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Asian - Pacific Area - U.S. Policy Interests (8)
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Asian - Pacific Area - U.S. Policy Interests (8)
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Asian - Pacific Area - U.S. Policy
Interests (8)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
1. Report U.S. Policy Interests in the Asian-Pacific Area
10/75
A
Introduction (1 p.)
folder I
Executive Summary (10 pp.)
Table of Contents (1 p.)
open
Summary Report (76 pp.)
Acknowledgements (4 pp.)
open
Folder 2
Bibliography (8 pp.)
open
Table of Contents (1 p.)
pen
Appendir One - Asia in the Shifting Balance of
World Power (46 pp.)
folder 3
Appendix Two - - Security Intersts, Concepts,
Threats and Capabilities (80 pp.)
Appendix Three - U.S. Economic Policy Toward
folder4
the Asian-Pacific Area (69 pp.)
Appendix Four - The Cultural Denominator in
Folder 5
U.S. East Asian Relations (21 pp.)
Annex 1 - Japan and the Structure of Peace in
Asia (42 pp.)
Annex 2 - Korea: Cockpit of Confrontation in
Northeast Asia (22 pp.)
Annex 3 - The Republic of Taiwan: Whither the
Folder 6
U.S.? (14 pp.)
Annex 4 - Vietnamese Power: To What End (14 ppl)
Annex 5 - ASEAN: Political/Economic/Security
Potential (9 @p.; pages 1-10 with no page 5)
Annex 6 - An Asian Identity for the
Folder7
Philippines (26 pp.)
Annex 7 - Thailand Faces the Future (25 pp.)
Annex 8 - Indonesia: Great Expectations (20 ppl)
Annex 9 - South Asian-Indian Ocean-Persian
folder 8
Gulf (22 pp.)
Annex 10 - Australia-New Zealand and the South
Pacific (25 pp.)
FILE LOCATION
Marsh Files
General Subject File
Asian-Pacific Area - U.S. Policy Interests
Boxes 4-5
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security Information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
WHM, 12/4/85
(c) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV.5-82)
6. South Asian-Indian Ocean-
Persian Gulf (Ann. 9)
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SOUTH ASIA-INDIAN OCEAN-PERSIAN GULF*
The many threads of conflict, imperial ambition, racial and religious
animosities that interlace the region from the Persian Gulf to the Straits
of Malacca make it one of the globe's most strategic theaters. The rate
of change in the power structure of this conglomerate area surpasses or
matches that of any other part of the globe. Thirty years ago Lord Mountbatten
was Viceroy of Britîsh India, the model point of Britain's empire. Today
the British Navy is west of the Suez and even west of Gibraltar. The Soviet
Union appears to aspire to become the dominant naval power in the region and
is utilizing the endemic conflicts of the area to acquire access to bases
and influence.
*Annex 9.
Acknowledgement: This appendix reflects the advice. and counsel of a number
of scholars who have focused for many years on the problems of the Persian
Gulf region, the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.
In partîcular Dr. Golam W. Choudhury, currently director of the Center for
International Studies at the North Carolina Central University, was
commissioned to write a paper which has been a major input to this study.
Dr. Choudhury was the Director General (Research) in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Government of Pakistan (1967-69) and a member of the Pakistan
Cabinet (1969-71). He had unique opportunities to study the Chinese and
Soviet policies; he visited the USSR and China as a member of the Pakistan
President's entourage to these countries on the State visits and participated
in dialogues with the top Chinese and Russian leaders. Much of Dr. Choudhury's
submission was based on notes and papers originating in connection with
meetings with the President of Pakistan and others, leaders of the Soviet
Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. It gave invaluable insights into
the motivations and style of the respective communist leadership groups.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
In addition, this appendix has benefited fr om the work of Dr. Normal D. Palmer,
Professor of Political Science and South Asia Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania. Dr. Palmer has been a close colleague and associate of the
writer for many years.
This appendix is also based on some of the research work of R. M. Burrell
and Alvin J. Cottrell. Dr. Cottrell is a member of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
The writer has benefited from informative personal discussions with
Dr. Cottrell concerning recent developments in the Indian Ocean area.
This appendix will examine the Soviet moves in South and Southwest Asia, in-
cluding the Indo-Soviet collaboration before and after the Indo-Soviet Treaty
of 1971 and the war in Bangladesh which soon followed. China, acting on the
ancient axiom "enemy's enemy is friend," offered friendship to Pakistan after
her war with India in 1962. Analysis of PRC policy and roles at that time
and after her reemergence in world affairs following the upheaval caused by
their cultural revolution will also be made.
CONTENTS
A. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH ASIA IN THE SIXTIES
B. SOVIET NAVY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
C. SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTIONS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
D. AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPPED
E.
THE SOVIET-ASIAN SECURITY PLAN
F. CONCLUSION
G.
US INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
This is a condensed version of a paper written on this subject in the
preparation of this study. The longer version is not being circulated.
Sections A, B, C, and D of the above table of contents are presented in
condensed form.
FORD LIBRARY is
A.
Evolution of Soviet and Chinese Policy Toward South Asia in the Sixties
1. The Soviet Union and South Asia. In South Asia the friendly Indo-
Soviet relations which began in the mid-50s were strengthened by the Soviet
attitude during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Russians gave massive
military aid to India from 1963 to 1969, yet constantly depicted the United
States as "responsible" for "tensions" in the Indian subcontinent. The
Soviet Union also wooed Pakistan and eventually gained increased influence
and power in South Asia. During the war between Pakistan and India in 1965
Russia played "peacemaker" at Tashkent. Though the problems proved insolvable,
the Tashkent Conference was a major diplomatic feat for the Soviet Union.
Russia continued to thwart China by offering to relieve Pakistan's
dependence on Peking. To consolidate its position, Russia sought ties with
the peripheral countries of China by a regional economic grouping of
Afghanistan, India and Iran. The US had tried a similar idea earlier.
Pakistan rejected the Soviet proposal, cooling relations, and thus the Soviets
were ready to support Bangladesh in 1971.
2. China's Policies in South and Southeast Asia. After a decade of
friendly Sino-Indian relations, India was shocked by China's "aggressions"
during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Pakistan was glad to see her enemy defeated
but upset by US aid to India, and thus turned to both Russia and China.
Peking's encouraging response to Pakistan's overtures of friendship alarmed
India and worsened relations between the US and Pakistan for awhile.
However, President Nixon in 1969 induced Pakistan President Yahya Khan to
act as courier between the US and China. The Chinese messages which Yahya
FORD is LIBRARY 074730
forwarded to the White House in 1969-1970, when analyzed later, revealed
Peking to be gravely concerned by the expansionism of the USSR. Fear of
a preemptive attack by Russia was the dominant factor in China's foreign
policy. China needed to normalize relations with the US because of the
Russian threat to its national security.
In South Asia the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War culminated in the dismem-
berment of Pakistan, the emergence of Bangladesh and the rise of India as the
major regional power in the area, with increased Indo-Soviet collaboration.
B.
The Soviet Navy and the Indian Ocean
During the past decade, while the Soviet Union was maneuvering diplo-
matically in South Asia it was also building a well-rounded navy for use in
its quest for global paramountcy. The Soviet navy has moved into all the
world's oceans and major seas, and it appears that the Russians will
continue to expand its naval arm and will seek bases for it in many areas.
Somalia is Moscow's main foothold in the strategic northwest of the Indian
Ocean. The opening of the Suez Canal will assist the extension of Soviet
influence throughout the Middle East, into the oil-rich and politically
unstable Persian Gulf and on into the Indian Ocean. By establishing a
;
position of great influence in the Indian Ocean and its littoral, the USSR
can help implement its containment policy toward China. The PRC has intruded
into Northeast Africa and Mozambique in competition with the Soviet Union.
The following chart indicates the main bases, fleet anchorages and
mooring buoy of external great powers in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet naval
advantage over the US in the Indian Ocean is established and, despite
continued US development of Diego Garcia, is likely to grow with the
FORD is LIBRARY 016830
-5-
reopening of the Suez Canal. Currently, the Soviet Union has 10 naval
bases for its Indian Ocean operations, not including Indian ports of call.
