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This file contains material relating to Operation Babylift, orphan airlift.
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4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese Refugees (1)
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4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese Refugees (1)
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This file contains material relating to Operation Babylift, orphan airlift.
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
John Marsh's War Powers Notifications Files
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The original documents are located in Box 122, folder "4/5/75 - Evacuation of Vietnamese
Refugees (1)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
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The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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Digitized from Box 122 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
4/2/75
4:30 Yul Brynner called from his dressing room
(617) 426-9291
and would appreciate a call back.
He is with an organization called "Friends for
All Children" ADRR Dept. of State
Said they had a donation from AID for $100, 000 ? ?
for ophans of Vietnam. The situation is desperate
for Saigaon. They have 500 kids already adopted
waiting for the legalization of papers. Supplies
are at the minimum.
He said you and he talked about this at lunch at the
Swedish Embassy? ? and you said if there was ever
anything he/ddu you could do to help to let him know.
He said what they really need is an airlift by a 747 from
Saigon to the United States -- to Oakland or Denver --
with even temporary visas for the kids who are to be
adopted by Americans, Europeans, Canadians, etc.
They're looking for places for the kids.
He would appreciate a call.
FORD A RALD LIBRARY
GE
LAW OFFICES
LANE AND EDSON, P. C.
SUITE 707
BRUCE 5. LANE
1025 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
TELEPHONE (202) 452-9300
CHARLES L.EDSON
CABLE ADDRESS"LIBRA"
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
TELEX 64448
EDWARD C. BERKOWITZ
HERBERT M. FRANKLIN
OF COUNSEL
DAVID FALK
STEPHEN C. GLASSMAN
FRANK H. PEARL
ARTHUR R.HESSEL
JOHN H. BETZ
RICHARD N. TAGER
ALAN G. ROSENBERG
April 2, 1975
SUSAN J. LUTZKER
HAND DELIVERY
Philip W. Buchen, Esquire
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
RALD of R. FORD
Dear Mr. Buchen:
I am writing at your suggestion, made in your telephone con-
versation yesterday with my partner, Bruce Lane, and myself. The
deterioration of the military situation has progressed so rapidly
in South Viet Nam that since our conversation, Camranh City, the
home of the little girl of whom we spoke, has in fact been captured
by the North Viet Namese and clearly any evacuation of the girl
is most likely impossible at this time.
For your information, I thought I would explain in more detail
the circumstances that prompted our telephone call. My brother-in-
law, Anton Anderegg of Boring, Oregon, served as a para-medic in
Viet Nam in the years 1970 and 1971. During that time he was
stationed at Camranh Bay and made the acquaintnace of the young
girl named Vuong Le Thu who lived in the Camranh Bay Christian
Orphanage. In the course of his tour of duty there he undertook to
help the young girl both personally and financially and continues
today to pay her support in the orphanage. About a year ago, Mr.
Anderegg began corresponding with Mr. Ha, the director of the orph-
anage, in an attempt to adopt the little girl and have her brought
to the United States to live with his family. For a variety of
reasons he was unable to make any progress toward this goal.
We had hoped, when we spoke to you, that some steps might be
taken to expedite her transfer to the United States and the adoption
by the Andereggs. We, of course, understood that many Americans
and other South Viet Namese who were in imminent danger had to be
evacuated from South Viet Nam on a priority basis, and we did not
expect that Vuong would preempt any air accommodations.
Philip W. Buchen, Esquire
April 2, 1975
Page Two
Unfortunately, the problem seems to have become moot, due to
the capture of Camranh Bay by the North Viet Namese this morning.
The Andereggs join Bruce Lane and me in thanking you for the
consideration you have shown in this matter.
Very truly yours,
Frank H. Pearl
A.
FORD
GERALD
3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR RON NESSEN
FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
FROM:
LOU THOMPSON
SUBJECT:
Summary of Secretary Schlesinger's April 2 Press Conference
Before the Secretary began his press conference, Joe Laitin said the
four ships are off Nha Trang and will be moving and he will give the
precise location later.
Secretary Schlesinger gave an over-all assessment of the combat situation
as follows:
Continued deterioration in the highlands, Cam Ranh Bay still under
government control, some reduction in combat activity around Saigon and
Tay Ninh, some increase in combat activity in the delta but the delta
remains relatively stable. Two-thirds of the country is under Communist
control and it is a situation of historic and tragic proportions.
Schlesinger said he expects the Saigon defenses will be tested within the
next four weeks or less. Said there is a possible defensive area around
Saigon and the delta which can be held with the present forces, however,
shoudl North Vietnam decide to move its uncommitted divisions south, the
defense of Saigon will be severely tested. Relatively little movement
from North Vietnam but some southward movement of NVN strategic
reserve positions.
Estimated equipment losses to be $2 billion.
Any one-for-one replacement of equipment would be what we preceive the
present needs would be to stabilize Saigon and would be contingent on the
President's decisions after he receives his report from General Weyand.
Concerning re-introduction of American forces, Schlesinger referred to
the President's March 6 statement and said that position stands. Said
he could not rule out the President asking Congress to use air power but
considered the probability of such a request to be relatively low.
- 2 -
The Department of Defense position on the use of U.S. Marines is to adher
strictly to the law of August 15, 1973 concerning the cut-off of all combat
activity in Southeast Asia. That law states that participation is not
permitted and if U.S. forces were placed in a situation where they could
be drawn into combat, we would be in violation of the law.
The Secretary was asked about plans to evacuate Saigon and he said that
the United States government has emergency evacuation plans for all capitols
around the world and there is, of course, a plan to evacuate Saigon. He
further stated that the forces of the United States are available for
emergency evacuation if requested by the Ambassador through the Department
of State.
Schlesinger said he is not planning to go to Palm Springs this week and
said he is in daily contact by phone with the President.
He was asked if U.S. intelligence was faulty concerning the events up
to this point, and Schlesinger replied that the basic intelligence problem
was one in which the presence of the South Vietnamese forces and their
will to fight was underestimated, our intelligence concerning Hanoi's
intentions was relatively accurate in that while a major offensive was
not planned until 1976, Hanoi said that if other opportunities presented
themselves, they would take advantage of them.
- GE RALD and 1) R. FORD
NEWS CONFERENCE
WITH
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
RALD GE R. FORD JBRART
AT THE PENTAGON
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1975 -- 12:30 P.M.
Secretary Schlesinger: Gentlemen, I recognize that there is
widespread interest and concern around the country with regard to
the evolving situation in Vietnam. So I thought I would take a few
minutes to answer some questions that you might have.
Generally speaking there is a continued deterioration in the
Highlands. Only four major locations have not as yet been taken
over by the Communist forces. Cam Ranh Bay at this point continues
under the control of the government. In MR III, in the area around
Saigon, there has been some reduction in the amount of combat activity.
The situation around Tay Ninh has eased somewhat. There is some
increased level of activity in the Delta but the situation in the
Delta continues to be stable. Generally speaking, I would say
that the conditions in Vietnam are serious. Two thirds of the
country are now under control of the Communists. It has been a
defeat of historic and tragic proportions for the Government to
this point. Whether or not a line can be stabilized north of
Saigon to permit the areas around Saigon and in the Delta to continue
is something that remains to be seen. We should have a testing of
that in the next four weeks or possibly less.
Q: Can we have a reading on the extent, the dollar value, of
the material which was lost, thrown away, destroyed, etc., by the
retreating South Vietnamese forces?
A: The cost of that is not available to us at this time. As
I mentioned the other day, the data that we have available indicate
that at least $600 or $700 million worth of equipment and supplies
have been lost but the sum could go to a billion dollars. I should
emphasize, however, that the major losses in that connection are
equipment losses and that this in no way interferes with the need
for material support for the combat forces that continue to support
the government in the area of Saigon and the South.
Q: Mr. Schlesinger, there's a report out of Saigon that some
of the commanders over there, I believe some people high in the
government, are saying that they are being betrayed by the United
States, that they had an assurance that if the Communists had
flagrantly violated the Paris Accords that the United States would
intervene. Is there any truth to that? Do you know anything about
that?
A: I think that in 1973, as Dr. Kissinger observed the other
day, the United States entered into certain moral commitments; they
were not legal commitments. It was plain at that time that the
United States intended to support the agreements. We have not been
in a position to exercise American power to support those agreements.
Until January or February of this year, Hanoi in its calculations
included as a very liably prospect the re-introduction of American
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2.
power. That is a waning influence and, as you know, under the
law we are not permitted to utilize American power which is the only
sanction that could be effectively employed for that purpose.
Q: Do you know of any such arrangement though with the South
Vietnamese government? Was there that kind of talk?
A: As I indicated earlier, I think that it was strongly stated
to the South Vietnamese government that the United States Government
intended to see to it that the Paris Accords were indeed enforced.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what's your reaction to the rapid deterioration
of the South Vietnamese military?
A: I think that this process of unraveling is one that we all
find disturbing. It is not surprising in a historical sense. Armies
that have been defeated before have tended to come apart. If one
reviews history, going back to the Roman Empire, one discovers that
in retreat armies do have a tendency to degenerate. A retrograde
operation of the sort that was ordered by President Thieu a few
weeks ago is, of course, the most difficult operation to be carried
out even by seasoned, disciplined, well-trained troops that are well
led.
Q: If the North Vietnamese army keeps up its push southward, does
the ARVN have the means to stabilize the military situation?
