be employed to force entry, just
as the thought of additional Americans being killed while on search
-4-
and identification missions is especially repugnant to them. The
families' concept of a Presidential Board is an organization which
will review and document the past, assess the present and make
responsible recommendations for the future. They believe an
independent Board would be less bound to the past than a similar
group made up of administration officials, congressmen, or even
family members. While the thought is never openly stated, it is
evident that more than anything the families want this matter to be
brought to a conclusion. A final report of a Presidential Board
represents the end that they seek. In their minds, the establish-
ment of a Presidential Board is their proof that the country did
care - that they as a group had succeeded in getting their issue to
the very top, and that the final resolution of their problem had been
reviewed by the President himself. Thus, the imperative for a
"Presidential Board. 11 Anything less, in their eyes, means one
more step that could and therefore must be taken. Most importantly,
the study group is convinced that the majority of the families have
privately agreed that the findings and recommendations of the Board
will represent the last word. If the Commission reports to the
President that "All has been done that can be done, 11 these family
members are ready to disband, and return to their lives.,
For these reasons, the Study Group recommends the establishment
of a Presidential MIA Board. The Departments of State and Defense
concur with this recommendation.
The second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords
is January 27, 1975. This date has assumed great significance among
all MIA groups. A large national meeting is planned here in
Washington beginning January 25 and ending with a series of events
commemorating the anniversary on January 27, 1975. It is recom-
mended that you support these activities by meeting in the Oval
Office with the Board of Governors of the National League of
Families, and issuing a proclamation declaring January 27, 1975
as "National MIA Awareness Day". This proclamation should be
issued on January 25, in order to permit appropriate planning
to occur around the nation. If you agree with the designation of a
Board, it is further recommended that you sign the Executive
Order creating the Board at this time. Approximately 16 family
members can be expected to attend such a signing ceremony.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
LET'S DISCUSS
-5- -
Attachments
TAB A - Executive Order establishing MIA Board
TAB B - - Listing of Potential Board Members
TAB C - - Proclamation declaring January 27, 1975
as "National MIA Awareness Day"
y
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Establishing a Board on United States personnel missing
or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of
the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, I hereby order as follows:
Section 1.
Establishment of the Board. There is hereby
established in the Executive Office of the President, a board of
eight members, which shall be known as the President's MIA Board.
The members of the Board shall be appointed by the President, who
shall also designate its Chairman.
Section 2.
Functions of the Board. The Board shall
examine and review the efforts that have been made to obtain an
accounting for United States personnel missing or unaccounted
for in Southeast Asia, and shall make recommendations to the
President regarding the future conduct of this vital program. Pur-
suant to the realization of this objective, the following areas of
interest are identified as starting points for the Board's study:
2.1.
Review and evaluate actions of the Executive
Branch of government in support of the national program on
United States personnel missing or unaccounted for in Southeast
Asia.
2.2.
Describe and document the failure of the
communist authorities to account for the missing and to return
the remains of the dead, as provided in the Vietnam and Laos
Agreements.
2.3.
Consider what further actions can be taken
to obtain information on United States personnel missing or
unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.
2.4.
Explore means by which search efforts can
be undertaken for crash and incident sites and other information on
United States personnel missing or unaccounted for throughout
Southeast Asia.
-2-
2.5.
Review existing laws, regulations, and pro-
cedures on United States personnel missing or unaccounted for in
Southeast Asia to insure their current suitability and effectiveness,
and, if appropriate, to recommend changes and deletions thereto.
Section 3.
Compensation of Board Members. Each
member of the Board, except any member who then receives other
compensation from the United States, may receive compensation
for each day he or she is engaged upon the work of the Board, not
to exceed the daily rate now or hereafter prescribed by law for
persons and positions in GS-18, as authorized by law (5 U.S. C. 5703)
for persons in the government service employed intermittently.
Section 4.
Funding of the Board. Necessary expenses
of the Board may be paid from the Unanticipated Personal Needs
Fund of the President, or from such other funds as may be avail-
able.
