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the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
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Digitized from Box 4 of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
III. PCB CASE DISPOSITIONS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CHAPTER III. CASE DISPOSITIONS
The products of our year's work on the Clemency Board were our 16,000 case
dispositions. Most Board members participated in thousands of these decisions, each
one carefully determined on the basis of our baseline formula and designated factors.
In hearing so many cases, some inconsistencies were bound to occur. However,
the process we followed and the substantive rules we applied reduced these
inconsistencies to a minimum.
Almost always, our different treatment of different kinds of individuals
reflected the contrasting facts of their cases. For example, our No Clemency rate
for black applicants was over twice (12%) what it was for whites (5%), because
of the greater number of blacks who had been convicted of violent felony offenses.
(Our pardon rate was the same for black and white applicants -- (43%).
Similarly, our case dispositions for civilian applicants were considerably
more generous than for our military applicants. Our pardon rate for civilians
was over twice that for discharged servicemen, while our civilian No Clemency rate
was less than one-fifth of that for servicemen for military applicants.
Our actual case dispositions are listed below:
*
PCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - MILITARY
Number
Percent
Cumulative
Upgrade
468
3.6
3.6
Pardon
4420
34.0
37.6
1-3 mos.
2613
20.1
57.7
4-6 mos.
2977
22.9
80.6
7-9 mos.
1235
9.5
90.1
GERALD
10-12 mos.
442
3.4
93.5
13 + mos.
26
0.2
93.7
No Clemency
819
6.3
100.0
Total
14,000
* These are projections based upon current Board trends.
PCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - CIVILIAN
Number
Percent
Cumulative
Pardon
1652
82.6
82.6
1-3 mos.
164
8.2
90.8
4-6 mos.
98
4.9
95.7
7-9 mos.
22
1.1
96.8
10-12 mos.
34
1.7
98.5
13 + mos.
8
0.4
98.9
No Clemency
22
1.1
100.0
Total
2000
PCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - TOTAL
Number
Percent
Cumulative
Upgrade
468
3.1%
3.1%
Pardon
6072
40.5%
43.6%
1-3 mos.
2777
18.5%
62.1%
4-6 mos.
3075
20.5%
82.6%
7-5 mos.
1257
8.4%
91.0%
10-12 mos.
476
3.2%
94.2%
13 + mos.
34
.2%
94.4%
No Clemency
841
5.6%
100.0%
Total
16,000
For our military applicants, we had four types of case dispositions: Upgrades
recommendations, Outright Pardons, Alternative Service, or No Clemency. For
civilian applicants, we had three: Outright Pardons, Alternative Service, No Clemency.
In addition, our alternative service dispositions could either stay at the applicant's
baseline, go up from that baseline, or go down from it. As shown below, our applicant's
baselines almost all were between thre e and six months.
Baseline
CIVILIAN
MILITARY
3 months
94.6%
87.8%
4-6 months
2.9%
15.5%
7-12 months
0.7%
0.6%
GERALD
13-24 months
1.9%
0.7%
Examples of Case Dispositions
The reasons for our case dispositions varied greatly from case to case.
However, it is possible to give examples of frequently-encountered categories of
cases. In the discussion which follows, we illustrate our different types of
dispositions for military and civilian applicants.
Military Applicants
The most generous disposition for military cases was an upgrade recommendation.
We recognized that a few military applicants had truly outstanding service
records prior to their AWOL proglems. When we found the offenses were not so
serious that a pardon was warranted, we also recommended that the applicant's
discharge be upgraded and that he receive veteran's benefits. As a minimum,
applicants must have had creditable service and a tour in Vietnam to be considered,
but wounds in combat, decorations for valor, and other mitigating factors were also
important.
(Case # 09067)
Applicant had 4 AWOL's totalling over 8 months,
but he did not begin his AWOL's until after returning
from two tours of duty in Vietnam, when his beliefs
concerning the war changed. He came to believe that the
U. S. was wrong in getting involved in the war and that
he "was wrong in killing people in Vietnam." He had
over three years' creditable service, with 14 excellent
conduct and efficiency ratings. He re-enlisted to serve
his second tour within 3 months of ending his first. He
served as an infantry man in Vietnam, was wounded, and
received the Bronze Star for valor.
Although only 3.6% of our military cases were so outstanding as to qualify
for upgrade recommendations, 34% of our military cases merited an outright pardon
without upgrade recommendations. There were two broad groups of cases that often
received pardons. First, there were the applicants who had understandable reasons
for their offenses.
2.
(Case #12631)
Applicant enlisted in 1960 and had a good record
In 1963 he married, but he began to have marital
problems soon afterwards. He was in a car accident
in 1964. The combination of these two influences
drove him to drink, and he became an alcoholic. His
frequent AWOL's were directly attributable to his
alcoholism.
The other broad group of military pardon cases were those applicants whose
offenses were those applicants whose offenses were relatively minor and whose
service records were good:
(Case #11606)
Applicant had 4 AWOL's totalling 6 days and surrendered
after the last two. He had 1 year and 9 months' creditable
service with above average conduct and proficiency ratings
and served a tour in a task force patrolling the waters
off Vietnam.
The bulk of our military cases resulted in alternative service dispositions.
As a general rule, these cases involved both aggravating and mitigating factors
which balanced out.
(Case #00291)
The applicant commenced his first AWOL after he was assaulted
by a cook while in KP. After his second AWOL, he was
allegedly beaten by 5 MP's while confined in the stockade.
On the other hand, he committed four AWOL's, the last one
lasting almost 3 1/2 years, and had less than one month of
creditable service.
(Case # 14813)
Applicant sent AWOL because he was involved with a girl and
was using drugs. He is presently incarcerated in a civilian
prison for a minor breaking and entering. On the other hand,
his two AWOL's were each of a few days' duration, and he is
a very low category IV AFQT.
No clemency dispositions normally resulted from other serious felony convictions,
such as the following.
(Case #10147)
While in the service, applicant received a General Court
Martial for robbery with force. After his discharge, he
was arrested and found guilty of armed robbery in Michigan.
(Case #04071)
Applicant is now serving a 15-year sentence in a civilian
prison for selling heroin
(Case #14930)
After discharge, applicant was convicted in a civilian court
of first degree murder and second degree robbery. He received
3.
a sentence of 25 years to life and will not be eligible
for parole until 1997.
Occasionally, we would deny clemency when the applicant committed his offense
out of cowardice, as in the following.
(Case #03304)
Applicant would not go into the field with his unit, because
he felt the new Commanding Officer of his company was in-
competent. He was getting nervous about going out on an.
operation; there was evidence that everyone believed there
was a good likelihood of enemy contact. (His company was
subequently dropped onto a hill where they engaged the enemy
in combat). He asked to remain in the rear, but his request
was denied. Consequently he left the company area because,
in the words of his chaplain, the threat of death caused him
to exercise his right of self-preservation. Applicant was
apprehended while travelling on a truck away from his unit
without any of his combat gear.
We also denied clemency if offenses were simply too serious and plentiful to
excuse.
(Case #03444)
Applicant received an SCM for two periods of AWOL (one day
each) and one charge of missing movement. He then received
an NJP for one AWOL (one day), another NJP for three AWOL's
(1; 1; 10 days), and one NJP for two AWOL's (7; 1 days).
He then received an SPCM for two AWOL's (2 months 17 days;
3 months 19 days). He accepted an undesirable discharge
in lieu of court martial for one period of desertion (2 yrs.
10 months 20 days), five periods of qualifying AWOL (8 days;
3 months 28 days; 1 month 2 days; 2 months 13 days; 6 months
29 days) and one period of non-qualifying AWOL (3 months
28 days). This is a total of one period of desertion, 15
periods of qualifying AWOL and one non-qualifying AWOL (total
of 5 years).
Civilian Applicants
An overwhelming majority of our civilian applicants received an outright pardon
without having to perform additional alternative service. It is difficult to cate-
gorize the pardon cases; such factors as conscientious reasons for the offense, an
improper denial of conscientious objector status, other personal or procedural un-
fairness, employment or other service to the public, and surrender to the authorities
all strongly influenced the decision to grant clemency. Occasionally we had a case
that combined them all.
4.
(Case #00552)
Applicant filed for a C.O.'s exemption on the basis
of his ethical conviction that the preservation of life was
a "fundamental point of my existence." The local
board denied it, presumably because his convictions were
ethical and not religious. Furthermore, he never re-
ceived notice that his request was denied. When ordered
to report for induction, he argued that he had not been
informed of the denial and requested an appeal. His
local board denied this request because the 30-day appeal
period had expired and mailing the denial of applicant's
request to his home constituted constructive notice of
the contents. Applicant refused induction, voluntarily
appeared at his trial, pled guilty and received a sentence
of three years' probation. During that period he worked
as a pharmacist for alternative service, but he also
worked as a volunteer on a drug abuse hotline and served
on the Board of Directors of the town's Youth Commission.
Pardon Conditioned Upon Alternative Service
The civilian cases resulting in alternative service generally fell into two
categories. First, some civilian applicants who have committed their offense for
conscientious reasons but served only a portion of their sentences.
(Case #00022)
Applicant claimed his refusal to report fro induction
was based on his philosophical convictions regarding
life. He was sentenced to three years in prison but
served only six months when he received a furlough
because of the clemency program. The second category of
The second category of alternative service cases were those in which the
applicant committed offense for slightly selfish reasons, but there were no
other serious aggravating circumstances.
(Case #548)
Applicant was convicted of failure to inform the local
board of his current address. At the time he was drifting
around with no fixed address so he did not bother to keep
in touch with his local board.
No Clemency. Very few of our civilian applicants did not receive clemency.
When they did not, it was often because they had either committed other violent
or heinous felonies.
5.
(Case #02407)
This civilian applicant had three other felony convictions
in addition to his draft offense. On 23 September 1970
he received a one-year sentence for sale of drugs. In
1971 he received one year of imprisonment and two years
of probation for possession stolen property. On 18 October
1972 he was convicted of failure to notify his local board
of his address and sentenced to three years' imprisonment
which was suspended and applicant was placed on pro-
bation. His probation was not satisfactorily completed
because on 23 March 1974 he was convicted of assault,
abduction and rape for which he received a 20-year
sentence.
We also denied clemency to applicants whose attitude and uncooperativeness
were contradictory to the spirit of the clemency program.
(Case #10374)
Applicant wrote the local board and asked for a post-
ponement of his induction because he alleged he had
received injuries in a car accident which disqualified
him for military service. He did not submit a physician's
statement. The board, therefore, ordered to report. He
claimed the board had ignored his earlier request and did
submit a statement from his doctor showing that he had
received some injuries in a car accident. However, another
doctor examined the applicant and found him completely
healed. Applicant refused induction and was convicted;
he received a sentence of 30 days in jail and 2 years'
probation. He admitted in an interview with the probation
officer that his reason for refusing induction was that
he did not want to go into the Army because he had recently
married and his wife was pregnant. The Probation Officer
reports that applicant's adjustment to probation is poor;
he has shown no initiative and is out of work most of the
time. His wife is now supporting him.
FORD
ANALYSIS OF BOARD DISPOSITIONS
The Board's case dispositions can perhaps best be understood by looking
at their relationships to the mitigating and aggravating factors. As one
might expect, case dispositions hinge directly upon the presence of absence of
several key factors. Consider the following table: *
Alternative
No
Veterans Benefits
Pardon
Service
Clemency
Mitigating
1
35.6%
28.0%
27.9%
31.2%
2
49.8
40.6
45.5
23.7
3
19.7
18.2
14.0
12.1
4
1.0
21.8
3.9
1.7
5
20.8
2.4
.5
-
6
99.6
73.1
73.1
73.5
7
98.1
33.5
8.6
18.4
8
16.3
20.0
9.6
7.0
9
-
4.0
.5
.2
10
4.2
29.3
4.8
.2
11
51.0
50.2
36.9
20.9
12
47.4
7.4
.8
1.7
13
40.6
10.5
3.2
2.6
14
86.6
40.2
27.3
22.8
15
41.5
2.7
.2
.2
16
35.1
4.3
..3
1.0
Alternative
No
Veterans Benefits
Pardon
Service
Clemency
Aggravating
1
33.1%
32.2%
46.4%
92.3%
2
0
.1
.1
.4
3
.3
.1
.2
.8
4
.6
1.1
1.2
6.5
5
3.0
9.5
41.7
55.7
6
0
1.1
.5
.4
7
.9
1.9
4.5
10.3
8
81.0
58.3
81.1
86.8
9
5.9
44.3
68.3
56.7
10
5.1
3.9
7.9
4.1
11
.9
3.6
10.9
11.5
12
7.3
18.3
31.2
24.1
* This table combines military and civilian cases.
The above table made no distinction between military and civilian cases.
However, the 83% pardon rate for civilians was twice that for military applicants
(41%) This is largely attributable to the different factors prevailing in the
the
two types of cases. The following table shows frequency with which all factors
were applied in civilian and military cases.
Percentage of
Percentage of
*
MITIGATING FACTORS
Civilian cases
Military Cases
#1 Inadequate Education
6.1
35.2
2 Personal/Family Problems
12.7
46.3
3 Mental/Physical Problems
9.7
15.1
4 Public Service
51.9
1.5
5 Service-Connected Disability
0.6
3.1
6 Creditable Military Service
2.5
81.3
7 War Zone Service
1.7
26.4
8 Procedural Unfairness
6.6
13.1
9 Denial of CO Status
11.7
1.1
10 Motivated by Conscience
65.9
4.6
11 Voluntary Return
59.7
38.4
12 Mental Stress from Combat
0.4
6.4
13 Combat Volunteer
0
10.0
14 Military Performance
1.1
41.3
15 Decorated for Valor
0
4.3
16 Wounded in Combat
0
3.8
(None)
5.3
(30)
Percentage of
Percentage of
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Civilian Cases
Military Cases
#1 Other Adult Convictions
6.1%
48.8
2 False Statement to PCB
0
0.6
3 Physical Force
0.6
1.1
4 Desertion During Combat
0.4
2.4
5 Selfish Motivation
16.7
27.9
6 Failure to do Alternative Service
4.9
0.3
7 Probation/Parole Violation
5.7
3.7
8 Multiple AWOL/UA Offenses
1.5
80.8
9 Extended AWOL/US
0.4
63.0
10 Missed Overseas Movement
0.2
5.6
11 Other Offenses
0
3.0
12 Apprehension by Authorities
3.4
17.6
(None)
(48.3)
(1.6)
Apart from the factors which were distinctly military, a few patterns emerge.
Civilian applicants were much more likely to have mitigating factor #10 (conscientious
reasons for offense), while military applicants were much more likely 10 have
aggravating factor #1 (other felony convictions or other court-martial convictions).
As the discussion below demonstrates, these two factors alone were accountable
for much of the difference between civilian and military case dispositions.
*
Note that a small percentage of our civilian applicants served in the military
their draft offense convictions.
MILITARY APPLICANTS
Mitigating and aggravating factors often had a combined rather than separate
effect upon case dispositions. For example, mitigating factor #6 indicated the length
of creditable military service, while mitigating factor #14 reflected the quality
of service. The two together told a much different story about a person than
did one without the other. Consider the following chart of the eleven most
frequent combinations of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in military
cases, ranked in order of the generosity of our case dispositions:*
Agg.
Mit.
# of
Leniency
Factors
Factors
cases
Pardon
1-3AS
4-6AS
7+AS
N/C
Ratio
8,9
2,6,11,14
47
18
17
10
2
2
3.09
1,8,9,12
2,6,14
66
30
16
14
3
3
3.02
1,8,9
1,2,6,11
50
21
10
13
4
2
2.88
8,9,12
1,2,6
44
10
21
10
3
0
2.86
1,8,9,12
2,6
78
15
22
31
7
3
2,85
1,8,9
2,6,11
63
15
22
20
3
3
2.84
1,8,9,12
1,2,6
48
13
19
13
1
2
2.83
8,9
2,6,11
57
10
23
22
2
0
2.72
8,9,12
2,6
67
11
19
33
4
0
2.55
5,8,9,12
6
43
1
4
25
13
0
1.84
1,5,8,9,12
6
59
0
6
24
24
5
0.76
Add just one factor -- mitigating factor #7 (Vietnam service) -- to the same
combinations, and completely different results emerge. The table below lists the
thirteen most frequent combinations of factors applicable to Vietnam veterans. Note
the much more widespread application of mitigating factor #14 and the total absence
of aggravating factor #5. The pardon rate of roughly 75% for Vietnam veterans
contrasted with a pardon rate of only about 25% for other military applicants.
Specifically, when mitigating factor #7 was added to the two combinations listed at the
top of the above chart markedly different results occurred. Again, note that the
"No Clemency" cases all involved aggravating factor #1, probably reflecting felony
convictions for violent crimes.
