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Defense - Military Base Realignments and Closures (2)
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Defense - Military Base Realignments and Closures (2)
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The original documents are located in Box 11, folder "Defense - Military Base
Realignments and Closures (2)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 11 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
OFFICE STATE OF THE PRESIDENT STATES OF UNITED
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
JAN 8 1976
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
January 8, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
DONALD G. OGILVIE
SUBJECT:
Helicopter Pilot Training
Attached is the Defense budget decision document which
consolidated helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.
Clements is apparently considering a proposal to con-
solidate fixed-wing aircraft training at Pensacola, but
no decision has been made to date.
I have asked Jim Mitchell and Paul O'Neill to check on
the forestry issue you raised and will get you a report
shortly.
Attachment
saw Jonly discussed 1/20/26
A/M Finday
GERALD R. FORD D's LIBRARY
mth.
NUMBER
PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION
31
adams
SUBJECT Program 8 - Consolidation of Undergraduate
DOD COMPONENT
Helicopter Pilot Training
Navy, Army
DESCRIPTION Covers all undergraduate helicopter pilot training.
FY 1977
Army
Navy
Alternative Estimate, TOA, $M
+12.5
-34.3
Alternative Estimate, Military E/S
+60
-2,000
Alternative Estimate, Civilian E/S
+23
-450
Evaluation
The potential for consolidation of undergraduate helicopter pilot training (UHPT)
has long been studied by different groups. While strong opposing views have been
presented by the Navy, the general conclusion reached by the Interservice Training
Review Organization (ITRO) task group is that significant savings could be
realized from consolidation. The greatest total savings to DoD, however, would
clearly be realized by having the Army conduct all DoD helicopter training at
Fort Rucker. The alternative directs that all UHPT training be consolidated under
Army, adds $12.5 million to Army training estimates for this purpose and reduces
Navy training estimates by $34.3 million for a net DoD savings of $21.8 million in
FY 1977. Larger savings will be realized in the outyears.
In addition, the alternative would preclude the Navy from acquiring two additional
outlying training fields near Pensacola and would provide for the reduction of at
least one Navy flight training base. The effect of the alternative would be to
also reduce Navy aircraft procurement requirements by $24.0 million. Aircraft
requirements will be addressed in a separate PBD.
Outyear savings indicated below include the impact of a Navy base closure and excludes
aircraft procurement reductions.
Outyear Impact: Per Year FY 1978 - FY 1981
Army
Navy
+12.5 Million
-$51.3 Million
+60 Military E/S
-2,300 Military E/S
+23 Civilian E/S
-900 Civilian E/S
Alternative. Consolidate all UHPT under Army; approve an increase of $12.5 million,
60 military E/S and 23 civilian E/S to Army estimates and a decrease of $34.3 million,
2,000 military E/S, and 450 civilian E/S to Navy estimates in FY 1977; and reduce
Navy flight training base structure by one base.
Mtg with sikes
clements
DOD must start thefficiencies
'hard pill time
Must do had things
Pensacola open option with Corpus Christ, (clemints does not like)
2
Nany Eighting to bitter end
DECISION The Deputy Secretary approved the alternative and to
FORD is LIBRARY 070838
consolidate at Fort Rucker.
December 15, 1975
SD,
FORM
OCT 74
428-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAGE 1 OF
5
Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DoD Directive 5400.7
NUMBER
PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION (Continuation) UHPT
317
CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION
DETAIL OF EVALUATION
Consolidation of Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training (UHPT)
For several years now, proposals have been considered to consolidate UHPT into an
all helicopter program under the Army. A great deal of pressure has been exerted
from the GAO and the Congress on the DoD to move forward with this consolidation.
Each time this issue has been addressed, significant economies identified have
prompted OSD staff support of such consolidation. However, each time a particular
version was solidified, staffed and began moving through the decision process,
strong objections have been raised by the Navy on the basis that the "Service
peculiar" needs of the Navy cannot be met causing delay in a decision on any partic-
ular consolidation proposal. On the other hand, Air Force helicopter pilots have
been trained by the Army successfully for a number of years and Army has successfully
trained Marines (several hundred a year during the Vietnam era). Navy conducts a
combination fixed and rotary wing UHPT program with graduates receiving some 100
hours in rotary-wing aircuaft in contrast to some 200 rotary-wing hours for graduates
of the Army all helo program.
At ASD (M&RA) request, the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) studied
the potential for this consolidation and found that significant savings would
accrue from such a move. GAO concluded also in a 1974 report that helicopter train-
ing consolidation would result in savings. In short, the issue has been studied
long enough and this PBD provides an alternative intended to prompt a decision to
consolidate helicopter training as part of the FY 1977 budget review process.
The ITRO task group found that significant commonality existed among the Services in
the UHPT basic course requirements for training a helo pilot. Navy graduates of
UHPT, as they do now, would attend advanced (Readiness Squadron) training to fully
prepare them for assignment to a fleet aviation unit. Service peculiar requirements
can be readily provided in this intermediate follow-on program or in an expanded
Service-specialized final segment of the UHPT syllabus, or both, as in the case for
the Air Force. These needs are discussed in detail by the ITRO. It is generally
agreed that a revision of the current UHPT syllabus to provide for such needs would
be desirable if Army did all the training at Fort Rucker.
The table below displays Service budgeted helicopter training rates over the next
several years, subject to adjustment in the current budget cycle.
FY 1976
FY 197T
FY 1977
FY 1978
FY
1979
FY 1980
FY
1981
Army
811
158
820
820
820
820
820
Air Force
50
12
50
50
50
50
50
Navy
225
50
201
200
200
200
200
Marine Corps
216
45
180
260
260
260
260
Other*
139
63
151
95
95
95
95
Total
1,441
328
1,402
1,425
1,425
1,425
1,425
*Includes Coast Guard, Foreign, etc.
Army training officials have advised that the Fort Rucker capacity for training
helicopter pilots is about 2,400 pilots per year; it is the only base that has the
capacity to train all helicopter pilots required by DoD. As indicated, the Army's
stated peak annual helo pilot training requirement FY77 through FY81 is less than
SD
FORM
1 OCT 74
428-1c
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAGE
2
OF
5
Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DoD Directive 5400.7
NUMBER
PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION (Continuation) UHPT
317
CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION
900 pilots. Because of Army's current pilot surplus, however, the PBD on Program VIII.
Army, proposes reducing the annual training rate to at least 675 and perhaps to 500
pilots. Assuming that this proposed training rate is accepted, only a quarter
of the present training capacity at Fort Rucker will be used. Furthermore, training
rates for the other Services are expected to be lower than those shown pending final
decision in separate PBD's currently under consideration.
The ITRO study addressed three options. The first option was to maintain the status
quo and allow Navy to proceed with its Long Range Pilot Training System at a one-time
cost of $17.7M and annual recurring savings estimated at $6.7M. Option two provided
for "All Helicopter" Training by the Army and identified one-time costs of $.2M and
annual recurring savings of $11.7M. Option three, which is essentially a compromise
between the first two options, would have collocated Navy training at Fort Rucker but
allowed Navy to continue its own training. One-time costs were estimated at $12.8M
with annual recurring savings of $6.3M. The estimates did not include cost avoidance/
savings associated with current Navy plans to acquire two outlying fields at Whiting
near Pensacola nor did they include reduced procurement requirements of T-34C train-
ing aircraft. Base utilization adjustments which could be accomplished with consoli-
dation were also not addressed in the ITRO study. The study was reported in March
1975 and although it remains valid, some detailed cost estimates may warrant updating.
Current estimates from the Army indicate that Army can train all Navy and Marine
Corps helo pilots for an annual additional Army cost of approximately $12.5M, an
estimate consistent with the ITRO study. The Army add-on is based on budgeted Navy-
conducted training rates and would be adjusted to reflect other budget adjustments in
these rates. This estimate is based on the following assumptions: (1) all primary
flight training (approximately the first half) will be performed by contract, as it
is now in the Army program ; (2) Navy will provide and fund all Instructor Pilots,
Check Pilots, and Flight Commanders required beyond primary flight training; (3)
training syllabus will be identical except for 25 hours of Navy-unique training;
(4) all academic instructors will be provided by Army; (5) flight clothing for USN
students will be provided by Navy; (6) Navy will furnish a detachment for all
administrative support for USN permanent party and students; (7) investment costs
for training aircraft are not included; and (8) Navy will transfer its UH-1 training
aircraft to Army to augment the present UHPT trainer inventory. The latter will
supplement Army UH-1 assets for the last half of the course; Army TH-55 assets from
the Vietnam surge are adequate to handle all DoD training loads.
The Navy budget displays the total cost of its flight training program which includes
estimated costs of training jet, propellar, and helicopter pilots for Navy, Marine
Corps, Coast Guard and foreign countries. Budget estimates are presented in aggre-
gate for all aircraft lines. The Service estimate breaks out only aircraft operating
cost for each line and does not separately identify the total costs of training jet
pilots, prop pilots or helo pilots. Navy has been repeatedly requested to break out
the cost for the helo pilot portion only. Navy has reported that it is having
great difficulty separating these costs and to date has been unable to provide the
data.
The table below displays data provided by the Navy for the FY 1976 Military Manpower
Training Report (MMTR), which identifies total cost of UHPT program for FY 1976 and
FY 197T, as contained in the President's Budget.
SD
FORM
428-1c
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAGE
3
OF
5
1 OCT 74
Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DOD Directive 5400.7
NUMBER
PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION (Continuation) UHPT
317
CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION
Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training
FY 1976
FY 197T
FY 1977
($000)
($000)
($000)
Navy Training Rate (Navy/Marcorps)
528
106
381
Appropriation
MilPers
35,884
8,877
39,245
0&M
22,260
5,879
27,681
Aircraft Procurement
11,010
3,670
34,800
Other Procurement
113
32
693
MILCON
2,672
0
0
Reimb.
0
0
0
71,939
18,458
102,419 (est.)
Purpose/Use
Student Pay and Allow.
4,797
1,195
5,154
Direct Spt. MilPers
22,538
5,515
22,795
Direct Spt. Other
12,332
3,369
14,531
Indirect Spt. MilPers
8,549
2,167
33,146
Indirect Spt. Other
23,723
6,212
26,793
71,939
18,458
102,419 (est.)
Costs associated with conduct of UHPT in FY 1976 were stated by Navy last year to be
$71.9M, of which $11M was for aircraft procurement and $2.7M was for new construc-
tion. Navy has been tasked to update and extend this table for FY 1977 funding.
Since Navy has not yet responded, the FY 1976/7T data above was used to factor the
FY 1977 costs for pricing out the alternative in this PBD. The costs for Navy UHPT
in FY 1977 have been estimated to be about $102.4M, of which $34.8M is programmed for
aircraft procurement.
Data from the above table indicates an average cost of about $136,000 per Navy helo
pilot graduate in FY 1976 and about $174,000 per graduate in FY 197T. Cost per
graduate in FY 1977 would exceed $260,000 when proposed aircraft procurement costs
are allocated. Comparable MMTR data for the Army helo pilot program indicates an
average cost per graduate of $87,000 in FY 1976 and $86,000 in FY 197T.
The Navy fixed-wing aircraft procurement plan, part of which supports Navy's UHPT,
is well underway. Total procurement is programmed for 228 T-34C training aircraft
at a total cost of $82.9M, with funding of 109 planned for FY 1977 at a cost of
$34.8M. About one-third of the total buy could be avoided under this consolidation,
or 76 aircraft at a savings of about $24M. Aside from the large investment cost of
such aircraft, they are more expensive to operate in the primary phase than the
different rotary wing aircraft that could be used if the Army did this training
instead. Based on the estimated Navy costs above and analysis by the OSD
staff, it is estimated that no less than $60M in FY 1977 Navy funds could be saved
by having the Army train all helicopter pilots at its UHPT base at Fort Rucker.