A: As I indicated before, that remains to be seen. If the
North Vietnamese continue to move their forces to the Saigon area,
that would be a very severe test of the forces remaining to the
government.
Q: Does the United States have any plans to cut off the airlift
to Phnom Penh?
A: The United States plans to continue the airlift to Phnom
Penh so long as there is funding available for the airlift and for
the supplies.
Q: But if Saigon is under siege, will you still attempt the
airlift?
A: The airlift, part of it comes out of Thailand, as you know.
Q: How long do you believe President Thieu can remain in power?
A: That is a subject for the Vietnamese to determine amongst
themselves. They have a constitutional system, and if there are
any changes to be made in the government, of course that is some-
thing that will be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.
Q: Mr. Secretary, will you recommend to the President that he go
to the Congress and ask for permission to reintroduce U.S. airpower
or any other way to put U.S. forces back into Vietnam, or to use
them in some way in Vietnam?
A: I think that the President's statement of March 6 is quite
definitive on that subject. He indicated at that time that there
would be no reintroduction of U.S. military power.
a
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Q: Including air power?
A: U.S. military power I believe was the gist of what he said.
Q: Mr. Secretary, sir, there isn't any ambiguity in your
earlier reply to the question of what kind of commitment we had
to South Vietnam at the time of the peace accords; you repeated
Secretary Kissinger's words, "the moral commitment. " Does
that -- did that commitment include a promise to intervene with
force in the event of a major violation by North Vietnam of the
Accords?
A: I do not know the answer to that question. What I indicated
earlier was that the United States indicated its determination at
that time that the Accords not be grossly violated and although the
Accords started to be violated by Hanoi from the very time the
agreements were signed, the violations tended to be low-level,
relatively discreet, rather than gross and blatant as they have become
more recently.
Q: Mr. Secretary, are there any plans to reintroduce the one-for-
one exchange? Are we going to try to get the number of aircraft to
Vietnam -- let's say, they've lost or abandoned?
A: Any question of the putting in of additional equipment into
Vietnam would be based upon what we perceive to be the present needs
of the situation, reflecting the possibility of a stabilizing of a
defense perimeter north of Saigon and that any details of that sort
will have to be worked out with the President subsequent to the
return of General Weyand when he provides his report.
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you have a worst-case/best-case forecast
for what is liable in the future? In the worst case, how long do
you think Saigon could hold; in the best case, how long?
A: I would care to avoid speculation on that subject. As you
know, the testing period should come in the next 30 days, and I would
hope -- we would all hope -- that under the circumstances that
Saigon will be able to stand up to that test. The best case I think
is just what has been indicated, that there will be the possibility of
a defensive area in the South -- Saigon and the Delta -- that can
be held with the forces available to the government.
Q: What are the ingredients going into making up this estimate
period? Why do you put that kind of time limit on it?
A: What is Hanoi's strategy, whether Hanoi plans to bring its
forces indeed down into the area around Saigon; whether it would
plan on an assault against Saigon; whether they would consolidate
their gains in the northern part of the country - in the Highlands
and MR I or would seek to disrupt by moving fnto the Delta areas,
I think that those are the major considerations regarding the
capability of the forces opposed to the government forces in that
period of time. There is also the question of how successfully the
government will be in pulling together the forces that are available;
the troops that have been evacuated from the North making them
reasonably combat effective and stemming and reversing the decline
in morale of those forces.
MOREO RALO 145 FORD ABRAN
4.
Q: Mr. Secretary, based on what you know now, do you see any
evidence that Hanoi is tilting toward any one of those options?
For example, do you see any evidence that they are moving down divisions
from MR I and II, for example, closer to Saigon?
A: There has been relatively little movement of that sort.
There has been the further movement, however, of some of their
divisions from the strategic reserve toward the South.
Q: Mr. Secretary, two more questions on the Phnom Penh
airlift: are you saying that if Saigon becomes unavailable, we'll
shift all of our operations to Thailand?
A: That would have to be worked out but I think that the question
is a moot one unless we get additional funding from the Congress
because our funding limitations are quite severe at the present time.
Q: What is our recourse if Thailand denies us permission?
A: Well, I think that we will have to deal with all of those
aspects as the problem arises; I do not think the problem will arise.
Q: In the past the Administration has always said the South
Vietnamese have shown the will to fight and therefore -- (inaudible)
Now the Administration is saying -- both Mr. Habib and you are saying --
that the test is about to come. Are you in any way telling the
South Vietnamese that it's time that they make a stand and fight;
it's time that they stop this strategic withdrawal; if they do not
they will have no chance of getting it when it comes.
A: That was not my intention to tell them that; but I think
that the circumstances convey that message in themselves.
Q: Can I get back to your earlier point; you referred back to
the President's remarks of March 6, I don't recall exactly, you
said military power, but the thrust of it was no GIs would be going
in. Are you ruling out the possibility that the President will
make a request to the Congress to use American airpower?
A: I cannot rule that out at this time but that is a subject
that would have to be reviewed very carefully with the President
and I think that the likelihood even of that form of reintroduction
of power is quite low.
Q: Do you anticipate a massive airlift during the next 30
days in the manner of the 1973 airlift to Israel?
A: No, sir, at this time we have the $175 million worth of
funding which is the fourth quarter's portion of the $700 million
worth of funding that was allowed to use in FY 75. We will continue
to draw on that, funding but the kind of operations that you describe
would depend upon the availability of far greater funding than is
presently available to us. At any point that we receive additional
funding we would have to consider that possibility.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I've been intrigued by your comments over the
last two weeks. First an attack on Saigon was expected in 1976;as
recently as Monday it was expected within 30 to 60 days and now
it's expected in thirty days. Are you troubled by the intelligence
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you've been receiving from your best experts? That's one question
and the second one is what's changed your mind SO rapidly?
A: I think that what I've just said is essentially what I've
said before that we could have a test in the next 30 days or SO. The
other day, I think I was talking about an assault on Saigon. What
we're saying here is that there is that possibility in the near time
frame. More generally with regard to the intelligence matter, the
prevailing intelligence until March 17 was that Hanoi intended to
chip away in an attempt to eliminate pacification, eliminate
government strong points but the main assault, the allout offensive
so frequently described would come in 1976. That could change if
there were opportunities presented to Hanoi. I think that the
estimate of Hanoi's intentions in retrospect probably stands up
quite well. The problem with intelligence was not the estimate of
the intentions but the estimate of the capabilities of South Vietnam.
It is obvious in retrospect that the strength, resiliency and steadfast-
ness of those forces were more highly valued than they should have
been, so that the misestimates, I think, apply largely to Saigon's
capabilities rather than to Hanoi's intention. Now, since March 17,
the intelligence community generally has stated that because of the
new opportunities that have been presented to Hanoi as a result of
the partial collapse of the forces of Saigon in the North, that they
have been altering their calculations and as a consequence an allout
offensive against Saigon may well come this year. I would point out,
however, that to this point the word offensive probably should be
kept in quotation marks. There has been relatively little combat
activity. The major combat activity occurred at Ban Me Thout which
fell on the 12th of March. In addition to that relatively small
scale engagement, there was a general withdrawal ordered by the
government that has created the opportunity that I have spoken of.
I think that in several ways that our intelligence was deficient.
The ways that come to mind -- this is in retrospect -- are that we
had spoken for the past two years of the major logistical effort
on the part of Hanoi developing a road network and a base structure
in the western part of South Vietnam. That the impact of that
very substantial expansion of Hanoi's capabilities was not fully
taken into account in striking the balance. Secondly, that we
have been engaged since we were faced with the reduced funding of
this year with the necessity of shrinking the logistical base and
the force structure of the forces available to South Vietnam and
that this shrinkage of the force structure has had effects that go
beyond the physical and have affected morale and organizational
cohesion and resiliency. That also was not taken into account
sufficiently in striking the balance. And finally, I think that we
must recognize that while we have talked continuously amongst our-
selves of the morale effects of the sharp reduction in ammunition
consumption and the ammunition allowed the South Vietnamese forces
that that impact on morale has not been taken sufficiently into
account as well as the fact that the economic conditions in Vietnam
have deteriorated in a manner so that the real pay of civil servants
and soldiers has deteriorated -- that also has affected the underlying
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cohesion of the forces of the government. Now, this is all very
well to speak of in retrospect. I think that these are major problems
that are easier to see in hindsight than they were in prospect.
Q: This does not add up to placing the blame on the legislature
or any one place in Washington.
A: That is correct. I have steadfastly attempted to avoid
placing the blame. If there is blame to be distributed, I think that
the blame can be distributed in a number of places. What I have
repeatedly said, and I have said this steadily during the course of
last year, that with regard to the drastic reduction of assistance
for Vietnam in which the President's budget request was reduced by
better than 60%, before one takes into account price increases, the
very substantial increase in fuel costs as well as munitions, that
first it was unworthy of the United States to fail to provide material
and moral support to the South Vietnamese after the Paris Agreements
that permitted the reduction of our own forces. I've emphasized that.
I have emphasized secondly, that as a result of the reduction in
funding available, that the force structure and logistical base of
the South Vietnamese forces has been shrunken. We did not think
shrunken unacceptably. Thirdly, we have been aware of the impact
on morale of the declining availability of ammunition and those are
considerations that must be kept fully in mind.