CIVILIAN CASES
As noted earlier, civilian cases were generally decided more generously than
military cases, usually because of the absence of aggravating factors and the presence
of mitigating factors #4 (prior alternative service) and #10 (conscientious reasons
for offense). In the absence of aggravating factor #5 (selfish reasons for offense),
the presence of either of these two mitigating factors generated a pardon in 97%
of all civilian cases. However, a finding of aggravating factor #5 reduced the
civilian pardon rate to just 35%. Some No Clemency decisions were based on that
factor alone. The table below lists the twenty most frequent civilian factor
combinations, in decreasing order of the generosity of case dispositions. Note
that some pardons were granted without any Mitigating Factor, and one No Clemency
without any aggravating factor. These cases were flagged by computer for
possible reconsideration by the Board.
AG
Mit.
POP
Pard.
1-3AS
4-6AS
7+AS
N/C
Ratio
None
2,4,10,11
32
32
4.00
None
9,10,11
28
28
12
4,10
19
19
4.00
12
10
16
16
4.00
None
4,9,10
13
13
4.00
None 3,4,10,11
10
10
4.00
None
10,11
152
150
2
4.99
None
4,10,11
345
340
4
1
3.98
None
4,11
23
22
1
3.96
None
4,10
117
112
4
1
3.95
None
10
64
59
3
2
3.94
6
4,10,11
13
12
1
3.92
None
2,4,10,11
11
10
1
3.91
5
4
17
10
4
2
1
3.59
None
4
16
12
2
1
1
3.44
None
None
21
12
5
1
2
1
5
3.19
4,11
15
7
3
3
2
3.00
5
11
22
7
5
6
3
1
5
2.68
None
18
1
8
4
4
1
2.22
Leniency
AG
MIT
POP
P
1-3AS
4-6AS
7+AS
N/C
Ratio
1,8,9
1,6
24
4
8
5
2
5
2.21
1,5,8,9
6,11
33
3
4
14
6
6
1.76
1,8
1,6,11
11
3
1
2
-
5
1.73
1,5,8,9
6,14
20
-
2
9
3
6
1.35
1,5,8
6
29
1
1
11
6
10
1.21
1,8
6
23
1
3
5
2
12
1.09
1.5.8.9
6
30
-
2
8
10
10
1
POP
Pardon
1-3 AS
4-6AS
7+AS
N/C
Ratio
AGG.
Mit.
1,8,9,12
1,2,6,7,14
11
4.00
11
1,8
6,7,14
10
10
4.00
1,8,9
2,6,7,11,14
13
12
1
3.85
8,9
2,6,7,11,14
19
15
3
1
3.74
8,9
2,6,7,11,13,14
11
8
3
3.73
8,9
6,7,11,14
11
8
3
3,73
8,9,12
2,6,7,14
17
13
2
2
3.65
3.56
1,8,9,12
2,6,7,17
18
14
2
1
1
1,2,6,7,11,14
13
11
1
1
3.54
1,8,9,
1,8,9
2,6,7,14
10
9
1
3.30
1,8
2,6,7,11,14
15
11
1
1
2
3.27
2,6,7,
11
7
2
1
1
3.27
1,8,9,12
1,8,9,12
6,7,14
10
5
1
2
2
2.70
The No Clemency Disposition in military cases usually (but not always) involved
aggravating factor #1. Aggravating factor #5 was also often present, along with
common
few or no mitigating factors. The chart below lists the ten most combinations of
factors which produced the greatest number of military No Clemency cases. The pardon
rate for these cases was only about 5%. Note also that cases with both aggravating
factor #1 and #5 and no mitigating factor almost invariably involved a jump from
our baseline (almost always 3 - 6 months in military cases) or a No Clemency decision.
There were not many civilian No Clemency cases, but a look at them shows
the importance of aggravating factors #1 (other felony convictions) and #5.
Aggravating factor #1 was shown by the above table to have been present in none
of the most prevalent combinations of civilian factors. However, it was present
in 15 of the 19 civilian No Clemency cases, two of the remaining four being
apparently unusual panel dispositions. In the table below, note the total
absence of mitigating factor #10.
AG
MIT.
POP
Pard.
1-3AS
4-6AS
7+AS
N/C
Ratio
None
4
16
12
2
:
1
1
3.44
None
None
21
12
5
1
2
1
3.19
5
11
22
7
5
6
3
1
2.68
5
None
18
1
8
4
4
1
2.22
1,5
2
3
1
-
-
1
1
1.67
1,5
None
3
1
-
-
1
1
1.67
1
None
5
1
1
-
1
2
1.60
5,7
None
2
-
-
-
1
1
0.50
1,5,7
None
2
-
-
-
-
2
0.00
1,5,6
None
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1,5,7
2
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1,5
8
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1,5
11
1
-
-
-
-
1
9.00
1
3
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1
11
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1
2,6
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
1,5,8
1,6,11
1
-
-
-
-
1
0.00
Comparison with Case Dispositions for the Other Programs
Our applicants --- military and civilian -- had already paid a price before
they applied for clemency. Roughly half had been incarcerated, most for several
months. Many had performed alternative service as a condition of probation.
Our baseline formula took this into account.
As a result, our case dispositions were naturally different from those of
the Justice and Defense Department programs. Their applicants had never paid
any price (other than the hardship of being a fugitive -- a factor which no
clemency program should weigh in its calculations). At the same time, we were
the only part of the President's program to grant clemency selectively. Neither
the Justice Department nor the Defense Department denied clemency to any eligible
applicant. The tables below show the alternative service assignments of the
other two parts of the President's clemency program.
DOJ PROGRAM
Average Alternative Service by Circuit
Number
Circuit
of Cases
Average Sentence
DC
1
24.0
56
17.5
First
169
19.6
Second
48
20.5
Third
Fourth
30
19.8
Fifth
88
22.5
Sixth
54
20.9
Seventh
18
16.8
Eighth
37
18.1
186
19.6
Ninth
1
Tenth
16
Comparing their case dispositions to ours can be misleading, unless prior
punishments are taken into account. When our military applicants' time in jail
(average: 2½ months) is taken into account according to our baseline formula--
which gives three months credit for every one month in jail -- the comparison changes.
Our case dispositions are still shown to be somewhat more generous than Defense's
but not by as much as a straight-line comparison would indicate. *
COMPARISON OF PCB AND DOD CASE DISPOSITIONS
DOD
Unadjusted PCB
Adjusted PCB
Disposition
Cumulative %
Cumulative %
Commulative %
Pardon
0
41
0
1-5 mos
2
66
0
6-12 mos
15
28
66
13-18 mos
22
0
28
19-24 mos.
100
0
0
25+ mos
-
0
0
No Clemency
-
6
6
Likewise, compare our program with that of the Department of Justice. Our
civilian applicants have served an average of 4 months in jail and 5 months of
prior alternative service. When our baseline calculation is applied, our
dispositions are shown to have been more severe than those of the Department of Justice**
COMPARISON OF PCB AND DOJ CASE DISPOSITIONS
DOJ Cumulative
Unadjusted PCB
Adjusted PCB
Disposition
Percent
Cumulative %
Cumulative Percent
Pardon
0
83
0
1-5 mos.
2
10
0
6-12 mos.
13
6
0
13-18 mos.
36
0
0
19-24 mos.
100
0
0
25+ mos
-
0
99
No Clemency
-
1
1
* This table assumes, obviously incorrectly, that all our military applicants
annlicants
One further note should be made about the Justice Department case dispositions.
For a wholly decentralized program, implemented by 94 United States Attorneys, the
consistency of case dispositions was substantial. As indicated by the following
table, the average alternative service assignments differed very little from
circuit to circuit. Some extremes did occur: The Eastern District of New York
assigned
of
applicants to 24 months of alternative service, while the
Western District of New York assigned its
applicants only an average of
months of alternative service -- only
of whom received the maximum
24 months. However, these districts were the exceptions.
A IV
IV. PCB APPLICANTS
A. INTRODUCTION
IV-A-1
Chapter IV: PCB Applicants
Chance and circumstance had much to do with the sacri-
fices faced by each individual during the Vietnam War. Only
9% of all draft-age men served there. Less than 2% ever faced
charges for draft or desertion offenses, and only 0.4%--less
than one out of two hundred--were convicted or still remain
charged with these offenses. By contrast, 60% of all draft-
age men were never called upon to serve their country.
War and conscription are, by nature, selective. and in
equitable. In a sense, our applicants were victims of misfor-
tune as much as they were guilty of willful offenses. Most
other young Americans did not have to face the terrible choices
which they did. For this reason alone, applicants to the
President's clemency program deserve the compassion of their
fellow countrymen.
As we decided cases, we came to understand better the
kinds of people who had applied for clemency. By the time our
Board had reviewed all cases, each of us had read approximately
4,000 case summaries for our respective panels. From these
case summaries, we learned what our applicant's family back-
grounds were like, what experiences they had with the draft and
the military, why they committed their offenses, and what
punishments they endured.
IV-A-2
Many of our applicants fell into common categories:
The civilian conscientious war resister who was denied in
his application for CO status and faced trial and punish-
ment was a matter of principle; the Jehovah's Witness who,
although granted a CO exemption, went to jail because his
religion prohibited him from accepting an alternative service
assignment from Selective Service; the Vietnam veteran who
went AWOL because of his difficulties in adjusting to post-
combat garrison duty; the young serviceman, away from home for
the first time, who could not adjust to military life; the
serviceman with his family on welfare, who went AWOL to find
a better-paying job to support them.
We also had more extreme cases: The civilian who dodged
and manipulated the system not for conscientious reasons, but
simply to avoid fulfillment of any kind of obligation of
national service--or the soldier who deserted his post under
fire.
In this chapter, we describe our civilian and military
applicants. Who were they? What did they do? Why did they
do it? Our actual cases tell much of the story, supplemented
by the results of a comprehensive survey we conducted from
the case summaries of almost 1,500 applicants. In our conclusion,
we try to identify who did not apply, why they did not, and
what happens to them now.
IVB
8
)
)
IV. PCB APPLICANTS
B. OUR CIVILIAN APPLICANTS
GERALD
IV-B-1
Our Civilian Applicants
During the Vietnam Era, there were approximately 28,600,000
men of draft-eligible age. About forty percent --- 11,500,000 --
served in the Armed Forces either before or during the Vietnam
War.
The rest, 17,100,000 men, never served in the military. Of
those, 12,250,000 either never registered for the draft, built
deferment on deferment, had high lottery numbers, or were other-
wise passed over by induction calls. Another 4,650,000 were given
other kinds of permanent draft exemption usually because of mental
or physical deficiencies; 145,000 of these exemptions were for
conscientious objection to war.
The Selective Service System issued 209,000 complaints re-
garding individual draft offenses, usually for failure to report for
induction or a pre-induction physical exam. Almost 90% (173,700)
of the complaints never resulted in indictments. Some registrants
agreed to enter military service as soon as their complaint was
issued; others never had charges brought against them despite their
continued refusal to join the service. Apparently, no records
FURD
exist to show how many were in each of the two categories.
Only 25,300 Selective Service complaints resulted in grand
jury indictments. Of those indicted, 4,522 remained fugitives un-
til the start of the clemency program. The remaining 20,800 stood
trial.
IV-B-2
Most (12,100) were acquitted; 8,700 were convicted. Only 4,900
ever went to jail. Thus, about 13,000 civilians either were
convicted of draft offenses or were still facing draft charges
when the President announced his clemency program. 4 For every one
of them, 12,000 others escaped military service by other means.
Background
6
Our civilian applicants were predominantly white, and came
from average American families. Over two-thirds were raised by
both natural parents, most had one to three brothers and sisters,
and evidence of severe family instability was rare. The proportion
of Blacks and Spanish-speaking persons was about the same as found
in the general population.
They grew up in cities and suburbs, with disproportionately
many in the West and few in the South. Born largely between 1948
and 1950, they were part of the "baby boom" which was later to
face the draft during the Vietnam War. Over three quarters had
high-school degrees, yet only 18% ever finished college. Only a
very small percentage ever had trouble with the law aside from their
draft offenses. In most ways, they were not unlike young men in
cities and towns across the United States. *
*
Unless otherwise noted, all statistics about our applicants came
from our own survey of approximately 500 civilian applicants.
IV-B-3
Two things set them apart. First, over 80% opposed the
war in Vietnam strongly enough to face punishment rather than
fight there. Second, they--unlike many of their friends and
classmates -- were unable or unwilling to evade the draft by ex-
emptions and deferments or escape prosecution through dismissal
and acquittal. They were unique in that they chose to stay within
the system and pay a penalty for their conscientious opposition to
the war.
Experience with the Selective Service System
Registration
Our applicants, like millions of young men, came into contact
with the Selective Service System when they reached the age of 18.
Often, it was their first actual contact with a government agency - -
an agency with which they had little in common.
The rationale behind the concept of Selective Service was that
established members of the community were the right ones to decide
from a group of eligible young who would serve in the military
and who would be exempt. It was hoped that this system would allow
decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Board members who
were sensitive to the national need could still consider
the special circumstances that often surrounded individual cases.
IV-B-4
This philosophy was based on a promise of trust and open
communication between individuals and board members. Often that
trust did not materialize. There were differences in age, life styles,
racial composition, values and opinions concerning the Vietnam
war.
The typical local board member was in his late fifties, with
20% over 70 years old. In the mid 1960's, 1.3% of all local board
members were black and 1.5% spanish-speaking. Many of the state
directors were Reserve or National Guard officers on active duty.
Beginning in the late 1960's and early 1970's the Selective
Service System made efforts to have the local draft boards more
accurately reflect the population of their areas. For example, 16%
of all local board members are now Spanish speaking, or of another
minority background
8/
Classification
Immediately after our applicants registered with the local
board, they were classified by their respective "neighborhood"
draft boards according to its interpretation of the law and regu-
lations of the system. Varying interpretations resulted from this
ERALD
decentralized system, and produced wide differences in the treatment
afforded to similar registrants. Today, a single national interpre-
tation of the law is promulgated in the regulations which are binding
upon local draft boards and which are supported in detailed procedural
IV-B-5
directives intended to provide uniformity of processing and
equality in treatment. The reform did not affect the authority
of the local draft board to classify men, but rather required that
all local boards classify the same way.
Another major problem in the classification procedure was the
lack of accurate and adequate information. The problem was two-
fold. Information had to be swiftly and accurately conveyed from
the National Headquarters to the local and state draft boards be-
fore it could be conveyed to the registrant. If local boards were
ignorant or misinformed of the requirements of the law, policy and
court decisions, their processing of registrants was likely to be
flawed. Secondly, when information disseminated to our applicants
was not an accurate explanation of their rights established by the
courts and the Congress, the exercise of such rights was often
meaningless. The problem is illustrated by testimony at Senate
hearings on the draft in 1972. A parent of a son killed in Vietnam
stated "I was appalled at how little sound, legal advice there
actually was available to our young men, in spite of the fact that
the Selective Service statutes have always constituted a clearly
defined body of law readily available to the legal profession as
CERALD
11 10/
a source of additional practice.
(Case # 3548)
Applicant failed to apply for conscientious
objector status because he mistakenly be-
lieved that the Supreme Court had ruled
that a prerequisite for this classification
IV-B-6
(#3548) con't
was an orthodox religious belief in a
supreme being.
Often, new registrants relied on the advice of local draft
clerks, who were neither tested nor trained in Selective Service
law, but who nevertheless gave the best advice they could and
which the registrants then relied on.
(Case #2290)
Applicant made no attempt to seek a personal
appearance before the local board or appeal
their decision, on the basis of advice
given by the clerk that the board routinely
denied such claims made by persons like
himself.
Written materials were often no more helpful than the clerks.
The language in many of the forms used by Selective Service was
not understandable by most registrants, especially those that
came from economically deprived backgrounds. One study showed that
the form 150 (the conscientious objector form) required at least
11/
a high school graduate level reading skill to understand.
The problem of applicant misinformation was compounded by the
difficulty national headquarters sometimes had in providing the
local boards with prompt and adequate information regarding binding
judicial interpretations of the Act. For example, the important
case of Mulloy V. United States (398 U.S. 410) regarding classifi
cation processing was decided by the Supreme Court on June 15,
GERALD
1970. This decision had the possibility of effecting every regi-
strant within the system. The decision and interpretation regard-
ing the decision were not communicated to local boards until
IV-B-7
August 11, 1970, a period of approximately two months. The
landmark decision in Welsh V. United States (398 US 333)
was decided the same day by the Supreme Court and expanded the
scope of conscientious objection. Yet some two years after the
Welsh decision, special forms for conscientious objectors had not
been amended to accurately reflect this decision. 12/ Many court
decisions regarding registration, classification and processing
were never communicated to registrants in informational brochures.
They had to rely on their own resources to gain a full understanding
of their legal rights and obligations.
Because of the inadequate amount of information available,
some of our applicants turned to draft counseling centers for
information. However, even the trained draft counselors found it
difficult to keep current regarding directives in the system. Sub--
scriptions to GPO publications were unsatisfactory. For example,
changes made in June 1971 did not reach the subscriber until
February 1972. 13/ Requests by registrants and draft counsellors
for state headquarters directives explaining policy and interpre-
tations plus copies of Operational Bulletins were denied on the
14
ground that these materials were internal communications.