The alternative would direct the Army to conduct undergraduate helo pilot training
for all DoD needs at Fort Rucker, beginning in FY 1977. This decision would require
adding 60 military E/S, 23 civilian E/S and $12.5M to the Army budget. Navy training
budget estimates could be reduced by 2,000 military, 450 civilians, and $34.3M in
FY 1977 with larger savings anticipated in the outyears. In addition, potential
SD
FORM
1 OCT 74
428-1c
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAGE
4
OF
5
Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DoD Directive 5400.7
NUMBER
PROGRAM/BUDGET DECISION (Continuation) UHPT
317
CONTINUATION OF CONSIDERATION
Navy aircraft procurement savings (now estimated at $24.0 million) will be addressed
in a separate PBD.
The alternative would direct Navy to withhold action on the planned acquisition of
two outlying fields at Whiting until the full impact of this decision is determined.
Consolidation of UHPT together with other training consolidation actions, makes
possible the reduction of the Navy flight training base structure by one base with
the location to be proposed by the Navy. The reductions above assume one-time
Navy phasing costs of $17M in FY 1977.
SD
FORM
428-1c
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAGE
5
OF
5
1 OCT 74
Disclosure Restricted Under FOI Act (5 USC 552) and DoD Directive 5400.7
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
January 19, 1976
Memo For Jack Marsh
Attached is a revised page 10 to sub-
stitute in the report I sent you over
the weekend regarding base closure
justifications.
aw
Alan Woods
DEPART DEP DE OF DIFINS
JAN 17 1976
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C., 20301
NIED STATES or THIREY
January 17, 1976
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN 0. MARSH, JR.
Attached you will find the bullet points you requested
for each significant base realignment to be studied.
Where there are substantive negative factors involved,
they have been included.
Also attached is an additional copy of the memorandum
indicating the names (in parentheses) of the Congress-
man in whose district the facilities are located and
the names of other Members of Congress and Senators
from that state who serve on committees which affect
DoD. An asterisk next to the state's name shows
whether or not it is a primary state.
I will remain available to discuss these with you at
your convenience. I can be reached at 697-8388
(office) or 549-5919 (home).
alonWood
Alan Woods
The Special Assistant
CC: James Cavanaugh
Donald Ogilvie
&
FORD
WE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REALIGNMENT CANDIDATES
JANUARY 1976
SIGNIFICANT CANDIDATES
ACTION
Key Committee Member
ALABAMA
STUDY CLOSURE OF CRAIG AIR FORCE BASE,
Dickinson (R) HASC
SELMA (Represented by Cong. Flowers-D)
Edwards (R)
HAC
Nichols (D)
HASC
Bevill (D)
HAC
ARIZONA
STUDY CONSOLIDATION AND RELOCATION OF
Goldwater (R) SASC
ACTIVITIES FROM DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE
BASE, TUSCON (Represented by Cong. Udall-D)
CALIFORNIA
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT MAC ARTHUR, LOS ANGELES
Cranston (D)
SBC
(Represented by Cong. Johnson-D)
B. Wilson (R)
HASC
Hinshaw (R)
HASC
CONSOLIDATE SUPPORT AND OVERHEAD OF NAVAL
Talcott (R)
HAC
ELECTRONIC LABORATORY CENTER/NAVAL UNDERSEA
Clawson (R)
HBC
CENTER, SAN DIEGO (Represented by B. Wilson-R)
C. Wilson (D)
HASC
Leggett (D)
HASC & HBC
Lloyd (D)
HASC
Burke (D)
HAS
Roybal (D)
HAC
McFall (D)
HAC
Burgener (D)
HAC
Dellums (D)
HASC
FLORIDA
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
Chiles (D)
SAC &SBC
KEY WEST (Represented by Cong. Fascall-D)
Young (R)
HAC
Bennett (D)
HASC
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
Sikes (D)
HAC
PENSACOLA, SAUFLEY FIELD (Represented by
Chappell (D)
HAC
Cong. Sikes-D)
Gibbons (D)
HBC
FORD
BERALD
2.
ILLINOIS*
STUDY CLOSURE OF SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT, SAVANNA
O'Brien (R)
HASC
(Represented by Cong. Railsback-R)
Michel (R)
HAC
Price (D)
HASC
Shipley (D)
HAC
Yates (D)
HAC
INDIANA*
STUDY CLOSURE OF JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND,
Bayh (D)
SAC
MADISON (Represented by Cong. Hamilton-D)
Hillis (R)
HASC
Roush (D)
HAC
REDUCE OPERATIONS AT NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT
Myers (R)
HAC
CENTER, CRANE (Represented by Cong. Hillis-R)
MAINE
STUDY REDUCTION OF BASE AT LORING AIR FORCE
Muskie (D)
SBC
BASE, LIMESTONE (Represented by Cong. Cohen-R)
MARYLAND*
STUDY CONSOLIDATION OF ORDNANCE SCHOOL,
Mathias (R)
SAC
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, ABERDEEN
Beall (R)
SBC
(Represented by Cong. R. Bauman-R)
Holt (R)
HASC
Long (D)
HAC
Mitchell (D)
HBC
MASSACHUSETTS*
STUDY REDUCTION OF SEMIACTIVE STATUS OF
Brooke (R)
SAC
FORT DEVENS, AYER (Represented by Cong.
Conte (R)
HAC
Drinan-D)
Boland (D)
HAC
Early (D)
HAC
'Neill (D)
HBC
MICHIGAN*
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF
Cederberg (R)
HAC & HBC
ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT SELFRIDGE AIR
Nedzi (D)
HASC
GUARD BASE, MT. CLEMENTS (Represented by
Carr (D)
HASC
Cong. O'Hara-D)
Traxler (D)
HAC
'Hara (D)
HBC
STUDY CLOSURE OF KINCHELOE AIR FORCE BASE,
KINROSS (Represented by Cong. Ruppe-R)
3.
MISSOURI
STUDY RELOCATION OF ACTIVITIES FROM RICHARDS-
Symington (D)
SASC
GEBAUR AIR FORCE BASE, GRANDVIEW (Represented
Eagleton (D)
SAC
by Cong. Bolling-D)
Randall (D)
HASC
Ichord (D)
HASC
Burleson (D)
HAC
MONTANA*
INACTIVATE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND SATELLITE
Mansfield (D)
SAC
DETACHMENT AND DISESTABLISH AIR FORCE
Baucus (D)
HAC
ACTIVITIES AT GLASGOW AIR FORCE BASE,
GLASGOW (Represented by Cong. Melcher-D)
NEW JERSEY*
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT DIX, WRIGHTSTOWN
Case (R)
SAC
(Represented by Thompson-D and Forsythe-R)
Patten (D)
HAC
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTACT OPERATION AT
ARMY MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL, BAYONNE
(Represented by Cong. Daniels-D)
NEW YORK*
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORTS HAMILTON AND TOTTEN,
Buckley (R)
SBC
NEW YORK CITY (Represented by Cong.
Mitchell (R)
HASC
Zeferetti-D; Rosenthal-D, Biaggi-D, Wolff-D)
Kemp (R)
HAC
McEwen (R)
HAC
STUDY RELOCATION OF NAVY RESALE OFFICE FROM
Conable (R)
HBC
NEW YORK CITY (Represented by Cong.
Hastings (R)
HBC
Zeferetti-D)
Stratton (D)
HASC
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF
Holtzman (D)
HBC
ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT STEWART AIRPORT,
Addabbo (D)
HAC
NEWBURGH (Represented by Cong. Gilman-R)
Koch (D)
HAC
OHIO*
STUDY CONVERSION OF CONTRACTOR OPERATED
Taft (R)
SASC
RESERVE FACILITY OF RICKENBACKER AIR FORCE
Regula (R)
HAC
BASE, COLUMBUS (Represented by Wylie-R
Miller (R)
HAC
and Devine-R)
Latta (R)
HBC
Ashley (D)
HBC
Stokes (D)
HAC & HBC
4.
OKLAHOMA
STUDY CONSOLIDATION AND RELOCATION OF
Bellmon (R)
SAC & SBC
ACTIVITIES FROM ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE
Steed (D)
HAC
ALTUS (Represented by Cong. Steed-D)
STUDY REALIGNMENT OF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND
COMMUNICATIONS AT TINKER AIR FORCE BASE,
OKLAHOMA CITY (Represented by Cong. Jarman-R)
PENNSYLVANIA*
STUDY REDUCTION OF OPERATIONS AT NEW CUMBER-
Schulze (R)
HASC
LAND ARMY DEPOT, NEW CUMBERLAND (Represented
Coughlin (R)
HAC
by Cong. Goodling-R)
Murtha (R)
HAC
McDade (R)
HAC
STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY OPERATIONS AT FORT
Schneebeli (R)
HBC
INDIANTOWN GAP, LEBANON (Represented by
Flood (D)
HAC
Cong. Schneebeli-R)
STUDY REDUCTION OF NAVAL HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA
(Represented by Cong. Barrett-D, Eilberg-D,
Green-D and Nix-D)
TENNESSEE*
STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL AIR STATION, MEMPHIS
Beard (R)
HASC
(Represented by Cong. Jones-D)
Evins (D)
HAC
TEXAS*
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION
Tower (R)
SASC
CORPUS CHRISTI AND REDESIGNATION AS NAVAL
White (D)
HASC
AIR FACILITY (Represented by Cong. Young-D)
Kazen (D)
HASC
Casey (D)
HAC
STUDY CLOSURE OF WEBB AIR FORCE BASE, BIG
Mahon (D)
HAC
SPRING (Represented by Cong. Burleson-D)
Wright (D)
HBC
Burleson (D)
HBC
VIRGINIA
STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY ACTIVITIES AT
Byrd (D)
SASC
ARLINGTON HALL, ARLINGTON (Represented by
Scott (R)
SASC
Cong. Fisher-D)
Whitehurst (R) HASC
Robinson (R)
HAC
STUDY CLOSURE OF WINT HILL FARMS STATION
Daniel (R)
HASC
WARRENTON (Represented by Cong. Robinson-R)
*
Daniel, D (D)
HASC
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT STORY, VIRGINIA BEACH
(Represented by Cong. Whitehurst-R)
5.
