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    "title": "Vietnam - General (5)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7787187",
    "collections": [
        "John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)",
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    "subjects": [
        "Foreign aid",
        "Legislation",
        "Legislative liaison",
        "Vietnam War, 1961-1975"
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        "logicalDate": "1976-03-31",
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        "year": 1975
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 43, folder \"Vietnam - General (5)\" of the John\nMarsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 43 of The John Marsh Files\nat the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nRuss\nTHIS IS CONFIDENTIAL - HAS TO\nBE \"PUT AWAY FOR THE NIGHT\"!!!\n!!!!!!\ncb\nTHE WHITE\nWASHINGTON\nclosey, losed 12\nJack --\nc\nFYI - we provided Culver's office\ntoday with a sanitized version\nof the DoD report on LCp1 Darwin\nJudge. Bill/Hendall hand delivered\nit to Culver's Office. if\nLIGRARY GERALD ? FORD\nIspan\nRuss\nM\nyes\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nBill\nGUILEY\nWILL DO\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDEFART OF DEFENST\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nNITED STATES or AMERICA\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nOffice Executive Mr. WASHINGTON, to Warren the of the President Assistant D.C. Military Gulley 10 20301 MAY Assistant 1975\nSubject: Removal of Remains of Two Marines from Saigon\nIn response to your request attached at Tab A is a narrative\nsummary of the circumstances surrounding the failure to evacuate\nremains of Cpl Charles McMahon Jr., USMC and LCpl Darwin L.\nJudge, USMC from Saigon.\nAs you know the State Department has primary responsibility\nin this area since they have jurisdiction over the Marine Security\nGuard Detachments. The most recent message on their efforts\nto recover the remains is attached at Tab B.\nKimmets Military Colonel, Kenneth R. Assistant USA Bailey K.Saily\nAttachments\nAMERICAN REVOLUTION\nUpon removal of attachments\n1776-1976\nthis document becomes\nCONFIDENTIAL\nunclas\nA\nNARRATIVE SUMMARY\nCpl Charles MCMAHON and LCpl Darwin JUDGE were instantly killed\nby an artillery rocket at the Defense Attache Office compound\nat Tan Son Nhut in Saigon at 4 a.m. Tuesday, April 29, which\nwould be Monday afternoon, 4 p.m. in Washington, D.C.\nWithin a few hours, Marine Officers were at the homes of the\nparents of the two slain Marines to notify them officially of\nthe deaths.\nNext day a priority radio message was dispatched, at the\nheight of the evacuation, to our Embassy in Saigon requesting\ninformation on the whereabouts of the remains and details con-\ncerning the return of the bodies. We received a message in-\ndicating the remains were aboard the carrier, USS MIDWAY.\nAn inquiry to the USS MIDWAY about the plans for transhipping\nthe bodies brought the response that the remains of the two\nMarines were not aboard. Contact was then made with Marine\nBrigadier General Richard CAREY, Commander of the Task Group\nthat spearheaded the evacuation who was then on one of the\nevacuation naval vessels. General CAREY started an investi-\ngation to locate the bodies. Telephone calls were made to\nUTAPAO and SATTAHIP and all bases in Thailand; the replies were\nnegative. In the ensuing days, in response to messages from\nWashington, D.C., searches were conducted aboard all the 7th\nFleet ships in the area, and then expanded to the U.S. Bases\nat Subic and Clark in the Philippines, and Guam, the Marianas.\nAll ships and land bases responded with negative replies. In-\nquiries, interviews and investigations continued over the\nweekend; attempts were made to communicate with personnel of\nthe Defense Attache Office, Saigon, who by this time were\ndispersed.\nOn Tuesday, May 6, General CAREY reported from aboard his ship\nthat thus far his inquiry had established only that the remains\nof the two Marines were received at the Seventh Day Adventist\nHospital near Ton Son Nhut. The Marine Security Guard Detach-\nment Commander, we were advised, had attempted before leaving\nSaigon to have the remains evacuated through appropriate\nEmbassy channels. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the American\nEmbassy, Saigon stated that the remains had left Saigon on one\nof the last USAF C130/C141 aircraft. He understood they were\nbound for Clark AFB, Philippines.\nIt was later determined that the bodies of the Marines were not\naboard any of the fixed wing USAF planes that left Tan Son Nhut\nbefore the airport was closed to fixed wing aircraft.\n1\nGeneral CAREY advised us that the remains were in all\nprobability at the hospital and that he was requesting\nassistance from Ambassador Martin in recovering the remains\nthrough diplomatic initiatives.\nOn the evening of Tuesday, May 6, the MCMAHON and JUDGE\nfamilies again were called upon by Marine Officers and were\nnotified of the facts.\nThey were told:\n\"We are unable to confirm that the remains of your\nson were evacuated from South Vietnam. The last\nknown location of the remains was the Seventh Day\nAdventist Hospital, Saigon, where they were sent\nfor preparation for evacuation. Be assured we are\ndoing our utmost to locate and recover your son's\nremains.\n\"\n\"It is requested that you do not disclose this in-\nformation to other than the immediate family mem-\nbers for at least one day in order that our con-\ntinuing efforts in this regard are not impeded.\"\nAfter midnight the Office of Public Affairs, Department of\nDefense was confirming in response to inquiries from the press\nthat the bodies of the two Marines were possibly still at the\nhospital in Saigon, and at the regular daily press briefing on\nWednesday morning all known details were released to the press.\nThat same day, the Department of Defense was informed by the\nDepartment of State that the probable source of reports that\nthe remains had been evacuated was a garbled telecon with the\nSeventh Day Adventist Hospital in Saigon at the height of the\nevacuation.\n2\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\nJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nMESSAGE CENTER\nCONFIDENTIAL\nVZCZCMLT755\nC\n0\nCOMIDERATIVE\n:\nL\nMULT\n52854\nSECT 60 OF 11819\nACTION\nDISTR CJCS(04)1-4 CJCS DJS J3(01)5 J5(01)6 NMCC: DDO(01)7\nSECDEF(04)8-11 SECDEF: ASD:ISA(07)12-18 ASD: PA(01)19 DIA: MCCC\nCSAF WASH DC\nCSA WASH DC\nCNO WASH DC\nFILE (1)20\nCOPY NO.\n9\n(020)\nTRANSIT/091925Z/0921127/001:47T0R1292109\nZNY 00000 Zoc STATE ZZH\nTFJK537\n00 RUEHC RUFHGV RUMJMA RUMTBK\nDE RUFNPS #1R19 1291927\nEXDIS\nEXCLUSIVE\nZNY 00000 ZZH\n0 R 091925Z MAY 75\nFM AMEMBASSY PARIS\nTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9247\nINFO RIMTBK/AMENBASSY BANGKOK 5314\nSECURE\nRUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6556\nDISTRIBUTION\nRUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2501\nSECCEP\nBT\nDEPSEG\n0 I D L PARIS 11819\nMILASST\nSPECASST\nMR. WEST\nEXDIS\ncan\nCCB\nSCTY\nE.O. 11652: YGDS-1\nOMP\nTAGS: AEMR, vs, FR\nMILPER\nSUBJECT: RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF DEAD SAIGON MARINE\nI&F\nDSP\nSECURITY GUARDS\nCABLE ON\nREF: (A) STATE 107163 EXDIS (B) MANILA 5982 EXDIS\nFILE\n1. EMBOFF APPROACHED QUAI ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ASIA\nBOLLE MAY 9 CONCERNING RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF TWO\nMARINE SECURITY GUARDS (REFTELS). BOLLE EXPRESSED\nSYMPATHY WITH U.S. DESIRE, BUT SAID QUAI CONSIDERED THAT\nIT WAS ENTIRELY TOO SOON TO ATTEMPT THE HUMANITARIAN\nPROJECT THE USG REQUESTED. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS\nBASICAILY UNABLE TO LEAVE HIS EMBASSY AND STILL HAD NO\nPAGE 1\n0\nN\nF\n00010109\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n20\nMR93-51, # State Hr. 9/10/93\nBy KBH NARA, Date 10/29/93\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\nJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nMESSAGE CENTER\nCONFIDENTIAL\n52854\nCONTACTS WITH THE \"SAIGON AUTHORITIES\". IT WOULD BE\nQUITE TMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO CHECK AT THE 7TH DAY\nADVENTIST HOSPITAL. BOLLE COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH\nEXPECT THE SITUATION TO BECOME MORE CLEAR VERY SHORTLY\nAND FRENCH EMBASSY SAIGON PERSONNEL WOULD BE ABLE TO\nCIRCULATE TO ASCERTAIN THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE REMAINS\nAND TO DETERMINE A MEANS FOR REPATRIATING THEM. BOLLE\nWAS AWARE THAT ICRC IS STILL REPRESENTED IN SAIGON,\nBUT MERILLON HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT\nHAD CONTACT WITH A COMMUNIST RED CROSS ORGANIZATION AND\n(0S0)\nHENCE WAS ABLE TO FUNCTION.\n2. COMMENT: AS IN THE CASE OF THE LIST OF AMERICANS 305\nIN SAIGON, THE GOF IS APPARENTLY VERY RELUCTANT TO BE\n30000\nYMS\nREONLY\nDIRECTLY AND PUBLICLY INVOLVED IN MATTERS CONCERNING THE\n00\nU.S. UNTIL IT IS ABLE TO REGULARIZE THE STATUS OF ITS\n894349\n30\nREPRESENTATION IN SVN. PERHAPS ICRC COULD BE MORE\nEFFECTIVE AT THIS TIME.\nHSS 32237 YMS\n85 YAM session 51 D\nRUSH\nBIRAR 43\nBT\nJOHBAN\n#1819\nORNI\nANNOTES\n8888\nSTAMP FXDIS EXCLUSIVE\n1008\nNMCC FOR DDO\nT8\nNUMBER COPIES\nCAP JWM 401\n1-800x 198811 .0.3\n89 say ruman 180AT\nBIOXS 9808 (8) 881881 STATE (A) 1438\nAISA HOH HOTOBRIO ЭИӀТОА IAUD 034340899A 970AM3 ol\nOWT RD MMIAM3A 40 YR3V003R OF YAN SUJOR\n3JJ08 (8)37939) BORAUD ЗИӀЯАМ\nTAMT 0383018M03 IAUD GIAB TUB 1361830 HTIN YHTARMYR\nMAIRATINAMUM 3HT ТЯМЗТТА OT MODE OOT YJ3RITH3 BAW TI\nЯСОАВВАВМА BHT \"03T830038 THE BHT\nDM DAN JUITE ONA Y88ABM3 81 HONWALD 77049\nin IN MY, ORTS\nPAGE =\nCONFIDENTIAL\n00010100\n20 8 Wd 6- AVAY SIG!\nNNNN\n09?1127\nRECEIVED\n#\nHey\nMEMORANDUM\nDARWIN SUDGE\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nPark kinsed- -\n- one of lest Marines in from clows-\n(ha called Schleruiges\n-meed info. re bodies\nMarshalltown, IOWA-\n-negotiations 1 recovery of rody -\nEmoneous report that bodes\nmere abound carriers - morg.\nmay not have been brought\nour, etc.- -\nNegotiating throught rench-\nDarwin\n,S'EN.\nBad McFarlane- -\nALRALD\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nRUSS ROURKE\nFROM:\nBUD MC FARLANE RCM\nSUBJECT:\nThe Last Two Marines\nKilled in Vietnam\nAttached is a report which in sum states that the remains\nof the last two Marines killed in Vietnam are still at the Seventh\nDay Adventist Hospital in Saigon. Apart from the obvious failure\nthat this fact represents, I have asked our staff for a prompt\nrecommendation on the actions that are now necessary to attempt\nto recover the remains. I will keep you posted.\nAttachment\nD GERALD ? 1100\nDEPART UNITED OF AMERICA DETAILS\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20301\nSTATES\nOF\n8 May 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMr. Warren L. Gulley\nExecutive Assistant\nOffice of the Military Assistant\nto the President\nThe White House\nPursuant to your request, attached is a Navy position on\nthe failure to evacuate the remains of the last two Marines to\nlose their lives in Vietnam.\nKen\nKenneth R. Bailey\nColonel, USA\nMilitary Assistant\nAttachment\nAMERICAN REVOLUTION WEENTENNING\n1776-1976\nDE OF DEFENSE\nDEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20350\nMM SMIRICA\n8 May 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL K. R. BAILEY, USA\nMilitary Assistant to the Special Assistant\nto the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of\nDefense\nSubj: Navy Position on Evacuation of Marines\nKen:\nPursuant to your request, attached is the response\nfrom the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy re-\ngarding the failure to evacuate the remains of the last\ntwo Marines to lose their lives in Viet Nam.\nThe Secretary of the Navy is aware of this report\nand it is the official Navy position at this time.\nIsslie Les N. Palmer\nCommander, U. Navy\nAdministrative Aide to the\nSecretary of the Navy\nAttachment\nOF DETINSE\nDEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY\nHEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20380\nIN REPLY REFER TO\nLITED STATES OF AMERICA\nPAI-JDM-gif\n8 MAY 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY\nSubj: Failure to remove the remains of two Marines from\nSaigon\nRef:\n(a) Telcon Col VITALI to LtGen MCLAUGHLIN, Chief of\nStaff, Headquarters, Marine Corps of 8 May 1975\n1. Reference (a) requested a report of the circumstances\nsurrounding the failure to evacuate the remains of Cpl Charles\nMCMAHON, Jr., USMC and LCpl Darwin L. JUDGE, USMC, from Saigon,\nformerly the Republic of Vietnam.\n2. Enclosure (1) consists of a narrative chronology of events\nand statements from the time of death to the present, 8 May,\n1975.\n3. Enclosure (2) is a citation of message references in the\npossession of this Headquarters.\nJohn n. M.MiLaughlin\nJOHN N. MCLAUGHLIN\nLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps\nChief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps\n0400/29 Apr (Saigon)\nCp1 McMahon and LCp1 Judge killed by\nheavy artillery rocket impacting in\nthe vicinity of the DAO compound\nSaigon\n29 Apr 75\nPersonal casualty notification made\nto parents of SNM by Capt. Maloney,\nInspector Instructor Boston (McMahon)\nand Capt. Arbelito, Inspector Instructor\nDes Moines (Judge). Initial information\nprovided was that the remains would\nprobably arrive for burial in 6 to 12\ndays.\n30 Apr 75\nA message was sent by Marine Security\nGuard Battalion in coordination with\nHQMC to CG 9th MAB requesting location/\nshipment of remains SNM\n1 & 2 May\nCTG 79.1 message stated that report\nsuggests remains SNM are aboard USS\nMidway and requested remains be\noff-boarded and held army mortuary\nBangkok.