/
GERALD
Other questions of procedural due process arose. Our appli-
cants did not have the right to a personal appearance prior to the
local draft board's initial classification decision. When a personal
IV-B-8
appearance before a local board or an appeal board was granted,
they did not have the right to bring witnesses to their personal
appearance. Also, local and appeal boards were originally not
required to provide a registrant with reasons for their decision.
(Case # 00596)
No reasons were given applicant regarding
the denial of his claim for conscientious
objector status. Consequently he was
simply unaware of how or where to appeal.
his case to a higher level.
After 1971, such information was required, but often consisted of
only a check-list with the general reasons for denial marked
but not explained for procedure similar to one already found acceptable.
(Case # 1318)
Denial of applicant's C.O. claim consisted
only of the board's conclusions. His
petition for certiorari was denied, although
one Justice indicated that he felt pro-
cedural due process required the factual
basis behind the conclusions be included.
Once a local draft board issued a final classification to our appli-
cants, they could appeal to the state appeals board and under
certain conditions, to the Presidential Appeals Board. The value
of these appellate rights was questionable. State boards often
gave their cases only cursory consideration, sometimes so, brief
that the procedure was held to deprive the registrant of due process
15
of law.
However, these appeals were essential if our applicant
hoped to prove his case in court.
(Case # 4296)
Applicant failed to appeal his local board's
denial of his C.O. claim, which was done
without giving any reasons to the applicant
for the denial. Although the District
Judge indicated, that the local board's
action was improper, he nevertheless convicted
IV-B-9
(Case # 4296) con't
local board's decision and thereby,
exhaust his administrative remedies.
If an applicant was unsuccessful in his initial bid for a particu-
lar classification status--whether or not he appealed his local
board's decision- he could request a rehearing at any time prior
to receiving his induction notice.
If his request contained
evidence of a prima facie case for reclassification, the board
had to reopen the case, and failure to do so was found to be a
denial of procedural due process. This right was critical to an
applicant, since a reopening theoretically brought with it the
entire sequence of appellate rights associated with an initial
classification determination. Similar appellate rights were not
provided for a board's refusal to reopen, (as distinguished from
a reopening with a denial of the claim). In addition, most circuits
required that a denial of a prima facie reopening case be accom-
panied with a reason for the denial. In practice, this was not
always the case.
(Case #2317)
Applicant's local board decided to give
him another hearing after he accumulated
additional evidence to support his claim.
In spite of this de facto rehearing, the
board proclaimed no such reopening had
occurred, and denied the applicant any
appeal rights.
Deferments and Exemptions
Many of our applicants held and many more sought a range of
deferments which would have postponed their draft eligibility, or
exemptions which would have ended it entirely. The most common
IV-B-10
deferments and exemptions were for student, occupational, hard-
ship and mental/physical status.
During most of the Vietnam era, it was the policy of Selective
Service to defer students who were enrolled on a full-time basis
until they terminated or completed their formal college education,
at which time they became available for selection and induction.
The only legal requirement relating to student deferments was
that which obliged the local draft board to permit college students
called up for induction to finish their current academic year.
A student's immediate future depended upon state headquarter's
interpretation of the overall national policy. Some state and local
boards instructed their registrants to use as a basis for determining
2-S status college qualifications tests scores and information
regarding rank in class, while others told their local boards that
these criteria were only advisory and could be ignored. The
definition of the term "full-time student" posed many problems.
Finally, some state headquarters extended student deferments to
individuals in business, trade or vocational school, while others
limited it to colleges.
There were three major criteria for obtaining an occupational
deferment: The registrant had to be employed in industries related
to the Defense Department, science, research and development,
engineering and health services. His employer had to show that
someone of similar competence was not available to replace the
IV-B-11
individual for whom the deferment was requested. Finally, the
employer had to show that loss of the individual to the draft
would have an adverse effect on the employer's ability to carry
out essential work. Formal guidelines and interpretations of
these criteria varied among the state and local boards, and
resulted in a lack of uniformity in the identification and deter-
16
mination of critical skills, occupations and professions.
The hardship deferment was granted only to those applicants
whose induction would create "extreme hardship" for their depen-
dents. To qualify, an applicant had to demonstrate that he made
a substantial financial contribution to a qualified dependent,
and that without this contribution, the dependent would suffer
extreme hardship. Although the formulation of this test varied
slightly among the circuits, determinations of extreme hardship
were by their nature subjective, and as in the other deferments,
there were varying applications of this standard among the local
boards. Even when the facts were relatively objective, policies
varied. For example, a provision in the 1967 Act authorized
"fatherhood" deferments and was duly incorporated into the regu-
lations, only to be revoked by the President in 1970. Thereafter,
fathers were not automatically grant such deferments.
Because of manpower needs during the war, the Selective
GERALD
Service and Defense Department revised downward the physical
and mental standards for service in the military. Physical and
IV-B-12
mental exemptions thus became harder to obtain. The prein-
duction rejection rates for all causes dropped from about 50%
17/
in FY 65 to 40% in FY 66 and approximately 35% in FY 67.
The Defense Department estimated that these revisions of standards
increased the induction or enlistment or previously ineligible
men by about 100,000 a year.
The exemption status of greatest concern to most of our
civilian applicants was that of conscientious objector (I-O).
We have evidence that almost half (44%) of our applicants took
some initiative to obtain a "CO" exemption, and the true proportion
may be even higher. Of that percentage, 15% never actually com-
pleted a CO application, 17% applied but were denied, and 12% were
granted CO status. Many of our applicants evidenced a great deal
of confusion concerning the CO exemption. There was no institut-
ionalized method for informing prospective conscientious objectors
when or how to fill out the necessary forms and present their
case to the local board. A strinking 26% of our applicants sub-
scribed to a pacifist religion which would ordinarily entitle
them to CO status most (20%) being Jehovah's Witnesses. Because
only 10% of our applicants received CO status for religious ob-
jection to war, it appears that the remaining 16% never applied or
were denied. Many of our applicants were simply uninformed about
the availability of the CO exemption and the procedures which must
be followed to obtain it.
IV-B-13
(Case # 10768)
Applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, had his
claim for ministerial exemption denied.
Since he made no claim for conscientious
objector status, he was classified 1-A
and inducted one month later. (He later
went AWOL and received an Undesirable
Discharge.
Some of our other applicants knew enough about the existence of
the exemption to inquire about it, but were subsequently dis-
couraged by their local boards.
(Case # 803)
In reply to applicant's request for a
Form 150, his local board included a note
stating that a CO classification was given
only to members of pacifist-oriented
religions. Accordingly, applicant did
not bother to return the form.
In the midst of the Vietnam War, the substantive law regarding
conscientious objectors changed dramatically, profoundly affecting
the ability of a great number of our applicants to submit C.O.
claims with any reasonable chance of success. In June
1970
the Supreme Court clafified
conscientious objection in Welsh
V. United States ; supra, stating that this exemption should be
extended to cover those whose conscientious objection stemmed from a
secular belief. Section 6 (j) was held to exempt from military
service those persons who consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or
peace, if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument
of war. In the later case of Clay V. U.S.
(
) the
court stated the three requirements for CO classification as:
opposition to war in any form, the basis of opposition to war must be
IV-B-14
moral, ethical or religious, and the beliefs must be sincere.
Based upon these standards, it is surprising that more of
our applicants did not apply for CO status, receive a CO exemp--
tion from their local boards, or raise a successful defense at
trial. We have found that 66% of our civilian applicants committed
their offense for conscientious reasons. Not all of these appli-
cants would have qualified for a C.O. classification because many
did not object to all wars, as required by Gillette.
(
).
(Case # 2338)
Applicant's conscientious objector claim
was denied by the local board because he
objected only to the Vietnam War, rather
than all wars.
Despite this, it is likely that more than the 12% of our applicants
who actually received such an exemption would have qualified under
today's standards. Why did this happen? Ninety percent of our
applicants registered prior to Welsh, SO their first information
about the CO exemption was that it applied primarily, if not
exclusively, to members of pacifist religions. Many of our applicants
may have been reluctant to apply for CO status prior to Welsh out
of recognition that, at the time, their moral and ethical beliefs
GERALD
would not have persuaded their local boards.
(Case # 1213)
Applicant did not submit a CO application be-
cause it was his understanding that his
local draft board would not consider a CO
request unless a registrant were associated
IV-B-15
(#1213) con't
with a widely recognized pacifist religion
and his refusal to participate in war
in any form stemmed from his personal
beliefs and general religious feelings.
He pled guilty to failure to submit to
induction and was convicted one year prior
to Welsh.
Many others passed through the Selective Service System be-
fore the middle of 1970, when Welsh was announced. Fifty-three
percent of our applicants who applied for a CO exemption did SO
before Welsh, and 35% committed their draft offense before the
decision. However, only 13% were actually convicted of their
offense before Welsh. Many of these individuals could have raised
Welsh defenses at trial, but a significant percentage of our appli-
cants (26%) pled guilty to their charges. The most likely expla-
nation for the small percentage of applicants who sought and were
granted CO exemptions is their lack of understanding of what the
Selective Service standards and procedures actually were. Despite Welsh, th
Selective Service made no immediate substantial changes in the
form 150 to reflect this broadening of the CO category. As a result
the format of the form 150 misled many applicants into thinking
that the non-religious nature of their beliefs disqualified them
from conscientious objector status.
(Case # 537)
Applicant initially failed to fill out a
GERALD
form to request C.O. status because the
religious orientation of the form led him
to believe he would not qualify. After
Welsh, the applicant believed he could
qualify under the Supreme Court's expanded
definition, and requested another Form 150.
When the board returned a Form 150 identical
to the one he received initially, the applicant
IV-B-16
(# 537)
again failed to complete it, believing
that he could not adaquately express his
beliefs on a form designed for members of
organized religious.
This misinformation was often reinforced by the local boards.
(Case # 2320)
Applicant failed to complete an outdated
Form 150 after being told by his local
board only members of certain religious sects
were eligible. This occurred after the
Welsh decision.
Those who did apply for CO status faced a form which asked
about the philosophical nature of the applicant's beliefs, their
relationship to his religion, and to the manner in which conducted
his life. While less-educated persons may have been discouraged from
applying for C.O. status because of the complexity of the Form 150
and other factors, the experiences of our applicants who did apply
reveals no such bias. Of our applicants with college degrees, 28%
applied for CO status, but only 4% were accepted. Of our applicants
with less education, 19% applied, but 10% (more than half) were
accepted. This may be attributable to the fact that persons with
more education usually based their claims on moral and ethical,
rather than religious grounds, as well as the fact that our appli-
cants may not have been a representative sample of all C.O. applicants.
Welsh specifically authorized local boards to grant CO exemptions
to persons sincerely opposed to war on moral and ethical (i.e.,
non-religious) grounds, yet some ( %) of our civilian applicants
had possibly valid "moral and ethical" CO applications denied after
IV-B-17
Welsh. Some local boards may still have relied on a test which
required belief in a supreme being. In one post-Welsh study
of CO applicants, all those interviewed who failed to express
belief in a supreme being had their CO applications denied.
(Case # 1373)
Applicant's request for conscientious
objector status was denied, partially on
the basis that he had no particular re-
ligious training or expreience to establish
opposition to war. This determination
was made after the Supreme Court stated in
Welsh that such formal religious training
was not a prerequisite to conscientious
objector status.
In contrast, CO applicants who claimed to be members of a pacifist
religion enjoyed a 56% success rate throughout the Vietnam era.
Registrants associated with recognized pacifist religions - Jehovah's
Witnesses, Black Muslims, and the Society of Krishna - were also
occassionally denied CO classification. The basis for denial of
CO status by Selective Service in these instances was usually lack
of sincerity. However, in many of these cases, the lack of famili-
arity with the teachings of a particular religion and the lack of
general acceptance of that religion may have been factors in the
denial of CO status. If the local board turned down as applicant's
CO claim, he could appeal to the state appeals board, However,
there were time limits and other procedures which appellante had to
observe. Some of our applicants were apparently not advised about
these procedures.
GERALD
IV-B-18
(Case # 2317)
Applicant, a Jehovah's Witnsss, unaware
of the time limitation on filing notice
of appeal, continued to gather evidence
for his appeal, which was ultimately
denied on the procedural grounds of
failure to give timely notice of appeal.
For many of our applicants, the realization that they were
conscientiously opposed to war came only after they received an
induction notice. This notice often acted as the catalyst which
led to an introspective examination of the applicant's convictions,
and a crystalization of his beliefs.
(Case #3099)
Applicant stated that "the induction order
forced me for the first time to make a
decision as to my views with regard to war.
However, when a registrant's request for a change in status came
after his induction notice was mailed, his ability to obtain a
rehearing was considerably limited, because reopening under such
conditions was prohibited unless the registrant experienced a
change in circumstances beyond his control. The question then was
whether his "late crystalization" constituted a change in circum-
stances beyond the applicant's control. The local boards were
split on this issue until the Supreme Court spoke in 1971, holding
in Ehlert V. U.S. (
) that a post-induction-notice
claim for consciencious objector status did not constitute a change
in circumstances beyond the applicant's control. Accordingly, those
applicants were left to press their claims in the military after
induction.
IV-B-19
Approximately one-eight of our civilian applicants did re-
ceive CO exemptions and were assigned to alternative service em-
ployment. Once the draft board recognized that a registrant was
a conscientious objector, it assigned him 24 months alternative
service in lieu of induction. Before 1971, there were wide dis-
crepancies among states and local draft boards regarding stan-
dards of appropriate civilian work. One local board might have
had a liberal policy of job approval allowing CO's to choose a
variety of jobs, while another board might have imposed highly
restrictive approval standards. Some individuals had difficulty
holding alternative service jobs because of personal of family
problems. Others decided that they could not, on good conscience,
continue to cooperate with the Selective Service System because of
their opposition to the war.
(Case # 560)
Applicant refused to perform alternative
service as a protest against the war in
Vietnam, and specifically requested that
his probation be revoked for those reasons.
However, most of our applicants assigned to alternative service who
refused to accept such assignments from Selective Service did so
because they felt their religion forbade them from cooperating with
any part of a war effort. These applicants, mostly Jehovah's
Witnesses, Muslims and Quakers, were prepared to accept an alter-
native service assignment ordered by a judge in their sentence upon
conviction for refusing to perform alternative service. However,
IV-B-20
many judges faced with such a request sentenced them to prison
instead.
(Case # 2336)
Applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, refused
to perform alternative service ordered by
the Selective Service System, on the grounds
that even this attenuated participation in
the war effort would violate his religious
beliefs; he did indicate that he would
be willing to perform similar services
under the court's order of probation.
Rather than accept this distinction, the
Judge sentenced the applicant directly to
prison for failure to perform alternative
service.
The Draft Offense
To be eligible for the clemency program, our applicants must
have committed at least one of six offenses enumerated in the
Executive Order. These offenses include the failure to register
(or register on time), failure to report changes in status
(primarily changes in address), failure to report for pre-induction
physical examination, failure to report for induction, failure to
submit to induction, and failure to perform alternative civilian
employment. The Clemency Board could not consider applications of
those who had only been convicted of other violations of the
Selective Service Act making false statements regarding a draft
classification; aiding and abetting another to refuse or evade
registration or requirements of the Selective Service Act; forging,
destroying or mutilating Selective Service documents such as draft
cards or other official certificates; or failing to carry a draft
card or carrying a false draft card. However, because the vast
majority of the Selective Service offenses committed during 1964-73
IV-B-21
fell within the eligibility requirements of the clemency program,
most civilian offenders during that period were eligible for the
program.
Our typical applicant initially complied with his Selective
Service responsibilities by registering for the draft, submitting
classification-requests, and notifying his local board about changes
in address and other changes in status. Betwwen the ages of 19
and 21, most of our applicants were classified 1-A. They, like
350,000 other young men during the peak draft years, were ordered
to report for induction. Nearly all of our applicants reported
for their pre-induction physical examination. It was not until
the date of induction, after complying with regulations to the
fullest extent, that our applicants actually decided to violate the
Selective Service Law. In fact, of those applicants who received
orders to report for induction, nearly half actually appeared for
induction. But, when the time came to take the symbolic step
forward, these applicants found that their conscience would not
allow them to participate further in the induction process. At
the time of our typical applicant's final decision to violate the
law, he was between the ages of 20 and 22 and the year was 1970-72.
For over 95% of these applicants, their failure to comply with the
Selective Service law was their first offense.
Our applicants committed draft offenses which fall into three
basic categories. The first of these categories, consisting of
IV-B-22
approximately 13% of all our applicants, were those who failed
to register, or to register on time and those who failed to re-
port changes in status, such as new addresses. Many of these
applicants did not graduate from high school, having achieved only
an elementary level of education. In addition, they were often
raised in economic and family environments which was not likely to
lead to an appreciation of their Selective Service responsibilities.