These bases are: Iraq, Aden, Scotia, Berbera, Mogadiscio, Chisimaid,
Sevchelles, Fortune Bank, Chaiyos Archipelago, and St. Branoan. The US
by contrast has facilities in Diego Garcia and Asmora in Ethiopia. It
should be noted that the US has a number cf joint US-Australian facilities
in Australia, but these are for communications purposes and do not directly
contribute to US naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean area.
In 1971 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution #2832 declaring the
Indian Ocean to be a "Zone of Peace," a resolution apparently aimed at
the US-British development of a small communications facility at Diego Garcia.
India's promotion of the Indian Ocean peace zone may be due to her aspirations
for an increasingly important role in that part of the world. There are
indications of the emergence of two rival groups: (1) the USSR, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and India; and (2) the PRC, Pakistan, Iran and possibly
Saudi Arabia and Tanzania. The primary US interest in the Indian Ocean lies
in keeping the sea lanes open by safeguarding the long-established principle
of freedom of the seas. Despite the desirability of the Indian Ocean becoming
a genuine peace zone, the prospects for this happening appear quite remote.
In this connection it is interesting to note the virulence of Soviet
propaganda against alleged US activities in the Indian Ocean area:
"New facts have been disclosed throwing more light on the
Pentagon's plan concerning the Indian Ocean. After the
series of exposures carried in the world press the American
Defense Department was forced to admit the existence of a
secret agreement with Great Britain, according to which
the United States has the right to use for military purposes
SECULE FORD VIBRAST
26
ail. Politics. and Sea Power: T Indian Ocean Vortex
Posture of Franconesia and
frican States
27
15°
30°
15°
CO°
75°
20°
105°
120°
135°
150°
treq
Afghanistan
30'
11
Libyan Arab
Jordan
Iran
Pakistan
skimuton
30°
Nepal
Republic
China
Kuwait Bahrain
Egypt
0
1000
2000 ml.
BAURAIN
United Arab
(UK-USA)
Emirates
0
1000
2000 km.
India
Saudi
GMASIRAH
Burma
Niger
Arabia
Oman
(UK)
Banglacin
Cum. Hop. of Viernam
Mariana 11.
15
Chad
ASMARA (USA)
Yesh Terr. ol After & 1ssas
Thailand
Philippines
15°
Sudan
I'.
Rep. of
own
DJIBOUTI
Vietnam
(r.n.)
DENDERA
(USSR)
Central
Ethiosis
HUSSAI
Brunci
Caroline Is.
African R.p.
Malaysis
(USSR)
Singere
Trust Terr. of the Fecille
United
(U.S.R)
OGAN 1. (UK)
Kenya
Papus New Guines
Zoire
MAHE
Tanzania
(UK-USA)
0
Indonesia
(USSR)
3 DIEGO GARCIA
ZANZIOAR
(UK-USA)
(CHIMA)
Angola
DIEGO SUAREZ (FR.)
Zimbin
TANANARIVE MAURITIUS (UK)
LISTON
0
(FR.)
Namibia
VACOAS (UK-USA)
NORTHWEST CAPE
Madagascar
(USA)
G
Botswann
REUNION (FR.)
0 PINE GAP (USA)
INDIAN OCE, IN
Swerilend
(USSR)
Australia
30"
WOOMERA (UK)
South
Africa
Lesotho
MUSSRI
c
NURRUNGAR (USAI
AMSTERDAM
(FR.) o
LEGEND
CROZET
45°
45°
0
Base
(FR.)
KERGUELEN
(FR.)
0
MAIN BASES, FLEET ANCHORAGES AND MOORING
Fleet Anchorage
EUCYS OF EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS
IN THE INDIAN CCEAN
Mooring Buoys
GERALD
15"
30°
45°
.00°
75°
90'
105°
120°
135°
150°
FORD
=7-
CONFIBENTIAL
not only the island of Diego Garcia but also several
other islands located northeast of Madagascar. The
ASSOCIATED PRESS Agency reports that now the Pentagon
is rapidly drawing up plans for creating new American
war bases on the islands of Desroches, Farquhar and
Aldabra which Great Britain has given to the Pentagon
in exchange for Polaris rockets at reduced prices. It
is planned to create a testing ground for various new
types of weaponry and big bases for fueling American
aircraft carriers and atomic submarines and also big
ammunitions dump and a-military airport.
Soviet naval domination of the Indian Ocean, if ever achieved, could
induce many of the littoral states to adjust their policies to make them
compatible with Soviet desires. At the present time, however, some Indian
Ocean states such as Sri Lanka are beginning to appreciate the Soviet threat
There is some evidence that Soviet heavy-handedness
I
has made other Indian Ocean littoral states apprehensive concerning the
amphibious Soviet bear. Private polls for example, indicate that more of the
littoral states favor the US base at Diego Garcia than oppose it.**
C.
Soviet and Chinese Interactions in South and Southeast Asia
India emerged strong and victorious in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War,
but her relations with the US and China worsened and even her image among
the countries of the Third World was adversely affected. Today India is
dependent on the Soviet Union to an untenable degree and also shares many
common objectives with the USSR, such as containment of China and preventing
the rearmament of Pakistan. Pakistan emerges from the war, however, as a
nation shorn of longstanding liability, many vexing problems, a desire for
revenge, plus poor relations with Afghanistan on its northwestern flank.
*FBIS Report-Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia 1030 GMT
October 3, 1975 (Unattributed Commentary).
FORD
**Dr. Alvin Cottrell, statement made at conference held by the Sino-Sortet
Institute of the George Washington University. October 4, 1975.
LIBRARY
CONSIDENTIAL
The Soviet Union emerged from the conflict with increased prestige
and India's gratitude, which may mean more extensive naval privileges that
will be vital assets to the USSR's expanding presence. in the region.
China escaped the defeat of her Pakistani client in relatively good shape.
The unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward the "new" Pakistan
continues, and its further dismemberment may be a goal of the USSR, India
and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is making claims to the Pathan-inhabited
territory of Pakistan, and the Baluchis, who share a border with Iran, are
demanding more autonomy. These disputes concern the Shah of Iran, as well
as Peking. If Afghanistan were to gain control of the northwest frontier
province of Pakistan, the Soviets might thereby gain indirect control of
the Khyber Pass, the historic land route from Russia to India. China and
Iran share a mutual suspicion of Soviet motives, and believe that the
responsibility for the security of the gulf area should be left to the
littoral states. Iran is pledged to protect the territory of the new
Pakistan, and India is worried about a modern military fleet coming to
Pakistan's aid in the event of a future Indo-Pakistan war. The Shah,
however, is providing aid to India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He hopes that
aid to the first two countries will induce them to moderate their hostility
toward Pakistan.
.
Currently, the usually tumultuous Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area
is relatively quiet. Improved stability in the Persian Gulf is perhaps
due to the new affluence from oil revenues. Even Iran and Iraq, bitter
enemies, have set aside their political differences. Settlement of the
Arab-Israeli dispute could also affect the stability of the Arab oil
producing countries, who might then turn their attentions to other matters.
SERALE FORD
1030
-9-
D. After The Finhting Stonned (1971-1975)
1. The Bangladesh Factor. The Soviet Union was the first of the great
powers to recognize Bangladesh and made efforts to penetrate the new state
in the name of cultural cooperation. The policies of China and the US
during the Bangladesh war were misinterpreted. These two great powers
were not opposed to Bengali national aspirations, but to the Soviet-Indian
intervention in Bangladesh to advance Indian hegemony in the subcontinent.
The complicated Sino-Indian relations which existed before the 1971 crisis
still exist, and no solutions are in sight. In the aftermath of the coup
of August 15, 1975, Bangladesh appears to be moving out of India's orbit.
At the same time, Pakistan is immeasurably weaker militarily with respect
to Indian than it has ever been since they both achieved independence.
Pakistan could not defend itself for more than a few days at most in the
event of an Indian attack.
2. China and Pakistan. Good relations between China and Pakistan
are likely to continue through the 1970s unless the Pakistani leadership
goes too far either in the direction of Russia or India, a remote possibility.
The PRC relationship with Pakistan demonstrates that China is more worried
about the Russians than the US and are upset by the US policy of withdrawal
in Asian affairs.
