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Charles E. Goodell Papers
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The original documents are located in Box 6, folder "Final Report - Draft Summary" of the
Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Charles Goodell donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 6 of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500
October 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO BOARD MEMBERS
FROM:
Lawrence M. Baskir/MR
SUBJECT:
Report Summary
I am enclosing a copy of the final draft of the Report
Summary. It incorporates the suggestions you have made
at the late September meeting. The only change remaining
to be made is an editing and reordering of headnotes, to
make the Report Summary parallel in structure to the main
body of the Report. This will involve no textual changes.
If you have any questions, please call me or Bill Strauss
at 395-3609, our new number at our temporary quarters in
the New Executive Office Building, not later than Friday
October 17 SO that we can meet our printing deadline of the
following week.
We are continuing to edit and condense the main body of the
Report, especially Chapter 2 which will be considerably
tighter. Some chapters may be reordered to improve the flow
of discussion.
GERALD FORD LIBRART
SUMMARY REPORT
I. The President's Clemency Program
In the years before President Ford assumed office, public
opinion was sharply divided over what the government policy
should be toward those who had committed Vietnam-era draft
violations and military absence offenses. Many citizens be-
lieved that these actions could not be forgiven in light of the
sacrifices endured by others during the war. Many others
believed that only unconditional amnesty was appropriate for
offenders who had acted in good conscience to oppose a war they
believed wrong and wasteful.
Something had to be done to bring Americans together
again. The rancor that had divided our country during the
Veitnam War still sapped its spirit and strength. The national
interest required that Americans put aside their strong personal
feelings. Six weeks after taking office, President Ford
announced a program of clemency, of forgiveness, of reconcili-
ation for Vietnam-era draft and military absence offenders.
In his Proclamation of September 16, 1974, President
Ford created a program of conditional clemency for roughly 13,000
civilians and 100,000 servicemen who had committed draft or
military absence offenses between the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
(August 4, 1964) and the day the last American combatant left
Vietnam (March 28, 1973). He authorized the Departments of
Justice and Defense, respectively, to review prospective
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
applications from the 4,522 draft offenders and 10,115
undischarged servicemen still at large. He created the
Presidential Clemency Board to consider prospective applications
from the 8,700 convicted and punished draft offenders and the
estimated 90,000 servicemen given bad discharges for absence
offenses. He gave all eligible persons 4½ months (later ex-
tended to 6½½ months) to apply. He promised that their cases
would be reviewed individually. He further indicated that
applicants would be asked to earn clemency where appropriate,
by performing up to 24 months of alternative service in the
national interest, under the supervision of the Selective
Service System.
Under the Justice Department program, fugitive draft offenders
would have their prosecutions dropped, enabling them to avoid the
punishment and stigma of a felony conviction. Under the De-
fense Department program, fugitive servicemen were offered an
immediate Undesirable Discharge as a permanent end to their
fugitive status. They were also offered the chance to earn a
Clemency Discharge. Under the Clemency Board program, con-
victed draft offenders were offered full and unconditional
Presidential Pardons for their draft offenses. Former service-
men who had received bad discharges and full Presidential
pardons for their absence offenses.
By granting pardon to convicted or discharged offenders,
President Ford was exercising the most potent constitutional form
of executive clemency available. The Presidential pardon connotes
official forgiveness for designated draft or military offenses,
restoring all federal civil rights lost as a result of those
specific offenses. However, an applicant who has been convicted
of other felony crimes receive a pardon only for his draft or
AWOL offenses. his pardon does not restore rights lost through
3
felony convictions for other crimes. Likewise, a full and
unconditional pardon indicates that government agencies should
disregard all pardoned offenses in any actions they take
involving clemency recipients.
By directing that the military services upgrade bad discharges,
substituting Clemency Dischages in their place, the President was
indicating to employers and creditors that they should not
discriminate against those individuals. As a "neutral" discharge,
the Clemency Discharge appears to be working: A recent survey
of largenational Employers and small local (Pennsylvania) employers
found that they view it as almost identical to a General Discharge
under Honorable Conditions and much better than an Undesirable
Discharge under Other-than-Honorable Conditions..
A Clemency Discharge does not confer veterans' benefits,
but it leaves an individual with the same appeal rights that were
available to himA prior to receiving such a discharge. Indeed, the
receipt of a Presidential pardon and a Clemency Discharge should
improve an individual's chances for further upgrade.
Altogether, approximately 21,800 eligible persons applied for
clemency.
No.
do
Agency
Applicants
No.Eligible
Applying
Applying
Defense
Fugitive deserters
10,115
5,600
55%
Justice
Fugitive draft offenders
4,522
700
16%
P.C.B.
Discharged AWOL offenders
90,000
13,589
15%
P.C.B.
Convicted draft offenders
8,700
1,879
22%
TOTAL
113,337
21,768
19%
4
Through the first week in January, we had received only 850
applications, with the initial January 31 deadline just a few
weeks away. At that time, the public did not realize that the
program included not only fugitives but also punished offenders--
including servicemen who had served in Vietnam. Very few people
realized that the President's program included the following
type of individual:
While a medic in Vietnam, this military applicant (an
American Indian) received the Bronze Star for heroism
because of his actions during a night sweep operation. When
his platoon came under intense enemy fire, he moved through
a minefield under a hail of fire to aid his wounded comrades.
While in Vietnam, he was made Squad Leader of nine men, seven
of whom (including himself) were wounded in action. After
returning to the United States, he experienced post-combat
psychiatric problems. He went AWOL several times to seek
psychiatric treatment, for which he received a bad discharge
Therefore, we began public service announcements on thousands
of radio and television stations, held meetings and press conferences
at dozens of cities, met with thousands of veterans' counselors
throughout the country, and circulated bulletins to agencies in
direct contact with eligible persons--such as Veterans' Administration
offices, employment offices, post offices, and prison. With a limited
budget of $24,000, the results were dramatic. During
the rest of January, we received over 4,000 new applications.
Because of this response the President extended the application deadline
another month. We received 6,000 in February and, after a final
extension, another 10,000 before the March 31st final deadline-
for a total of about 21,500, of whom 15,468 turned out to be eligible.
This increase in applications was directly attributable to our public
information campaign. By asking our applicants who telephoned us
when they learned they were eligible, we discovered that over 95%
5
did not realize they could apply until the January 8 start of
the campaign; 90% applied within days or even hours of their
discovery that they were eligible.
The Departments of Defense and Justice did not experience a
similar increase in applications, because it was already widely
understood that fugitive draft offenders and military absentees
could apply for clemency. In fact, that still is the public
perception. An August 1975 Gallup Poll found that only 15% of the
American people understood that convicted draft offenders and
discharged AWOL offenders could apply for clemency. Virtually
the same percentage--16³--of those eligible actually did apply.
We are convinced that most of the remainder still do not know that
they were eligible for the program Others may not have applied
because their lives are settled, with their draft offense convictions
or bad discharges of no present consequence to them. We suspect
that
very few failed to apply to the Clemency Board because
of their opposition to our program.
The press and the public were--and indeed, still are--preoccupied
with anti-war fugitives who fled to Canada. However, we found that
only 6% of our civilian applicants and 2% of our military applicants
had ever gone to Canada. Virtually all of them subsuquently
returned to the United States long before they applied for clemency.