\n2 May\nUSS Midway reported to CTG 79.1 that no\nremains were aboard\n2 May\nBrigGen Carey orders investigation\nconcerning the evacuation of the remains\nof SNM.\nAdj, FMFPac attempts to trace the location\nof the remains, placing telephone calls\nto BrigGen Carey, Army and Air Force\nBases at UTAPAO and SATTAHIP Thailand.\nIn turn military airlift command\nSATTAHIP called the USS Midway off the\ncoast of Thailand, which again stated\nthere were no remains aboard. Eventually\nall Thai bases were contacted with\nnegative results.\nENCLOSURE (1)\n3 May\nThroughout the 2d and 3rd of May searches\nwere conducted of all 7th Fleet ships in\nthe area and the search efforts were\nexpanded to U.S. bases at Subic and\nClark in the Philippines. All with\nnegative results.\n3 May\nBrigGen. Carey related to FMFPac that an\nEmbassy Officer indicated the remains\nwere believed to have been evacuated\nby one of the last C-141 or C-130 aircraft\nfrom Tan Son Nhut. Communication by\nAdj FMFPac with Hickam AFB indicated\nlast C-130 departed Tan Son Nhut at 282010Z\nApr 75, 25 minutes after the SNM were\nkilled. C-130 was committed to evacuating\nthe crew of a previous C-130 hit by rocket\nfire. Communications with 374th Tactical\nAirlift Wing Clark AFB, and the pilot\nof the last C-130 out of Tan Son Nhut\nconfirmed the aircraft did not have remains\naboard.\n4 May\nAdjutant, FMFPac communicated with Marine\nBarracks Guam requesting inquiry of\nmortuary facilities concerning remains\nof SNM. Results negative.\n5 May\nInquiry, interviews and investigation\ncontinued. Attempts were made to\ncommunicate with Embassy DAO personnal.\nAll efforts were negative in that either\nthe individuals had no knowledge of the\nremains or could not be reached.\n6 May\nCTG 79.1 reported the investigation\ncompleted with the following findings\na) The remains were received at the\nSaigon Adventist Hospital.\nb) Marine Security Guard Detachment\nCommander attempted to have\nthe remains evacuated through\nthe appropriate Embassy channels.\n2\nc) Deputy Chief of Mission, American\nEmbassy, stated the remains left\nSaigon on one of the last USAF\nC-130/C-141. Believed headed to\nClark AFB.\nd) That the remains were not evacuated\nby C-130/C-141 aircraft.\ne) That the remains are in all probability\nstill in Saigon.\nBrigGen. Carey has requested assistance\nfrom Ambassador Martin in recovering the\nremains through Diplomatic channels.\nAmbassador Martin has indicated that he\nwill initiate appropriate action to\nrecover the remains.\nThe following statement was provided to\nMcMahon and Judge families 062030 May 75:\n\"We are unable to confirm that the remains\nof your son were evacuated from South\nVietnam. The last known location of the\nremains was the Seventh Day Adventist\nHospital, Saigon, where they were sent\nfor preparation for evacuation. Be\nassured we are doing our utmost to locate\nand recover your son's remains.\nIt is requested that you do not disclose\nthis information to other than the immediate\nfamily members for at least one day in\norder that our continuing efforts in this\nregard are not impeded.\"\n7 May, 1125\nThe Department of State informed the\nDepartment of Defense that erroneous\ntelephone communications with the 7th Day\nAdventist Hospital, Saigon, were the\nprobable source of reports that the remains\nhad been evacuated.\n3\nCTG 79.1 010330 May75\nMSGBn 301721 May75\nCTG 79.1 020310 May75 (c)\nCTG 79.1 010104 May75 (c)\nCTG 79.1 090934 May75 (c)\nUSS Midway 020720 May75 (c)\nCTG 79.1 040437 May75 (c)\nCTG 79.1 060652 May75 (C)\nSECSTATE 070340 May75 (c) EXDIS EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY\nENCLOSURE (2)\nIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nMay 7, 1975\nTO:\nPhil Buchen\nJack Marsh M\nMax Friedersdorf\nPaul Theis\nMay I have your comments/\nconcurrence as soon as possible.\nThanks.\nLes Janka\nx3116\n5/8 -\n12:40\nDRAFT\nMay 7, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nSUBJECT:\nSenator Abourezk's Letter Requesting\nNixon-Thieu Letters\nSenator Abourezk has written you the letter at Tab B requesting\ncopies of the 1972-73 correspondence between President Nixon and\nPresident Thieu. The Senator states that U.S. commitments to South\nVietnam contained in these letters are relevant to hearings his Judiciary\nSubcommittee on Separation of Powers will be holding next week on\nexecutive agreements and commitments.\nThe Senator notes that two of the letters in question were made\npublic by a South Vietnamese spokesman and states that the letters are\nessential to consideration of pending legislation requiring Congressional\noversight of executive agreements.\nThe draft response to Senator Abourezk declines turning over\nthe letters and reiterates the arguments you made to SenatorsSparkman\nand Stennis regarding the essential need of confidentiality in diplomatic\nintercourse. The response also points out the policy and intentions\ncontained in the letters were stated publicly, that the Administration\nhas hever invoked any assurances or commitments contained in the\nletters as a basis of Congressional action, and that, therefore, the\nGERALD R. FORD\nrecord of the Nixon-Thieu exchanges is not relevant to the Subcommittee's\nhearings.\nRECOMMENDATION\nThat you sign the letter to Senator Abourezk at Tab A.\nPhilip Buchen, Jack Marsh, Max Friedersdorf and Paul Theis concur.\nGERALD + FORD\nDRAFT\nMay 7, 1975\nDear Senator Abourezk:\nThank you for your letter of May 2 regarding the impending\nhearings of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers which will\nexamine executive agreements and commitments.\nI will not be able to respond affirmatively to your request for\ncopies of letters sent by President Nixon to President Thieu during\n1972-73, which according to your letter contain U.S. commitments\nregarding American assistance to South Vietnam. A cardinal principle\nof diplomatic intercourse is the confidentiality of exchanges between\nheads of state. Despite the fact that two of the Nixon-Thieu letters\nhave been made public, unilaterally, my responsibility to ensure the\neffective conduct of American diplomacy requires that the continued\nconfidentiality of the exchanges not be breached in the interest of\npreserving this essential principle for all our diplomatic communications\nwith other countries.\nWith specific reference, however, to your concern about\ncommitments regarding assistance to South Vietnam, I remind you\nthat President Nixon and members of his Administration stated publicly\nand repeatedly that the United States intended to continue its aid rela-\ntionship with the Republic of Vietnam and react vigorously to massive\nGERALD\n-2-\nviolations of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement. The same policy and\nintentions were reflected in the diplomatic exchanges.\nAny documents which could be construed as containing or\nconstituting a government-to-government undertaking have been\nprovided to the Congress. Furthermore, neither this Administration\nnor the previous one has ever invoked any private assurances or com-\nmitments contained in any letters as arguments for Congressional action.\nRequests for security assistance and opposition to the 1973 prohibition\nof the use of military force were always argued on the merits of openly-\nstated policy in the belief it was in our national interest to maintain the\nnecessary conditions for the viability of the Peace Agreement. Our\npolicy was determined by this view of our interests, not by commitments\nor assurances given in any private documents. I do not believe, therefore,\nthat the record of the exchanges between President Nixon and President\nThieu are relevant to the examination being undertaken by the Subcom-\nmittee.\nSincerely,\nJAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN\nJOHN\nLELLAN. ARK.\nROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.\nART. MICH.\nHIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII\nLOWARD M. MENNEDY, MASS.\nHUGH SCOTT, PA.\nMINCH BAYH, IND.\nSTROM THURMOND, S.C.\nQUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.\nCHARLES MC c. MATHIAS, JR., MD.\nMOBERT c. BYRD, W. VA.\nWILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.\nUnited States Senate\nJOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.\nJAMES ABOUREZK, S. DAK.\nPETER M. STOCKETT\nCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY\nCHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20510\nMay 2, 1975\nThe Honorable Gerald R. Ford\nThe White House\nWashington, D. C.\nDear Mr. President:\nFor some time the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers has been\nexamining executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs with\nme\nspecial emphasis on executive agreements and commitments. The\nSubcommittee held extensive hearings on the subject in April and\nMay of 1972. Despite congressional attempts to define the powers,\nduties and prerogatives of the two branches of the government in\nthis area of foreign policy, the problem of executive agreements\nvis-a-vis the treaty power of the Senate has remained a matter of\nincreasing concern.\nVarious legislative proposals are now pending which would prescribe\na congressional role in the making of international agreements, other\nthan treaties, that commit our national resources. The Subcommittee\npresently has before it two such bills requiring congressional over-\nsight of these agreements. S. 632 introduced on February 7, 1975,\nby Senator Bentsen and S. 1251 introduced on March 20, 1975, by\nSenator Glenn. The separation of powers questions involved in\nsuch legislative proposals are vitally important; therefore, we\nhave scheduled hearings on May 13, 14, and 75, 1975.\nObviously, the letters made public on April 30, 1975, in Washington\nby Nguyen Tien Hung, former Minister of Planning for South Vietnam,\nare of compelling relevance to these hearings and consideration of\nthe above-referenced legislation.\nAccordingly, I respectfully request that you furnish to the\nSeparation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the\nJudiciary, copies of the letters of November 14, 1972, and January 5,\n17, and 20, 1973, sent by President Richard M. Nixon to President\nNguyen Van Thieu, in which President Nixon makes commitments regard-\ning American assistance to South Vietnam in the post-settlement\nperiod.\nThe Honorable Gerald R. Ford\nMay 2, 1975\nPage Two\nI also request that you send the Subcommittee copies of the letters\nof November 11 and December 20, 1972, from President Thieu to\nPresident Nixon regarding American assistance to South Vietnam\nin the post-settlement period. I also ask that you transmit to\nthe Subcommittee copies of any other material or information\nrelated to this correspondence and its substance which is in your\npossession. Please let me hear from you regarding these requests\n1 by close of business on May 7, 1975. Your cooperation will be\nappreciated in view of the time constraints under which we are\noperating.\nSincerely,\nPowers\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nMAY 7, 1975\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSTATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT\nTwo years have passed since the last American troops\nleft Vietnam. Shortly after our withdrawal, draft induc-\ntions were terminated. We established an All-Volunteer\nArmed Force with the highest pay in history. For the\nfirst time, the Nation's youth could look to the military\nfor jobs fully competitive with civilian Job alternatives.\nAmerica is no longer at war. But peacetime military\nvolunteers have remained fully eligible for all the wartime\nveteran benefits designed to reward those who entered\nservice during the period of actual hostilities in Vietnam.\nThe time has now come to terminate wartime benefits\nwhich apply to the new peacetime volunteers. This is con-\nsistent with action taken by earlier Presidents in ending\nwartime veterans benefits after World War II and the Korean\nConflict.\nToday, therefore, I have issued a Proclamation terminating\non May 7, 1975, the eligibility period for those Vietnam\nwar benefits that the President is empowered by law to\nend. At the same time, I am submitting appropriate legis-\nlation to the Congress requesting the termination of the\neligibility period for G.I. Bill education and training\nbenefits -- an action that is solely the prerogative of\nthe Congress.\nThese actions primarily concern future peacetime\nvolunteers who are neither disabled nor die in service.\nI want to emphasize that the termination actions will in\nno manner impair the eligibility for full wartime benefits\nof the more than 7 million Vietnam-era veterans already\ndischarged, or those presently serving in our Armed Forces.\nmore\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\n2\nFuture veterans disabled in service will continue to\nreceive Veterans Administration compensation and other\nservice-connected benefits on an absolute par with present\nwartime benefits. Families of those who die in service will\nreceive the same service-connected benefits available to\nfamilies of veterans of wartime service.\nThe period between the cessation of hostilities and the\ntermination of eligibility for wartime veterans' benefits has\nalready extended longer in the case of Vietnam than for any\nprior war. For virtually all of our World War I military\npersonnel, the benefit eligibility period ended with the\nNovember 11, 1918, Armistice. For World War II veterans,\neligibility was terminated on most benefits December 31, 1946,\nsome 16 months after the surrender of Japan. A Proclamation\nby President Eisenhower established a January 31, 1955,\ntermination date for most of the Korean Conflict benefits.\nThe Proclamation followed the signing of the Korean Armistice\nby 18 months.