PUERTO RICO
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT BUCHANAN
GUAM
STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL SHIP REPAIR FACILITY
AGANA (Represented by Cong. Won-D)
* Primary State
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JANUARY 1976
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
ALABAMA
STUDY CLOSURE OF CRAIG AIR FORCE BASE,
1,500
550
2,050
SELMA
Excess Undergraduate Pilot Training
(UPT) training base capacity
Craig lowest producer of all UPT bases
Airspace problems
Weather limits flying operation
New investment has purposely been with-
held because Craig has been "soft" for
some time
Large percentage of substandard
facilities
No need for other AF requirements
ARIZONA
CONSOLIDATE AND RELOCATE ACTIVITIES FROM
980
40
1,020
DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, TUCSON
(Transfer from SAC to TAC, inactive 100th
Strat. Recon Wing; relocate 349th Strat
Recon Sqd's U-2 aircraft to Beale AFB,
Calif. and merge with SR-71 assets; con-
solidate SAC and TAC drone personnel and
equipment under TAC at base; and relocate
Det. 1 of the AF Fighter Weapons Center
which has six A-10 aircraft and performs
Operational Test & Evaluation mission for
Nellis AFB, Nevada)
Collocates Strat. Recon resources
Reduces air space hazard for U-2 by
relocating
2.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
ARIZONA (Continued)
Avoids U-2 construction requirements at
D/M
Results in economies due to consolida-
tion of Strat. Recon and drone resources
CALIFORNIA
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT MAC ARTHUR, LOS ANGELES
90
180
270
Reduction of unneeded, high cost, single
mission installation (DoD policy to
eliminate)
Reduction of overhead and support costs
Originally proposed in 1974 but not fully
implemented
Reserve mission can be performed as effec-
tively at Naval Air Station, Los Alamitos
CONSOLIDATE SUPPORT AND OVERHEAD OF NAVAL
370
370
ELECTRONIC LABORATORY CENTER/NAVAL UNDERSEA
CENTER, SAN DIEGO
Economies through consolidation of
overhead and support facilities
Situated almost across street from
each other
FLORIDA
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
330
28
358
SAUFLEY FIELD, PENSACOLA
Realignment of Navy Aviation Training
assets
Economies through consolidation
Property will continue to be used for
Navy non-flying activities
3.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
FLORIDA (Continued)
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
2,600
640
3,240
KEY WEST
Cost Economies due to reduction of
base Operating Support Costs
Reduces Navy shore establishment
Consolidates similar activities in
Pensacola area
ILLINOIS
STUDY CLOSURE OF SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT, SAVANNA
15
415
430
Continuation of Army's long range plan
to reduce unneeded depot structure
(Reduction affected 2-3 years ago)
Preliminary estimate indicates long term
pay back (14 years)
Army analyses indicates this most feasible
one at this time
Property will probably be retained for
contingency requirements.
INDIANA
STUDY CLOSURE OF JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND,
4
420
424
MADISON
Continuation of Army's long range plan
to reduce unnecessary installations
One of four locations at which ammo test-
ing is accomplished. Proposals will
reduce to three, thereby eliminating
some duplication
Will result in better utilization of
proposed mission relocation sites (Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Md.; Yuma, Ariz. and/or
Dugway, Utah)
Preliminary estimate indicates long term
pay back (11.4 years)
4.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
INDIANA (Continued)
REDUCE OPERATIONS AT NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT
445
445
CENTER, CRANE
RIF only (11%)
Need based upon Navy's projection of
workload
MAINE
STUDY REDUCTION OF BASE AT LORING AIR
2,750
465
3,215
FORCE BASE, LIMESTONE
Scheduled reduction of older B-52
(G models) from active inventory
Results in part from total force
strategy which transfers certain SAC
tanker functions to Reserve Component
responsibility (i.e., KC-135s to
Reserves)
Will retain capability to support SAC,
Air Defense Command alert and contin-
gency requirements
Reduction of single mission base (DoD
policy is to evolve to multi-mission
base)
Results in sizable resource reductions
(less than 3 month pay back)
New investment has been held to minimum
in recent years
Coastal SAC base
MARYLAND
STUDY CONSOLIDATION OF ORDNANCE SCHOOL,
1,475
720
2,195
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND (APG), ABERDEEN
Consolidation of similar training
activities (Ordnance School, APG
and Missile and Munitions School,
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama)
5.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
MARYLAND (Continued)
Very cost effective - 1.1 year pay back
(but $40 mil in new MILCON)
Reduces overhead and support costs
Would significantly reduce APG with no
planned back fill.
MASSACHUSETTS
STUDY REDUCTION TO SEMIACTIVE STATUS OF
4,370
850
5,220
FORT DEVENS, AYER
Consolidation of Army Intelligence
training activities
Reduces overhead and support costs
Cost effective - 5.6 year pay back
Preliminary estimates indicates
$50 mil MILCON required
MICHIGAN
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF
21
230
251
ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT SELFRIDGE AIR
NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MT. CLEMENS
Could be very cost effective
Reduces DoD civilian end strength
Would continue to provide required
family housing
Reserve Component activities unaffected
STUDY CLOSURE OF KINCHELOE AIR FORCE BASE,
2,700
470
3,170
KINROSS
Single mission base
Transfer of KC-135 forces closure
Clean base, allowing maximum economies
to be realized
6.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
MICHIGAN (Continued)
Very cost effective - 1.4 year pay back
Facilities redistribution of B-52 assets
for consolidation
Low investment
No significant recent new construction
MISSOURI
STUDY RELOCATION OF ACTIVITIES FROM RICHARDS-
2,370 1,680
4,050
GEBAUR AIR FORCE BASE, GRANDVIEW
(INCLUDES NOVEMBER 1974 ANNOUNCED ACTION)
Consolidate similar functions
Reduces headquarters
Relocation of Air Force Communications
Service will anable management efficiences
to be realigned
Base retained for Air Force Reserve use
If Navy relocates Reserve activities from
Memphis tempo of AF planned operations at
this base could increase substantially
Very cost effective - 1.6 year pay back
MONTANA
INACTIVATE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND SATELLITE
149
15
164
DETACHMENT AND DISESTABLISH AIR FORCE
ACTIVITIES AT GLASGOW AIR FORCE BASE,
GLASGOW
TERMINATE ARMY CONTRACT OPERATIONS AT GLASGOW
AIR FORCE BASE, GLASGOW
Consolidation of SAC assets
Reduction in overhead and support
cost ($10 mil)
Action delayed for some period to assist
local community in overcoming adverse economic
impact of 1968 closure of base with little
attraction of long term industrial tenants for
use of base facilities
7.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
MONTANA (Continued)
Base excess and will be available for
State/Local ownership
Civilian energy projects now being con-
sidered by State for base should help miti-
gate being economic impact.
NEW JERSEY
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION AT
7
590
597
ARMY MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL, BAYONNE
No need for full time DoD longshoremen
Trend towards containerization diminished
need for Bayonne break bulk type operation
Accomplishment by contract allows when and
as needed arrangement with resulting
economies
NEW YORK
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORTS HAMILTON AND TOTTEN,
410
604
1,014
NEW YORK CITY
Eliminates small single mission, high
cost installations
Reduces overhead and support costs
Very cost effective - 2.7 year pay back
Reserve activities remain
STUDY RELOCATION OF NAVY RESALE OFFICE FROM
18
740
758
NEW YORK CITY
Consolidates DoD activities on military
installation
Reduces Navy SLUC costs (DoD payments to GSA)
Reduces overhead and support costs
No civilian end strength reduction
8.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
NEW YORK (Continued)
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACT OPERATION OF
41
148
189
ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT STEWART AIRPORT,
NEWBURGH
Could be very cost elfective
Reduces DoD end strength
Would continue to provide required
family housing
Reserve activities remain
OHIO
STUDY CONVERSION TO CONTRACTOR OPERATED
1,750
560
2,310
RESERVE FACILITY OF RICKENBACKER AIR
FORCE BASE, COLUMBUS
Transfer of KC-135 to Reserve allows
inactivation of active sqds at this
base and transfer to take place at same
base
Very cost effective - less than three
months pay back
Avoids MILCON for Reserve KC-135 transfer
by using existing KC-135 facilities on
base
Base remains viable but for Reserves
only
OKLAHOMA
CONSOLIDATE AND RELOCATE ACTIVITIES FROM
615
52
667
ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE, ALTUS
Nunn Amendment - communications units
deploy to Europe
Increases communications posture in
Europe
Assists in modernization of National
Guard Air Tactical Control System
9.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
OKLAHOMA (Continued)
Combines two mobile communications units
and one base for increased efficiences
REALIGNMENT OF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AND COMMUNI-
413
5
418
CATIONS AT TINKER AIR FORCE BASE,
OKLAHOMA CITY
Assists in modernization of Air National
Guard Tactical Air Control System
Increase communications posture in Europe
Nunn Amendment - communications units
deploy to Europe
PENNSYLVANIA
STUDY REDUCTION OF ARMY AVIATION MAINTENANCE
35 1,420 1,455
OPERATIONS AT NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT,
NEW CUMBERLAND
Consolidates Army Aviation Maintenance
activities (Corpus Christi, Texas/
New Cumberland, Md.)
Reduces overhead and support functions
Permits significant annual cost
reductions
Improves management of Army aviation
maintenance activities
STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY OPERATIONS AT
130
820
950
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, LEBANON
Owned primarily by State; State National
Guard activities unaffected
ROTC training mission reassigned elsewhere
several years ago
Operation New Life (VN Refugee Program)
delayed consideration of proposal
Eliminates unneeded, low utility, Reserve
Component base which has very marginal
10.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
PENNSYLVANIA (Continued)
mobilization use (Reserves for main
training use Drum, N.Y.; Hill, Va.;
Pickett, Va. and will use Dix more)
Very cost effective - less than four
months pay back
Enables civilian personnel end strength
reduction
STUDY REDUCTION OF NAVAL HOSPITAL,
590
248
838
PHILADELPHIA
Regionalization of hospital assets
Navy regards 300 bed hospital as excess
to its requirements
Enables civilian personnel end strength
reduction
STUDY CLOSURE OF THE DEFENSE CLOTHING
1,600
1,600
FACTORY, PHILADELPHIA
Enables civilian end strength reduction
Work would be accomplished by contract
In line with Government Policy
Problem may be that industry may not be
responsive (such as has happened in past)
Option may be to reduce to 500 person-
nel level
Civilian employees - 85% Black;
80% women.
TENNESSEE
STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL AIR STATION, MEMPHIS
580
100
680
(Relocate five Reserve Squadrons to
Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.)
Naval Air Reserve Facility (Marine/
Navy Reservists)
60% of Reservists now come from Kansas
City area
11.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
TENNESSEE (Continued)
Increase in Reserve training effective-
ness
Helps Reserve morale
Reduces costs
TEXAS
STUDY DISESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR STATION,
1,549
880
2,429
CORPUS CHRISTI AND REDESIGNATION AS
NAVAL AIR FACILITY
Consolidation of Naval Aviation training
assets
Reduces overhead and support costs
Makes more effective use of a better
physical plant in Pensacola
Retains Navy presence
Proposed relocation of Army Aviation
Maintenance Activity from New Cumberland
to this station would help offest impact
Navy needs to reduce its Aviation train-
ing base structure and this proposal
helps do this
Relocates Chief of Naval Aviation Training
to Pensacola, thereby placing this head-
quarters in a better position to manage
aviation training
STUDY CLOSURE OF WEBB AIR FORCE BASE,
1,860
700
2,560
BIG SPRING
Excess Undergraduate Pilot Training
base capacity
Serious community land encroachment
problem
Does not have three runway systems
required for effective Undergraduate
Pilot Training (neither does Craig-
12.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
TEXAS (Continued)
remaining five Undergraduate Pilot
Training bases do)
More substandard facilities than
remaining five Undergraduate Pilot
Training bases.
Very substantial savings ($38 mil per
year) - two months pay back
VIRGINIA
STUDY TERMINATION OF ARMY FACILITIES AT
690
560
1,250
ARLINGTON HALL, ARLINGTON
Substandard facilities
High cost operations
Relocate to better facilities
GSA would support residual DIA
activities
Long overdue
Reduces civilian personnel end strength
$25 mil MILCON required
ten year pay back
STUDY CLOSURE OF VINT HILL FARMS STATION,
700
425
1,125
WARRENTON
Operational need diminished
Residual essential activities can be
accommodated elsewhere
Very cost effective - one year pay back
Eliminates single mission high cost
installation
13.