Section 5.
Administrative Services and Support for the
Board. Necessary administrative services and support may be
provided the Board by the General Services Administration on a
reimbursable basis.
Section 6.
Informational and Technical Support of the
Board. All departments and agencies in the Executive branch
are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Board in its
work, and to furnish the Board all appropriate information and
assistance, to the extend permitted by law.
Section 7.
Tenure of the Board. The Board shall sub-
mit its final recommendations to the President not later than
June 30, 1975, at which time it shall cease to exist.
THE WHITE HOUSE
January 25, 1975
POTENTIAL CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
The study group was unanimous in its recommendations that
Ambassador Bunker be nominated for selection as Chairman
of the Board. Because of the potential workload associated with
the position, Mr. Bunker was contacted and indicated tentatively
that he would serve as Chairman of the Board -- if such a Board
were established and if he was appointed.
POTENTIAL BOARD MEMBERS
The list of potential Board members was developed after careful
review of capabilities and demonstrated public service. None of
these individuals has been contacted regarding service on the
Board, however, each has indicated a willingness to serve in
support of this matter in the past. With your approval, contact
will be established.
POTENTIAL BOARD MEMBERS
HONORABLE ELLSWORTH BUNKER
Ambassador-at-Large
Department of State
22nd and C Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20520
Mr. Frank T. Cary
Chairman of the Board
International Business Machines
Armonk, New York 10504
Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran /
United States Air Force (Retired)
3819 Prince William Drive
Fairfax, Virginia 22003
Mr. Charles Duncan
Dean, Howard University Law School
2935 Upton Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Mr. George Elsey
President, American Red Cross
1730 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem II
United States Air Force (Retired)
2408 Belcher Drive
Montgomery, Alabama 36111
Mr. Jerome Holland
President, Hampton Institute
Suite 1490
270 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
-2-
Mr. Gilbert Jones
Vice Chairman of the Board
International Business Machines
Armonk, New York 10504
Mr. Tom Jones
President and Chairman of the Board
Northrop Corporation
1800 Century Park East Century City
Los Angeles, California 90067
Dr. George Kozmetsky
Dean, Graduate School of Business
University of Texas BEB 203
Austin, Texas 78712
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
Formerly Ambassador to Human Rights Commission
770 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021
Admiral John S. McCain
United States Navy (Retired)
2101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
General John C. Meyer
United States Air Force (Retired)
TAB Communications Incorporated
410 32nd Street
Newport Beach, California 92660
Major General John Murray
United States Army (Retired)
Vice President
Association of American Railroads
1920 L Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
- -3- -
Dr. Dallion Oakes
President
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah 84601
Mr. David Packard
Chief Executive
Hewlett-Packard
4 Choke Cherry Road
Rockville, Maryland 20850
Mr. T. A. Wilson
Chairman of the Board
The Boeing Company
Post Office Box 3707
Seattle, Washington 98124
1
Announcing the designation of January 27, 1975, as National MIA
Awareness Day.
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
January 27, 1975, marks the second anniversary of the
signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
the Peace in Vietnam. Although that Agreement contains specific
obligations on accounting for the missing and the return of the
remains of the dead, the communist authorities have failed to
provide information on Americans missing in Southeast Asia, or
to complete the return of the remains of our dead. Over 2400
Americans are still unaccounted for some 900 of them still
listed as missing, the remainder declared dead with their bodies
never recovered. The families of these men continue to live with
the anguish of uncertainty about the fate of these loved ones.
NOW, THEREFORE I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the
United States of America, do hereby designate Monday, January 27,
1975, as National MIA Awareness Day, a day dedicated to the many
Americans who remain missing or unaccounted for in Indochina,
and to their families. I call upon all Americans to join in this
occasion in voicing the clear, continuing commitment of the
American people and their government to seek the fullest possible
accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia and the
return of the remains of those who died. As an expression of that
commitment, I have this day ordered the establishment of a
Presidential Board on United States personnel missing or unaccounted
for in Southeast Asia. It shall be the responsibility of this board to
review all aspects of our national program on this subject and to
-2-
develop and make recommendations for achieving our national goal
as previously cited -- "the fullest possible accounting for Americans
missing in Southeast Asia and the return of the remains of those
who died. 11
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
twenty fifth day of January, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-five and of the Independence of the United States
of America the one hundred ninety ninth.