\nI believe the actions I have taken today make an equitable\ndistinction between those who serve in time of war and those who\nserve in time of peace. These actions also guard the Nation\nagainst unwarranted future expenditures and will result in\ncumulative savings of $1.5 billion over the next five years\nafter termination.\n####\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nMAY 7, 1975\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nFIXING TERMINAL DATE RESPECTING SERVICE IN THE\nARMED FORCES ENTITLING PERSONS TO CERTAIN\nVETERANS BENEFITS\nBY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nA PROCLAMATION\nThe Congress has provided that entitlement to certain\nveterans benefits be limited to persons serving in the\nArmed Forces during the period, beginning August 5, 1964,\nreferred to as the Vietnam era. The President is authorized\nto determine the last day on which a person must have entered\nthe active military, naval, or air service of the United States\nin order for such service to qualify as service during that\nperiod.\nThe signing of the cease-fire agreements and implementing\nprotocols on January 27, 1973, between the United States of\nAmerica and the Republic of Vietnam, on the one hand, and\nthe Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional\nRevolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam\non the other hand, has terminated active participation by\nthe Armed Forces of the United States in the Vietnam conflict.\nNOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the\nUnited States of America, by virtue of the authority vested\nin me by Section 101 (29) of Title 38 of the United States\nCode, do hereby proclaim, for the purposes of said Section\n101(29), that May 7, 1975, is designated as the last day\nof the \"Vietnam era.\"\nIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this\nseventh\nday of May in the year of our Lord nineteen\nhundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the\nUnited States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.\nGERALD R. FORD\n####\n6-10\nJAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN\nJOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.\nROMAN L. HRUSKA. NEBR.\nPHILIP A. HART. MICH.\nHIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII\nEDWARD M. KENNEDY. MASS.\nHUGH SCOTT, PA.\nBIRCH BAYH, IND.\nSTROM THURMOND, S.C.\nQUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.\nCHARLES MC C. MATHIAS. JR., MD.\nROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.\nWILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.\nUnited States Senate\nJOHN V. TUNNEY, CALIF.\nJAMES ABOUREZK, S. DAK.\nPETER M. STOCKETT\nCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY\nCHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20510\nJune 9, 1975\nThe Honorable Gerald R. Ford\nThe White House\nWashington, D. C.\nme\nDear Mr. President:\nDuring the hearings on executive agreements held on May 13, by\nthe Separation of Powers Subcommittee, retired Admiral Elmo\nZumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, testified that it\nwas \"quite clear\" to him that \"verbal commitments had been made\"\nto South Vietnam based on what he was told \"in one meeting between\nthe President, the Secretary of Defense and the members of the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff on the 30th of November 1972.\"\nWhen I asked Admiral Zumwalt who had indicated that these were\ncommitments to South Vietnam, he responded that \"the best source,\nI suppose, Mr. Chairman, of that would be if you could get a hold\nof the tape.\" The Admiral added that it was his \"recollection\"\nthat \"it was implicit in a whole series of things that were said,\"\nbut he was unable to recount with complete accuracy everything\nthat was said at that meeting.\nThe conversations conducted at that meeting as they pertain to\nthe making of secret commitments and to the making of international\nagreements obviously are crucial to this Subcommittee's study of\nexecutive agreements. Thus, we respectfully request that you make\navailable to the Subcommittee any tapes or transcripts of tapes of,\nor any other material which in any way relates to, the meeting\nheld on November 30, 1972.\nThank you for your help on this matter.\nSincerely,\nJames Chairman James Abourezk abourez\nFORD\nSubcommittee on Separation of Powers\nJUN 12 1975\nJune 10, 1975\nDear Senator:\nThis will acknowledge receipt of your letter\nto the President of June 9 requesting that the\nSubcommittee on Separation of Powers be\nfurnished with material relating to a meeting\nreportedly to have been held on November 30,\n1972.\nYou may be assured your letter will be accorded\nearly consideration.\nWith kind regards,\nSincerely,\nWilliam T. Kendall\nDeputy Assistant\nto the President\nThe Honorable James Abouresk\nUnited States Senate\nWashington, D.C. 20510\nbec: w/incoming to Philip Buchen for further action.\nDec: w/incoming to John Marsh - for your information.\nbcc: w/incoming to Max Friedersdorf - for your information.\nWTK:EF:VO:vo\nFORD i LIBRARY\nMONOGRAPH\nCOMMUNIST INDOCHINA:\nPROBLEMS, POLICIES AND SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT\nby\nJoseph C. Kun\nThis monograph\npresents individual research\nin support of the continuing\nWorld Power Assessment\nproject of Georgetown University's\nCenter for Strategic and International Studies.\nIt is for limited circulation and represents\nonly the views of the author.\nCOMMUNIST INDOCHINA:\nPROBLEMS, POLICIES AND SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT\nby\nJoseph C. Kun\nFebruary 1976\nFOREWORD\nThe dramatic rush of events in the Indochina peninsula\nsince the spring of 1975 marked the end of more than a\ndecade of deep American involvement in Vietnam, Laos and\nCambodia. They did not, of course, end major power interest\nin that strategically important region. On the contrary,\nthe removal of United States influence and drastic scaling\ndown of its military strength in the area have meant that the\nSoviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan\nhave all moved to try to improve their ties with the new\ncommunist governments in Laos, Cambodia and both North and\nSouth Vietnam. This scramble for influence will affect the\ncourse of events throughout the Far East for years to come.\nTo analyze the initial developments in the region in\nthis first year after the US withdrawal, we have asked\nJoseph C. Kun to report on the internal developments in each\ncountry and how these have affected regional ties as well\nas relationships with the major Asian powers and with the\nUnited States. Mr. Kun is well qualified in this field. He\nstudied Asian affairs at the University of Budapest and at\nHarvard University. He has contributed to studies on Asia\nat MIT and Columbia University and has published many articles\non Far Eastern political developments.\nThis monograph was edited for publication by Ms. Nancy\nEddy of the CSIS staff.\nRay S. Cline\nStrategic\nExecutive Director of Studies\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nINTRODUCTION\n1\nCHAPTER I\nTHE DOMESTIC SCENE\n5\nThe Two Vietnams\n5\nLaos: Toward a \"People's Democracy\"\n10\nCambodia: A Unique Experiment\n14\nCHAPTER II\nSPHERES OF INFLUENCE\n19\nVietnam: Which Way to Lean?\n19\nLaos: Friendship with Moscow\n20\nCambodia: Closer to Peking\n23\nThe Growth of Sino-Soviet Involvement 24\nCHAPTER III INDOCHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD\n27\nLaos: How Much Status Quo?\n27\nCambodia: The Limits of Isolationism: 28\nTokyo: A Stake in Indochina\n31\nVietnam: What Role for the US?\n34\nINTRODUCTION\n\"The wars of Indochina ended with two bangs and a\nwhimper within a single month last spring.\" So the pres-\ntigious London weekly, The Economist, summed up what took\nplace in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in April-May 1975. 1\nIn retrospect, the communist victory in Indochina was inevi-\ntable. The Paris agreement, signed more than two years\nearlier, was never implemented by the communists, and viola-\ntions of the ceasefire continued unabated throughout the\nentire period. After August 1974 when, under Congressional\npressure, bombing missions ceased in Cambodia, the US was\nnot in a position to offer its allies the kind of assistance\nrequired to sustain them any longer unless the North Viet-\nnamese also ended their support for local communist forces.\nNo such prospect was forthcoming. In a final show-\ndown, the communists overran Phnom Penh and Saigon on April\n17 and 30 respectively. The door was now open to the imple-\nmentation of sweeping political and economic measures aimed\nat changing the nature of the existing societies. A few\nweeks later, the coalition government that had been in office\nin Laos for some 13 months fell apart. By the end of 1975,\nall of Indochina was under the firm control of three com-\nmunist regimes, whose leaders shared the heritage of the\nsame Vietnam-dominated communist movement, the Indochinese\nCommunist Party (ICP).\nBut the emergence of these regimes, accompanied by the\ndecline of Western influence in the region, did not put an\nend to great power involvement in Indochina. Almost simul-\ntaneously with the withdrawal of the last American officials\nfrom South Vietnam and Cambodia, competition between China\nand the Soviet Union for spheres of influence sharpened.\nApparently led by material considerations, the North Viet-\nnamese leadership abandoned its earlier balanced stand in\nthe Sino-Soviet conflict. Hanoi's endorsement of Soviet\npolicies unpopular with the Chinese was rewarded by new,\nlong-term agreements which in essence guarantee the imple-\nmentation of the country's economic plans for the second\nhalf of this decade.\n1 The Economist (London), July 12, 1975.\n-2-\n-3-\nCommunism in Indochina has many faces. In Cambodia,\nThe dramatic developments that changed the internal\na new experiment is underway in which, under the slogan of\npolitical situation in the states of Indochina could not\n\"self-reliance,\" the population of the cities has been in-\nfail to affect the region's relations with the rest of the\nterned and mass, forced labor has been used to rebuild the\nworld. After outlining the recent domestic developments in\ncountry's economy. Rejecting all ties with the Soviet Union,\neach of the countries involved, this study will briefly\nthe Red Khmer leaders rely on the political and economic\nexamine the foreign policy patterns now evolving there. In\nsupport of the People's Republic of China (PRC).\nspite of marked differences in orientation, the new regimes\nare expected to retain their existing relations with non-\nIn contrast, the new communist regime in Laos seems\ncommunist countries and seek new ones. In this context, the\nreceptive to Soviet influences. However, the Pathet Lao\nauthor sees opportunities for the United States in estab-\nleadership which abolished the country's 600-year-old\nlishing diplomatic ties with Vietnam, which holds the key to\nmonarchy and set up a Vietnamese-style People's Democratic\nthe future of the entire Indochina region.\nRepublic in December 1975, may find itself under increasing\nNorth Vietnamese domination in the months and years to come.\nThe third nation, South Vietnam, which was from the\nvery beginning fully dependent on Hanoi, is now facing an\nuncertain future under North Vietnamese tutelage.\nThe establishment of communist governments throughout\nIndochina therefore did not result in friendship and tran-\nquility for all. Instead, superpower involvement is once\nagain on the rise, and the animosities arising from ethnic\nand political differences remain. With the impending com-\npletion of the unification process, Vietnam will become the\nmost populous and, militarily, the strongest power in con-\ntinental Southeast Asia.\n2 Estimates vary on the actual size of the population\nof a united Vietnam. In recent speeches North Vietnamese\nVice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and South Vietnamese President\nNguyen Huu Tho, spoke of 43 and 45 million people respec-\ntively. At least one North Vietnamese publication claimed\na population of \"nearly 50 million people,\" an obvious\nexaggeration. However, with anything over 40 million people,\nthe unified Vietnamese state would become the most populous\ncountry in continental Southeast Asia.\nCHAPTER I\nTHE DOMESTIC SCENE\n1. The Two Vietnams\nAfter some months of hesitation, in the fall of 1975\nthe Vietnamese communists decided to speed up the unifica-\ntion of the two parts of the country. The process, con-\nsisting of several phases, is to be carried out over a six-\nmonth period and is scheduled to be completed at the end of\nApril 1976.\nThe first two steps toward the merger of North and\nSouth Vietnam were the meeting of a Joint Political Con-\nsultative Conference for Reunification, held in Saigon\n(now Ho Chi Minh City) between 15-21 November 1975, and the\nratification of the decisions reached by that conference in\nthe second part of December. During talks between repre-\nsentatives of the two parts of Vietnam, it was decided to\nhold general elections throughout the entire country at the\nbeginning of April in order to elect representatives for a\njoint all-Vietnam National Assembly. Since the schedule\ncalls for the election of one deputy for every 100,000\npeople, the joint assembly is to be a sizable body of over\n400 representatives.\nThe assembly, described as the supreme legislative\norgan of the united Vietnam, will meet on April 25. During\nthe session it will set up a joint government and formulate\na new communist-style constitution. Moreover the meeting\nwill also settle such formalities as the location of the\ncapital, the name of the new state (most probably a People's\nDemocratic Republic of Vietnam), the joint flag and the\nnational anthem. The end of the session will mark the birth\nof a new united Vietnamese state in Indochina on the last\nday of April. The date has been chosen to coincide with\nthe first anniversary of the communist takeover of Saigon\non April 30, 1975.