Of our 15,468 eligible persons, less than 400 ever went to Canada.
This stands in marked contrast to the 3,700 (24%) who were
Vietnam veterans. In recent years, many estimates have been made
of the number of fugitive draft and AWOL offenders in Canada,
usually on the basis of very limited data. Based on our own data
6
and our understanding of applicants to the Defense and Justice
programs, we estimate that a maximum of 7,000 persons eligible
for clemency were ever Canadian exiles. We further estimate that
only 4,000 (less than 5%) of the 91,500 who were eligible but did
not apply for clemency are still in Canada, contrary to the usual
public impression.
What happens now to those who did not apply? The 8,300 who
are still fugitive should surrender to authorities. While they
will suffer the stigma of a bad discharge or felony conviction,
they will end their fugitive status. The 8,000 who have already
been punished can apply to the Pardon Attorney in the Department
of Justice and to the appropriate military discharge. review
boards, avenues of relief which are not related to the President's
clemency program and are not affected by the program's end.
II. The Presidential Clemency Board
The Clemency Board was the only new agency created by President
Ford for the special purpose of reviewing the cases of clemency
applicants. Originally, the President named nine members to the
Board, designating former U.S. Senator Charles E. Goodell as the
Chairman. After the great increase in applications, the President
expanded the Board to eighteen members. Both the original Board
and the expanded Board were representative of a cross-section of
views on the Vietnam War and on the issue of clemency. The Board
consisted of 13 veterans of military service, three women, and
two priests. The Board included five Vietnam veterans, two of whom
were severely disabled in combat. Another member has a husband who
still is listed as missing in action. The backgrounds and
7
perspectives of every member contributed to our overall policies
and to our case dispositions.
The Board worked very hard during the spring and summer in
order to fulfill the President's requirement that we give each
case
individual
attention before the President's September 15
deadline. The consensus was remarkable, given the wide range
of views represented on the Board. What we sought to maintain was
a reasoned, middle ground. By compromising among ourselves, we
believed that we would promote the President's goal of a national
reconciliation.
To assure the fairness and consistency of our case dispositions,
we developed a case-by-case review procedure consistent with our
mission of clemency. Because, ours was a program of clemency, not
law enforcement, we unanimously decided not to seek the assistance
of the FBI in preparing our cases. We limited our file acquisition
to the official military or court records. Similarly, we kept case
files confidential to protect the rights of applicants and to
preserve the spirit of reconciliation. We promised strict
confidentiality to all who applied to the Board. For each case,
staff attorneys prepared narrative summaries which were carefully
checked for accuracy. Each applicant was sent his summary, with
the opportunity to identify errors and provide additional information.
Staff attorneys presented cases in oral hearings before three or four
member
Scard panels who had read the case summaries in advance. Panel
8
counsels were also present to assure an objective staff attorney
presentation and to assure that Board policy precedents were
applied correctly. Every Board member had the right to refer
any case to the full Board. This right was exercised in only about
700 (5%) of our cases. The Chairman referred about 50 cases
to the full Board, assisted by a computer-aided staff reveiw which
flagged case dispositions for being either too harsh or to lenient,
Our dispositions varied little from week to week, especially
after our basic policy decisions had been made. During our first
six months, we decided 500 cases, recommending outright pardons
recommending outright pardons (without alternative service) to
46% of all cases, denial of clemency to 3%, and alternative service
to the remainder. During our latter six months, we decided 14,000
cases recommending outright pardons to 44%, denial of clemency
to 6%, and alternative service to the remainder.
Contributing to the fairness and consistency of our process
were the clear rules we established and published for deciding cases.
Our alternative service "baseline" formula took account of the fact
that all of our applicants had been punished for their offenses.
We started with
24 months, deducting three months
for every one month spent in confinement, and deducting one month
for every month spent in satisfactory performance of court-ordered
alternative service. In cases where military officials and Federal
judges considered offenses to be minor enough to merit short
i
sentences, we reduced the baseline figure to match the sentence
actually given. Our minimum baseline was three months, and almost
9
98% of our applicants had baselines of six months or less.
To determine whether an applicant deserved clemency--and, if
so, whether his assigned period of alternative service should be
different from his working baseline--we applied 28 specific
aggravating and mitigating factors. As with our baseline formula,
we developed our list of factors by consensus. We were all very
concerned about the reasons for an applicant's offense and the
circumstances of that offense. Likewise, we were concerned about
his overall record as a serviceman and as a member of his
community. In special cases, we also were concerned about facts
surrounding his application for clemency. Almost all of our designated
factors were established very early in our process. Only
aggravating factors #11 and #12 were established by our expanded
Board, although all factors were continually clarified as new
fact situations arose. Each factor was codified, with illustrative
case precedents, through publication of five issues of the
Clemency Law Reporter. The following was our final list of factors:
Aggravating Factors
1. Other Felony Convictions
2. False Statement to Board
3. Use of Physical Force in Committing Offense
4. AWOL in Vietnam
5. Selfish Motivation for Offense
6. Failure to do Alternative Service
7. Violation of Probation or Parole
8. Multiple AWOL Offense
9. Extended AWOL Offense
10. Missed Overseas Movement
11. Non-AWOL Offenses Contributing to Discharge for Unfitness
12. Apprehension by Authorities
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
10
Mitigating Factors
1. Inability to Understand Obligations
2. Personal or Family Problems
3. Physical or Mental Problems
4. Public Service Employment
5. Service-Connected Disability
6. Extended Creditable Military Service
7. Vietnam Service
8. Procedural Unfairness
9. Denial of CO Status for Technical, Procedural, or Improper
Grounds
10. Conscientious Motivation for Offense
11. Voluntary Surrender to Authorities
12. Mental Stress from Combat
13. Volunteering for Combat
14. Above Average Military Performance Ratings
15. Decorated for Valor
16. Wounded in Combat
We did not apply each factor with equal weight. For example,
conscientious motivation or serious personal or family problems
often led to outright pardon recommendations. The following two
cases were typical:
This civilian applicant had participated in anti-war
demonstrations before refusing induction. He stated that
he could not fight a war which he could not support. However,
he does believe in the need for national defense and would
have served in the war if there had been an attack on United
States territory. He stated that "I know that what is
happening now is wrong, so I have to take a stand and hope
that it helps end it a little sooner."
This military applicant's wife was pregnant, in financial
difficulties, and faced with eviction; she suffered from an
emtional disorder and nervous problems; his oldest child was
asthmatic and an epileptic, having seizures that sometimes
resulted in unconsciousness. Applicant requested transfer
and a hardship discharge both of which were denied.
Creditable Vietnam service was also a highly mitigating factor,
usually resulting in an outright pardon. In particularly meritorious
cases, we recommended to the President that he direct the military
to upgrade the applicant's discharge to one under honorable conditions,
with full entitlement to veterans' benefits. We were particularly
H.
concerned about the eligibility of wounded or disabled veterans
for medical benefits. We made upgrade recommendations in the
following two cases:
Applicant did not go AWOL until after returning from two
tours of duty in Vietnam, when his beliefs concerning the
war changed. He came to believe that the U.S. was wrong in getting
involved in the war and that he "was wrong in killing people
in Vietnam" He had over three years' creditable service,
with 14 excellent conduct and efficiency ratings. He
re-enlisted to serve his second tour within three months of
ending his first. He served as an infantry man in Vietnam,
was wounded, and received the Bronze Star for Valor.
