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Privacy Act
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1563125
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Privacy Act
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's General Subject Files
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Department of State. U.S. Disarmament Administration. (9/9/1960 - 9/26/1961)
Privacy, Right of
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 28, folder "Privacy Act" of the John Marsh Files
at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized
from
BOX
20
[Privacy]
THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
Mr. Marsh.
%
This is for your 4:00 LIG meeting.
donna
L
FORD & BERMLO LIBRARY
Attendees for LIG Meeting, Wednesday, May 21, 1975, 4:00 p.m.
AID
Denis Neill
CIA
George Cary
DOD
John Maury
Dick Fryklund
Fred Hitz
Don Sanders
State
Amb. Robert McCloskey
John Lehman
White House
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Bob Wolthius
Bill Kendall
Vern Loen
OMB
Donald Ogilvie
NSC
Les Janka
Col. Clinton Granger
USIA
Edward Hidalgo
FORDO i LIBRARY GERAL
THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(As it Relates to Congressional Liaison)
1.
SUBJECT MATTER
-
The Act applies to any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual that is maintained by an
Agency of the Federal Government.
2.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
-
The Freedom of Information Act deals with the right of
all members of the public to Government information.
-
The Privacy Act is concerned with the rights of each
individual and the records of his personal data held
by the Government.
3.
CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON AGENCIES IN ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING
PERSONAL DATA
A -
Only information relevant and necessary to the functions
of the Agency may be collected
B -
The Agency must establish rules for
-
Notifying an individual in response to an
inquiry as to whether a record is maintained
concerning him
-
Disclosing to him the contents of such record
-
Amending such record in response to a request
by the individual
C -
The Agency must publish in the Federal Register by
August 27 and annually thereafter
-
A full and complete description of each system of
records subject to the Act (i. e., records containing
personal data which are retrievable by name or
other individual identifier)
FORD
LIBRARY
-
A description of procedures through which the
individual can exercise his rights of access.
D
- The Agency must provide timely advance notice to the
Congress and to OMB concerning the privacy impact
of any proposed new system of records containing
personal data.
4. SECURITY AND ACCURACY OF RECORDS
-
All Agencies must
-
Insure accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and
completeness of all records
-
Must provide training and rules of conduct to
insure that all personnel dealing in records of
personal data perform their duties in conformity
with the Act.
-
Establish appropriate safeguards for all record
systems containing personal data to prevent any
willful or inadvertent misuse
5. RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE TO OTHER THAN THE RECORD SUBJECT
A -
An Agency may disclose files only to
-
Persons having a need-to-know in the performance
of their duties
For a routine use, i. e., compatible with the purpose
-
for which it was originally collected, provided that
notice of such routine use has been published in the
Federal Register
B -
Disclosure is also authorized as required by the Freedom of
Information Act.
6. ACCESS BY THE RECORD SUBJECT
A -
The indivisual must be given access to his record and to
have a copy made of all or part thereof
B -
The individual may request amendment of a record
- 2 -
GLEALD 19 4. FORD LIBRARY
-
If an amendment of the record is requested,
the Agency must within 10 days
-
Make the requested correction, or
-
Inform the individual of the refusal,
provide the reason and inform him
of his right to request a review
7. CIVIL REMEDIES
A -
An individual may within 2 years bring a cause of action
against an Agency in the U. S. District Court (in the District
of a residence or the District of Columbia) for:
-
Refusal to comply with a request of an individual
for access to his record
-
Making a final determination not to amend a record
as requested
B -
If the Court determines that the Agency intentionally or
willfully failed to comply with the Act to the detriment of
the plaintiff, the damages shall not be less than $1,000
and the Government shall be assessed attorney fees and
other litigation costs
8.
CRIMINAL PENALTIES
-
A fine of not more than $5,000 may be assessed against
any officer or employee of an Agency who
-
Willfully maintains a system of records without
giving the required public notice
9. THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION
-
Members
-
The Commission consists of 3 members appointed
by the President, 2 by the President of the Senate,
and 3 by the Speaker of the House
in
GERALD
FORD
- 3 -
LIBRAST
-
Functions
-
The Commission is directed to make a study of
data banks, information systems of Government
and private organizations
-
To determine the standards and procedures
in force for the protection of personal
information
-
To make recommendations to the
President of the Congress for
legislative, administrative or voluntary
adoption of the principles of the Privacy
Act
-
To make recommendations for other
legislation as appropriate
-
Duration
-
The Commission shall perform its work within
two years
10. EFFECTIVE DATE
-
All principal provisions except those relating to the
Privacy Commission and mailing lists take effect on
September 27, 1975
LISERAY GERALD FORD
- 4 -
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 21, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
LES JANKA
les
SUBJECT:
ACDA Impact Statement
The most explosive issue in this afternoon's LIG is likely to be the
interagency controversy over the Administration's position on
H. R. 1550. This bill is attached to the ACDA Authorization legisla-
tion and attempts to strengthen the role of ACDA within the Executive
Branch by placing the Director of ACDA on the NSC and other steps.