\n3 In South Vietnam the ratification was carried out at\na meeting of a South Vietnamese People's Representative Con-\nference which met in Saigon on December 20. In the North,\nthe same process was accomplished at a session of the National\nAssembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) that met\nin Hanoi between 21-27 December.\n-6-\n-7-\nAlthough all this would seem to be the natural outcome\nAs one editorial appearing in the North Vietnamese military\nof the takeover, the convocation of the unification talks in\ndaily put it, the country \"was already unified in various\nNovember of 1975 came as a surprise to most observers in view\nrespects during the war years,\" a surprisingly candid ad-\nof earlier statements by South Vietnamese communist officials\nmission of the fact that Hanoi never considered the fron-\npredicting that unification might take up to five years. As\ntiers of South Vietnam an obstacle to armed aggression.5\nrecently as the summer of 1975, the foreign minister of the\nThe key problem to be decided upon by the reunification\nSouth Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)\nconference, according to the same article, was the \"state\nvaguely described unification as something to be decided upon\nissue, or the formalization of what had in fact been\n\"in the future\" by the peoples of the two Vietnams. 4 At that\nachieved by military means.\ntime, the North Vietnamese regime was still anxious to pro-\nmote the separate international recognition for South Vietnam\nAn early deadline for the completion of the unifica-\nby having both halves of the country represented in the United\ntion process was particularly important in view of Hanoi's\nNations.\nintention to inaugurate its second Five Year Plan at the\nbeginning of 1976. There remain of course striking dif-\nAs the policy of rapid unification became accepted, that\nferences in the political, economic and social structures\neffort was completely abandoned. The events of the Joint\nof the two parts of the country. The official view on the\nPolitical Consultative Conference for Reunification last Novem-\npolitico-economic status of Vietnam, expressed in the usual\nber showed that even the existence of the South Vietnamese\ncommunist terminology, is that following the takeover in the\nNational Liberation Front (NLF), a front organization that,\nSouth, the Vietnamese revolution entered a new stage in which\nunder communist direction, played a leading role in the\n\"the entire country engages in socialist revolution and\nstruggle for political control of the South, had become super-\nsocialist construction.\" Entry into the socialist stage\nfluous. Its forced merger with the Patriotic Front of North\nrequires, among other things, the planned development of the\nVietnam, a meaningless united front organization composed of\neconomy, including the nationalization of the private sector,\npuppet parties and mass organizations, eliminated it as a\na task that is to be carried out \"in conformity with the\nsymbol of a separate South Vietnamese struggle, one that some\nrealities existing in each zone of our country.\" The same\nnationalist elements in the south may have cherished in the\nscheme also calls for the planned development of cultural\npast.\nlife and the building of \"men of a new type\" throughout the\nentire country. 7\nThere is a striking contradiction between the gradual-\nistic approach with which the Vietnamese communists are pre-\nsently proceeding toward the complete unification of the\ncountry, and statements issued before the convocation of the\n5 Realize National Reunification and Build a Powerful\nreunification conference in November. In articles hail-\nCountry,\" Quan Doi Nhan Dan (Hanoi) editorial, November 10,\ning the opening of that conference, Vietnamese communist\n1975.\npublications openly claimed that unification of the two\n6\nhalves of the country had long been completed in all but name.\nPreparations for the second Five Year Plan (1976-1980)\nbegan following the ceasefire in 1973. For the intervening\nperiod, the DRV initiated a two year plan of reconstruction\n4\nand rehabilitation that began in February 1974.\nInterview with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister\nof the PRG, Le Quotidien de Paris (Paris), July 22, 1975.\n7\nFinal Communique of the Political Consultative Con-\nference For Reunification, Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) in\nEnglish, November 21, 1975.\n-9-\n-8-\nVo Chi Cong, all members of the North Vietnamese party\nIn spite of the somewhat utopian plans of this kind,\nhierarchy. 11 It is not difficult to see how such a team\nno one in Hanoi seems to believe that it will be an easy\ncould find a common language with the Hanoi delegation led\ntask to transform the South Vietnamese economy into some-\nby party ideologist Truong Chinh and other military and\nthing resembling a communist model. As a recent Radio Hanoi\npolitical functionaries of North Vietnam.\ncommentary put it, \"Reforming the formerly dependent South\nVietnamese economy and transforming it into an independent\nThe party organization that was in full control of the\nand sovereign socialist economy is an all-sided and hard\nNLF since its establishment fifteen years ago will not need\nstruggle\n\"8 The Vietnamese apparently do not expect to\nto be formally united with its counterpart in the North. The\ncarry out the transformation and rehabilitation of South\nSouth Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) that sep-\nVietnam's economy without the help of the more industrialized\narated from the VWP in January 1972 has, for all practical\ncommunist states. The talks conducted by (North) Vietnamese\npurposes, remained an appendix of the latter. While through-\nWorkers' Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan in Moscow and\nout the war years the PRP avoided public contact with the\nEastern Europe late in 1975 appear to have included arrange-\nNorth Vietnamese party and played down its role as a communist\nments for economic assistance for both parts of Vietnam.9\nvanguard organization, in confidential party documents it\nThe economic and trade agreements signed during his visits\nadmitted being separated from the VWP in appearance only. 12\nwere to cover the entire second Five Year Plan. In some\nAs an article published in the Hungarian party daily\ninstances, North Vietnam's negotiating partners agreed to\nNepszabadsag last year correctly pointed out, \"Vietnam always\ncoordinate their economic plans with that of Hanoi for the\nhad only one Communist Party; northerners and southerners\ncorresponding five year period 10 a commitment that may prove\nboth united in the VWP. \"13 Whether formal merger of the two\nquite costly in the long run.\nparts of the North Vietnamese party will be deemed necessary\nremains to be seen. At any rate, such a move would be an\nIt may have been due to their having accepted the im-\nexercise devoid of any real meaning.\npending unification as a fait accompli that, during the first\nround of talks on the subject in November 1975, the leaders\nof the South Vietnamese NLF stopped pretending independence\nfrom Hanoi. Although the South Vietnamese delegation to the\n11\nPham Hung is a member of the VWP Politburo and secre-\ntalks included a wide assortment of personalities in all walks\ntary of the South Vietnam Committee of the VWP; Vo Chi Cong\nof life, the key men in the 25-member group were such seasoned\nand Tran Nam Trung, respectively chairman and secretary general\ncommunist functionaries as Pham Hung, Tran Nam Trung and\nof the South Vietnam People's Revolutionary (communist) Party\n(PRP), are both members of the VWP Central Committee.\n12 A cadre document captured soon after the PRP's\n8\nOur People in the South are Determined to Build an\nseparation from the VWP declared that the declaration of the\nIndependent and Sovereign Socialist Economy,\" Radio Hanoi\nformer was \"a necessary strategy /designed/ to deceive the\ncommentary, November 6, 1975.\nenemy.\" The new party, the document stated, \"must maintain\nthe outward appearance of a separation from the VWP so that\n9 Le Duan visited six East European countries and the\nthe enemy cannot use it in his propaganda Quoted by\nSoviet Union in October-November 1975. According to the\nDouglas Pike in Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of\njoint communiques issued following the talks, the diplomatic\nthe National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge,\nrepresentatives of the South Vietnamese PRG were among those\nMass. MIT Press, 1966), p. 140.\nparticipating on the Vietnamese side.\n13\nNepszabadsag (Budapest), June 11, 1975.\n10 Agreements on the coordination of national economic\nplans were reached with the Soviet Union and East Germany.\nLong-term loans were negotiated with Hungary, Bulgaria,\nRumania, East Germany and the USSR. Curiously, no new loan\ncommitments were made by Poland and Czechoslovakia during\nLe Duan's visit.\n-10-\n-11-\n2. Laos: Toward A \"People's Democracy\"\ngave up his office to Kaysone Phomvihan who, as the leader\nof the Lao communist movement, became the first communist\nThe momentum of communist victories in South Vietnam\nofficially to head the government of what once used to be\nand Cambodia in April 1975 could not fail to shatter the\nknown as the Land of a Million Elephants.\nRightist, Neutralist and Pathet Lao coalition that emerged\nin Laos a year earlier. At the beginning of May, organized\nIn an \"action program\" presented to the congress by\nanti-Rightist demonstrations in Vientiane led to the resigna-\nPremier Kaysone, the new regime outlined its policies for the\ntion and flight of some cabinet members and generals. The\ncurrent period. 15 The program provides for the elimination\ngradualistic approach shown by the Pathet Lao during this\nof all elements allegedly hostile to the new Laotian politi-\ninitial period had, however, been interpreted by some foreign\ncal system, such as the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal\nobservers as an indication that the communist-dominated Lao\nlandlords, and promises to gradually readjust the country's\nPatriotic Front (NLHS) was still interested in retaining a\ninherently weak economy through nationalization of the re-\ncoalition government. Some others saw it as a sign of\nmaining private sector and the establishment of new material\ndivision between moderate and hard-line elements within the\nand technological bases \"in accordance with the socialist\nLaotian communist movement. But, if there indeed was a\nsystem.\" The political and economic measures outlined in the\ndivision, it did not prevent the Pathet Lao from completing\nprogram, coupled with a cultural indoctrination campaign\nthe takeover in everything but name by mid-summer.\nwhich is to take effect immediately, are part of the overall\neffort to turn Laos into a full-fledged communist dictator-\nThe entry of the Pathet Lao forces into the principal\nship.\ncenters of Laos, presumably to accelerate the \"integration\" of\nthe two armies in early June, the purge of all non-communist\nThe most important political event that accompanied the\nelements from the police force in July, the emergence of a\nrecent Laotian upheaval was the sudden change in the status\npeople's revolutionary administration in Vientiane in August,\nof the Laotian communist movement in the fall of 1975. Since\nand the political reeducation and social \"cleaning up cam-\nits formation in 1955, the communist party, known as the Lao\npaigns\" applied to all strata of the population were stages\nPeople's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), had kept out of sight,\nin the process that for all practical purposes eliminated the\nleaving the NLHS as the representative of the political forces\njoint administration of the country.\nof \"liberation.\" This practice, shared by the communist\nmovements of South Vietnam and Cambodia, served to emphasize\nThe Pathet Lao-directed demonstrations demanding the\nthe national character of the popular fronts, while obscur-\nend of the coalition government in late November were the\ning the leading role played within those fronts by the local\nfirst step toward the formal completion of that process. A\ncommunist movements.\nNational Congress that met in Vientiane in the first days of\nDecember decided, under communist guidance, formally to dis-\nsolve both the coalition government and the policy-making\nNational Coalition Political Council. The country's six-\n15 The National Congress of People's Representatives\ncentury-old monarchy, abolished at the same time, was re-\nconvened by the NLHS Central Committee on December 1, 1975,\nplaced by a Lao People's Democratic Republic. King Savang\nwas an ad hoc body composed mainly of representatives of\nVatthana, who had reigned only in name for the past sixteen\nthe newly formed provincial and local people's councils under\nyears, was replaced by NLHS chief Prince Souphanouvong as\npresident.\n14\nthe direction of the new communist leadership. The full\nCoalition Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma\ntext of the \"action program,\" delivered by Kaysone on behalf\nof the new government, was carried by Radio Vientiane on\nDecember 4, 1975.\n14\nIn an attempt to retain at least the appearance of\nrespect for the monarchy which has been extremely popular with\nthe rural population, the regime appointed the former heir to\nthe throne, Prince Savang Vatthana, to the titular post of\n\"supreme counselor\" to the President.