M
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
January 22, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
KEN COLE
SUBJECT:
Designation of Presidential Board
for MIA Matters
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from General Lawson
advocating three items:
-- (1) Issuance of a Presidential proclamation declaring
January 27, 1975 (the second anniversary of the
signing of the Paris Peace Accords), to be "National
MIA Awareness Day. "
-- (2) Issuance of an Executive Order designating a
Presidential MIA Board to investigate and recommend
actions in this area.
--
(3) An Oval Office meeting with the Board of Governors
of the National League of Families this Saturday,
January 25, when you would sign both the Proclamation
and the Executive Order.
Neither the proposed Proclamation nor the proposed meeting
with sixteen representative families are particularly controversial.
The Proclamation is an appropriate and reasonable designation
and provides a convenient reason for meeting with MIA representa-
tives if you have not already done SO.
There is, however, a great deal of controversy over the wisdom
of the Executive Order creating a Presidential Board for MIA
- 2 -
matters. General Lawson indicates that the families favor one
and that Congressional interest is growing. However, such a
Board runs the substantial risk of thrusting you personally into
an area of past controversy which you bore no responsibility
for creating and for which there is absolutely no hope of solution.
Clearly, the expectations of the group have been raised--but
this alone should not force you further into a very emotional
and difficult situation. One viable alternative might be to direct
the Secretary of Defense to create such a Board and report to
you upon its recommendations. This would show some action,
but would insulate the White House from the known unpredicta-
bilities of Commissions.
OPTIONS:
LAWSON
BAROODY
1.
Create the Presidential Board by Executive Order.
[N.B. In any event, the Executive Order cannot be
prepared and funded by this Saturday, so that it will
have to follow the Proclamation by a week. ]
Cole
ASH
SCOCROFT
2. Direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a depart-
BUCHEN
mental board and report to you upon its recommendations.
3. Postpone the creation of any such Board pending possible
Congressional action in this area.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM
MAJOR GENERAL LAWSON
SUBJECT
Designation of a Presidential Board
for MIA Matters
For several months the MIA families have been searching for a
responsible means of realizing their objectives. After careful
and intense study, they have come forward with a request for
the establishment of a "Presidential MIA Board", modeled along
the lines of the Presidential Amnesty Commission.
Upon receipt of the request, a study group was formed to evaluate
the proposal. We have now completed a series of meetings with
members of the National League of Families, Congress, the
Departments of State and Defense, and various other interested
individuals. From these discussions, the following observations
were formulated:
(1)
Family members are generally optimistic about
the potential value of such a group. Although they are realistic
enough to understand that a Board cannot perform "acts of magic, "
they do believe that a Presidentially directed organization might
achieve some measure of success. At the minimum, they believe
the activities of the Board would focus international attention upon
the failure of the North Vietnamese to comply with the provisions
of the Paris Peace Accords.
(2)
Members of Congress have already issued state-
ments suggesting creation of either a Presidential Board or a
Congressional Committee to "investigate and make recommenda-
tions regarding the conduct of the MIA program. " Congressional
interest in the MIA issue has increased in the past six months.
Restrictive amendments to the Foreign Trade Bill and the Military
Construction Bill on this subject were initiated and only narrowly
missed enactment. Both State and Defense have registered concern
for the impact which such amendments could have had upon existing
programs.
