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Middle East - General
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1563072
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Middle East - General
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 22, folder "Middle East - General" of the John
Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
NOV 14 1975
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 13, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
THROUGH:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
VL
m.f
VERN LOEN
SUBJECT:
UN Zionist Resolution
You asked for Congressional reaction to the UN General Assembly
Resolution which describes Zionism as a form of racism.
On Tuesday, November 11, the House passed, 384-0, H. Res. 855,
condemning the action. The Senate earlier passed S. Con. Res. 73
which is identical except that it calls for the Foreign Relations
Committee to reassess U.S. participation in the UN Assembly.
That provision was dropped from the House version after Rep.
Kastenmeier (D-Wisc.) objected to the unanimous consent request
of Majority Leader Tip O'Neill, who co-sponsored the House
resolution with Minority Leader John Rhodes.
Judging from the comments I have heard both on and off the floor,
Members are outraged at the action by the General Assembly,
but not ready to cut off U.S. support as yet. Rep Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.)
said Congress should "take a long hard look at our participation in the
General Assembly, 11 and Rep. Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.) urged the UN to
reconsider and rescind the resolution.
Rep. John Rousselot (R-Calif.) went so far as to call for moving
the UN to another country and Rep. Clarence Long (D-Md.) said
that as a Member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which
handles the voluntary UN contributions, every request "will be
closely examined in light of this vote on Zionism. "
Digitized from Box 22 of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
The Administration request for FY'76 is $169 million, which has
not yet been voted, on top of the $150 million assessment as a UN
member, already voted.
Such UN backers as Buchanan, Fraser, Bingham, Rosenthal and
Findley said nothing during the brief discussions of the House
resolution. However, Rosenthal and Buchanan on the same day
joined in sponsoring H. Con.Res. 477, which reinstated the final
paragraph of H. Res. 475 as follows:
"Resolved, that the Committee on
1
International Relations and the
Committee on Foreign Relations
begin hearings immediately to
reassess the United States
participation in the UN General
Assembly. 11
A copy of that resolution and Mr. Rosenthal's statement are
attached.
'005
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks November 11, 1975
pled: The wheat exportedyp to the U.S.S.R.
Hawaii's best daily newspapers will cer-
other body by Senators HUMPHREY and
175, on the other hand was probably
tainly, enhance that publication's jour-
HUGH SCOTT.,
ased early in 1974 before wheat prices
nalistic excellence.
The General Assembly vote is in viola-
cereal grain exports for the first six
I wish John and his beautiful wife,
tion of the United Nations charter, which
atha of 1975 do not include any of the
Kitty: the best of good fortunes as they
encourages respect for human rights and
purchases of wheat which have been
move-from the cold Potomac to sunny
for freedom of religion. It is a moral out-
made recently by the U.S.S.R. These pur-
Hawaii.
rage of the first magnitudes
hases will not begin appearing in the ex-
The following information excerpted
The attack on Zionism wreaks havoc
figures until later this year and during.
from a November 1, 1975 story in the
on the concept of peaceful resolution of
Star-Bulletin provides a partial view of
international disputes and undermines
This is all grain through the mill. What
John Simonds career to date:
the effectiveness of the United Nations by
to be learned from it is the tremendous
JOHN SIMONDS ASSUMES EDITORSHIP
raising significant questions about the
ager of one large purchaser creating
John E. Simonds, a Washington bureau
sincerity of the resolution's proponents
normous disruptions in the world mar
staffer with the Gannett News Service since
in the search for a just and lasting peace
etplace and taking unfair advantage of
1966 and its specialist on/news of Hawaii and
in the Middle East.
the Pacific areas, was named managing editor
other nations whose poorer economies
The bitter irony of the General Assem-
with responsibility for news operations.
may most desperately need & stable price
bly vote was pointed out by the Israeli
In becoming managing editor, Simonds
on wheat and grain. In addition. the
returns to the newsrdom where he served
delegate when he noted that it came on
fact that the Soviet Union found itself
for eight.months-in 1972 on temporary.as
the anniversary of the 1938 Nazi assault
paying more than the world price in
signment from the Gannett News Service's
on Jewish communities throughout Ger-
early 1975 should be a lesson to the So-
Washington Bureau.
many in which synagogues in all the
viets that the best course of action is a
Simonds, 40, has, spent 18 years in the
cities were burned, Jewish holy books
long-term stable gram and wheat pur-
newspaper business, beginning as a reporter
were destroyed and Jewish homes at-
with Seymour, Indiana Daily Tribune and
chase agreement. Finally, of course, such
tacked.
has worked for the United Press Interna-
a regular system of purchases will pro-s
Anti-Semitism is one of the oldest and
tional in Columbus, Ohio; the Providence,
tect the American consumer and Ameri-
Rhode Island Journal-Bulletin and the
most virulent forms of racism in history.
can farmer from the boom-and-bust
Washington Evening Star where he was an
It was partially as a response to such at-
high-price-and-scarcity cycle of unpre-
assistant city editor before joining Gannett's
tacks that the philosophy of a Jewish na-
dictable, erratic and massive purchases
Washington bureau.
tional,homeland-Zioniam-evolved. To
of agricultural commodities.
A native of Boston, Simonds grew up in
equate-th philosophy with racism is to
Nyack, New York, is a graduate of Bowdon
equate day with night. Zionism. is the
College, Brunswick, Maine, and served as a
antithesis of racism.
lieutenant in the Army.
The resolution follows:
His personal interest in Hawaii predates
JOHN SIMONDS ASSUMES
H. Corr. RES. 477'
Gannett's purchase of the Star-Bulletin.
EDITORSHIP
He is married to Kitty Muller Simonds, a
Concurrent resolution relating to the United
native of Maul, who has been a member of
Nations and Zionism
HON. ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT
the staff of Hawaii Senator Hiram L. Fong
.
Whereas the United States, as a founder
for 11 years.
of the United Nations Organization has a
OF GUAM
fundamental interest in promoting the pur-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
poses and principles for which that organi-
HITLER WOULD HAVE BEEN
zation was created; and
Tuesday, November 11, 1975
Whereas in Article I of the Charter of the
PROUD
Mr. WON PAT. Mr. Speaker, the Gan
United Nations the stated purpose of the
nett News Service which owns and oper
United Nations include:
ates leading daily newspapers in Guam,
HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL-
"To achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an ecomy
Hawaii, and many other U.S. areas, has
OF NEW YORK
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
just named one of their most outstand-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
character, and in promoting and encourag.
ing Washington bureau reporters, John
Tuesday, November 11, 1975
ing respect for human rights and for funda
Simonds, to be the new managing editor
mental freedoms for all without distinction
of the Honolulu. Star Bulletin.
Mr. ROSENTHAL Mr. Speaker, the
as to race, sex, language or religion;" and
John's departure from Washington
United Nations, which was founded to
Whereas. the General Assembly of the
combat the fascism and Naziism of
United Nations decided to launch on Decem
will leave a vacuum for those of us in
World War II, has now apparently be-
ber 10, 1973, a Decade of Action to Combat
the Congress who have had the privilege
Racism and Racial Discrimination and, a
of working with him. John Simonds
come an instrument of those venal
program of action which the United States
ways can be counted on to report events
causes. As history's supreme racist and
supported and in which it desires to par
in a fair and unbiased manner. This
-the engineer of the slaughter of 6 million
ticipate; and
characteristic and his sharp wit will be
Jews, Hitler would have been proud of
Whereas the United Nations General As
sorely missed by his many friends and
those 72 delegates to the General As-
sembly on November 10, 1975 adopted a
associates.
sembly who voted last night to condemn
resolution which describes Zionism as a form
During his career in Washington with
Zionism.
of racism thereby identifying it as a target
of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism
Gannett. John Simonds has, I believe,
A vote for that resolution was a vote
and and Discrimination; and
established a proud and remarkable rec-
against everything the United Nations
Whereas the extension of the program of
ord of accurate journalistic reporting
purports to stand for. The sound em-
the Decade to include a campaign against
and sincere dedication to the high prin-
anating from supporters following the
Zionism brings the United Nations to & point
ciples of his craft. Although John's
vote was not a cheer for victory but quite
of encouraging anti-Semitism, one of the
relentless pursuit of a story has occasion-
possibly a death knell for the United
oldest and most virulent forms of racism
ally made me and my staff doublecheck
Nations.
known to human history;
our facts. working with him has always
Now, therefore, be it
The time has come for a total reassess-
left the distinct impression of absolute-
ment by the United States of its role in
Resolved, That the House of Represents-
professionalism.
tives (the Senate concurring). sharply con-
the United Nations and its financial and
demns the resolution adopted by the Gen-:
As a result of his work with Members
other support for the world body. Ac-
eral Assembly on November 10, 1975 in that
of Congress from Guam and Hawaii,
cordingly, I am today joining my col-
said resolution encourages anti-Semitism by
John has become one of the most knowl-
league from Alabama, Mr. BUCHANAN, in
wrongly associating and equating Zionism
edgeable persons in journalism about
introducing a concurrent resolution con-
with racism and racial discrimination. there-
Pacific affairs. His deep understanding
demning the U.N. action and calling for
by contradicting a fundamental purpose of
of the many problems and intricacies of
hearings on further U.S. participation in
the United Nations Charter; and: be it
that part of the globe will stand him in
the General Assembly to be held by the
Resolved, That the Congress strongly on
good stead as managing editor of the
House International Relations Commit-
poses any form of participation by the United
Honolulu Star-Bulletin. While I regret
States Government in the Decade for
tee, on which I serve, and the Senate
to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimina
his departure from the Nation's Capital,
Foreign Relations Committee.- identi-
tion so long as that Decade and program
John's presence at the rudder of one of
cal resolution is being submitted in the
main
distorted
and
"compromised:
by
November
I1;
1975
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks
6007
aforementioned resolution naming Zionism
U.S. government during the summer: over
States, and another 3,000 to 4,000 work-
as one of the targets) of that struggle; and
whether to move. Thanks largely to pressure
ing abroad.
be it.,
from President Ford's political right, such
The last two decades have been posi-
Resolved, That the Congress calls for an
a move is now more difficult:
energetic effort by all those concerned with
The argument in favor of pursuing nor-
tive strides made in our country in elim_
the adherence of the United Nations to the
malization is best put by A Doak Barnets,
inating discriminatory barriers. The
purposes stated in its Charter to obtain
a leading student of Chinese affairs.
Congress, executive branch and our
consideration of the aforementioned resolu-
There is continuing in China, he says, a
courts have all played & part in making
tion with & view to removing the subject of
policy issue over the advisability of improv-
America truly a country where all its
Zionism, which is 5 national but in no way at
Ing relations with the U.S. in their current
citizens are afforded equal opportunity,
racist philosophy, from the context of any
status, those relations could retrogress more
equality under the law and generally
programs and discussions focusing on racism
easily than if they were sealed by the ex-
equal pay for edual work.
or racial discriminations and be it further
change of ambassadors.
The unfair distinction drawn between
Resolved, That the Committee on Interna-
Additionally, he argues, Peking is not pre-
tional Relations and the Committee on For-
pared to discuss the things the U.S. would
nonappropriated fund employees and
eign Relations begin hearings immediately to
like. to pursue-trade, extended exchanges,
their counterparts, appropriated fund
re-assess the United States further participa-
and peace and security in Arsia-until nor-
employees, must be erased now. Both
tion in the United Nations General Assembly
malization.
these groups perform the same range of
Further, the argument goes, Chairman
services and yet the nonappropriated
Mao-Tse-tung is alive now. Delay would put
fund employees are treated inequitably.
the issue beyond the election year and into
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH
1977 when China will probably be engaged
For example, in my district, nonappro-
CHINANMIGHT NOT HELP THINGS
in the uncertainties of succession, and oppo-
priated fund employees doing the same
sition could then arise in China.
work receive 30 to 60 percent less in
If Mao's successors adopted an attitude
hourly wages than appropriated fund
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
of limited detente towards Moscow and our
employees.
relationship with China had not moved,
In 1972, Congress granted partial re-
OF HEINOIS
that would make it more difficult.
lief to some nonappropriated fund em-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The opposite argument [which, for what
ployees by enacting Public Law 92-392-
Tuesday, November 11, 1975
it's worth, I favor] notes that the mere exist-
ence of diplomatic ties has never prevented
Wage Grade Act. However, this partial
Mr. DERWINSKI Mr. Speaker, one of
worsening of relations The current lines
reform has failed to remove significant
the members of the Washington press
of communication are no better or worse than
disparity in pay.
corps uniquely qualified to analyze. the
an embassy would provide.
Hopefully, the Nation has learned from
complex triangle involving the United
The issues the United States wants to pur-
this experience that partial remedies
sue are not. urgent enough to warrant the
States, Red China and the Soviet Union
never result in equitable solution of seri-
spectacle of our dropping an ally because
is Frank Starr of the Chicago Tribune,
ous problems. We now have the oppor-
Peking wants us to. When Peking finds it in
who served as that publication's bureau
its interest to deal with such questions, it
tunity to resolve this matter as it should
chief for many years in Moscow.
will find a way,to deal with them.
have been done at the outset.
Thus, in his article. published in the
Current contacts and exchanges, experts
Tribune on November 7, he analyzes the
confirm, are not affected by the absence of
full diplomatic relations. In fact, some coun-
COMPANIES THROUGHOUT THE NA-
situation, President Ford may face when
tries which have such relations have less
TION TO BE ADVERSELY AF-
traveling to China I believe overall that
satisfactory exchanges than we.
FECTED IF NEW YORK CITY DE-
his comments are very-much to the point
As for the uncertainty of a Moscow-Pe-
FAULTS
The article follows:
king detente, short of tandem policy co-
NORMALIZING ATIONS. WITH CHINA MIGHT
ordination, whicheno one expects, that might
NOT HELP THINGS
improve rather than worsen U.S. contacts.
HON.-RICHARD L. OTTINGER
(By Frank Stair)
But for the moment the credibility of U.S.
OF NEW YORK
WASHINGTON. Some last minute confu-
security guarantees in Taiwan is very much
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
in question m any case, so discussing It in
sion erupted in planning President Ford's
Peking can do no one any good.
Tuesday, November 11.1975
trip to China, and perhaps it's just as well.
If the trip were shelved for a while, no dam-
Further, the firing of Defense Secretary
Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, my col-
age would be done.
James Schlesinger- the Chinese fa-
The only issue currently outstanding is
vored as & balance against what they saw
leagues Congressmen GILMAN, PATTISON,
one which the United States would do well
as a U.S. bias toward Moscow-cannot cre-
and PEYSER and I have just completed
to avoid: Beyond that, there's no purpose to
ate a favorable atmosphere for a Ford visit
an 11,000-mile trip around the country
be served by a Presidential visit to China ex-
to Peking.
advocate legislation authorizing a
cept the care and feeding of what is essen-
Federal loan guarantee for New York
tially a. static but still delicate new Astan
City and to sample public-opinion on
relationship. Were it not for: the bruise of a
NONAPPROPRIATED FUND
this proposal.
postponed trip, that job, being largely propa-
EMPLOYEES
We were extremely heartened to find
randistic, could be done as well by long dia-
that more than three-quarters of the
tance.
HON. WILLIAM- D. FORD
people we informally interviewed ex-
So what is the issue? It is normalization of
relations, an issue that few in this country
pressed support for New York and for
OF MICHIGAN
understand the meaning of but one which
legislation to avoid that great city's de-
some nonetheless periodically agitate to re-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
fault. In our visits to Chicago, Los An-
ve.
Tuesday, November 11, 1975
geles, Denver, Cleveland, Grand Rapids,
Technically It means closing the United
Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker,
Milwaukee, and Des Moines, people in
States Embassy on Taiwan, ending the Amer-
the streets, taxi drivers, people we met
ican security commitment to Taiwan, remov-
I recently introduced H.R. 10419 to grant
in hotels and at airports, were over-
ing troops stationed there, and upgrading
nonappropriated fund employees, who do
the mission in Peking to embassy status.
the same work as appropriated fund em-
whelmingly favorable to backing up
There was a time right after the rebirth of
New York.
ployees, full parity both in wages as well
S.-Chinese relations when Peking insisted
America is very closely interrelated.
as fringe benefits.
was in no hurry to "normalize," and U.S.
You cannot have catastrophe in one
officials echoed that sentiment But since the
While on active duty in the U.S. Navy
major center without It affecting the rest
latter part of 1973 a change has occurred
and later in the U.S. Air Force Reserve,
of the country. This is well illustrated
mong the Chinese, who now bring pressure.
I saw the work of these dedicated non-
by information we obtained over the
They have begun to support Puerto Rican
appropriated fund employees, and have
weekend from the office of New York
eparatists, equating Puerto Rico with Tai-
never forgotten it.
wan, and the message China experts read
City's Comptroller, Harrison J. Goldin,
om Secretary Kissinger's recent trip there
While there are only a small number of
about possible adverse effects on the
18 that Peking is prepared to leave every-
nonappropriated fund employees in my
Nation's businesses if New York City
bing statte until Taiwan is cashiered.
congressional district, there are approxi-
were to be allowed to default. In a partial
But the debate seems to have begun in the
mately 140,000. throughout the United
listing for the seven States we visited,
tolerance to start condoning, even by
REQUEST FOR CONSIDERATION OF
tional
inaction. the demagogery witnessed
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLU-
eign Relations begin hearings immediately to
yesterday at Neheadquarters.
TION, 475, PROVIDING: FOR
re-assess the United States further partic-
DEMNATION OF RESOLUTION OF
ipation in the United Nations General
Assembly.