During his combat tour in Vietnam, applicant's platoon
leader, with whom he shared a brotherly relationship, was
killed while the latter was awakening applicant to start his
guard duty. The platoon had set up an ambush point because
it had come upon an enemy comple and the platoon leader
was mistaken for a Viet Cong and shot by one of his own men.
This event was extremely traumatic to applicant, and he
experienced mightmares. In an attempt to cope with this
experience, applicant turned to the use of herion to which
he became addicted. During his AWOL, he overcame his drug
addiction only to become an alcoholic. After obtaining
help and curing his alcoholism, he turned himself in.
On the other hand, some aggravating factors were considered
very grave, generally leading to "No Clemency" decisions. There
were very few applicants who clearly went AWOL from combat situations.
This applicant would not go into the field with his unit,
because he felt the new Commanding Officer of his company was
incompetent. He was getting nervous about going out on an
operation; there is evidence that everyone believed there
was a good likelihood of enemy contact. (His company was
subsequently dropped onto a hill where they engaged the enemy
in combat He asked to remain in the rear, but his request
was denied. Consequently, he left the company area because,
in the words of his chaplain, "the threat of death caused
him to exercise his right of self-preservation." Applicant
was apprehended while traveling on a truck away from his,
unit without any of his combat gear.
We denied clemency in the above case, but other cases of
AWOL in Vietnam involved strong mitigating factors. Often,
combat wounds or the psychological effects of combat led to an
AWOL offense. For example, we recommended an outright pardon
in the following case:
Applicant was assigned to an infantry unit in Vietnam.
During his combat service, he sustained an injury which
caused his vision to blur in one eye. His vision steadily
worsened, and he was referred to an evacuation hospital
in DaNang for testing. A doctor's assistant told him that
the eye doctor was fully booked and that he would have
to report back to his unit and come back to the hospital
in a couple of weeks. Frustrated by this rejection and
fearful of his inability to function in an infantry unit,
applicant went AWOL.
13
Applicants who had been convicted of felony offenses involving
serious bodily harm were almost always denied clemency, as in the
following case:
(Case #02407) THis civilian applicant had three other felony
convictions in addition to his draft offense. In 1970,
he received a one-year sentence for sale of drugs. In
1972, he received one year of imprisonment and two years
of probation for possession of stolen property. In 1972,
he was convicted of failure to notify his local board
of his address. He was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment, but his sentence was suspended and he
was put on probation. In 1974, he was convicted of assault,
abduction, and rape, for which he received a 20-year sentence.
Perhaps our most difficult--and disputed--cases involved
applicants who had been convicted of a civilian felony offense
other than a draft offense, but who had strong mitigating
factors applicable to their case. Some Board members argued that we
should disregard unrelated felony convictions, since we were not
granting clemency for those offenses. Others argued that granting
clemency to convicted felons would cheapen the clemency grants to
others. The majority of the Board took the middle view--that a
felony conviction would be viewed as a highly aggravating factor,
but each case would be evaluated individually. Each case was
decided on its total facts, in accordance with the President's
direction to avoid a blanket amnesty process. Even so, 42% of
our applicants with other felony convictions were denied clemency,
either because of the nature of their felony offense or because
they did not have compensatingly strong mitigating factors.
However, less serious felony convictions did not overshadow
an applicant's Vietnam service or other mitigating facts.
14
page 12.
(Case #14792) Applicant volunteered for the Special Forces after
his first year in the Army. He re-enlisted to.
effect a transfer to Vietnam, where he served as
a parachute rigger and earned excellent conduct and pro-
ficiency ratings. Altogether, he served for 18 months
in Vietnam and over three years in the Army, with
two Honorable Discharges for re-enlistment
His AWOL offenses totaled 29 days, did not occur until
after his return from Vietnam, and were attributed
to his problems with alcohol. After his Undesirable
Discharge in lieu of court-martial, he was convicted
of stealing a television set and served six months
in prison. He was recently paroled.
In a few cases, a clear connection existed between an applicant's
Vietnam service and his felony conviction.
(Case #11116) Applicant served eight months in Vietnam as a
supply specialist before his reassignment back to the
United States. His conduct and proficiency scores
had been uniformly excellent during his Vietnam service.
However, while in Vietnam he became addicted to heroin.
He could not break his habit after returning stateside,
and he began a series of seven AVOL offenses as he
"got into the local drug scene." Eventually, he
"ran out of monev" and "had a real bad habit," SO he
"tried to break into a store with another guy that
was strung out." He was arrested, convicted for
burglary, and given an Undesirable Discharge for AWOL
while on bail. (The above quotations are drawn from
applicant's written statement to our Board)
Others rehabilitated themselves after their felony offense, indicating
their desire to be productive and law-abiding members of their communities.
(Case #02230) Shortly after receiving a Bad Conduct Discharge from
the Navy for his AWOL offenses, applicant vas convicted
of transporting stolen checks across state lines. He
was sentenced to a ten-year term, but was paroled after
one year and four months. During his confinement, he
underwent psychiatric care. Since his parole, he has
re-married and established a successful subcontracting
business. Currently, he is working with young people
in his community in connection with church groups,
trying to provide guidance for them. His parole
officer stated that licant has straightened out
and is a responsible member of his community.
In each of the above three cases, our Board recommended that the
:15
President grant an outright Pardon. Obviously, we had no
jurisdiction to grant clemency for their other felony offense5,
Our case disposition tallies are listed below. Our civilian
applicants received a greater proportion of outright pardons,
both because a much greater proportion had conscientious reasons
for their offenses and because a much smaller proportion had
other felony convictions.
Final Civilian Dispositions
Number
Percent
Outright Pardons
1432
82%
Alternative Service:
3 months
140
8%
4-6 months
91
5%
7+ months
68
4%
No Clemency
26
1%
Final Military Dispositions
Number
Percent
Outright Pardon
4620
36%
Alternative Service:
3 months
2555
20%
4-6 months
2941
23%
7+ months
1756
14%
No Clemency
885
7%
These tallies reflect the spirit of compromise on our Board.
Some of our members suggested that we categorically deny clemency
to applicants with multiple civilian or military convictions,
applicants who failed to report to Vietnam when ordered, and applicants
who went AWOL while in Vietnam. Others would have preferred 100%
outright Pardons, with no one denied clemency. The majority believed
that the President wished to avoid either extreme.
III. Applicants to the Clemency Board
Chance and circumstance had much to do with the sacrifices
faced by each individual during the Vietnam War. By nature, war
and conscription are selective. Only 9% of all draft-age men
served in Vietnam. Less than 2% ever faced charges for draft
or desertion offenses, and only 0.4%--less than one out of two
hundred--were convicted or remained charged with these offenses
at the start of the clemency program.
Many of our applicants fell into common categories: The
civilian conscientious war resister who had his application for CO
status denied and who stood trial rather than leave the country; the
Jehovah's Witness who, although granted a CO exemption, went to jail
because his religion prohibited him from accepting an alternative
service assignment from Selective Service; the Vietnam veteran
who went AWOL because of his difficulties in adjusting to post-
combat garrison duty; the serviceman with a low apitude score
Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(
CategoryIV) who could not adjust to military life; the
serviceman who went AWOL to find a better-paying job to get his
family off welfare.