-2-
(3)
The Supreme Court decision which upheld the lower
courts' actions in the McDonald versus McLucas case (permitting
the redesignation of certain MIA to that of Presumptive Finding of
Death [PFOD] - gives the green light to service secretaries to hold
independent hearings and reviews on all MIA cases immediately if
they so desire. This issue is one of the most controversial aspects
of the entire MIA program. Currently, redesignation hearings are
only held when requested by a family member. Some members
(primarily wives) would privately prefer to have the redesignation
program proceed - but, they cannot bring themselves to be the
initiating factor. Others (primarily parents), have and will con-
tinue to use every possible means of delay to obstruct redesigna-
tion action. By law, this action cannot be held up much longer.
A Board would be a most useful means to publicly illuminate all
aspects of this very difficult question, and to develop recommen-
dations for the resolution of the matter.
The study group recognized that there are certain inherent dangers
associated with the establishment of Presidential Boards.
(1)
Some recommendations of similar groups have
tended to be narrowly focused and could not be implemented when
considered in the context of total national policy. (This is a potential
problem in this case since one of the most frequent proposals from
the MIA community is the adoption of foreign trade restrictions
designed to force access for search and identification teams into
North Vietnam and other communist occupied areas.)
(2)
The recommendations of Presidential Boards seldom
satisfy everyone concerned with the issue. In this case, it is the
study group's conclusion that approximately 80% of the family mem-
bers will be satisfied with the recommendations of the MIA Board,
primarily because they know that their issue was carefully consid-
ered by the very top leadership of the nation.
(3)
The news media has sometimes postulated that the
very act of establishing a "Presidential Group", in itself, implies
the existance of a serious problem.
Despite the dangers cited above, the study group's final conclusion
was that the formation of a Presidential MIA Board is timely and
would serve an extremely useful function in the resolution of Vietnam
era matters.
-3-
This recommendation was primarily influenced by the following
observations:
(1)
The programs and actions taken on behalf of the
American MIA and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia have been
recognized by all nations as models of concern, interest and
coordinated governmental action. These programs should be
reviewed, analyzed and documented. Family members do not
have a concise, complete view of the total actions taken by their
government in support of the POW's, MIA's, and unaccounted for
personnel. This review would do much to mute those charges which
have been made that "the government doesn't care. 11
(2)
There is strong evidence that the question is not -
"Will there be a Board?", but, "Who will initiate the Board?'
The mood of Congress is quite clear. If the Executive Branch
does not initiate action within the immediate future, a Congres-
sional committee will almost certainly be appointed to accomplish
the study. Neither the families nor the representatives of the
Defense or State Departments favor that action.
(3)
As a result of modern communications and the
extended duration of the Vietnam Conflict, the families of the
POW, MIA and unaccounted for personnel became acquainted and
formed organizations for mutual support. These groups have
not dissolved as they have in the aftermath of previous conflicts.
Indeed the principal organizations seem to be stronger than ever.
They are well funded, have strong leadership, and they are now
achieving the autonomy of purpose which they seemed to lack in
the past. During the recent holiday season, over 65,000 Christmas
cards were addressed to the MIA's and mailed to various govern-
ment agencies, "to be delivered to addressee at current location. 11
Marches and demonstrations are becoming more vocal and demon-
strative. They have come to believe that only in this manner can
they achieve their objectives. It is the considered, collective judge-
ment of the study group that these groups will not "go away" without
an overt action on the part of the government.
(4)
The responsible family members look to the estab-
lishment of the Presidential Board as the "Beginning of the End"
to their long vigil. Certainly they do hope that the activities of
the Board will focus international attention on their problem and
will result in a relaxation of restrictions on search and identifi-
cation team movements. However, none of them believe that
military force could or should be employed to force entry, just
as the thought of additional Americans being killed while on search
-4-
and identification missions is especially repugnant to them. The
families' concept of a Presidential Board is an organization which
will review and document the past, assess the present and make
responsible recommendations for the future. They believe an
independent Board would be less bound to the past than a similar
group made up of administration officials, congressmen, or even
family members. While the thought is never openly stated, it is
evident that more than anything the families want this matter to be
brought to a conclusion. A final report of a Presidential Board
represents the end that they seek. In their minds, the establish-
ment of a Presidential Board is their proof that the country did
care - that they as a group had succeeded in getting their issue to
the very top, and that the final resolution of their problem had been
reviewed by the President himself. Thus, the imperative for a
"Presidential Board. Anything less, in their eyes, means one
more step that could and therefore must be taken. Most importantly,
the study group is convinced that the majority of the families have
privately agreed that the findings and recommendations of the Board
will represent the last word. If the Commission reports to the
President that "All has been done that can be done, 11 these family
members are ready to disband, and return to their lives.