Q: In discussions on morale, do we have any feeling yet for the
state of morale which has set in the South Vietnamese divisions in
the III and IV Regions, those which have not been involved in this
retreat?
A: We do not know the answer to that. We know that the effects
of the collapse in the North cannot but have some effect on the morale
of the remaining forces. As I indicated earlier, any decline in morale
must be stemmed and reversed if there is to be a substantial chance
of establishment of a stabilized perimeter.
Q: For example, in the 1972 offensive in hindsight it was
viewed that the North made some mistakes in not fully exploiting some
of their opportunities and that they didn't have the wherewithal to
respond quickly to a changing situation. You said now that they
obviously have a very good logistics system. Is there any doubt
in your mind that they have the capability, if they choose, to bring
down a large number of divisions quickly and to launch the kind of
attack that would be a very serious test for the defenders?
A: They have the capability to move those divisions forward
into MR III and MR IV.
Q: If you were going to choose the word to describe the way
you feel about the South Vietnamese actions, or lack of actions, how
would you describe it?
A: I think that my reaction is one of sympathy. We are all
distressed, I think, at the partial cellapse of the forces available
to the government in the North. It is plain that the strategic
decision to withdraw, however wise in terms of the forces available
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to the government under those circumstances with the decline in
the mobility assets available to the government, that this was
executed in a way and without sufficient preparation that it has
led to at least a partial debacle. That, I think, elicits
sympathy on the part of myself and on the part of most Americans.
Q: Would you say that the South Vietnamese divisions and
forces are sufficient to withstand a North Vietnamese attack -- it's
a question of morale and ability of the government to organize
these forces?
A: As I've indicated before, that will be a severe test.
Q: Are the physical forces available to the government
sufficient, in youe estimation, to withstand an attack?
A: As I suggested, I think the question there is the morale
of those forces and how they will perform when and if the test comes.
I would prefer not to speculate further on that at this time.
Q: Did President Thieu ask the United States for either troops
or air cover?
A: I do not know whether there has been any formal request.
I would have to check on that and we'll get back to you.
Q: Does the Defense Department have any general plans for the
evacuation of Saigon, and also, any plans to save equipment the
United States has supplied?
A: The United States Government has an emergency evacuation plan
for all capitals around the world, so that I would suspect that we
have one that is in good shape with regard to Saigon, but that is not
unique to the circumstances of Saigon. With regard to the equipment,
there are no such plans. That first of all presupposes that
circumstances would arise in which it would be appropriate to withdraw
equipment, and I do not think that there is much capability to do so.
Q: To follow up on that point, will those four U.S. ships and will
those 700 Marines be available for this emergency evacuation plan if
it becomes necessary to protect American citizens, not only from the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong but from South Vietnamese soldiers?
A: In the event of an emergency evacuation plan, the forces of
the United States are available at the request of the Ambassador
through the Department of State.
Voice: We're run over about 12 minutes. Let's take about
three more questions.
Q: Mr. Secretary, is it known how many aircraft were lost in
the rout and is it known why they didn't fly them out?
A: Many of the aircraft were non-flyable; some of them were in
storage. As you know, once again as a result of the decline in funding,
there have been insufficient parts to maintain some of the aircraft.
Contract maintenance funds were shrunken under the reduced budget and
as a result the decision was made to put some of the aircraft aside and
to concentrate on the maintenance of others. To what extent other
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aircraft that were flyable were not flown out and why, I do
not know the answer.
Q: Do we know the total number left behind?
A: It certainly would be in excess of several hundred.
Q: Barring further aid to South Vietnam this fiscal year, is
the $175 million enough to cover the losses, and the defense of
Saigon into the rainy season?
A: The question of enough is dependent upon the ability of
the government effectively to organize the forces available to them.
We have a request to the Congress for $300 million in addition. The
overall strategy with regard to aid will be reviewed by the
Administration when General Weyand returns. The amount of aid
that we can move in at the present time is quite limited.
Q: Do you plan to go out to the western White House this
weekend?
A: I'm not planning on that at this time; I'm in touch with
the President by phone on a daily basis.
Q: The other part of the question is, is the rainy season
going to hinder the North Vietnamese -- the rains are about due to
start in another month or so in MR III?
A: The restrictions on the North Vietnamese would be far less
than they have been historically because of the improvement of the
road net.
Q: Mr. Secretary, there always is great sensitivity when we
move in Marines and our ships and we all remember the Tonkin Gulf;
what exactly are the orders for the four Navy ships with the four
Marine rifle companies aboard?
A: The position of the Department of Defense in its issuance of
orders is to adhere strictly to the law specified in the cutoff
of all combat activities in the summer of 1973. I believe
August 15; at that time it was indicated to all forces that they
should avoid situations that would require participation in combat.
Those orders continue to apply throughout the four successive states
of Indochina. In any circumstances in which it appears that American
forces would be drawn into combat situations that would be circumstances
that we become involved in such matters voluntarily, we would be in
violation of the law.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that the United States
was determined to uphold the principles of the Paris Accords and
see that they were enforced and so forth; what recourse does
the United States have other than to send in troops?
A: That is the problem. I think you put it very well. The
ultimate sanction after 1973 was the sanction of re-employment
of U.S. military power to enforce the Accords. With the legislation
that was passed August 15, 1973, the ultimate sanction disappeared
for the enforcement of those Accords.
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9.
Q: Can I switch you to something else that you commented
on this week in regard to an oil embargo. You said intervention
is a remote possibility; you also said on the other hand we would
have to react. You spoke of the reaction being severe; do you want
to elaborate on that?
A: No.
Q: Will you? Or didn't you get enough questions to clarify
your thinking on the matter?
A: I think that there is inherently in such a situation a
considerable degree of ambiguity as I indicated. The prospect of
military intervention on which I was directly asked, continues to
be a remote possibility. What I further stated was that the United
States might react less tolerantly towards the reintroduction of
a boycott depending on the circumstances than it did in 1973.
Now, just how we might react under such hypothetical conditions
has not been defined; I do not believe it can be defined until such
conditions arise and decisions are made.
END
FORD a LIBRARY RALD
GE
Informal Briefing
ASD/PA Joseph Laitin
Wednesday, April 2, 1975
Mr. Laitin: My name is Joe Laitin for those of you who don't know me.
I see a lot of familiar faces here.
The Secretary has been out of the building for a couple of hours and
I've deferred the start of this briefing to await his return. Although he
has some urgent business coming up he is deferring some of his own appoint-
ments so that he can come down here and address you himself. I anticipate
that we'll have about 20 minutes, SO keep your questions short.
Q: Will he have an opening statement?
A: I anticipate that he might make an opening statement, but we want
to reserve most of the time for questions, which I assume is what you would
want. I remind you, he only has about 20 minutes, so let's try to make the
most of it. He'll be down here within a minute or two. Meantime, is there
anything you want to ask me?
Q: What's the present location of those four ships and what are their
orders?
A: They're off Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay. Before the end of the
day we can give you more details. They're moving in that offshore area.
We'll give you their precise location later, John.
Q: How far off Nha Trang are they?
A: I can fine that out for you. I read in the New York Times this
morning that they're a mile off shore. You may be right, but I'm trying to
check.
Q: The story didn't say they were one mile off. It said they had
permission to go in one mile.
A: I believe that is an accurate statement on your part.
Q: Nha Trang is now under North Vietnamese control, isn't it?
A: I can't add to that right now, but we certainly can get the
answer for you before long. I think it is, but I have not read all the cables.
I've read a lot of the traffic this morning but I was not concentrating on
that aspect at the time.
Q: On the other part of John's question about the orders these ships
will be under, what these ships will be doing ---
A: Fred, you'll get all the information that we have available as the day
goes on just as we've been doing the last couple of days.
Q: My memory is that the provisional revolutionary government of North
Vietnam claims a 12-mile territorial limit.
A: You're getting into a legal question there that I don't feel
qualified to address myself to, although your question is certainly a good one.
MORE
FORD A. EALD
2.
Q: That was a legal question you got into on August of 1964.
A: I went into that with some of our people and it's a long, complicated
legal thing, and if you talk to one of our general counsels, I'll be glad to
arrange that later in the day, John. As I understand it, beyond three miles
is generally considered as being in international waters.
Q: Does the Secretary have a specific announcement is is it just
going to be mainly Q&A?
A: I told you that he's been out of the building for a couple of
hours and I felt that because of the recent developments you would much
prefer to hear from him than from me, or any of the people in my office.
Q: What's the destination of those four ships?
A: They are in a general area off the coast of Nha Trang.
Q: What's their destination? At one time it had been Cam Ranh Bay.
A: They're in that area between Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang.
Q: Where are they going to go now from there is what I'm trying to find
out?
A: That's one of these I'm trying to find out, too. I'm trying to be
as candid as I know how to be with you.
Q: All four ships have arrived?
A: Yes.
Q: And the Marine rifle companies have been dispersed among the
four ships?
A: I have not had word that the Marine rifle companies have been
dispersed -- I think the term is transdecked -- because they are on the two
ships that came from the Okinawa. Before the end of the day I think we
should have more information on that. I'm trying to expedite some of this
information. Some of it I understand won't be available until late tonight, but
we'll get it to you as soon as we can. If it's important enough, I won't
hesitate to wake you at 3:00 a.m.
Q: Has any thought been given to using the space on some of these
cargo planes that have come in, the C-5s, to bring some of these babies out?