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
PERSONNEL AFFECTED
ACTION
MIL
CIV
TOTAL
VIRGINIA (Continued)
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT STORY, VIRGINIA BEACH
470
40
510
Personnel reduction only
Property will continue to be retained
by Army for training purposes
Requires $7.3 MILCON
Cost effective - four year pay back
PUERTO RICO
STUDY CLOSURE OF FORT BUCHANAN
170
470
640
Closure of single mission, high cost
installation
Reduces civilian personnel end strength
Very cost effective - 6-month pay back
Serves as only remaining Army military
installation in Puerto Rico which is a
source of large recruiting base for
the volunteer Army.
GUAM
STUDY CLOSURE OF NAVAL SHIP REPAIR FACILITY,
7
330
337
AGANA
High cost operation (US wages vs wages
in the Philippines and Japan which are
competitors of the Guam operation)
Long ship transit times from Western
Pacific - excess use of fuel, high cost
Significant economic impact
Issue will revolve around US vs Foreign
bases/nationals.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1976
S
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
RUSS ROURKE Ruse
Bryce Harlow called to advise that he has been told that Bill
Clements has been instructed to stand by for base closure
announcements this week.
It is reasonable to assume that everyone at the White House
having an involvement in this matter is now "on board. 11 If
that is not the case and if, indeed, Harlow's information is
even correct, then it is quite another matter.
I recognize fully that we have debated to death the wisdom
of the aforementioned move and the best procedures to be
followed. The Harlow call is, therefore strictly FYI.
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
John Tower -
Corpus Christi -
- out of loop - DOD- -
Cheney operation -
still under review
FORD
FEB 2 ( 1976
February 27, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF
SUBJECT:
Senator Rd Brooke R-MASS)
Attached is the letter just received from Senator Brooke
pertaining to Ft. Devens.
I recommend the President phone Senator Brooke today.
bcc: Jack Marsh
/
Dick Cheney
FORD is LISRABY 076838
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
EDWARD W. BROOKE
MASSACHUSETTS
February 27, 1976
Dear Mr. President:
May I bring to your attention a matter that is of the
deepest concern to me and to which I hope you will give your
personal attention.
There are very persistent and very troubling reports
that the Department of Defense will recommend the closing of
Fort Devens Army Base in Ayer, Massachusetts. At the
present time Massachusetts suffers from a 12 percent
unemployment rate which is one of the highest in the country.
To close Fort Devens and to thereby deprive the state's
economy of the $100 million which this base generates
annually, would be to saddle our state with an unbearable burden.
On January 29, I had occasion to discuss this matter
with Army Secretary Martin Hoffmann. And I understand
full well the Army's need to close or realign certain bases
in order to comply with the budgetary constraints mandated
by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. But
Fort Devens' brief cannot and must not be limited to one
department's fiscal difficulties. It must be expanded to
consider the very drastic economic impact on Massachusetts
and New England. It must also consider the economic impact
such action would have on other Federal programs such as
unemployment compensation and job retraining. And above
all, it must be wedded to and steeped in the concept of equity.
Fort Devens provides for 5,700 military personnel and
1,600 civilian jobs. It boasts an annual payroll of $86 million,
with attendant economic benefits of over $20 million. To take
these jobs and federal funds from Massachusetts would be a
serious blow to her already grippled economy.
- 2 -
Moreover, it is my understanding from the Secretary
of the Army that there is no study being done at this time
to determine the impact of such an action on overall federal
and state expenditures. I well remember the arguments
put forth when the Boston Naval Shipyard was closed. Great
savings were anticipated for the Department of Navy. But
the Department of Defense never considered the tremendously
increased expenditures by the Labor Department for job
training programs; by the Commerce Department for EDA
grants; by HEW for additional contributions to Massachusetts
state programs; by the Department of Defense itself for the
activities of the Office of Economic Adjustment; and by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts for increased social services
and unemployment benefits. In light of these kinds of costs,
action such as that contemplated for Fort Devens might
well prove to be uneconomic and counterproductive to the
spending reductions we all seek.
The people of Massachusetts are ready, willing and
able to shoulder their share of the burdens in these
difficult economic times. But only if they know that their
share is equal to those of other states in other regions. And
in the past several years it is quite clear that these burdens have
not been distributed equitably. In fact, since 1968 New England
has suffered twenty-five percent of all base closings in the
country. In Massachusetts alone, we have suffered the
closing of the Springfield Armory, the Watertown Arsenal,
the Boston Naval Shipyard, the Westover Air Force Base,
and the Otis Air Force Base. To a people who already think
these actions by the Federal Government were capricious
and vindictive, the closing of Fort Devens would be the
proverbial last straw. In serious jeopardy would be their
belief that their government can and will decide problems in
a fair and reasonable fashion.
- 3 -
I recognize your very great time restraints
particularly at this moment, but I consider this matter
to be of such overriding importance that I respectfully
request an appointment at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely yours,
Edward of WL 'Brooke
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
R
FOR,
BALD
MAR 15 1976
March 12, 1976
Dear Senator:
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter
of March 11 to the President expressing your
strong objections to any action being taken
with respect to Glasgow Air Force Base until an
appropriate alternative use can be found.
Please be assured the President will receive
your letter without delay. I am certain it will
be fully considered.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely,
William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Honorable Mike Manafield
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bcc: w/incoming to Capt. Kollmorgen - - for DRAFT REPLY -
Max Friedersdorf signature - ASAP
bec: w/incoming to Jack Marsh - FYI
WTK:JEB:VO:vo
FORD i LIBRASY 07V83
MIKE MANSFIELD
3-12
MONTANA
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Header
Mashington, D.C. 20510
March 11, 1976
Handedtowtic 3/12
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
Yesterday, I was visited by Walter B. LaBerge, Assistant Secre-
tary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and several of his col-
leagues. The purpose of their visit was to advise me of proposed studies
of installations and activities in Montana.
Mr. LaBerge stated that it was the intention of the Department
of the Air Force to inactivate the Strategic Air Command "Satellite" units
at Malmstrom and Glasgow Air Force Bases in Montana. This would entail a
loss of 199 military and 11 civilian spaces at these two installations. It
is my policy not to oppose reductions in force based on military requirements
within the Department of Defense and feel that that matter is best left to
the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I interpose no ob-
jection to the inactivation of these SAC units.
However, I vigorously object to any action concerning Glasgow Air
Force Base which may relieve the Department of Defense, and specifically
the Department of the Air Force, of its responsibility for maintaining this
facility as a viable installation under its jurisdiction until such time as
an appropriate alternative use can be found.
Since 1966, when it was first announced that Glasgow Air Force
Base, the newest in the Air Force inventory, was to be closed, I have taken
the position that the people of Montana did not ask that the Base be es-
tablished; the people of Montana did not object to it being closed for mili-
tary reasons; and that these decisions rested entirely with the Federal
government. But with this exercise of authority, there remained an attendant
responsibility for the Administration to develop an alternative productive
use for this outstanding facility in Northeastern Montana. It is clearly
The President
-2-
March 11, 1976
beyond the capability of Glasgow, Valley County, or the State of Montana
to support an installation of this size at that location, and it is too
modern and complete to abandon.
Under two previous Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense,
the Department of the Air Force has been responsible for actively pursuing
a program of civilian use of facilities not required by Federal agencies,
as well as possible joint civilian aviation use of the airfield facilities.
In 1973, I was advised by then Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, that
"Glasgow Air Force Base will be almost fully occupied by military and other
Federally supported activities." Despite this, the Department of Defense
and the Department of the Air Force have been ineffective in finding a use
for the Base other than establishing a small satellite of SAC for a limited
period of time. No significant Defense-related long-term contracts have
been developed from within the entire DOD effort except one or two small Army
procurements as a temporary measure. This in spite of being advised by
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements on May 23, 1974, that immediate atten-
tion would be provided to the matter of DOD contracts being placed at Glas-
gow to facilitate its conversion from an active military post, and to pro-
vide employment opportunities in that isolated area of the country. It is
difficult for me to accept that a Department which spends approximately 30%
of its entire budget of more than $100 billion on procurement has been un-
able to identify a single significant long-term item or items to be fabricated,
assembled, or produced at Glasgow. It is even more difficult to understand
why such an outstanding air facility located in such an advantageous posi-
tion for polar flights, both to Europe and the Far East, not to mention
Alaska, has not been utilized in the government's vast transportation network.
I can only assume that those charged with this responsibility have not ag-
gressively sought a solution.
In order for this Base to be reported excess and disposed of under
Title 10 procedures, it will require the concurrence of the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee. I feel that I must do all in my power to prevent this from
happening. Further, in my capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Mili-
tary Construction of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, this matter will
be gone into thoroughly. As a matter of responsibility, the Air Force should
be required to maintain an adequate contracting agency at Glasgow to ad-
minister the Base utilities, facilities, fire and police protection, tower
operations, and tenant relationship so that those few on-going civilian en-
terprises now there can continue. This requirement should remain until an
alternative use is developed. I am requesting that the Air Force, which
must produce a thorough environmental impact statement, also consider and
study as a viable alternative the adaptability of the Base to a state energy
complex encompassing a gasification plant, a Char Oil Energy Development
The President
-3-
March 11, 1976
Plant; and an electrical generation plant to supply both electric utilities
and process steam for the total energy center. This is one of the more promis-
ing alternatives being offered for study, and if it is successfully processed
will relieve the Department of Defense from all responsibility at the Base.
In this regard, the cooperation of ERDA and FEA will be absolutely necessary.
Of all Air Force installations listed on the current notification
for inactivation, Glasgow is probably the only one which will not be eagerly
sought after by local communities and private entrepeneurs for alternative
civilian use. Other states with heavy population and requirements for in-
dustrial expansion will have few problems in transforming an active military
installation to a civilian industrial park. I agree that Glasgow Air Force
Base is the most difficult situation to face the Office of Economic Adjust-
ment in the Department of Defense and, therefore, should receive the highest
priority in their efforts to seek nationwide civilian use of excess instal-
lations.
In the meantime, I would appreciate it if no action is taken to
diminish the equipment or facilities at Glasgow until Congressional approval
is obtained.
With best personal wishes, I am
Respectfully yours,
frihe manafred
APR 1 1976
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date April 1, 1976
TO:
Jack Marsh
FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT
Please Handle
For Your Information
X
Per Our Conversation
Other:
V
UP-058
(BASES-STATES)
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- HERE ARE THE BASES INCLUDED IN THE ARMY'S
PLANS TO IMPOSE CUTBACKS TO SAVE $42 MILLION A YEAR (RIF DENOTES
REDUCTION IN FORCE):
BASE
ACTION
MILITARY
CIVILIAN
JOBS
JOBS
CALIFORNIA:
92
684
FT. MACARTHUR
CLOSURE
92
178
FT. ORD
RIF
506
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
5
10
WASHINGTON RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
5
10
IDAHO:
11
12
BOISE RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
11
12
ILLINOIS:
15
733
ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL
MOVE TOOL SET UNIT
320
SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT
CLOSURE
15
413
INDIANA:
4
438
JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND
CLOSURE
4
438
KANSAS:
-
16
53
SCHILLING MANOR
CLOSURE
16
53
MARYLAND:
1,603
860
ABERDEEN PROV. GRND.