-
E. The Soviet-Asian Security Plan
The Soviet Union has endeavored to use India to advance its concept
of Asian security. The Soviet scheme for Asia seems remarkably similar
to the concept adopted at the Conference on European Security and Cooperation
held in July 1975. Collective security in Asia must, in the Soviet view,
"be based on such principles as (1) renunciation of the use of force in
FJRD LIBRARY
relations between states; (2) respect for sovereignty and inviolability of
borders; (3) non-interference in internal affairs; and (4) broad develop-
ment of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and
mutual advantage."
An earlier Soviet radio "Peace and Progress" commentary on March 23, 1972
suggested that both Bangladesh and Pakistan should emulate India in entering
into a treaty with the Soviet Union on the model of the Indo-Soviet Treaty
of 1971. The commentator said principles embodied in the Indo-Soviet Treaty
were applicable to "any other people in the world."
A Soviet diplomatic technique in dealing with Asian countries has been
to stress initially "innocuous economic cooperation" and then to reveal their
real aim, the Asian Security Plan. Kosygin made such approaches to Pakistan
when he visited Rawalpindt in May 1969 and when Yahya visited Moscow in
June 1970. Soviet diplomatic dialogues confirmed this economic approach to
the security plan until 1971. But in the changed circumstances following the
"new = order in the subcontinent, the Russians began to publicly express
their diplomatic objectives through their propaganda media.
It was particularly in relation to India that the Soviets have followed
the economic approach to security designs. The Soviet Union and India
signed an agreement on September 19, 1972 to set up a "commission on
economic, scientific and technical cooperation," presumably in accordance
with Article 6 of the 1971 Friendship Treaty. The agreement stipulates
that each country will take into account the needs of the other's economy
when formulating India's defense and security plan for the next five years.
Brezhnev, in his foreign policy speech to the Soviet Trade Union
Congress on March 20, 1972, claimed that tbere was growing interest in the
FORD & LIBRARY 076832
DECLASSIFIED
Asian security idea. He was, however, shrewd enough to emphasize that in
Asia it was not a question of "military blocs and grouping" but of "good-
neighborly cooperation by all interested states"-- a theme which was
devised to meet the sensitivities of Asian countries like India to any
idea of a military pact. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the Brezhnev
plan seems to be a military pact camouflaged to meet Soviet needs in the
growing Sino-Soviet rivalry in.Asia.
The Soviets have also expanded economic ties in the name of establishing
the "material basis" of collective security. The Russians began to express
hopes that their friendship treaties with developing countries like
Afghanistan and India might contribute to the construction of a wider
economic network under their aegis. In 1972-73, they began to stress the
importance of greater economic cooperation as the basis for regional
security, and appeared to be reviving Kosygin's 1969 plan for a trade and
transit scheme covering India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly Iran and
Turkey.
Brezhnev's Visit to New Delhi
One of Brezhnev's main objectives in going to India in November 1973
was to reinforce the Soviet image in the eyes of the non-aligned nations
and to counteract Chinese efforts to discredit it. The Russian were
worried over the inroads the Chinese were making among developing countries
of the Third World. China, though not a participant of the non-aligned
nations conference at Algeria in October 1973, was gaining support among
these countries. China also made additional bids to gain influence in
the Middle East. Peking's denial of "great power status" and its claim
to be champion of "small and medium" countries were not well received by
FORD LIURARY
1930
the Kremlim leaders. China also supported the proposal put forward by
Sri Lanka, Iran and others for a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean since,
according to China, it was a reflection of these countries' logical
demands for "struggle against domination by some big powers and their
efforts to create zones of influence." Pravda accused China of having
inspired the scheme.
The Sino-Soviet rift has considerably enhanced India's geo-political
importance to Moscow. India admittedly no longer speaks "with the global
voice" as in the days of Nehru, but, in the great game of Sino-Soviet
rivalry, India has become a substantial piece on the board. Brezhnev,
therefore, wanted to get maximum political support from India. The Soviets
would regard a move by India to improve relations with China as counter
to Soviet-India friendship.
With regard to the Asian Collective Security Plan, there were two
interpretations of Brezhnev's mission to India. One was that a new Soviet
strategy for Asia--a "peace offensive" in which India would be given the
leading role--would begin with Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi. This might
require abandoning the Asian Collective Security Plan of 1969 which failed
to gather support among the Asian countries. Instead, the new strategy
would seek to upgrade India's role as a stable and strong "bastion of
anti-imperialism and peace." The friendship treaty of 1971 was to be
strengthened by more fruitful aid and trade to serve as an example for
others to follow. Bangladesh, Afghanistan and even Pakistan were considered
among potential signatories of the friendship treaty along the basis of the
Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. The other interpretation of Brezhnev's mission
was that he would exert pressure on India to get endorsement of his Collective
1930
FORD is LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
Security Plan which would not only cement the Soviet-Indian relationship
but would also render a Sino-Indian rapprochement less likely.
In his speech at the Indian Parliament on November 28, 1973, Brezhnev
strongly advocated his Asian Security Plan. He asserted that it was an
"opportune" time to deal with Asian security: "In a word, we are calling
for an active, broad and constructive discussion. The opportunity has
arrived and the present situation in Asia has created adequate prerequisites.
Asia can and must become a continent of peace."
It is ironic that Brezhnev chose the Indian Parliament, where Nehru
had for a decade denounced military pacts and harped on the virtues of
keeping his country away from any military or security plans, to recommend
to the Asian countries a Soviet version of "SEATO". Some diplomats, mostly
Europeans, in New Delhi were convinced that Brezhnev gained major economic
and political leverage in India and tacitly advanced the doctrine of Asian
security. Other diplomats and most Indians, however, maintained that the
various agreements signed between the two countries during Brezhnev's
visit had only strengthened their "economic friendship," and Mrs. Gandhi
had to pay no additional price.
In a debate in the Indian Parliament on December 6, 1973 members of
opposition parties voiced criticism and concern over the Soviet Union's
growing influence. They also. alleged that the Soviet Union had obtained
port facilities in India for her naval vessels. The Indian Foreign
Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, however, denied these allegations: "We have
not given any port facilities to the Soviet Union for military purpose."
The opposition members, nevertheless, alleged that there were "secret
agreements."
GERMO LIGHARY FORD
-14-
India expressed interest in obtaining MIG-23 plans, fighter-bombers
and mobile SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, as well as Soviet assistance in plans
for new naval vessels. It is hard to believe that the Soviet Union promised
such generous economic and military supplies without any "political price"
or quid pro quo. (On this point, Dr. Choudhury observes: "I may tell from
my experience when Pakistan was seeking arms from the Soviet Union in 1967-70,
the Soviet demands were not only 'cash' price, but also 'political dividends'
for any arms supplies.")
India now possesses, largely from Soviet assistance, one of the
largest and best-equipped military establishments in the world.
"Despite the attention focused on the recent military
buildup in Iran and other Persian Gulf states, India
posseses by far the largest land, sea, and air forces
of any Indian Ocean littoral power. The armed forces
number more than 1.1 million, including border security
forces.
"More important, however, India appears to be on the
verge of achieving a new military status in the Third
World--a self-sufficient armaments industry. Indian
analysts boast that within a decade the nation's
large and thriving indigenous research and development
sector will be able to supply the military with most
of the advanced weaponry it will require.'
There has- been a growing Soviet role in Indian military planning and
development. How much Indian strategic thinking is in tandem with that
of the Soviet Union remains to be seen. Now under authoritarian rule,
India may be willing to cooperate more openly with Soviet maneuvering in
Asia. Admittedly, India is too big a country to be completely a "client"
of a superpower. Nor is this an agreeable status for India under a leader
*Richard Burt, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post, August 30, 1975,
p. A-9.
1030
GERALE FCRD LIBRART
like Mrs. Gandhi. At the same time, India's desire for military assistance
from Moscow puts limits on her autonomy.
One aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict that is frequently overlooked
is the immense population disparity between China and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the potential of Indian manpower is a factor on Soviet-Indian ties.
During the heyday of the British Empire the British Army of India played
a crucial role in sustaining British power in both the Middle East and in
Asia. A comparable combination of Soviet technology and skilled Indian
manpower may presents interesting possibilities to Soviet planners.
The Soviet Union is beginning to capitalize on the success of the
1973 Helsinki Conference on European Security. and Cooperation to renew
pressure for a Soviet-backed collective security system for Asia.