A: As far as I know, there are only one or two C-5s that have gone to
Saigon. As for whether any thought has been given to this problem, I can
only answer that by saying I've discovered that thought is being given to
everything around here.
Q: I'm sure you can't answer right now, but is there any possibility
whether it will be considered?
Q: Could we just ask what, if anything, the C-5s or the other airlift
planes are taking out of South Vietnam?
A: I have absolutely no information on that now, but when I know,
you'll know, as the day goes on.
A
FORD
MORE
RALD
LIBRAD
3.
Q: Will you take it as a query then?
A: Of course, Mike.
Q: In the event of a general evacuation, are there any plans for
preventing the loss of more U.S. - -furnished military equipment? In other
words, if there is a takeover by North Vietnam, the whole country, they
would be turned into --
A: I think that that is one of the questions that you might address
to the Secretary when he arrives here momentarily.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of Defense.
A
FORD
BRA
4/3/75
This was transmitted to the President
this morning and the content was
coordinated with State and NSC.
Dr. Marrs
RALD GE R. FORD VERART
We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers
of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United
States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist
these people.
I have, for example, directed all available naval ships
to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist.
We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence
to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North
Vietnam to permit the movement of refugees to areas of their
choice.
The requirements for the care and ultimate disposition
of all those who are fleeing from the war will be heavy. Because
of the large numbers involved and the overwhelming need for
assistance, I will soon be asking the Congress for additional funds
to meet this humanitarian requirement. We will as well be working
with the humanitarian agencies to do everything humanly possible
to relieve the tragic plight of these refugees.
A.I.D. is working with
the Republic of Vietnam to expedite transportation to the
United States for about 2,000 Vietnamese orphans now in
Saigon. I have directed that funds from a $2 million
children's assistance allocation be used to airlift them
in suitable and safe aircraft as soon as possible, and
that the USAID Mission in Saigon move immediately to cut
through any red tape or bureaucratic obstacles.
These orphans are now in the custody of licensed adoption
agencies operating in Vietnam. They were already in the
process of adoption by American families living in various
parts of the United States. Those few who do not have
families arranged will be placed with families now on
waiting lists of the agencies.
We do not now need foster care homes or additional spon-
soring families. Adoption agencies involved which have
U.S. offices will be contacting the prospective parents.
Inquiries from families in the U.S. who are in the process
of adopting Vietnamese children should be made to the
appropriate adoption agencies. (A list is attached).
&
FORD
RALD
LIE
A.I.D. has been working with the Government of Vietnam and
U.S. voluntary agencies in Vietnam for two weeks to expedite
the transportation and placement of these orphans in U.S.
homes, because of the overloading of voluntary agency
facilities in Saigon caused by the refugee situation.
We presently are lining up one or two C-5A planes and
equipping them to ensure safe transportation and care
en route. We are also lining up alternative available
planes. The flights will begin within the next 36 to
48 hours and possibly sooner. We are arranging to have
the children met at Travis Air Force Base and/or other
locations on the west coast and to be cared for upon
arrival.
World Airways brought 57 orphans into Oakland last night
at 11:30 p.m. This was an unauthorized flight because the
South Vietnam Government, the FAA, and the U.S. Mission in
Saigon considered the rice cargo plane to be unsafe and
unsuitable for a long flight of infants across the Pacific.
We would welcome World Airways participation as long as
its flights are safe and appropriate arrangements for
medical care made.
FORD
RALD
LIBRARY
The following agencies with branches in Vietnam are active in
intercountry adoption work. All are either licensed or in the pro-
cess of being licensed by the Ministry of Social Welfare of the
Republic of Vietnam to handle such adoptions.
Prospective adoptive parents should contact one of the following
agencies:
Holt Children's Service
P.O. Box 2420
1195 City View Street
Eugene, Oregon 97402
Telephone: (503) 687-2202
TAISSA (Traveler's Aid--International
Social Services of America)
,
345 East 46th Street, Room 715
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-2747
Friends For All Children
445 South 68th Street
Boulder, Colorado 80303
Telephone: (303) 494-7305
United States Catholic Conference
201 Park Avenue, South
New York, New York 10003
Telephone: (212) 475-5400
Friends of Children of Vietnam
600 Gilpin
Denver, Colorado 80211
Telephone: (303) 321-8251 or 8262
Pearl S. Buck Foundation
2019 DeLancey Place
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
Telephone: (215) 732-1030
World Vision Relief Organization
919 West Huntington Drive
Monrovia, California 91016'
Telephone: (213) 357-1111
A
FORD
RALD
12:35 p.m.
Thursday, April 3
Mr. Marsh says the memo sent up by General Scowcroft
on the Refugees is about to be released unless you
have strong reservations.
Mr. Marsh is presently in General Scowcroft's office.
OERALD OF R. FORD
To: Phil Buchen
From: Brent Scowerof t
FORD & LIBRARY RALD
35
We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers
of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United
States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist
these people.
I have, for example, directed all available naval ships
to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist.
We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence
are colling
to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North
Vietnam to permit the movement of refugees to areas of their
choice.
The requirements for the care and ultimate disposition
of all those who are fleeing from the war will be heavy. Because
of the large numbers involved and the overwhelming need for
assistance, I will soon be asking the Congress for additional funds
to meet this humanitarian requirement. We will as well be working
with the humanitarian agencies to do everything humanly possible
to relieve the tragic plight of these refugees.
R. FORD LIBR.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 3, 1975
MEMO FOR:
SITUATION ROOM
FROM:
JACK MARSH M
Please transmit, via classified channels, the attached
to Mr. CHENEY Don Runisfeld for the President's consideration.
Thank you.
FORD & LIBRAR RALD
CLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 3, 1975
DON CHENEY
RALD & R. FORD JBRART
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
JACK MARSH July
Attached is a question and a proposed response which I have prepared on
the Vietnam matter which I would appreciate your bringing to the President's
attention for his consideration.
By way of background, you should be aware that I have run this by Buchen,
Rourke, Wolthius and Cannon who concur in the response.
I have also showed it to Henry who goes with the first paragraph of the response
but takes strong exception to the second paragraph which he feels should be
modified to be less conciliatory. He makes several points which I feel I should
pass on.
1.
Henry feels that a statement of not trying to assess blame as to
what went wrong is appropriate.
2.
He feels a firm response is necessary by the President that does
not permit the Congress to escape responsibility. He feels that
it is necessary to recount a number of legislative actions in recent
years that lead to the straw that broke the camel's back. For
example, the bombing halt, the steady cuts in aid, other Con-
gressional limitations.
In summary, his view is that the Congress failed to make the hard
choices and accept the responsibilities required of the situation.
Brent's view would be to take the first paragraph of the response on North
Vietnamese aggression and use the responses to similar questions already
forwarded by NSC for the second portion. I feel you should have the
benefit of these views recognizing that the question he receives is not likely
to be in the form any of us have propounded and the response he gives might
reflect a number of inputs.
Determined to be Administrative Marking
Date 1/28/98 By KBH
CLASSIFIED
QUESTION:
Mr. President, there has been much discussion as to who is to blame for the
disastrous turn of events in Vietnam. There has been some reference to your view
that the Congress is fault for failing to provide the recent request for $300
Million in aid. Who do you feel is to blame?
ANSWER:
Let's remember the real source of the problem in Vietnam is the flagrant
aggression and violation of the Paris Peace Accords by the North Vietnamese. They
have invaded South Vietnam. They are the aggressors. They are causing the
refugee problem. If they would withdraw and stop their aggression and their
atrocities, the situation in that country would stabilize. North Vietnam is where
the blame lies by ignoring the Peace Agreement they signed.
that
Now as to what's happened because of the aggression is more complex
involving many factors here and in Vietnam. As you know, I have had a long
record of supporting our effort there. Naturally, I am sorry that I did not receive
the response that I had hoped for in my request for additional aid and assistance.
Like many others, I am disappointed that over a period of years there has been
both a diminution and limitation on our assistance to South Vietnam but it is not
up to me to become involved in a national debate as to who in America is at fault.
My hope is that the Congress will join with me in doing whatever we might to be
of help and assistance to this besieged country and its people.
It is a tragic situation. I am deeply troubled by what has happened but my
support for them has not changed and I am glad that I did what I did to try to obtain
for them the help I felt they needed.
FORD A. HALD LIBRA
D.t mind to be Administrative Marking
Date 1/28/98 By KBH
CLASSIFIED
-2-
I concur with the agrument that Henry is making on Presidential leadership
and calling on the Nation to pull together to make tough choices and accept
responsibilities as a world leader. I think this should be the thrust of next
week's Congressional Message and insuing speeches in the days and weeks
ahead. In this the Congress will have to be challenged, and in a Churchillian
sense.
Where I think we differ is how we point out these Congressional inactions in
Vietnam that contributed to developments there. I think the press conference
forum is not the best place to make the points that need to be made.
FORD & RALD
4/3/75 torThursday
2
--
A giant storm dumped snow on five midwestern states,
causing 29 deaths and closing down Chicago's O'Hare
Airport for only its third time. Michigan used its
National Guardsmen to rescue motorists.
--
More favorable economic news was reported by the networks.
The President expressed confidence at his news conference
that recovery will start by summer.