Our civilian applicants were not unlike most young men of their
age. They grew up in stable middle-class families. Eleven percent
were black, and 1.3% were Spanish-speaking. Over three-quarters
graduated from high school, and their average IQ was 111.
Roughly one in four was a Jehovah's Witness or member of another
religious sect opposed to war. Almost half applied for a
conscientious objector exemption, which was usually denied. The
typical draft offense was failure to report for or submit to
induction. Three-quarters committed their offense because of
17.
their opposition to war in general or the Vietnam War in particular.
For 96%, it was their only felony offense, committed at the
average age of 21.
Most civilian applicants surrendered immediately, and most
who were ever fugitives lived openly at home. Only 6% ever took
exile in Canada. After indictment, most pled guilty. Two-thirds
were sentenced to probation, usually on the condition that they
perform alternative service. The other one-third went to prison,
usually for periods of less than one year. Less than 1% served
prison terms of two years or longer, but some were in
prison for as long as five years.
At the time of their applications for
clemency, almost all were either working full-time or in school.
Only 2% were unemployed, with another 2% in prison for unrelated
felony offenses. Approximately 100 were still
imprisoned for their draft offenses when the President announced
his clemency program. They were released upon the condition
that they apply for clemency.
Unlike our civilian applicants, the vast majority of our military
applicants were not articulate, well-educated, or motivated explicitly
by opposition to the war. Almost none had applied for a
conscientious objector exemption before entering the service, and less
than 5% committed their AWOL offenses because of opposition to the
war. Most grew up in a broken home, with parents struggling to cope
with a low income. Roughly one in five were black, and 3.5% were
Spanish-speaking. Despite an average IQ of 98, over three-quarters
dropped out of high school before entering military service at the
18
age of 17 or 18. Almost one in three was tested as below the
30th percentile of intelligence (Category IV on the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test), making them only marginally qualified for
military service.
Most military applicants enlisted rather than be drafted, usually
joining the Army
the Marines. Slightly over one-third were ordered
to Vietnam. Seven percent failed to report, but the other 27%
did serve in Vietnam, usually a full year's tour. Of those who
served in Vietnam, half either volunteered for a Vietnam assignment
volunteered for a combat mission, or re-enlisted while in Vietnam.
Very few
went AWOL in Vietnam; only Four percent
one percent of all applicants went
AWOL from an apparent combat situation. However, almost one in four
suffered from mental strees caused by combat, and two in five
have experienced severe personal problems as a result of their Vietnam
tour. Two percent of our applicants returned from Vietnam with
disabling injuries.
Their AWOL offenses usually occurred after training and in
stateside bases. Over half committed their offenses because of
serious personal or family problems. Other common reasons for
AWOL offenses included resentment of some action by a superior
officer or a general dislike of military service. Typically, our
applicants went AWOL two or more times. Most returned to their
home towns, where they lived openly. Only 2% of our military
applicants ever took exile in Canada. Almost half surrendered
voluntarily after their last AWOL offenses. At the time of their
GERALD
LIDA
'19
last AWOL, they were typically 20 or 21 and had accumulated
14 months of creditable service.
Upon their return to military control, about 15% were given
administrative Undesirable Discharges for Unfitness. The other
85% faced court-martial charges, roughly half accepting an
Undesirable Discharge in lieu of court-martial. This was a
particularly frequent practice among applicants discharged after
1970. The remaining 40% stood General or special C ourtMartials,
were convicted, and received Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharges.
All court-martialed applicants spent at least some time in
confinement, with their sentences averaging five months in length.
One hundred and seventy were still confined when the clemency program
started, and they were released upon application.
The bad discharges have seriously
affected the current
employment status of our applicants. Seventeen percent were
unemployed at the time of their clemency application, whereas
only 8% were unemployed during their last AWOL offense. Another
7% were presently incarcerated for civilian felony offenses.
Altogether, 12% had been convicted for at least one civilian felony
offense.
IV. Managing a Clemency Program
After our late winter flood of applications, we were faced
with a seemingly impossible task. Through mid April, the original
nine-member Board had heard 500 cases. To meet the President's
deadline of September 15, we had to experience a 40-fold increase
in our case resolution rate. We met that deadline--to the day--
with the Board deciding every case for which we had enough
information. We decided 14,514 cases : After September 15, 1975,
900 cases with partial or recently arriving files were referred
to the Department of Justice for action in accordance with Board
precedents.
deadline
Meeting the President's
would have been impossible
without a - competent staff. We and our staff emerged from this
process with an experience in crisis management which we think
may be useful to managers of comparable entities in the future.
The senior staff developed solutions to management problems which
enabled us to act upon over a thousand cases per week. At the
same time, it maintained high standards of quality and integrity
in our legal process. All policy decisions were made by the Board
and implemented by the staff Having to manage an organization
which mushroomed from 100 to 600 employees during a six-week
period, it is remarkable that our process involved as little
confusion as it did.
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
.V. What Did We Accomplish?
We are very proud of what the President has accomplished in his
clemency program. He implemented his program courageously, in the
face of early criticism from those who thought he did too much and
those who though he did too little. The program received little
overt public support.
When the program started a Gallup Poll found that only 19%
of those polled approved of a conditional clemency program. The
overwhelming majority preferred either unconditional
21
amnesty or no program of any kind. By contrast, an August 1975
Gallup poll found that a majority of those expressing an opinion
are now in favor of conditional clemency, with the minority
equally split on either side of the issue. The same poll found
that roughly four out of five people would accept a clemency
rec ipient as at least an equal member of their community.
Likewise, a survey of employer attitudes has discovered that a
Clemency Discharge and Presidential Pardon would have real value
when a clemency recipient applies for a job. The clemency program
is in fact accomplishing the President's objective of reconciling
Americans.
To place the President's clemency program in its proper
Presidents
perspective, one must take note of the manner in which Washington,
Lincoln, and Truman applied their powers of Executive Clemency in
dealing with persons who had committed war-related offenses.
President Ford's program is the most generous ever offered, when equal
consideration is given to the nature of the benefits offered, the
conditions attached, the number of individuals benefit
and
the speed with which the program followed the war. Yet the President's
program does not break precedent in any fundamental way. The only
new feature of President Ford's program is its condition of
alternative service.
While we are confident that history will regard this program as
a success, much of the work remains unfinished. As of September,
1975, only a very small percentage of our applicants have as
yet been required to contact Selective Service to begin performing
alternative service. Of the 52% of our applicants who received
22
conditional clemency, three-quarters were assigned six months
or less of alternative service. We hope that most will complete
this assignment and receive clemenc The responsibility for
implementing the alternative service portion of the program in
a fair and flexible manner, fully in accord with the clemency
spirit of the President's program, rests with the Selective Service
System. Likewise, we expect that the UnitedStates Pardon Attorney,
entrusted with the carry-over responsibility for our program,
will perpetuate the policies--and spirit--of our Board. Finally,
we hope that other government agencies which will later come
in
contact with clemency recipients--especially the Veterans
Administration and the Discharge Review Boards of the Armed Forces--
will deal with them as clemently as their responsibilities permit.