On August 28, 1975, the New York Times reported that:
"A lengthy analysis in the government newspaper Izvestia
asserted that the Asian continent would particularly
benefit from the adoption of the principles agreed upon
by 35 states at Helsinki. Izvestia went on to contend
that Asia was now in 'extremely urgent need of its own
system of collective security.
"Also, in the latest issue of the Soviet foreign affairs
weekly Novoye Vremya, a Soviet historian declared that
the European conference, which wound up in Finland at
summit level earlier this month, had provided 'a fresh
stimulus to the realization of the idea of security and
cooperation in Asia'.'
There is little chance the Soviet security scheme for Asia can be
orchestrated in the same manner as the CSCE in Europe. After twenty
years of pressure, divisive diplomacy and with NATO in disarray, the
Soviet Union is far more influential in Europe than it can be in Asia.
Peking presents the Soviet with a far bigger problem than does western
Europe--and one that will not easily go away.
FORD is LIBRARY
1930
F. Conclusion
The Soviet Union has persistently pursued expansionist policies in
South Asia and, although mistrusted, enjoys considerably more influence in
the region today than ten years ago. A Soviet naval advantage over the
US in the Indian Ocean exists and, despite continued US development of
Diego Garcia, is likely to grow with the reopening of the Suez Canal.
For the time being the Soviets are relatively satisfied with the
status quo in the subcontinent and adjacent region. They will make those
commitments necessary to preserve their existing status. The increased
importance of the sea lanes between the Middle East and South and South-
east Asia makes the Indian Ocean of greater importance to the Soviets, and
they will probably increase their naval strength there. In any case, it
seems improbable that the Soviets will accept South Asia as a "nuclear-free
zone." Their attitude toward the emergence of India as a nuclear power
appears ambivalent. In the event there should be any further break-up of
Pakistan or fracturing of India, the Soviet Union would probably attempt
to capitalize on such a development through the acquisition of smaller
(and less expensive) client states which might provide base, port and
communications facilities directly on the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese regard India as a Soviet "lackey" and a participant of the
Soviet containment policy directed against China. Peking perceives the
Political-economic situation in South Asia as fundamentally unstable and
susceptible to drastic change. Believing time to be on their side, Peking
FORD is LIBRARY
policymakers are not inclined to take initiatives for change. PRC policies
seek to balance the Soviet-Indian alliance through whatever means are
available, including support for Pakistan and overtures or pressures on the
small states on India's peripheries.
The recent increase in Iran's economic and military strength and her
collaboration with both the US and the PRC has helped restrain Soviet-
Indian destabilizing actions in the region.
India has become the dominant power of the subcontinent, primarily with
Soviet assistance. India has insisted that its new relationship with the
Soviet Union does not affect its policy of non-alignment. However, the
special ties between New Delhi and Moscow display the attributes of an
alliance.
The new Indian position on the subcontinent seems unchallengable,
unless India faces overwhelming domestic problems. The shift of India from
a democratic to an authoritarian regime is a manisfestation of basic political
and economic weakness. The capacity of India to solve its problems is
questionable, and the possibility of a military takeover should not be
ruled out.
Some Indian leaders are apprehensive about the closeness of the
New Delhi-Moscow connection. The alignment shattered India's relations
with China, created an image of dependence harmful to India's standing
with many elements of the Third World and, to a lesser extent, hurt India's
standing with the United States. These Indian leaders would like to see
India "normalize" its relations with China on the basis of the status
FCRD i LIBRARY
1030
quo, if China is willing, and to see India improve its relations with the
United States, if they knew how. Ideally, these leaders would like to obtain
sufficient Washington support to balance that of Moscow. It is possible
therefore that as people and policies change, India may one day move away
from Mrs. Gandhi's currently uncomfortably tight Soviet connection.
Pakistan remains politically and economically weak and militarily
vulnerable despite PRC and US assistance. Further dismemberment of
Pakistan would be highly destabilizing to the region as a whole.
Bangladesh could bring India far greater problems as an independent
state that when it was part of Pakistan. Bangladesh owes its very
existence to the Indian army, and it faces tremendous problems. Although
the governmental changes which took place in Bangladesh in August 1975
are likely to strengthen the US influence in the subcontinent and weaken
that of India and the Soviet Union, the greatest beneficiary in the coup
which deposed Sheik Mujibur Rahman will be the PRC which, because of its
relationship to Pakistan, has until now not had relations with Bangladesh.
Pakistan also may be strengthened, as it could have much friendlier relations
with the new leadership of its old east wing than in the past. While the
future of former East Pakistan is still in doubt with regard to its
political and economic viability, it is certain that it will no longer be
an Indian client state, and thus could pose some questions for India's
security problems on its eastern front. This development might help to
diminish the threat to Pakistan itself. Politically, Bhutto will now be
much stronger since Sheik Mujibur Rahman was the symbol of Pakistan's
humiliation.
FORD & 07VH39 LIBRARY
-19-
DECLASS
CONFIDENTIAL
Just as developments in the subcontinent are increasingly linked with
those westward to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the affairs of
South Asia and Southeast Asia are also more and more interlaced. Recently,
articles in the official Soviet press have charged Peking with pursuing a
policy of active subversion against India, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia, as well as staking out territorial claims against virtually
every other Southeast Asian country.
Stepped-up mîlitary activity Бу the Chinese-based communist party in
Northeast Burma has taken place since the fall of Indochina. It has been
accompanied by a serious deterioration of political order in Burma. The
increased power of the Chinese-sponsored White Flag Burmese Communists
could complicate India's security problems on the northeastern frontiers.
The possibility that the Soviet Union might supply General Ne Win's govern-
ment with arms in exchange for naval facilities at Coco Island in the
Andaman Sea would be another serious example of the intensifying Sino-
Soviet competition for influence in South and Southeast Asia.
Since independence, India, in a quiet way, has emphasized concern
over the independence of Burma and Malaysia. The Indian military and
diplomatic establishment regard Burma as India's Ardennes. The Indian
government is also quite aware of the reciprocal link between the fate of
Burma and Thailand. Although during the Vietnamese war New Delhi followed
a systematic public policy of being pro Hanoi
[
FORD is LIBRARY 036830
1930
It remains to be seen whether India will join unambiguously in Moscow's
efforts to enlarge its position in the Southeast Asia region vis-a-vis
China. This kind of a straightforward Soviet-Indian thrust to gain leverage
in the area could lead. the Chinese to undertake rather drastic actions
to enlarge its unilateral sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, and thereby
trigger a confrontation between India and China.
In sum, by establishing a position of great influence in the Indian
Ocean and its littoral, the USSR is implementing its containment policy
toward China. In response the PRC has already intruded into Northeast Africa
and Mozambique in competition with the Soviet Union. This competition is
likely to contribute to the radicalization of this region at the expense
of western influence.
Regardless of its behavior elsewhere, the evidence of the past
decade does not suggest that the Soviet Union has shown a real and sustained
desire to stabilize the equilibrium of the countries located along the
Indian Ocean's northern littoral. As a global power, the United States
interacts with its adversary, the Soviet Union, in most regions of the
earth. Increasingly, the Indian Ocean region has become a theater of
growing Soviet-US contention. The extend to which the US attempts to
monitor, keep abreast of or surpass the spread of Soviet influence in the
Persian Gulf-Straits of Malacca arc will be in part dependent on how the
US perceives its interests in this part of the world.
In this context, a limited US naval presence in the Indian Ocean has
been justified as a means of furthering these general interests. The build-
up of the US-UK base facilities at Diego Garcia has been similarly justified.
1030
GERALA FORD LIBRART
G. Policy Recommendations
The principle of economy of means dictates that US interests be sus-
tained with the least commitment of resources, based on careful calculations
of requirements.
The United States should seek tacit areas of mutual agreement with
the Soviet Union as far as operations in the Indian Ocean are concerned.
These could include agreements on the limitation of naval presence and
other military activities, on the preservation of the principle of freedom
of the sea and the unrestricted use of the key straits and access routes,
including the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Malacca. In essence we would
keep our presence at a low level and hope that the Soviets would do the
same. All nations should be able to use the ocean for such peaceful
purposes as fishing, exploitation of mineral resources and the seabed,
hydrographic and other types of research and exploration. Such use of
the Indian Ocean and its seabed should be in accordance with the agreements
reached in the UN Law of the Sea Conference.