FROM THE WIRES
O'Neill and Delegation To See Rabin
Tel Aviv (AP) --- A 25-man U.S. Congressional delegation
arrived in Israel today for talks with Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rąbin and a tour of Israel's front line with Syria. The
delegation, led by Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., (D., Mass.),
flew aboard a U.S. Air Force jet from Cairo, where they met
high-ranking Egyptian officials. O'Neill said he expected
the Geneva Middle East peace conference to be reconvened, but
he did not rule out further Israeli-Egyptian negotiations
through the United States despite the collapse of Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger's mediation mission. "The final step
should be settled directly between Israel and Egypt," he said.
The delegation leaves for home Sunday.
----
Kissinger - Dobrynin Meet
Washington (UPI) -- Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
today conferred with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on
Middle East issues and the talks on strategic arms limitation
agreements. Dobrynin said he and Kissinger also discussed
Indochina "but only on minor issues." The hour-long meeting
started at 3:30 p.m.
---
FROM THE NETWORKS
FORD A. RALD LIBRAR
Ford Says He Has Authority to Use Military to
GE
Protect Americans in South Vietnam
President Ford said today at a San Diego news conference
he believes he has the authority to use the military to
protect any evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam, CBS
reported.
3
Walter Cronkite challenged this on the CBS Evening News.
Cronkite said:
"The question about the President's authority to use troops
for an evacuation involves the War Powers Act passed by Congress
in 1973 over the veto of then President Nixon. That law says
the President may use troops if it becomes necessary because of
an attack on the United States, its territories or possessions,
or its armed forces. But the law says nothing about the
protection of Americans overseas, neither authorizing the use
of troops nor expressly forbidding it, for that matter. Spokes-
men in the offices of some Senators who backed the law concede
that this is a murky area.
ABC/NBC reported that the President's news conference was
his first detailed assessment of what he termed the "sad and
tragic events in South Vietnam," but said he retains basic
optimism about the future. The President announced (shown on
CBS film) an American airlift of some 2,000 already-adopted
orphans.
John Chancellor (NBC) said the President indicated it would
be up to the American people to judge who is at fault for
the events in South Vietnam. Howard K. Smith (ABC) said Ford's
mood was somber and his personal frustration was clear. Tom
Brokaw (NBC) said the President blamed the chaos on President
Thieu's unilateral decision to withdraw his troops from the
Central Highlands. Thieu also was frustrated by Congress, which
had refused to vote additional aid to South Vietnam, the
President said.
Bob Schieffer (CBS) said the President defended the history
of the American involvement in Vietnam. Tom Jarriel (ABC) said
Ford protested that the restrictions of the War Powers Act
stripped him of even the psychological threat of U.S. interven-
tion in Indochina.
On ABC/CBS film, the President said he is frustrated but
he is convinced "this country is going to continue its leader-
ship. " The President said (on NBC/CBS film) that the United
States will not abandon its allies. He warned any adversaries
that they should not feel that the tragedy of Vietnam is an
indication that Americans have lost their will or desire to
stand up for freedom anywhere in the world.
A
FORD
GERALD
RALD
LIBRA
mE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APRIL 3, 1975
Office of the White House Press Secretary
(San Diego, California)
THE WHITE HOUSE
TEXT OF REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
I am delighted to be here today on the beautiful shores of San Diego bay
America's cleanest bay in forms of sise and traffic, I am especially
pleased because this is a showcase of what Americans can do on a local
level to solve problems and respond to the future with creativity and
confidence.
San Diago has demonstrated that environmental quality is good business.
Even the animals in your famous 200 are thriving because of your achieve-
ments in preserving our natural heritage as you develop the most modern
recreational and industrial facilities. I commend your carefully managed
residential growth. San Diego is truly & city on which others could be
modeled.
I am especially proud of the role of the United States Navy as a good
FORD IF EARAD LIBRARY
citizen in San Diego, among our greatest Naval bases, And I pledge to
you today, as one who sailed from be re during World War Two, that I
remain committed to a Navy second to none in readiness, capability and
dedication to our nation's highest ideals.
I know that the concerns of this area go beyond your vital Navy installations
and the wonders of the San Diego 200. Too many in this region are without
employment. Prices and taxes are too high. New sources of energy are
essential,
I also know that local problems are best solved by local people. This
administration responded to your pioneering of growth management strategy
to preserve the residential anvironment. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development has just approved San Diego's application for $9.1 million
uzder the historic.new community development block grant legislation.
This confers upon San Diego the distinction of being one of the very first
major cities to receive such assistance,
Your able mayor, Pete Wilson, tells me that one of the ways this grant
will be used is to speed economic development by attracting new business
and industries to San Diego, Funds from this new block grant approach
are available for the first time to prepare sites and, together with the
on-the-job training programs of the Department of Labor, offer an extra
inducement for new enterprises to locate in your already world-renowned
climate.
This kind of local initiative and planning proves we are on the right track
with bleck grants instead of trying to run everything from Washington,
and demonstrates my firm conviction that the best features of community
development should neither be sacrificed in the current economic climate
nor stifled by Federal red tape.
San Diego is a showcase of the good neighbor policy. The nearby Mexican
border is the busiest international crossing in the world. making this a
gateway city with a unique challenge. San Diego and Tijuana share the same
air and water and seek joint solutions to problems that cross national
boundaries.
-2-
I commend Fronteras 1976, the San Diego community's bicentennial project,
jointly sponsored by the city and the University of California at San Diego,
This project will advance regional and international understanding demon-
strating to the world the potential of creative cooperation and interdependence
among sovereign nations.
Serious problems confront the American people at home, Yet unemployment
and the growth of our economy, as well as our national security, are directly
related to relations with the rest of the world.
In recent weeks we witnessed discouraging and tragic events in the Middle
East on which we depend for far too much of our energy needs. These
developments dramatised the urgency of moving ahead in San Diego and
throughout America with constructive action to make this nation independent
of foreign sources of energy.
Today 1 renew my challenge to the Congress to act before the end of this
month on the urgently-needed energy program I requested last January.
We can afford no more delays.
I would not be frank and honest with you if I were to ignore the serious
setbacks we have suffered in recent weeks in our quest for peace in the
Middle East and, more recently and more dramatically, in Southeast Asia.
Even as I speak, the dimansions of the human catastrophe in Southeast Asia
increase. Whether from your evening news shows or morning headlines
or from my top secret reports, it is impossible not to be moved and
shaken by the sudden and tragic developments in South Vietnam. All
Americans are shocked and saddened and wondering what we can do.
First, we are taking all the humanitarian measures we can to relieve the
innocent civillan refugees in South Vietnam whose plight touches the heart
of America, At the same time, we are providing for the safety of all the
Americans who from a deep sense of duty might be endangered by swift
changes in the battl e sone.
FORD I RALD LIBRARY
30
Second, as soon as they return from their Easter recess and I have oppor
tunity to address them, I will sak the members of the Congress for a firm
American commitment to humanitarian assistance for the helpless victims
of North Vistnamese aggression in flagrant violation of the Paris accords,
which sought to end the suffering and bloodshed on a civilised basis.
Finally, I must say with all the certainty of which I am capable: no adver-
saries or potential enemies of the United States should imagine that America
can be safely challenged; and no allies or time-teated friends of the United
States should worry or fear that our commitments to them will not be honored,
because of the current confusion and changing situation in Southeast Asia.
We stand ready to defend ourselves and support our allies as surely as we
always have,
As it always has, adversity is creating a new sense of national unity among
Americans in these sad and troubled times. I will not engage in recrimina-,
tions or attempts to assess blame, nor should any of us, Not all the facts
are known. What essential now is that we keep our nerve and our essential
A
unity as a.powerful but paace-loving nation.
As President and Commander-in-Chief, it is my sworn duty to maintain and
strengthen the power for peace which the United States possesses both at
home and abroad.
(MORE)
-32
The military strength of this Nation depends, as It always has, on Its
economic strength and the will power and self-discipline of its people.
The credibility of the United States in the world, both among our allies and
our adversaries, depends upon their assessment of our moral, economic
and military strength and staying power. All three of these elements are
easential.
Let me consider briefly the problem of ensuring and increasing our
economic strength. In this, the obvious priority is to get out of the recession
we have been experiencing, and particularly to increase employment and get
the jobless back into productive jobs.
But along with that urgent goal goes another priority, less obvious to some,
which is to end the recession without adding unnecessarily to the inflationary
pressures which have plagued us for many years prior to the recession and
which helped to bring it on, We must make more jobs and reverse the
recession without recklessly inviting a new round of double-digit Inflation,
rising interest rates and higher prices which in the long run would cancel
out whatever stimulus and expansionary incentive we can apply to the
economy in the short run.
That is why I am determined to hold the line on all the massive Federal
spending programs which are moving through the Congress, That is why 1
have drawn the line at a maximum budget deficit of $60 billion, which is
where we stand now and is as far as we dare to go without endangering
economic recovery.
I am gratified that some of the responsible members of the Senate and the
House, on both aides of the political aisle, have spoken publicly of the danger
of more massive deficits. Not merely the Administration, but the country
needs their help and will need their votes when the showdowns come, But 1 have
no wish to wage a veto war with Congress. We have enough real ware and
rumors of war, What I would prefer is for the Congress to exercise its
constitutional power of the purse with the responsibility and prudence that the
people expect of it. Congress must cut rather than spend; It must reduce
existing programs instesd of creating new ones. It cannot go on giving away
more and more government benefits without considering how to pay for them,
and the damage that will be done by borrowing to pay for them.