On balance, we consider ourselves to have been partners in a
Comceived Comic
mission of national reconcilation, wisely
excessivent
by the President.
A less generous program would have left old wounds festering;
blanket, unconotional amnesty would have opened new wounds. We are
confident that the President's clemency program provides the
cornerstone for national reconciliation at the end of a turbulent
and divisive era. We aRe proud to have played a role in that
undertaking.
SUMMARY REPORT
I. The President's Clemency Program
In the years before President Ford assumed office, public
opinion was sharply divided over what the government policy
should be toward those who had committed Vietnam-era draft
violations and military absence offenses. Many citizens be-
lieved that these actions could not be forgiven in light of the
sacrifices endured by others during the war. Many others
believed that only unconditional amnesty was appropriate for
offenders who had acted in good conscience to oppose a war they
believed wrong and wasteful.
Something had to be done to bring Americans together
again. The rancor that had divided our country during the
Veitnam War still sapped its spirit and strength. The national
interest required that Americans put aside their strong personal
feelings. Six weeks after taking office, President Ford
announced a program of clemency, of forgiveness, of reconcili-
ation for Vietnam-era draft and military absence offenders.
In his Proclamation of September 16, 1974, President
Ford created a program of conditional clemency for roughly 13,000
civilians and 100,000 servicemen who had committed draft or
military absence offenses between the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
(August 4, 1964) and the day the last American combatant left
Vietnam (March 28, 1973). He authorized the Departments of
Justice and Defense, respectively, to review prospective
applications from the 4,522 draft offenders and 10,115
FORD in LIBRARY
2
undischarged servicemen still at large. He created the
Presidential Clemency Board to consider prospective applications
from the 8,700 convicted and punished draft offenders and the
estimated 90,000 servicemen given bad discharges for absence
offenses. He gave all eligible persons 4½ months (later ex-
tended to 61/2 months) to apply. He promised that their cases
would be reviewed individually. He further indicated that
applicants would be asked to earn clemency where appropriate,
by performing up to 24 months of alternative service in the
national interest, under the supervision of the Selective
Service System.
Under the Justice Department program, fugitive draft offenders
would have their prosecutions dropped, enabling them to avoid the
punishment and stigma of a felony conviction. Under the De-
fense Department program, fugitive servicemen were offered an
immediate Undesirable Discharge as a permanent end to their
fugitive status. They were also offered the chance to earn a
Clemency Discharge. Under the Clemency Board program, con-
victed draft offenders were offered full and unconditional
Presidential Pardons for their draft offenses. Former service-
men who had received bad discharges and full Presidential
pardons for their absence offenses.
By granting pardons to convicted or discharged offenders,
President Ford was exercising the most potent constitutional form
of executive clemency available. The Presidential pardon connotes
official forgiveness for designated draft or military offenses,
restoring all federal civil rights lost as a result of those
specific offenses. However, an applicant who has been convicted
of other felony crimes receive$ a pardon only for his draft or
AWOL offenses; his pardon does not restore rights lost through
3
felony convictions for other crimes. Likewise, a full and
unconditional pardon indicates that government agencies should
disregard all pardoned offenses in any actions they take
involving clemency recipients.
By directing that the military services upgrade bad discharges,
substituting Clemency Dischages in their place, the President was
indicating to employers and creditors that they should not
discriminate against those individuals. As a "neutral" discharge,
the Clemency Discharge appears to be working: A recent survey
of largenational Employers and small local (Pennsylvania) employers
found that they view it as almost identical to a General Discharge
under Honorable Conditions and much better than an Undesirable
Discharge under Other-than-Honorable Conditions..
A Clemency Discharge does not confer veterans' benefits,
but it leaves an individual with the same appeal rights that were
available to himA prior to receiving such a discharge. Indeed, the
receipt of a Presidential pardon and a Clemency Discharge should
improve an individual's chances for further upgrade.
Altogether, approximately 21,800 eligible persons applied for
clemency.
No.
ox
Agency
Applicants
No. Eligible
Applying Applying
Defense
Fugitive deserters
10,115
5,600
55%
Justice
Fugitive draft offenders
4,522
700
16%
P.C.B.
Discharged AWOL offenders
90,000
13,589
15%
P.C.B.
Convicted draft offenders
8,700
1,879
22%
TOTAL
113,337
21,768
19%
4
Through the first week in January, we had received only 850
applications, with the initial January 31 deadline just a few
weeks away. At that time, the public did not realize that the
program included not only fugitives but also punished offenders-
including servicemen who had served in Vietnam. Very few people
realized that the President's program included the following
type of individual:
While a medic in Vietnam, this military applicant (an
American Indian) received the Bronze Star for heroism
because of his actions during a night sweep operation. When
his platoon came under intense enemy fire, he moved through
a minefield under a hail of fire to aid his wounded comrades.
While in Vietnam, he was made Squad Leader of nine men, seven
of whom (including himself) were wounded in action. After
returning to the United States, he experienced post-combat
psychiatric problems. He went AWOL several times to seek
psychiatric treatment, for which he received a bad discharge
Therefore, we began public service announcements on thousands
of radio and television stations, held meetings and press conferences
at dozens of cities, met with thousands of veterans' counselors
throughout the country, and circulated bulletins to agencies in
direct contact with eligible persons--such as Veterans' Administration
offices, employment offices, post offices, and prison. With a limited
budget of $24,000, the results were dramatic. During
the rest of January, we received over 4,000 new applications.
Because of this response the President extended the application deadlin
another month. We received 6,000 in February and, after a final
extension, another 10,000 before the March 31st final deadline--
for a total of about 21,500, of whom 15,468 turned out to be eligible.
This increase in applications was directly attributable to our public
information campaign. By asking our applicants who telephoned us
when they learned they were eligible, we discovered that over 95%
5
did not realize they could apply until the January 8 start of
the campaign; 90% applied within days or even hours of their
discovery that they were eligible.
The Departments of Defense and Justice did not experience a
similar increase in applications, because it was already widely
understood that fugitive draft offenders and military absentees
could apply for clemency. In fact, that still is the public
perception. An August 1975 Gallup Poll found that only 15% of the
American people understood that convicted draft offenders and
discharged AWOL offenders could apply for clemency. Virtually
the same percentage--1 of those eligible actually did apply.
We are convinced that most of the remainder still do not know that
they were eligible for the program Others may not have applied
because their lives are settled, with their draft offense convictions
or bad discharges of no present consequence to them. We suspect
that
very few failed to apply to the Clemency Board because
of their opposition to our program.
The press and the public were--and indeed, still are--preoccupied
with anti-war fugitives who fled to Canada. However, we found that
only 6% of our civilian applicants and 2% of our military applicants
had ever gone to Canada. Virtually all of them subsuquently
returned to the United States long before they applied for clemency.
Of our 15,468 eligible persons, less- than 400 ever went to Canada.
This stands in marked contrast to the 3,700 (24%) who were
Vietnam veterans. In recent years, many estimates have been made
of the number of fugitive draft and AWOL offenders in Canada,
usually on the basis of very limited data. Based on our own data
6
and our understanding of applicants to the Defense and Justice
programs, we estimate that a maximum of 7,000 persons eligible
for clemency were ever Canadian exiles. We further estimate that
only 4,000 (less than 5%) of the 91,500 who were eligible but did
not apply for clemency are still in Canada, contrary to the usual
public impression.