U.N. ASSEMBLY EQUAT-
U.N. SHOULD BECOME INSTRUMENT
ING ZIONISM WITH RACISM AND
The SPEAKERST there objection to
FOR PEACE
PROVIDING FOR HEARINGS TO
the request of the gentleman from
(Mrs. FENWICK asked and was given
REASSESS FURTHER U.S. PAR-
Massachusetts?
permission to address the House for
TICIPATION IN U.N. GENERAL AS-
Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, reserving
minute and to revise and extend her
SEMBLY
the right to object, and I certainly shall
remarks.)
not object, It is my privilege and my
Mr. O'NEILL: Mr. Speaker, I send to
Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Speaker, I join
honor to join with the distinguished ma-
the desk a concurrent resolution (H.
with my colleagues in the strongest con-
Jority leader in the presentation of this
Con Res. 475). and ask unanimous con-
demnation of what we have seen in the
concurrent resolution.
sent for its immediate consideration.
general assembly: of the United Nations,
There seems to be no doubt as to the
The Clerk read the concurrent resolu-
an organization that we had hoped would
necessity for this resolution. The
tion, as follows:
be an instrument of peace in the world
General Assembly of the United Nations
CON. RES. 475
and, more than that, an organization de-
has seen fit to adopt a resolution which
voted to principle, exerting moral force,
Concurrent resolution relating to the United
states that Zionism is racism. This body
Nations and Zionism
rather than physical force, in the affairs
has previously adopted a resolution con-
Whereas the United States, as a founder
of nations.
demning such action.
of the United Nations Organization has a
I' think that al Ior tis are bitterly dis-
Certainly this body and this Govern-
fundamental interest in promoting the pur-
appointed and outraged at what we have
ment can have no part of any such
poses and principles for which that organi-
seen, and I only hope that this will not
zation was created; and
proceedings.
move us 1 inch from our determination
Whereas in Article I of the Charter of the
I congratulate the majority leader for
to make this organization what it should
United Nations the stated purpose of the
offering this resolution and it is my priv-
be instrument for peace.
United Nations include:
ilege and honor to join with him in spon-
hope that it will not move us 1 inch
"To achieve-internationalEcooperation in
soring it.
from the direction n-which we know we
solving international problems of an eco-
Mr. Speaker, withdraw my reserva-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
have to go, which is forward in an or-
tion of objection.
character, and in promoting and encourag-
derly world that exists on principles of
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
ing respect for human rights and for funda-
justice and law
mental freedoms for all without distinction
the request of the gentleman from Mas-
Mr. Speaker, that is what I hope this
as to race, sez, language or religion;" and
sachusetts?
very damaging action of the U.N. will
Whereas the General Assembly of the
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, re-
bring about in the hearts and minds of
United Nations decided to lunch on Decem-
serving my right to object, I would like
the people of this Nation.
ber 10,Γ 1973, a Decade of Action to Combat
to ask the majority leader if I heard the
Racism and Racial Discrimination and a pro-
reading of the concurrent resolution cor-
gram of action which the United States sup-
rectly in that, It calls for a reappraisal of
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CUT
ported and in which it desires to participate;
whether this country should be part of
and
ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE
Whereas the United Nations General As-
the General Assembly? And if that is the
UNITED NATIONS
sembly on November 10, 1975 adopted a res-
import of this concurrent resolution,
(Mr. DEVINE asked and was given
olution which describes Zionism as a form of
while I sympathize otherwise with its ob-
permission to address the House for 1.
racism thereby identifying it as a target of
jectives, I would be constrained to object
the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and
minute and to revise and extend his
to the immediate consideration of it
and Discrimination; and
remarks.)
Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
Whereas the extension of the program of
tleman will yield, I would ask unanimous
Mr. DEVINE Mr. Speaker, we are
the Decade to include a campaign against
consent that the last paragraph of the
hearing a lot of moaning and groaning
Zionism brings the United Nations to a point
concurrent resolution be reread so that
and finashing of teeth and wringing of
of encouraging anti-Semitism, one of the
oldest and most virulent forms of racism
the gentleman from Wisconsin will un-
hands here today about the U.N.
known to human history: now, therefore,
derstand exactly what is contained in the
The majority leader (Mr. O'Neill)
be it
concurrent resolution
made reference to the letter with 434
Resolved, That the House of Representa-
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
Members against the resolution, and I
tives (the Senate concurring), sharply con-
the request of the gentleman from Mas-
was one of the signators.
demns the resolution adopted by the General
sachusetts?
I guess it took the Zionist racist reso-
Assembly on November 10, 1975 in that said
There was no objection.
lution to pinpoint the U.N. irresponsi-
resolution encourages anti-Semitism by
The Clerk read as follows:
bilities and get the attention of the Mem-
wrongly associating and equating Zionism
with racism and radical discrimination,
Resolved, That the Committee on Interna
bers. A number of us around. here have.
thereby contradicting a fundamental pur-
tional Relations and the Committee on For-
been talking about this organization for
pose of the United Nations Charter; and
eign Relations begin hearings immediately to
quite a period Atime. It has resolved
be
reassess the United States further participa-
itself into nothing more than an inter-
Resolved, That the Congress strongly op-
tion in the United Nations General Assembly.
national debating society. It has utterly
poses any form of participation by the United
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I
failed year in and year out in its peace-
States Government in the Decade for Action
object.
keeping operation.
to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimina-
The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I would hope
tion so long as that Decade and program
that the Members who are up here de-
remain distorted and compromised by the
aforementioned resolution naming Zionism
ploring this action will, when the time
TIME FOR REVIEW OF U.N. FINAN
as one of the targets of that struggle; and
comes to vote on the contribution of the
CIAL SUPPORT
be it
United States for this organization, use
Resolved, That the Congress calls for an
(Mr. FRENZEL asked and was given
their heads and reduce the share of the
energetic effort by all those concerned with
permission to address the House for
United States, because we have been
the adherence of the United Nations to the
minute and to revise and extend his re:
much too generous over the years.
purposes stated in its Charter to obtain re-
marks.)
I do not think that we should neces-
consideration of the aforementioned resolu-
Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, yesterday
tion with a view to removing the subject of
sarily abolish the United Nations, but we
at the United Nations, the General As-
Zionism, which is a national but in no way
should put it in the proper perspective,
a racist philosophy, from the context of any
sembly voted in favor of resolutions that
and not yield so much to all of these
programs and discussions focusing on racism
glorified anti-Semitism and terrorism.
pipsqueak nations that have the same
or racial discrimination; and be it further
Our U.S. Ambsasador correctly described
vote as we do.
Resolved, That the Committee on Interna-
previous such resolutions as "obscene"
November 12, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
JACK MARSH
In reference to the recent action by the United Nations on the
Zionist Resolution, do you suppose you could have your people
take some doundings from Members, such as Buchanan, Fraser,
Bingham, Rosenthal, Findley and their counterparty in the
Senate, to see what the reaction is of those who have been strong
U.N. backers to this action.
JOM/dl
QERALD FORD LIBRABI
[176]
MONOGRAPH
SOVIET ARMS AID
IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
by
Roger F. Pajak
The following monograph
presents individual research
FORD :- LIBRARY GERALD
in support of the continuing
World Power Assessment
project of Georgetown University's
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
It is for limited circulation and represents
only the views of the author.
SOVIET ARMS AID
IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
by
Roger F. Pajak
January 1976
FOREWORD
In view of present tensions and the dangers of war in
the Middle East, the extraordinary Soviet 20-year program
of providing military equipment, supplies and training to
Arab countries takes on special meaning. The program has
been very large and very expensive, on the order of
$7 billion for the Arab countries of the Middle East. The
military and political results are still hard to assess,
but it is clearly a critical element in the strategic
situation in this explosive part of the world.
We have asked a close student of Soviet arms aid
diplomacy to put the record in a broad political perspective,
setting forth Soviet successes and shortcomings in using
what Moscow plainly considers a key instrument of Soviet
Middle East policy. The author is Dr. Roger F. Pajak, a
Foreign Affairs Adviser with the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. He received degrees in International
Relations and Soviet Studies from Michigan State University,
Harvard University, and American University, and has been
with the United States Government as a Soviet foreign affairs
specialist since 1963. By training and because of his
present work, he is exceptionally well qualified to deal
with the subject of Soviet arms in the Middle East.
Copyright 1976 by The Center for Strategic
Ray S. Cline
and International Studies
Executive Director of Studies
All rights reserved
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I
INTRODUCTION
1
II
EGYPT
2
III
SYRIA
19
IV
IRAQ
28
V
LIBYA
37
VI
FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
44
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the Soviet drive to gain influence and weaken the
position of the West in the Middle East, arms aid has clear-
1y emerged as the most durable instrument in Moscow's
diplomatic repertoire. The priority accorded the Middle East
in Soviet foreign policy calculations is reflected in the
share of total Soviet arms aid allocated to the area. Of
the estimated $12 billion in such aid extended to the
nonaligned, developing world from 1955 through 1974, the
Arab countries of the Middle East have received about $7
billion, or roughly 60 percent of the total.
How effective has arms aid been in accomplishing the
objectives set for it by Moscow in the Middle East? With
such advanced Soviet equipment as TU-22 supersonic bombers,
MIG-23 swing-wing interceptors, and Scud tactical missiles
being provided to the Arab states, has the program been
worth the economic cost? Has it perhaps resulted in more
problems than gains for Moscow? In particular, has nega-
tive Egyptian reaction to Soviet policy irrevocably
reoriented Cairo to Western sources of arms supply?
In addressing these questions, this paper attempts to
place the record of Soviet arms aid diplomacy in the Middle
East in perspective. It delineates the checkered paths of
the Soviet military assistance programs in the primary Arab
"confrontation states" -- Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya --
particularly since the June 1967 war, with a view toward
assessing the successes and shortcomings of this key instru-
ment of Soviet policy in this volatile area.
1U.S. Department of State, Communist States and Developing
Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974 (Washington, January 1976).
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
-3-
CHAPTER II
EGYPT
and other equipment to Egypt to replace what had been destroy-
ed.6
Among the developing countries of the Third World,
Accompanying the heavy volume of materiel was an influx
Egypt ranks as the leading recipient of Soviet military
of Soviet instructors and advisers to improve the qualitative
assistance. Since the beginning of Moscow's assistance
shortcomings in the Egyptian armed forces. In the summer of
program in 1955, Egypt by the end of 1974 had received
1967, the number of Soviet advisory personnel in Egypt grew
an estimated $3.4 billion in Soviet arms aid. 2
to about 3,000, several times the number present before the
June conflict.
On the eve of the June 1967 war the arsenal of modern
Soviet equipment in its hands gave Egypt, in conjunction
In assuming a broadened training and advisory role in
with the well-equipped Syrian and Iraqi forces, a formidable
the Egyptian forces, Moscow penetrated the Egyptian military
military capability against Israel. But in the brief six
establishment to a depth it had never before achieved in any
day conflict, the Arab forces were decimated, with Egypt
non-Communist country. Soviet advisers and technicians were
taking the heaviest losses.
reportedly assigned to every air and naval base, military
training facility, and major maintenance depot in Egypt.
Whatever second thoughts Moscow may have had about its
provision of modern arms to the Arabs, who used them neither
The role of Soviet advisers thus changed dramatically
wisely nor well, the immediate Soviet reflex action was to
after the June war. With the acquiescence of the Egyptian
initiate a large scale resupply airlift. Even while the
High Command, the Soviet Union acquired an important voice
fighting was going on, Soviet transport aircraft began
in Egyptian training and tactical matters. 9
deliveries of replacement equipment to Egypt and Syria. 3
Within three weeks 130 jet fighters were reportedly deliver-
In January 1970, a watershed event occured in the Soviet-
ed.4
Egyptian relationship. As a result of Nasser's personal
entreaties for some response to Israeli deep-penetration bomb-
A year later, Soviet deliveries of military equipment
ing raids in the Egyptian interior, the Soviets decided to
had brought overall Arab inventories nearly up to pre-war
establish and operate a full scale air defense system in Egypt.
levels. By July 1968, the Egyptian air force consisted of
The first contingent of Soviet SAM missile crews -- numbering
about 400 aircraft, only 30 fewer than prior to the June
about 1,500 men -- arrived in March 1970 and began installation
war. 5 By the second anniversary of the war, Moscow had
of an SA-3 surface-to-air missile system, specifically designed
delivered approximately $700 million in aircraft, tanks,
to counter low-flying aircraft. Shortly afterwards, the first
Soviet-piloted MIG-21J interceptors (an improved version of
the MIG-21), with supporting elements, began arriving at special
²Ibid.
3 Lawrence Whetten, "The Military Consequences of Mediter-
⁶Honorable R. Lawrence Coughlin, The Congressional Record
ranean Super Power Parity," New Middle East, November
(Washington: U.S. Congress, House, September 16, 1969), p. E7537.
1971, p. 17.
7 New York Times, July 16, 1968.
4 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
⁸william Beecher, "The Soviet Push in the Mideast," Army,
Research, February 1972), p. 150.
April 1968, p. 23.
⁵Ibid.
9A. Y. Yodfat, "Arms and Influence in Egypt--the Record
of Soviet Military Assistance, since June 1967, New Middle East,
July 1969, p. 30.
-4-
-5-
Egyptian air bases that would come under Soviet control. 10
form of base rights and shore support for ships of the Soviet
By late spring, newly-arrived Soviet military personnel
Mediterranean squadron. Following the June war, the Soviets
numbered about 15, 000, some assigned as advisers to Egyptian
were granted the use of various naval supply and repair
air defense units, but the majority manning the new SA-3 and
facilities in Egypt, including a large dry dock, two float-
improved model SA-2 SAM sites proliferating in the Egyptian
interior and in the canal zone. 11
ing docks, and repair yards in Alexandria,⁶ as well as
facilities at the former British naval base at Port Said. 17
The Soviets also were allowed to begin development of a deep
The widespread Soviet presence forced Israel to discon-
tinue her deep penetration raids into Egypt as of mid-April.
water port, largely for their own use, at the secluded port
of Mersa Matruh, near the Libyan border. 18
At about that time, Soviet-piloted MIG-21J aircraft began
flying defensive combat patrols over the Egyptian interior,
Besides the use of Egyptian port facilities, the Soviets
but refrained from interfering with Israeli aircraft operating
in the canal zone. 12 Despite the presumed interest of both
were allowed to base naval patrol aircraft in Egypt, thereby
sides in avoiding a direct aerial clash, one such incident
providing their fleet with important reconnaissance support.
A variety of Soviet aircraft with Egyptian markings, located
did occur on July 30, when the Israelis shot down four Soviet
MIG-21's. 13
at several bases in Egypt, provided valuable tracking and
positional data on U.S. and NATO naval craft for the Soviet
Mediterranean squadron. 19
During the remainder of 1970 and into 1971, Soviet deliv-
eries continued at a high level, as Moscow introduced a
Another significant quid pro quo received by Moscow in
variety of modern equipment into the Egyptian inventory.
Egypt received some of the same types of air defense equip-
return for its assistance was Cairo's acquiescence in a
ment as the Soviet forces, even before the Warsaw Pact
Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed
nations in some cases. Besides being the first non-Communist
on May 26, 1971. The treaty committed both sides to consult
state to receive the new SA-3 missile system, Egypt received
on matters of joint concern and threats to the peace and to
the Frog tactical ground rocket and the mobile ZSU-23-4 radar
avoid joining alliances hostile to the other partner. With-
controlled antiaircraft gun -- regarded as the Soviets' most
out precluding any of its options, Moscow thereby instituted
effective weapon against low-flying aircraft. 14 Also note-
a new element of deterrence against Israel, while reminding
Cairo of its limited ability to maneuver. 20
worthly among Soviet deliveries was some of Moscow's latest
electronic command and control equipment to improve the
Egyptian air defense system. 15
In keeping with the vagaries of the Middle East, however,
the nadir for Moscow in Soviet-Egyptian relations before the
For her largesse, the Soviet Union exacted various
October 1973 war was reached barely a year later, in July 1972,
elements of non-economic repayment. The first was in the
6Washington Post, July 21, 1972,
°Charles Wakebridge, "Electrons over Suez," Ordnance,
17 Sunday Telegraph (London), June 7, 1970.
May-June 1972, p. 475.
11 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 152.
18 Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East
(New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1971), p. 17.
¹²wakebridge, op. cit., p. 475.
19 Vice Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr., "View from the Bridge of
13 Lawrence Whetten, "June 1967 to June 1971: Four Years
the Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
of Canal War Reconsidered," New Middle East, June 1971, p. 23.
February 1973, p. 27.
14 Ibid., p. 21.
20 Joshua, op. cit., p. 18.
15
International Defense Review, No. 3, May-June 1971,
p. 211.
-6-
-7-
with the expulsion of nearly all Soviet military personnel
from Egypt. Frustrated by the military stalemate on the
A flow of spare parts and replacement equipment was
Suez Canel front and irritated by continued Soviet foot-
maintained to Egypt after the Soviet exodus, but it took
the October 1973 war to cause Moscow to resume arms deli-
dragging on his entreaties for more advanced weapons,
President Sadat gave the order for expulsion. Given several
veries in earnest. The Soviets instituted a vast resupply
days' advance notice, the Soviet withdrawal began even be-
airlift on the second day of the war. 28 During the resupply
fore Sadat's public announcement of July 18. 21 The sudden-
operation Egypt reportedly received about 100 fighter air-
ness and extent of the Soviet departure gave rise to
craft, 600 tanks, and equipment for 30 SAM batteries. 29
speculation that Moscow had retaliated against Sadat's action
by withdrawing its air defense units -- which reportedly were
Even during the war, however, further strains arose in the
exempted from the original expulsion order -- as well as
Moscow-Cairo relationship. The reported Soviet insistence
instructors and technicians. 22 This in turn may have prompted
on payment in hard currency for new advanced equipment did
Sadat to order out the Soviet naval reconnaissance units. 23
nothing to endear the Soviets to the Egyptians. 30 Cairo
showed its displeasure by restricting Soviet contact with
At any rate, the Soviets probably saw no point in argu-
Egyptian troop units and access to equipment evaluation
ing or pleading with Sadat, once the issue was made public. 24
reports 31
Rather than exacerbate a bad situation, Moscow presumably
felt impelled to temporarily retrench in Egypt, while working
Strains were reflected in a major speech by Sadat on
to improve its position elsewhere in the Middle East at least
April 18, 1974, in which the Egyptian leader announced that
Egypt would end its exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union
for the short term.
for arms and would seek them elsewhere. Sadat said that he
By early August, nearly all of the reported 21,000
had made this decision because Moscow, for the previous six
Soviet advisory and air defense personnel in Egypt, 25 as well
months, had not acted fully on his requests for more advan-
as naval reconnaissance units, had returned to the Soviet
ced weapons 32 In the wake of Sadat's announcement, all
Union. Most of the air defense equipment, however, was
shipments of Soviet military equipment, including badly
turned over to the Egyptians, a notable exception being four
needed spare parts, came to a halt. 33
MIG-25 Foxbat high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, which
the Soviets took with them. 26 Only an estimated 700 or so
From the date of Sadat's speech through the rest of the
Soviet instructors were believed to be in Egypt by the end
year, no Soviet deliveries of arms -- with the exception
of 1972. 27
of two shipments of spare parts in August -- are known to
have been made to Egypt. 34 An October announcement that
21 Anthony McDermott, "A Russian Withdrawal; or Divorce,
Egyptian Style," New Middle East, August 1972, p. 6.