If the Soviet Union continues to expand its presence and influence
in the Indian Ocean for unilateral gain, for indirect maneuvers against
the PRC or, though currently hard to envision, for potential interruption
of Japanese shipping, the US should undertake to prevent Soviet ascendancy
in this distant ocean. This effort would involve continued expansion of
US naval presence and surveillance capability in response to Soviet
deployments if the Soviets are unwilling to agree to end escalation of
naval competition in the area.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
1030
..22%
The US should: (1) avoid direct involvement in various manifestations
of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the Indian Ocean area
(2) respond favorably to
(a)ks)
any Indian initiatives for more cooperative relations with the United States;
(3) maintain close cooperative relations with Iran and Pakistan; (4) help
to strengthen Pakistan militarily; and (5) encourage Iranian-Indonesian
cooperation.
FORD i LIBRARY 033870
CONFIDENTIAL
1030
7. Australia-New Zealand and
the South Pacific (Ann. 10)
DECLASSIFIED
SUNI UNITED
AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC*
The two principal countries in the South Pacific, Australia and New Zea-
land, are so situated geographically that security problems comparable to
those currently faced by other countries in the Asian-Pacific region simply
do not appear to exist for them. Most of Indonesia is located south of the
Equator, yet Indonesia is properly treated within the Southeast Asian region
rather than in the South Pacific. The security links between Australia and
Indonesia, however, are potentially through the ANZUS Pact. US security
guarantees to its South Pacific allies obtains for the US utilization of some
important installations as well as operating rights in the area.
Both countries turned from Great Britain to the United States for their
principal security alliances during World War II. Until the advent of Labor
Party governments in both countries in 1972, they followed the American lead
in security activities in the Pacific region. Since then they have been more
critical and their cooperation has been on a far more selective basis. But
US interests in both Australia and New Zealand are far wider than purely
security interests would indicate.
A. US Interests and Considerations
-
US security, political and economic interests in Australia have grown
since the Second World War. In the security context, US access to jointly-
operated defense and communications facilities are quite important; economi-
Annex 10: A major input to this annex was a paper commissioned from
Dr. Harry Gelber of the University of Tasmania. The paper also benefited from
Ambassador Marshall Green's comments on the penultimate draft.
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
cally the US has large investments in Australia, and Australia imports around
$2 billion a year from the US. A factor to bear in mind, however, is that
large scale foreign investment has spurred some economic nationalism in
Australia. This is of some concern since American investment in Australia
exceeds the combined total of American investment in all the other countries
of East Asia. Cooperation with both Australia and New Zealand on a large
number of "interdependence" issues in international forums is increasingly
valuable; there such interests derive from collaboration on a number of
activities ranging from education to scientific cooperation. Australia's
interests in nearby Papua New Guinea and indirectly in West Irian (Irian
Barat) is also helpful to the US in keeping these areas relatively stable.
The ending of the Indochina conflict has benefited US relations with
Australia, and many Australians recognize more than ever how important the
US presence in the Western Pacific is to their own security. At the same
time it is unlikely that many Australians accept the. need for a significant
US presence in the Indian Ocean, including the base of Diego Garcia. Those
who oppose this presence believe this to be provocative to the Soviets.
They ignore the fact that the Soviets have their own motivations for moving
into the Indian Ocean. A good deal of Australian trade passes through this
ocean. Hence it should be recognized that a US presence in the area contri-
butes to Australian and Japanese uninterrupted use of their sea lanes.
There are about 60,000 Americans living in Australia--far more American
civilians than in any other country of Asia or the Pacific. With a population
of less than 14 million, Australia is the world's largest exporter of meat
and wool, second largest of sugar, third of wheat. Its resources of iron ore,
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
bauxite, coat, cupper, nicket and uranium are among the greatest in the
world.
From the foregoing it is obvious that Australia's importance to the US
is far greater than its relatively small population would indicate.
B. Foreign Policy Options
Australia and to some degree New Zealand, is engaged in a reassessment
of its position in the world. The scope and character of this review has
no precedent in its recent national experience. The extent and precise
significance is less so, and the conclusions drawn as to the proper Australian
response vary greatly as between different groups even within the comparatively
small professionally concerned foreign affairs community. The internal
differences of analysis and prescription are therefore wider and more various
than at most times in the past. A sketch of the range of current opinion
offers an uncertain guide in predicting future policy.
The more obvious changes in Australia's relationship to its international
environment can be classified under three broad headings: changes in the
strategic and political patterns of global and especially great power
relationships, the growing importance of new factors such as questions of
race, energy, raw materials and multinational enterprise, and the closer
and more delicate relationship between foreign policy and domestic opinion.
The breakup of the post-Second World War alliance systems is universally
accepted as an accomplished fact. The sweeping consequences of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, especially its demonstration that the communist world is
not monolithic--and perhaps never was--is now a platitude. The necessity
for a redesign of US policies in the Pacific in the aftermath of the American
defeat in Vietnam is accepted. So is the notion that the political and
constitutional consequences of Watergate have brought great changes, at
GERALD ? FORD
least for the time being, in the freedom of movement of any US administration
03:31:30
1030
DECLARAFIED
in designing its foreign policy, and that predictions about American
action and any attempt to influence it will have to take much closer
account of Congressional preferences than might have been the case before,
say, 1972.
To Australian foreign affairs cognoscenti many of the great questions
about the global balance are systemic rather than individual and specific.
In what ways, if at all, should the Soviet Union be regarded as a satisfied
power? Will the Soviet-American detente endure and what costs will it
entail in other areas of US policy? What are the consequences of the Sino-
Soviet dispute for world politics in general and Southeast Asia in parti-
cular? What role will a united or quasi-united Vietnam choose to play in
its own region or outside it? What can be predicted about the future
economic and political development of Japan? How is the politico-military
balance of the Indian Ocean area likely to develop?
In addition to these questions about global politics, the government
and the foreign affairs community has been impressed by the importance of
new types of questions relating to the management of world opinion at or
through the United Nations; problems of energy and raw materials, the
political consequences of mass travel, of aid and development policies and
of transnational activities. All governments, it is beginning to be
appreciated, are compelled to operate simultaneously in different, environ-
ments and to play different games, at different levels and with different
prizes and penalties. Moreover, these levels have complex interrelation-
ships.
For example, the Australian government has for the last two or three
years gone out of its way to adjust to antiracist attitudes at home and
abroad. No doubt the primary motivations were concerned with the view of
1930
LISA GERALD 4. YORD
the Australian public and of members of the government that racism was
objectionable. But it may not be wholly irrelevant that some senior
observers have warned that Australian national security might itself become
vulnerable to certain Third World pressures. It has been suggested that
in some circumstances a majority in the UN General Assembly might be
prepared to condemn the tenure of a vast continent by a few million white
Australians and to declare that a portion of it should be apportioned to the
use of others. These observers have warned that, while the circumstances of
such a situation could not be predicted in any detail, Australians should
not take it for granted that their traditional friends in Europe and America
would side with them on the issue or that, even if they did, they would
make their support for Australia effective. It would therefore be wise to
cultivate the friendship of the Third World long before such a question
appeared likely to come up on the agenda.
The third dimension of the problem involves the increasingly complex
relationship. between domestic and foreign policy,: in Australia as in most
other advanced countries. It has been aptly described* as both the inter-
nationalization of domestic issues and the domestication of international
issues. Certainly the boundaries betweem them are blurred. The reasons,
although inadequately analyzed, probably include the immediate and populist
impact of television politics, the fragmentation and impersonal pluralism
of modern societies and, for Australia and the US among others, the enormous
importance of a common language as a medium for global communication and
intercourse.
*Hugh Collins: Australian Foreian Policy in the Era of Detente, Australian
Outlook (forthcoming).