When the American people are tightening their belts to get through the worst
recession of recent times -- caused in large part by decades of deficits and
ever-growing government programs the Congress should not ask them to
suffer the consequences of more of the same fiscal folly.
FORD a GERALD LIBRARY
I would like the Congress to fix an absolute celling on Federal spending for
the coming year. The ceiling where I drew the line. To do this effectively,
the Congress must go one step further put the already enacted procedures
of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 into effect
a whole year ahead of schedule, starting this July 1.
In the face of a huge deficit that could reach $100 billion if my budget is over-
ridden, it is hard to Bee how Congress can refuse to do this and retain any
fiscal credibility,
Excessive Federal spending for years has fueled the fires of inflation and
imposed the unfairest tax of all on the American people -- robbing the retired
of their pensions, the elderly of their Social Security, the hard-working majority
of their paychecks' full value in the supermarket, Runaway Inflation can rain
the productive growth and essential strength of the free enterprise system and
cripple our entire American economy.
.4.
That is why my economic recovery program contains two elements, each
essential to its success. One, a quick one-time tax cut to stimulate buying
power and new investment in job-producing expansion. The other,
spending cuts and a one-year moratorium on Dew spending by the govern-
ment except for emergency and energy needs. Federal tax cuts alone will
not work without simultaneous Federal spending restraints.
I am deeply concerned, however, that some elements in Congress will try to
pay for additional spending programs by dangerously stripping billions from
the defense budget, At a time like this, nothing could be more shortsighted or
devastating to our safety.
Individually, many of the domestic spending programs proposed in the Congress
may have attractive aspects, They provide help to some worthy group,
It is hard for Members of Congress to oppose them it will be hard for me
to veto them if Congress enacts them. But it is not the individual programs
that are unacceptable but the sum total of them adding up easily to
$30 billion or more to bring the deficit into the $100 billion range.
Defense spending, on the other hand, provides no benefits except the most
precious benefit of all the freedom of our country and the last hope for
peace in the world. As President Eisenhower so wisely observed, only the
strong are free. Certainly we have ample reason to believe this truth today.
My budget recommendations for national defense are the minimum I believe
to be essential for our skiety.
It is now a popular idea that because Americans are not fighting anywhere,
bacause we are seeking to broaden every avenue of peace, that we can expand
social benefit programs and pay for them out of defense cutbacks, Simple
arithmetic disproves this. I have seen careful mathematical projections
that show, if welfare and other transfer payments continue merely at their
present rate of growth about 9% annually for the past 20 years half o
the American people will be living off the other half by the year 2000,
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Except for vastly increasing taxes on those who work, the only way such pay-
ments can be continued indefinitely ia to take them away from our national
defense. Other superpowers are doing nothing of the kind, I pledge to you
today that I will resist stripping America's defense capability in every legal
way available to me,
But if the men and women you send to the Congress fail to face up to these
inescapable realities, refuse to exercise the balanced judgment their own
new budget committee has been set up to enforce, then by simple arithmetic
it will only be B. few short decades before our defenses will be down to a single
soldier with a single rifle with a single round of ammunition.
I have more faith in America than that, 1 have always been an optimist. And
wherever I can get away from Washington and see Americans as they really
live and work and play and plan for their children, my sense of what's right
with our country is recharged and reinforced.
I am very pleased to be here today in the optimistic atmosphere and problem-
solving climate of Southern California. 1 am among people with great
experience and great courage, Many of the heroic POW's, who were liberated
from North Vietnam are here in San Diago. They know the need for an orderly
and peaceful world. They also know as men who live on the brink of doom,
the danger of pessimism. They know that the objective facts are not as
bad as a moad of frustration and futility to which some of our countrymen are
tempted to succumb,
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Today 1 want to appeal to the common sense and courage of the American
people, This is not a moment for despair or fataliam, Obviously it is not
the time to dismantle our defense capabilities -- including our intelligence
capacities.
We will go on helping people to help themselves. It is in keeping withour
religious heritage, our decency and our own self-interest. We will preserve
partnerships with people striving for freedom.
I reject the prophets of doom who see nothing but depression at home and
despair abroad. I will reject any advice to pull down the stare and stripes
and sail home from the seas of the world to the safe anchorage of San Diego
Bay. If we do so, this anchorage will no longer be safe. You know it. And
I know it.
Under my Presidency, we will neither furl the flag nor abandon hope, We will
maintain constancy and credibility in American policy, at home and abroad.
We are living in a complicated and troubled time, Events are moving very
rapidly. But we will not withdraw inward nor surrender to a state of shock.
America is being put to the test It is not just a test of our moral authority
in the world. It is a test of our will to develop our own energy resources, to
reduce bureaucratic waste, and to preserve our dollar by guarding against
non-essential spending with the same vigilance that we continue the watchful-
ness and strength of our armed forces,
It is a test of our will to provide for the economic security of our families
while assuring the military security of our nation. We can meet this test only
be reducing vulnerability to weaknesses in our economy and anergy capacities.
That is why an adequate security program goes hand-in-hand with sound
economic policies and prompt, effective energy legislation.
America has the will. America has the resources. America has the know-how.
And American has the faith.
I share your belief in America. If you despaired of this nation and its future,
you would not be here today. Together, WD will build a new and better tomorrow,
# # #
GE LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 12
of the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
12:01 P.M. PDT
April 3, 1975
Thursday
In the Silver Room
At the San Diego Convention
and Performing Arts Center
San Diego, California
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please sit down.
At the outset, let me express my appreciation
to Mayor Pete Wilson and the fine people of San Diego
for the very warm welcome.
I also am delighted to see one or more of my
former colleagues in the Congress here. It is always
nice to see them and all others who may be here. Good
morning.
I have a short opening statement.
We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold
numbers of Vietnamese flea the North Vietnamese onslaught.
The United States has been doing -- and will continue to
do -- its utmost to assist these people.
I have directed that all available Naval ships
to stand off Indochina, to do whatever is necessary to
assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use
its moral influence to permit these innocent people to
leave, and we call on North Vietnam to permit the
movement of refugees to the area of their choice,
FORD & LIBRARY GRAALD
While I have been in California, I have been
spending many hours on the refugee problem and our human-
itarian efforts, I have directed that money from a $2
million special foreign aid children's fund be made avail-
able to fly 2000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United
States as soon as possible.
I have also directed American officials in Saigon
to act immediately to cut red tape and other bureaucratic
obstacles preventing these children from coming to the
United States.
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I have directed that C-5A aircraft and other
aircraft especially equipped to care for these orphans
during the flight be sent to Saigon. I expect these
flights to begin within the next 35 to 48 hours. These
orphane will be flown to Travis Air Force Base in California,
and other bases on the West Coast, and cared for in
those locations.
These 2000 Vietnamese orphans are all in the
process of being adopted by American families. This is
the least we can do, and we will do much, much more.
The first question is from Mr. George Dissinger
of the San Diego Tribune.
QUESTION: Mr. President, are you ready to accept
Communist takeover of South Vietnam and Cambodia?
THE PRESIDENT: I would hope that that would
not take place in either case. My whole Congressional
life in recent years was aimed at avoiding it. My
complete efforts as President of the United States were
aimed at avoiding that.
I am an optimist, despite the sad and tragic
events that we see unfolding. I will do my utmost in the
future -- as I have in the past -- to avoid that result.
QUESTION: Mr. President, I understand you are
soon going to ask Congress for new authority to extend
humanitarian aid in Southeast Asia. I wondered if you
stand by your request, though, for more military aid for
South Vietnam.
THE PRESIDENT: We do intend to ask for more
humanitarian aid. I should point out that the Adminis-
tration's request for $135 million for humanitarian aid
in South Vietnam was unfortunately reduced to $55 million
by Congressional action. Obviously, we will ask for more;
the precise amount we have not yet determined.
We will continue to push for the $300 million
that we have asked for and Congress had authorized for
military assistance to South Vietnam, and the possibility
exists that we may ask for more.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, how and why did
the U.S. miscalculate the intentions of the will of
the South Vietnamese to resist?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe that we mis-
calculated the will of the South Vietnamese to carry
on their fight for their own freedom.
There were several situations that developed
that I think got beyond the control of the Vietnamese
people. The unilateral military decision to withdraw
created a chaotic situation in Vietnam that appears to
have brought about tremendous disorganization.
I believe that the will of the South Vietnamese
people to fight for their freedom is best evidenced by
the fact that they are fleeing from the North Vietnamese
and that clearly is an indication they don't want to
live under the kind of government that exists in North
Vietnam,
The will of the South Vietnamese people, I think,
still exists. They want freedom under a different kind of
government than has existed in North Vietnam. The
problem is how to organize that will under the traumatic
experiences of the present,
QUESTION: Unilateral decision by whom?
THE PRESIDENT: It was a unilateral decision by
President Thieu to order a withdrawal from the broad,
exposed areas that were under the control of the South
Vietnamese military,
QUESTION: Hr. President, what is your response
to the South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington's
statement that we had not lived up to the Paris peace
accords and that the Communists are safer allies?
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY 30
THE PRESIDENT: I won't comment on his statement.
I will say this: That the North Vietnamese repeatedly
and in massive efforts violated the Paris peace accords.