28 New York Times, November 28 1973.
22 New York Times, July 19, 1972.
29 Washington Post, November 24, 1973; Near East Report,
January 16, 1974, p. I0.
23 Washington Post, August 2, 1972.
30
Washington Post, November 19, 1973
24 New York Times, August 7, 1972.
31
Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1973,
25 Military Aviation News, June 1975, p. 7.
p. 16.
32
26 Ibid., July 1975, p. 4.
New York Times, April 19, 1974.
33
27 Strategic Survey 1972 (London: The International
Washington Post, May 23, 1974.
Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], April 1973), p. 26.
34
Military Aviation News, November 1974, p. 7.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-9-
-8-
cluded before and shortly after the 1973 war. 41
Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev would visit Cairo in January
heightened Egyptian hopes that a resumption of Soviet deli-
The arrival of two squadrons -- about 24 aircraft
veries was imminent. These hopes were dashed on December
of MIG-23's in early 1975 finally raised overall Egyptian
30 when Moscow suddenly announced the indefinite postpone-
combat strength to nearly the pre-October war level,
ment of Brezhney's visit, ostensibly for reasons of health. 35
according to Western specialists. 42 Even the MIG-23's in
Egypt's inventory, however, cannot be optimally employed
In his first public remarks after the postponement of
without the accompaniment of TU-114 radar-equipped early
the visit, Sadat again took the Soviet Union to task for its
warning aircraft, which the Soviets apparently have been
refusal to replace all equipment lost in the October war.
unwilling to export because of the sensitive equipment
During an interview he stated: "I want every Arab to know
involved. 43 Furthermore, the reported cessation of Soviet
that since the ceasefire of October 1973
there has been
shipments of air defense equipment -- SAM's, antiaircraft
no Soviet replenishment and no major arms received up to this
guns, and radar -- since the war has made it difficult for
moment.
"36
the Egyptian air defense forces to maintain a high degree of
combat readiness. According to Egypt's air defense commander,
In a dramatic move to secure military equipment from a
his forces "have not received a single missile replacement
different quarter, Sadat visited Paris in January 1975 with
from the Soviet Union since the end of the October war. 1144
a shopping list for arms. During his visit, the Egyptian
leader reportedly concluded a deal for several hundred million
Another factor adversely affecting Egyptian combat
dollars worth of equipment, including 44 advanced Mirage F-1
readiness has been the process of absorbing newer Western
fighter aircraft, mostly for delivery in the late 1970's. 37
equipment, especially advanced Mirage fighters, into the
Already in late 1974, Egypt had begun to receive the first
predominantly Soviet-supplied inventory. 45 Moreover,
of 36 Mirage fighters ordered on her behalf by Saudi Arabia. 38
dwindling Egyptian stocks of spare parts and the dearth of
current Soviet shipments have forced a curtailment of Egyptian
Sadat's Paris shopping spree apparently served to send
training. The standard 20 hours of monthly flight time for
a message to Moscow, as reflected in the arrival in Cairo
on February 3 of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for two days
air force 46 pilots, for example, has been reduced to about 15
hours.
of talks. Gromyko attempted to soothe bruised Egyptian
feelings by "activating" some arms contracts that had been
suspended by Moscow since early 1974. 39 On February 18,
the delivery of six advanced, swing-wing MIG-23 fighters to
41 Washington Post, February 9, 1975.
Egypt was reported, the first shipment of major Soviet equip-
ment in nearly a year. 40 Some spares and other equipment also
42
Ibid., June 13, 1975.
began to arrive, reportedly under existing contracts con-
43
Robert Jackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London:
Tom Stacey, Ltd., 1970), p. 244.
35 Washington Post, December 31, 1974.
44 Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 7, 1975, p. 15.
36 New York Times, January 9, 1975,
45
Ibid., June 30, 1975, p. 12.
37
Ibid., February 19, 1975; Washington Post, January 30, ,1975.
46
Ibid., Washington Post, June 13, 1975.
38
New York Times, November 20, 1974.
39
Washington Post, February 17, 1975.
40
New York Times, February 19, 1975.
-10-
-11-
Compounding these technical and materiel problems for
and Qatar to establish a $1 billion Arab military industrial
Egypt is the current Soviet demand that Cairo resume payments
organization centered in Egypt. 51 With Saudi Arabia initial-
for military equipment. Cairo has been seeking a renewed
1y providing the bulk of the financing, the new organization
moratorium on repayment of its Soviet military aid debt
is reported to be in the final negotiating stages with the
estimated at $1.5 billion to $2 billion -- for some time.
UK over a $1 billion arrangement to supply Egypt with 200
With a reported 75 percent of Egypt's annual exports -- other-
Hawk light strike aircraft and 250 Lynx helicopters 52 as
wise capable of earning badly-needed hard currency currently
well as antitank missiles and electronic equipment. 53
going to Communist countries for overall foreign debt pay-
ment, Sadat has appealed for a renewed ten-year suspension
For the second phase of this long-term Arab rearmament
of arms payments to enable Egypt to concentrate on rebuilding
program, Cairo is also negotiating with the UK and France
its economy. According to 48 Sadat, Syria has already been
for the establishment of complete factories in Egypt for
granted such a moratorium.
the licensed production of both the Hawk and the Lynx.
While it would require some years to attain a substantial
During a May 1, 1975 speech, Sadat complained publicly
output, these facilities would eventually serve as the
of the Soviets' rejection of a payments delay recently
nucleus of Egypt's arms industry. 54 Financing for these
requested by Foreign Minister Fahmi in Moscow. "We never
arrangements would be provided at a planned level of $1
said we will not pay," Sadat stated. "We are asking for a
billion annually from 1975-78 by the newly established Arab
reassessment of our position." Finally, making clear that
industrial organization. 55
recent Soviet deliveries were made under pre-October war
commitments, not new agreements, he complained, "The Soviet
Egyptian officials concede that Cairo's increasing
Union has refused to replace our losses, even if we pay cash. 1,49
shift in procurement policies entails a high degree of risk
for Egyptian war readiness. This is especially marked be-
Further infuriating Sadat was a new Soviet arms aid
cause of the reported increase in Israeli combat capability
arrangement with Libya disclosed in May 1975 (see below).
since the October war. 56 While Egyptian government offi-
With Libya's small 30,000 man army scheduled to receive as
cials are optimistic over the country's ability to diversify
many as 1,200 tanks, additional SAM equipment, and late-model
its arms procurement and still field a credible military
MIG-23's, compared with the relative trickle of Soviet equip-
force, some Egyptian military officers take a gloomier view. 57
ment then arriving in Egypt, the Egyptians were understand-
ably disgruntled. Sadat was especially vexed by Soviet
"irresponsibility" in giving "expensive and dangerous war
toys" to Libyan leader Qadhafi, whom Sadat regards as "100
51 Military Aviation News, May 1975, p. 6; The Economist,
percent sick. "50
June 21, 1975, p. 69.
To offset the serious shortfall in equipment require-
52 Military Aviation News, June 1975, pp. 6-7.
ments from the Soviet Union, Egypt has been trying to
53
expand arms supply arrangements with the West. Another
Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1975.
step in that direction was taken in May 1975 with the agree-
ment by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
54 Washington Post, May 12, 1975; Washington Star News,
June 27, 1975.
55 The Economist, June 21, 1975, p. 67.
47
Washington Post, July 20, 1975.
56 Strategic Survey 1974 (London: IISS, April 1975), p. 15.
48 The Economist, June 28, 1975, p. 67; Aviation Week and
57
Space Technology, February 3, 1975, p. 16.
New York Times, July 22, 1975.
49 Washington Post, May 2, 1975.
50
Ibid. June 13, 1975.
-12-
-13-
Indications are that military dissatisfaction over Sadat's
Another recent element of strain in Soviet-Egyptian
arms diversification policies may be on the increase, as
relations has been Cairo's hampering of the Soviet use of
reflected in an abortive plot to overthrow him in June 1975.
naval facilities in Egypt. As of the early summer of 1975,
According to a Beirut newspaper, the Egyptian chief of intel-
the Soviet Mediterranean fleet reportedly has been denied
ligence and some 40 senior officers were reported to have been
summarily retired under suspicious circumstances. 58 Other
the use of two of its prime berthing facilities -- the port
of Mersa Matruh, near the Libyan border, and an anchorage
recent reports refer to disgruntlement on the part of many
in Egyptian waters in the Gulf of Sollum. While Soviet na-
officers who feel that Sadat's antagonizing of Moscow provides
val craft have always been required to request permission
the Soviets with a pretext for refusal to provide additional
to enter Egyptian ports and anchorages, these requests
equipment to Egypt. Some military elements also are upset
heretofore have been treated as formalities and routinely
by Sadat's espousal of peace negotiations which they feel
granted. Since last June, however, Soviet requests to enter
squander the fruits of the October war and make the option
of renewed hostilities less credible. 59
the above two areas reportedly have not been answered, in
effect amounting to a denial of entrance. 62
The Soviet Union may in fact be attempting to nurture
Soviet ships have still been using the important
such sentiment on the part of the Egyptian armed forces
maintenance and repair facilities in the main port of
with a view toward undermining the Sadat government. The
Egyptian Communist Party inactive since 1964 on Moscow's
Alexandria, but they have been encountering increasing
orders -- is reported to be clandestinely preparing for a
harassment on the part of Egyptian port officials. Long
"return to action" in anticipation of the "sudden explosions"
delays in gaining permission to enter the port have been
to which Sadat's policies are expected to lead. 60 Soviet
reported, as well as requirements to fill out additional
forms and other types of red tape. Foreign diplomatic
Arabic broadcasts to the Middle East of late are taking a
sources have ascribed this Egyptian harassment of Soviet
similar line. A recently issued Egyptian Communist Party
document refers to the "patriotic trend" in the armed forces
naval facilities as pressure on Moscow vis-a-vis Egypt's
and alludes to Communist support in that quarter, while
military debt question and the continuation of Soviet arms
claiming that the party is "the only organized political
shipments. 63
force" in Egypt, outside the government's own political
machine. While not directly calling for the overthrow of
An interview published in a Kuwaiti newspaper
of September 9, 1975, provided the occasion for another of
Sadat, Moscow may be orchestrating its propaganda, as well
Sadat's bitter denunciations of the Soviet Union. Stating
as the activities of Egyptian Communist Party elements,
that "no person with dignity can accept the method of
toward setting in motion events that may lead to the replace-
Russian dealing", Sadat accused Moscow of failing him in
ment of the Sadat regime⁶¹ currently perhaps Moscow's
his "year of decision", prior to the October war. "Since I
fondest hope in the Middle East.
assumed power in Egypt," Sadat continued, "the Russians have
not been satisfied with me. They want another president.'
Speaking of arms supplies, Sadat complained that he was "ten
58
steps behind Israel and three steps behind Syria. ":64
Washington Post, July 30, 1975.
59
Ibid.
60 Ibid., August 28, 1975.
62 New York Times, July 28, 1975; Washington Post,
July 20, 1975.
61
Ibid.
63 Washington Post, July 20, 1975.
64 Ibid., September 10, 1975.
-14-
-15-
The deteriorating state of Soviet-Egyptian relations
the White House press secretary reiterated that the US
was further reflected in the reported withdrawal of four
would consider Egyptian requests for military equipment
Soviet-manned Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft from Egypt in
"to increase Egypt's confidence in its course" of diver-
September. These high performance aircraft, among the most
sifying its sources of arms supply. 68
advanced in the Soviet inventory, had been operating in
Egypt since the October war. With the loss of their Egyp-
While the US appeared to be seriously considering
tian base of operations for these aircraft, it was reported
ending its two-decade-long arms embargo against Egypt,
that the Soviets were negotiating with Syria for use of a
indications were that Washington was not prepared to make
similar base in that country. 65
any specific commitments to Sadat in the near term. Several
days prior to the scheduled arrival of Sadat in the US,
Meanwhile, with prospects for new Soviet arms acquisi-
Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "I don't think we will
tions currently remote, Sadat began to entertain serious
be prepared at this moment to make any specific commitments
hopes for securing some assistance from the US, particularly
of military aid, but we will be prepared to discuss the
after initialing the Sinai II disengagement pact with Israel
problem with him in general terms. "69
on September 1, 1975. While realistically aware that Washing-
ton could approve nowhere near the scale of major arms
Not surprisingly, the question of US military sales to
commitments in effect for Israel, Sadat hoped for at least
Egypt during Sadat's visit to the US, October 26-November 5,
a symbolic amount of defensive equipment, such as a squadron
1975, apparently was restricted to general discussions of
of F-5 fighter aircraft at a minimum. Sadat further hoped
Egyptian military needs, with no commitments made on an arms
that his purchase of French Mirages in 1974 and early 1975
supply relationship. Sadat reportedly was told that the US
would demonstrate that the Soviets no longer controlled
could not now discuss specific arms acquisitions, but that
Egypt's military posture. 66
"the subject could be reopened later. "70
Statements by US officials following Sinai II con-
Sadat, however, did win an administration promise of
comitantly gave some indication that the US might favorably
approximately $1 billion in aid -- $750 million in economic
consider Egyptian requests for military equipment during
assistance and an additional $250 million in food aid.
Sadat's planned visit to the US in October 1975. In an
Egyptian government officials acknowledged that this was
interview with the Los Angeles Times on September 24, 1975,
a fourfold increase in the amount of US assistance to Egypt
President Ford stated that "we will discuss with the Egyp -
over the previous year, while there had been no US assistance
tians certain arms assistance for them" adding that "there
at all for the eight years prior to that. Thus despite the
is to some extent an implied commitment." Due to the
lack of a specific American arms supply commitment, Sadat
strains between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Mr. Ford averred
reportedly viewed his US visit as one of his most important
that Sadat "has taken a very strong position" that "his own
acts in formalizing the end of his prior exclusive dependence
national security" would be jeopardized if Western sources
on Moscow. 71
of military equipment were not found. 67 Several days later,
Following his visit to the US, Sadat stopped in London
for three days of arms supply talks with British officials.
At a press conference there on November 8, 1975, Sadat claimed
65 Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1975.
to be "completely satisfied" with the discussions in "diversi-
66 Washington Post, October 19, 1975.
67
Ibid., September 25, 1975.
68 New York Times, September 27, 1975.
69 Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1975.
70 Washington Star, November 9, 1975.
71
New York Times, November 6, 1975.
-16-
-17-
fying the sources of Egyptian weapons supply." British
In the meantime, the Egyptian armed forces are becoming
officials reportedly indicated that Her Majesty's Govern-
increasingly desperate for alternative sources of equipment
ment had all but lifted its existing embargo on supersonic
and supplies. Because of the shortage of spare parts, the
Jaguar fighter bombers for Cairo. These modern aircraft
army and air force are reported to have begun resorting to
were reported to be at the top of Sadat's arms shopping
cannibalization of existing equipment to maintain operational
list. The sale of 200 Jaguars, valued at about $1.2
readiness. Concern accordingly has been evinced in the armed
billion, was reported in the British press. 72
forces over Sadat's failure to obtain US equipment. Some
military elements reportedly feel that, under present
Asked why his arms purchasing mission apparently had
conditions, Egypt does not pose a credible threat to Israel
been more successful in the UK than in the US, Sadat replied
and thus lacks sufficient military leverage to induce further
that he had begun his arms diversification program with
Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories. 76
the UK and France last year and could now negotiate "speci-
fics" with both countries. While in the US, he stated that
Egypt, in the view of British military analysts, regards
he could only sketch his military needs in "broad outlines, 173
US military equipment over the next five years as critical to
its security interests. In the estimation of the Egyptian
Inasmuch as the Jaguar is jointly produced by the UK
military high command, a view shared to some extent by
and France, it remained unclear what production sharing
Israeli analysts, Egypt has sufficient equipment strength
arrangements would have to be completed for the deal. The
available to defend in the Sinai or, if necessary, to fight
purchase is reported to involve an initial order of 30 to
Israel in combination with other Arab states. The current
60 aircraft, with the Egyptians interested in eventually
preoccupation of Cairo is with the military balance two
producing the aircraft under license. 74
or three years from now. This is where the need for modern
US or other Western equipment, especially fighter aircraft
Sadat also is reported to have concluded an agreement
and air defense radar, is viewed as acute.
77
for the purchase of British Swingfire antitank missiles in
a $40 million deal. In addition, the Egyptians reportedly
The Soviet Union, in the opinion of some Western mili-
expressed an interest in purchasing the British Chieftain
tary analysts, is not overly concerned by Sadat's efforts
main battle tank, but London has been unwilling to intro-
to "turn around" the Egyptian military forces. Sadat,
duce this tank into the area because of the possibility of
according to a Soviet source, "is only one man. 1.1. Further-
disrupting the Arab-Israeli military balance. As an
more, the source regards the arms aid program envisaged
alternative, the British reportedly proposed a feasibility
by Sadat as well beyond Cairo's financial resources, even
study to re-engine the Soviet tanks now in the Egyptian
if generous US aid is forthcoming. 78
inventory, and the Egyptians are said to be considering this
possibility. 75
Egypt's prospects for obtaining large-scale Western
military assistance to compensate for the reduced level
of Soviet support appear to bear upon the internal
72 Cited in the Washington Post, November 9, 1975.
73Ibid.