MOVE ORDINANCE SCHOOL
1,475
720
TRANSPORTATION COURSES
103
21
FT. DETRICK
MAKE SUBINSTALLATION
25
119
MASSACHUSETTS:
4,372
846
FT. DEVENS
END ACTIVE ARMY OPS
4,372
846
MICHIGAN:
21
234
SELFRIDGE AFB
CHANGE HOUSING INSTLN
21
234
MONTANA:
9
12
HELENA RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
9
12
NEW JERSEY:
280
PICATINNY ARSENAL
RIF
280
NEW YORK:
451
752
FTS. HAMILTON, TOTTEN
CLOSURE
410
604
STEWART ANNEX
CHANGE HOUSING INSTLN
41
148
NORTH DAKOTA:
14
12
FARGO RECRUIT COMMAND
CLOSURE
14
12
PENNSYLVANIA:
167
2,237
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP
END ACTIVE ARMY OPS
132
819
NEW CUMBERLAND DEPOT
MOVE AVIATION MAINT
35
1,418
PUERTO RICO:
168
466
FT. BUCHANAN
CLOSURE
168
466
RHODE ISLAND:
12
13
PROVIDENCE RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
12
13
SOUTH DAKOTA:
13
12
SIOUX FALLS RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
13
12
TEXAS:
115
58
AMARILLO RECRUIT COMMAND
RIF
12
9
FT. HOOD
RIF
103
49
VIRGINIA:
1,886
1,073
ARLINGTON HILL
RELOCATE
667
588
FT. STORY
RELOCATE TROOPS
468
37
VINT HILL FARMS
CLOSURE
ALD FORD LIBRARY
751
448
UPI 04-01 12:57 PES
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
9/13/76
TO:
Mr. Wolthuis
FROM: Mr. Ogilvie
10 Pane meDiNoill
7 pm
Blothing
HALD R. FORD
send barlto
Don Ogehi
ARMY RESPONSE
Dear Mr. Breckinridge [Ford]:
During the past several months the President has
been requested to review the Army's realignment action
at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD). This re-
view has confirmed the original decision to phase down
LBAD. In view of recent requests, I have again reviewed
the case at the request of the President. I find that the
decision to realign LBAD remains valid.
The decision to realign the mission at LBAD was not
an easy one. After the cessation of hostilities in South
East Asia, there began a significant decline in the
communication-electronics maintenance and supply work-
load. The decline necessitated a major curtailment in
the workforce. The combined capacities at the Lexington-
Bluegrass, Sacramento, and Tobyhanna depots, our communication
and electronic depots, exceeded the Army's requirements in
the electronics maintenance functional area. Substantial
management efficiencies were to be gained by consolidating
into two depots. The facilities, location and other key
missions assigned to the Tobyhanna, Sacramento, and
Lexington-Bluegrass Depots were compared and the study
2
indicated a reduction at Lexington-Bluegrass. Most im-
portantly, the Army gains the greatest total savings from
realigning at LBAD.
As you know, on April 1, 1976 the Army announced a
series of realignments to effectuate approximately 6,000
additional civilian space reductions which is in consonance
with the FY 1977 budget submitted by the President. The
Congress obtained an additional civilian manpower reduction
on Defense, resulting in the loss of an additional 1814
spaces by the Army. These reductions further highlight
the dollar and manpower constraints within which the Army
must live. The LBAD action was an early step in the Army's
worldwide program to live within the budgetary constraints
of a peacetime era while fielding an effective fighting
force ;a program that continues to date.
There is concern over the report that purports to rank
LBAD number one among Army depots. In previous correspondence,
the Army has explained that the Productivity and Effectiveness
Report only rates each depot against itself and does not mean
that LBAD is the best or most efficient depot in the system.
The report presents data based on a 1972 start point only
as a self-improvement indicator. The Army must reduce
its workforce not on the basis of improvement but in a
manner that results in the most effective defense force
possible.
3
In summary, I have reviewed in detail the realignment
and the Secretary of Defense concurs with my recommendation
that the realignment must occur. LBAD, when reduced to a
depot activity, will result in substantial savings after
the realignment costs have been incurred. Delays in im-
plementing our plan are costly to the taxpayers and threaten
to jeopardize the readiness of our Army in the field. Ac-
cordingly, the Army will proceed with the phase down.
Sincerely,
Martin R. Hoffmann
TOBACCO
ICS Court Souse SUILDING
107 CHRAMSION
Congress of the United States
FAMILY FAHWS RUMAL
DEVELOPMENT
MENTUCKY 20007
DEPARTMENT DESPATIONS
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIC
(SA) 233-1301
House of Representations
FEDERAL BUILDING
SMALL BUSINESS
COVINGTON. KINTUCKY 41011
Mashington, B.E. 20515
(106) 131-2599
SBA AND SAICLECISLATION
SBA OVERSIGHT AND
May 24, 1976
MINGRITY ENTERPRISE
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
This has reference to my telephone conversation earlier today
with Deputy Assistant Charlie Leppert, concerning your announced re-
view of the Army's decision to phase down Lexington Blue Grass Army
Depot (LEAD), as reported on May 24, 1976 in the Lexington Herald.
I am pleased that you have asked for the "specific facts" for your
personal study upon returning to the White House and am writing to
bring to your attention the comprehensive file which I provided
nearly a year ago outlining facts which I think you will find fully
justify reversing the Army's decision to phase back LEAD by 2600
even though LBAD has consistently been ranked No. 1 in the nation
in efficiency and economy. I presented this material to your then
Deputy Assistant Vernon Loen on July 2, 1975, aboard Air Force 1,
enroute to a conference on domestic and economic affairs in Cincinnati,
Chio.
My detailed report included an analysis of some thirteen letters
which I had written to the then Army Secretary "Bo" Calloway, revealing
significant errors in the figures, calculations and logic which the
military relied upon in Project CONCISE, which has been used as justi-
fication for the proposed 2600 job cut back at the Depot.
For your convenience I am enclosing herewith a copy of my July 2
letter and referenced correspondence with the Secretary of the Army.
In addition to this earlier material, I call to your attention
and enclose for your perusal, additional data further addressing the
areas of comparative costs between the three electronics depots;
their overhead ratios; effectiveness and efficiency and the total
installation point-of-view concept.
A. Lexington is the lowest cost depot. The following
rate comparison table between the three electronics depots shows that
Lexington operates at a lower cost than the other two.
THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS
2
Maintenance Cost Recovery Rate Per Hour
FY-75
Present
Present Rate
Difference
Lexington
$11.79
$13.22
Sacramento
15.03
18.65
$5.43
Tobyhanna
12.34
14.15
÷ .93
It costs $5.43 more at Sacramento and $.93 more at Tobyhanna
for each direct manhour worked. For each million manhours worked
at Lexington in lieu of Sacramento, savings in the amount of
$5,430,000 would accrue. The difference between Tobyhanna and
Lexington would be $930,000 for one million manhours. The Army
projected 2,530 manyears of electronics maintenance workload for
the steady state year 1978. This equates to over 4.25 million direct
manhours per year.
Please note my letter of March 4, 1975, addressed to Secretary
Calloway stating, among other things, that the following rates were
in effect as utilized by AMC Comptroller during the first quarter,
Fiscal Year 1975 (the up-date period for CONCISE) as follows:
Lexington
$11.79
Tobyhanna
12.34
Sacramento
15.03
The Secretary's reply under date of April 18, 1975, stated basically
that (1) LBAD's maintenance labor costs were lower than SAAD's but
that the supply, supply support, and overhead costs must also be
considered, and that at best the rates could not be used because
they fluctuate.
The $11.79 labor rate includes all overhead supply costs. The
supply costs referred to made no mention of the supply rates for the
same period which were $12.44 for LBAD, $13.60 for SAAD, and $13.19
for TOAD. Your attention is invited to Enclosure 1, documentation
prepared by the Major Item Data Agency (MIDA) which controls depot
workloads. The source of the present SAAD and TOAD rates is at En-
closure 2. LBAD was not included in this package due to a misunder-
standing by MIDA. The "present" LBAD rates were submitted to MIDA
(Enclosure 3) and approved by MIDA (Enclosure 4).
FORD & LIBRAR BRALD
3
Secretary Calloway's response (Enclosure 5) to my March 14th
letter (Enclosure 6) omitted, as you will note, corresponding SAAD
rates. The source of the actual first and second quarter fiscal
year rates used in the Secretary's reply is unknown, but it is
known that those cited for LBAD are erroneous. The actual average
maintenance rate used by LBAD was $11.79 for both the first and
second quarters. Enclosure 7 contains the wage grade payroll scale
for LBAD, SAAD and TOAD. When coupled with LBAD's efficiency, ef-
fectiveness, and ratio of overhead to direct cost, there is no doubt
that LBAD is far more economical than SAAD.
B. Lexington has the lowest maintenance overhead cost:
The following table reflects the ratio of direct dollars to indirect
dollars expended by each depot.
Ratio of Direct $ to Overhead
Nov. -74
Nov. 75
Present
Direct Overhead
Direct
Overhead
Direct
Overhead
Lexington
1.00
.65
1.00
.69
1.00
.69
Sacramento
1.00
.92
1.00
.92
1.00
1.02
Tobyhanna
1.00
.77
1.00
.79
1.00
.83
Lexington has a much better ratio of direct to overhead than the
other two depots.
During Fiscal Years 72, 73, and 74 LBAD was ranked No. 1 in the
AMC System for its best ratio of direct to indirect labor cost. This
ranking was published by the Army in the AMC-MAPS reports dated October
1974. This data, Mr. President, exemplifies the management effort at
LEAD to produce the most efficient operation in the system. Needless
to say morale, which has been of the highest order over the years, has
not been helped by this bureaucratic lack of recognition.
C. Lexington is the most effective and efficient depot.
The effectiveness system, as used by the Army, measures how well a
depot performs its mission while the efficiency system evaluates the
economical application of people and money. When considered together,
these provide a comprehensive evaluation system for depot management.
The Army utilizes this system to relatively rank all of its eleven
depots against each other. The following table reflects the ranking
of the electronics maintenance depots for Fiscal Years 74 and 75.
FORD is LIBRARY ERALD
4
Depot Rankings
FY-74
FY-75
Lexington
1
1
Sacramento
10
11
Tobyhanna
3
8
It is difficult to understand a decision to phase back the
Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot which is the lowest cost depot, and
which ranks No. 1 in efficiency and effectiveness, other than to specu-
late that this decision was based on political considerations, without
regard to cost efficiency and depot performance.
The depot rankings of efficiency and effectiveness have been pro-
vided to Department of the Army (see Enclosure 8). Army's response
addressed only the efficiency portion of the system saying that it only
measures against its own past performance (see Enclosure 9). Army
does not mention effectiveness which does measure all depots against
common standards. When considered together, depots are measured by how
well their missions are performed and evaluates their economical ap-
plication of people and money. Therefore, contrary to Army's conten-
tion, the combined ranking does measure depot against depot.
D. Installation point-of-view concept. This concept is
utilized by Army to predict the savings to be realized by phasing down
or closing an installation. This methodology uses two factors in ar-
riving at average installation manyear costs. These factors are:
1. Manyears worked at an installation.
2. Total cost to operate the installation including
the cost of items produced.