\n-12-\n-13-\nDuring the second part of 1975, the LPRP suddenly\nit may receive from other communist regimes, for its future\nabandoned its earlier low posture and began to project an\neconomic development Laos will have to rely primarily on\nentirely new image. In articles and broadcasts issued during\nHanoi. In a recent interview with the North Vietnamese news\nthis period, the party was described as the originator and\nagency, LPRP Secretary General Kaysone Phomvihan placed\nundisputed leader of the entire revolutionary process. In\nstrong emphasis on this requirement by pointing out that in\nthis respect it not only overshadowed the NLHS, but made the\nbuilding up its economy, Laos \"now very much needs the\nlatter seem almost superfluous. As a recent Pathet Lao\nassistance and cooperation of all fraternal and friendly\nbroadcast put it, \"Facts show that the Lao People's Revolu-\ncountries, first of all Vietnam. \"18\ntionary Party has been the organizer and leader of all\nvictories of the Lao revolution. \"16\nIn addition to the economic necessities, the educa-\ntional and family ties that connect the new leaders of Laos\nThe completion of the Pathet Lao takeover in December\nwith North Vietnam are likely to contribute to the special\nbrought the entire Indochina region under the control of\nrelationship between the two regimes. 19 All this, plus the\ncommunist parties, sharing the common heritage of the Indo-\npossible North Vietnamese reluctance to withdraw completely\nchinese Communist Party. The stress placed in recent state-\nfrom Laotian territory should be sufficient to ensure the\nments on the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's early ties\nPathet Lao leadership's loyalty to Hanoi. 20\nwith the ICP, a movement set up in 1930 by the Vietnamese\ncommunist leader Ho Chi Minh, suggest that the new Laotian\nregime will give a very high priority to its relationship with\n18\nthe Vietnamese party. 17\nKaysone's interview with a Vietnamese news agency\ncorrespondent, broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao on October 20,\nParty ties alone, however, cannot satisfactorily ex-\n1975. Emphasis added.\nplain the Laotian communists' affinity to Hanoi. During the\n19\npast decades, North Vietnam sustained the Lao liberation\nKaysone Phomvihan is half Vietnamese, while Prince\nmovement by direct military presence on Laotian territory and\nSouphanouvong is married to a Vietnamese woman. The two,\nby material and political assistance. No matter how much aid\nlike many other Pathet Lao leaders, received their formal\neducation in Hanoi in the 1930's. For biographic informa-\ntion on Kaysone and other leaders of the LPRP leadership\nsee Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of\n16\nPathet Lao news agency in English to Southeast Asia,\nNeutralization (New York:Praeger, 1964), pp. 72-83.\nOctober 27, 1975, outlining a Radio Pathet Lao commentary of\n20\nOctober 25. Emphasis added.\nThere is no reliable information on the number of\nNorth Vietnamese troops presently on Laotian territory.\n17\nThis emphasis on the importance of the Indochinese\nEstimates range from 36,000 to as low as 12,000 men. It is\nCommunist Party as \"the precursor of the LPRP\" appears in\ngenerally agreed that the North Vietnamese are still main-\nalmost all recent statements dealing with the communist party's\ntaining a sizable force in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of\nrole in the revolutionary struggle. As a Radio Pathet Lao\nsouthern Laos in addition to the troops in the territories\ncommentary put it, \"Due to its just cause and correct policy,\nfirmly under Pathet Lao control.\nthe LPRP, continuing the work of the Indochinese Communist\nParty, has successfully organized and led the people of all\nnationalities and placed them under the Lao Patriotic Front\n\"\nRadio Pathet Lao, October 29, 1975. Emphasis added.\n-14-\n-15-\n3. Cambodia: A Unique Experiment\nBy forcing the urban population into the countryside\nand by shifting large masses of people from one end of the\nThe new Cambodian regime, controlled by hard-line\ncountry to the other, 23 the regime is trying to fulfill major\nelements of the Red Khmer movement, have chosen a new, un-\nconstruction tasks in the countryside, particularly those\ncharted path toward a communist revolution. The \"Cambodian\nconnected with irrigation. The replacement of dikes with\nroad,\" the regime's uprooting of the urban population and its\nhigher, more sturdy structures is an important part of the\nreliance on forced labor, is a new experiment on which most\nwork performed by former urban residents in various parts\ncommunist countries prefer to remain silent.\nof the country. The constitution promises full employment\nfor all citizens, a principle that is being implemented by\nThe state system introduced by the Cambodian regime\nthe utilization of forced labor on such projects. The \"full\nat the end of 1975 is quite different from those being formed\nequality of all citizens,' as claimed by the constitution, is\nin Laos and the two parts of Vietnam. The difference begins\nbeing achieved through the abolition of private property\nwith the name of the new Cambodian state. Instead of calling\nwhich, in the words of the government report, led to the\nit a People's Republic, the regime chose \"Democratic Cam-\ndisappearance of both \"rich and poor classes\" for the simple\nbodia\" as the official name of the country. The new state\nreason that \"everybody works either in the fields or in the\nconstitution, adopted by a so-called Third National Congress\nfactories.\"\nin December 1975, set down the fundamental principles along\nwhich the country is to be governed. 21\nThe constitution does not clarify the exact nature of\nthe state system now being instituted in Cambodia. With the\nFrom that document, and from an explanatory report on\npromulgation of that document, \"Democratic Cambodia\" became\nthe constitution delivered to that assembly by Vice Premier\na republic. However, that term is not used in the constitution\nKhieu Samphan, 22 there emerges the image of a unique totali-\nand in his report Khieu Samphan carefully avoided any refer-\ntarian society in which the state takes full charge over all\nence to the abolition of the monarchy. However, the consti-\naspects of the life of the population without considering the\ntution provides for the establishment of a state presidium,\nwishes of any single individual. Collectivity covers not only\ncomprised of a president and a first and second vice president.\nownership and the forms of production, but it extends to all\nThe presidium is described as a form of collective leadership\naspects of the people's livelihood and work, barring the most\nset up with the purpose of avoiding mistaken decisions by any\nelementary personal belongings of the individual. Collective\nsingle individual: \"A collective leadership is less prone to\nownership is universal. All main production facilities and\nmake errors.\"\nthe means of transportation have been declared collective\nproperty. Farming and rural production have also been\ncollectivized. While there is no mention in the constitution\n23\nof the role of the private sector in the basic services and\nCambodian refugees reaching Thailand reported in\ncommerce, it may be assumed that as far as such things still\nJanuary 1976 that toward the end of 1975 the Cambodian\nexist, they will be performed on a collective basis.\nauthorities initiated a new wave of migration that is be-\nlieved to rival the forced evacuation of city residents from\nPhnom Penh in April 1975. According to the reports, peasants\nas well as many of those who had been forced to leave the\n21\nThe Third National Congress met in Phnom Penh on\ncapital are \"being shifted principally into the more sparsely\nDecember 14, 1975. The full text of the constitution was\npopulated northwestern area of the country, primarily\ncarried by Radio Phnom Penh on January 5, 1976.\nBattambang province.\" David A. Andelman in The New York\nTimes, January 21, 1976.\n22\nKhieu Samphan's report on the constitution is the\nsingle most comprehensive document on the political system\nnow emerging in Cambodia. Although it was delivered at the\nThird National Congress in December 1975, the text of the\nreport was released only at the beginning of this year.\nRadio Phnom Penh, January 5, 1976.\n-16-\n-17-\nThe new system has yet to be implemented in practice.\nPremier in charge of foreign relations, Son Sen, Vice Premier\nAs of January 1976 the regime continued to rely on some of\nin charge of defense, and Hu Nim, Minister of Information and\nthe institutions set up by Prince Norodom Sihanouk during his\nPropaganda. The same men are also believed to be the leading\nexile in Peking. Sihanouk himself was still being described\nfunctionaries of the elusive Cambodian communist movement.\nas head of state, and decrees were being issued in the name\nThe Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party (CPRP), which is\nof the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia. It may\nthought to be the real force behind the Red Khmer movement,\nbe safe to assume, however, that the publication of the consti-\nremains in the background; neither its leadership nor its\ntution signalled the beginning of a new phase in the country's\norganizational structure is known to the outside world. It\nrecent turbulent history, and that the last vestiges of the\nis characteristic of the unique nature of the new constitution\nmonarchy will disappear in the near future. 24\nthat it makes no reference to political parties, including\nthe communist CPRP.\nAt least in theory, supreme state power in Cambodia is\nto rest with an Assembly of People's Representatives, com-\nThe new regime places great emphasis on Cambodia's\nposed of 250 members. of which over half come from the peas-\nnational traditions and rejects foreign cultural influences,\nantry. The representatives to this body are to be elected\nprimarily those from the West. One important factor that\nthrough \"direct and prompt general elections to be held\nappears to have played a part in the regime's abrupt up-\nthroughout the country every five years.\nrooting of the urban population following the Red Khmer take-\nover of the capital was the Red Khmer leadership's anger over\nThe exact form of government administration to be set\nthe \"bourgeois\" habits of the city dwellers. In his report\nup in Phnom Penh is not specified in the constitution. Real\nKhieu Samphan mentions specifically the city population's\npower seems to be wielded by a very small group of indivi-\nlack of national character and their enjoyment of what he\nduals who led the Red Khmer armed forces to victory last\ncalls vestiges of corrupt and reactionary culture. 26 In an\nApril. The most influential member of this group is Khieu\neffort to promote national tradition, the regime introduced\nSamphan who, although a Vice Premier, clearly outranks all\nthe policy of complete rejection of Western influence, in-\nother members of the administration, including Premier Penn\ncluding Western-style clothing. In Khieu Samphan's words,\nNouth 25 The few visible members of the Cambodian com-\n\"we dress in line with our national mores, in accordance\nmunist leadership besides Khieu Samphan are Ieng Sary, Vice\nwith the realities, and within the means of our people and\nour nation.\"\nThe regime's concern over the reconstruction of the\n24 The role Sihanouk is to play in the new Cambodian\neconomy, its rejection of foreign cultural influences and the\nregime is not clear. In spite of his two visits to Phnom\nstriving toward a classless society, all reflect a kind of\nPenh following the Red Khmer victory, the Prince remains\nmessianism that is frequently present at the early stages of\nsomething of an outsider to the regime. It is possible\nthat he will be assigned to a honorary post, probably out-\nside of Cambodia.\n26\nParts of Khieu Samphan's report betray a sur-\n25 Penn Nouth, a close associate of Sihanouk, appears\nprisingly naive attitude toward foreign cultural influences:\nto have no real influence over government decisions. His\n\"Look at what the former regime/ did to their followers:\nretention as Premier may be a gesture toward the Prince who\nthe houses of Phnom Penh are full of unthinkable things.\nis still believed to enjoy great respect among the rural\nI do not know how to describe them. These homes have no\npopulation.\nnational character at all\n-18-\nCHAPTER II\nSPHERES OF INFLUENCE\nrevolutionary movements, particularly in Asia. However, the\nhistory of world communism has shown that this kind of naive\nmessianism tends to diminish rapidly soon after the new\n1. Vietnam: Which Way To Lean?\ncommunist officialdom becomes entrenched in bureaucratic\nroutine. It may be due to their awareness of such a possi-\nWhile the reunification of the two halves of the\nbility that the new Cambodian leaders are purposely trying\ncountry will most directly benefit Hanoi, Moscow has appar-\nto maintain revolutionary elan and avoid a slowdown in the\nently scored some important gains from recent developments\npace of economic reconstruction. Similarly, the desire to\nin Indochina. VWP First Secretary Le Duan's trip to the\neliminate the effect of foreign influences on the population\nSoviet Union and East Europe in the fall of 1975 revealed\nmay be a factor in the regime's unwillingness to relax its\na shift in North Vietnamese policies, from the state of\npolicies of labor exploitation and population shifts within\ncareful balance between Moscow and Peking to a perceptibly\nthe country.\npro-Soviet stance. In the joint communiques signed during\nthe visit, the North Vietnamese gave their approval to\npolicies that the Chinese have openly criticized in recent\nyears.