76 New York Times, November 10, 1975.
74 Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 17, 1975,
77 Ibid., October 22, 1975.
p. 22.
78
Ibid.
75Ibid.
-18-
CHAPTER III
SYRIA*
political situation in the country. The armed forces, in
this respect, are regarded as Sadat's primary source of
political support. 79 The ability of Sadat to secure a
Syria, with $2.1 billion in Soviet military aid received
continuing supply of modern weaponry -- from whatever source
through 1974, ranks as the second largest recipient of Soviet
-- to the satisfaction of his military establishment will
arms among the nonaligned countries. 80 Soviet arms aid
remain the crucial question in the survival of the Sadat
cooperation with Syria dates from 1956, when in January of
government.
that year the Syrian government concluded its first arms
accord with Moscow, because of the "impossible conditions"
for purchasing arms attached by the West. After the 1956
accord, follow-up agreements, technical assistance, and
81
good will naval visits ensued in the usual Soviet pattern.
Though encountering problems and periodic setbacks, a
Soviet working relationship was maintained with Syria over
the next decade. By the eve of the June 1967 war, Syrian
military and economic dependence on Moscow was pronounced. 82
Though not suffering as heavily in the June war as
Egypt, Syrian equipment losses were substantial. In air-
craft, for example, Syria lost 32 MIG-21's, 23 MIG-15/17's,
2 IL-28 bombers, and 3 helicopters, for a total of 60 air-
craft, or practically two-thirds of her entire air force. 83
Within a year, however, Soviet resupply had more than
79 Ibid., November 10, 1975.
replaced Syria's losses. Replacement deliveries, reportedly
valued at about $300 million, included 120 aircraft -- many
late model MIG-21 and SU-7 fighters among them to replace
earlier vintage MIG-15's and 17's lost in the conflict --
and some 400 tanks. As many as 1,000 additional Soviet
advisory personnel also arrived in the country. At the
same time, Soviet long-range bombers initiated visits to
Syria, and the construction of naval support facilities began
under Soviet supervision in the ports of Latakia and Tartus.
80 U.S. Department of State, op. cit.
81
Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 105.
82
Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 123.
83 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 152.
*This chapter and that on Iraq following are a revised
version of an article that appeared in the Winter 1976 issue
of Strategic Review.
-20-
-21-
The latter would prove valuable for Syrian naval craft as
By the middle of 1970, three years after the June war,
well as ships of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, as
Syria was nearly totally dependent on the Soviet Union for
regular Soviet naval visits in 1968 began to demonstrate. 84
the sustenance of its mìlitary machine. The air force,
which had tripled in size since the war, boasted 175 late
While Syria remained crucial to Soviet calculations in
model MIG-21 fighters and SU-7 fighter bombers (as opposed
the area, policy differences between the two countries grew
to 55 before the war) and 85 MIG-17 fighters. 89 Deliveries
more acute after the June war. The apparent central differ-
to the ground forces during the three-year period included
ence was over policy toward Israel. In contrast to Moscow's
250-300 tanks, over 100 armored personnel carriers, 400
espousal of a political approach to a settlement, the
field guns and mobile rocket launchers, and an estimated 40
Syrians continued to press for reprisals and the total defeat
SA-2 SAM missiles. 90 Transfers to the navy included two
of Israel, as underscored by their heavy support of the
Soviet-supplied minesweepers, six Komar-class missile
Palestinian guerrillas. These differences placed a consider-
patrol boats, and at least a dozen motor torpedo boats. 91
able strain on Soviet-Syrian relations. 85
Striving to correct the operational deficiencies in
At the end of 1968, reports in the Lebanese press
the Syrian armed forces were an estimated 2,000 to 3,000
mentioned Syrian attempts to approach the West for military
Soviet military instructors and advisers, perhaps one-fifth
equipment, ostensibly because of Soviet threats to with-
the number in Egypt at the time. As in Egypt, the Soviet
hold arms if Damascus continued to oppose an Arab-Israeli
personnel were engaged in training, planning, and logistics
political settlement. Although a Syrian military delegation
activities down to divisional, and in some cases lower,
returned empty-handed from Paris, Damascus shortly after-
levels. Although some improvement was said to have been
wards concluded a new agreement with Moscow, in an apparent
made in Syrian operational efficiency since the June war,
successful use of counterpressure on the Soviets. 86
Soviet officers in Syria did not consider the Syrian forces
ready for renewed hostilities with Israel. 92 Operational
The Syrians apparently tried to repeat this tactic the
and maintenance standards remained lamentably poor, a partial
following year, when, in May 1969, a Syrian military mission
legacy of the eight coups d'etat undergone by the country in
visited Peking. The aim reportedly was to pressure the
Soviets to provide additional advanced weapons by seeking
the previous 17 years. Morale 93 in the armed forces accord-
ingly remained at a low ebb.
assistance from the Chinese. 87 The latter turned down a
reported Syrian request for SAM's, but did agree to provide
Another military aid agreement signed with Moscow in
infantry weapons for the Palestinian guerrillas based in
February 1971 continued the flow of materiel in that year.
Syria. 88
Deliveries over the next six months included 35 additional
fighter aircraft and 22 MI-8 helicopters -- the first
known delivery of the latter craft, designed to carry com-
bat troops.
94
84A.Y. Yodfat, "The USSR, Jordan, and Syria," Mizan,
March-April 1969, p. 84.
85Charles McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations (London:
89 Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 1, 1970, p. 16.
Central Asian Research Center, 1973), p. 91.
90 Lenzowski, op. cit., p. 152.
86Yodfat, "The USSR, Jordan, and Syria," op. cit., p. 88.
91 Joshua, op. cit., p. 20.
87 New York Times, May 18, 1969.
92 Christian Science Monitor, July 9, 1970.
88Honorable R. Lawrence Coughlin, op. cit., p. E7537.
93 Jackson, op. cit., p. 168,
94
New York Times, July 12, 1971.
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-23-
While the April 1972 Soviet friendship treaty with
The chief of Israeli military intelligence, General
Iraq received considerable attention in the Western press,
A. Yariv, publicly stated at the time that the Soviets were
a similar treaty with Syria was conspicuous by its absence.
"playing up" developments in Syria to bolster their diplo-
Surprisingly enough, Syrian wariness over a closer involve-
matic position in the area following their setback in Egypt.
ment with Moscow reportedly caused Damascus to reject a
Soviet offer of such a treaty. 95 Another Soviet-Syrian
While stating that his country was watching the situation
carefully, Yariv commented that there were no signs of a
arms accord, however, was signed in May, the accord promis-
substantial increase in the Soviet presence in Syria -- a
ing the Syrians their first SA-3 SAM's, as well as additional
factor of more concern to Israel than new equipment deli-
missile-equipped patrol boats. 96
veries. He added that the recent shipments apparently
were intended to bolster Syria's "relatively weak side,"
Following the sudden ouster of virtually all Soviet
her air defense, given reports of the newly-arrived SA-3
personnel from Egypt in July 1972, Western observers awaited
equipment. 100
some reactive move by the Soviets in the area. It came two
months later in the form of a prominent airlift of Soviet
The diplomatic reaction from the September-October air
military equipment to Syria. During late September and early
and sea lift had just abated, when another, even larger,
October, some 20 AN-12 transport aircraft, as well as several
airlift began in November and continued into December. The
merchant ships, arrived in Syria with new equipment, report-
latter, about twice as large as the previous airlift, invol-
edly including 12 to 15 MIG-21 fighters, new T-62 medium
ved about 40 aircraft, including the very large AN-22
tanks, and SA-3 missiles. 97 Also arriving in the airlift
transport, capable of carrying a 220,000 pound payload.
were a reported 150 new Soviet advisers, probably SA-3
A11 that has been reported on the contents of the later air-
instructors and technicians, adding to the several thousand
lift was the inclusion of an unspecified number of MIG-21
already in the country. 98 Moscow evidently took this con-
fighters, presumably to replace the dozen or more shot down
spicious and dramatic step to demonstrate that it still
in dogfights with the Israelis over the previous half year. 101
maintained a secure foothold in the Middle East.
Deliveries continued on a heavy scale during 1973.
Also in September, Western sources reported that Moscow
During the first six months, Soviet shipments amounted to
negotiated some type of arrangement with Damascus, whereby
a reported $185 million, compared with about $150 million
the Soviets would expand naval facilities at the Syrian
for all of 1972. 102
ports of Latakia and Tartus for their use. Up to that time
Soviet naval craft could only make port calls at those
In September 1973, Syrian and Israeli aircraft tangled
locations. The exact nature of the arrangement was not made
in the biggest air battle in the Middle East since the
clear, but the Soviets presumably planned to establish an
1967 war. Israel claimed it shot down 13 Syrian MIG-21's
alternate base of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean,
until the status of their Egyptian bases became clarified. 99
for the loss of one of its Mirages The day following the
95 Strategic Survey 1972 (London: IISS, April 1973), p. 27.
100 Washington Post, September 28, 1972.
101 Ibid. January 10, 1973.
96R. M. Burrell, "Opportunities for the Kremlin's Drive
East," New Middle East, July 1972, p. 13.
102 London Sunday Times Staff, The Yom Kippur War
(New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 72.
97 Washington Post, September 28, 1972.
98 Ibid., October 6, 1972.
99New York Times, September 14, 1972.
-24-
-25-
battle, Soviet Ambassador Mukhitdinov was reportedly summon-
system and other electronic equipment. 107 A Pentagon spokes-
ed by President Assad, who demanded advanced MIG-23 fighters
man in effect subsequently confirmed the Israeli information,
from Moscow, as well as Soviet participation in Syrian
saying he would not quarrel with the levels mentioned by
SAM launch operations in future clashes with the Israelis.
Peres. He added, however, that US analysts estimated the
When the Soviets apparently demurred unless Damascus signed
number of Soviet advisers present at about 2,000. 108
a friendship treaty with Moscow, Assad restricted the
movement of Soviet advisers in the country. 103 "Those
Besides replacing Syrian war losses, the Soviets pro-
damned Syrians,' complained Ambassador Mukhitdinov, "will
vided additional modern equipment to Damascus. In the spring
take anything except advice. "104
of 1974, the first advanced swing-wing MIG-23 fighters were
identified in Syria}09 the first country outside the Soviet
The October war showed the extent of the vast Soviet-
Union to receive this late-model aircraft. 110 A total of
supplied arsenal in Syria. The Syrians deployed a reported
45 were reported in the country. 111 Other newly-arrived
total of 32 SA-6 batteries (Egypt deployed 46), each battery
sophisticated equipment included 30 Scud surface-to-surface
having four launchers with three missiles apiece. In the
missiles with a range of 180 miles, over 100 Frog shorter-
first three days of hostilities, the number of SAM missiles
range tactical rockets,12 vehicle-mounted multiple SA-7
fired on the combined Syrian and Egyptian fronts reportedly
SAM launchers, and new 180 mm howitzers. 113 The Scuds, with
totalled over 1,000, reflecting a deployment density
their capability of striking Israeli cities with high
surpassing that of any. known SAM system in the world, the
explosive warheads, posed the gravest concern to Tel Aviv
Soviet Union included. 105 Syrian losses reportedly totalled
and raised the threat of an Israeli preemptive strike in the
222 aircraft of all types (about two-thirds of total air
event of an imminent renewal of hostilities. 114
force strength), some 1,100 tanks (50 percent of total tank
holdings), and 17-20 SAM batteries (over half of Syria's
Prior to the post-October resupply of the Syrians,
inventory) 106
Israeli military planning was based on the premise that Egypt
While Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt virtually ceased
after the war, Soviet shipments to Syria continued at a
high rate. By August 1974, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon
107
Ibid.
Peres claimed that not only were Syrian losses replaced,
but that Syria was stronger than before the war. Mr. Peres
108 Defense/Space Daily, December 19, 1974, p. 264.
stated that Syrian air force strength totalled about 400
aircraft -- about 25 percent more than prior to October
109
Washington Post, September 12, 1974.
1973 and that its SAM system was about 20 percent larg-
er. In addition, all tank losses had been made up, mostly
110
Known by the NATO codename, Flogger, the aircraft is
with modern T-62's. Peres added that about 3,000 Soviet
capable of speeds more than twice the speed of sound, with
advisers were in Syria, some operating the missile defense
approximately the same performance characteristics as the
F-4 Phantom, except for a less favorable range and ordnance
capacity (Washington Post, February 2, 1975).
103 Washington Post, September 26, 1973.
111
Ibid., September 12, 1974.
104 London Sunday Times Staff, op. cit., p. 72.
112
Ibid., November 20, 1974.
105
London Sunday Times Staff, op. cit., p. 189.
113
International Defense Review, No. 3, May-June 1974,
106
p. 284.
New York Times, August 8, 1974.
114
Washington Post, November 20, 1974.
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-27-
was the fulcrum of war or peace in the area. It was further
regarded that no war was feasible without Egyptian partici-
to the current fragile peace in the Middle East. It remains
pation, and that while Cairo was involved in negotiations,
to be seen whether Syria, now heavily subsidized by Saudi
the likelihood of hostilities was not imminent. I15
Arabian funds, will continue its tentative probings toward
the West for military equipment and industrial development, 20
The spate of Soviet shipments to Syria in 1974 changed
or will remain closely tied to Moscow.
the outlook of the Israelis. The latter by mid-year
regarded the Syrians as capable of launching a full-scale
onslaught on their own, with the expectation that the Iraqis
and other Arab countries would join in. 116 Indeed, US
officials at that time also felt that "the Syrians were well
ahead of where they were before the war," as a result of
the heavy volume of Soviet deliveries, while the Egyptians
were approximately at their pre-war strength. Concomitantly,
120 Washington Post, June 23, 1975.
Washington regarded Israel as stronger militarily vis-a-vis
both Egypt and Syria than before the war. 117
The critical Syrian weakness remained trained and
experienced manpower. Half of Syria's tanks were reportedly
manned by inexperienced crews, while many aircraft remained
grounded due to the shortage of fully qualified pilots,
only about 60 of whom were reported to have survived the
war. 118 Until Syrian pilots could be trained, some of the
newly arrived MIG-23's were reportedly being flown by Cuban
and North Korean pilots. 119
Despite shortcomings in training and experience in
its armed forces, Syria -- one of the most volatile and
impatient of the Arab states -- poses a serious threat
11
New York Times, August 8, 1974.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., October 3, 1974.
118U.S. News and World Report, March 17, 1975, p. 14.
Time, December 2, 1974, p. 46.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
CHAPTER IV
-29-
IRAQ
toward the Kurds for some time, was seriously disturbed by
Baghdad's handling of the rebellion. 124 It went so far as
Iraq ranks after Egypt and Syria as the third major
to publish a warning in Pravda in June 1963 that the Soviet
Arab recipient of Soviet arms aid, having received $1.6
Union would not remain indifferent if Soviet arms were used
billion in such assistance through 1974. 121 The close
against the Kurdish dissidents. Arms shipments concomi-
Soviet-Iraqi arms supply relationship began following the
tantly were curtailed. These moves provided the first
coup of General Abdul Karem Kassem against the Nuri al-Said
known instance of Moscow's use of leverage against an aid
government in July 1958. As the sole Arab member of the
recipient and served to restrain the Iraqis in their anti-
anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, Iraq had alienated Arab nation-
Kurdish operations. 125
alist elements and had been eclipsed in prestige by Egypt,
Iraq's traditional rival. Kassem, seeking to counteract
After the Right Baathist regime was overthrown by a
these factors, changed Iraq's foreign policy stance to one
military junta in November 1963, the new Iraqi government
of nonalignment and severed military ties with the West.
removed most strictures against the local Communists and
In order to further strengthen his domestic position and
arranged a truce with the Kurds. The Soviet attitude
enhance Iraq's regional stature, Kassem concomitantly ap-
toward Baghdad changed markedly, as reflected in the re-
proached the Soviet Union for military assistance. 122
sumption of arms shipments in early 1964. 126
The Soviets responded quickly to the Iraqi requests.
While Soviet-Iraqi relations improved over the next
Delivery of a squadron of MIG-15 fighters in late 1958 was
several years, the Kurdish problem continued to fester
followed by the arrival of a large military training mission.
between the two countries. In 1965, Baghdad again launched
Other deliveries of aircraft, including MIG-17 and MIG-21
a large-scale offensive against the dissidents. This time,
fighters, transports, helicopters, and trainers, took place
however, Moscow appeared unwilling to strain relations with
in the early 1960's as the Iraqi air force was reorgan-
Baghdad and refrained from pressuring Iraq. Within the
ized and modernized. 123
broader context of overall policy objectives in the Arab
world, Moscow apparently was not prepared to manipulate its
Despite this assistance, strains arose in Baghdad's
arms aid tie at this time. 127 Soviet cooperation continued
relations with Moscow. The Iraqi Communist Party, follow-
with the installation of an SA-2 surface-to-air missile
ing its abortive revolution in February 1963, received
system and the delivery of three additional squadrons of
rough treatment by the Right Baathists, an extremist fac-
all-weather MIG-21 interceptors and Iraq's first TU-16
tion which overthrew the Kassem regime during the same
medium jet bombers. 128
month. Even more troublesome in Soviet-Iraqi relations
was the regime's war against the rebellious Kurdish
tribesmen in northeast Iraq, which had been underway since
1961. Moscow, which had maintained a protective attitude
124 McLane, op. cit., pp. 55 -56.
125 The Economist, June 29, 1963, p. 1344.
121U.S. Department of State, op. cit.
126 McLane, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
122 Joshua, op. cit., p. 17.
127
Joshua, op. cit., p. 19.