For these reasons, the Study Group recommends the establishment
of a Presidential MIA Board. The Departments of State and Defense
concur with this recommendation.
The second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords
is January 27, 1975. This date has assumed great significance among
all MIA groups. A large national meeting is planned here in
Washington beginning January 25 and ending with a series of events
commemorating the anniversary on January 27, 1975. It is recom-
mended that you support these activities by meeting in the Oval
Office with the Board of Governors of the National League of
Families, and issuing a proclamation declaring January 27, 1975
as "National MIA Awareness Day". This proclamation should be
issued on January 25, in order to permit appropriate planning
to occur around the nation. If you agree with the designation of a
Board, it is further recommended that you sign the Executive
Order creating the Board at this time. Approximately 16 family
members can be expected to attend such a signing ceremony.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
LET'S DISCUSS
JACK-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
hAWSON Also ASKED
WHETHER you WANTED
TO BE THERE WHEN
and iF THIS GOES iNTO
THE PRESIDENT are
WHETHER you THOUGHT
it SHOULD SIMPLY GO
in in THE NORMAL
PAPER FLOW!
Run
ESTABLISHMENT OF MIA BOARD
Department of Defense
Concur
Department of State
Concur
OMB
Notes that Unan-
ticipated Personnel
Needs Funds are about
depleted but suggests
that if President
desires to order estab-
lishment of Board, funds
will be located.
Domestic Council (Cole)
Concur
Dr. Marrs
Concur
Mr. Baroody
Concur
Counsellor Marsh
Mr. Hartmann
Defers to Mr. Marsh
Mr. Buchen
See Attachment -
Mr. Areeda
Non-Concur
General Scowcroft
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1975
Jack, Ted hand delivered the
attached to me. At first he
had intended it as a memoran-
dum for the President, but
changed his mind, and decided
to try it out on you as an initial
idea.
R
I don't think IT
will go g gan with it.
/
MARRS
Trop P
Ho RN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
THRU:
COUNSELOR MARSH
FROM:
DR. TED MARRS year
There has been an extensive adverse reaction to the test of a Departmental
Task Force on MIA. There is a solid distrust of the military and of State
officials with whom the families have been dealing.
The attached letter from Dermot Foley describes what I believe would be
a workable and acceptable Task Force.
I recommend we change our tack while we can and use Foley's words
in describing our program -- and then follow it.
CC: Mr. Rumsfeld
Attachment RAR S advered Ted
Mr. Hartmann
General Scowcroft
General Lawson
Kaplan, KILSHEIMER & FOLEY
ATTORN AT Saw
CAPLAN
122 EAST 429 STREET
KILSHEIMER T.C
FOLEY
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
HAS MON
MU RA' HILL 7-1980
REBERT N KAPLAN
January 24. 1975
Dr. Theodore Marrs
Room 103
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.
Re: MIA Task Force
Dear Dr. Marrs:
From a review of my notes, I find that it was
suggested when we met in November, that I send you my
thoughts on the need for and the function of a Task Force
to address problems respecting the M. I,A, situation.