The most controversial feature is Section 104 which would require
DOD and ERDA to submit arms "control impact statements" to
ACDA for its review and would also require the transmittal of these
statements with a unilateral ACDA report to the Congress for its
review. There is unanimous Administration opposition to the pro-
visions of the original bill.
However, State and ACDA believe that there is such strong support
on the Hill for strengthening ACDA's role that some form of impact
statement provision will be passed. They have been strongly urging
that a compromise be worked out with the Committee which would
eliminate the formal impact statement and its provision to the
Congress and have worked for substitute language which would
merely formalize in legislation the satisfactory informal procedures
now in force.
The current dispute revolves around the fact that at one point there
was complete interagency agreement to attempt such a compromise,
and Deputy Secretary Ingersoll testified to the HIRC that the Administra-
tion would be willing to work out compromise language which would
provide an Administration agreed impact statement within any DOD
or ERDA budget request. No unilateral ACDA statement would go to
the Congress. Subsequent to Ingersoll's testimony, however, DOD
GERALD LIBRANT 1080
-2-
fell off its willingness to support a compromise when precise language
could not be agreed on within the bureaucracy after a series of long,
difficult interagency meetings and extended consultations with Senate
and House committee staffs.
The issues were finally put to Dr. Kissinger in his NSC role, and he
decided to support the position of DOD, firmly opposing further com-
promise attempts and all forms of any impact statement. State and
ACDA are embarrassed by this reversal of the Administration's
position and are strongly challenging the wisdom of putting ourselves
in a position where our refusal to compromise will result in tougher
language which we will then have to veto. Our veto may be over-
ridden or we will at least be faced with an unsatisfactory compromise
we cannot veto but will still give us considerable institutional grief.
Nevertheless, in today's LIG meeting Secretary Kissinger's instructions
should be strongly communicated to the bureaucracy and the attached
statement of the Administration's position may be used to provide
marching orders.
FORD LIBRART
Administration Position on H. R. 1550 - ACDA Impact Statement
-- The Administration's strong opposition to Section 104 as
originally written was expressed in the Ikle letter to Morgan and
Sparkman of April 16, 1975.
-- On May 14, Deputy Secretary Ingersoll testified that the
Administration would be willing to "accompany any request for
authorization for any program found by the NSC to have a significant
impact on arms control or disarmament policy with a statement
analyzing that impact. 11
Subsequently, the Administration has been unable to reach
agreement on satisfactory language expressing the above compromise
offer.
-- The Administration remains opposed to any provisions calling
for an impact statement in any form for the following reasons:
- There is no certainty that any language can be found
to avoid the possibility of litigation to force compliance with
the impact statement provisions and which could lead to court
challenges delaying vital security or arms control programs.
- It would disrupt ACDA's effectiveness within the
Executive Branch by creating a formal adversary relation-
ship with DOD and ERDA.
- The result of requiring such statements would be
counterproductive to the Congressal intent of getting more
timely and complete information on the DOD budget and arms
control issues because it would formalize the flow of infor-
mation and thus create internal executive branch barriers
limiting ACDA's access to only that information specified
in the legislation.
- It would impose a heavy and unnecessary bureau-
cratic burden on DOD, ERDA, ACDA and the NSC. The broad
language of even the compromise legislation would require so
many statements to be analyzed that ACDA's limited resources
would be spread too thin and diverted from the really key arms
control issues.
- The existence of any form of impact statement might
tend to focus Congressional attention on the adequacy and form
of the statement itself rather than on the substantive arms
control issues now discussed in substantive Congressional
hearings by the Director of ACDA.
FORD
GERALD
Congressional Strategy on Diego Garcia
Background
On May 12 the President signed and sent to Congress a Determination
which, by law, must lie in Congress for sixty days before funds under
the Military Construction Act can be obligated for certain new facilities
on Diego Garcia. During this period, either House can disapprove the
Determination by simple majority. Senator Mansfield has introduced
such a resolution, and Senators Kennedy, Javits and Pell have intro-
duced an amending resolution, which would delay obligation of funds
until the U.S. has initiated talks with the Soviets on Indian Ocean
arms limitations.
Strategy
The Administration approach to Congress should have several elements.
First, the attached justification which the President approved when he
signed the May 12 Determination will be sent to the President Pro
Tempore and the Speaker. This should be utilized as the basis for
discussions with Congress.