123 Jackson, op. cit., p. 171.
128 Military Aviation News, July 1974, p. 5.
-30-
-31-
Iraqi losses in the June 1967 war, though sizable, were
Despite the relatively cautious nature of the Soviet
on a much smaller scale than those of Egypt and Syria.
commitment, Soviet- Iraqi- relations continued to be close.
Aircraft losses included 9 MIG-21's, 5 Hawker Hunters, 1
Soviet arms shipments continued, highlighted later in the
TU-16 medium bomber, and 2 transports. As a result of Soviet
year by the installation of the first SA-3 SAM sites in
replacement deliveries, Iraqi air force strength a year after
the country. 133
the war substantially exceeded the pre-war level. By mid-
1971, the Soviets had, over a four year period, provided Iraq
A rather curious--and still unexplained--development
with 110 MIG-21 and SU-7 fighters, over 20 helicopters and
occurred in the late summer of 1973 with the delivery of
trainers, 100-150 tanks, some 300 armored personnel carriers,
about a dozen supersonic TU-22 Blinder medium-range bombers
and about 500 field guns and artillery rockets. 129
to Iraq. Although the Blinder had been in Soviet service
for some 12 years, this was the first and only deployment
The Soviet aid relationship with Iraq flourished, nur-
of this type of aircraft outside the Soviet Union or Eastern
tured at least partly by Baghdad's unusually good repayment
Europe. Capable of speeds of approximately 900 mph, with
record. With hard currency earnings from oil exports, Iraq
a range of 1,400 miles, the Blinders were described by the
was better able than any other Soviet client to meet its
Pentagon as "far more formidable than any aircraft supplied
repayment obligations to Moscow. 130
by Moscow to Egypt or any other Arab nation so far. 134
Oddly enough, though delivery occurred just prior to the
The military-diplomatic relationship between Moscow and
October war, no mention was made of the aircraft being used
Baghdad was formalized in April 1972 in the signing of a
in the war.
fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation during
Premier Kosygin's first visit to Iraq. 131 Apparently result-
While the bomber could represent a threat to Israel or
ing from Iraqi initiative, the treaty constituted a major
Iran, Iraq's prime adversaries, the general assessment of
step in Soviet efforts to consolidate and formalize a
Western military specialists was that introduction of the
political position in the Arab world independent of the
aircraft did not alter the military balance. 135 Soviet
Soviet presence in Egypt.
motives in supplying the aircraft were unclear, but US
officials viewed the move as an attempt by Moscow to reas-
Similar to the 1971 treaty with Egypt, the accord called
sure its Arab clients that they could continue to rely on
for cooperation in the military, political, and economic
the Soviet Union for advanced military equipment. 136
spheres and regular consultations on international issues
affecting the interests of both parties. Also, like the
Egyptian treaty, it did not provide for mutual assistance
in the event of hostilities, but stipulated only that the
133
Ibid.
two sides would continue to assist each other in strengthen-
ing their defense capabilities and to "coordinate their
134 Military Aviation News, October 1973, p. 15.
positions" should a threat to peace arise. 132
135 New York Times, October 3, 1973.
136Ibid.
129 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.
130A. Y. Yodfat, "Russia's Other Middle East Partner,"
New Middle East, November 1971, p. 28.
131 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union in the Middle
East," Current History, October 1972, p. 169.
132 Strategic Survey 1972 (London: IISS, April 1973), p. 28.
-32-
-33-
Little definitive information is available on the ex-
This reported involvement of Soviet pilots, as well as
tent of Iraqi involvement in the October war, but Baghdad's
ground force advisers, 140 in combat missions was the first
equipment losses were believed to be small. Following the
such reported role for Soviet personnel since the clash of
conflict, the Soviets continued to supply new types of late
Soviet-manned Egyptian MIG's with Israeli aircraft in 1970. 141
model equipment to Iraq. Scud surface-to-surface missiles--
Reports had appeared in Western newspapers of Soviet parti-
with conventional warheads--were reported in Iraq for the
cipation in bombing missions against anti-government dis-
first time in late 1974. Additional Soviet military ad-
sidents in the Sudan in 1971, but these were not confirmed. 142
visory personnel also were reported in the country, giving
rise to speculation that the missiles would remain under
US specialists believe that the use of advanced Soviet
Soviet control initially. Scud missiles--minus nuclear
aircraft against the Kurds probably had more political than
warheads had previously been provided to Egypt and Syria. 137
military significance. The utilization of high performance
aircraft and Soviet pilots would not have an appreciable
In October 1974, it was reported that the MIG-23, one
military impact in an elusive guerrìlla war, such as the
of the most modern fighters in the Soviet inventory, also
Kurdish campaign in the rugged mountains of northeastern
had been introduced into Iraq for the first time. About 12
Iraq, where few profitable targets existed for aerial at-
were reported to have arrived in Iraq, although no fully
tack. 143 The active Soviet role at any rate presumably did
qualified Iraqi pilots were yet available to fly them. 138
serve the useful purposes of providing operational experience
for Soviet military personnel and signifying Soviet support
144
Western observers speculated that the arrival of the
at a crucial time for Baghdad.
MIG-23's was in response to the continuing military buildup
by neighboring Iran, especially the orders for 80 advanced
By early 1975, however, problems again arose in Soviet-
US F-14 fighters placed by Teheran in the first half of
Iraqi relations. Friction began with the Soviet purchase of
1974. Another possible use mentioned for the aircraft was
a sizable amount of Iraqi oil which Moscow resold at a pro-
employment against the Kurdish dissidents -- the subject of
fit to third countries. Baghdad was further perturbed by
renewed hostilities by the Iraqi government following the
Moscow's non-reaction over Iran's occupation of two small,
Kurds' rejection in March 1974 of Baghdad's limited autonomy
but strategic islets in the Persian Gulf, Iraq's outlet to
plan. Reports had been circulating that the TU-22's deli-
the sea. Overshadowing these two developments, however,
vered earlier already had been involved in bombing strikes
was the perennial sore spot caused by the Kurdish war.
against the Kurds. The latter aircraft reportedly were
flown by Soviet crews in high-altitude bombing strikes to
minimize chances of being shot down, a consequence which
could have proven diplomatically embarrassing for Moscow. 139
140 Washington Post, February 2, 1975.
141
Ibid., October 5, 1974.
137 Washington Post, February 2, 1975.
142 Ibid., January 1, 1971; Manchester Guardian, March
5, 1971.
138
Ibid.
143 Washington Post, October 5, 1974.
139 International Defense Review, No. 5, September -
144
October 1974, p. 574.
Ibid.
-34-
-35-
The festering problem of Kurdish separatism had prac-
we should diversify in this field we shall do so
We
tically transfixed Iraqi foreign policy for some time.
have a free will.
149
While Baghdad remained committed to preventing any signifi-
cant Kurdish autonomy, Moscow had long viewed the Kurdish
Iraq indeed appears to have emerged from its former
minority in Iraq as a potential base from which similar
paranoiac isolation toward a more open role in the Arab
separatist tendencies could perhaps be fostered in the
world. In March 1975, Baghdad -- while still wary of
larger Kurdish population of neighboring Iran. Exacerbating
Iranian ambitions for hegemony in the Gulf area concluded
the situation, from Moscow's viewpoint, was the Iraqi
a border accord with Tehran. This accommodation paved the
army's reported tendency in the renewed hostilities to
way for a successful culmination of the Iraqi offensive
concentrate on local Kurdish leaders with Communist procliv-
which finally ended the Kurdish war a few weeks later. 150
ities.
145
Baghdad's cooperative international mood continued with the
conclusion in July 1975 of a border agreement with Saudi
As the harsh winter weather stalled Iraq's anti-Kurdish
Arabia, ending years of enmity with that country, as well
offensive at the beginning of 1975, Baghdad made repeated
as an economic aid program with Jordan, another traditional
urgent entreaties to the Soviet Union for additional artil-
rival. Finally, development contracts concluded with
lery, infantry weapons, and ammunition. These entreaties
Japanese and Western European firms151 instead of the
elicited little response from Moscow, severely straining
Soviet Union -- to enlarge the Iraqi port of Um Qasr may
ties with the Iraqi government. 146 The uncooperative Soviet
the Soviet Union.
signify a further 152 degree of estrangement between Iraq and
attitude apparently contributed to Iraqi efforts to acquire
military equipment in the West.
This does not mean that Moscow is prepared to allow
Baghdad had made some large-scale purchases from France
its painstakingly developed relationship with Iraq to
already the previous year. Included in the 1974 deals were
crumble away. While Baghdad has long been important in
31 Alouette III helicopters, armed with SS-11 antitank mis-
Soviet policy calculations in the Middle East, it is
siles, 147 1,000 automatic 60 mm mortars, 60,000 rounds of
currently all the more so because of the tenuous Soviet
artillery ammunition, and laser range finders for armored
position in Egypt. The Soviet Union remains vitally
cars, for a total reported value of about $70 million,
interested in preventing another Iraqi defection from the
amounting to a significant arms purchase arrangement. 148
ranks of the "progressive" Arab states as occurred in
1955. Moscow also maintains an avid interest in Iraqi oil,
Iraq's discernible edging away from its traditional
xenophobic isolation was thus given added impetus by Moscow's
foot dragging in providing additional arms supplies in
149
early 1975. Questioned about Iraq's reported arms shopping
Washington Post, April 25, 1975.
in the West, after a decade and a half of nearly exclusive
150
reliance on Moscow, Iraqi President Saddam Tikriti in
New York Times, March 23, 1975.
April 1975 stated: "If national conditions dictate that
151
Washington Post, July 20, 1975.
152
Instead of a "formidable Soviet naval base" located
145 Ibid., February 9, 1975.
at Um Qasr, as reported in the Western press over the past
few years, two US newsmen who visited the site in February
146
Ibid.
1975 reported only "half a dozen jetties built out into
the estuary from naked sand," plus "a cluster of sheds,
147 SIPRI Yearbook 1975 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975),
housing, and headquarters buildings of the Iraq navy"
p. 203.
(see Washington Post, February 12, 1975).
148 Military Aviation News, September 1974, p. 16.
-36-
CHAPTER V
perhaps the most accessible foreign source available, as
LIBYA
well as in potential access to Iraqi port facilities in the
Persian Gulf. Given such motivations, one can expect a
sustained commitment on the part of Moscow in arms aid and
In September 1969, a group of radical officers over-
other support for Iraq. 153
threw the constitutional monarchy in Libya. The ruling
Revolutionary Command Council quickly established close
ties with Cairo. Its leader, Colonel Qadhafi, became the
most ardent proponent of revolutionary Pan-Arab policy
and called for the early liberation of Arab lands occupied
by Israel. 154
153 McLane, op. cit., p. 58.
The overthrow of the royalist government opened a new
phase in Soviet relations with Libya. Moscow moved quickly
to recognize the Qadhafi regime. The latter, while remain-
ing hostile to Arab Communism, was not averse to establishing
ties with the Soviet Union. In the process of consolidating
its hold on the country, the new government ingratiated
itself with Moscow by causing the US and the UK to evacuate
their Libyan bases in early 1970. 155
Soviet military equipment sought by Qadhafi was not
long in coming. The first deliveries of 30 medium tanks and
100 armored personnel carriers and other vehicles arrived in
July 1970. 156 The equipment was subsequently exhibited in
the September 1 parade commemorating the first anniversary of
the revolution 157
While willing to procure Soviet ground forces equipment,
Qadhafi did not wish to deal exclusively with Moscow for
arms. 158 In fact, he earlier had negotiated a surprisingly
large contract with France for 110 sophisticated Mirage
154 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.
155
McLane, op. cit., p. 77.
156washington Post, July 23, 1970.
157 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.
158 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 153.
-39-
-38-
fighter aircraft. With only a handful of barely-trained
To replace the Egyptian advisers, Libya requested the
pilots in its tiny air force, Libya evidently had cooperated
augmentation of a small Pakistani advisory contingent which
had been training Libyans on transport aircraft and heli-
closely with Egypt in arranging the deal, inasmuch as Cairo
copters for some two years. The total number of Pakistani
had been trying unsuccessully to procure Mirages at least
since early 1968. 159
advisers grew to about 600, including between 20 and 40
pilots. Besides the Pakistanis, a small number of French,
For the next several years, the Soviets kept a low
Italian, and Yugoslav instructors also were reported to be
present in the country. 163
profile in Libya. When the October 1973 war erupted, Libya
made a substantial contribution to the Arab cause in the
While the saturation point of the small Libyan armed
form of financial assistance and equipment transfers. Libya
force had been reached by early 1974, according to quali-
was reported to have provided some $500 million in support
fied observers, Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud was reported
for the war effort, including the financing of 70 replace-
to be seeking additional military equipment from Western
ment MIG-21's and other equipment for Egypt and Syria.
European countries. Unsuccessful in this attempt, among
Despite vehement denials at the time, Libya subsequently
other reasons because of Libya's support of dissident move-
acknowledged the participation of some of its Mirages in the
ments in Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and
war. These aircraft evidently were flown by other Arab
elsewhere, 164 Libya had little choice but to again approach
pilots, inasmuch as only 25 Libyan pilots were then qualified
to fly the 100 Mirages in the inventory. 160
Moscow, despite Qadhafi's continued antipathy toward the
Soviets. During Prime Minister Jalloud's first visit to
Moscow in May 1974, an overall trade agreement was concluded
Meanwhile, a rift that began during the October con-
which included the Soviet supply of SAM missiles and other
flict between Qadhafi and Sadat over the latter's handling
arms in exchange for Libyan oil. 165 It will be noted that
of the war grew increasingly bitter. Qadhafi subsequently
this accord was concluded shortly after Moscow's suspension
condemned Sadat's willingness to engage in negotiations
of arms shipments to Egypt, following steadily deteriorating
toward a peace settlement, repeatedly advocating a renewed
relations with Cairo. The strain in relations with Egypt
war to destroy Israel. The feud finally degenerated into a
probably made it easier for the Soviet leadership to paper
series of personal accusations and counter-accusations
between the two Arab leaders. 161 Cairo ended its close mili-
over existing differences with Qadhafi and come to a modus
vivendi with him.
tary cooperation by abruptly withdrawing all Egyptian pilots
from Libya, as well as the SAM equipment and two naval craft
Another large Soviet arms agreement was reported to
that Egypt had loaned to that country. The Egyptians also
have been concluded in December 1974. In addition to TU-22
ceased work on the air defense system it had been building
around Libyan bases at Tobruk, Benghazi, and Tripoli. 162
supersonic bombers (thus far provided only to Iraq), MI-8
helicopters, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM missiles, tanks, and anti-
tank missiles, the deal evidently included advanced MIG-23
Floggers, the first 13 of which were delivered in early May
159 New York Times, January 24, 1970 and July 23, 1970.
1975, shortly before the visit to Libya of Soviet President
Alexei Kosygin. 166
160 Military Aviation News, May 1974, p. 20.
161 Sketch, September 13, 1974, p. 13.
163
Ibid.
162 Washington Post, February 18, 1974.
164
Ibid.
165
Washington Post, May 21, 1974 and October 20, 1974.
166 Military Aviation News, March 1975, p. 17, and May
1975, p. 17.
-40-
-41-
By that time, the number of Soviet military advisers
tween Libya and Egypt, which had reached the stage of a bitter
and technicians in Libya had more than doubled to about 480
personal feud between Qadhafi and Sadat. Observers express-
over the 200 present a year before. The Soviets were
ed doubt in particular over the alleged agreement to establish
reportedly providing training on SAM's, antitank missiles,
Soviet bases, citing Qadhafi's public opposition to any such
and T-62 tanks for Libyan personnel and serving as advisers
facilities in the Mediterranean area. 171
in Libyan artillery and armored units. Soviet personnel
reportedly also were operating SAM equipment around key
Moscow denied Egyptian press reports of an agreement
installations in the country. Increasing friction between
for bases in Libya in the form of an article in Pravda,
Soviet and Libyan personnel was reported to have led to
which harshly rebuked A1 Ahram, "a newspaper for an Arab state
pressure on Qadhafi by Libyan officers to expe1 the Soviets,
friendly to the Soviet Union," for publishing such accounts.
but Qadhafi apparently was unwilling to reduce the Soviet
The Soviet newspaper did not deny reports of a new arms deal
presence while delivery contracts remained in effect. 167
with Libya, but ridiculed the figure of $12 billion as "quite
a statement. 1,172
Qadhafi was driven into an even tighter relationship
with Moscow by the British government's refusal in April 1975
A "Libyan spokeman" in Cairo in early June reportedly
to sell six submarines and 38 Jaguar advanced strike air-
placed the value of the arms accord at $800 million, a vast
craft. London was willing to sell other items on Libya's
deal in itself for a country of two million people, but
$1.4 billion shopping list transport aircraft, frigates,
provided no further details. 173 Shortly thereafter, Qadhafi
tank transporters, ammunition, and support equipment -- but
publicly scoffed at reports of a multibillion deal with
was unwilling to risk upsetting the military balance in the
Moscow or of Libyan acquiescence in the use of Libyan base
area by including the sensitive submarines and fighter
facilities by the Soviets. "We deal with the Soviet Union
aircraft. 168 The all-or-nothing demands of the Qadhafi
on a commercial and not an ideological basis," he stated. 174
regime resulted in the collapse of negotiations.
Definitive information on the May 1975 arms accord is
Following the Kosygin visit to Libya in May, the
still sparse. Western officials believe the arrangement
semiofficial Egyptian newspaper, A1 Ahram, reported the
includes an increase to 1,000 tanks from the 600 reportedly
conclusion of a huge new Soviet arms deal valued at $4
ordered in 1974. 175 In addition, six F-class diesel sub-
billion with Libya, in return for the use of military
bases. 169 Egyptian President Sadat, in an interview with
marines are included, as well as assistance in the rebuilding
of World War II submarine servicing and repair facilities at
the Los Angeles Times, put an even higher figure of $12
the Libyan ports of Tobruk and Benghazi. About 100 Libyan
billion on the value of the accord. 170 Foreign observers
naval personnel are reported to have gone to the Soviet
speculated, however, that the Egyptian reports may have
Union for submarine training, while the number of Soviet
been a spin-off of the increasingly vehement polemics be-
167 New York Times, February 21, 1975.
171 Ibid., May 23, 1975.
168 Washington Post, April 12, 1975.
172 Cited in the New York Times, May 28, 1975.
173
169 Cited in the New York Times, May 23, 1975.
Washington Post, June 13, 1975.