To obtain the average cost per manyear worked the total cost is divided
by the number of manyears. These average manyear costs of the three
electronics depots were compared, and the depot with the highest average
manyear cost considered the most expensive to operate. This would be a
valid system if each depot had identical missions and produced identical
items. In the case of the electronics depots there is 2 substantive
difference in the missions of the three depots. LBAD performs the major
portion of design, fabrication and assembly known as quick reaction
projects which can be categorized as research and development. Per-
centage breakout of this workload by depot is as follows:
Lexington
60
Sacramento
11
FORD is LIBRA GOLD
Tobyhanna
29
5
Fifty-five (55) percent of funds allocated =0 perform this type of
work is required for material, equipment and travel expense. The
result is that these expenses are reflected in the total depot expense,
inflating the cost above depots not having like missions. These costs
are a direct result of the mission performed and are not controllable
by the depot. Because of this Quick Reaction Mission, Lexington Blue
Grass Army Depot was penalized. The following reflects the average
maintenance manyear cost at Lexington with and without the Quick Reaction
Project influence:
Average Manyear Cost Including Quick Reaction Projects*
Depot
Salary
Other Costs
Average Cost Per Man Year
Lexington
$11,710
$6,737 (3,031)
$18,447 (14,741)
Sacramento
13,422
3,895
17,317
Tobyhanna
11,412
3,031
14,493
*Source - GAO
Removing the influence of the quick reaction projects reduces the
Lexington costs substantially bringing the average cost per manyear in
line with Tobyhanna. The quick reaction project has greatly penalized
Lexington, while Sacramento with very little of this type work is by
far the highest in cost.
The GAO accepted this installation point-of-view concept as one
that could be used, but it clearly discriminates against an installation
having that mission. The above data was furnished GAO who in turn
questioned the Army. The draft GAO statement received in September
1975 stated "According to Army officials, the other two depots also
have unique workloads and assigned missions which are reflected in
their costs. They claim that their cost comparison tried to recognize
some of these differences. However, they readily point out that they
did not intend to make all options equal or identical since this simply
was not feasible" (emphasis added).
It is impossible for SAAD or TOAD to have unique missions comparable
to LBAD's QRP because their total workload's "Other Cost" (including
their uniques) is less than the "Other Costs" for QRP alone at LBAD.
Enclosure 10 breaks out the QRP "Other Costs" from that used by CONCISE
(Encl. 11). QRP consumed 55% of LBAD's "Other Costs" but only 13.3% of
our funded manyears of workload. The only possible way that Army could
conclude LBAD is more expensive than SAAD or TOAD is to include these
noncontrollable, extremely high dollar costs in our costs per funded
manyear.
G7V3
LIBRA
The Army has stated also that the ORP workload was $12.26 million
during FY-75 and would decrease to about $5.25 million for Fiscal year
1976 and a similar amount for 1977 and 1973. However, logic and common
sense dictate that any future decrease has no bearing on the argument
that the past QRP workload inflated LBAD's cost per funded manyear.
Army does not have to identify ORP or other unique missions at
the three depots in order to perform a fair evaluation. They need
only to exclude the cost elements that are not variable between the
installations from the "Other Cost" rate used by CONCISE. The "Other
Costs" are broken down by element at Enclosure 10. An alternative
average might involve a calculation to determine the cost of completing
Army's planned workload at each installation. I believe this would be
a fairer system in that it would allow all options of CONCISE to be
considered on an equal basis.
Mr. President, I submit for your special consideration without
reference to prior argumentation, a new element, viz., that Army should
rescind their action to further phase back the Lexington Blue Grass Army
Depot since actions taken to date have resulted in a reduction of
maintenance production personnel at the three depots to a point near
the Fiscal Year 78 steady state objective. Each of the three depots
could reduce their productive work force to bring into balance workload
requirements and power restraints. Overhead personnel should also be
reduced to maintain an efficient ratio of direct to indirect costs.
The advantages of this recommenda tion are as follows:
1. Mobilization Base Retained. The capacity to meet war-
time requirements can be expanded without resorting to three-shift, seven
day operations.
2. Most Effective, Efficient and Economical Depot Retained.
3. Skill capabilities Retained. Closure of the Lexington
Maintenance facility will result in the loss of peculiar skills utilized
to support world wide defense missions. These skills are not available
at either Sacramento or Tobyhanna. Examples of these are:
a. Satellite Communication Terminals
b. Missile Monitor Systems
c. Automatic Secure Voice Communication Systems
d. Combat Service Support Systems
e. Defense Communication System Contingency Stations
f.
World Wide Primary Technical Control Centers.
As Lexington employees have no transfer of function rights, or do not
prefer to leave this locality, these skills will be lost to the Army.
FORD
give
LIVERIT
7
4. Army Steady State Workload Objective Attained. à good
parcentage of the savings objective has already been realized by a
reduction of personnel since the CONCISE announcement. For instance, the
productive personnel in the three depot maintenance activities now total
2674 people. The Army's objective was to reach a steady state workload
of 2530 people in FY-78. To attain this goal only 144 people would have
to be reduced in the next two years. This can be attained through attrition.
5. Community Impact Reduced. Reduction would be spread over
three installations (in three states) lessening the community effect.
6. Less Contract to Industry Required. With capabilities at
three depots, less work will have to be contracted to industry. Past
experience has shown that contracts with industry are:
a. More expensive. The Army claims that it does not
have the funds to maintain the three depot maintenance facilities but
admits that contracts to industry must be let to eliminate the maintenance
work back-logged. If money can be made available for these contracts it
can be diverted to accomplish this backlog most economically in-house.
b. Less responsive to Army requirements.
C. Rework of equipment repaired by industry is required
in many instances.
Failing the acceptance of this recomendation, the Army should phase
down the depot highest in cost, and it's certainly illogical to phase
down a depot which has consistently ranked No. 1 in the depot effective-
ness and efficiency system and which operates at the lowest cost.
Based upon the compelling facts of the situation it is not in the
best interests of either our Nation's defense or the prudent use of tax-
payer's dollars, to phase back LBAD, the most cost effective, innovative,
and efficient facility in our depot system.
Appreciating the great demands made on your attention, may I hear
from you at your early convenience and prior to the announcement or,
preferably, making of any final decision.
With best wishes, I am
Respectfully yours,
Sn J. white
John E. Breckinridge
&
FORD
STA
LIBRARY
APPROPRIATIONS
United States Senale
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
July 9, 1976
Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
MF
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear President Ford:
In further reference to our recent correspondence regarding
the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot, let me begin by saying that I
could not agree more that moving "toward an efficient allocation of
resources" should be a goal of the Department of Defense. I write
today because of my desire for this "efficient allocation" and
because of your commitment to review the Army's decision to cut
back at the depot.
In your July 3 letter to me, you indicated that "relevant
data on the realignment of the depot" had been forwarded to you
by Secretary Hoffman. Mr. President, all of us know what the
Army's position is. What I, on behalf of the depot employees,
am seeking to determine is what you think should be done after
you have reviewed both sides of the issue.
In the interest of allowing 2 fair exchange of views on
this most important matter, I respectfully request that opponents
of the cutback be allowed to analyze the data provided you by
Secretary Hoffman
Strict the ennouncement of the original
decision, there has not been a complete, impartial review of
information other than that given by the Army itself.
Once we know the figures being used by the Army, I ask that
you allow opponents of the cutback to make a detailed response.
I believe then we will be in a much better position to discuss
the situation. However, in the meantime, I believe you should
be aware of the points listed below:
1. LBAD has the lowest labor pay scale of the electronic
depots.
2. LEAD also has the lowest cost recovery rates.
Honorable Gerald R. Ford
Page 2
July 9, 1976
3. In addition to the above, LBAD has ranked Number One in
the Army's own efficiency and effectiveness measurement system every
quarter since July 1973, including the first half of FY 76, the
most recent available information. This rating is in comparison
with all Army depots. LBAD has stayed Number One even under the
trying conditions the Army has placed them under.
4. The Department of the Army made an error in its method of
determining the depot to phase down. LBAD can operate cheaper than
it's sister depots of Tobyhanna and Sacramento. If the electronics
workload (4.4 million man hours) would be divided between Tobyhanna
and Lexington, the government would save $11.9 million per year
over the current plans. If it were divided between Sacramento and
Lexington, we would save $2.046 million per year. If one depot
could do all the work, Lexington could complete it $23.9 million
cheaper than Sacramento and $4.1 million cheaper than Tobyhanna.
In short, every one million manhours of work taken from LBAD and given
to Sacramento will cost the tax payer an additional $5.43 million per
year. Likewise, for every one million man hours of work taken from
LBAD to give to Tobyhanna will cost the tax payer $.9 million per
year.
Mr. President, I respectfully request you to have the Army
suspend any action until such time as you can examine both sides
of this issue.
Sincerely,
Walter D. Huddleston
On
Block Depot NPW hel Front Leac Oc
By JOHN ALEXANDER
8/27
Lesder Stall Writer
Apparently the decision to eliminate 2,500
jobs at the Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot to
to be enforced as soon as a court injunction is
Cutbacks
lifted And the President is powerless to fatsiers
The decision was reflected in a letter made
public this morning by Sen Wendell Ford, D-Ky,
which had been forwarded B him by a constitu-
ent It apparently had been malled a employes 2'
the depot.
TX letter says that the
"He had boned to keep the
President bis reviewed the
depot open," the Walts
The Army plans a transfer
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Thereiore. the letter SAYS,
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Various court actions have
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FORD is LIBRARY Q7V
ST4 Discrict, KENTUCKY
AGRICULTURE
DISTRICT OFFICES:
TOBACCO
305 Court SCUARE BUILDING
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FAMILY FAP*5 AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
TO: CHEAPSIDE
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LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY 40507
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
(506) 253-1301
house of Representatibes
10 FEDERAL BUILDING
SMALL BUSINESS
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Mashington, B.C. 20515
SBCOMMITTEES:
(SCB) 431-2699
S3A AND saic LEGISLATION
SBA OVERSIGHT AND
August 27, 1976
MINORITY ENTERPRISE
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
ME
Dear Mr. President:
I am enclosing for your information a copy of a news article which
appeared on the front page of the Lexington Leader this afternoon, the
release of which my staff has verified with your press office. I quote
it in pertinent part for your ready reference as follows:
"He had hoped (the President) to keep the depot open,'
the White House said, 'but found it difficult in light of
the economic mood on defense in Congress.
'The Congress did not approve the extra money for the
defense budget which would have been needed to keep the
depot at full strength, obviously feeling the cutbacks are
necessary for economic reasons.
"The President regrets the decision extremely,' the White
House said.
Needless to say I was both surprised and disturbed to read this
statement, attributed to you as the basis for your agreement with Anny's
decision to cut back the Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD), not only
in view of the fact that I have received only interim responses to my
substantive letters of May 24, 1976 and July 20, 1976, forwarded since
your announced decision of May 20 to review the matter, but more particu-
larly because there is presently pending before the House and Senate
conferees the largest defense budget in the history of the world -
some 112 odd billion dollars -- a budget larger even than those which
we experienced during the years of World War II; a budget item I might
add, which I continually support.
It is true that the Congress has made some reductions in the
pending defense budget -- a total reduction of $2,342,000,000 (including
a postponement in B-1 procurement, which I voted against) in other areas
FORD
MARALD
LIBRARY
THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS
where the reductions might be made without harming national defense, such
Army permanent station funds (travel funds) and the patrol hydrofoil.
program which many considered somewhat large and elaborate). However,
the Congress, both House and Senate, have agreed to every cent requested
the Defense Department for Fiscal Year 1977 for all depot operations.
Firty million of this $710 million over-all depot operation budget is
for communications and electronics repair/overhaul, in which LOAD is
pre-eminent. This should be compared with the $60.3 million for FY- 76 and
the $33.1 million for FY 75 - the period in which we were gearing down
from the Vietnam War.
Mr. President, I submit that the stated basis for agreeing with
Army's announced plan under Project CONCISE to phase back the most
efficient and effective depot in our 11 depot system does not ring
true, and I urge you to designate someone more concerned with the
facts than serving as apologist for the Army's erroneous decision,
to reconsider in your behalf the position which has been announced
on a basis unsupported by the facts.