As we left your office and returned to New York,
my brother and I engaged in some preliminary analysis and
speculation as to what, if anything, is the likely attitude
of the Administration towards a Task Force and, if such a
body is convened, how it should proceed,
Our estimate was that an indisposition to pro-
ceed with the Task Force probably prevails in the Administra-
tion and that if we were in error, it should become apparent
in a short time as actions and decisions of the President
are announced, Our pessimism increased very substantially
the next day when the family members who had spoken to Gen,
Scowcroft while we were seeing you, reported that he pro-
fessed not to know of the Task Force proposal,
My view at the moment is that, until and unless
the President takes steps indicating a commitment to convene
a Task Force, the families are entitled to presume that he
Dr. Theodore Marrs
-2-
January 24, 1975
does not intend to do so, Indeed, I believe that, at this
point, if he does not reveal, in some substantial and
tangible way, that he intends to move toward meaningful
accomplishments in the M.I.A. area, we must presume that
he plans not to accomplish much but to let the situation
drift along safely hidden from the light of day. I can
tell you most sincerely that I would regard that as a
genuine pity. I believe that I share with most family
members a keen desire to cooperate with rather than oppose
or criticize the President.
Under these circumstances, an expression of my
views respecting the Task Force may be of some value. For
whatever it is worth, the following is offered.
1. I belive that the Task Force would be unduly
restricted by an attempt to tightly circumscribe its functions
and goals before it is created. Rather, the first assignment
of the Task Force should be to examine and analyze the present
situation, factually, and to find out how and why we arrived
Concern
at this position.
2. Only then can the Task Force look for remedies
or solutions. In doing so, a spectrum of viewpoints probably
must be considered. These may include the military and
diplomatic needs of our Government, the civil and due pro-
cess rights of the missing men themselves as well as those
of their next-of-kin, the impact of the present problems
Contar
as precedent in future conflicts, the development of new
approaches and the improvement of existing approaches to
augment present accounting efforts and the development of
new criteria and procedures for determining whether an M.I.A.
has died or is presumed to have died.
3. The Task Force should be composed of a limited
number of objective, independent citizens of impeccable repu-
tation. Representation from the Senate and House would be
appropriate as well as the principal professions, academic
institutions, religious organizations, industry and labor.
The goal should be to obtain the services of a group of
FORD LIBRARY
would except cancer for
lango.
Dr. Theodore Marrs
-3-
January 24, 1975
individuals distinguished by their objectivity, candor,
integrity, dedication and thoughtfulness who would fairly
reflect a spectrum of responsible views.
4
In addition to the Task Force proper, there
should be provision for meaningful in-put of opinions and
views by those who may not be objective but who have an
interest In what is occurring. These would surely include
the Families OI the M.I.A. $s and also, possibly, the De-
partments of State and Defense.
5, The Task Force should be given a time schedule
for the completion of its initial work and the preparation
of its own program. That program should also set time
come
schedules.
6, Candor and openness are essential to success
of the Task Force. If there were any indication of a cover-
up of information or of an attempt to pave over the problems
rather than to meet and deal openly with them, the project
would be severely compromised,
-
7. I am informed there is a fear that materials
and information made available to the Task Force would be
:- target for inquiry under the Freedom of Information Act.
I suggest that this is not a legitimate objection to the
convening of the Task Force. Any such materials and/or
information presumably is now in government possession and,
thus, is now eligible for F.I.A. inquiries. Consequently,
there is little distinction between exposing such data to
3. Task Force appointed by the President or to a Federal
Judge for in camera inspection as required under the F.I.A.
amendments which become operative in February. (Come to
think of it, those who would obstruct the Task Force might
be much more distressed with a Judge.)
I would be pleased if the foregoing were helpful.
X realize that I have only touched on some of the most ele-
mentary aspects of the problem and that much more detailed
consideration may be needed. However, I expect we may agree
Dr. Theodore Marrs
-4-
January 24, 1975
that the Administration and the M.I.A. families have reached
something of a fish-or-cut-bait position. If the President
really means to do something effectual and substantive about
the M.I.A.'s, now is the time to do so and the time to let
the families know that the wait-and-see policy is over.
I am enclosing with this letter a number of documents
which we had discussed and which you indicated an interest in
reviewing. If you know of any way in which I can contribute
to a serious effort to achieve an M.I.A, accounting, please
contact me.