174
170
Ibid., July 16, 1975.
Ibid., May 29, 1975.
175
New York Times, May 29, 1975.
-43-
-42-
absorb, let alone maintain and operate, the types of modern,
military advisers in the country is expected to reach about
sophisticated equipment now being delivered or on order. 180
600. 176 Although an effective Libyan submarine capability
President Sadat himself has voiced concern that Libya might
would be at least several years in the offing, the possibil-
use the newly delivered equipment some of which Moscow
ity of such a capability in itself 177 is disconcerting to
has so far denied him against Egypt. Sadat went on to
Western defense specialists.
suggest that training the Libyan army to operate the equip-
ment reportedly earmarked for it would necessitate a Soviet
In another portentous development, Libya and the Soviet
presence of 20 to 50 years. 181
Union -- shortly after the visit of Kosygin jointly
announced that Moscow would provide Lìbya with the latter's
While the full implications of the current Soviet-
first nuclear reactor. The 10 megawatt facility would be
Libyan relationship are still being debated, it appears
used for "peaceful measures only,' as announced by the Libyan
that the Soviets are trying to solidify their new foothold
news agency. US nuclear experts confirmed that a reactor
in Libya, thus putting new pressure on Sadat to repair his
of that size could only be used for research purposes, being
unravelling ties with Moscow. 182 Although the Soviets
too small for the production of sufficient quantities of
probably did not acquire military base rights in Libya,
plutonium for a weapon. 178
they reportedly did gain access to limited naval use of
ports in the country. 183 With the abrupt cancellation of
The agreement, nevertheless, served to further exacer-
Brezhnev's planned January 1975 visit to Cairo still vividly
bate Libyan-Egyptian relations. Referring to the new Soviet
in the Egyptian mind, Kosygin's May visit to Tripoli and
commitments to Libya, Sadat was quoted as saying that the
the resulting new arms agreement probably were intended by
supply of "such an arsenal like this raises many questions."
Moscow to unsettle Sadat, as well as to recoup some of the
Following on the heels of the arms accord, Sadat added that
prestige lost at Egypt's hand in the Middle East since early
the nuclear agreement "doesn't surprise me at all. 1179
1974.
Indeed, the overall motivations behind the May accords
remain somewhat puzzling. The arms deal may have been an
enlargement of the already sizable December 1974 agreement.
180 Ibid., June 13, 1975.
Egyptian officials have disparaged the Libyan capability to
181 New York Times, May 29, 1975.
182
Washington Post, June 3, 1975.
176 Baltimore Sun, June 30, 1975; Washington Post, July 20,
183
1975.
Military Aviation News, June 1975, p. 18.
177 Not the least of any resulting problems would be the
difficulty of determining the origin of a submarine attack,
should any ensue in a crisis situation in the Mediterranean
area (see Washington Post, July 20, 1975).
178
Washington Post, June 3, 1975.
179
Ibid.
CHAPTER VI
-45-
FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
What does the future portend for Soviet arms aid in the
Middle East, particularly for the currently strained aid
Despite some setbacks and frustrations, arms aid on
relationship with Egypt? Despite the recent vicissitudes
balance is probably still regarded by the Soviet leaders as
in Soviet-Egyptian relations and Cairo's probings for US
their most effective instrument of policy toward the Arab
and Western European arms, it still appears that some type
Middle East. Although the net cost of the program has in-
of working arrangement will be maintained between Cairo and
creased substantially over the past several years, from a
Moscow. Both sides have too much at stake to accept a
low cost dispensing of obsolescent weapons to provision of
complete split.
some of the most advanced items in the Soviet inventory,
there is little doubt that arms exports have proven a worth-
While the Soviet Union has attempted to further cement
while political investment from Moscow's point of view.
relations with Iraq and Syria and to secure its foothold in
Libya, it still regards Egypt as crucial to its Middle East
Because of its significant contribution to the strength-
policy. To permit the current strain in relations to lead
ening and survival of Moscow's Arab clients, the arms aid
to a complete rupture between Moscow and Cairo would have
program had had extraordinary impact vis-a-vis the Soviet
incalculable consequences on the Soviet position in the
presence in the area. Fostering an image of the Soviet Union
Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World. At the same
as a powerful friend and ally of the Arab countries, the
time, Egypt, for its part, must realize that it has no
program has served as the prime instrument for acquiring
practical short-term alternative than to rely on Moscow, at
influence in the Arab world, providing Moscow with political
least for spare parts for equipment on hand, to maintain a
entree into areas where its role had hitherto been limited
viable military capability. It would simply require too
or nonexistent.
much time -- at least five years as a conservative estimate
to reequip and retrain the Egyptian forces with modern
This is not to say that the program has been a diplo-
armaments from another supplier. Consequently, it appears
matic panacea for Moscow. It is not apparent, for example,
that arms aid -- with suitable fine tuning -- will continue
that such aid has enabled the Soviets to exercise leverage
as a prime instrument of Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis
for political concessions in the Arab countries. Nor has
the Arab states.
the aid facilitated the activities of local Communist parties
in the area. Moreover, the Soviets have found that their
military aid largesse has created a variety of risks and
problems. The ready provision of assistance has nurtured a
dependence on the part of Moscow's Arab clients, implying a
continual obligation on the part of the Soviet Union. Thus
becoming identified to some extent with the policies and
actions of client states over which it has had little, if
any, real control, Moscow has found this situation both
embarrassing and dangerous.
Reflecting something of Moscow's priorities in the area,
Soviet arms supplies to Egypt--despite the virtual suspen-
sion of shipments in 1974 -- nearly equal those to the other
Arab Middle East countries combined. Iraq and Syria still
depend almost exclusively on Soviet equipment, while recent
Soviet deliveries to Libya have made that country a major
recipient.
November 5, 1974
MEMORANDUM TO:
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY
FROM: JOHN 0. MARSH, JR.
I would appreciate your comments on the
attached, please.
Thank you.
Attachment: Mideast Economic Cooperation
FORD is LIBRARY 9E8ALD
MIDEAST Economic Cooperation
An aggressive program for the involvement of the U.S.
Government and business interests in the economic development
of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of important
U.S. economic, political and security interests. For this effort
to realize its full potential, however, it should be regional rather
than bilateral in scope; should effectively dovetai the efforts of
U.S. business and finance with those of the Washington bureaucracy;
and should be centered in a single executive agency, in order to
provide bureaucratic cohesion and organizational impetus to the
program, and to ensure that it is rapidly responsive to national
policy. The Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration
provides a good model for such organization. (The principal difference
is that in this case investment capital would be regionally generated,
with the U.S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial
goods.) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally highlight
the importance which the Administration assigns to the initiative, and
emphasize its historic significance.
FORD is LIBRARY
EXCERET FROM SECNAV LETTER OF 30 APRIL 1974 TO
DIRECTOR OMB (Subject: NEW ADMINISTRATIVE INITIATIVES)
R.J.
MIDEAST Economic Cooperation
An aggressive program for the involvement of the
U.S. Government and business interests in the economic develop-
ment of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of
important U.S. economic, political and security interests. For
this effort to realize its full potential, however, it should
be regional rather than bilateral in scope; should effectively
dovetail the efforts of U.S. business and finance with those of
the Washington bureaucracy; and should be centered in a single
executive agency, in order to provide bureaucratic cohesion and
organizational impetus to the program, and to ensure that it is
rapidly responsive to national policy. The Marshall Plan's
Economic Cooperation Administration provides a good model for
such organization. (The principal difference is that in this
case investment capital would be regionally generated, with the
U.S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial
goods.) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally
highlight the importance which the Administration assigns to
the initiative, and emphasize its historic significance.
FORD
LEBRARY
MEMORANDUM
5298
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 6, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR
JOHN MARSH
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT:
Requests for Comments on
Middle East Economic Development
In response to your request for NSC staff comments on the attached,
it is difficult for us to evaluate the "MIDEAST Economic Cooperation"
proposal without knowing the overall context into which this statement
might go. However, we have the following preliminary comments:
- In our foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East,
we are keenly aware of the potential for an expanded
US role in Middle East development.
- - - For this purpose, the US has entered into a series
of Joint Commissions with a range of Middle Eastern
nations in order to expand and develop opportunities in
the economic field. State, Treasury and other economic
bodies within the Government are carefully developing
the framework of the Joint Commission network throughout
the Middle East, in a way which complements the peace-
making process.
- In view of this, any initiative along the lines of the attached
should be submitted to the Under Secretaries Committee in
charge of the Joint Commissions so that it can be put in the
perspective of our foreign and economic interests in the
highly complex Middle East negotiating situation.
-As a particular comment, it is worth noting that mention of
the "Marshall Plan" evokes memories of a time when the US
was able to provide massive aid. The thrust of our policy today
is to build a framework for cooperation which links US technology
with foreign funds.
If the attached is a suggestion from a private citizen, we would
be willing to clear on an appropriate letter of reply addressing
the concerns expressed in this statement.
LIBRARY
MIDEAST Economic Cooperation
An aggressive program for the involvement of the U.S.
Government and business interests in the economic development
of the Mideast has great potential to advance a variety of important
U.S. economic, political and security interests. For this effort
to realize its full potential, however, it should be regional rather
than bilateral in scope; should effectively dovetail the efforts of
U.S. business and finance with those of the Washington bureaucracy;
and should be centered in a single executive agency, in order to
provide bureaucratic cohesion and organizational impetus to the
program, and to ensure that it is rapidly responsive to national
policy. The Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration
provides a good model for such organization. (The principal difference
is that in this case investment capital would be regionally generated,
with the U.S. providing planning, managerial expertise, and industrial
goods. ) The analogy to the Marshall Plan would additionally highlight
the importance which the Administration assigns to the initiative, and
emphasize its historic significance.
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500
SECRET
NOV 15 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR
JOHN 0. MARSH, JR.
SUBJECT:
Mid-East Economic Cooperation
In your November 5 memorandum you requested our comments on an
attached draft paper, entitled "Mideast Economic Cooperation."
This draft argued that: (1) greater U.S. government and business
involvement in the economic development of the Mid-East is highly
desirable; (2) the thrust of the U.S. effort in this direction
should be regional rather than bilateral in scope; (3) it should be
centered within a single executive agency; and lastly (4), the ECA
of the Marshall Plan would provide a good organizational and con-
ceptual model.
Our reaction is as follows:
There is, of course, a major effort already under way in
this area. One way in which the USG has attempted to restructure
its economic relation with the Mid-Eastern countries is through a
series of joint bilateral cooperation commissions operating at the
Cabinet level. Any further moves on our part to establish major,
new institutional arrangements before significant substantive
progress is achieved could be counterproductive. They would at best
further inflate expectations and at worst lend credence to the charge
that we are trying to divert attention from substance to form.
Although the present setup may be adequate in the short run,
what is required is clarification and institutionalization of current
arrangements for backstopping our Mid-East initiatives. To some degree
this should emerge from the NSDM #278 exercise on Joint Commissions.
In the long run there might be a number of advantages in centralizing
our Mid-East initiatives within a single executive agency. However,
the short run is crucial, and in the short run this would only add
to the confusion.
A regional approach to Mid-Eastern economic development
might well generate greater resource demands on the USG than the
current series of bilateral initiatives to Mid-Eastern countries.
SECRET
121
DTDD,1/14/86
Page 2
SECRET(GDS)
The ECA approach in Europe was predicated on a number of
factors not operative in the Mid-East.
-- Europe was an area of paramount concern, now we profess
worldwide economic responsibilities. Other regional
areas have also been presidentially designated as high
priority, e.g., Latin America (NSDM #257).
-- Europe could create a reasonably harmonious regional
organization (the OEC) for us to work with and through.
-- The task was reconstruction, a far easier one than
initial economic development.
Overall, it is not clear yet that the Mid-East nations have a common
goal, other than pricing of oil. In fact, there are indications each
nation has different goals.
Some other comments:
-- Development of new industries in the Mid-East without
markets may bring import restrictions from other nations.
-- It is important in the short run to see that our policies
in each separate bilateral commission are consistent.
WILLIAM D. EBERLE
Executive Director
Attachment
SECRET(GDS)
m
963
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OP IMMED /ROUTINE
DE RUGMAD #6735 3251125
0 R 2110532 NOV 74
FM USIS/TEL AVIV
TO USINFO WASHOC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE
NSC WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USIS/LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
DIA WASHOO
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 6736
USIAC
USINFO FOR IOP/M, IPS, 385, INE
BEIRUT FOR VOA AND RAPA
ROME FOR VOA
GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL
USINFO FOR PRESIDENT'S PARTY IMMEDIATE
E 0 11852: N/A
SUBJ: MEDIA REACTION (229/74) 21 NOV 74
1. SUMMARY: UNDERSECRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS
L
ON PLO AND PROSPECTS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN
MIDDLE EAST ARE MAJOR MEDIA TOPICS, MAARIV
EDIOTORIAL DESCRIBES " TONGUE SLIPS" AND THEIR
RETRACTIONS AS " MOST ORIGINAL POLITICAL TACTIC"
WHICH SENIOR US OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN USING IN
HANDLING PALESTINIAN SUBJECT. AL HAMISHMAR
REPORTS FONMIN ALLON SAID THAT SISCO'S CLARIFICATION
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
*WHSR COMMENT
ADANCE TEAM, JANKA
PSN:013750 PAGE 01
TOR:325/13:12Z DTG:211053Z NOV 74
*******U N CLASSIFIE 0*******3 COPY
0000000SS5555500000 LASSIFIE 0*******S
COPY
SAVED HIM PROTEST TO STATE DEPARTMENT. DAVAR(ESHED)
SAYS SADAT-FEISAL INTRANSIGENCE-- AND NOT ISRAELI SHORTSIGHTEDNESS--
OBSTRUCTED ISRAELI-JORDANIAN PEACE AGREEMENT. HAARETZ US
CORRESPONDENT REPORTS: (A) ISRAEL WILL PROTEST SYRIAN
BREACH OF PROMISE MADE TO DR. KISSINGER TO PREVENT
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM ITS TERRITORY; AND (B) us IS
CONCERNED THAT EGYPT MIGHT REFUSE TO OPEN CANAL BEFORE ADDITIONAL
IDF WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI. HAARETZ AND MAARIV TALK
ABOUT DIFFICULTIES IN US-ISRAEL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS
AND MENTION POSSIBILITY THAT FINANCE MINISTER
RABINOWITZ'S XCHEDULED TRIP TO US MIGHT BE DELAYED.
S-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE
ALL MEDIA; EMPHASIS ON AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE
ON OIL AFFAIRS. PRESS AND RADIO HIGHLIGH FONMIN
ALLONIS APPEAL THAT US=USSR DETENT EXTEND TO
MIDDLE EAST AS WELL. END SUMMARY.
2. UNDERSECRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS ON PLO
(A) ALL MEDIA COMPARE SISCO'S CLARIFICATIONS ON PLO TO
HIS ORIGINAL STATEMENT (USIA INTERVIEW). JERUSALEM POST AND
DAVAR CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON CARRY SISCO'S REPLY TO
THEIR QUESTIONS THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARD
PLO. ONE RADIO REPORTER REMARKED THAT BY MAKING ORIGINAL
STATEMENT ON PLO, SISCO PLEASED THE PALESTINIANS KNOWING
THAT HE CAN LATER MAKE CLARIFICATIONS THAT WILL SATISFY ISRAEL.
(B) MAARIV EDITORIALIZES: " ON THE DELICATE AND COMPLEX
SUBJECT OF PALESTINIANS, THE US HAS ADOPTED A MOST ORIGINAL
POLITICAL TACTIC. SENIOR US OFFICIALS ARE FLOATING TRIAL BALLONS
THROUGH 'TONGUE SLIPS! AND RETRACTIONS, WE ARE VERY
CONCERNED THAT ALL THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TONGUE
SLIPS' ARE NOT INCIDENTAL. BUT RATHER INTENDED.. SISCO'S
CLARIFICATION IS NOT ENOUGH. ISRAELI POLITICIANS SHOULD
ACT TO PREVENT AN EROSION IN US POSITION ON PALESTINANS...
(LEST) THE FREQUENT !TONGUE SLIPS! ARE AIMED AT PAVING
THE WAY FOR SUCH A CHANGE..
(C) AL HAMISHMAR WRITES:". IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, FONMIN
ALLON SAID THAT UNDER SICRETARY SISCO'S CLARIFICATION HEADED
OFF A STRONG PROTEST TO STATE DEPARTMENT REGARDING SISCO'S
(EARLIER) REMARKS ON THE PLO. PAPER QUOTES ALLON: # I
PERFER TO ACCEPT THE AMENDMENT AND (THEN) HOLD THE US TO THIS
INTERPRETATION.
FORD
3. TERRORIST TARACKS
(A) HAARETZ US CORRESPONDENT (MARGALIT) REPORTS: FOLLOWING
THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY POFLP SPOKESMAN IN DAMASCUS...
GERALD
LIBRARY
REGARDING THE ATTACK ON BEIT SHEAN, ISRAEL WILL PROTEST THE
SYRIAN BREACH OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. (THIS BREACH)
IS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE PROMISE WHICH SYRIA MADE TO DR,
KISSINGER TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM ITS TERRITORY...
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THIS WAS A SECRET PROMISE AND DR. KISSINGER NEVER ADMITTED
THAT HE HAS RECEIVED SUCH A PROMISE..."