For example, according to Selective Service regulations and case
law, "current address" was the address at which mail would have
reached the registrant. While use of a false address was a willful
violation, forgetfulness was no defense. Furthermore, the local
board was under no obligation to find the registrant's current
address, and giving the address of a parent or relative was not
enough to avoid liability.
(Case # 822)
The applicant's induction notice was sent by
his local board to his mother. The letter
was returned to the local board and sub-
sequently the mother telephoned a new
address to the local board. Local board
mail still failed to reach the applicant,
and he was indicted and convicted of failure
to keep the board informed of his address.
The last address his mother gave the local
board was correct, but the court did not
accept the applicant's defense that mail did
not reach him because his name was not on the
mail box.
However, most of our applicants in this category committed their
offenses because of their unintentional misunderstanding of Selective
Service obligations.
IV-B-23
(Case # 3151)
The applicant registered for the
draft and subsequently moved to a new
address. He reported his change of address to
the local post office but did not specifi-
cally notify his local board. He stated
that he thought this action fulfilled his
obligation to notify his local board in
writing of address changes.
The second category of offenses committed by our applicants
includes those who failed to perform required alternative civilian
employment, comprising 13% of our civilian applicants. Typically,
the applicant received a conscientious objection exemption from
his local board because of his membership in a widely recognized
Pacifist religious group as Jehovah's Witness, Black Muslim or the
Society of Friends. These applicants complied with all Selective
Service requirements prior to receipt of an order from Selective
Service to report to a designated civilian job for two years work
of national importance, intended as a substitute for military ser-
vice these applicants refused to accept employment because they
believed that because of its relationship to the war effort, such
work would compromise their religious principles. However, as an
indication of their acceptance of their continuing responsibili-
ties as citizens, most of these applicants indicated at the time of
their offense that they would perform alternative service, as long
as it was at the direction of the courts.
Almost three-quarters of our applicants fell into the third
category of offenses which relate to the induction process. This
category includes those who failed to report for their pre-induction
IV-B-24
physical examination, failed to report for induction, or failed
to submit to induction. Applicants in this category represent
approximately 74% of all our applicants. Following their classi-
fication as 1-A, these applicants were ordered by their local
boards to report for pre-induction examinations, which only 4% of
our applicants failed to do. Subsequent to passing the pre-induction
examination, our applicant received orders to report for induction.
Once induction was ordered, a postponement of the induction date,
could have been sought but would not have invalidated the original
order to report for induction, even if the inductee passed his
twenty-sixth birthday in the interim. Once the induction order
was issued and after all postponements were exhausted he had a con-
tinuing duty to report for induction, although it was often the
practice of the Selective Service to issue several induction orders
before filing a complaint with the district attorney, and many of
our applicants received two or three induction orders. Approximately
38% of our applicants failed to report for induction, but nearly
the same percentage decided to appear at the induction station for
initial processing Until the final step in this process, the oath
of induction into the Armed Forces and the symbolic step forward,
the inductee is under civilian control. It was at this final stage
of the process that the remaining one-third of our civilian appli-
cants broke the law.
IV-B-25
Numerous reasons were given by our applicants for their
offenses. The most frequent of-their-reasons was their con-
scientious objection to war in either general or particular form.
Fifty-seven percent expressed either religious, ethical or moral
objection to all war, and an additional 14% expressed specific
objection to the Vietnam War. When other related reasons were
considered, (such as denial of CO status), 81% of our civilian
applicants committed their offenses for reasons related to their
opposition to war. Expressions of conscience were found by the
Clemency Board to be valid mitigating circumstances in nearly four-
fifths of these cases. By contrast, less than one out of six of
all our civilian applicants were found by the Board to have committed
their offenses for obviously manipulative and selfish reasons.
Other major reasons given by our civilian applicants for their offense
include procedural errors and denial of CO status (5%), various
medical problems (6%) and family or personal problems (10%). In
evaluating these reasons, we found that both family/personal prob-
lems and medical problems were determined to be mitigating in
nearly all the cases in which applicants raised them. Surprisingly,
procedural errors and improper denial of CO status were found in
nearly one fifth of all cases, a far greater proporation than one
would expect from the reasons given by our applicants. This large
discrepancy was probably due to the unfamiliarity of most of our
applicants with either Selective Service procedures or CO requirement
IV-B-26
Thus, many of our applicants probably were never aware that
the disposition of their cases by Selective Service might have
been either incorrect or not according to established procedure.
Experiences as a Fugitive
At one time or another, our applicants faced the difficult
decision whether to submit to the legal process or become a
fugitive. Nearly two-thirds of our applicants immediately surren-
dered themselves to the authorities. Of the remaining one-third
who did not immediately surrender, the vast majority never left
their hometown. Of the 18% of our applicants who left their
hometowns to evade the draft, slightly less then half ever left
the United States. Most of our at-large civilian applicants re-
mained fugitives for less than one year. Many reconsidered their
initial decisions to flee. About one-third surrendered, and many
of the rest were apprehended only because they lived openly at
home and made no efforts to avoid arrest. Over two-thirds of our
at-large applicants were employed full-time; most others were
employed part-time, and only one out of ten was unemployed. Only
a small percentage assumed false identities or took steps to hide from
authorities.
Most of our fugitive applicants who chose to go abroad went
to Canada. Geographical proximity was one reason why some of our
applicants chose Canada, and the similarity in culture, history
IV-B-27
and language was another. However, the major reason for the large
emigration of American draft-resisters to Canada was the openness
of their immigration laws. After 1965, when the Pearson govern-
ment accepted 1,700 American resisters (largely draft resisters)
as landed immigrants, the Canadian government instituted a liberal
immigration policy toward American draft resisters and military
deserters. In 1967, Prime Minister Pearson's Parlimentary Secre-
tary of the Department of Manpower and Immigration told the
Canadian House of Commons that "an individual's status with regard to
compulsory military service in his own country has no bearing upon
his admissibility to Canada either as an immigrant or as a visitor. "
The
present policy toward American draft resistors and mili-
tary deserters was announced by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1969:
"Canada will become a refuge from militarism."
The living conditions of draft-related emigres varied con-
siderably. Many existed as transients, at first living in hotels
and on the road. Others lived in Canadian homes until they were
able to support themselves. With the average pay close to ten to
thirty percent less than the income received in the United States
and the unemployment rates nearly identical, many American emigres
were forced to live from donation but some found excellent jobs as
and
school teachers, plumbers A carpenters, and many went back to school.
Once settled, the living conditions the draft evader experienced
in Canada were very similar to those found in the United States.
IV-B-28
Since 1964, many efforts were made to tabulate the total
number of civilian draft resistors and military deserters. The
estimates varied widely,
ranging
from 2,000 to 25,000
to 100,000
the State Department announced in 1970 that there
were only 2,000. A list released by the Justice Department in Jan
of 1975 showed that there remained only 4,400 Vietnam-era draft-
law violators anywhere in the world who were subject to criminal pro-
secution.
There are several explanations for these discrepancies. For
one, political motivations might have influenced both government
and private figures during the war cra. In addition, the counting
methods used by all sources are certainly not infallible. The
Canadian exile figures of up to 100,000 were derived by counting the
number of files on newly arrived American emigrants at the aid
centers strategically placed near the United States border, many of
which included Americans who emigrated to Canada for reasons other
than the draft or AWOL related offenses. A few aid centers kept
files on American draft-age males without asking them whether a
file had been previously started at another center. For these reasons,
many were counted twice, some even perhaps even more. Speculation
based upon our sample of applicants and the Department of Defense's
sample of its applicants (and assuming that virtually all of the
Department of Justice applicants are Canadian exiles), would indicate
that only about 8,000 out of 123,000 persons eligible for the
IV-B-29
President's program were ever Canadian exiles. There may have
been others against whom complaints were issued but no indictments
ever brought, who are now free to come home without penalty.
Experience with the Judicial Process
Filing of the complaint. Our applicant began to face court
action when his local draft board determined that sufficient evidence
of a Selective Service violation existed to warrant the forwarding
of his file to the United States attorney. Between 1964 and
1974, 209,000 cases were referred by Selective Service to the
Department of Justice for prosecution; of that number, only 25,000
indictments were returned. This startling figure can be par-
tially explained by the practice of allowing violators to enlist
rather than face prosecution; another major factor was the
unwillingness of local U.S. Attorneys to prosecute draft cases
which were increasingly unpopular, weak, and of relatively low priority.
2. Disposition of Draft Cases
a. Dismissals, After a complaint was filed by Selective Service
and an indictment returned against our applicant's both the courts
and the Justice Department determined whether further prosecution was
warranted. Statistics from the Justice Department show that a large
number of cases were dropped after indictment because of faulty
Selective Service processing or recordkeeping. For instance, draft
records were routinely destroyed when a registrant reached age 26.
IV-B-30
Therefore, unless the records were separated, his files were
destroyed and prosecution rendered impossible.
The courts dismissed draft cases for many reasons. Many
dismissals represent cases involving legal flaws in which the
defendants "committed no Selective Service violation at all, be--
cause the induction orders they refused were illegal as determined
authoritatively by federal courts and U. S. attorneys.' " Included
among these defendants are those who were called by their local
draft boards earlier than usual or by mistake. In addition, in
districts where careful pre-indictment investigations were the
exception rather than the rule, cases were dismissed where it was
found that the defendant never received his orders to report or where
the local draft board never requested that the defendant be pro-
secuted.
Analysis of the number of cases and the dismissal rate during
the years 1968 1974 reveals a continuous increase in both the num-
ber of cases and the dismissal rate (except for 1974). Through
1968, only about 25% of all cases resolved in dismissal. From
1969 through 1972, about 55% were dismissed --- and in 1973, over
two-thirds were dismissed.
GERALD
One important element influencing the dismissal rate in par
ticular jurisdictions was the practice of forum shopping. Many
defendants searched for judges with a reputation for leniency or
IV-B-31
a tendency to dismiss draft cases. As an example, the Northern
District of California was known for its willingness to dismiss
draft indictments on minor technicalities. Since 1970, nearly
70% of the cases tried in that court resulted in dismissal or
acquittal. At that time, many young men transferred their draft
orders to the Oakland induction center before refusing induction,
thus enabling them to try their cases in the Northern District.
In 1970, this dismiss averaged 48.9 draft cases per 10,000 population
compared the national average of 14.1; the Central District of
California closely followed with 43.1. Some apparently "Forum
Shopped in California and other Western states; Five percent of
them received their convictions in the Ninth Circuits, even though
their homes were elsewhere.
Jurisdictional inequities in the dismissal rate for draft offenses
within the same state were common during the war era. For example, in
contrast to the dismissal rate in the Northern District of California
(70%), the Eastern District of California dismissed only 40% of
its draft cases. Similarly,
.n the Eastern District of
Virginia 63% of the draft cases were dismissed, versus only 35% in
the Western District.
Convictions and Acquitals
After our applicants were indicted and their motions for dis-
missal refused, many indicted draft violations pled not guilty,
and they next entered the trial stage. Nearly three-fourths of our
IV-B-32
applicants pled either guilty or nolo contendre. The emotional
and financial drain of a protracted trial was certainly a
factor in this decision, as was the availability of a plea bargain,
especially in those jurisdictions where the U.S Attorney routinely
brought multiple-count indictments.
Of the 21,400 draft law violators who stood trial during the
Vietnam era, 12,700 were acquitted. From our applicants statis-
tics, it appears that a person pleading not guilty to a draft
offense stood only a 15% chance of conviction. Not surprisingly,
none of our applicants were among the 12,700 fortunate persons
who were acquitted of draft charges. There were many reasons for
these acquittals. In 1970-71, an increasing number of draft defen-
dants were acquitted because of irregular or unconstitutional pro--
cedures used by local draft boards. Many of those acquitted were
subjected to deliberately accelerated draft calls because they
were regarded as troublemakers. The Supreme Court struck down this
practice in Gutnecht V. U.S 18, by holding that punitive reclassi-
fication was "blatantly lawless. 11 Acquittals often occurred when
local draft boards or state appeal boards failed to consider requests
for medical deferments based on disqualifying conditions such as
Astma. A number of acquittals also were obtained when it was found
that the local board did not follow proper procedures, such as failure
to state reasons for denying substantial claims for conscientious
IV-B-33
objector or hardship status and failure to provide adequate ad-
rights.
In 1970 the Supreme Court in Welsh
broadened the conscien-
tious objection exemption by ruling that strongly held non-religi-
ous pacifist beliefs qualified for the exemption. For some time
after this decision, Selective Service gave inadequate advice to
local boards on the effect of this and other decisions. This lack
of guidance resulted in acquittals for those post-Welsh denials of
conscientious objection status which were based on pre-Welsh grounds.
As described earlier, many of our applicants might have qualified
for this type of acquittal.
Another significant factor in the increased rate of acquittals
was the increased level of activity by competent attorneys in the
field of Selective Service law. By 1970, anti-war feelings made
it respectable for attorneys to represent draft violators. Draft
counseling centers were also better able to recommend lawyers well
versed in Selective Service law.
Our typical applicant was convicted at the age of 23, nearly
two years after his initial offense. Less than one out of ten of
our applicants appealed his conviction. An analysis of thse con-
victions rates shows clear jurisdictional discrepancies. For in-
stance, the Southern states had the highest propensity for conviction,
with the Eastern states and California having the lowest. In 1972
IV-B-34
there were 27 draft cases tried in Connecticut, with only one
resulting in conviction. In the Northern District of Alabama
during the same period, 16 draft cases resulted in 12 convictions.
These different conviction rates apparently occurred because of wide
differences in attitude toward the draft violators. Regardless of
the explanation, it is clear that these differences in treatment
encouraged wide scale forum shooping by our applicants.
The conviction rate itself varied considerably during the war
era. In 1968, the conviction rate for violators of the Selective
Service Act was 66%; by 1974, the conviction rate was cut in half
to 33%. Apparently, as time went by, prosecutors, judges and juries
had less and less enthusiasm for convicting draft-law violators.
IV-V-35
Sentence:
The first aspect of the draft and judicial systems which often
dealt favorably with our applicants was the sentence of the District Court
Judge. Only about one-third of our applicants ever went to prison. A
breakdown of the length of incarceration for our applicants is as follows:
No incarceration - 67%
1-6months - 15%
7-12 months - 5%
13-18 months - 8%
20-22 months - 5%
The sentencing provisions of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967
provided for jail terms ranging from zero to 5 years, giving judges almost
unlimited sentencing discretion. The sentencing dispositions of the courts
were inconsistent and widely varying, dependent to a great extent upon year
of conviction geography, race, and religion. In 1968,
% of all convicted
draft offenders were sentenced to prison, their average sentence was 37 months,
and 13% received the maximum 5-year sentence. By 1974, only 22% were sentenced
to prison, their average sentence was just 15 months, and no one received the
maximum. Geographic ineqaities were almost as striking: In 1968, almost
one-third of those convicted in the southern-states 5th Circuit received
the maximum 5-year prison sentence contrasted with only 5% receiving the
maximum in the castern-states 2nd Circuit. During the early years of draft
offense trials in 1968, of 33 convicted Selective Service violators in
Oregon 18 were put on probation, and only one was given a sentence over 3 years.
In Southern Texas, of 16 violators, none were put on probation, 15 out of 16
received at least 3 years and 14 received the maximum 5-year sentence. 21/
GERALD
IV-V-36
Other sentencing inequities occured on the basis of race. In 1972, the
average sentence for all incarcerated Selective Service violators was
33.5. months while for blacks and other minorities the average sentence
was 45.1 a disparity which decreased to a difference of slightly more
than two months in 1974. The average length of sentence for our black
applicants were
compared to
for white applicants.
Some religious inequities may also have occurred. For the years 1966 through
1969 incarcerated Jehovah's Witness received sentences averaging about 1 month
longer than the average Selective Service violators. During this same period,
religious objectors other than Jehovah's Witness received average sentences
about 6 months shorter than the average violator.
Although a variety of sentencing procedures were available, the majority
of convicted Selective Service violators were sentenced under normal adult
procedures. If the offender were sentenced to jail, two types of sentence were
available: (1) a sentence of definite time during which he might be paroled
after serving 1/3 of his term; or (2) an indeterminate sentence during which
parole eligibility might be determined by a judge on the Board of Parole at
a date before, but not after 1/3 of the sentence had expired. Under the Youth
Correction Act, the convicted defendant might be unconditionally discharged
before the end of the period of probation or commitment. This discharge
automatically operated to set aside the conviction. Because commitments and
probations under the Youth Corrections Act were indeterminate, the period of
supervison might have lasted as long as six years. Bureau of prison statistics
indicate, however, that the Youth Corrections Act was used as a sentencing
procedure only in 10% of all violation cases. When it was applied, the six
year maximum period of supervison was imposed in almost all cases.
IV-V-37
Prison Experience: Over one-third of our applicants received prison
sentences and were incarcerated, some for periods of up to five years.
Since very little information is available concerning the treatment of
Selective Service violators, we relied upon a brief survey of prison officials
across the country to provide us with some evidence of the experience of
our applicants in prison. Although this survey was not scientific and
comprehensive, it did reveal the possible lack of uniformity in handling
draft violators accross the country.