\nHanoi's endorsement of such touchy issues as East-\nWest detente, the results of the recent Conference on Securi-\nty and Cooperation in Europe and the (pro-Soviet) Portuguese\nCommunist Party's efforts to gain an upper hand in that\ncountry, were certain to antagonize the Chinese leadership.\nMoscow and its East European allies will have to repay\nNorth Vietnam for its endorsement of Soviet policies by\nsupplying the united Vietnamese regime with expensive machine-\nry to refurbish the heavy industrial base in the North and\nkeep both North and South supplied with consumer goods that\nare in short supply in Vietnam. 27 For the Soviet Union,\n27 An agreement signed in December 1975 on Soviet\neconomic and technological aid to North Vietnam in the 1976-\n1980 period envisaged cooperation in such diverse areas as\nthe construction of large power generating projects, chemical,\nmachine-building and coal industries, projects for the pro-\nduction of building materials, for the food and light indus-\ntries, as well as in geological prospecting, agriculture and\nother branches of the Vietnamese economy. Radio Moscow,\nDecember 18, 1975. Details on the agreement were given by\nVitaly Morozov, First Vice Chairman of the USSR State\nCommittee for Foreign Economic Relations in an interview\nwith the Soviet news agency TASS on January 4, 1976.\n-21-\n-20-\nDuring the years prior to the communist victory,\nthe existence of a united Vietnam and the long-term pros-\nMoscow's dealings with the Lao liberation movement were con-\npect of a Vietnam-led federation of communist states evol-\nducted primarily through Soviet agencies outside the country,\nving in Indochina represent both a guarantee against the\nsuch as the Soviet embassy in Hanoi. The collapse of the\nrapid spread of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and a\nthree-sided coalition which, among other things, led to the\npromise of economic, political, and, possibly, military\nreduction of the US diplomatic presence and the elimination\nadvantages in a region of considerable strategic importance.\nof the giant US aid effort, resulted in the sudden influx\nof Soviet personnel in Laos. While estimates vary, Western\nOn the other hand, the appearance south of the PRC's\njournalists reporting out of Vientiane last fall detected\nborders of a strong, Soviet-oriented Vietnam would be most\na numerical increase of Soviet personnel in Laos from some\nunwelcome to the Chinese leadership. Although while in\n100 in June to 300-500. 29 These figures include embassy\nPeking in September 1975 Le Duan was received by Mao,\npersonnel, pilots and technical specialists of all kinds,\nChinese disappointment with the Vietnamese leader could\noperating both in the capital and in the countryside.\neasily be detected from the failure of the two sides to\npublish a joint communique on the talks. Disagreements were\nPrior to November 1975, most foreign supplies arrived\nalso evident from Le Duan's abrupt departure from Peking and\nvia Thailand, due to landlocked Laos' continued dependence\nthe lack of a return banquet for his Chinese hosts, which is\non the port of Bangkok and the Thai rail network for its\nmost unusual during such visits. Hanoi's own reservations\nimport requirements. 30 The early completion of an all-\nabout China's anti-Soviet stance were clearly expressed by\nweather road from Vientiane to the former liberated areas in\nthe Vietnamese news agency's unusual treatment of Chinese\nthe northeast that would tie up with the North Vietnamese\nVice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's banquet speech made in Le\nroad system, a project to which the regime reportedly is\nDuan's honor: the VNA version of the speech missed Teng's\nremarks in which he warned against the superpowers (a\ngiving very high priority, should eventually eliminate the\nneed to rely on Thailand for the transit of imported goods.\npseudonym for the Soviet Union), as being the \"biggest inter-\nnational exploiters and oppressors of today.\"\n2. Laos: Friendship With Moscow\n29 Fox Butterfield from Vientiane in The New York Times,\nOctober 21, 1975.\nThe bulk of economic assistance the Laotians will be\nreceiving from communist countries other than North Vietnam\n30 Until November 1975, Laos relied on the Thai rail\nis likely to come from the Soviet Union. Throughout the\nnetwork for the import of almost everything from rice to\n1960s, Moscow contributed to the Pathet Lao and Neutralist\ngasoline. But the recent differences with Thailand that led\nwar effort weapons and other aid material that reached Laos\nto the closure of the border between the two countries have\nby road and, to a lesser extent by air, via North Vietnam.\nmade the Vientiane regime greatly dependent on North Vietnam\nSoviet assistance was, however, greatly stepped up after the\nfor its imports. An emergency protocol signed between North\nPathet Lao regime established itself in Vientiane in nid-\nVietnam and Laos on December 3 specified that as of that date\n1975.\n28\nforeign aid contributions would be directed to Haiphong\nharbor and will be transported to Laos by air or road. The\nprotocol stipulates that in 1976 the Vietnamese side will\ntransport 60,000 tons of material and aid originating from\n28\nThe Lao people have received constant, unconditional\nthird countries to Laos. The Vietnamese will also help\nand sincere material and moral support and assistance from the\nLaos repair a number of highways thereby facilitating road\nparty, government and fraternal people of the USSR, particu-\ncommunications between the two countries. Radio Vientiane,\nlarly after. the seizure of administrative power throughout\nDecember 6, 1975.\nthe country. Radio Pathet Lao, November 7. 1975. Emphasis\nadded.\n-22-\n-23-\nFor the Soviet Union, the emergence of a friendly com-\nmunist regime in Laos has obvious advantages. Laos is a\nThe Pathet Lao takeover in Laos presupposes that the\nvery poor country, possessing only a few light industrial\n1961 agreements on Chinese road building be reconsidered\nenterprises. The cost of Soviet aid to Vientiane will there-\nby the new Vientiane administration. For the time being,\nfore remain far below what the Soviet Union is spending on the\nthe Laotians appear to be willing to further utilize the\neconomic reconstruction of the two Vietnams. On the other\nChinese project and have made a new arrangement for the con-\nhand, the introduction of new aid projects will provide Moscow\nstruction of a new stretch of road in 1976.31 However, the\nwith excellent listening posts south of the Chinese border.\nregime must sooner or later limit the road builders' mono-\nThe Laotian regime's alliance with North Vietnam should pre-\npoly over much of the northwestern part of Laos. During the\nvent China from exerting an influence on the Indochina region,\npast 15 years, the Chinese crews enjoyed a form of extra-\nwith the possible exception of Cambodia. Meanwhile, the\nterritoriality, due both to the remoteness of the area in\nSoviet presence in Vientiane could bolster some of the forces\nwhich they operated and to the inability of the Royal Laotian\nwithin the Laotian communist movement who may hope to retain\narmed forces to exert control over the road builders.\nthe country's independence from Hanoi.\nSince the early 1960's, Chinese activity in Laos has\n3. Cambodia: Closer To Peking\ntaken three different forms. First, unlike the USSR, while\nmaintaining diplomatic relations with the governments under\nAlthough it relies on Chinese support, the Red Khmer\nPrince Souvanna Phouma, China has also maintained official\nin Cambodia have thus far shown no interest in openly taking\nrepresentation at Prince Souphanouvong's NLHS headquarters\nsides in great power rivalries now shaping up in Indochina.\nin Phong Saly. The Chinese consulate in the latter was mainly\nPerhaps out of ideological considerations, Phnom Penh rejects\nconcerned with the coordination of China's material and\nany relationship with Moscow. While they accept Chinese\nmilitary aid and with travel arrangements for NLHS func-\nassistance, there is nothing to indicate that the Cambodian\ntionaries outside of Laos. Second, Chinese weapons, mainly\nleaders will allow their country to become the \"Albania\" of\nthe light variety, reached the NLHS area through the road\nSoutheast Asia.\nconnecting Phong Saly with the town of Meng La in Yunnan\nprovince.\nThe Soviet leadership's belated attempts to pacify\nPrince Sihanouk by breaking diplomatic relations with the\nThe third and potentially most important form of\nLon Nol government in March 1975 came at a time when Sihanouk\nChinese activity concerned the construction of a complex and\nhimself was rapidly losing control over Cambodian develop-\nextensive road network that runs across the rugged terrain\nments. China, which gave shelter to the Prince following\nof northwest Laos in a northeast-southwest direction,\nhis ouster in March 1970 and later became the main weapons-\nreaching the Burmese and Thai borders at two separate points\nsupplier to the Red Khmer movement, remains the primary\nand the Mekong river at a third.\nsource of foreign economic assistance to Cambodia.\nThe road building project that the Chinese conducted\nAt the moment neither China nor the Soviet Union pose\nfor over 13 years employs an estimated 10,000 construction\na direct threat to Cambodia's independence. However, perhaps\nworkers, presumably all members of the Chinese People's\nas a result of their concern over being surrounded by North\nLiberation Army (PLA). The roads, and those working on them,\nhave been protected by an undetermined number of PLA troops,\nincluding both infantry and antiaircraft battalions.\n31 At the end of 1975, a new group of Chinese road\nbuilders arrived in Laos to begin work on the Nambak-Luang\nPrabang road in early 1976. Pathet Lao News Agency,\nDecember 30, 1975.\n-24-\n-25-\nVietnamese-dominated areas, the new Red Khmer leadership\nextensive reliance on Soviet and East European economic aid\nhas formally declared its opposition to being drawn into\nfor the new Five Year Plan period is likely to contribute to\nalliances with outside forces. The Cambodian constitution,\nthe deterioration of relations between North Vietnam and the\npromulgated in January 1976, provides for a \"neutral, non-\nPRC. Conflicting territorial claims, even if the territory\naligned, sovereign and democratic state with territorial in-\ninvolved is minuscule, can only add to what appears to be a\ntegrity.\" Moreover, in a separate article on Cambodia's\npotential clash between the two neighbors. 32\nforeign policy, the document specifically rejects the idea\nof allowing foreign military bases on Cambodian territory,\nIn view of the Laotian communists' close ties with the\nand provides for \"absolute struggle against all forms of\nNorth Vietnamese leadership, the future of Laotian-Chinese\noutside interference in its internal affairs, be it through\nrelations seems greatly to depend on Hanoi's relationship\nsubversion, military aggression, or any other means.\nwith the PRC. Any rift between the Vietnamese and Peking\nwould almost inevitably be reflected in Vientiane's attitude\nThe constitution's emphasis on independence, neu-\ntoward China. Closer to home, a potential source of conflict\ntrality and nonalignment, may be due to earlier instances\nwould be a Pathet Lao demand for the withdrawal of Chinese\nof Vietnamese aggression which left a strong mark on the\nconstruction units from Laotian territory. Chances are that\nmemory of the Cambodian people. Since April 1975, a large\nany attempt by the new Vientiane leadership to terminate\nsegment of the Vietnamese community is believed to have left\nearlier agreements with the PRC on the construction of roads\nCambodia for South Vietnam. However, due to the lack of exact\nin northwestern Laos would be angrily denounced by the Chinese\ndelineation of sections of the border between Cambodia and\nas a \"flagrant violation\" of existing treaties.\nVietnam, it is impossible to determine whether Vietnamese\ntroops are presently stationed within the territorial limits\nof the new Cambodian state.\n32 Before the communist takeover in April 1975, the\n4. The Growth Of Sino-Soviet Involvement\ngovernment of South Vietnam claimed ownership of both the\nParacel Islands and the Spratlys. Shortly after taking\npossession of the South, Vietnamese communist units seized\nPredictions as to the long-term effect of the Sino-\nthe Poulo Wai Island group, also claimed by Cambodia. Hanoi's\nSoviet conflict on Indochina are almost impossible to make\ninterest in the offshore islands is evident from the Quan Doi\nat this juncture. However, a variety of factors, such as\nNhan Dan editorial, referred to in Footnote 5, which stated:\nNorth Vietnam's siding with Moscow on a number of political\n\"Today, our national unification is the firmest and of the\nissues, Hanoi's disagreement with Peking on the meaning of\nhighest degree; from Lang Son to Ca Mau and from the mainland\n\"hegemonism,\" and the steady growth of Soviet economic assis-\nto the offshore islands, our country is now actually unified.\"\ntance to the DRV have apparently driven the Vietnamese com-\nEmphasis added. The latest reiteration of the Chinese claim\nmunists closer to the Soviet fold.\nto the islands came in a Kwang-ming Jih-pao (Peking) article\nof mid-November in which the Chinese leadership strongly re-\nPeking's reaction to this development may be reflected\nasserted its view that the Spratlys were a part of China's\nin the intensification of Chinese diplomatic activity through-\n\"sacred territory.\" The article warned that the Spratlys,\nout Southeast Asia. The Chinese may try to increase their\nlike Taiwan, would \"certainly be returned to the motherland.