(B) JERUSALEM POST REPORTS:JORDANIAN TROOPS WERE
YESTERDAY STILL LAYING SEIGE TO THE VILLAGE OF ZAMILYE, NEAR THE
ISRAELI BORDER FACING THE BEISAN (VALLEY), IN SEARCH FOR
COLLABORATORS OF THE TERRORISTS WHO COMMITTED THE OUTRAGE
IN BEIT SHEAN ON TUESDAY."
4. ISREALI- EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS
HAARETZ (MARGALIT) WRITES: THERE IS INCREASED
CONCERN IN THE US THAT EGYPT MIGHT INSIST ON AN ADDITIONAL
ID FWITHDRAWAL IN SINAI BEFORE OPENING THE CANAL.. KISSINGER
PROMISED DINITZ LAST WEEK TO CLARIFY EGYPT'S POSITION.
THE FOLLOWING PICTURE EMERGES: KISSINGER OBTAINED
TWO PROMISES FROM EGYPT ( ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED HIS METHOD OF
OBTAINING PROMISES):(A) WHEN CANAL REOPENS, ISRAELI
CARGOES WILL BE PERMITTED; AND (B) EGYPT WILL START CLEARING
CANAL AND REHABILITATE ITS VILLAGES AFTER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.
EGYTP, HOWEVER, HAS NOT SPECIFIED A DATE FOR RE-OPENING CANAL...
SOME ISRAELI SOURCES CLAIM THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEM
INVOLVED OVER THIS ISSUE, (SINCE) CANAL WILL NOT BE READY FOR
NAVIGATION BEFORE MARCH/ APRIL, 1975. ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A SECOND PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL CAN START (BEFORE THEN) coeAS
PRACTICAL IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED
BEFORE THAT DATE ANY WAY... WRITER RECALLS REMARK MADE BY
AN ISRAELI ELEMENT ON POSSIBILITY THAT CANAL RE-OPENING AND IDF
WITHDRAWAL WILL BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY,
5. ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS
DAVAR (ESHED) DISAGREES " WITH THOSE WHO, SINCE ARAFAT MADE
HIS DEBUT AT UNGA, HAVE BEEN FEELING SORRY OVER LOST OPPORTUNITIES
TO CONCLUDE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN. ESHED NOTES:",
THERE ARE THOSE WHO MOURN BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS NOT CONCLUDED AN
AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN, AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO MOURN BECAUSE
OF ISRAEL'S LACK OF COOPERATION IN HELPING EMERGENCE OF LOCAL
PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP THEY BOTH FORGET THE BASIC ASSUMPTION..
THAT NO ARAB ELEMENT IS CAPABLE OF DETACHING ITSELF FROMTHEREST
OF THE ARAB WORLD, NO MATTER HOW WEAK ITS CONNECTIONS ARE WITH ARAB
COUNTRIES, AND CONCLUDE A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT WITH ISRAEL..
HUSSEIN'S HOPES TO RECOVER THE WEST BANK WERE DIMMED BY
EGYPT FEISAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW HUSSEIN'S MANDATE ON PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION. FEISAL'S POSITON ON JERUSALEM OBSTRUCTED
CHANCES FOR SEPARATE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS
MORE IMPORTANT FOR FEISAL TO RECOVER JERUSALEM. THAN TO
OBSTRUCT SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE AREA UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE FOR ISRAEL. ASIDE
BERRLD FORD LIBRARY
FROM CAUTIOUS MOVEMENT IN ITS (SIMULTANEOUS) CONFRONTATION
WITH THE ARAB WORLD STAEP-BY-STEP UNTIL THE PROBLEMS ARE
RESOLVED, THERE WILL BE NO DECISION ON THE PALESTINIAN-
PSN:013750
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N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
INCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
JORDANIAN ISSUE.. BEFORE ADDITIONAL PROGRESS ON THE ISRAELI-
EGYPTIAN FRONT IS MADE..."
6. PRESIDNET FORD'S TALKS IN JAPAN: US-USSR SUMMIT
ALL MEDIA HIGHLIGHTED FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS REPORTS
ON PRESIDENT'S TALKS IN JAPAN AND TEXT OF US-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE,
IN AN APPEAL AIMED AT FORTHCOMING SOVIET AMERICAN TALKS AT
VLADIVOSTOK, FONMIN ALLON REPORTEDLY URGED FORD AND BREZHNEV
TO EXTEND THEIR 'DETENTE' TO MIDDLE EAST AS WELL. ALLON SAID
THAT ISRAEL SUPPORTS REAL AND HONEST DETENTE THAT WOULD COVER ALL
PARTS OF THE WORLD NOT ONLY US, USSR AND EUROPE.
7. US-ISRAELI ECONOMIC TALKS
MAARIV REPORTS: " FINANCE MINISTER RABINOWITZ'S CHEDULED
TRIP TO US MIGHT BE POSTPONED UNLESS AMERICANS COME UP WITH
NEW PROPOSALS THAT WOULD RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ERUPTED
INT EH TALKS.. TREASURY SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT DIFFICULTIES EXIST
OVER A NUMBER OF CLAUSES. INCLUDING US ASSISTANCE IN SENDING
GRAINS AND FINANCING ISRAELI PURCHASES IN US.
MOSS
BT
BERALO FORD LIBRABY
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o
961
SECREP
*******S COPY
OP IMMED
Determined to be an administrative marking
DE WTE #3992 2091840
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and
0 2818332 JUL 75
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983
FM JACK MARSH
By
ROAD NARS date 1/14/86
TO DICK CHENEY (WARSAW)
SECRET WH51350
JULY 28, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: JACK MARSH
JUST PRIOR TO LEAVING, THE PRESIDENT TALKED ON THE PHONE WITH
SENATOR CASE IN REFERENCE TO THE ARMS SALES TO JORDAN.
IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD GET BACK TO CASE WITH GUIDANCE ON
MONDAY, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE MET.
I SUGGEST YOU COMMUNICATE WITH BRENT AND GET BACK TO ME AT
EARLIEST INASMUCH AS WE HAVE HAD INQUIREIES FROM THE SENATOR
TODAY ON THIS MATTER.
0100
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
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0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Determined to be an administrative marking
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983
July 28, 1975
By
2000 NARS date 1/14/86
MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JACK MARSI July
Just prior to leaving, the President talked on the phone with
Senator Case in reference to the arms sales to Jordan.
It was agreed that we would get back to Case with guidance on
Monday, before the Committee met.
I suggest you communicate with Brent and get back to me at
earliest inasmuch as we have had inquiries from the Senator
today on this matter.
GERALD LIBRANY FORD
SECRET
992
*******
SECREP-
*******S COPY
OP IMMED
DE WTE #3995 2092117
Determined to be an administrative marking
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and
0 282120Z JUL 75
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983
FM JACK MARSH
By
DAD
NARD date 1/17/86
TO DICK CHENEY (WARSAW)
SECRET WH51353
JULY 28, 1975
FROM: JACK MARSH
TO: DICK CHENEY
YOU CAN DISREGARD MY REQUEST FOR AN ANSWER FOR SENATOR CASE.
I HAVE FOUND OUT WHAT I NEEDED TO KNOW.
0061
FORD is LIBRARY 07V835
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0
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
M
WASHINGTON
August 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
RKW for Jom
THROUGH:
JOHN O. MARSH
FROM:
VERN LOEN VL
SUBJECT:
Congressional Visit with President
Sadat on August 9, 1975
It was my privilege to take detailed notes on an hour-long meeting
between President Sadat and eight Members of Congress at Mr. Sadat's
Mediterranean Coastal retreat on the above date. Participating members
were Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark.; and Reps. William J. Randall, D-Ark.;
Ralph S. Regula, R-Ohio; Marvin Esch, R-Mich.; Roy A. Taylor, D-N.C.;
Edwin Eschleman and William Goodling, both R. -Pa. and Robert Eckhardt,
D. -Texas.
President Sadat responded candidly to questions posed by each Member.
Being aware of the delicate negotiations underway, each Member was
extremely careful to pose his question tactfully and with the understanding
none was there to negotiate-simply to develop facts in their roles as
voting Members of Congress. Mr. Sadat's responses, which were
taped, follow:
"My main concern is peace. Ours is a backward country. I want to
concentrate on our plan for economic development to the year 2000. Go
ahead and inspect our military facilities. Those airplane dugouts cost
150,000 pounds apiece. This is wasteful.
"Israel exhibits belligerency toward Egypt. With peace, all will be
very.bright.
"I discussed our problems with President Ford at Salzburg. I asked the
help of the U.S. and its allies, especially in regard to our need for
liquidity.
"President Ford is a straightforward, honest man. It has been a new
era since November, 1973, when I first met Secretary Kissinger.
GERMLO S. FORD VIBERRY
- 2 -
"Egypt represents between 1/3 and 1/2 of the Arab World. You have more
interests in the hands of the Arabs than the Israelis. They must be
convinced to take the road to peace, stop their military buildup. I'm
not afraid of peace -- Israel is afraid of peace. There can be no war
without Egypt.
SOVIET ROLE: "The Soviets still misunderstand why I sent their
experts out of the country in July, 1972, resulting in a cutoff of Soviet
military aid. In 1974 we decided to diversify our arms sources. I am
not worried about economic aid. The time may come when I ask for
arms from the United States - - will you agree to sell me arms? (No
answer from Congressmen.)
"I shall always fight to be independent, but please don't worsen my
position with the Soviets. Ninety per cent of my arms are Russian.
Therefore, the Soviets still provide air training personnel; then they
leave.
U. S. ROLE: "After the '67 war we had confrontation with you because
of the ugly face of Lyndon Johnson. President Ford & Dr. Kissinger now
show the real face of America as a big brother--not a world policeman.
REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE: "Israel should withdraw from our lands
occupied after the '67 war. For 27 years the Israeli propaganda says
Arabs say no to everything- not for peace.
"I declared publicly that I was ready for peace with Israel in 1971. This
is the turning point right now. I started by opening the Suez Canal and
releasing the refugees.
"After 27 years of belligerency, hatred, violence and blood, we cannot
normalize relationships in a month. They can't start shopping in Cairo
tomorrow. Let's try in our generation. End the present atmosphere
formally. This will lead to other steps.
"Israel is using our land as a wedge for bargaining. I tell them they
must withdraw--they are negotiating every inch.
"As much as Israel is suspicious, we are suspicious, too. We also want
guarantees. Israel is hesitant and confused. They should withdraw from
the Sinai. Let the United States and USSR or Security Council give us
guarantees.
"If Israel gives back my lands, we will negotiate at Geneva under
auspices of the two superpowers. They started three of the four wars.
There must be a reciprocal approach.
"Israel is afraid of peace because of weak leadership, weak government.
- 3 -
It is playing for time, looking to the U.S. elections next year. They
expect the U.S. to take no major foreign policy action in 1976, as is
your custom in an election year. 11
Afterwards, President Sadat posed obligingly for individual photographs,
even with junior staff members. The Egyptians hosted a luncheon on a
veranda overlooking the beach. Transportation for the two-hour journey
from Cairo was provided by means of two Russian-built transports that
are part of the Egyptian Air Force.
On the evening of August 8, the Congressional delegation, accompanied
by staff, held a similar discussion in Cairo with members of the
People's Assembly, led by the deputy Speaker.
Ambassador Eilts was in the United States on his peace mission. Mrs.
Eilts hosted a reception on August 9 at their home (guest list of 240
attached).
SUMMARY: It was the guarded concensus of the Congressmen that
President Sadat is a genuine, straightforward world leader of imposing
stature. They were most reassured by his candid views and expressed
desire for peace, in contrast to the carefully orchestrated Israeli
propaganda approach and the stolidly militant aura of that nation.
However, I doubt that many of them will be very vocal in their
assessments for fear of the Jewish reaction back home.
cc: Max Friedersdorf
Les Janka
Don Ogilvie (OMB)
ECEPTION AT THE RESIDENCE OF AMBASSADOR & MRS. EILTS
In honor of the Flonorable John M, Maury
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
and Members of the Congressional Delegation
Saturday, August 9, 1975 - 7:30 to 9:30 p.m. P.
Host and Hostess
The Honorable John M, Maury
The Honorable Dale 3umpers and Mr. Bumpers
The Honorable William J. Randall and Mrs. Randall
If Codego and Mrs. Hanson
The Honorable Ralph S, Regula and Mrs. Regula
The Honorable Marvin Esch and Mrs, Esch
The Honorable Roy A, Taylor and Mr:. Taylor
The Honorable Edwin Eschleman and Mrs. Eschleman
The Honorable William F. Goodling and Mrs. Goodling
The Honorable Robert Eckhardt and M rs. Eckhardt
The Henerable James 6, Comman
Mr. Michael Finlay
Mr, Michael Van Dusen
Mr. Peter Collins
Mr. Vernon Loan
Ms. Mildred Ward
Miss Nancy Berg
Mr. Donald Sanders
Col. Charles Hammond
Mrs. Nancy Wooldridge
It, Col. Michael Rhode
Lt, Col, Charles Wollerton
Lt. Col. Keith K. Hunt
Mr. William Rosemund
FORD LIBRARY
Diplomatic Missions
His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and Mrs, Touchette
His Excellency the Ambassador of Federal Germany and Mrs. Stritzer
His Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain and Lady Adams
Ambassador and Mrs. Wee D 322 Chang - Consul General of South Korea
His Excellency the Ambassador of Spit n and Mrs. Alabart
(Revised page 1)
2
The Presidency
Mr. Tahsin Beshir - Controller Ger ral of the Press
The People's Assembly
His Excellency the Speaker and Mrs Marei
Dr. and Mrs. Gamal E1 Oleifi - Dep ty Speaker
Dr. and Mrs. El Sayed All El Sayed Deputy Speaker
Mr, and Mrs. Moheb Stino - Chairn 10, Industry and Power Committee
Mr. and Mrs. E1 Husseini Abdel Ra man - Chaisman, Public Utilities Committee
Mr. and Mrs. Moustafa Kamel Mou d - Chairman, Economic Committ a
Mr. and Mrs. Ahmed Found = Chair an Planning & Budget Committee
Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Fattah Moustaf = Chief of Protocol
General and Mrs. Abdel Kerim Darwish - (Dr. Laila Takla Member, liducation
and Scientific Research Committee
The Foreign Relations C numittee
Mr. and Mrs. Zakaria Loutfi Gorna: - Chairman
Mr, and Mrs. Mohie E1 Din El Shaz
Mr. and Mrs. Mansour Mohamed H: isan
Mr. and Mrs. Safwat Mohie El Din
Mr. and Mrs. Ahmed E1 Demerdast Tount
Dr. and Mrs. Roushdi Said
The Arab Socialist Union
Dr, and Mrs. Rifaat El Mahgoub = I rst Secretary
Dr. Zeinab El Sobki - Secretariat for Women's Affairs
The Arab League
Dr. and Mrs. Sayed Nofal - Assista Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Selim El Y: 11 Assistant Secretary for Inform tion
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Wahid E1 D. El Dall - Director, Arab Affairs hept.
Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Racuf El Ridi = Organizations Dept.
Suez Canal Authority
Mr. and Mrs. Mashhour Ahmed Ma hour - Director
Mr. and Mrs. All Mahmoud - Deput Director
Mr. and Mrs. Adel Erzat Director, Engineering Dept.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Ministry of Economy & Economic Cooperation
His Excellency the Minister of Economy & Economic Cooperation and Mrs. Shafel
Dr. and Mrs. Ahmed Effat o Coord nator for U.S. Assistance to Egypt
Mr. and Mrs. Gamal El Nazer a Undersecretary
Mr. and Mrs. Wagih Shindi 9 Undersecretary
Dr. and Mrs. Zaki About Nasr - Chief of Cabinat to the Minister
Dr. and Mrs. Hamed E1 Sayeh - Chairman, National Bank
Mr. and Mrs. Fouad Sultan - President, Misr-Iran Bank
Mr. and Mrs. Abdel Moneim El Banna a Deputy Governor, Central Bank
Mr. and Mrs. Bahir Onsi a Deputy Chairman, Arab-African Bank
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed El Barbari " Director General, Foreign Depart ment
Ministry of Finance
His Excellency the Minister of Fina ace and Mrs. Abu Ismail
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Mohamed Riad, Minster of State for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador and Mrs. Mahmoud Abdel Ghaffar - First Undersecretary
Ambassador and Mrs. Gamal Mansour = Undersecretary
Dr. and Mrs. Ossama El Baz - Chief of Cabinet to the Minister
Mr. and Mrs. Hisham Amer a Counselor, Minister's Office
Dr. and Mrs. Mountr Zahran - First Secretary, Minister's Office
Mr. and Mrs, Mohamed El Baradei c Second Secretary, Minister's Office
Mr, and Mrs. Esmat Abdel Halim - First Secretary, USA Desk
Mr. Ibrahim El Shuweiai a First Secretary, USA Desk
Ministry of Petroleum
Mr. and Mrs. Selim Rizkallah - Undersecretary
Ministry of Transport
Mr. and Mrs. Mahmoud Kamel Moragi - Chairman, General Egyptian Hailways
Authority
Ministry of War Production
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Abdel Fattah - Chairman, General Organization for
Military Factories & Aviation Industries
Dr. and Mrs. Ahmed Salem Mohamed c. Director, General Egyptian Organization
for Military Factories & Aviation Industries
FORD is LIBRARY OFRALD
Ministry of Was
Major General and Mrs. Mohamed Khald Assistant to the Minister
Mr. and Mrs. Hassan Ahmed El Kateb - Official Military Spokesman
It. General and Mrs. Mohamed All Fahni Chief of Staff, ARE ARmed Forces
Major General and Mrs. Hassan E1 Greely Chief of Operations
Vice Admiral and Mrs. Found Zikri C ARE Naval Forces
Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. Mahmoud Shaker Abdel Monetm - Conumander, RE
Air Forces
Like General and Mrs. Helmi Afifi = Con dander, Air Defense Forces
Major General and Mrs. Ibrahim Found Tassax = Director, Military Intellig ice Dept
Major General and Mrs. M.H. Shawkat Deputy Director, Military Intellige are Dept.