During the early years of the Vietnam war, Jehovah's Witnesses rather
than other draft resisters filled the prisons. Jehovah's Witnesses were
ideal prisoners because of their adaptability and tendency to avoid creating
security problems. Most officials in our survey stated that Jehovah's
Witnesses were selective about their associates, either sticking with one
another or living alone. Other draft violators with other than religious
reasons for their offenses experienced greater difficulty adapting to prison life.
The first prison in our survey was a Northeastern prison. This prison
official stated that around 1970, as the climate changed on the outside, the
men on the inside became more vocal. Stressing unity in numbers, this official
found that draft violators were no longer a strange breed. They started
to meet and socialize with each other and attempt to organize protests,
which usually were not permitted. Draft violators tended to gravitate toward
the Inmate Grievance committee and, by 1971, they were less cooperative and
more disruptive. While this prison official denied that homosexual attacks
were directed specifically against draft violators, he did characterize the
vast majority of them as "young, not streetwise, pacifist and intellectual,"
thus "drawing attention" from hardened criminals.
IV-V-38
A prison official in a Midwestern prison admitted that the draft
violators were "not the most popular individuals" and caused staff resentment.
He stated that because most of the other inmates were conservative, "waving
the red, white and blue," who tried to isolate the draft violators. While
he spoke highly of the Jehovah's Witnesses, he believed that draft violators
did not adjust as well to incarceration. The draft violators were placed in
minimum custody and were neither particularly "vocal" nor organized enough
to make protests.
A Southern Prison official admitted that both his staff and the surrounding
residents were conservative, an attitude reflected in prison life. The draft
violators were subject to severe peer pressure. If they tried to expound
on their beliefs, they were subject to ridicule from the other inmates.
Anyone who spoke out against the war was considered "weird," so draft resisters
stayed among themselves. They experienced some difficulty adjusting to prison
life and, because of their passive nature, required support and encouragement.
Although the prison maintained a work release program, draft violators were
not allowed to participate in the 1960's because of adverse community reaction
to them.
Our final prison interview was with an official in a Western prison.
This official stated that the draft violators located in his prison generally
posed no threat to security, adjusted well and abided by the rules and
regulations. Although they had the potential to be influential and disruptive
because of their higher educational level, they were not. This official thought
they were more well-liked than draft violators during World War II. Their
acceptability was attributed to the easygoing atmosphere of the surrounding
community. Although anti-war ceremonies were not permitted at the prison,
this official claimed no punishment or retaliation resulted from criticism
of the war. He stated that draft violators were not excluded from work release
IV-V-39
programs, but because they showed less need than other inmates, few expressed
any desire to participate.
It appears that the draft violator faced the same pressure, boredom
and loneliness as other inmates. Most reports from incarcerated draft
violators themselves show that their strategy was a typical prison strategy:
survival. This was hardly unique in view of the need for a callous and
conformist response to a life-style of confinement. Whether a particular
prejudice was directed toward them seemed to be a problem of locale.
While the Clemency Board has discovered no evidence of wide scale
mistreatment of draft violators in federal prisons, isolated instances of
harsh treatment occurred.
Case #1210
Applicant was arrested in Arizona and extradited to
the Canal Zone for trial (location of his local board).
Prior to trial, he was confined for four months in an
unairconditioned four by six foot cell in a hot jungle.
Some evidence exists that the applicant was denied the
full opportunity to post reasonable bail. At his
trial the applicant was convicted and sentenced to an
additional two months confinement. By the time of his
release, the applicant's mental and physical health
substantially deteriorated and he was confined in a
mental hospital for several months. The applicant is
presently back in society but his mental health is still
a subject of great concern.
Some could not excape the effects of their prison experience even after
their release.
Case # 0059) Applicant became addicted to herion while serving the prison
sentence for his draft conviction. Unable to legitimately
support his habit after he was released, he turned to
criminal activities. He was later convicted of robbery,
and returned to prison.
The parole grant rates for Selective Service violators, like all other
prisoners, was determined categorically: it depended primarily on the nature
of their offense and not on individualized aspects of their personal history
or their imprisonment. It was the policy of many parole boards that draf t
IV-V-40
violators serve a minimum of two years for parity with military duty, but
most Selective Service violators were released after their initial parole
application. Jehovah's Witnesses received first releases in nearly all
instances. The majority of those serving prison sentences over one year
were released on parole whereas the great majority of those with prison
sentences less than one year served until their normal expiration date.
Most Selective Service violators were granted parole after serving approximately
half their prison sentences. This is higher than the national average for
all crimes, including rape and kidnapping. However, in each year from 1965
to 1974, Selective Service violators were granted parole more often than
other federal criminals.
Consequences of The Felony Conviction
A felony conviction had many grave ramifications for our applicants.
The overwhelming majority of states construe a draft offense as a felony,
denying our applicants the right to vote -- or, occasionally, just suspending
it during confinement. Some of the consequences of felony conviction are
less well known. In some states, for example, a felon lacks the capacity
to sue, although he or his representative may be sued; he may be unable to
execute judicially enforceable instruments or to serve as a court appointed
judiciary; he may be prohibited from participation in the judicial process as
a witness or a juror. A lesser known consequence of a felony conviction
might be that he may even lose certain domestic rights, such as his right to
exercise parental responsibility. For example, six states permit the adoption
of an ex- convict's children without his consent. The principle disability
arising from a felony conviction is usually its effect upon employment
opportunities. This effect is widespread among employers. One study found
only one employer out of 25 willing to hire a convicted felon. Often,
IV-V-41
this job discrimination is reinforced by statute. States license close to
4,000 occupations, with close to half requiring "good moral character"
as a condition to receiving the license; therefore, convicted felons are
often barred from such occupations as accountant, architect, cosmetologist,
dry cleaner and barber.
Case #1256)
Applicant, a third year law student, was told he could
not be admitted to the bar because of his draft conviction.
Even more severe restrictions exist in the public employment section.
Case # 2448 Applicant graduated from college, but was unable to find
work comparable to his education because of his draft
conviction. He qualified for a job with the Post Office
but was then informed that his draft conviction rendered
him ineligible.
Case #1277
Applicant qualified for a teaching position, but the
local board of education refused to hire him on the basis
of his draft conviction. The Board later reversed its
position at the urging of applicant's attorney and the
local federal judge.
Despite this, our civilian applicants generally fared reasonable well
in the job market. Nearly three out of four applicants were employed either
full time or part time when they applied for clemency. In fact, only 2% of
our civilian applicants were unemployed at the time of their application.
The remainder of our applicants had returned to school (13%), were presently
incarcerated ( %), or were furloughed by prison officials pending disposition
of their cases by our Board ( %).
/ HU U
IV. PCB APPLICANTS
C. OUR MILITARY APPLICANTS
IV-C-1
C. Our Military Applicants
During the Vietnam War, 7,500,000 individuals served in uniform.
Most served well under difficult circumstances, and 94% received
Honorable Discharges. One-third of them served in Vietnam, where
56,000 lost their lives and 300,000 were wounded. Almost one in
twelve Vietnam era servicemembers -- 500,000 -- went AWOL ("Absent
Without Official Leave") one or more times. Almost half of the
AWOL offenders were absent for less than 30 days. Usually, they
were reprimanded or given a minor (non-judicial) punishment.
More than one half of these offenders -- 325,000 -- left their
units for more than 30 consecutive days, thereby giving rise to
administrative classification as deserters;" over 10,000 never
returned. Of those who did return, about one-third (123,000) faced
court-martial charges. Many (55,000) avoided trial by accepting a
"For the Good of the Service"- discharge, while another 68,000
did stand trial, with all but 500 found guilty. The majority
(42,500) of those found guilty were punished and returned to their
units; the others were adjudged Bad Conduct (23,000) or Dishonorable
(2,000) Discharges. The remaining 63,000 had established a pattern
of misconduct which prompted an administrative discharge: 43,000
were given General Discharges for Unsuitability, and 20,000 received
Undesirable Discharges for Unfitness.
The President's clemency program included the 100,000 who
had received Undesirable, Bad Conduct, or Dishonorable Discharges --
A 30 day absence subjects a serviceman to the maximum punishment
authorized for an Article 86 UCMJ, absence without leave offense.
Judicial proof of desertion, however, requires more than proof of
30 day absence.
**/ "For the Good of the Service" discharges were commonly known to us
as discharges "in lieu of court-martial" described in service regu
lations. SEE: Army Regulation 635-200, Chapter 10.
IV-C-2
plus the 10, 115 who were still at large. Their offenses were often
very serious -- some AWOLs were for as long as seven years -- and
many were repeat offenders. This group comprised only one-sixth
of all AWOL offenders and one-third of all desertion offenders
during the Vietnam War.
In the discussion which follows, we trace the general
experiences of our military applicants. In sequence, we look
at the following:
1. Background
2. Induction or Enlistment in the Armed Forces
3. Early Experiences in the Military
4. Requests for Leave, Reassignment, or Discharge
5. Assignment to Vietnam
6. AWOL offenses
7. Encounters with the Military Justice System
8. Effects of a less than Honorable Discharge
1.
Background
Our military applicants were raised in small towns or on
farms (40%), and a disproportionate number (30%) came from the
South. Generally, they came from disadvantaged environments.
Many (60%) grew up in a broken home struggling to cope with a
low income (57%). Most were white, but a disproportionate per-
centage were black (21%) and Spanish-speaking (4%). Their average
IQ was very close to the national average. Nonetheless, over
three-quarters dropped out of high school before joining the
service, while less than one-half of one percent graduated from
college. Despite the common belief that our applicants resisted
the war, our applicants were not articulate, well-educated
opponents of the war; almost none of them (0.2%) had applied for
a conscientious objector draft classification before entering the
military.
2.
Induction or Enlistment in the Military
Our applicants began their military careers at an early
age. Almost one-third enlisted at age 17, and over three-quarters
were in uniform by their 20th birthday. Most (84%) enlisted
rather than be drafted. Our applicants represented the Army
(63%), the Marines (23%), and to a lesser degree, the Navy (12%)
and the Air Force (3%).
The reasons for enlistment varied from draft pressure to
the desire to learn a trade, to the simple absence of anything
else to do. Many of them saw the military as an opportunity to
become more mature.
IV-C-3
(Case #00148) Applicant enlisted after high school becuase he did not
want to go to college or be inducted into the Army.
(Case #02483) Applicant enlisted to obtain specialized training
to become a microwave technician.
(Case #00179) Applicant enlisted at age 17 because he wanted a place to
eat and a roof over his head.
(Case #00664) Applicant enlisted because he was getting into trouble all
the time and felt that service life might settle him down.
As the Vietnam war expanded America's military manpower needs, the pres-
sures on recruiters became very intense. Many recruiters were helpful to our
applicants by arranging entry into the preferred military occupational speci-
ality and geographic area of assignment.*
(Case #00356) Applicant enlisted at age 17 for motor maintenance training,
but instead was trained as a cook. This action caused him disappointment
and frustration. His grandmother contended that he was misled by the
recruiter.
(Case #01371) Applicant started drinking at age 13 and was an excessive
user of alcohol. He was expelled from two schools after getting into
trouble with teachers because of his dislike and disrespect for authority.
He was turned down for enlistment by the Air Force. The Naval Recruiting
Officer told him to omit these facts from his application for enlistment
in the Navy.
PROJECT 100,000
Before the Vietnam War, the military generally had not accepted persons
for enlistment or induction if they had Category IV scores on their AFQT
test, imposing an enlistment barrier at the 30th percentile. Some individuals SC
ing between the 15th and 30th percentiles were brought into the service
under project STEP.
In August, 1966, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara announced
Project 100,000 "to use the training establishment of the Armed Forces to
*The press for manpower led to improp rieties by recruiters and misunder-
standings by enlistees, which some of our applicants claimed were justi-
fications for their unauthorized absences.
**The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
was the basic test for
mental qualification for service in the military, administered at the Armed
Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES).
IX-C4
help certain young men become more productive citizens when
they return to civilian life." Like STEP, Project 100,000
offered the opportunity and obligation of military service
to marginally qualified persons by reducing mental and medical
standards governing eligibility. During its first year, 40,000
soldiers entered the military under this program. Thereafter,
it lived up to its name by enabling 100,000 marginally qualified
soldiers to join the service each year.
Military studies have indicated that the opportunity for
technical training was the principal motivation for the enlist-
ment of Category IV soldiers. However, over half enlisted at
least party because of the draft pressure. Other reasons for
enlistment were to travel, obtain time to find out what to do
with one's life, serve one's country, and enjoy educational
benefits after leaving the service. Despite their eagerness for
vocational training, many Category IV soldiers soon found them-
selves being trained in the combat arms -- skills of little
significance in the civilian job market. Almost 40% of all
soldiers in combat arms positions in 19 had Category IV AFQT
scores
However, some of our less educated applicants did
learn marketable skills, and 13% received a high school equivalency
certificate while in the service.
IVC-5
Almost one-third of our applicants (32%) were allowed to join the
military despite pre-enlistment AFQT scores at or below the 30th percentile,
including one half of 1% whose scores were below the 10th percentile and who
were generally statutorily ineligible for military service.
(Case No. 00847) Applicant had an AFQT of 11 and a GT (IQ score ) of
61 at enlistment. He successfully completed basic
training, but went AWOL shortly thereafter.
(Case No. 0229) Applicant had an 8th grade education and an AFQT of
11. From a broken home, he was enthusiastic about
his induction into the Army, believing that he would
have financial security and would receive technical
training. His lack of physical agility and difficulties
in reading and writing caused him to fail basic training
He was in BCT for nine months before he was sent to
AIT as a tank driver. He continued to have learning
problems in advanced training. This problem was
compounded by the ridicule of his peers who discovered
that he required several months to complete basic
training.
Not all of our Category IV applicants joined the service because of
Project 100,000. Some had other test scores qualifying them for enlistment
under the earlier standards. Nonetheless, we suspect that many of our
applicants would never have been in the service were it not for Project 100,00
Our Category IV applicants tended to be from disadvantaged circumstances
Compared to our other applicants, they were predominantly Black or Spanish-
speaking (42% vs. 18%)* and grew up in cities (55% vs. 44%). Their families
struggled with low incomes (72% VS. 49%), and they dropped out of high school
(75% vs. 56%). The quality of their military service was about the same as
that of our other applicants; however, they had no more punishments for
non-AWOL offenses (53% VS. 52%) or non-AWOL charges pending at time of dischar
(13% VS. 12%). Despite this, a greater percentage received administrative
Undesirable Discharges (68% VS. 57%).
*
The first figure is the percentage of the Category IV soldiers, the second
refers to all other soldiers.
IV-C-6
We saw only the failures of Project 100,000 -- never its successes.
If our applicants were representative of all 100,000 discharged and fugitive
servicemen eligible for clemency, 35,000 of the latter had Category IV AFQT
scores. Of all Category IV soldiers during the Vietnam Era,
% committed
AWOL offenses and were eligible for clemency. Of all Category I - II soldiers,
% committed AWOL offenses and were eligible for clemency.
3. Early Experiences in the Military
Our applicant's first encounter with the military was in basic training.
It was during these first weeks that our applicants had to learn the regimen
and routine of military life. For many, this was their first experience away
from home and the first time they faced such intense personal responsibilities.
Some of our applicants did not adjust well to the demands placed on them.
Homesickness and emotional trauma found expression ranging from commonplace
complaints and tears, to the more unusual conduct:
(Case No. 02483) Applicant went on aimless wanderings prior to advanced
training. He finally lost control of himself and
knocked out 20 windows in the barracks with his bare
hands, resulting in numerous wounds to himself.
Ethnic and cultural differences among recruits posed problems for others
who did not get along well in the close quarters of the barracks environment.
(No. 0309)
During boot camp, applicant, of Spanish heritage,
was subjected to physical and verbal abuse. He recalls
being called "chili bean" and "Mexican chili". His
ineptness also made him the butt of his boot camp unit.
He wept at his trial when he recalled his early
experiences that led to his AWOL.
(No. 10125)
Applicant's version of his various problems is that he
could no longer get along in the Marine Corps. Other
Marines picked on him because he was Puerto Rican, and
wouldn't permit him to speak Spanish to other Puerto
Ricans and finally they tried to get him into trouble
when he refused to let them "push" him around.
Women, in particular had unique problems.
**
Since 63% of our applicants were Army, our discussion will center (unless
otherwise specified) on Army procedures, which differ in degree from other
services, but not in substance.
IV-C-7
(Case No. 00704) Applicant was a high school graduate with a Category I
AFQT score and a GT (IQ test) score of 145. She
complained that other soldiers harrassed her without
cause and accused her of homosexuality. She departed
AWOL to avoid the pressure.
Incidents of AWOL during basic training usually resulted in minor forms
of punishment. Typically, a new recruit would receive a non-judicial punishment
resulting in restriction, loss of pay, or extra duty. Seven percent of our
applicants were discharged because of an AWOL commencing during basic training.