What happens now to those who did not apply? The 8,300 who
are still fugitive should surrender to authorities. While they
will suffer the stigma of a bad discharge or felony conviction,
they will end their fugitive status. The 8,000 who have already
been punished can apply to the Pardon Attorney in the Department
of Justice and to the appropriate military discharge. review
boards, avenues of relief which are not related to the President's
clemency program and are not affected by the program's end.
II. The Presidential Clemency Board
The Clemency Board was the only new agency created by President
Ford for the special purpose of reviewing the cases of clemency
applicants. Originally, the President named nine members to the
Board, designating former U.S. Senator Charles E. Goodell as the
Chairman. After the great increase in applications, the President
expanded the Board to eighteen members. Both the original Board
and the expanded Board were representative of a cross-section of
views on the Vietnam War and on the issue of clemency. The Board
consisted of 13 veterans of military service, three women, and
two priests. The Board included five Vietnam veterans, two of whom
were severely disabled in combat. Another member has a husband who
still is listed as missing in action. The backgrounds and
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
7
perspectives of every member contributed to our overall policies
and to our case dispositions.
The Board worked very hard during the spring and summer in
order to fulfill the President's requirement that we give each
case individual
attention before the President's September 15
deadline. The consensus was remarkable, given the wide range
of views represented on the Board. What we sought to maintain was
a reasoned, middle ground. By compromising among ourselves, we
believed that we would promote the President's goal of a national
reconciliation.
To assure the fairness and consistency of our case dispositions,
we developed a case-by-case review procedure consistent with our
mission of clemency. Because ours was a program of clemency, not
law enforcement, we unanimously decided not to seek the assistance
of the FBI in preparing our cases. We limited our file acquisition
to the official military or court records. Similarly, we kept case
files confidential to protect the rights of applicants and to
preserve the spirit of reconciliation. We promised strict
confidentiality to all who applied to the Board. For each case,
staff attorneys prepared narrative summaries which were carefully
checked for accuracy. Each applicant was sent his summary, with
the opportunity to identify errors and provide additional information.
Staff attorneys presented cases in oral hearings before three or four
member
Bcard panels who had read the case summaries in advance. Panel
8
counsels were also present to assure an objective staff attorney
presentation and to assure that Board policy precedents were
applied correctly. Every Board member had the right to refer
any case to the full Board. This right was exercised in only about
700 (5%) of our cases. The Chairman referred about 50 cases
to the full Board, assisted by a computer-aided staff reveiw which
flagged case dispositions for being either too harsh or to lenient.
Our dispositions varied little from week to week, especially
after our basic policy decisions had been made. During our first
six months, we decided 500 cases, recommending outright pardons
recommending outright pardons (without alternative service) to
46% of all cases, denial of clemency to 3%, and alternative service
to the remainder. During our latter six months, we decided 14,000
cases recommending outright pardons to 44%, denial of clemency
to 6%, and alternative service to the remainder.
Contributing to the fairness and consistency of our process
were the clear rules we established and published for deciding cases.
Our alternative service "baseline" formula took account of the fact
that all of our applicants had been punished for their offenses.
We started with
24 months, deducting three months
for every one month spent in confinement, and deducting one month
for every month spent in satisfactory performance of court-ordered
alternative service. In cases where military officials and Federal
judges considered offenses to be minor enough to merit short
sentences, we reduced the baseline figure to match the sentence
actually given. Our minimum baseline was three months, and almost
9
98% of our applicants had baselines of six months or less.
To determine whether an applicant deserved clemency--and, if
so, whether his assigned period of alternative service should be
different from his working baseline--we applied 28 specific
aggravating and mitigating factors. As with our baseline formula,
we developed our list of factors by consensus. We were all very
concerned about the reasons for an applicant's offense and the
circumstances of that offense. Likewise, we were concerned about
his overall record as a serviceman and as a member of his
community. In special cases, we also were concerned about facts
surrounding his application for clemency. Almost all of our designated
factors were established very early in our process. Only
aggravating factors #11 and #12 were established by our expanded
Board, although all factors were continually clarified as new
fact situations arose. Each factor was codified, with illustrative
case precedents, through publication of five issues of the
Clemency Law Reporter. The following was our final list of factors:
Aggravating Factors
1. Other Felony Convictions
2. False Statement to Board
3. Use of Physical Force in Committing Offense
4. AWOL in Vietnam
5. Selfish Motivation for Offense
6. Failure to do Alternative Service
7. Violation of Probation or Parole
8. Multiple AWOL Offense
9. Extended AWOL Offense
10. Missed Overseas Movement
11. Non-AWOL Offenses Contributing to Discharge for Unfitness
12. Apprehension by Authorities
10
Mitigating Factors
1.
Inability to Understand Obligations
2. Personal or Family Problems
3. Physical or Mental Problems
4. Public Service Employment
5. Service-Connected Disability
6. Extended Creditable Military Service
7. Vietnam Service
8. Procedural Unfairness
9. Denial of CO Status for Technical, Procedural, or Improper
Grounds
10. Conscientious Motivation for Offense
11. Voluntary Surrender to Authorities
12. Mental Stress from Combat
13. Volunteering for Combat
14. Above Average Military Performance Ratings
15. Decorated for Valor
16. Wounded in Combat
We did not apply each factor with equal weight. For example,
conscientious motivation or serious personal or family problems
often led to outright pardon recommendations. The following two
cases were typical:
This civilian applicant had participated in anti-war
demonstrations before refusing induction. He stated that
he could not fight a war which he could not support. However,
he does believe in the need for national defense and would
have served in the war if there had been an attack on United
States territory. He stated that "I know that what is
happening now is wrong, SO I have to take a stand and hope
that it helps end it a little sooner."
This military applicant's wife was pregnant, in financial
difficulties, and faced with eviction; she suffered from an
emtional disorder and nervous problems; his oldest child was
asthmatic and an epileptic, having seizures that sometimes
resulted in unconsciousness. Applicant requested transfer
and a hardship discharge both of which were denied.
Creditable Vietnam service was also a highly mitigating factor,
usually resulting in an outright pardon. In particularly meritorious
cases, we recommended to the President that he direct the military
to upgrade the applicant's discharge to one under honorable conditions,
with full entitlement to veterans' benefits. We were particularly
concerned about the eligibility of wounded or disabled veterans
for medical benefits. We made upgrade recommendations in the
following two cases:
Applicant did not go AWOL until after returning from two
tours of duty in Vietnam, when his beliefs concerning the
war changed. He came to believe that the U.S. was wrong in gettin
involved in the war and that he "was wrong in killing people
in Vietnam" He had over three years' creditable service,
with 14 excellent conduct and efficiency ratings. He
re-enlisted to serve his second tour within three months of
ending his first. He served as an infantry man in Vietnam,
was wounded, and réceived the Bronze Star for Valor.
During his combat tour in Vietnam, applicant's platoon
leader, with whom he shared a brotherly relationship, was
killed while the latter was awakening applicant to start his
guard duty. The platoon had set up an ambush point because
it had come upon an enemy comple and the platoon leader
was mistaken for a Viet Cong and shot by one of his own men.