1030
GERALD FORD LIBRART
It is clear, in a way which cuts across party divisions, that there
is a new sense of initiative, a disposition to regard Australia as an inde-
pendent party in international dealings rather than as a power destined to
follow the lead of others. There is a sense that, even if the critical
problems of world politics ultimately determine the framework within which
Australian policies must be made, Australia cannot do very much about most
of them and would do better to concentrate on those issues where she can
"make a difference." And in these, there is some disposition to seek the
role of balancer, of a deciding diplomatic factor, provided this does not
involve undue economic or political costs. Although these attitudes may
be generalized and some of their current manifestations ill-judged, one
would expect them to represent a long-term shift in Australian attitudes
to the outside world. They have already found reflection in Australian
attitudes on the Indian Ocean, the assumption of a special Australian role
in large areas of the Southwest Pacific and in some aspects of her resources
diplomacy, including her positions on bauxite and tin.
This shift is marked both by pragmatism and flexibility. There is
little evidence for supposing that the Prime Minister or the government
are working towards some grand long-term plan or that policy is conceived
in abstract or even coherently global terms. In Australia as elsewhere,
policy-making tends to be piecemeal and ad hoc, though the rhetoric for
domestic consumption often suggests otherwise. On the other hand, the
new Australian diplomacy is showing markedly more flexibility than the old.
Indeed, some of its critics argue that flexibility of tactics sometimes
appears to be regarded--on Indian Ocean matters for instance-- as a substitute
for policy.
GERACO FORD LIBRARY
1030
C. The Labor Government's Performance
For the most part it would be an error to attribute all the changes
which have occurred during the past three years mainly to the views and
prejudices of the Australian Labor Party. : Though some of the elements in
current policies are naturally and rightly a reflection of the attitudes of
the party in power, the change of mood in Australia and the resulting change
of policy, runs much deeper than that. The narrower definition of essential
Australian interests, the pragmatic realization that developing mainland
Southeast Asia can be affected, if at all only by diplomatic Australian
influence, the acceptance of the new facts of US diplomacy, all go well
beyond the boundaries of the ALP. It may be true (thought the point is
arguable) that many of Australia's present mainstream views on matters like
Vietnam and pollution and urbanization have been derived from the US oppo-
sition while previous views are largely derived from US governments, but
the fact remains that the adjustment to the facts of life in 1975 has on the
whole been smooth. And the new mood of nationalism, though historically
deeply rooted in the ALP, also goes well beyond its ranks. The new
emphasis on Australia's personality in formal and ceremonial terms, as
well as in policies towards multi-nationals and the outside world, is
likely to survive the Whitlam Government.
The learning process, at work since the Whitlam Labor Party gained
control of the Australian Government, has affected US-Australian relations.
For example, all of our facilities in Australia, such as the Northwest
Cape Naval Communications Facility, are now jointly operated. Procedures
have been worked out for Parliamentary and Congressional visits to all
facilities.
Similarly, Australian attitudes towards US and other foreign companies
1930
FCAD LIBRAET
operating in Australia have matured. There is no threat to present
investments, although Australian leaders talk about taking a more restrictive
view toward new investments. The current economic downswing in Australia
has also helped improve US-Australian relations. Rising unemployment and
other economic woes induce an appreciation of the need for inward flow of
investment in Australia to keep industries going and to open up new job
opportunities. With less of Australia's GNP going to defense, there is
greater appreciation of the worth of Australia's defense association with
the United States.
It is too early to predict how long the Labor Government will be in
power, but its increasing pragmatism deserves approbation.
D. Asian Regionalism
Asian regionalism will play a mixed role in Australian policy. Its
most important aspect is the opportunity it affords Australia and her
statesmen to differentiate themselves from Europeans or Americans on the
one hand and from racists of various denominations on the other. Insofar
as regionalism equals anti-racism, it will continue to play a role of
importance both domestically and externally. But beyond that Australian
regionalism may be declaratory rather than substantive and involving major
resources. Support for ASEAN will continue to be given, but not in a way
which is likely to embrace any major commitments. Australia concurred with
the end of SEATO once Thailand and the Philippines agreed that this orga-
nizational expression of the Manila Pact should be ended.
Australia perceives Japan and Indonesia as the two most important
countries of Asia affecting Australia. Japan is Australia's largest market
and the most economically dynamic country in the world. Indonesia is
Australia's biggest and closest neighbor. Toward both of these countries
1930
FORD LIERSH,
Australia is pursuing policies that are entirely consistent with our own.
The Australians are aware that adequate long-term access to overseas raw
materials at fair prices will probably have more effect on Japan's foreign
policy in decades to come than any other single factor. They also acknowledge
a viable non-aligned Indonesia to be the most likely platform on which a
stable international order in Southeast Asia can be constructed. Consequently,
relations with Indonesia will continue to be a matter of the first importance
for any Australian administration.
The Australian role in relation to the newly-independent Papua New Guinea
will also be important. Australia will, whether under an ALP government
or another, give economic and political aid to that country. It will also
lend military aid and perhaps support. Whether such support should extend
to the dispatch of Australian troops to New Guinea in support of the
government in Port Moresby is a matter of controversy within Australia.
All would doubtless depend upon the circumstances at the time. In certain
Southwest Pacific island areas; i.e. Fiji, Australia might come to play
the role of the local major power. This has not yet become a matter of
substantial political debate within Australia, and it is not now possible
to predict the outcome of such a debate.
E. Resources Diplomacy
More in the public eye at present are the areas of policy for which
the government has coined the term "resources diplomacy." Historically,
this can be seen as an extension of the raw materials and trading policies
which, given their impact on any projections about national development,
have always been close to the core of Australia's relations with the
outside world. But its development in current circumstances faces Australia
with a series of dilemmas which have not been widely appreciated, let alone
FORD LIBRAR,
10
CONFIDENTIAL
publicly resolved.
Australia and the United States have much in common with respect to
these issues. Both the U.S. and Australia are major producers of agricultural
products, and are among the top exporters of grains and other foodstuffs.
We both contain within our vast geographic reaches a sizeable proportion
of the world's mineral resources. We will both face pressures from a
resource-short world, especially for our foodstuffs. We both wish to help
others but we both have our own needs at home.
Australia has been under pressure at meetings of world producers of
bauxite and copper and iron ore, but has resisted efforts to establish
price-fixing cartel without due regard to the interests of consumer nations.
This is Australia's sensible answer to those who would go the OPEC route.
There is conflict in Australia, however, between a wish to maximize
Australia's economic benefits from the resources in her soil and the wish
to use Australian influence to pursue political aims such as anti-pollution
or anti-proliferation in the nuclear field.
1
Another unresolved dilemma
I
concerns the relationship between long-term raw materials contracts, and
the political relationships which they imply, and the wish for short-term
diplomatic flexibility. Yet another concerns the potential conflict between
maximum independence of Australian decision-making and the requirement for
close cooperation with other governments if orderly marketing arrangements
:
FORD
are to be achieved.
Indeed, it is in this area that some of the most acute difficulties
DECLASSIFIED
Australian policy-making during the latter half of the 1970s may well lie.
The Prime Minister, Mr. Whitlam, seems to have seen the point, although
understandably he has not said much about it in public. During his 1975
visit to Europe, most of his time seems to have been spent dealing with
such problems as beef exports and uranium problems as well, perhaps, as
more general discussions on Australia's need for the import of capital.
This need continues undiminished. Not only does Australia have no real
prospect of domestically generating the capital required for any of the
more likely forms of national development plans, but the dangers of an
adverse technology gap in relation to Europe, the US and Japan are probably
increasing. A serious attempt to reduce them will involve action at the
resources diplomacy and payments levels are well as that of national
science policy. It will also require a changed attitude toward multi-
national enterprise. Here the present government's record is not good, and
substantial changes will be required within the next year or so in the
policies which a government of either political party is able to pursue.
GERAIE FORD LIBRART
1030
DECLASSIFIED
F.
Security Threats and Choices
The role which either Australia or New Zealand can play in Pacific
security is limited; they are geographically detached and have small popu-
lations. The 13,000,000 Australians inhabit only the fringes of a large
and almost empty island continent. Obviously, Australia, much larger than
New Zealand with four times the population and geographically closer to
the Asian part of the Pacific scene, plays a more important role than New
Zealand. Consequently, the remaînder of thîs discussion will focus on
Australia. One should bear in mind, however, that New Zealand will fre-
quently cooperate with Australia in 50th security policy planning and under-
takings.