They sent North Vietnamese regular forces into South
Vietnam in massive numbers -- I think around 150,000
to 175,000 -- well-trained North Vietnamese regular
forces, in violation of the Paris peace accords, moved
into South Vietnam,
We have objected to that violation. I still
believe that the United States, in this case and in other
cases, is a reliable ally and although I am saddened
by the events that we have read about and seen, it is
a tragedy unbelievable in its ramifications.
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I must say that I an frustrated by the action
of the Congress in not responding to some of the requests
for both economic, humanitarian and military assistance
in South Vietnam. And I am frustrated by the limitations
that were placed on the Chief Executive over the last
two years.
But let me add very strongly, I am convinced
that this country is going to continue its leadership.
We will stand by our allies and 1 specifically warn
any adversaries they should not, under any circumstances,
feel that the tragedy of Vietnam is an indication that
the American people have lost their will or their desire
to stand up for freedom any place in the world.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, can you explain why
President Thieu, with our close military ties as allies,
did not tell you what he was going to do in terms of the
retreat?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the only answer to that
can come from President Thieu.
QUESTION: Hr. Ford, recently you said the fall
of Cambodia could threaten the national security of this
country. Considering the probable fall of South Vietnam
to Communist forces, do you feel that will threaten our
national security, and if so, how?
THE PRESIDENT: At the moment, I do not anticipate
the fall of South Vietnam, and I greatly respect and
admire the tremendous fight that the government and the
people of Cambodia are putting up against the insurgents
who are trying to take over Cambodia.
I believe that in any case where the United
States does not live up to its moral or treaty obligations,
it can't help but have an adverse impact on other allies
we have around the world. We read in European papers to
the effect that Western Europe ought to have some questions.
Let me say to our Western European allies, we
are going to stand behind our commitments to NATO, "and
we are going to stand behind our commitments to other
allies around the world.
But, there has to be in the minds of some
people, a feeling that maybe the tragedy of Indochina
might affect our relations with their country. I
repeat, the United States is going to continue its leader-
ship and stand by its allies.
QUESTION: Are you, in fact, a believer of the
domino theory of, if Southeast Asia falls, then perhaps
FORD a GERALD LIBRARY
some of the other countries in the Pacific are next?
THE PRESIDENT: I believe there is a great deal
of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it does not
happen, I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia,
Thailand, the Philippines, don't misread the will of the
American people and the leadership of this country to
believing that we are going to abandon our position in
Southeast Asia.
We are not, but I do know from the things I
read and the messages that I hear, that some of them
do get uneasy. I hope and trust they believe me when
I say we are going to stand by our allies.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, as you are well aware,
there are about 7000 Americans still in Saigon. They
are in danger not only from Communist attack, but from
South Vietnamese reprisals. There are reports that the
South Vistnamese are in a bad temper toward Americans.
Do you feel that under the War Powers Act and
also under the limitations voted by Congress in 1873
on combat by Americans in Indochina, that you could send
troops in to protect those Americans, and would you, if
it came to that?
THE PRESIDENT: I can assure you that I will
abide totally with the War Powers Act that was enacted
by the Congress several years ago. At the same time,
I likewise assure you that we have contingency plans to
meet all problems involving evacuation, if that should
become necessary. At this point, I do not believe that
I should answer specifically how those contingency plans
might be carried out,
QUESTION: Sir, you don't want to talk specifi-
cally. Can you tell us, however, if you do believe that
you do have the authority to send in troops? You are not
saying, I understand, whether you would, but do you have
the authority?
THE PRESIDENT: It is my interpretation of
that legislation that a President has certain limited
authority to protect American lives. And to that extent,
I will use that law,
QUESTION: Mr. President, despite your statement
here this morning about war orphans, there apparently is
a lot of red tape in Washington. A San Diego man who is
trying to get four Vietnamese children out of that
country has received hundreds of calls from people all over
the Western United States wanting to help, even adopt
children, but despite this outpouring of compassion by
the American people, all he gets in Washington is, "No way."
There is nothing that can be done. Why is he
running into this problem, if we are trying to help?
FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
THE PRESIDENT: Having had some experience in the
past with the Federal bureaucracy, when we had a similar
problem involving Korean orphans, I understand the
frustration and the problem.
But, I am assured that all bureaucratic red
tape is being eliminated to the maximum degree and that
we will make a total effort, as I indicated in my opening
statement, to see to it that South Vietnamese war orphans
are brought to the United States,
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QUESTION: Do you think something can be done
before it is too late for many of them?
THE PRESIDENT: I can only say we will do
what has to be done, what can be done, as a practical
matter. I cannot guarantee that every single South
Vietnamese war orphan will get here, but I can assure
you that we intend to do everything possible in that
humanitarian effort.
QUESTION: Mr. President, the Gallup Poll
shows a very healthy majority of the American people,
60 percent of the American people, are more concerned
about the high cost of living than they are about any
other issue including the recession and international
developments.
I would like to ask you, in view of that,
if Congress does not respond to your repeated appeals to
hold down spending and not exceed a level that would pro-
duce a deficit of $60 billion, If they don't do that,
and government borrowing increases to cover the deficit,
do you have any plans, is there anything you plan to
do beyond just these appeals to Congress to prevent a
resurgence of inflation?
THE PRESIDENT: As I clearly indicated last
Saturday night when I approved the Tax Reduction Act,
I have drawn the line on additional Federal spending.
That is as far as we dare go.
If we 80 beyond that, we amplify the potentialities
for a resurgence of double-digit inflation. I intend to
appeal to the Congress to hold the lid and I intend to
appeal to the American people to get their Members of
Congress -- Senators and Congressmen -- to stop coming
to the White House with one spending bill after another,
In addition, I am asking the Congress to enact a
provision that would make applicable for fiscal year 1975
the Budget Control Act that was enacted last year by
the Congress.
Under the present law, the Budget Control Act,
which forces the Congress to set a ceiling, does not
FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
actually come into effect until fiscal year 1977. It
seems to me in the crisis that we face today, that the
Congress ought to amend the Budget Control Act and make it
applicable to fiscal year 1976 80 they will impose on
themselves, individual Members of Congress -- House
and Senate -- a spending limitation.
Now, they are going through sort of a practice
session on it. I wish they would abandon the practice
session and get down to the ball game, and they, themselves,
set a spending limit at the level that I indicated.
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QUESTION: What I am asking you, Hr. President,
is if you have any strings to your Dow other than these
Congressional strings? In other words, what I am asking
you is, do you plan any executive action to try to
curb a resurgence or prevent a resurgence of inflation?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the executive actions
will be directives to the various departments of the
government to limit their spending even within the
appropriated amounts that Congress has made available.
We are expecting every department to spend as
little as possible to carry out their programs or their
manuates, and this includes holding the line on Federal
personnel; it includes the limitations on spending
for anything that cannot be justified. Under the ,law,
that is the maximum that I can do in an executive capacity.
QUESTION: Mr. President, if it would alleviate
the refugee problem in South Vietnam and bring about
something of a temporary ceasefire, would you urge
President Thieu to resign?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe that it is my
prerogative to tell the head of state elected by the
people to leave office. I don't believe whether it
is one head of state or another makes any difference
in our efforts to help in the humanitarian program,
We are going to carry it on, I hope, with
a full cooperation of the South Vietnamese government,
and I don't think it is appropriate for me to ask him,
under these circumstances, to resign. I don't think
his resignation would have any significance on our
humanitarian efforts,
QUESTION: In that regard, are there any plans
underway by the U.S. government to accept large numbers
of Vietnamese refugees in this country other than the
2,000 orphans that you have talked about?
THE PRESIDENT: Under existing law, action by the
Attorney General can permit refugees who are fleeing
problems in their own country to come to the United States.
This authority was used after World War II. This authority
was used after the Hungarian invasion by the Soviet Union.
This authority has been used on a number of
a
other occasions. I can assure you that that authority
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is being examined and if it will be helpful, I certainly
will approve it.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, what is your judgment
now on when you expect the recession to end and recovery
to begin? Is it the third quarter of this year, or will
it be later?
THE PRESIDENT: Our best judgment is that the
recession will turn around during the third quarter of
this calendar year. We are already seeing some significant
changes in the statistics that give us more certainty
that the recession will end and that economic recovery
will begin in the third quarter of this calendar year.
QUESTION: Could you tell us what those signs
are, please, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, The latest report shows
that there has been an increase in the ordering of
manufactured goods. The first time I think in six months
that there has been an increase rather than a decrease.
Interest rates are dropping. More money for
borrowers is being made available. The inflation is
receding, or at least the rate of inflation is receding.
As of the last report, it would annualize at about
7,2 percent, contrasted with a 12 or 13 percent rate of
inflation in 1974.
When you add up all these various economic
indicators, it does show that the receasion is receding
and that economic conditions will get better in the
third quarter of 1975.
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FORD A. GERALD LIBRARY
Page 10
QUESTION: Mr. President, in line with the
spending question last year when you campaigned in
California, you asked voters to help defeat the big
spenders in Congress and, if they happened to be
Republicans, well, so be it.
Do you plan to use the same philosophy in
campaigning next year, and to the extent you will openly
campaign against Republicans whose philosophies or
policies may contradict yours? If BO, how does this sit
with your statement that the Republican Party is broad
enough for all views?
THE PRESIDENT: I expect to be campaigning
very hard for my own re-election in 1976. I will, of
course, urge that voters in every state support those
candidates who believe as I do, that we have got to
hold a line on and restrain excessive Federal spending.