This event was extremely traumatic to applicant, and he
experienced nightmares. In an attempt to cope with this
experience, applicant turned to the use of herion to which
he became addicted. During his AWOL, he overcame his drug
addiction only to become an alcoholic. After obtaining
help and curing his alcoholism, he turned himself in.
On the other hand, some aggravating factors were considered
very grave, generally leading to "No Clemency" decisions. There
were very few applicants who clearly went AWOL from combat situations.
This applicant would not go into the field with his unit,
because he felt the new Commanding Officer of his company was
incompetent. He was getting nervous about going out on an
operation; there is evidence that everyone believed there
was a good likelihood of enemy contact. (His company was
subsequently dropped onto a hill where they engaged the enemy
in combat He asked to remain in the rear, but his request
was denied. Consequently, he left the company area because,
in the words of his chaplain, "the threat of death caused
him to exercise his right of self-preservation." " Applicant
was apprehended while traveling on a truck away from his
unit without any of his combat gear.
We denied clemency in the above case, but other cases of
AWOL in Vietnam involved strong mitigating factors. Often,
combat wounds or the psychological effects of combat led to an
AWOL offense. For example, we recommended an outright pardon
in the following case:
Applicant was assigned to an infantry unit in Vietnam.
During his combat service, he sustained an injury which
caused his vision to blur in one eye. His vision steadily
worsened, and he was referred to an evacuation hospital
in DaNang for testing. A doctor's assistant told him that
the eye doctor was fully booked and that he would have
to report back to his unit and come back to the hospital
in a couple of weeks. Frustrated by this rejection and
fearful of his inability to function in an infantry unit,
applicant went AWOL.
Applicants who had been convicted of felony offenses involving
serious bodily harm were almost always denied clemency, as in the
following case:
(Case #02407) THis civilian applicant had three other felony
convictions in addition to his draft offense. In 1970,
he received a one-year sentence for sale of drugs. In
1972, he received one year of imprisonment and two years
of probation for possession of stolen property. In 1972,
he was convicted of failure to notify his local board
of his address. He was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment, but his sentence was suspended and he
was put on probation. In 1974, he was convicted of assault,
abduction, and rape, for which he received a 20-year sentence.
Perhaps our most difficult--and disputed--cases involved
applicants who had been convicted of a civilian felony offense
other than a draft offense, but who had strong mitigating
factors applicable to their case. Some Board members argued that we
should disregard unrelated felony convictions, since we were not
granting clemency for those offenses. Others argued that granting
clemency to convicted felons would cheapen the clemency grants to
others. The majority of the Board took the middle view--that a
felony conviction would be viewed as a highly aggravating factor,
but each case would be evaluated individually. Each case was
decided on its total facts, in accordance with the President's
direction to avoid a blanket amnesty process. Even so, 42% of
our applicants with other felony convictions were denied clemency,
either because of the nature of their felony offense or because
they did not have compensatingly strong mitigating factors.
However, less serious felony convictions did not overshadow
an applicant's Vietnam service or other mitigating factol 5.
раде 12.
(Case #14792) Applicant volunteered for the Special Forces after
his first year in the Army. He re-enlisted to.
effect a transfer to Victnam, where he served as
a parachute rigger and earned excellent conduct and pro-
ficiency ratings. Aleogether, he served for 13 months
in Victuan and over three years in the Army, with
two Honorable Discharges for re-enlistment purposes.
Mis AWOL offenses totaled 29 days, did not occur
after his return from Vietnam, and were attributed
to his problems with alcohol. After his Undesirable
Discharge in lieu of court-martial, he was convicted
of stealing a television set and served six months
in prison. He was recently paroled.
In a few cases, a clear connection existed between an applicant's
Vietnam service and his felony conviction.
(Case #11116) Applicant served eight months in Vietnam as a
supply specialist before his reassignment back to the
United States. His conduct and proficiency scores
had been uniformly excellent during his Vietnam service.
However, while in Vietnam he because addicted to heroin.
He could not break his habit after returning stateside,
and he began a series of seven ANOI. offenses as he
"got into the local drug scene." Eventually, he
"ran out of money" and "had a real bad habit," SO he
"tried to break into a store with another guy that
was strung out." He was arrested, convicted for
burglary, and given an Undesirable Discharge for AWOL
while on bail. (The above quotations are drawn from
applicant's written statement to our Board)
Others rehabilitated themselves after their felony offense, indicating
their desire to be productive and law-abiding members of their communities.
(Case #02230) Shortly after receiving a Bad Conduct Discharge from
the Navy for his AWOL offenses, applicant was convicted
of transporting stolen checks across state lines. He
was sentenced to a ten-year term, but was paroled after
one year and four months. During his confinement, he
underwent psychiatric care. Since his parole, he has
re-married and established a successful subcontracting
business. Currently, he is working with young people
in his community in connection with church groups,
trying to provide guidance for them. His parole
officer stated that applicant has straightened out
and is a responsible member of his community.
In each of the above three cases, our Board recommended that the
President grant an outright Pardon. Obviously, we had no
jurisdiction to grant clemency for their other felony offense,
Our case disposition tallies are listed below. Our civilian
applicants received a greater proportion of outright pardons,
both because a much greåter proportion had conscientious reasons
for their offenses and because a much smaller proportion had
other felony convictions.
Final Civilian Dispositions
Number
Percent
Outright Pardons
1432
82%
81,5%
Alternative Service:
3 months
140
8%
9.77%
7.96%
4-6 months
91
5%
7+ months
68
4%
No Clemency
26
1%
1757
Final Military Dispositions
Number
Percent
Outright Pardon
4620
36%
Alternative Service:
3 months
2555
20%
4-6 months
2941
23%
7+ months
1756
14%
No Clemency
885
12,757
7%
These tallies reflect the spirit of compromise on our Board.
Some of our members suggested that we categorically deny clemency
to applicants with multiple civilian or military convictions,
applicants who failed to report to Vietnam when ordered, and applicants
who went AWOL while in Vietnam. Others would have preferred 100%
outright Pardons, with no one denied clemency. The majority believed
that the President wished to avoid either extreme.
III. Applicants to the Clemency Board
Chance and circumstance had much to do with the sacrifices
faced by each individual during the Vietnam War. By nature, war
and conscription are selective. Only 9% of all draft-age men
served in Vietnam. Less than 2% ever faced charges for draft
or desertion offenses, and only less than one out of two
hundred- were convicted or remained charged with these offenses
at the start of the clemency program.
Many of our applicants fell into common categories: The
civilian conscientious war resister who had his application for CO
status denied and who stood trial rather than leave the country; the
Jehovah' st Witness who, although granted a CO exemption, went to jail
because his religion prohibited him from accepting an alternative
service assignment from Selective Service; the Vietnam veteran
who went AWOL because of his difficulties in adjusting to post-
combat garrison duty; the serviceman with a low apitude score
Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(
CategoryIV) who could not adjust to military life; the
serviceman who went AWOL to find a better-paying job to get his
family off welfare.
Our civilian applicants were not unlike most young men of their
age. Usually, They grew up in stable middle-class families. Eleven percent
were black, and 1.3% were Spanish- peaking. Over three-quarters
graduated from high school, and their average IQ was 111.