Sincerely yours,
- -e th
John B. Breckinridge
FORD i LIBRAR 077
Saturday Morning, July 10, 1976
Page A-6
HERALD- LEADER
Proud Time For Depot
Employes and staff members of the
down has been dissolved by the U.S.
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot have
Court of Appeals. There was hope that
more reason than usual to be proud of
the new ratings might have some helpful
their No. 1 ranking in the Army
effect on the decision. This was especial-
Materiel Command.
ly true when one considers that a facility
In view of the announced cutback
in Sacramento, Calif., scheduled to get
and phase-down of the Lexington and
the local depot's maintenance mission,
Richmond facilities, workers could
ranked 12th, or last. A depot at Tobyhan-
have, with some justification, adopted a
na, Pa., slated to receive the supply mis-
lame-duck attitude and let performance
sion, ranked fifth.
quality go by the wayside. To their
everlasting credit; they didn't and as 2
Those rankings certainly should give
result the Army's own ranking system
the Kentucky congressional delegation
judged them the most efficient and
and the Save the Depot Committee
most effective.
some help in their efforts to stop the
phase-down.
The local depot has, year-in and
In a system where more and more
year-out, held top ratings, and we are
emphasis is put on efficiency and plain
gratified to see those rankings main-
old getting the job done, we think the
tained even in the face of adversity.
government-military establishment
An injunction against the phase
should look to Lexington.
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DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS.
LEXINGTON. KENTUCKY 40507
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIG
(504) 253-1501
House of Representatives
1, FEDERAL BUILDING
SMALL BUSINESS
CUVINGTON. KENTUCKY 41011
Washington, B.C. 20515
SUBCOMMITTEES:
(506) 431-2599
SBA AND SBIC LEGISLATION
SOA OVERSIGHT AND
July 20, 1976
MINORITY ENTERPRISE
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
MF
With further reference to my earlier correspondence con-
cerning Army's decision to phase down the Lexington Blue Grass
Army Depot (LBAD), I enclose a copy of an editorial which ap-
peared in the Lexington Herald-Leader on Saturday morning,
July 10, 1976, and a copy. of Army's Productivity Trend and Ef-
fectiveness Performance Evaluation for the first half of Fiscal
Year 1976. The report previously entitled "Efficiency and
Effectiveness Report", has been renamed, as you may be aware.
Your particular attention is directed to pages 49 and 50 of
the report, reflecting that LBAD continues to hold the No. I
position which it initially established in Fiscal Year 1973 over
all other similar Army Depots. You will further note, Mr. Presi-
dent, that Tobyhanna and Sacramento, which are scheduled to
receive LBAD's maintenance mission and supply mission, rank 5th
and 12th, respectively.
This information exemplifies, once again, the established
management effort at LBAD to continue to maintain the most ef-
ficient operation in the system. Needless to say morale, which
has been of the highest order over the years, has not been helped
by this bureaucratic lack of recognition.
I submit once again that it is not in the best interest of
either our Nation's defense, or the prudent use of taxpayer's
dollars, to proceed with a phase back of LEAD, the most cost
effective, innovative, and efficient facility in our depot system.
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
Page 2
T shall greatly appreciate your consideration of the
enclosed material in connection with the review which you
have been making of Army's decision based upon Project
CONCISE.
May I hear from you in this matter at your early con-
venience.
Sincerely yours,
2 7. write
John B. Breckinridge
FORD is LIBRARY
COMMERCE
AERONAUTICAL AND
SPACE SCIENCES
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 19, 1976
Dear Mr. President:
In regard to your continuing review of the Army's
decision to phase out the mission of the Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot, I want to call your attention to the most
recent DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance
Evaluation. This document was prepared by the Headquarters
United States Army Material Command and once again, the
Lexington Depot was ranked as the most productive and effective
operation in the Army as it has since FY-73 by this measurement
system.
I am enclosing a copy of this evaluation for your
information and specifically would invite your attention to
pages 49 and 50. Please note that the Tobyhanna and Sacramento
Depots, to which the Army proposes to transfer the Lexington-
Blue Grass mission, are ranked fifth and last, respectively.
Quite frankly, Mr. President, it would appear to me
that if the Army would go to the time and effort to prepare
a detailed evaluation of this nature, serious consideration
would be given to its results. Obviously, this is not the
case which seems both paradoxical and contrary to the very
purpose of such an evaluation.
As you complete your review, I urge you to seek an
explanation as to why this and prior evaluations which
ranked the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot first in both productivity
and efficiency, were seemingly ignored.
In my opinion, this should have a significant bearing
on your personal review of this matter, and I would hope
influence you that this decision is wrong and should be
reversed.
Sincerely,
Audell Jard
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
DISTRICT OFFICES:
108 WATTS FEDERAL BUILDING
172-C NEW FEDERAL BUILDING
314 FEDERAL BUILDING
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40501
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40202
OWENSBORO. KENTUCKY 42301
(502) 223-2335
(502) 582-6251
(502) 685-5158
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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Blue Bran
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Chency called from airplane
reporter
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June 23, 1976
Dear Senator:
This will acknowledge receipt of your June 22
letter to the President concerning the Blue Grass
Army Depot in Lazington, You may be assured
it will be called promptly to the President's
attention.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Henorable Walter D, Huddleston
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bee: w/incoming to Bab Wolthuis for further handling and DRAFT
WTK:JEB:VO:vo
FORD of GIVE LIBRARY
DOLESTON
COMMITTEES:
UCKY
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
APPROPRIATIONS
Mail
Senate
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
June 22, 1976
Jun
23
AM
10
48
HAND DELIVERED
RECEP SECURITY UNIT
THE WNITE HOUSE
The Honorable Gerald Ford
WASHINGTON
The White House
Washington, D.C.
not
Dear Mr. President:
Perhaps the most serious economic blow that central
and eastern Kentucky has sustained in the past two years was
the Defense Department's decision to cut back operations at the
Blue Grass Army Depot in Lexington, with the loss of approxi-
mately 2,600 jobs.
Since that time, the people of central and eastern
Kentucky and the Kentucky congressional delegation have made
a major effort to forestall that decision, based on the fact
that the Blue Grass depot has been rated the most efficient
depot of its kind in the country. Court action has also been
instituted and the case is now before the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
On May 24, the day before the presidential primary in
Kentucky, Mr. Jerry Jones of your staff was quoted in a page
one story in the Lexington Herald as saying that you were
"personally looking into the proposed cutbacks" and that you
had ordered "specific facts" on the matter to be ready for your
review upon your return to Washington. Earlier, in a press
conference in Washington with members of the Kentucky press
corps - on May 20th -- you stated, in response to a question,
"I will take a look at it."
Needless to say, those comments - especially the banner
story in the Herald gave great hope to the people of central
and eastern Kentucky. Employees who stood to lose their jobs
felt that at last they would get a fair review of the Defense
Department's decision -- which, incidentally, was made after
contrary assurances were given the Kentucky congressional delegation.
The Honorable Gerald Ford
June 22, 1976
Page 2
I write today to inquire as to the status of that
personal review, if indeed there is to be one. My office
has made two inquiries to the White House in this regard.
The first reply was that the review has been done and the
White House is "sticking by the original Army decision. "
That was last week. If true, it could not have been much
of a review. And, if so, why was no public announcement
made?
Another inquiry was made to the office of Mr. Jones,
who promised the "personal" review by you. That resulted in
a referral to the Office of Management and Budget, which stated
that the only review taking place was the one already in progress
by the Department of the Army in response to the congressional
delegation. This inquiry also produced the startling information
that results of the inquiry would not be made public until after
the court action is resolved.
All of which raises the question in my mind as to whether
a "personal review" by the President was ever contemplated, or
whether the promise of a review was made by your staff with
May 25th in mind.
In any event, I urge you to seriously undertake a
genuine review of this Defense Department decision, which I
believe was wrong and which I believe the facts will show to
be wrong. You have raised high hopes in Kentucky with your
promise; I just hope you will follow through on that promise.
Sincerely,
Walter D. Huddleston
Wendell Zorl
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PENDING
Friday
8/27/76
MiL.A.d.
Bob--
Attached is a draft received today from
the Military Aide's ofc. in response to Senator
Ford's July 19 letter to the President on
Lexington-Blue Grass. Bill Kendall would
prefer if it could be sent out over someone
else's signature (instead of a WTK signature).
Also, I am attaching the original of the
August 26 letter to the President from Senator
Ford, which we received today and which
encloses an interesting letter from a Dept.
of the Army official. (Note that the name of
the person to whom this letter was addressed
has been blocked out.) How should this
letter from Senator Ford be handled?
You may be interested to know that we
have in our pending file a July 20 letter to
the President from Congressman Breckinridge
on the same matter as the July 19 letter from
Senator Ford. A draft for Breckinridge is
expected next week and will probably be similar
to the one furnished for Senator Ford.
Judy Berg-Hansen Judy
8/30
Bob asked me to find and to whom the 8/10
Best David letter was sent. Called mil. aide
found and that the letter was sent to
b was referred to Shupe's of x414 9.
Robt. Palmer, Jr., Rt. S, Log Lick Rd.,
WiNchester, Ky. 40391. Told Bob. jeb
.. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN
1.
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
2.
AGERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
AICH.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
NON, NEV.
TED STEVENS. ALASKA
NG, LA.
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., MD.
United States Senate
>S. UTAH
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
DLUNGS. S.C.
JAMES L. SUCKLEY. N.Y.
DM.
NOUYE, HAWAII
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
JOHN & v. JANEY. CALIF.
ADLA: E. STEVENSON, the
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
WENDELL H. FORD. KY.
JOHN A. DURKIN, N.M.
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, CHIEF COUNSEL
S. LYNN SUTCLIFFE, GENERAL COUNSEL
MALCOLM M. B. STERRETT, MINORITY COUNSEL
August 26, 1976
Dear Mr. President:
me
I am writing to bring to your attention that a letter is
being circulated, purportedly in your behalf, by the Department
of Defense declaring that you have completed your personal
review of the decision to phase out the Lexington-Blue Grass
Army Depot and that the action will not be reversed. Quite
naturally I was surprised to learn of this since I am still
awaiting a response to a letter I sent you in early July
concerning the progress of this review, while at the same time
bringing to your attention the most recent efficiency rating
for the Depot.
I am asking that you either confirm or deny the validity
of the statement in the Department of the Army's letter. If
it is true, I would appreciate an explanation as to why neither
I nor other members of the Kentucky Congressional delegation
had been advised that your review was indeed finished.
Sincerely,
Hendell tak
Wendell H. Ford
KENTUCKY
FORD
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
20500
ARRALD
Enclosure
DEI
OF
The
ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS
WASHINGTON D.C. 20310
DALO-SMZ-E WH 12472
10 AUG 1976
1976 AUG 20
MY
On behalf of President Ford, I am replying to your letter of 2 June 1976
regarding Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD). The President has had
the decision reviewed. After review, the position of Department of
Defense remains unchanged; when no longer enjoined, the Army will proceed
with the reduction.
The decision to reduce LBAD was made only after careful and detailed study
and thorough consideration of the viable alternatives, including the re-
duction of Sacramento Army Depot (SAAD) and the reduction of Tobyhanna
Army Depot (TOAD). The newer and larger facilities at TOAD and the
location and other missions assigned to SAAD dictated the decision to
realign LBAD. The largest annual cost reduction, best use of facilities
and most economic flexibility to meet unprogrammed requirements are
offered by reducing LEAD to depot activity status.
Regarding the depot rating system, it measures a depot against its own
past performance. This rating system does not compare one depot with
another, except in relation to the progress each depot makes against
its own past performance. Lexington is the most improved depot. The
Army must, however, look to total savings to the government in deciding
upon realignments. As a result, Lexington was chosen.