\"\ninfluence over the countries not yet committed to North Vietnam\nFor an interesting roundup of conflicting claims to the\nor the Soviet Union, such as Cambodia, Burma, Malaysia and\nSpratlys, see Fox Butterfield in The New York Times, January\nThailand. The recent Soviet gains in Laos and Vietnam\n25, 1976.\nare, however, bound to result in the further sharpening\nof the Sino-Soviet competition in Indochina. Hanoi's\nCHAPTER III\nINDOCHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD\n1. Laos: How Much Status Quo?\nThe new Pathet Lao government's relations with the\nrest of the world will depend on its ability to retain a\nsemblance of independence in its dealings with individual\nforeign states. The communists' willingness to retain dip-\nlomatic ties with the United States has been interpreted by\nsome Western observers as an attempt to use the US as a\ncounterweight to North Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese in-\nfluence in Laos. A more likely explanation is the new\nLaotian leaders' awareness of the economic problems con-\nfronting the country in the months and years to come.\nAlthough all US aid effort has been terminated and\nAID officials left the country before the June 30, 1975,\ndeadline set by the Pathet Lao, the new administration may\nhope that the United States could still be persuaded to con-\ntribute to the maintenance of former projects by supplying\nspare parts and technological and engineering know-how.\nUntil last June, the US acted as the principal contributor\nto the five-nation Foreign Exchange Operation Fund (FEOF),\na consortium set up to underwrite the kip, and thereby pro-\nvide Laos with its only means to make purchases in non-\ncommunist markets.\nPathet Lao officials not familiar with the workings\nof the US government may feel that the willingness to retain\nan American diplomatic presence in Vientiane could lead to\nthe reversal of Washington's decision to stop payments to\nthe Fund. 33 For the time being, however, the retention of\nfriendly relations with the remaining members of FEOF,\nAustralia, England, France, and Japan, are becoming even\nmore important. Unless new Western credits are forth-\ncoming, the country's reliance on the communist world, and\nparticularly on Vietnam, for the supply of economic\nnecessities will become heavier.\n33 The Pathet Lao authorities who ordered the closure\nof all AID facilities by the end of June, later complained\nabout Washington's decision to cut off all economic assis-\ntance. American aid to Laos in FY 1975 amounted to some\n30 million dollars. In July 1975, Congress prohibited any\nfurther aid to Indochina, including assistance given through\ninternational agencies.\n-28-\n-29-\nLaos' relations with the rest of the world have on the\nwhole remained unaltered in spite of the breakdown of the\nIronically, the Prince, whose dislike of radicalism\ncoalition government in mid-1975. The Pathet Lao charges\nis well-known, cited this unusual situation as the reason for\nagainst Thailand, which resulted in the sudden deterioration\nthe new Cambodian regime's lack of readiness to normalize\nof Thai-Lao relations over a border incident last fall,\nrelations with France. As Sihanouk put it, \"We cannot receive\nappeared to be an exception. Since any long-term disruption\nlarge numbers of ambassadors at the same time; there is a\nin the relations between Bangkok and Vientiane would have\nshortage of water and electricity in Phnom Penh; there is not\nserious economic consequences for Laos, some observers feel\neven a market The Prince also made it clear that he had\nthat it was the North Vietnamese regime that tried to turn\nlittle say in the matter: \"The home leadership, which is\nthe differences between the two countries to its own advan-\nfollowing the world situation closely, will decide; it will\ntage. Any real or imaginary danger to the new Laotian state's\ngive its judgment. 35\nindependence would serve as an excuse to continue the deploy-\nment of North Vietnamese forces on Laotian territory indefi-\nThe \"home leadership,\" meaning the Red Khmer leaders\nnitely.\nin Phnom Penh, has thus far shown little interest in estab-\nlishing relations with the rest of the world. As of\nHaving achieved a military victory with North Viet-\nJanuary 1976, there were only six diplomatic missions in the\nnamese help, the Laotian communists may now find that the\ncapital, although plans have reportedly been made to set up\ncountry's political and economic independence may at least\nrelations with Rumania, Yugoslavia and Algeria. 36 It is\npartially hinge on their ability to hold on to existing\nlikely, however, that the gradual normalization of the\ncontacts with the non-communist world, and particularly with\ndomestic situation will allow for the inclusion of more\nthe nations of Southeast Asia. The more Laos' relations\n\"neutralist\" countries in this category.\nwith its immediate neighbors is allowed to deteriorate, the\nmore its reliance on Hanoi will increase. A long-term con-\nBut the hard realities of the country's economic\nflict with Thailand would further worsen the country's\nsituation demand that Cambodia also deal with its neighbors\neconomic situation, thereby limiting the new regime's\nin Southeast Asia. Vice Premier Ieng Sary's visit to\nability to retain its grasp over the conduct of domestic\nBangkok at the end of October was a breakthrough in this\naffairs.\nrespect, although it did not lead to the establishment of\nembassies in the two capitals. 37 However, a second meeting\n2. Cambodia: The Limits Of Isolationism\n35 Le Monde (Paris), October 11, 1975.\nNine months after the Red Khmer took over Phnom Penh,\nthe once bustling metropolis remains an empty shell. Follow-\ning his brief visit to the capital in September 1975,\n36 Up to the beginning of February, the Pathet Lao had\nSihanouk estimated that some 100 thousand people were left\nreceived new ambassadors from North Vietnam, North Korea,\nin what once used to be a city of three million inhabitants.\n34\nAlbania, Cuba, and the PRG of South Vietnam. The Chinese\nambassador, formerly accredited to Sihanouk, now resides in\nPhnom Penh.\n34 In an interview with a Japanese newspaper, Sihanouk\n37 As a result of Ieng Sary's visit to Thailand, the\nimplied that the evacuation of the capital's three million\nRed Khmer's first contact with the non-communist world, the\nresidents was due to persistent food shortages. The Daily\ntwo countries agreed on the immediate establishment of\nYomiuri (Tokyo, English edition), October 21, 1975.\ndiplomatic relations. Prior to the establishment of em-\nAccording to most foreign estimates, the population of Phnom\nbassies, an issue on which Sary remained very vague, liaison\nPenh never exceeded the 1.8 million mark.\noffices were set up in towns along the Thai-Cambodian border.\nAccording to Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, these\noffices will deal with all kinds of contacts, including\n\"political, immigration, trade and other matters.\"\n-30-\n-31-\nbetween Ieng Sary and Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai\nIn the long run, the Cambodian communists may find it\nChunhawan, held in November revealed something about the\ndifficult to keep the North Vietnamese at a distance. The\nnew Cambodian leadership's independence from its communist\npointedly correct but cool reception given to the North\nneighbors. The talks happened to coincide with the sharp\nVietnamese ambassador upon his arrival in Phnom Penh in\ndeterioration of Thai-Laotian relations and the incident\nOctober 1975 may have been designed to demonstrate the\nthat temporarily closed parts of the border between Laos and\nregime's desire to treat Hanoi as an equal. However, the\nThailand. 38 Thus the Laotian and North Vietnamese attacks\nimpending reunification of the two parts of Vietnam brings\non the Thai leadership had little effect on the independent-\nCambodia in direct contact with the North Vietnamese. The\nminded Red Khmer which prefers to put national interests\nlack of exact delineation of its border with South Vietnam\nabove communist \"internationalism, at least on the regional\nand the suspected presence of some North Vietnamese troops\nscale. 39\non Cambodian territory could give rise to conflicts between\nthe Chinese-oriented Cambodians and Soviet-oriented North\nSoon after the establishment of the Lao People's\nVietnamese. This would be all the more likely if relations\nDemocratic Republic in December, the Laotian communists sent\nbetween Hanoi and Peking were to further deteriorate in the\nan official delegation to Phnom Penh in search of closer\nfuture.\nrelations with the Red Khmer regime. In spite of the high\nlevel talks between the two sides, the final communique merely\nCambodia's \"neutralism\" therefore may be a source of\nreiterated the principles of independence, sovereignty and\nirritation to the Vietnamese leadership. The two regimes'\nterritorial integrity. Although the communique included a\nrelations could be further complicated by conflicting terri-\npledge for the strengthening and developing of the relations\ntorial claims that came to light as a result of the Vietnamese\nbetween the two countries, no agreement was signed on\noccupation of the Poulo Wai Islands in June 1975. 41\nspecific topics such as trade or transportation, and no formal\ndiplomatic relations were established. 40\n3. Tokyo: A Stake In Indochina\nBy the end of 1975, the most important non-communist\n38 The meeting, which took place on November 17, was,\npower to have established a presence in Vietnam was Japan.\naccording to the official Cambodian statement, \"extremely\nTokyo's strong preoccupation with this region can be ex-\nsuccessful\" and proceeded in an \"atmosphere of friendship\nplained both by Japan's geographical closeness to the Indo-\nand understanding.\" Radio Phnom Penh, November 22, 1975.\nchina peninsula and by the extensive economic ties it already\nhad with the rest of Southeast Asia. The Vietnam agreement\n39 Phnom Penh's relationship with Thailand was,\nof January 1973 that led to the military disengagement of the\nhowever, briefly disrupted in December due to a minor\nUnited States from Indochina was quite naturally seen by the\nborder incident over the ownership of a loosely delineated\nJapanese as an opportunity to establish a presence in that\nstrip of the frontier in Western Cambodia. Although the\nregion. In 1974, Japan and North Vietnam concluded an\nclash ended with the two sides agreeing on a ceasefire, the\nagreement on diplomatic relations, although the formal\nexact ownership of the territory involved remains unresolved.\nopening of embassies was postponed pending the outcome of\n40\nThe text of the joint Lao-Cambodian communique was\ncarried by Radio Phnom Penh on December 19, 1975.\n41\nOn June 10, 1975, Vietnamese communist troops in-\nvaded the Poulo Wai Island group about 55 miles off the\nCambodian coast. The ownership of the islands had been\ncontested by the former non-communist governments of South\nVietnam and Cambodia.\n-32-\n-33-\neconomic talks. Those talks resulted in an important agree-\nChanges that have recently become apparent in North\nment signed in Hanoi in October 1975. The Japanese make no\nVietnam's attitude toward China and the Soviet Union have\nsecret of the fact that the agreement, a 8,500 billion yen\nsomewhat altered the original Japanese view of the power\n(ca. $30 million) grant-in-aid to the DRV, is in essence a\nrelations in a postwar Indochina. Following the Vietnam\nform of reparation for damage caused to Vietnam during World\nagreement of 1973, the Japanese saw Southeast Asia as being\nWar II. 42 But Tokyo's willingness to agree to the Vietnamese\nno longer a focal point of the power struggle among the\ndemand that made the opening of embassies conditional on\nsuperpowers. They also evaluated the North Vietnamese\neconomic assistance reflects a lingering inferiority complex\ncommunists' balanced stand between Peking and Moscow as a\nthat the Japanese continue to exhibit in their dealings with\nguarantee of Vietnam's continued independence from both\nthe nations of Southeast Asia. In addition to this, there\ncommunist powers.\nappears to be a concern that, if pushed too hard, the Japanese\napproaches to the countries of this region could be taken as\nIn the light of the latest developments, the Japanese\na new attempt at the domination of Southeast Asia, if only in\nnow begin to realize that the intensification of the Sino-\nthe economic sense. 43\nSoviet competition in Indochina may complicate their own\ndiplomatic activity in that region. They also believe that\nIn spite of this, the Japanese government seems to be\nChina's impatience with Japan over the latter's stand on the\nconvinced of the economic and political advantages that would\n\"hegemony\" question, which remains the key issue blocking\nresult from the establishment of full diplomatic relations\nthe Sino-Japanese treaty talks, may have something to do with\nwith the countries of Indochina and particularly with North\nthe Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive in Indochina. 46\nVietnam. Economically, it is hoped that the high initial\ninvestment will pay off at a later date in the form of North\nNevertheless, relations are actively being sought not\nVietnamese orders for heavy industrial equipment necessary for\nonly with Hanoi but also with the rest of Indochina. Diplo-\nthe speedy reconstruction of the country's industrial base. 44\nmatic contacts with Laos have been retained in spite of the\nPolitically, the Japanese feel that Vietnam has been, and is\ngradual abolition of the coalition government since last May\nlikely to remain, the key power in the area, and its influ-\nand the formal assumption of power by the Laotian communists\nence on its neighbors will be even stronger in the years to\nat the end of 1975. The Japanese government has also extended\ncome. It is through its ties with Hanoi that Tokyo hopes to\nrecognition to the Red Khmer in Cambodia and the PRG in South\nmend its relations with the rest of Indochina. 