Second, we should continue to emphasize the importance of expanding
facilities on Diego Garcia for contingency purposes. With the opening
of the Suez Canal on June 5, high tensions and the possibility of an oil
embargo in the Middle East, the striking evidence of the major Soviet
facility at Berbera, and the loss or prospective loss of important and
secure facilities in Southeast Asia, adequate facilities on Diego Garcia
are needed to protect legitimate and vital U.S. interests. If we do not
move rapidly we might not have these facilities when we need them.
Third, we must stress the independence of possible arms control
measures in the Indian Ocean and our security needs for facilities
on Diego Garcia. If asked about possibilities for arms control in the
Indian Ocean, we should emphasize that there are great technical
difficulties in developing workable measures for arms control in the
Indian Ocean.
Fourth, if directly asked about negotiations with the Soviet Union, we
should say that we would consider exploring this subject with the Soviets,
but only after Diego Garcia construction is underway and after we come
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
-2-
up with a technically feasible arms control approach. The U.S. cannot
be placed in a position where Soviet dilatory negotiating procedures
could deprive us of badly needed facilities on Diego Garcia at a time
when our vital and legitimate interests could soon be jeopardized, and
while the Soviets are rapidly expanding their own facilities at Berbera.
Even if we were to assume the Soviets would act in good faith, the very
difficult and technical negotiations would be apt to be very protracted.
Therefore, we must have approval for Diego Garcia first.
Finally, we should make it clear that the President cannot accept any
legislation requiring either a link between Diego Garcia and arms
control, or a requirement that we proceed to talk to the Soviet Union
on this question.
÷
FORD
LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Justification for the Presidential Determination
on the Construction of Limited Support Facilities
on Diego Garcia
In 1966, the United States signed an agreement with the British Government
providing that the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory would be
available for 50 years to meet the defense purposes of both governments.
In this context, we concluded in 1972 an Administrative Agreement providing
for the establishment of a limited communications station on the small atoll of
Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean. In February 1974, an agreement
was negotiated ad referendum to replace the 1972 agreement and to provide
for the construction and operation of a proposed support facility. The
British Government announced in December 1974 its agreement with our
proposal to expand the facility
The United States has an important interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean
area. In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area is essential
to the economic well-being of modern industrial societies. It is essential that
the United States maintain and periodically demonstrate a capability to operate
military forces in the Indian Ocean. Such exercise of our right to navigate
freely on the high seas communicates to others the importance we attach to
the stability of the region and to continued free access by all nations.
The credibility of any US military presence ultimately depends on the ability
of our forces to function efficiently and effectively in a wide range of circum-
stances. Currently, the US logistics facility closest to the western Indian
Ocean is in the Philippines, 4,000 miles away. At a time when access to
regional fuel supplies and other support is subject to the uncertainties of
political developments, the establishment of modest support facilities on
Diego Garcia is essential to insure the proper flexibility and responsiveness
of US forces to national requirements in a variety of possible contingencies.
The alternative would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval tankers
and other mobile logistics forces.
Objections have been raised to this proposal on the grounds that*it will
prompt an increase in the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and give rise
to an arms race in the region. Clearly, both we and the Soviets are aware
of the military presence of other nations, but it would be incorrect to assume
that Soviet actions are determined exclusively by the level or nature of our
BERRALO FORD LIBRARY
- 2 -
force presence. The growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of
their own national interests -- including the continuing expansion of the
Soviet Navy in a global "blue water" role -- rather than to US force presence
as such.
A distinction must also be drawn between facilities and force presence. The
proposed construction on Diego Garcia would enhance our capability to pro-
vide support to US forces operating in the Indian Ocean. However, there is
no intent to permanently station operational units there, and the installation
would not imply an increase in the level of US forces deployed to that region.
We have, on several occasions, expressed our willingness to consider con-
structive proposals for arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we do not
believe that construction on Diego Garcia should be contingent upon the out-
come of discussions on such proposals. In our view, these are two separate
issues.
The Diego Garcia proposal has been criticized by a number of regional states
which favor the concept of a special legal regime limiting the presence of the
great powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace resolutions adopted in the United Nations General Assembly.
United States policy has consistently been to oppose measures that would con-
stitute an unacceptable departure from customary international law concerning
freedom of navigation on the high seas.
We are aware of the concern expressed by some states of the region, but we
do not share their conviction that the construction of support facilities on
Diego Garcia will result in an arms race or that these facilities will somehow
represent a threat to their interests. On the contrary, it is our belief that
such facilities will contribute to the maintenance of healthy balance essential
to the preservation of regional security and stability. It is our considered
judgment that the legitimate differences in perspective between ourselves
and certain other nations with respect to Diego Garcia are susceptible to
reasoned discussion within a framework of mutual respect and need not
inhibit the development of satisfactory relations with the states of the region.
GERALD FORD LIBBARY