Following basic training, pressures on the average soldier with family
or personal problems may have increased, incidental to a transfer to another
unit for advanced or on the job training. Altogether, 10% of our applicants
were discharged for an AWOL begun during advanced training. Individual
transfers resulted in breaking up units and frequently intense personal friend-
ships. The AWOL rate tended to be higher for soldiers "in transit" to new
/
assignments.
Many of our applicants were discouraged by training in an occupational
speciality they feared would lead to Vietnam assignments. Others were trained
in jobs which they found unsatisfying and some of our applicants were given
details which made no use of their newly-earned skills.
(Case No. 9488) Applicant found himself pulling details and mowing
grass rather than working in his military occupational
speciality. He then went home and did not return for
over three years.
*
Scheduling of schools, formation of units, personnel transfers and other
administrative actions may have led to delays, assignments to transient
billets, and temporary details of newly trained personnel to duties not
utilizing their skills. Also, military life, especially for lower ranking
enlisted personnel, required the performance of certain duties for which
no training was required, such as kitchen patrol and area cleanups.
IV-1-8
Others were still having difficulty adjusting to the many demands
of military life. As in civilian employment circles, a daily routine had to
be followed, superiors had to be treated with respect and orders had to be
obeyed. The civilian's or service-member's failure to comply with these
expectations could result in his being fired, with attendant loss of pay,
promotability and status, or transfer. But the servicemen may have violated
violated military custom or law which could lead to
disciplinary action. Altogether, over half (53%) of our applicants were
punished for one or more military offenses other than AWOL which would not
have been criminal offenses in civilian life. Only 3% were punished for
military offenses comparable to civilian crimes (such as theft or vandalism).
(Case No. 14392) Applicant had difficulty adjusting to the regimentation
of Army life. While he was in the service, he felt that
he needed to have freedom of action at all times. He
would not take guidance from anyone, was repeatedly
disrespectful, and disobeyed numerous orders. His
course of conduct resulted in'his receiving three non-
judicial punishments and three Special Court-Martial.
After training periods were completed, our applicant morale often
declined. This is probably due to the break-up of units with soldiers moved
to different duty assignments. Therefore, much of the closeness and camaraderie
of their early military life was disrupted. Many of our applicants faced more
loneliness than before, with personal and family pressures leading to numerous
instances of AWOL. A majority (52%) of our applicants were discharged for
AWOL offenses occurring during stateside duty other than during training.
4. Requests for Leave, Reasignment, or Discharge
Most of our applicants complained of personal or family problems during
their military careers. Parents died, wives had miscarriages, children had
illnesses, houses were repossessed, families went on welfare, and engagements
were broken.
IV.C-9
(Case No. 3289) The applicant failed the first, second and fourth
grades, and quit high school in his first year because
he was uncomfortable there. He was drafted into
the Army and in view of his educational deficiencies,
was sent to a Special Training Company. His GT score
was 54 and his AFQT score of 14 placed him in Category IV.
During his 4 months and 19 days of creditable service
he was absent without official leave on five occasions.
He was motivated in each instance by his concern for
his grandmother who was now living alone and who he
believed needed his care and support.
The military has remedies for soldiers with these problems. They could
request leave, reassignment (compassionate, or normal change of duty station),
and, in extreme cases, discharge due to a hardship. Unit officers, chaplains,
attorneys of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and Red Cross workers were
there to render assistance within their means. Because of impatience,
bashfulness, distrust, or misinformation, many applicants never tried to solve
their problems through military channels. Other applicants indicated that
they tried some of these channels but failed to obtain the desired relief.
(Case No. 1244) Applicant's wife was pregnant, in financial difficulties
and being evicted; she suffered from an emotional
disorder and nervous problems; his oldest child was
asthmatic and an epileptic, having seizures that
sometimes resulted in unconsciousness. Applicant
requested transfer and a hardship discharge which
were denied.
The Department of Defense discovered that 58% of its clemency applicants
did seek help from at least one military source before going AWOL. However,
only 45% approached their commanding officer, and fewer yet approached an
officer above the Company level.
Only 1.3% of our applicants were granted
leave or reassignment to help them solve the problem which led to their AWOL.
By contrast, 8.6% had their leave or reassignment requests turned down.
(Case No. 74-436) Applicant received information that his pregnant wife
was in the hospital. She had fainted and fallen on
the edge of a coffee table and had started bleeding
internally. Applicant asked his commanding officer
for permission to return home after informing him
IV-C-10
of his wife's difficulty and of the risk of a
miscarriage. This request was denied, so he went AWOL.
Sometimes, the enormity of the problem made one period of leave
insufficient for the applicant's purpose.
(Case No. 01336) While applicant was home on leave to get married, a
hurricane flooded his mother-in-law's house, in which
he and his newly wed wife were staying. Almost the
entire property and his belongings were lost. He
requested and was granted a 21-day leave extension,
which he spent trying to repair the house, However,
the house remained in an unliveable condition, and
his wife began to suffer from a serious nervous
condition. Applicant went AWOL for four days to ease
the situation. He returned voluntarily and requested
a Hardship Discharge or a six-month emergency leave,
both of which were denied. He then went AWOL.
Requests for leave or reassignment were matters within a commanding officer's
*
discretion.
The Hardship Discharge offered a more lasting solution to the conflict
between a soldier's problems and his military obligations, without the stigma
of most other administrative separations. To get a Hardship Discharge, he had
to submit a request in writing to his commanding officer, explaining the nature
of his problem and how a discharge would help him solve it. The Red Cross
was often asked for assistance in documenting the request. Higher headquarters
was required to review the request and had the power to make final decisions.
None of our applicants received Hardship Discharges of course -- but
,
000 were granted during the Vietnam War to individuals who adequately
documented problems as required by service regulations.
Requests for leave were matters within the Commanding Officer's discretion.
However, leave is earned at the rate of 30 days per calendar year (2½ days
per month fo satisfactory service) and individuals often used leave substan-
tially in excess of the amount they had earned. Commanding. Officers could
not normally authorize "advance leave" in excess of 30 days, even "Emergency
Leave" was charged against the annual leave allowance. As a general rule
was no procedure available to military personnel comparable to "Leave
Without Pay" or a sabbitical leave as in the civilian sector.
FORD
LIBRARY
-C - 38
Occasionally, our applicants requested reassignments not
because of their need to be close to home, but because of a
dislike for their unit or commanding officer. Though reassign-
ments were not always easy to arrange, / a procedure was
adopted in light of the emerging volunteer army to permit
persons with similar skills to switch jobs requiring similar
skills with a willing service member at a different installation.
The soldier who was conscientiously opposed to war could
apply for in-service conscientious objector status. Very few
of our applicants did. Only 1.1% took any initiative to
obtain this in-service status, and only 0.5% made a formal
application. It is likely that the rate of C.O. applications
and approvals would have been higher if the services permitted
their judge advocates to take active roles in the C.O.
application process at no cost to the service member (also
true of Hardship Applications). While the soldier was entitled
to counsel at the various stages of the proceeding, counsel
was not furnished by the Government, and civilian counsel
could have been very expensive. Since the C.O. application
process is one of the most elaborate administrative proceedings
that an individual soldier may initiate, the average soldier
7
Reassignment practices varied with individual services; in
general, members could be transferred within command, with
minimal difficulty, major geographical reassignments re-
quired high level authority.
IV-C-39
would likely become confused without proper guidance in the
preparation of the application, its documentation, and pre-
sentation before the hearing officer. Moreover without
someone to make appropriate inquiries into the status of the
application, the soldier could easily become disillusioned and
frustrated by the delays in processing. These delays might
have run as long as four months -- and even longer if the
service member failed to comply with all regulatory require-
ments or became frustrated and departed AWOL after filing his
request (thereby stopping all favorable personnel actions).
There are two types of conscientious objector applications.
One resulted in reassignment to a non-combatant activity, while
the other provided for a discharge under honorable conditions.
Each type involves separate but similar procedures. Both
procedures put the burden of proof on the applicant, who was
required to submit statements on six separate questions con-
cerning the origin, nature, and implications of his conscientious
objection. The applicant had to "conspicuously demonstrate
the consistency and depth of his beliefs. 11 / It was difficult
for the inarticulate person to meet this standard.
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 4, folder \"Final Report - Draft, 8/29/75 (3)\" of\nthe Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Charles Goodell donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 4 of the Charles E. Goodell Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nIII. PCB CASE DISPOSITIONS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nCHAPTER III. CASE DISPOSITIONS\nThe products of our year's work on the Clemency Board were our 16,000 case\ndispositions. Most Board members participated in thousands of these decisions, each\none carefully determined on the basis of our baseline formula and designated factors.\nIn hearing so many cases, some inconsistencies were bound to occur. However,\nthe process we followed and the substantive rules we applied reduced these\ninconsistencies to a minimum.\nAlmost always, our different treatment of different kinds of individuals\nreflected the contrasting facts of their cases. For example, our No Clemency rate\nfor black applicants was over twice (12%) what it was for whites (5%), because\nof the greater number of blacks who had been convicted of violent felony offenses.\n(Our pardon rate was the same for black and white applicants -- (43%).\nSimilarly, our case dispositions for civilian applicants were considerably\nmore generous than for our military applicants. Our pardon rate for civilians\nwas over twice that for discharged servicemen, while our civilian No Clemency rate\nwas less than one-fifth of that for servicemen for military applicants.\nOur actual case dispositions are listed below:\n*\nPCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - MILITARY\nNumber\nPercent\nCumulative\nUpgrade\n468\n3.6\n3.6\nPardon\n4420\n34.0\n37.6\n1-3 mos.\n2613\n20.1\n57.7\n4-6 mos.\n2977\n22.9\n80.6\n7-9 mos.\n1235\n9.5\n90.1\nGERALD\n10-12 mos.\n442\n3.4\n93.5\n13 + mos.\n26\n0.2\n93.7\nNo Clemency\n819\n6.3\n100.0\nTotal\n14,000\n* These are projections based upon current Board trends.\nPCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - CIVILIAN\nNumber\nPercent\nCumulative\nPardon\n1652\n82.6\n82.6\n1-3 mos.\n164\n8.2\n90.8\n4-6 mos.\n98\n4.9\n95.7\n7-9 mos.\n22\n1.1\n96.8\n10-12 mos.\n34\n1.7\n98.5\n13 + mos.\n8\n0.4\n98.9\nNo Clemency\n22\n1.1\n100.0\nTotal\n2000\nPCB FINAL DISPOSITIONS - TOTAL\nNumber\nPercent\nCumulative\nUpgrade\n468\n3.1%\n3.1%\nPardon\n6072\n40.5%\n43.6%\n1-3 mos.\n2777\n18.5%\n62.1%\n4-6 mos.\n3075\n20.5%\n82.6%\n7-5 mos.\n1257\n8.4%\n91.0%\n10-12 mos.\n476\n3.2%\n94.2%\n13 + mos.\n34\n.2%\n94.4%\nNo Clemency\n841\n5.6%\n100.0%\nTotal\n16,000\nFor our military applicants, we had four types of case dispositions: Upgrades\nrecommendations, Outright Pardons, Alternative Service, or No Clemency. For\ncivilian applicants, we had three: Outright Pardons, Alternative Service, No Clemency.\nIn addition, our alternative service dispositions could either stay at the applicant's\nbaseline, go up from that baseline, or go down from it. As shown below, our applicant's\nbaselines almost all were between thre e and six months.\nBaseline\nCIVILIAN\nMILITARY\n3 months\n94.6%\n87.8%\n4-6 months\n2.9%\n15.5%\n7-12 months\n0.7%\n0.6%\nGERALD\n13-24 months\n1.9%\n0.7%\nExamples of Case Dispositions\nThe reasons for our case dispositions varied greatly from case to case.\nHowever, it is possible to give examples of frequently-encountered categories of\ncases. In the discussion which follows, we illustrate our different types of\ndispositions for military and civilian applicants.\nMilitary Applicants\nThe most generous disposition for military cases was an upgrade recommendation.\nWe recognized that a few military applicants had truly outstanding service\nrecords prior to their AWOL proglems. When we found the offenses were not so\nserious that a pardon was warranted, we also recommended that the applicant's\ndischarge be upgraded and that he receive veteran's benefits. As a minimum,\napplicants must have had creditable service and a tour in Vietnam to be considered,\nbut wounds in combat, decorations for valor, and other mitigating factors were also\nimportant.\n(Case # 09067)\nApplicant had 4 AWOL's totalling over 8 months,\nbut he did not begin his AWOL's until after returning\nfrom two tours of duty in Vietnam, when his beliefs\nconcerning the war changed. He came to believe that the\nU. S. was wrong in getting involved in the war and that\nhe \"was wrong in killing people in Vietnam.\" He had\nover three years' creditable service, with 14 excellent\nconduct and efficiency ratings. He re-enlisted to serve\nhis second tour within 3 months of ending his first. He\nserved as an infantry man in Vietnam, was wounded, and\nreceived the Bronze Star for valor.\nAlthough only 3.6% of our military cases were so outstanding as to qualify\nfor upgrade recommendations, 34% of our military cases merited an outright pardon\nwithout upgrade recommendations. There were two broad groups of cases that often\nreceived pardons. First, there were the applicants who had understandable reasons\nfor their offenses.\n2.\n(Case #12631)\nApplicant enlisted in 1960 and had a good record\nIn 1963 he married, but he began to have marital\nproblems soon afterwards. He was in a car accident\nin 1964. The combination of these two influences\ndrove him to drink, and he became an alcoholic. His\nfrequent AWOL's were directly attributable to his\nalcoholism.\nThe other broad group of military pardon cases were those applicants whose\noffenses were those applicants whose offenses were relatively minor and whose\nservice records were good:\n(Case #11606)\nApplicant had 4 AWOL's totalling 6 days and surrendered\nafter the last two. He had 1 year and 9 months' creditable\nservice with above average conduct and proficiency ratings\nand served a tour in a task force patrolling the waters\noff Vietnam.\nThe bulk of our military cases resulted in alternative service dispositions.\nAs a general rule, these cases involved both aggravating and mitigating factors\nwhich balanced out.\n(Case #00291)\nThe applicant commenced his first AWOL after he was assaulted\nby a cook while in KP. After his second AWOL, he was\nallegedly beaten by 5 MP's while confined in the stockade.\nOn the other hand, he committed four AWOL's, the last one\nlasting almost 3 1/2 years, and had less than one month of\ncreditable service.\n(Case # 14813)\nApplicant sent AWOL because he was involved with a girl and\nwas using drugs. He is presently incarcerated in a civilian\nprison for a minor breaking and entering. On the other hand,\nhis two AWOL's were each of a few days' duration, and he is\na very low category IV AFQT.\nNo clemency dispositions normally resulted from other serious felony convictions,\nsuch as the following.\n(Case #10147)\nWhile in the service, applicant received a General Court\nMartial for robbery with force. After his discharge, he\nwas arrested and found guilty of armed robbery in Michigan.\n(Case #04071)\nApplicant is now serving a 15-year sentence in a civilian\nprison for selling heroin\n(Case #14930)\nAfter discharge, applicant was convicted in a civilian court\nof first degree murder and second degree robbery. He received\n3.\na sentence of 25 years to life and will not be eligible\nfor parole until 1997.\nOccasionally, we would deny clemency when the applicant committed his offense\nout of cowardice, as in the following.\n(Case #03304)\nApplicant would not go into the field with his unit, because\nhe felt the new Commanding Officer of his company was in-\ncompetent. He was getting nervous about going out on an.