My enthusiasm for an individual candidate will,
of course, depend upon his strong support for my policy
of fiscal restraint, but I am not going to pass judgment
today on individuals, whether in one party or another.
QUESTION: Does thia mean then that there is a
possibility that during that campaign you could come
out openly in support of a Democrat as opposed to a
Republican?
THE PRESIDENT: I believe in the need for the
country to have individual Members of the House and
Senate who believe that these massive Federal spending
programs are bad for America,
I certainly will look with favor on anyone who
believes as I do, that we cannot spend ourself into
prosperity. A tax cut approach is a far better way,
and that massive spending programs are not good for
America,
a
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QUESTION: Mr. President, you now head an
Administration which came to power on a strong law-and
GE
LIBRARY
order platform, but the crime rate since 1989 has done
nothing but go up and the statistics include crimes at
the highest levels of government.
My question is, whether you think it would be
fair for the Democrats to charge that this Administration
is soft on crime, or at least is incapable of dealing
with the problem?
THE PRESIDENT: Unfortunately, for the country
the crime rate has been increasing for the last ten or
15 years, whether it was under a Democratic adminis-
tration, under President Kennedy or President Johnson,
or, except for, I think, one year under the former President,
the crime rate has been going up, I don't think it is
a partisen issue.
Page 11
It is DI judgment that We have to maximize
our efforts--the Federal Government, state government
and local units of government--to try and have
proper enforcement of the law, which includes the
prosecution of people who violate the law.
I can only assure you that to the extent that
the Federal Government can do something about it, we --
this Administration -- will do it. The facts of life
are that most law enforcement is the local responsibility.
Through the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the
Federal Government has been spending for the last several
years around $800 million to help local units of government,
state units of government in the upgrading of their law
enforcement capability, helping police departments,
helping sheriff's departments, helping the courts, and
will continue to do it.
But, the principal responsibility rests at the
local level.
QUESTION: Will you be able to spend any more
money under your proposition that the line has to be
drawn somewhere on fighting the crime problem?
THE PRESIDENT: I think in the budget I submitted,
there is ample money for a Federal effort to carry out
the Federal role in the area of law enforcement.
QUESTION: Mr. President, you spoke a few
minutes ago about being frustrated by the limitation of
the War Powers Act. If it were not forbidden now, would
you like to send American planes and Naval forces and
possibly ground forces into Vietnam to try to turn the
situation around?
THE PRESIDENT: I have said that there are no
plans whatsoever for U.S. military involvement in
Vietnam. On the other hand, I think history does prove
that if a Chief Executive has a potential to, it, to
some extent, is a deterrent against aggressors.
QUESTION: So, that is your frustration, because
you do not have that power to at least threaten the
possibility?
THE PRESIDENT: I did not use the word "threat."
I said the potential for power, I think, over the years
has indicated that that potential is a deterrent
against aggression by one country against another.
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Page 12
QUESTION: Mr. President, in view of the
possible primary entries by Governor Reagan and
perhaps Governor Thompson of New Hampshire, would you
be good enough to discuss your own timetable?
When will you set up your committee, specifically,
and can you also tell us, do you plan to enter any
primaries yourself, or through a stand-in candidate?
THE PRESIDENT: We have not defined our precise
timetable, nor our precise plans for the pre-convention
campaign. We are in the process of putting together
our timetable and our plans. I have seid repeatedly that
I intend to be a candidate; but I have made no categorical
announcement to that effect. But, the matter is not
being neglected.
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QUESTION: Mr. President, in light of current
concerns regarding the assassination of President
Kennedy and the recent showings of the Zapruder films,
do you still have the same confidence in the finding
of the Warren Commission that you had as a Member of that
Commission?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you have to read very
carefully what the Warren Commission said. And I,
as a member of the Warren Commission, helped to
participate in the drafting of the language. We said that
Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. We said that the
Commission had found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign
or domestic.
Those words were very carefully drafted. And
BO far, I have seen no evidence that would dispute the
conclusions to which we came.
We were most careful because in 1963 and 1964,
when we most carefully analyzed all the evidence available,
there was none of the involvement of anybody or
anybody as a group, in the assassination.
It is my understanding that the Rockefeller
Commission may, if the facts seem to justify it, take
a look at it, at the problem, and I suspect that the
House and Senate committees that are currently investi-
gating CIA history may do the same,
But the Commission was right when it made
its determination and it was accurate, at least to
this point -- I want to re-emphasize that -- as to
the evidence that we saw.
QUESTION: Mr. President, some people are saying
this week that despite all our massive aid in Vietnam
and all the lives that were lost there, that the whole
thing has come to nothing.
Now, how do you feel about this, and do you
think there is any lesson to be learned in what has.
been happening over there?
GE LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
THE PRESIDENT: I believe that the program of
the previous four or five Presidents -- President Kennedy,
President Johnson, President Nixon, and myself
were aimed at the -- in the right direction, that we
should help those people who are willing to fight for
freedom for themselves.
That was a sound policy. Unfortunately,
events that were beyond our control as a country have
made it appear that that policy was wrong. I still
believe that policy was right if the United States
had carried it out as we promised to do at the time
of the Paris peace accords where we promised, with the
signing of the Paris peace accords, that we would make
military hardware availablc to the South Vietnamese
government on a replacement, one-for-one basis. Unfortunately,
we did not carry out that promise,
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QUESTION: Are you blaming Congress for this, then?
THE PRESIDENT: I am not assessing blame on
anyone. The facts are that in fiscal year 2974, there
was a substantial reduction made by the Congress in the
amount of military equipment requested for South Vietnam.
In fiscal year 1975, the current fiscal year,
the Administration asked for $1 billion 400 million
in military assistance for South Vietnam. Congress put
a ceiling of $1 billion on it and actually appropriated
only $700 million.
Those are the facts, I think it is up to the
American people to pass judgment on who was at fault or
where the blame may rest. That is a current judgment,
I think historians, in the future, will write
who was to blame in this tragic situation. But the
American people ought to know the facts and the facts
are as I have indicated.
I think it is a great tragedy, what we are seeing
in Vietnam today, I think it could have been avoided. But
I am not going to point a finger. The American people
will make that judgment. I think it is more important
for me and the American people and the Congress, in the
weeks and months ahead, to do what we can to work
together to meet the problems of the future.
That is what I intend to do, and I will go more
than half way with the Congress in seeking to achieve that
result. I think we have the capability in America. I
think we have the will to overcome what appears to be a
disaster in Southeast Asia. To the extent that I can,
I hope to give that leadership.
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Page 15
QUESTION: Mr. President, regardless of what
caused it, it seems apparent that for the first time in
our Nation's history, the enemy is about to win a war
where Americans fought and died. Do you think those
$5,000 lives were wasted?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think they were
wasted, providing the United States had carried out the
solemn commitments that were made in Paris. At the time
American fighting was stopped in South Vietnam, at 8
time when the agreement provided that all of our troops
should be withdrawn, that all of our POW's should be
returned, if we had carried out the commitments that
were made at that time, the tragic sacrifices that were
made by many -- those who were killed, those who were
wounded -- would not have been in vain.
When I see us not carrying through, then it
raises a quite different question.
QUESTION: Is that a yes, then, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: I still think there is an
opportunity to salvage the situation in Vietnam, and if
we salvage it, giving the South Vietnamese an opportunity
to fight for their freedom, which I think they are anxious
to do,if given an honest opportunity, then there was not
a sacrifice that was inappropriate or unwise.
QUESTION: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
In a speech you are going to deliver here in
San Diego this afternoon, you warm against the fatalism,
despair and the prophets of doom. Yet, as I look
back over the past eight months or a year -- and I don't
mean to suggest that these are in any way your respon-
sibility or fault ** I have a laundry list which cites
Portugal as having a leftist government raising serious
questions about its future in NATO.
Greece and Turkey are at each other's throats,
threatening the Southern flanks of that alliance. We
are familiar that Secretary Kissinger's mission failed in,
his peace talks with Egypt, and Ierael, and we don't need
to rehash the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam.
That being the case, sir, how can you say
that the world outlook -- and particularly as you
address it in your speech next week on the state of the
world -- is anything but bleak for the United States
when many of the minuses which I cited are actually
plusses for the Soviets?
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THE PRESIDENT: The speech that I am giving to
Congress and to the American people next week will deal
with many of the problems that you have raised. I
think we do face a crisis, but I am optimistic that if
the Congress joins with me, and the American people support
the Congress and me, as President, we can overcome those
difficulties.
We can play a constructive role in Portugal;
not interfering with their internal decisions, but
Portugal is an important ally in Western Europe. We can
find ways to solve the problem in Cyprus and hopefully
keep both Greece and Turkey strong and viable members
of NATO.
We can, despite the difficulties that trans-
pired in the Middle East in the last several weeks, find
a way to keep a peace movement moving in that very
volatile area.
It may mean - and probably does -- that we
will have to take the problem to Geneva. I would have
preferred it otherwise, but the facts are that if
Congress and the American people and the President work
together -- as I expect they will -- then in my judgment,
those disappointments can become plusses.
QUESTION: But, sir, can you cite any specific
reasons for the optimism you express?-
THE PRESIDENT: The historical character of the
American people, that is the main ingredient that in my
judgment, will take America from the disappointments of
the present to the optimism of the future.
THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President,
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, very much,
END
(AT 12:45 P.H. PDT)
RALD 1/7 R. FORD JBRAST