The general tendency in Australia is toward a narrower definition of
defense responsibilities. The changed circumstances of world politics are
reinforced by the fall of Vietnam and the evidence of uncertainty about
whether or how or when the US might engage herself in the Pacific or South-
east Asia. Australian opinion perceives no credible external role for
Australian forces for the foreseeable future, except, perhaps, the dispatch
of some troops in support of a UN peacekeeping operation. Suggestions for
sending ground troops or other forces to any part of Southeast Asia or the
Middle East or even Papua New Guinea would encounter vehement objections
almost irrespective of the circumstances which might cause a government to
send them.
GERALE FORD LIBRARY
dissing
Nor is there a credible threat in sight in response to which more
potent forces and a more serious capability for distant involvement might
be created and maintained. One of the most powerful of the anti-Vietnam
arguments was the suggestion that the war was irrelevant to Australia's
(and America's) real concerns. No new concern which might have to be met
with the use of armed force is at present in sight. The government's own
strategic assessment, on which defense planning is based, maintains that
there is unlikely to be a threat to metropolitan Australia for the next ten
or fifteen years. Though this statment has been much disputed, no specific
alternative has been suggested other than the maintenance of very limited
forces for presently unknown contingencies which might arise without warning.
When we disagree on specific issues, the United States and Australia
should make the extra effort to avoid complicating each other's problems,
especially on an issue of predominant concern to one of them. This is
especially important in the security realm. While economic issues loom in-
creasingly, security problems cannot be brushed aside. Australia views ANZUS
and our joint facilities in Australia as helping to preserve a world equili-
brium which is essential for an effective negotiating process on arms. limi-
tations, force withdrawals and prevention of nuclear arms proliferation. Yet
there are some underlying differences between the US and Australia in
assessing potential threats to stability, particularly in the Indian Ocean
area. One distinguished British analyst, now resident in Australia, has
described the issue as follows:
FGRD it 07/339 LIBRARY
"The accession to power of labor governments in Australia
and New Zealand in 1972, and the decision of the former
to reduce defense forces, on the assumption that there
will be no 'threat' to the country for fifteen years or
so, changed the situation in the eastern part of the
Southern Hemisphere to a considerable extent. From the
Chinese point of view, as Chou En-lai has remarked,
Australia is the 'gateway to the south that is to say,
to the Indian Ocean via Southeast Asia.
"The strategic assessment that no specific 'threat' to
Australia could not be forecast was reached against the
general background of what is commonly seen as the
'detente' in international relations, or the end of the
Cold War A number of Defense Department officials and
officers have publicly disassociated themselves from this
assessment
Officials remaining in the Department allege
that owing to the politicization of the public service,
Defense and Foreign Affairs position papers are self-
censored so as to fit the preconceptions and purposes of
their political masters.
"The attitude of the Liberal and Labor Parties has differed
only in degree, both accepting literally the 'no threat'
misconception. In fact, Defense and Intelligence officials
point out privately that predictions about the international
environment and emerging threats can only be made for two
or three years ahead, whereas the lead time for developing
adequate defenses is eight to ten years.
Informed Australians would deny any threat confronting Australia via
the expansion of some variant of Chinese communism down through Southeast
Asia into Indonesia. Although this threat may be blocked by the emergence of
*W. A. C. Adie, Oil, Politics and Seapower, The Indian Ocean Vortex, Crane,
Russak and Company, Inc., New York, 1975. Adie is Senior Research Fellow,
Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.
GERALD ? FORD
a strong, united and independent Vietnam, it has not altogether disappeared--
at least in the minds of some officials in Jakarta. High-ranking PRC
officials have asserted that the national-liberational movements which they
support in the ASEAN countries "are not negotiable." It was against the
threat since 1950 of creeping communist insurgency that Australians (and New
Zealanders as well) have maintained a weak forward defense by deploying
units of the Australian Armed Forces to several Southeast Asian countries.
The current Australian leadership, however, no longer accepts this policy
and has replaced it by its reverse: Fortress Australia. Currently, Aus-
tralia's formal external deployment is limited to a small contribution in
the FPDA (Five Power Defense Arrangement--UK, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia and Singapore). Australia maintains two squadrons of Mirage aircraft
and some transport aircraft at Butterworth. in Malaysia and stations a naval
vessel in the area. New Zealand maintains transport aircraft and an infan-
try battalion in Singapore. Since the British plan to withdraw all these
forces by March 31, 1976, the Australian-New Zealand commitment to keep forces
there as long as Singapore and Malaysia want them continues to be a residual
hangover from the now-defunct forward strategy.
It should be noted that Australia's contribution to forward defense
has always been marginal in comparison with either its British or American
"partners." During the Malaysian emergency Britain, with a lower per capita
GNP and fives times the population, supplied 25 times as many men and made
a proportionately larger financial contribution. In Vietnam, the proportionate
FORD is LIBRARY cryano
16
per capita contribution compared to the United States was even less. These
observations indicate that Australia's interests in forward defense were
not overwhelming. In every case Australia's allies carried the major burden--
a fact which might usefully be recalled from time to time.
It has already been suggested that Australia, because of its location,
is relatively immune from any direct military attack, including long-range
missiles or aircraft. The buildup of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean
would have to be even more evident and impressive than now appears to be the
case for the Australians to worry about a threat from that region.
By the end of this century Australia may face a potential threat from
China if that country becomes the predominant power in Asia. Australia might
have no choice but to accommodate with such a China or to the USSR if the
Soviets should gain naval hegemony in the Indian Ocean.
The basic fact remains, however, that the Australian Government cannot
conceive of any plausible threat against its territories for years to come.
This perception poses problems with respect to the maintenance of even proto-
type armed forces which would be necessary were the security situation to
suddenly become threatening.
The absence of a readily identifiable present threat cannot be taken
to imply that there will never be any threat. It is impossible to predict
what will happen 10 to 15 years from now, particularly in the extremely
volatile Indian Ocean area. Western Australia could be extremely vulnerable
FORD i LIBRARY
1030
to hostile developments there. Port Hedland in Western Australia, located
in a region which produces much of that country's mineral wealth, is almost
as many ocean miles from the Sidney naval base as it is from Shanghai or
Nagasaki.
Australia should be interested in construction of a viable security
system that might mitigate conflict in that vast region of the globe. But
because of the general apathy of public opinion concerning foreign and
security affairs (matched in the US and elsewhere), Australia has eschewed
becoming an actor in the developing Indian Ocean drama.
Indonesia, if it again becomes hostile, could pose a threat to Australia
against which Australian efforts could be meaningful. Indonesis population,
resources and regional leadership aspirations are well known to Canberra.
Against this potential threat Australia could protect itself by drawing upon
alliances (primarily ANZUS), by strengthening its own relatively miniscule
defenses, seeking to foster goodwill and friendship between Australia and
Indonesia, and by helping to protect Indonesia from either PRC or Soviet
pressures.
Australia may wish to cultivate Indonesia within a wider maritime
security arrangement focusing on the Indian Ocean. Two possibilities suggest
themselves; one includes Iran.
During the Shah's visit to Australia in September 1974 the Iranian
leader told members of Parliament of his desire to trade as widely as possible.
FORD : LIBRARY
But, "we have to be sure that these goods leaving our country will travel
through the waters of the Indian Ocean safely." The Shah has frequently
expressed the wish that certain littoral states of the Indian Ocean might
join in a collective security arrangement comparable to NATO. The four
pillars of such a compact would be Iran, Indonesia, South Africa and Aus-
tralia. An Australian Labor Government, however, mîght not wish to team
up with apartheid South Africa. There are likely to be few takers for this
scheme in Canberra.
Another concept suggests a Japanese, Indonesian and Australian mari-
time triangle. Presumably Japan could help bank an Indonesian naval expansion--
in close association with Australia--in exchange for guaranteed passage through
the Straits of Malacca or Lombok. Again, Canberra, given its Fortress
Australia perspective, is not likely to buy this idea.
The willingness of both Australia and New Zealand to maintain and widen
their military cooperation with members of ASEAN, if asked, could be of
considerable value. Because Australia and New Zealand are small countries,
the ASEAN states should have no psychological problems with such relationships.
As Pacific countries, Australia and New Zealand could sometimes serve as
more effective brokers with Asian societies than the US.