Brigadier General and Mrs. E1 Mo'taz E llah Safa Chief, Military Attachet Branch
Capt. and Mrs. Mohamed Mortada El Ta All - Assistant, Military Attaches Branch
Squadron Leader and Mrs. A, Ashraf - Elector, Aircraft Clearances, Military
Attaches Branch
Rear Admiral and Mrs. Aly Osman De:aty Commander, ARE Naval Force
Rear Admiral and Mrs. Farouk El Shaik:
Rear Admiral and Mrs, Husein Assem F way
Maj C General and Mrs. Moustafa H. El lamal
Major General and Mrs, Fawzi Abdel Fa Fatah
Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. N. Nabih El lesseiry
Air Vice Marshal and Mrs. Badie Waffal: M. Gabra
Egyptian Press
Mr. and Mrs, All Hamdi E1 Gammal a E tor in Chief, Al Ahram
Mr. and Mrs. Handi Fouad - Director, Diplomatic Section, Al Ahram
Mr. and Mrs. Mohsen Mohamed Editor in Chief. Al Gomhouria
Mr. and Mrs. Galal El Hamamsi Edito: in Chief, Al Akhbar
Miss Maha Abdel Fattah = Diplomatic Co respondent, Al Akhbar
Mr. and Mrs, Fomel Lablb - Managing B Biltor, Al Massawar
Caire American College
Mr. and Mrs, Joseph Kennedy = Superint adent
American University
Dr. and Mrs. Frank Blanning . Deas of S idente
Dr. and Mrs. Thomas Lamont
GERALD is. FORD LIBRARY
American Firms in Cairo
Mr. and M.s. Guenter Neubert = Ch: se Manhattan Bank
Mr. and Mrs. J.T. Schulemberg - Clevron Oil Co. of Egypt
Mr. and Mrs. John Goodridge - First National City Bank
Mr. and Mrs. D.B. Wilkie a Director, FUPCO
Mr. and Mrs. Donald Spielman - Mobil Oil Egypt
Mr. and Mrs. Mohamed Aboul Ezz Mobil Exploration
Foreign Press
Mias Libby Bassett - ABC
Mr. Gordon Martin - BBC
Mr. and Mrs. John Sheehan a CBS
Mr. and Mrs. Abdallah Schleifer a MBC
Mr. and Mrs. Wilton Wynn 9 Time Magazine
Mr, Maurice Guindi - UPI
American Embassy
The Honorable Frank E. Maestrone and Mrs. Maestrone
Mr. and Mrs. Bryce M. Gerlach
Mr. and Mrs. Howard Russell
Brigadier General and Mrs. LeRoy V, Svendsen
Capt. and Mrs. Peter Block
Col. and Mrs. William Graham
Col. and Mrs. William Dolam
Mr. Wilbert Templeton
Mr. and Mrs. Edward Peck
Mr. and Mrs. John Craig
Miss April Glaspie
Mr. Whitley Bruner
Mr. Thomas Murphy
Mr. and Mrs. D. Ford Brown
TOTAL: 240
FORD is LIBRARY 070820
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
A2
THE WASHINGTON POST-
Friday, Sept. 13, 1975
RI
U.S. Experts 'Starkly Wrong'
About 73 Mideast War Data
By George Lardner Jr.
By then, Cline testified, "My before Oct. 6 failed to turn by Egyptian President Anw
Washington Post Staff Writer
staff and I had concluded that
up any official statement from
Sadat, In addition, Cline said
U.S. intelligence experts
hostilities probably were im-
any office or committee re-
under the so -called detent
were "starkly wrong" about
minent" and drew up a draft
sponsible for producing fin-
treaties, the Soviet. Union was
the imminence of the 1973 war
memo to that-effect. He said
ished, analytical intelligence
obligated to consult with the
in the Middle East that led to
he asked that Kissinger be no-
which contributed anything
United States on threats to
the Arab oil boycott, the
tified that we had reached
resembling a warning" as
peace.
House intelligence committee
this "conclusion" but learned
such.
Rep. Morgan F. Murphy
later that night that the State
The study" found that "in-
disclosed yesterday.
III.) said be thought this
secretariat.
and
stead of warnings the Com-
pretty dangerous
The WashingtonStar.
Friday, Suptember 12, 1975
Kissinger, Aides Hit on 1973 War
United Press International
pendents from Egypt and
ed channels of communica-
A former intelligence
Syria two days before the
row sphere." He recom-
tion that existed under
mended no one man should
official says he tried to tell
attack. Other evidence- be-
President Richard M.
be allowed to hold both
Secretary of State Henry A.
fore the committee indicat-
Nixon and Kissinger, who
Kissinger that war in the
ed the Defense Intelligence
Kissinger's jobs simultane-
was - and still is - both
ously.
Middle East was imminent
Agency correctly predicted
Secretary of State and the
in 1973 but Kissinger aides!
the attack three days in ad-
Cline, a professional
President's chief national
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1975
Signs of 1973 Mideast War Eluded U.S. Spy Agencies
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
fensive across the canal and in
The report, maintained that
The tommittee has sought,
Special to The New York Times
the Golan Heights area."
"certain substantive precon-
first by. letter and Later by
WASHINGTON, Sept. II-
The report of the committee,
ceptions (deletion) turned the
subpoena, materials given to
The United States intelligence
which is charged with advising
analyst's attention principally
Presidents Johnson and Nixon
community acknowledges that
the National Security council
toward political indications that
on four major recent crises,
it failed to predict the 1973
on war and critical situations,
the Arabs were bent on finding
including the 1973 Arab-Israeli
Arab-sraeli war and that sev-
went on to note, "It is possible
non-violent menas to achieve
war, the 1968 Communist Tet
eral intelligence agencies even
that the Egyptians or Syrians,
their objectives and away from
offensive in South Vietnam, the
predicted that there would be
particularly the latter, may
indications (mainly military) to
Cyprus crisis and the recent
no war only hours before the
have been preparing a raid or
the contrary."
revolution in Portugal.
hostilities broke out, according
other small-scale action."
Maj. Gen. Howard P. Smith,
Representative Otis G. Pike,
to a secret report made public
The committee met, its report
an Air Force officer in charge
Democrat of Suffolk County
today.
said, at "0900 on 6 October
of the. Pentagon agency's
and the committee chairman,
The report represents the
1973," which was a few hours
analytical section, said that
complained today that the Ad-1
first public admission by the
before the attack.
three analysts had been trans-
ministration had been unwilling
intelligence agencies that they
In an intelligence summary
ferred as a result of the failure.
or slow to respond to the com-
failed to warn of the war. On
dated the same day but pre-
The material from the secret
mittee's requests. "All we have
30
sumably
prepared
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, September 12, 1975.
1
What's News-
World-Wide
No U.S. intelligence agency unequivo-
cally predicted the October 1973 Mideast
war, the House Intelligence Committee was
told However the BY director of the State
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 5, 1975
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
JOSEPH J. SISCO
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE BRIEFING ROOM
5:20 P.M. EST
MR. NESSEN: As promised, we have Joe Sisco, the
Under Secretary of State, to give you a report not only on
today's meeting, but since we didn't have anyting on Sunday,
Joe is going back over the entire visit and catch you up
on the entire visit as well as today's specific meeting.
Q Is this on the record?
MR. NESSEN: Yes.
Q
Was it true he thought Chicago was the greatest
city in America?
MR. SISCO: I might say that we were all impressed,
I am saying this on the record, Peter, for obvious reasons, because
you are I are native Chicagoans, but it was an impressive
show that Mayor Daley put on. It was impressive in every
respect.
Let me just make a few brief observations and then
open the floor to questions.
The two Presidents held their final meeting here
a moment ago, as you know, after having held meetings
earlier in the week here in Washington and likewise in
Jacksonville.
We consider the visit of President Sadat as
important, timely and very useful. First of all, I think the
visit strengthened the close personal rapport that was
established between the two Presidents initially at their
meetings in Salzburg.
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Secondly, we believe the visit gave President Sadat
an opportunity to see and know our country and our people
better and vice versa, and, therefore, we believe that as
a result of the visit country-wide, the opportunity given
to the President to address the Joint Session of Congress
today, this has contributed to greater understanding between
the two Governments.
Third, I would say that the principal focus of the
discussions between the two Presidents was on the simple
question of where we go from here in the Middle Eastern
diplomacy. I think it is fair to say that both Governments
feel it is important that the process of peace continue with
respect to the Middle East and, therefore, there was a
substantial amount of the discussion focused on the diplomatic
aspects.
On our part, we reaffirmed that we are prepared to
undertake a serious effort to see whether we can get
negotiations started between Syria and Israel. Secondly, we
reaffirmed also our intention to continue consultations looking
towards the possibility of a renewal of a Geneva Conference.
And, third, as indicated by the Secretary of State in his
statement before the UN General Assembly, we are also, and
continue to be, prepared to explore any other informal
meetings to get the process of peace moving once again in the
aftermath of the recent Egyptian-Israeli Agreement and
while the implementation process of that agreement goes on.
A fourth aspect of the visit, we feel that the visit
and the talks contributed to a strengthening of the bilateral
relationships between the United States and Egypt and in
broadening the areas of cooperation between the two Governments.
I would cite, in particular, the agreements that were signed
earlier in the week -- a health cooperation agreement, a
P.L. 480 agreement, an agreement on a museum exhibition,
and an agreement on avoiding double taxation between the two
countries and today's initialing by the respective Foreign
Ministers of an agreement in principle in the areas of
peaceful uses of atomic energy.
As most of you know, the agreement initialed
today is expected to cover cooperation in the fields pertaining
to peaceful uses of atomic energy, including design and
construction and operation, research and power reactors.
I will not go into the details because I think that the
statement put out today is self-evident and a full explanation
in and of itself.
I will take any questions now.
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Q
Mr. Sisco, why was there no joint communique
issued?
MR. SISCO: This question has been asked. I
would not candidly attach any significance whatsoever to
no joint communique having been issued. We felt and they
felt that in view of the number of public statements made
by everybody concerned, in view of the fact that the concrete
results have all been signed on the basis of the specific
agreements that I indicated to you, including the one
initialed today, that really primarily what had to be said
had really been said either in public statements or in
the various announcements. So I would not read any kind of
hidden designs that there were any contemplated or expected
difficulties with writing a communique. Really, all of
you have the concrete results.
Q
Could I follow that up by asking -- you
referred to public statements and there have been some
public statements that are a little confusing in that
President Sadat before he came here said he was going to
ask the U.S. for arms. Today, and most recently, he said,
"I did not come here asking for anything."
What was the situation and what was the response?
MR. SISCO: I think I can answer that very
quickly, Marilyn. President Sadat indicated he was not
coming here with any shopping list. That is the fact
of the matter.
The question of arms was discussed in a general
way. I think most of you are familiar with what President
Sadat has said publicly insofar as his situation is concerned
with respect to arms. He has said it in various inter-
views. That principally was the focus of the discussion
on arms. There were no specific commitments made and
there was no specific shopping list to address ourselves to.
Q
Was there a general agreement to study the
matter, or how would you phrase that?
MR. SISCO: I would not go beyond what I had
to say, Marilyn, other than there was a general discussion
of this and no specific commitments were made.
Q Well, sir, I would ask you without offending
you what the President's response was and whether you could
project for us the continuing dialogue on arms?
MR. SISCO: Well, we have said publicly on a
number of occasions that we expected a general discussion
of this question to take place. It did.
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We also said even before the visit, and as I am
saying after the visit, that no specific commitments have
been made, However, obviously this is an issue that in
time will have to be addressed and we have said this
heretofore. I am not adding anything new but this is
really basically where it stands.
Q
About the atomic reactor, what about that?
Will they be getting other supplies and atomic energy
from France and other places?
MR. SISCO: The question is will they be getting
other supplies or other reactors. As you know, what was
initiated today was an agreement in principle to cooperate
in the field and as part of this cooperation initially
what is involved are two power reactors not to exceed in
total 1,200 megawatts. That is really what is involved
under stringent safeguards.
What was initialed today, you should understand,
is not actually the agreement. It was really the framework
or the setting down of the principles on which a detailed
agreement would be signed. It is largely the framework
and I think it is important for me to make that point so
that there will be no confusion because discussions with
respect to the detailed agreement would have to continue.
Q
Has President Ford accepted in principle
President Sadat's invitation to visit Egypt, and what is
the outlook for such a visit?
MR. SISCO: Well, there isn't anything concrete
on that with respect to any specific date. I know that
the two Presidents agreed that they would remain in very
close contact over the coming weeks and months, but there
is nothing specific on any plans.
Q
Does that mean that President Ford has not
accepted the invitation?
MR. SISCO: I think there has been and is an
interest on the part of the President with respect to a
possible visit to Egypt, but the point I am making is that
nothing specific was agreed to in this regard.
Q
There were points of conflict between the
two Presidents. President Ford spoke out against the
anti-Zionism resolution in the United Nations and President
Sadat said some things anti-Jewish and anti-Zion at the
National Press Club. Also President Sadat spoke rather
intensively on several occasions about support for the
Palestinians -- in some cases he mentioned the PLO and
in some he didn't. President Ford pointed out what the
U.S. policy was about the PLO and its position.
How do they resolve these things, or what do
they say about them that you can tell us?
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MR. SISCO: Well, first of all with respect to
the Zionism matter, I think each side's view is very clear
in this regard. You noticed, for example, that President
Sadat said in his address before the Congress that there
are matters on which views are going to agree or converge
and there are other matters where this is not the case.
With respect to the position on Zionism as reflected
at the UN, I think you are very clear as to what position
Egypt has adopted and what position we have adopted.
With respect to the second part of your question,
the question of the Palestineans, I don't think I can really
add to what President Sadat had to say to the Congress.
It was very clear as to the nature of the appeal that he
made.
As far as our position is concerned, one, we have
always said that in any durable peace the legitimate
aspirations of the Palestinians would have to be taken
into account.
Insofar as the question of the actual participation
of the PLO at any conference, again you know what our
position has been. We have felt and continue to feel
that the inhibiting factor here is that the PLO has failed
to acknowledge and recognize Security Council Resolution 242
and Israel's right to exist.
So what it amounts to is that in this regard the
Egyptian view is clear and so is the U.S. view and our
policy has remained unchanged.
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Q
I have two questions. First of all, was it under-
stood at the outset of the talks that there would be no
communique or was that decided during the visit?
And my second question is, what concrete steps
are in the making on the American side in order to further
any Israeli-Syrian accord?
MR. SISCO: We had considered tentatively the
question of whether a communique had to be issued but we
left it open right from the beginning for determination in the
course of the talks and we mutually agreed there was really
no need for a communique based on this since we have put out
the essential results.
I want to be very categoric. We then didn't even
address the specifics in any communique and I want to be very
clear that the fact that no communique was issued is not to
be taken that we started the process and that some huff
or some difference arose. We didn't do that.
Let me take the second part of the question. With
respect to the on-going efforts to achieve negotiations, we
are going to review the situation now at the State Department
in the light of these talks. As part of that, we have called
back our Ambassador from Damascus and we will, as part of that
internal consultation, begin -- today is Wednesday, I think
probably near the end of this week we will review the situation
in the light of these talks.
Q
What can you say about the efforts to arrange
a meeting between President Ford and President Asad while
the President is on his European trip?
MR. SISCO: There are no immediate plans for such
a meeting and, Peter, I would not expect a meeting to take
place.
Q Mr. Sisco, has the U.S. Government decided
what position they will take on the Egyptian resolution in
the General Assembly?
MR. SISCO: No, in fact I can't say that we have
really studied the text. I gather that a resolution has been
submitted in the last 24 hours. We will have to give that
careful study.
Q
Is that on Palestinians, too?
MR. SISCO: It is basically, Marilyn. I haven't
seen the text but basically it is along the lines of what
President Sadat indicated in his General Assembly speech.
I understand it is a question of the Palestinians participating
in a Geneva Conference"on equal footing." As I said,
I haven't seen the text and we havenot studied it.
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Q
Given the American position on the Palestinians,
why does that take study and consideration?
MR. SISCO: For one thing, I think it is pretty well
for us to look at the text before one decides how one is going
to vote, but obviously this text is going to be looked at
from the point of view of what American policy is and I hope
I have made what American policy is very clear in response
to Joe Polakoff's question.
Q May I ask you another question about the
Suez Canal and free transportation? Is there some statement
on the part of Egypt on that?:
MR. SISCO: She asked whether she could ask a question
with respect to Israel cargoes going through the Suez Canal.
My response is that, as all of you know, this question of
Israel cargoes going through the Canal was part and parcel
of the agreement signed between Egypt and Israel. That principle
has been implemented, as you all know.
Q Mr. Sisco, would you take a question on another
subject?
MR. SISCO: I have got my hands full and I would
rather not get into anything else.
Q You wouldn't rule out that some general
agreement was made on arms, and could you clarify that in
any way?
MR. SISCO: I don't think I can be any more categoric
than I was. I said, one, the nature of the discussions was
general, and, secondly, I was categoric in saying no specific
commitments were made. I can't be more categoric.
Q
The question was asked if some general agreement
was made and you said you would not go beyond your previous
statement.
MR. SISCO: There is no general agreement and my
answer is "no," if you read into what I said that I was
trying to keep that open.
Q
When do you expect Mr. Rabin to come to
Washington?
MR. SISCO: I have no late information on that.
Q
Did you discuss with Mr. Sadat the date of
passage of another ship in the Canal?
MR. SISCO: No, this has not come up.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END
(AT 5:35 P.M. EST)
cong.
November 12, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
JACK MARSH
In reference to the recent action by the United Nations on the
Zionist Resolution, do you suppose you could have your people
take some doundings from Members, such as Buchanan, Fraser,
Bingham, Rosenthal, Findley and their counterpario in the
Senate, to see what the reaction is of those who have been strong
U.N. backers to this action.
JOM/dl
GERALD FORD AIBRARY