On 9 July 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the decision of the District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky
on an injunction in furtherance of the realignment at LBAD. Additionally,
on 3 August 1976, the District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky
also ruled in favor of the Army in another court challenge to the realign-
ment.
Your interest in this matter is appreciated.
it
FORD
Sincerely,
MINGEARIA
FREEDOMA
REVOLUTION
BERT A. DAVID
ARMY
Major General, GS
AMERICAN
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
1776-1976
for Logistics
OF
DEPARTY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
STATES
August 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant to the President
THROUGH: Mr. Warren L. Gulley
Director, White House
Military Office
Pursuant to your request, attached is a draft reply to
Senator Wendell H. Ford
Deel Zeller
USN
Military Assistant
Attachment
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1776-1976
Dear Senator Ford:
This is in response to your letter of July 19, 1976 to the President
concerning Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD).
The Army's requirement in the communications-electronics commodity
area has decreased. As a result, workloads in both general supply and
maintenance operations have declined. Further supply reductions have occurred
with the implementation of the Revised Supply Distribution Plan.
The total electronics maintenance capacity at Lexington Blue Grass,
Sacramento (California) and Tobyhanna (Pennsylvania) far exceeds current and
CONSIDERATION of ALL FACTORS
future requirements. Based upon a comparison of the three depots, it has been
determined that the greatest savings to the Government will be achieved through
the realignment of Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot.
Your referenced report, which rates each depot against itself, does
not mean that LBAD is the best depot in the system -- it means only that LBAD
is the most improved depot when rated against itself. The hard work and
efforts put forth by the employees of LBAD is fully recognized and is indicative
of the dedicated employees throughout the depot system. Despite all the efforts
of our dedicated civil servants in the depot system, lack of money and emphasis
REALIGNMENT
on improved management dictate the closure of some of our installations and
activities. LBAD is only one of many activities and installations that is being
reduced.
We fully understand and share your concern over the economic and human
impact of the proposed reductions at LBAD. However, it must be realized that
since 1968, the defense establishment has been cut by almost 350,000 civilian
personnel and 1.4 million military personnel without a corresponding reduction-
in the number of activities and installations. In addition, the Defense budget
last year was cut by $7 billion. Faced with these continued reductions and the
need to streamline our military operations, we must reduce and realign our
domestic base structures.
Your interest in this matter is appreciated and we hope the above information
will be helpful for you.
Sincerely,
Mr. Kendall
2
July 22, 1976
Dear Senator:
Thank you for your July 19 letter to the President
concerning the Lenington-Blue Grass Army Depot
and enclosing the DARCOM Productivity Trend and
Effectiveness Performance Evaluation.
Be assured that I will call your letter to the atten-
tion of the President and the appropriate advisers
without delay. You will hear further as soon as
possible.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Honorable Wendell H. Ford
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bec: w/ inc. to Military Aide for DRAFT for Kendall signature.
bcc: w/ inc. to Bob Wolthuis fyi
WTK:JEB:j
JUL 26 1976
WH 13748
WENDELL H. FORD
COMMITTEES:
KENTUCKY
COMMERCE
AERONAUTICAL AND
SPACE SCIENCES
Mnited States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 19, 1976
Dear Mr. President:
In regard to your continuing review of the Army's
decision to phase out the mission of the Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot, I want to call your attention to the most
recent DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance
Evaluation. This document was prepared by the Headquarters
United States Army Material Command and once again, the
Lexington Depot was ranked as the most productive and effective
operation in the Army as it has since FY-73 by this measurement
system.
I am enclosing a copy of this evaluation for your
information and specifically would invite your attention to
pages 49 and 50. Please note that the Tobyhanna and Sacramento
Depots, to which the Army proposes to transfer the Lexington-
Blue Grass mission, are ranked fifth and last, respectively.
Quite frankly, Mr. President, it would appear to me
that if the Army would go to the time and effort to prepare
a detailed evaluation of this nature, serious consideration
would be given to its results. Obviously, this is not the
case which seems both paradoxical and contrary to the very
purpose of such an evaluation.
As you complete your review, I urge you to seek an
explanation as to why this and prior evaluations which
ranked the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot first in both productivity
and efficiency, were seemingly ignored.
In my opinion, this should have a significant bearing
on your personal review of this matter, and I would hope
influence you that this decision is wrong and should be
reversed.
Sincerely,
Audell Jard
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
DISTRICT OFFICES:
108 WAYTS FEDERAL BUILDING
172-C New FEDERAL DUILDING
314 FEDERAL BUILDING
FRANKFORT. KENTUCKY 40601
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40202
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY 42301
(502) 223-2386
(502) 582-6251
(502) 685-5158
draft we -8/2
Rent x
walthins
w/ note
July 22, 1976
Dear Senator:
Thank you for your July 19 letter to the President
concerning the Laxingtom-Blue Grass Army Depot
and enclosing the DARCOM Productivity Trend and
Effectiveness Performance Evaination.
Be assured that I will call your letter to the atten-
tion of the President and the appropriate advisers
without delay. You will hear further as SOOD as
possible.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William T. Kendall
Deputy Assistant
to the President
The Honozable Wendell H. Ford
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
bcc: w/ inc. to Military Aide for DRAFT for Kendall signature.
bee: w/ inc. to Bob Wolthuis lyi
WTK:JEB:j
FORD & LIBRARY
KENTUCKY
COMMERCE
AERONAUTICAL AND
SPACE SCIENCES
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 19, 1976
Dear Mr. President:
In regard to your continuing review of the Army's
decision to phase out the mission of the Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot, I want to call your attention to the most
recent DARCOM Productivity Trend and Effectiveness Performance
Evaluation. This document was prepared by the Headquarters
United States Army Material Command and once again, the
Lexington Depot was ranked as the most productive and effective
operation in the Army as it has since FY-73 by this measurement
system.
I am enclosing a copy of this evaluation for your
information and specifically would invite your attention to
pages 49 and 50. Please note that the Tobyhanna and Sacramento
Depots, to which the Army proposes to transfer the Lexington-
Blue Grass mission, are ranked fifth and last, respectively.
Quite frankly, Mr. President, it would appear to me
that if the Army would go to the time and effort to prepare
a detailed evaluation of this nature, serious consideration
would be given to its results. Obviously, this is not the
case which seems both paradoxical and contrary to the very
purpose of such an evaluation.
As you complete your review, I urge you to seek an
explanation as to why this and prior evaluations which
ranked the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot first in both productivity
and efficiency, were seemingly ignored.
In my opinion, this should have a significant bearing
on your personal review of this matter, and I would hope
influence you that this decision is wrong and should be
reversed.
Sincerely,
Audell Jaral
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
DISTRICT OFFICES:
108 WATTS FEDERAL BUILDING
172-C NEW FEDERAL BUILDING
314 FEDERAL BUILDING
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40202
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY 42301
(502) 223-2333
(502) 582-6251
(502) 685-5158
M
FEEDBACK
DARCOM PRODUCTIVITY TREND
12/76
AND EFFECTIVENESS PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION, FIRST HALF FY 1976
Prepared by
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS DIVISION
COMPTROLLER HQ, USAMC
AUG 28 1976
President's Mail - August 27, 1976
House
1. Bill Archer
Requests message of congratulations for Hedley V. Jackson of
Houston, who will receive the highest award which Rotary
International can bestow on August 31.
2. Garry Brown
Urges that H.R. 15194, the Public Works Employment Appro-
priations Act, be signed or allowed to become law without the
President's signature, if it passes the Senate in substantially
the same form as it passed the House. Explains why.
3. James Collins
Praises Bob Dole and Jim Baker selections. Requests 15-minute
appointment with the President to present a campaign issue
idea.
4. Thomas Morgan
Endorses Seymore Heyison for the National Highway Safety
Advisory Committee.
5. Gillis Long
Sends detailed letter urging the President to take immediate
action to alleviate "the severe impact that the low prices
have had on sugar producers."
6. Steward McKinney
Send detailed letter urging a veto of H.R. 12261, "in keeping
Edward Biester
with the Republican Party Platform adopted in Kansas City
which for the first time calls for
full home rule over
those matters that are purely local. "
7. Robert Michel
Writes on behalf of Louis Neumiller, who was on the committee
which chose the President as one of the 10 Outstanding Young
Men in 1950, who recommends that the campaign film include a
segment from this award.
8. Walter Fauntroy
Sends detailed letter urging a veto of H.R. 12261. Says it
"seriously undermines the District of Columbia Home Rule
Act. "
9. Harley Staggers
Expresses deep appreciation for the ceremonial pen marking
the signing of the National Swine Flu Immunization Program.
10. John Dent
Request that the President "take immediate action to place
Richard Schulze
either an embargo or impose quotas on foreign mushroom imports."
Point out that "subsequent to your decision for 'adjustment
assistance' to the domestic mushroom industry, imports by
Asian mushroom processors have increased by the largest
volume ever experienced."
11. Pat Schroeder
Writes on behalf of the Denver Committee of Concern for
Soviet Jewry regarding Mikhail Mager, whose visa requests
to emigrate to Israel to be reunited with his wife have been
denied.
FORD
LIB
President's Mail - August 27, 1976
House
12. Bo Ginn
Supports the CAB's recommendation for nonstop air service
between Atlanta and London.
13. Jerome Ambro
Requests that Nassau County be declared a disaster area due
to damage from Hurricane Belle.
14. Bud Shuster
Extends invitation to the President or a member of his family
to attend the Republican Day Rally at the McClure Bean Soup
Celebration on September 18.
15. Silvio Conte
Extends invitation to the National Italian American Bicentennial
Tribute Dinner on September 16 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
16. 4 Members of the South Dakota Delegation and 2 Former Members
Extend invitation to a reception in honor of Congressman
Jim Abdnor on August 30 at the Rotunda Restaurant.
17. James Florio
Requests greetings for Mrs. Verna Kannaro on her 88th birthday
September 5.
18. James Hanley
Requests greetings for Mrs. Elsie Coles on her 111th birthday
August 27.
19. John Murtha
Requests citation honoring Dr. Harold W. Thomas to be presented
at a school dedication in October.
President's Mail - August 27, 1976
Senate
1S Floyd Haskell
Cites P.L. 90-498, which authorizes that the week including
September 15-16 be designated National Hispanic Heritage Week.
Hopes a proclamation will be issued.
2S Wendell Ford
Writes about a letter being circulated in the President's
behalf by DOD saying that the President has completed his
personal review of the decision to phase out the Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot and that the action will not be reversed.
Asks for a confirmation or denial and, if a confirmation,
requests explanation why the Kentucky Congressional delegation
was not advised that the review was finished.
3S Pete Domenici
Sends detailed letter concerning the campaign and the ethnic
vote. Offers his help.
4S Ted Stevens
On behalf of Mr. J. L. Laughlin, sends a set of post cards
with pictures of each of the camps being used in the con-
struction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
5S Bill Brock
Endorses Kenneth M. Smith for reappointment to the National
Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children.
6S Hugh Scott
Endorses Richard C. Frame's invitation to attend the
Distinguished Republican Award Dinners in Pennsylvania this
fall.
7S Bill Brock
Writes on behalf of Miller McDonald, who wishes to be appointed
to a Presidential advisory board or commission.
8S Milton Young
Writes on behalf of the General Manager of Minn-Dak Farmers
Cooperative in support of an increase in the sugar tariff.
9S Clifford Hansen
Requests autographed photograph for Etna Johnson.
9-1-76
- status
FORD s OFRATO LIBRARY