These possibilities aside, the Australian Government's directive to its
forces is to be prepared to defend the Australian continent, but without
FORD a 07V820 LIBRARY
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specifying against whom such a defense might be conducted and under what
technological and diplomatic circumstances the action might take place.
The result has been, predictably, to produce glaring defects in Australia's
defense arrangements. No policies for making these good have yet been
developed, however, probably Because to do so would be expensive, technically
difficult, diplomatically costly and, most important, politically contro-
versial.
For the time being, the absence of an effective defense policy arouses
little public interest and less passion. The implied risks may, however,
one day be substantial. In the event of a conflict in Korea of the Middle
East, for example, or some other event which appeared to make Australian
participation desirable to significant sections of Australian opinion, it
would at once be seen that Australia had no forces to send. Even on the
narrowest grounds of party political advantage it hardely seems advisable
for any government to incur such a risk.
In deciding what forces to raise and maintain and what contingencies
for their use might be contemplated, however, the government of the day will
inevitably be driven back to arguments about the nature and extent of the
American alliance. Even a geographically narrow concept of the defense of
the Australian continent, "Fortress Australia," is impossible to put into
practice without a close accounting of assumptions about control of the seas
FORD & 076530 LIBRARY
1030
20
surrounding Australia, including particularly the Indian Ocean area. In
these respects alone, the American role will be important and potentially
decisive.
G.
The American Connection
The American relationship has, of course, been a major factor in most
aspects of Australian external policies for a considerable period of time.
Resources diplomacy can hardly be conducted without reference to Washington,
just as Australia's wishes in the field of technology, trade and financial
connections obviously involve varying degrees of reliance upon, or at any
rate cooperation with, the United States.
At the same time it should be stressed that the flavor of the relation-
ship may change, just as the flavor of US external policies is changing also.
The maintenance of the US tie is not in question. The Prime Minister has
stressed the fundamental role of ANZUS in the same way as his predecessors.
Also like his predecessors, he has adopted many lines of policy which are
calculated to fit in with or follow US policies and US initiatives. It might
be argued that some of the more ostentatious moves towards "independence" by
his administration are little more than a carrying-out of the spirit of the
Nixon doctrine. The American-Australian-New Zealand connection is solid.
But that is not the whole story. The American tie is being viewed less as an
overriding principle of policy than as one particular, if important, input
to policy-making on a specific subject or group of subjects. Whether this
FURD is DEPAIL LIBRARY
-21-
subtle change of focus is a matter of Australian initiative or should rather
be seen as a partial reaction to Washington's own disposition to see re-
lations with allies more in Bargaining terms is an interesting question, but
not one which is relevant to policy-making.
Two countries as close as America and Australia tend to judge each
other by their own standards. There will always be this danger in our re-
lations--that of taking each other for granted, of assuming and presuming
too much. As we both look toward the future our focus is shifting away from
bilateral issues toward regional and especially global issues, issues where
solutions require collective action on a totally unprecedented scale.
Fundamental issues, for example, in which Australia, New Zealand and the
United States have much in common include: population, food, energy, access
to resources and their pricing, terrorism, narcotics, nuclear proliferation,
arms control.
Cooperation between the US and its ANZUS partners will continue to be
close, but somewhat more ad hoc than in the past. Australian governments
are likely to resist the idea that if the relationship between allies is to
display an appropriate mixture of stability and flexibility, it is they who
should display stability while the US, in pursuit of great power global
purposes, is more free to be flexible. No future Prime Minister of Australia
can be expected to commit himself to the US as unreservedly as did
Mr. Whitlam's immediate predecessors; and none will willingly go out on a
limb, as did Mr. McMahon and Mr. Gorton, on matters connected with Vietnam,
only to find themselves cut off by US action.
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In both Australia and New Zealand the prospect, then, appears to be
for a continuation of cooperation and friendship both at the fundamental
level of attîtudes and assumptions and at the surface level of policy. But
it will be combined with a greater insistence upon Australian initiative,
and, in Australia as in the United States, changed definitions of national
:
interests in the somewhat novel circumstances of today. What practical
policies will flow from these new combinations is not altogether clear.
In a number of specific areas--the problems of Korea, the development of
the external aspects of an Australian national science policy, policy towards
multi-national economic enterprises are examples--the changes may well be
minor. But in others the constraints may not be so clear. Australian
policies towards China, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, to mention
some instances, may continue to diverge from those which American adminis-
trations would prefer.
The defeat of Whitlaw's ALP Government could change the tone of foreign
policy somewhat. Despite the maturation of Whitlaw's policies, there
remain some important differences which would be reflected should the opposition
parties take control: (1) the opposition parties believe Australia's pri-
mary relationship must be with countries whose interests are compatible and
complimentary with particular emphasis on the United States; (2) the
opposition stresses the fact that Australia must become more self-reliant,
and puts special emphasis on developing Australia's economic resources and
contributing actively to solving global problems especially those involving
FORD is LIBRARY
1030
23
aid, trade, and investment which in their view threaten the whole system
of international relations; (3) the opposition rejects the concept of a
neutral zone in Southeast Asia. It stresses the importance of ASEAN and
pledges Australian economic assistance to ASEAN countries. The opposition
also pledges to work towards maintaining a political balance in Southeast
Asia to prevent either China, the Soviet Union, or North Vietnam from be-
coming the dominant power in the region.
H. Conclusion
All these considerations notwithstanding, the present relations between
the United States and its ANZUS partners are generally satisfactory. In
particular:
1. The warm and friendly support which both Australia and New Zea-
land have given to ASEAN's development is likely to increase following the
US setback in Indochina. At this stage the prospects for ASEAN becoming a
zone of neutrality in Southeast Asia appear remote.
2. The greatly improved pattern of US-Japanese relations over the
past several years has in general been matched by favorable relations be-
tween Japan and Australia and New Zealand. In particular, there is a
:
considerable level of two-way trade--between Japan and Australia, as well
as a triangular trade between Japan, the US and Australia. The mutuality of
economic interests between Japan and the two developed countries of the
South Pacific is a major plus factor in the Paçific region.
FORD :- LIBRARY 033330
24
3. The US and its ANZUS allies generally see that now is not the
time to establish positions on various neutralization schemes for Southeast
Asia.
4. A general area of divergence between the US and Australia and
New Zealand relates. to the nuclear question. Both of our partners would
like to see some kind of South Pacific nuclear free zone established. Both
governments opposed the visits of US nuclear-powered warships to their
parts; New Zealand still does, but Australia has worked out with the United
States procedures which now make such visits possible. On the matters of
nuclear testing and non-proliferation, all three ANZUS countries are not
too far apart. It should be noted, however, that support for a nuclear free
zone in the South Pacific is more vocal than solid, particularly in Australia.
Most professionals and semi-professionals see why it is impractical, and few
people would take their opposition to things nuclear to the lengths of
suggesting that the US Navy should cease to operate in sea areas of interest
to Australia or New Zealand.
Looking toward the future Australia and New Zealand could play an
important role in assuring the peaceful development of the :countries in
Southeast Asia. Australia over time might be induced to participate in
allied efforts to insure that the Soviet Navy does not gain a dominant
position in the Indian Ocean. As already mentioned, few people in Australia
see any signs that the Soviet Navy is, or is about to be, in a position to
dominate the Indian Ocean. In other words, the Australians are relaxed
because they do not regard the danger as plausible, not because they would
FORD is LIBRARY GETALO
25- CONFIDENTIAL
be comfortable with the situation if it should develop. Obviously, there
are major educational tasks ahead for the US if the implications of the
Soviet naval Buildup in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere is to be understood
and the potential danger this poses is to be met.
I.
Policy Recommendations
The United States should:
1.
Encourage Australia and New Zealand to retain the current level
and nature of their military cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore after
the British withdraw their forces in March 1976. New Zealand and Australia
can contribute to some degree of psychological security in SEA by retaining
their current links to Singapore and Malaysia. Both of these states want
to retain their pluralistic societies and ties to "the West" but not
necessarily directly with only the United States.
3.
Given
4.
Attempt to induce New Zealand to abandon its proposal for a
nuclear free zone in the South Pacific.
5.
Continue to cooperate with both Australia and New Zealand on
global interdependence issues in all multilateral discussions.
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