Respectfully yours,
DGF:sw
Dermot G. Foley
Enclosures:
1. Copy of letter dated 9/6/74 from John O. Marsh, Jr.
to D. G. Foley;
2. M.I.A. Memorandum of D. G. Foley dated 5/13/74;
3. M.I.A. Memorandum of D. G. Foley to Martin Hoffman
dated 5/30/74;
4. Statement of D. G. Foley to House Armed Services
Committee dated 10/10/74; and
5. Supplemental Statement of D. G. Foley to Housed
Armed Services Committee dated 12/13/74.
RED TAG
M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 26, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
THRU:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF RKW
VERN LOEN VL
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. G.
SUBJECT:
Rep. John McCollister and MIA's
At the direction of Vern Loen I attempted to meet with John McCollister
concerning the MIA matter he has discussed with you.
I attempted to set up a meeting with him on Wednesday, March 26.
McCollister advised me that he did not want to discuss the matter with any-
one except Jack Marsh. He stated further that he had discussed the matter
initially with Jack Marsh and was going to be critical of some people now
and therefore did not want to spread the matter around by talking to others.
Rep. McCollister said he would be happy to meet with you after the Easter
Recess.
backupin
bcc: Doug Bennett
Bob Wolthuis
MIA files
GLRALD FORD LIBRART
RED TAG
M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 26, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
THRU:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF RKW
VERN LOEN VL
FROM:
CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. Gg.
SUBJECT:
Rep. John McCollister and MIA's
At the direction of Vern Loen I attempted to meet with John McCollister
concerning the MIA matter he has discussed with you.
I attempted to set up a meeting with him on Wednesday, March 26.
McCollister advised me that he did not want to discuss the matter with any-
one except Jack Marsh. He stated further that he had discussed the matter
initially with Jack Marsh and was going to be critical of some people now
and therefore did not want to spread the matter around by talking to others.
Rep. McCollister said he would be happy to meet with you after the Easter
Recess.
bcc: Doug Bennett
Bob Wolthuis
JOHN Y,, MCCOLL:STER
COMMITTEE ON
SECOND DISTRICT, NEBRASKA
INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
217 CANNON OFFICE BUILDING
202-225-4155
PMIAS
Congress of the United States
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE AND FINANCE
DISTRICT OFFICE:
FEDERAL BUILDING
House of Representatives
215 NORTH 17TH STREET
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102
Hashington, D.C. 20515
THE SELECT COMMITTEE
402-221-3251
ON SMALL BUSINESS
December 5, 1974
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
It seems to me that we are at an impasse in our efforts to get
some kind of accounting of our servicemen who are Missing in
Action in Southeast Asia. This is a heart-rendering, frustrating
situation for the wives and families of those still not accounted
for. My conversations with wives tell me that they would like
to see some kind of a new task force appointed with the purpose
of breaking the impasse.
The task force would be a demonstration of your continuing concern
and would have the opportunity of resolving the issue.
I hope that you will consider appointing such a task force.
Sincerely,
JOHN Y. McCOLLISTER
Member of Congress
JYM:fw
EXECUTIVE
ND8-1
December 9. 1974
FG221
Dear Johns
This is to acknowledge and thank you for your
December 5 letter to the President suggesting
that a new Insis force be appointed to sesist is
OBP effects to get some kind of accounting of
our servicemen who are missing in action is
Southeast Asia.
I shall see that your letter is called to the Pres-
Ident's easly attention. He is determined that
the Government of the United States will not
break faith with the families whose mes are
still listed as missing in setion. We are doing
overything we as to make certain that the
missing men are accounted for and that the
families will be as fally informed as possible.
With kind regards.
I
May L Friedersdorf
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Henorable John X., McCallister
Hoses of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
12-13 13 NSC further called + action paid
bee w/ine to General Scowcreit - for further handling
one Vt. he taken.
MLF:EF:jlc
9
RECEIVED
DEC 12 1974
CENTRAL FILES
JH