\noperation; there was evidence that everyone believed there\nwas a good likelihood of enemy contact. (His company was\nsubequently dropped onto a hill where they engaged the enemy\nin combat). He asked to remain in the rear, but his request\nwas denied. Consequently he left the company area because,\nin the words of his chaplain, the threat of death caused him\nto exercise his right of self-preservation. Applicant was\napprehended while travelling on a truck away from his unit\nwithout any of his combat gear.\nWe also denied clemency if offenses were simply too serious and plentiful to\nexcuse.\n(Case #03444)\nApplicant received an SCM for two periods of AWOL (one day\neach) and one charge of missing movement. He then received\nan NJP for one AWOL (one day), another NJP for three AWOL's\n(1; 1; 10 days), and one NJP for two AWOL's (7; 1 days).\nHe then received an SPCM for two AWOL's (2 months 17 days;\n3 months 19 days). He accepted an undesirable discharge\nin lieu of court martial for one period of desertion (2 yrs.\n10 months 20 days), five periods of qualifying AWOL (8 days;\n3 months 28 days; 1 month 2 days; 2 months 13 days; 6 months\n29 days) and one period of non-qualifying AWOL (3 months\n28 days). This is a total of one period of desertion, 15\nperiods of qualifying AWOL and one non-qualifying AWOL (total\nof 5 years).\nCivilian Applicants\nAn overwhelming majority of our civilian applicants received an outright pardon\nwithout having to perform additional alternative service. It is difficult to cate-\ngorize the pardon cases; such factors as conscientious reasons for the offense, an\nimproper denial of conscientious objector status, other personal or procedural un-\nfairness, employment or other service to the public, and surrender to the authorities\nall strongly influenced the decision to grant clemency. Occasionally we had a case\nthat combined them all.\n4.\n(Case #00552)\nApplicant filed for a C.O.'s exemption on the basis\nof his ethical conviction that the preservation of life was\na \"fundamental point of my existence.\" The local\nboard denied it, presumably because his convictions were\nethical and not religious. Furthermore, he never re-\nceived notice that his request was denied. When ordered\nto report for induction, he argued that he had not been\ninformed of the denial and requested an appeal. His\nlocal board denied this request because the 30-day appeal\nperiod had expired and mailing the denial of applicant's\nrequest to his home constituted constructive notice of\nthe contents. Applicant refused induction, voluntarily\nappeared at his trial, pled guilty and received a sentence\nof three years' probation. During that period he worked\nas a pharmacist for alternative service, but he also\nworked as a volunteer on a drug abuse hotline and served\non the Board of Directors of the town's Youth Commission.\nPardon Conditioned Upon Alternative Service\nThe civilian cases resulting in alternative service generally fell into two\ncategories. First, some civilian applicants who have committed their offense for\nconscientious reasons but served only a portion of their sentences.\n(Case #00022)\nApplicant claimed his refusal to report fro induction\nwas based on his philosophical convictions regarding\nlife. He was sentenced to three years in prison but\nserved only six months when he received a furlough\nbecause of the clemency program. The second category of\nThe second category of alternative service cases were those in which the\napplicant committed offense for slightly selfish reasons, but there were no\nother serious aggravating circumstances.\n(Case #548)\nApplicant was convicted of failure to inform the local\nboard of his current address. At the time he was drifting\naround with no fixed address so he did not bother to keep\nin touch with his local board.\nNo Clemency. Very few of our civilian applicants did not receive clemency.\nWhen they did not, it was often because they had either committed other violent\nor heinous felonies.\n5.\n(Case #02407)\nThis civilian applicant had three other felony convictions\nin addition to his draft offense. On 23 September 1970\nhe received a one-year sentence for sale of drugs. In\n1971 he received one year of imprisonment and two years\nof probation for possession stolen property. On 18 October\n1972 he was convicted of failure to notify his local board\nof his address and sentenced to three years' imprisonment\nwhich was suspended and applicant was placed on pro-\nbation. His probation was not satisfactorily completed\nbecause on 23 March 1974 he was convicted of assault,\nabduction and rape for which he received a 20-year\nsentence.\nWe also denied clemency to applicants whose attitude and uncooperativeness\nwere contradictory to the spirit of the clemency program.\n(Case #10374)\nApplicant wrote the local board and asked for a post-\nponement of his induction because he alleged he had\nreceived injuries in a car accident which disqualified\nhim for military service. He did not submit a physician's\nstatement. The board, therefore, ordered to report. He\nclaimed the board had ignored his earlier request and did\nsubmit a statement from his doctor showing that he had\nreceived some injuries in a car accident. However, another\ndoctor examined the applicant and found him completely\nhealed. Applicant refused induction and was convicted;\nhe received a sentence of 30 days in jail and 2 years'\nprobation. He admitted in an interview with the probation\nofficer that his reason for refusing induction was that\nhe did not want to go into the Army because he had recently\nmarried and his wife was pregnant. The Probation Officer\nreports that applicant's adjustment to probation is poor;\nhe has shown no initiative and is out of work most of the\ntime. His wife is now supporting him.\nFORD\nANALYSIS OF BOARD DISPOSITIONS\nThe Board's case dispositions can perhaps best be understood by looking\nat their relationships to the mitigating and aggravating factors. As one\nmight expect, case dispositions hinge directly upon the presence of absence of\nseveral key factors. Consider the following table: *\nAlternative\nNo\nVeterans Benefits\nPardon\nService\nClemency\nMitigating\n1\n35.6%\n28.0%\n27.9%\n31.2%\n2\n49.8\n40.6\n45.5\n23.7\n3\n19.7\n18.2\n14.0\n12.1\n4\n1.0\n21.8\n3.9\n1.7\n5\n20.8\n2.4\n.5\n-\n6\n99.6\n73.1\n73.1\n73.5\n7\n98.1\n33.5\n8.6\n18.4\n8\n16.3\n20.0\n9.6\n7.0\n9\n-\n4.0\n.5\n.2\n10\n4.2\n29.3\n4.8\n.2\n11\n51.0\n50.2\n36.9\n20.9\n12\n47.4\n7.4\n.8\n1.7\n13\n40.6\n10.5\n3.2\n2.6\n14\n86.6\n40.2\n27.3\n22.8\n15\n41.5\n2.7\n.2\n.2\n16\n35.1\n4.3\n..3\n1.0\nAlternative\nNo\nVeterans Benefits\nPardon\nService\nClemency\nAggravating\n1\n33.1%\n32.2%\n46.4%\n92.3%\n2\n0\n.1\n.1\n.4\n3\n.3\n.1\n.2\n.8\n4\n.6\n1.1\n1.2\n6.5\n5\n3.0\n9.5\n41.7\n55.7\n6\n0\n1.1\n.5\n.4\n7\n.9\n1.9\n4.5\n10.3\n8\n81.0\n58.3\n81.1\n86.8\n9\n5.9\n44.3\n68.3\n56.7\n10\n5.1\n3.9\n7.9\n4.1\n11\n.9\n3.6\n10.9\n11.5\n12\n7.3\n18.3\n31.2\n24.1\n* This table combines military and civilian cases.\nThe above table made no distinction between military and civilian cases.\nHowever, the 83% pardon rate for civilians was twice that for military applicants\n(41%) This is largely attributable to the different factors prevailing in the\nthe\ntwo types of cases. The following table shows frequency with which all factors\nwere applied in civilian and military cases.\nPercentage of\nPercentage of\n*\nMITIGATING FACTORS\nCivilian cases\nMilitary Cases\n#1 Inadequate Education\n6.1\n35.2\n2 Personal/Family Problems\n12.7\n46.3\n3 Mental/Physical Problems\n9.7\n15.1\n4 Public Service\n51.9\n1.5\n5 Service-Connected Disability\n0.6\n3.1\n6 Creditable Military Service\n2.5\n81.3\n7 War Zone Service\n1.7\n26.4\n8 Procedural Unfairness\n6.6\n13.1\n9 Denial of CO Status\n11.7\n1.1\n10 Motivated by Conscience\n65.9\n4.6\n11 Voluntary Return\n59.7\n38.4\n12 Mental Stress from Combat\n0.4\n6.4\n13 Combat Volunteer\n0\n10.0\n14 Military Performance\n1.1\n41.3\n15 Decorated for Valor\n0\n4.3\n16 Wounded in Combat\n0\n3.8\n(None)\n5.3\n(30)\nPercentage of\nPercentage of\nAGGRAVATING FACTORS\nCivilian Cases\nMilitary Cases\n#1 Other Adult Convictions\n6.1%\n48.8\n2 False Statement to PCB\n0\n0.6\n3 Physical Force\n0.6\n1.1\n4 Desertion During Combat\n0.4\n2.4\n5 Selfish Motivation\n16.7\n27.9\n6 Failure to do Alternative Service\n4.9\n0.3\n7 Probation/Parole Violation\n5.7\n3.7\n8 Multiple AWOL/UA Offenses\n1.5\n80.8\n9 Extended AWOL/US\n0.4\n63.0\n10 Missed Overseas Movement\n0.2\n5.6\n11 Other Offenses\n0\n3.0\n12 Apprehension by Authorities\n3.4\n17.6\n(None)\n(48.3)\n(1.6)\nApart from the factors which were distinctly military, a few patterns emerge.\nCivilian applicants were much more likely to have mitigating factor #10 (conscientious\nreasons for offense), while military applicants were much more likely 10 have\naggravating factor #1 (other felony convictions or other court-martial convictions).\nAs the discussion below demonstrates, these two factors alone were accountable\nfor much of the difference between civilian and military case dispositions.\n*\nNote that a small percentage of our civilian applicants served in the military\ntheir draft offense convictions.\nMILITARY APPLICANTS\nMitigating and aggravating factors often had a combined rather than separate\neffect upon case dispositions. For example, mitigating factor #6 indicated the length\nof creditable military service, while mitigating factor #14 reflected the quality\nof service. The two together told a much different story about a person than\ndid one without the other. Consider the following chart of the eleven most\nfrequent combinations of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in military\ncases, ranked in order of the generosity of our case dispositions:*\nAgg.\nMit.\n# of\nLeniency\nFactors\nFactors\ncases\nPardon\n1-3AS\n4-6AS\n7+AS\nN/C\nRatio\n8,9\n2,6,11,14\n47\n18\n17\n10\n2\n2\n3.09\n1,8,9,12\n2,6,14\n66\n30\n16\n14\n3\n3\n3.02\n1,8,9\n1,2,6,11\n50\n21\n10\n13\n4\n2\n2.88\n8,9,12\n1,2,6\n44\n10\n21\n10\n3\n0\n2.86\n1,8,9,12\n2,6\n78\n15\n22\n31\n7\n3\n2,85\n1,8,9\n2,6,11\n63\n15\n22\n20\n3\n3\n2.84\n1,8,9,12\n1,2,6\n48\n13\n19\n13\n1\n2\n2.83\n8,9\n2,6,11\n57\n10\n23\n22\n2\n0\n2.72\n8,9,12\n2,6\n67\n11\n19\n33\n4\n0\n2.55\n5,8,9,12\n6\n43\n1\n4\n25\n13\n0\n1.84\n1,5,8,9,12\n6\n59\n0\n6\n24\n24\n5\n0.76\nAdd just one factor -- mitigating factor #7 (Vietnam service) -- to the same\ncombinations, and completely different results emerge. The table below lists the\nthirteen most frequent combinations of factors applicable to Vietnam veterans. Note\nthe much more widespread application of mitigating factor #14 and the total absence\nof aggravating factor #5. The pardon rate of roughly 75% for Vietnam veterans\ncontrasted with a pardon rate of only about 25% for other military applicants.\nSpecifically, when mitigating factor #7 was added to the two combinations listed at the\ntop of the above chart markedly different results occurred. Again, note that the\n\"No Clemency\" cases all involved aggravating factor #1, probably reflecting felony\nconvictions for violent crimes.\nCIVILIAN CASES\nAs noted earlier, civilian cases were generally decided more generously than\nmilitary cases, usually because of the absence of aggravating factors and the presence\nof mitigating factors #4 (prior alternative service) and #10 (conscientious reasons\nfor offense). In the absence of aggravating factor #5 (selfish reasons for offense),\nthe presence of either of these two mitigating factors generated a pardon in 97%\nof all civilian cases. However, a finding of aggravating factor #5 reduced the\ncivilian pardon rate to just 35%. Some No Clemency decisions were based on that\nfactor alone. The table below lists the twenty most frequent civilian factor\ncombinations, in decreasing order of the generosity of case dispositions. Note\nthat some pardons were granted without any Mitigating Factor, and one No Clemency\nwithout any aggravating factor. These cases were flagged by computer for\npossible reconsideration by the Board.\nAG\nMit.\nPOP\nPard.\n1-3AS\n4-6AS\n7+AS\nN/C\nRatio\nNone\n2,4,10,11\n32\n32\n4.00\nNone\n9,10,11\n28\n28\n12\n4,10\n19\n19\n4.00\n12\n10\n16\n16\n4.00\nNone\n4,9,10\n13\n13\n4.00\nNone 3,4,10,11\n10\n10\n4.00\nNone\n10,11\n152\n150\n2\n4.99\nNone\n4,10,11\n345\n340\n4\n1\n3.98\nNone\n4,11\n23\n22\n1\n3.96\nNone\n4,10\n117\n112\n4\n1\n3.95\nNone\n10\n64\n59\n3\n2\n3.94\n6\n4,10,11\n13\n12\n1\n3.92\nNone\n2,4,10,11\n11\n10\n1\n3.91\n5\n4\n17\n10\n4\n2\n1\n3.59\nNone\n4\n16\n12\n2\n1\n1\n3.44\nNone\nNone\n21\n12\n5\n1\n2\n1\n5\n3.19\n4,11\n15\n7\n3\n3\n2\n3.00\n5\n11\n22\n7\n5\n6\n3\n1\n5\n2.68\nNone\n18\n1\n8\n4\n4\n1\n2.22\nLeniency\nAG\nMIT\nPOP\nP\n1-3AS\n4-6AS\n7+AS\nN/C\nRatio\n1,8,9\n1,6\n24\n4\n8\n5\n2\n5\n2.21\n1,5,8,9\n6,11\n33\n3\n4\n14\n6\n6\n1.76\n1,8\n1,6,11\n11\n3\n1\n2\n-\n5\n1.73\n1,5,8,9\n6,14\n20\n-\n2\n9\n3\n6\n1.35\n1,5,8\n6\n29\n1\n1\n11\n6\n10\n1.21\n1,8\n6\n23\n1\n3\n5\n2\n12\n1.09\n1.5.8.9\n6\n30\n-\n2\n8\n10\n10\n1\nPOP\nPardon\n1-3 AS\n4-6AS\n7+AS\nN/C\nRatio\nAGG.\nMit.\n1,8,9,12\n1,2,6,7,14\n11\n4.00\n11\n1,8\n6,7,14\n10\n10\n4.00\n1,8,9\n2,6,7,11,14\n13\n12\n1\n3.85\n8,9\n2,6,7,11,14\n19\n15\n3\n1\n3.74\n8,9\n2,6,7,11,13,14\n11\n8\n3\n3.73\n8,9\n6,7,11,14\n11\n8\n3\n3,73\n8,9,12\n2,6,7,14\n17\n13\n2\n2\n3.65\n3.56\n1,8,9,12\n2,6,7,17\n18\n14\n2\n1\n1\n1,2,6,7,11,14\n13\n11\n1\n1\n3.54\n1,8,9,\n1,8,9\n2,6,7,14\n10\n9\n1\n3.30\n1,8\n2,6,7,11,14\n15\n11\n1\n1\n2\n3.27\n2,6,7,\n11\n7\n2\n1\n1\n3.27\n1,8,9,12\n1,8,9,12\n6,7,14\n10\n5\n1\n2\n2\n2.70\nThe No Clemency Disposition in military cases usually (but not always) involved\naggravating factor #1. Aggravating factor #5 was also often present, along with\ncommon\nfew or no mitigating factors. The chart below lists the ten most combinations of\nfactors which produced the greatest number of military No Clemency cases. The pardon\nrate for these cases was only about 5%. Note also that cases with both aggravating\nfactor #1 and #5 and no mitigating factor almost invariably involved a jump from\nour baseline (almost always 3 - 6 months in military cases) or a No Clemency decision.\nThere were not many civilian No Clemency cases, but a look at them shows\nthe importance of aggravating factors #1 (other felony convictions) and #5.\nAggravating factor #1 was shown by the above table to have been present in none\nof the most prevalent combinations of civilian factors. However, it was present\nin 15 of the 19 civilian No Clemency cases, two of the remaining four being\napparently unusual panel dispositions. In the table below, note the total\nabsence of mitigating factor #10.\nAG\nMIT.\nPOP\nPard.\n1-3AS\n4-6AS\n7+AS\nN/C\nRatio\nNone\n4\n16\n12\n2\n:\n1\n1\n3.44\nNone\nNone\n21\n12\n5\n1\n2\n1\n3.19\n5\n11\n22\n7\n5\n6\n3\n1\n2.68\n5\nNone\n18\n1\n8\n4\n4\n1\n2.22\n1,5\n2\n3\n1\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1.67\n1,5\nNone\n3\n1\n-\n-\n1\n1\n1.67\n1\nNone\n5\n1\n1\n-\n1\n2\n1.60\n5,7\nNone\n2\n-\n-\n-\n1\n1\n0.50\n1,5,7\nNone\n2\n-\n-\n-\n-\n2\n0.00\n1,5,6\nNone\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1,5,7\n2\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1,5\n8\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1,5\n11\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n9.00\n1\n3\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1\n11\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1\n2,6\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\n1,5,8\n1,6,11\n1\n-\n-\n-\n-\n1\n0.00\nComparison with Case Dispositions for the Other Programs\nOur applicants --- military and civilian -- had already paid a price before\nthey applied for clemency. Roughly half had been incarcerated, most for several\nmonths. Many had performed alternative service as a condition of probation.\nOur baseline formula took this into account.\nAs a result, our case dispositions were naturally different from those of\nthe Justice and Defense Department programs. Their applicants had never paid\nany price (other than the hardship of being a fugitive -- a factor which no\nclemency program should weigh in its calculations). At the same time, we were\nthe only part of the President's program to grant clemency selectively. Neither\nthe Justice Department nor the Defense Department denied clemency to any eligible\napplicant. The tables below show the alternative service assignments of the\nother two parts of the President's clemency program.\nDOJ PROGRAM\nAverage Alternative Service by Circuit\nNumber\nCircuit\nof Cases\nAverage Sentence\nDC\n1\n24.0\n56\n17.5\nFirst\n169\n19.6\nSecond\n48\n20.5\nThird\nFourth\n30\n19.8\nFifth\n88\n22.5\nSixth\n54\n20.9\nSeventh\n18\n16.8\nEighth\n37\n18.1\n186\n19.6\nNinth\n1\nTenth\n16\nComparing their case dispositions to ours can be misleading, unless prior\npunishments are taken into account. When our military applicants' time in jail\n(average: 2½ months) is taken into account according to our baseline formula--\nwhich gives three months credit for every one month in jail -- the comparison changes.\nOur case dispositions are still shown to be somewhat more generous than Defense's\nbut not by as much as a straight-line comparison would indicate. *\nCOMPARISON OF PCB AND DOD CASE DISPOSITIONS\nDOD\nUnadjusted PCB\nAdjusted PCB\nDisposition\nCumulative %\nCumulative %\nCommulative %\nPardon\n0\n41\n0\n1-5 mos\n2\n66\n0\n6-12 mos\n15\n28\n66\n13-18 mos\n22\n0\n28\n19-24 mos.\n100\n0\n0\n25+ mos\n-\n0\n0\nNo Clemency\n-\n6\n6\nLikewise, compare our program with that of the Department of Justice. Our\ncivilian applicants have served an average of 4 months in jail and 5 months of\nprior alternative service. When our baseline calculation is applied, our\ndispositions are shown to have been more severe than those of the Department of Justice**\nCOMPARISON OF PCB AND DOJ CASE DISPOSITIONS\nDOJ Cumulative\nUnadjusted PCB\nAdjusted PCB\nDisposition\nPercent\nCumulative %\nCumulative Percent\nPardon\n0\n83\n0\n1-5 mos.\n2\n10\n0\n6-12 mos.\n13\n6\n0\n13-18 mos.\n36\n0\n0\n19-24 mos.