45\nVietnam. The Japanese embassy in Saigon, which remained open\nfollowing the communist takeover in April, has had little\nformal contact with the South Vietnamese authorities and its\n42\npersonnel has been reduced drastically. In spite of their\nThe Daily Yomiuri (English edition), October 11, 1975.\n43\nThese factors in Japan's relationship with Southeast\n46\nAsia were elaborated upon by Masataka Kosaka in Options for\nYomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), November 12, 1975. At the\nJapan's Foreign Policy (London: Institute for Strategic\nend of 1975 the Japanese government suddenly relaxed its ear-\nStudies, 1973, Adelphi Papers No. 97), pp. 22-27.\nlier objections to the inclusion of a so-called \"hegemony\"\n44The first years of official contacts more or less\nclause in the long-pending peace treaty with China. It is\nencouraged this notion: Japanese-DRV trade in 1975 amounted\nimpossible to determine what, if any, role Soviet involvement\nin Indochina had in that decision.\nto some 15 billion yen and appears to be growing.\n45\nAsahi Evening News (Tokyo, English edition),\nNovember 5, 1975.\n-34-\n-35-\nexpressed interest in establishing a dialogue with the PRG,\nthe Japanese must have come to the conclusion that sooner or\nof diplomatic contacts with the US conditional on American\nlater all dealings with, 47 the Vietnamese must be channeled\nreconstruction aid to North Vietnam, a demand that the Ford\ndirectly through Hanoi.\nadministration feels it cannot comply with in view of the\nchanges that have taken place in the situation in Indochina\nsince the signing of the Paris agreement three years ago.\n4. Vietnam: What Role For The US?\nIn spite of this, however, last fall both the US and\nUp to now, Hanoi's relationship with Japan has centered\nNorth Vietnam made some initial gestures that opened the way\nprimarily on economic matters. The North Vietnamese are now\ntoward a dialogue between the two governments. The first\ninterested in creating economic as well as political rela-\nsuch gesture was the DRV's releasing of nine Americans who\ntionships with the major industrial powers of the West, in-\nhad elected to stay in South Vietnam during the US evacuation\ncluding the United States. Some progress has already been\nin April 1975. Somewhat later Hanoi accepted some 1500\nmade in that direction. 48 But as the date of unification\nVietnamese refugees who chose to return to their homeland.\napproaches, Hanoi must embark on a bolder foreign policy course\nIn return, the US allowed a Quaker organization, the American\nthat involves establishing contacts with powers that were con-\nFriends Service Committee, to resume shipments of small\nsidered hostile during the years of confrontation.\nquantities of relief supplies to Vietnam. In December, the\nDRV invited members of the House Select Committee on Missing\nEver since North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong re-\nPersons to discuss the fate of some 850 US military personnel\nopened the issue of normalizing relations with the US in June\nlisted as missing in action or held prisoner in Indochina, a\n1975, 49 the problem has been widely discussed by American\nmove that appeared as a promising beginning toward the solu-\npolitical and journalistic circles. In their recent state-\ntion of a major outstanding issue between the two governments.\nments, the North Vietnamese leaders have made the establishment\nAlthough the meetings held between the Select Committee and\nthe North Vietnamese brought only moderate results, 50 both\nduring those sessions, and in communications with some members\nof the US Congress, the North Vietnamese expressed interest in\n47\nThe PRG seems to have no illusions about its role\nestablishing diplomatic relations with the United States. 51\nin Vietnam's foreign relations after reunification. Speaking\nabout the post-reunification stage, a PRG diplomat revealed\nthat the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry will move to Hanoi.\n50\nOn December 21, 1975 the North Vietnamese released\nHowever, the same official saw a continuing role for Saigon\nthe bodies of three American pilots killed in the Vietnam war.\nin the handling of Vietnam's economic contacts with the non-\nHowever, Hanoi still declines any knowledge of the fate of\ncommunist world. Interview given by the director of the\nthe rest of the US military personnel listed as missing or\nPress Department of the PRG Foreign Ministry to a Japanese\nkilled in Indochina during the war.\nnewsman at the end of October. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo),\nNovember 1, 1975.\n51\nIn a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, the North\n48\nVietnamese indicated the willingness to return the remains\nAs of 1975, the North Vietnamese maintained diplo-\nof two American marines killed in Saigon in the last days of\nmatic relations with a number of industrialized countries\nthe US withdrawal from South Vietnam. During a trip to Hanoi\nsuch as Australia, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nand Saigon in January 1976, Senator George McGovern con-\nKingdom.\ncluded that the US should consider the problem of negotiation\n49\nwithout undue haste.\nIn a speech before the DRV National Assembly on June\n3, 1975, Dong's remarks on normalization of US-Hanoi contacts\nwere the first instance in about a year and a half that a\nsenior North Vietnamese official had directly addressed him-\nself to the problem.\n-36-\n-37-\nHowever, the half-hearted approach Hanoi has thus far\nHowever, the North Vietnamese seem genuinely inter-\nshown toward the issue of locating and returning the persons\nested in buying \"capitalist\" goods and technology and, in\nstill missing in Indochina may be due to the Vietnamese com-\ncertain areas, the purchase of US technology and know-how\nmunists' underestimation of the importance attached to that\nmay be more attractive than that available at other free-\nproblem by the American public. It was perhaps to help the\nworld markets. Recent hints by Hanoi on the regime's willing-\nNorth Vietnamese leaders better to understand Washington's\nness to renegotiate the contracts of US firms formerly en-\nview on this matter that, in a speech delivered on December 7.\ngaged in offshore drilling along the South Vietnamese coast\nPresident Ford confirmed the basic principles of US policy\nis the most important indication that economics may be the key\ntoward the newly established regimes of Indochina. \"Our poli-\nto the future of US-Vietnamese relations. 53\ncies toward the new regimes of the peninsula,\" the President\nstated, \"will be determined by their conduct toward us. We\nHanoi may also be counting on a possible change in\nare prepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill -- parti-\nWashington's attitude toward the present embargo on US busi-\ncularly the return of the remains of Americans killed or\nness with Vietnam. The Vietnamese leaders may argue that\nmissing in action, or information about them. 52\nunder increasing pressure from American oil companies, the\nadministration will soon stop blocking new legislative moves\nWhat makes the President's words all the more relevant\naimed at ending the embargo. The Vietnamese appear fully to\nis that presently there is little public or congressional\nunderstand that the embargo must be lifted before American\npressure on the administration calling for a speedy decision\ncompanies can resume oil exploration off the coast of South\non the recognition of the Vietnamese regime. Whatever pres-\nVietnam. However, they may not understand that legislative\nsure there may be in that direction, it comes from US busi-\nmoves toward lifting the embargo may be dependent on Hanoi's\nness circles in the Far East that are interested in the\nwillingness to locate and return the remains of Americans\nlifting of the US embargo against Cambodia and Vietnam.\nstill missing in Indochina.\nOn the other hand, in spite of the DRV's continued\ninsistence on American reconstruction aid, the frequent calls\nfor US recognition betray a certain degree of urgency. In\n53\nSuch willingness was expressed to Western newsmen by\nview of North Vietnam's involvement in the Sino-Soviet con-\nthe chief representative in Singapore of the North Vietnamese\nflict, Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders may believe that\nNational Import-Export Corporation who stated that US oil\nAmerican diplomatic presence in Vietnam could help alleviate\ncompanies must make new applications if they want to make a\nexisting pressures from China and the Soviet Union. In the\ncontribution to Vietnamese oil exploration. (Reuters from\nlong run, the North Vietnamese leadership will find it diffi-\nSingapore, November 25, 1975). During meetings between the\ncult to make US reconstruction aid a precondition to the\nNorth Vietnamese and members of the Select Committee on\nestablishment of relations. Some hardliners within the\nMissing Persons last December, the American participants\nVietnamese communist leadership may already be opposed to\nreceived the impression that the Vietnamese were interested\naccepting money from the US on purely ideological grounds.\nin a \"mutually profitable\" oil deal, once relations with the\nUS had been normalized. The New York Times, December 8,\n1975. For an up-to-date roundup on the role oil may be\nplaying in future US-Vietnamese relations see Forbes, January\n52, These principles were part of President Ford's\n15, 1976, pp. 17-18.\n\"Pacific Doctrine,' outlined in a speech delivered in Hawaii,\nupon his return from a visit to the People's Republic of\nChina and other Asian countries in December 1975.\n-38-\nMany people in the United States are aware of the\npotential advantages of having diplomatic ties with a coun-\ntry that is rapidly assuming a pivotal role in Indochina.\nBut the establishment of relations with Hanoi is neither a\nmatter of urgency, nor is it absolutely necessary for the US.\nIn the words of a recent editorial on the subject, \"they need\nus more than we need them. \"54 On the basis of that tenet,\nthe administration may want to proceed slowly in its efforts\nto establish formal ties with the Vietnamese. Without setting\npreconditions of its own, it should keep reminding Hanoi of\nthe issue that concerns most Americans when it comes to US-\nVietnamese contacts, the matter of the servicemen still un-\naccounted for in Indochina.\nThere is one additional factor that should be con-\nsidered in this respect: the North Vietnamese leaders are\nnot likely to be in a position formally to negotiate with\nthe US on behalf of a united Vietnamese state prior to the\ndate of unification which is now set for April 30, 1976.\nTherefore, the administration has a reasonable period of\ntime at its disposal to evaluate the new atmosphere now\nshaping up in Indochina. With no reason to rush the\nmatter, Washington has an edge over the Vietnamese, one that\nshould be taken full advantage of.\n54 The Washington Post, November 24, 1975.\n1\n3/20/26\nNEWS\nFOREIGN POLICY\nHAK Sounds A Note Of Caution: Secretary Kissinger said\nFriday that US \"contingency plans\" against Cuba are aimed at\ntrying to caution the Soviet Union and the Castro government that\nfurther intervention in Africa could have \"serious consequences. \"\nKissinger acknowledged that his warnings to Cuba had been\na kind of psychological warfare against that country and the USSR\nRichard Valeriani (NBC) reported.\nKissinger told a Senate subcommittee (on NBC film) : \"I\nwould ask everybody to keep in mind that we are dealing here\nwith a situation in which we are attempting to discourage or\ndeter Soviet and Cuban involvement before it has reached the\nstage where crisis decisions have to be taken.' \"\nKissinger added (on ABC/CBS film) : \"There is no urgent\nsituation at this moment that requires a crisis decision. We\nshould not look at this immediate situation in terms of planning\na military move in any time frame that is now immediately foreseeable.\nWe are rather trying to call the attention of the USSR and of\nCuba to the serious consequences of contemplated action.\"\nBernard Kalb (CBS) said Kissinger diffused the sense of\nurgency that seemed to be reflected in the disclosure of\ncontingency plans and warnings to Cuba.\n\"The Secretary of State was edging his way along a precarious\ntightrope, reassuring Congress that no action is imminent or\neven in active planning, and that before any military move is\ntaken Congress will be consulted. What would happen if Congress\nrefused to give its consent to such a move? Nobody asked and\nKissinger didn' volunteer an opinion,\" Ted Koppel (ABC) reported.\n-- AP; UPI; Networks (3/26/76)\nUS Considering Talks With Hanoi: The State Department\nannounced Friday that it has sent a message to the Communist\ngovernment of North Vietnam, signalling an American willingness\nto hold official talks.\n\"As President Ford arrived in California, White House aides\nwere concerned that Republican conservatives may not like the\nidea of negotiating with the North Vietnamese,\" John Cochran (NBC)\nreported.\nTom Jarriel (ABC) reported that the President \"stopped short\nof saying exploratory talks were underway, but implied they are\nunder consideration because a congressional delegation that\nvisited Hanoi believes they would be useful.\"\nFord said (on ABC/NBC film) : \"That congressional committee"
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