Roughly one in four was a Jehovah's Witness or member of another
religious sect opposed to war. Almost half applied for a
$78839 FORD LIBRARY
conscientious objector exemption, which was usually denied. The
typical draft offense was failure to report for submit to,
Submit
to
11
induction. Three-quarters committed their offense because of
their opposition to war in general or the Vietnam War in particular.
For 96%, it was their only felony offense, committed at the
average age of 21.
Most civilian applicants surrendered immediately, and most
who were ever fugitives lived openly at home. Only 6% ever took
exile in Canada. After indictment, most pled guilty. Two-thirds
were sentenced to probation, usually on the condition that they
perform alternative service. The other one-third went to prison,
usually for periods of less than one year. Less than 1% served
prison terms of two years or longer, but some were in
prison for as long as five years.
At the time of their applications for
clemency, almost all were either working full-time or in school.
Only 2% were unemployed, with another 2% in prison for unrelated
felony offenses. Approximately 100 were still
imprisoned for their draft offenses when the President announced
his clemency program. They were released upon the condition
that they apply for clemency.
Unlike our civilian applicants, the vast majority of our military
applicants were not articulate, well-educated, or motivated explicitly
by opposition to the war. Almost none had applied for a
conscientious objector exemption before entering the service, and less
primarily
than 5% committed their AWOL offenses because of opposition to the
war. Most grew up in a broken home, with parents struggling to cope
with a low income. Roughly one in five were black, and 3.5% were
Spanish-speaking. Despite an average IQ of 98, over three-quarters
dropped out of high school before entering military service at the
age of 17 or 18. Almost one in three was tested as below the
30th percentile of intelligence (Category JV on the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test), making them only marginally qualified for
military service.
Most military applicants enlisted rather than be drafted, usually
joining the Army the Marines. Slightly over one-third were ordered
to Vietnam. Seven percent failed to report, but the other 27%
did serve in Vietnam, usually a full year's tour. Of those who
served in Vietnam, half either volunteered for a Vietnam assignment
volunteered for a combat mission, or re-enlisted while in Vietnam.
? A
Very few
went AWOL in Vietnam; only Four percent,
one percent of all applicants went
AWOL from an apparent combat situation. However, almost one in four
suffered from mental strees caused by combat, and two in five
have experienced severe personal problems as a result of their Vietnam
tour. Two percent of our applicants returned from Vietnam with
disabling injuries.
Their AWOL offenses usually occurred after training and in
stateside bases. Over half committed their offenses because of
serious personal or family problems. Other common reasons for
AWOL offenses included resentment of some action by a superior
officer or a general dislike of military service. Typically, our
applicants went AWOL two or more times. Most returned to their
home towns, where they lived openly. Only 2% of our military
applicants ever took exile in Canada. Almost half surrendered
voluntarily after their last AWOL offenses. At the time of their
last AWOL, they were typically 20 or 21 and had accumulated
14 months of creditable service.
Upon their return to military control, about 15% were given
administrative Undesirable Discharges for Unfitness. The other
85% faced court-martial charges, roughly half accepting an
Undesirable Discharge in lieu of court-martial. This was a
particularly frequent practice among applicants discharged after
1970. The remaining 40% stood General or special C artials,
were convicted, and received Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharges.
All court-martialed applicants spent at least some time in
confinement, with their sentences averaging five months in length.
One hundred and seventy were still confined when the clemency program
started, and they were released upon application.
The bad discharges have seriously
affected the current
employment status of our applicants. Seventeen percent were
unemployed at the time of their clemency application, whereas
only 8% were unemployed during their last AWOL offense. Another
7% were presently incarcerated for civilian felony offenses.
Altogether, 12% had been convicted for at least one civilian felony
offense.
IV. Managing a Clemency Program
After our late winter flood of applications, we were faced
with a seemingly impossible task. Through mid April, the original
nine-member Board had heard 500 cases. To meet the President's
deadline of September 15, we had to experience a 40-fold increase
in our case resolution rate. We met that deadline-- to the day--
with the Board deciding every case for which we had enough
information. We decided 14,514 cases : After September 15, 1975,
900 cases with partial or recently- arriving files were referred
to the Department of Justice for action in accordance with Board
precedents.
deadline
Meeting the President's
would have been impossible
without a competent staff. We and our staff emerged from this
process with an experience in crisis management which we think
may be useful to managers of comparable entities in the future.
The senior staff developed solutions to management problems which
enabled us to act upon over a thousand cases per week. At the
the Board
same time, it maintained high standards of quality and integrity
in our legal process. All policy decisions were made by the Board
and implemented by the staff. Having to manage an organization
The Clemenry Board staff
47
642
which mushroomed from 100 to 600 employees during a SIX week
on detail loan from other
agencies in 3 months then immediately began to dis opper is
period) it is remarkable that our process involved as little
confusion as it did.
V. What Did We Accomplish?
We are very proud of what the President has accomplished in his
clemency program. He implemented his program courageously, in the
face of early criticism from those who thought he did too much and
those who though he did too little. The program received little
overt public support.
When the program started, a Gallup Poll found that only 19%
of those polled approved of a conditional clemency program. The
overwhelming majority preferred either unconditional
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
amnesty or no program of any kind. By contrast, an August 1975
Gallup poll found that a majority of those expressing an opinion
are now in favor of conditional clemency, with the minority
equally split on either side of the issue. The same poll found
that roughly four out of five people would accept a clemency
receipient as at least an equal member of their community.
Likewise, a survey of employer attitudes has discovered that a
Clemency Discharge and Presidential Pardon would have real value
when a clemency recipient applies for a job. The clemency program
is in fact accomplishing the President's objective of reconciling
Americans.
To place the President's clemency program in its proper
perspective, one must take note of the manner in which, Washington,
Lincoln, and Truman applied their powers of Executive Clemency in
dealing with persons who had committed war-related offenses.
President Ford's program is the most generous ever offered, when equal
consideration is given to the nature of the benefits offered, the
conditions attached, the number of individuals benefite
and
the speed with which the program followed the war. Yet the President's
program does not break precedent in any fundamental way. The only
new feature of President Ford's program is its condition of
alternative service.
While we are confident that history will regard this program as
a success, much of the work remains unfinished. As of September,
1975, only a very small percentage of our applicants have as
yet been required to contact Selective Service to begin performing
alternative service. Of the 52% of our applicants who received
conditional clemency, three-quarters were assigned six months
or less of alternative service. We hope that most will complete
this assignment and receive clemency
The responsibility for
implementing the alternative service portion of the program in
a fair and flexible manner, fully in accord with the clemency
spirit of the President's program, rests with the Selective Service
System. Likewise, we expect that the UnitedStates Pardon Attorney,
entrusted with the carry-over responsibility for our program,
will perpetuate the policies--and spirit--of our Board. Finally,
we hope that other government agencies which will later come
in
contact with clemency recipients--especially the Veterans
Administration and the Discharge Review Boards of the Armed Forces--
will deal with them as clemently as their responsibilities permit.
On balance, we consider ourselves to have been partners in a
Comceivel
mission of national reconcilation, wisely
by the President.
A less generous program would have left old wounds festering;
blanket, unconotional amnesty would have opened new wounds. We are
confident that the President's clemency program provides the
cornerstone for national reconciliation at the end of a turbulent
and divisive era. We are proud to have played a role in that
undertaking.