\n100\n0\n0\n25+ mos\n-\n0\n99\nNo Clemency\n-\n1\n1\n* This table assumes, obviously incorrectly, that all our military applicants\nannlicants\nOne further note should be made about the Justice Department case dispositions.\nFor a wholly decentralized program, implemented by 94 United States Attorneys, the\nconsistency of case dispositions was substantial. As indicated by the following\ntable, the average alternative service assignments differed very little from\ncircuit to circuit. Some extremes did occur: The Eastern District of New York\nassigned\nof\napplicants to 24 months of alternative service, while the\nWestern District of New York assigned its\napplicants only an average of\nmonths of alternative service -- only\nof whom received the maximum\n24 months. However, these districts were the exceptions.\nA IV\nIV. PCB APPLICANTS\nA. INTRODUCTION\nIV-A-1\nChapter IV: PCB Applicants\nChance and circumstance had much to do with the sacri-\nfices faced by each individual during the Vietnam War. Only\n9% of all draft-age men served there. Less than 2% ever faced\ncharges for draft or desertion offenses, and only 0.4%--less\nthan one out of two hundred--were convicted or still remain\ncharged with these offenses. By contrast, 60% of all draft-\nage men were never called upon to serve their country.\nWar and conscription are, by nature, selective. and in\nequitable. In a sense, our applicants were victims of misfor-\ntune as much as they were guilty of willful offenses. Most\nother young Americans did not have to face the terrible choices\nwhich they did. For this reason alone, applicants to the\nPresident's clemency program deserve the compassion of their\nfellow countrymen.\nAs we decided cases, we came to understand better the\nkinds of people who had applied for clemency. By the time our\nBoard had reviewed all cases, each of us had read approximately\n4,000 case summaries for our respective panels. From these\ncase summaries, we learned what our applicant's family back-\ngrounds were like, what experiences they had with the draft and\nthe military, why they committed their offenses, and what\npunishments they endured.\nIV-A-2\nMany of our applicants fell into common categories:\nThe civilian conscientious war resister who was denied in\nhis application for CO status and faced trial and punish-\nment was a matter of principle; the Jehovah's Witness who,\nalthough granted a CO exemption, went to jail because his\nreligion prohibited him from accepting an alternative service\nassignment from Selective Service; the Vietnam veteran who\nwent AWOL because of his difficulties in adjusting to post-\ncombat garrison duty; the young serviceman, away from home for\nthe first time, who could not adjust to military life; the\nserviceman with his family on welfare, who went AWOL to find\na better-paying job to support them.\nWe also had more extreme cases: The civilian who dodged\nand manipulated the system not for conscientious reasons, but\nsimply to avoid fulfillment of any kind of obligation of\nnational service--or the soldier who deserted his post under\nfire.\nIn this chapter, we describe our civilian and military\napplicants. Who were they? What did they do? Why did they\ndo it? Our actual cases tell much of the story, supplemented\nby the results of a comprehensive survey we conducted from\nthe case summaries of almost 1,500 applicants. In our conclusion,\nwe try to identify who did not apply, why they did not, and\nwhat happens to them now.\nIVB\n8\n)\n)\nIV. PCB APPLICANTS\nB. OUR CIVILIAN APPLICANTS\nGERALD\nIV-B-1\nOur Civilian Applicants\nDuring the Vietnam Era, there were approximately 28,600,000\nmen of draft-eligible age. About forty percent --- 11,500,000 --\nserved in the Armed Forces either before or during the Vietnam\nWar.\nThe rest, 17,100,000 men, never served in the military. Of\nthose, 12,250,000 either never registered for the draft, built\ndeferment on deferment, had high lottery numbers, or were other-\nwise passed over by induction calls. Another 4,650,000 were given\nother kinds of permanent draft exemption usually because of mental\nor physical deficiencies; 145,000 of these exemptions were for\nconscientious objection to war.\nThe Selective Service System issued 209,000 complaints re-\ngarding individual draft offenses, usually for failure to report for\ninduction or a pre-induction physical exam. Almost 90% (173,700)\nof the complaints never resulted in indictments. Some registrants\nagreed to enter military service as soon as their complaint was\nissued; others never had charges brought against them despite their\ncontinued refusal to join the service. Apparently, no records\nFURD\nexist to show how many were in each of the two categories.\nOnly 25,300 Selective Service complaints resulted in grand\njury indictments. Of those indicted, 4,522 remained fugitives un-\ntil the start of the clemency program. The remaining 20,800 stood\ntrial.\nIV-B-2\nMost (12,100) were acquitted; 8,700 were convicted. Only 4,900\never went to jail. Thus, about 13,000 civilians either were\nconvicted of draft offenses or were still facing draft charges\nwhen the President announced his clemency program. 4 For every one\nof them, 12,000 others escaped military service by other means.\nBackground\n6\nOur civilian applicants were predominantly white, and came\nfrom average American families. Over two-thirds were raised by\nboth natural parents, most had one to three brothers and sisters,\nand evidence of severe family instability was rare. The proportion\nof Blacks and Spanish-speaking persons was about the same as found\nin the general population.\nThey grew up in cities and suburbs, with disproportionately\nmany in the West and few in the South. Born largely between 1948\nand 1950, they were part of the \"baby boom\" which was later to\nface the draft during the Vietnam War. Over three quarters had\nhigh-school degrees, yet only 18% ever finished college. Only a\nvery small percentage ever had trouble with the law aside from their\ndraft offenses. In most ways, they were not unlike young men in\ncities and towns across the United States. *\n*\nUnless otherwise noted, all statistics about our applicants came\nfrom our own survey of approximately 500 civilian applicants.\nIV-B-3\nTwo things set them apart. First, over 80% opposed the\nwar in Vietnam strongly enough to face punishment rather than\nfight there. Second, they--unlike many of their friends and\nclassmates -- were unable or unwilling to evade the draft by ex-\nemptions and deferments or escape prosecution through dismissal\nand acquittal. They were unique in that they chose to stay within\nthe system and pay a penalty for their conscientious opposition to\nthe war.\nExperience with the Selective Service System\nRegistration\nOur applicants, like millions of young men, came into contact\nwith the Selective Service System when they reached the age of 18.\nOften, it was their first actual contact with a government agency - -\nan agency with which they had little in common.\nThe rationale behind the concept of Selective Service was that\nestablished members of the community were the right ones to decide\nfrom a group of eligible young who would serve in the military\nand who would be exempt. It was hoped that this system would allow\ndecisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Board members who\nwere sensitive to the national need could still consider\nthe special circumstances that often surrounded individual cases.\nIV-B-4\nThis philosophy was based on a promise of trust and open\ncommunication between individuals and board members. Often that\ntrust did not materialize. There were differences in age, life styles,\nracial composition, values and opinions concerning the Vietnam\nwar.\nThe typical local board member was in his late fifties, with\n20% over 70 years old. In the mid 1960's, 1.3% of all local board\nmembers were black and 1.5% spanish-speaking. Many of the state\ndirectors were Reserve or National Guard officers on active duty.\nBeginning in the late 1960's and early 1970's the Selective\nService System made efforts to have the local draft boards more\naccurately reflect the population of their areas. For example, 16%\nof all local board members are now Spanish speaking, or of another\nminority background\n8/\nClassification\nImmediately after our applicants registered with the local\nboard, they were classified by their respective \"neighborhood\"\ndraft boards according to its interpretation of the law and regu-\nlations of the system. Varying interpretations resulted from this\nERALD\ndecentralized system, and produced wide differences in the treatment\nafforded to similar registrants. Today, a single national interpre-\ntation of the law is promulgated in the regulations which are binding\nupon local draft boards and which are supported in detailed procedural\nIV-B-5\ndirectives intended to provide uniformity of processing and\nequality in treatment. The reform did not affect the authority\nof the local draft board to classify men, but rather required that\nall local boards classify the same way.\nAnother major problem in the classification procedure was the\nlack of accurate and adequate information. The problem was two-\nfold. Information had to be swiftly and accurately conveyed from\nthe National Headquarters to the local and state draft boards be-\nfore it could be conveyed to the registrant. If local boards were\nignorant or misinformed of the requirements of the law, policy and\ncourt decisions, their processing of registrants was likely to be\nflawed. Secondly, when information disseminated to our applicants\nwas not an accurate explanation of their rights established by the\ncourts and the Congress, the exercise of such rights was often\nmeaningless. The problem is illustrated by testimony at Senate\nhearings on the draft in 1972. A parent of a son killed in Vietnam\nstated \"I was appalled at how little sound, legal advice there\nactually was available to our young men, in spite of the fact that\nthe Selective Service statutes have always constituted a clearly\ndefined body of law readily available to the legal profession as\nCERALD\n11 10/\na source of additional practice.\n(Case # 3548)\nApplicant failed to apply for conscientious\nobjector status because he mistakenly be-\nlieved that the Supreme Court had ruled\nthat a prerequisite for this classification\nIV-B-6\n(#3548) con't\nwas an orthodox religious belief in a\nsupreme being.\nOften, new registrants relied on the advice of local draft\nclerks, who were neither tested nor trained in Selective Service\nlaw, but who nevertheless gave the best advice they could and\nwhich the registrants then relied on.\n(Case #2290)\nApplicant made no attempt to seek a personal\nappearance before the local board or appeal\ntheir decision, on the basis of advice\ngiven by the clerk that the board routinely\ndenied such claims made by persons like\nhimself.\nWritten materials were often no more helpful than the clerks.\nThe language in many of the forms used by Selective Service was\nnot understandable by most registrants, especially those that\ncame from economically deprived backgrounds. One study showed that\nthe form 150 (the conscientious objector form) required at least\n11/\na high school graduate level reading skill to understand.\nThe problem of applicant misinformation was compounded by the\ndifficulty national headquarters sometimes had in providing the\nlocal boards with prompt and adequate information regarding binding\njudicial interpretations of the Act. For example, the important\ncase of Mulloy V. United States (398 U.S. 410) regarding classifi\ncation processing was decided by the Supreme Court on June 15,\nGERALD\n1970. This decision had the possibility of effecting every regi-\nstrant within the system. The decision and interpretation regard-\ning the decision were not communicated to local boards until\nIV-B-7\nAugust 11, 1970, a period of approximately two months. The\nlandmark decision in Welsh V. United States (398 US 333)\nwas decided the same day by the Supreme Court and expanded the\nscope of conscientious objection. Yet some two years after the\nWelsh decision, special forms for conscientious objectors had not\nbeen amended to accurately reflect this decision. 12/ Many court\ndecisions regarding registration, classification and processing\nwere never communicated to registrants in informational brochures.\nThey had to rely on their own resources to gain a full understanding\nof their legal rights and obligations.\nBecause of the inadequate amount of information available,\nsome of our applicants turned to draft counseling centers for\ninformation. However, even the trained draft counselors found it\ndifficult to keep current regarding directives in the system. Sub--\nscriptions to GPO publications were unsatisfactory. For example,\nchanges made in June 1971 did not reach the subscriber until\nFebruary 1972. 13/ Requests by registrants and draft counsellors\nfor state headquarters directives explaining policy and interpre-\ntations plus copies of Operational Bulletins were denied on the\n14\nground that these materials were internal communications.\n/\nGERALD\nOther questions of procedural due process arose. Our appli-\ncants did not have the right to a personal appearance prior to the\nlocal draft board's initial classification decision. When a personal\nIV-B-8\nappearance before a local board or an appeal board was granted,\nthey did not have the right to bring witnesses to their personal\nappearance. Also, local and appeal boards were originally not\nrequired to provide a registrant with reasons for their decision.\n(Case # 00596)\nNo reasons were given applicant regarding\nthe denial of his claim for conscientious\nobjector status. Consequently he was\nsimply unaware of how or where to appeal.\nhis case to a higher level.\nAfter 1971, such information was required, but often consisted of\nonly a check-list with the general reasons for denial marked\nbut not explained for procedure similar to one already found acceptable.\n(Case # 1318)\nDenial of applicant's C.O. claim consisted\nonly of the board's conclusions. His\npetition for certiorari was denied, although\none Justice indicated that he felt pro-\ncedural due process required the factual\nbasis behind the conclusions be included.\nOnce a local draft board issued a final classification to our appli-\ncants, they could appeal to the state appeals board and under\ncertain conditions, to the Presidential Appeals Board. The value\nof these appellate rights was questionable. State boards often\ngave their cases only cursory consideration, sometimes so, brief\nthat the procedure was held to deprive the registrant of due process\n15\nof law.\nHowever, these appeals were essential if our applicant\nhoped to prove his case in court.\n(Case # 4296)\nApplicant failed to appeal his local board's\ndenial of his C.O. claim, which was done\nwithout giving any reasons to the applicant\nfor the denial. Although the District\nJudge indicated, that the local board's\naction was improper, he nevertheless convicted\nIV-B-9\n(Case # 4296) con't\nlocal board's decision and thereby,\nexhaust his administrative remedies.\nIf an applicant was unsuccessful in his initial bid for a particu-\nlar classification status--whether or not he appealed his local\nboard's decision- he could request a rehearing at any time prior\nto receiving his induction notice.\nIf his request contained\nevidence of a prima facie case for reclassification, the board\nhad to reopen the case, and failure to do so was found to be a\ndenial of procedural due process. This right was critical to an\napplicant, since a reopening theoretically brought with it the\nentire sequence of appellate rights associated with an initial\nclassification determination. Similar appellate rights were not\nprovided for a board's refusal to reopen, (as distinguished from\na reopening with a denial of the claim). In addition, most circuits\nrequired that a denial of a prima facie reopening case be accom-\npanied with a reason for the denial. In practice, this was not\nalways the case.\n(Case #2317)\nApplicant's local board decided to give\nhim another hearing after he accumulated\nadditional evidence to support his claim.\nIn spite of this de facto rehearing, the\nboard proclaimed no such reopening had\noccurred, and denied the applicant any\nappeal rights.\nDeferments and Exemptions\nMany of our applicants held and many more sought a range of\ndeferments which would have postponed their draft eligibility, or\nexemptions which would have ended it entirely. The most common\nIV-B-10\ndeferments and exemptions were for student, occupational, hard-\nship and mental/physical status.\nDuring most of the Vietnam era, it was the policy of Selective\nService to defer students who were enrolled on a full-time basis\nuntil they terminated or completed their formal college education,\nat which time they became available for selection and induction.\nThe only legal requirement relating to student deferments was\nthat which obliged the local draft board to permit college students\ncalled up for induction to finish their current academic year.\nA student's immediate future depended upon state headquarter's\ninterpretation of the overall national policy. Some state and local\nboards instructed their registrants to use as a basis for determining\n2-S status college qualifications tests scores and information\nregarding rank in class, while others told their local boards that\nthese criteria were only advisory and could be ignored. The\ndefinition of the term \"full-time student\" posed many problems.\nFinally, some state headquarters extended student deferments to\nindividuals in business, trade or vocational school, while others\nlimited it to colleges.\nThere were three major criteria for obtaining an occupational\ndeferment: The registrant had to be employed in industries related\nto the Defense Department, science, research and development,\nengineering and health services. His employer had to show that\nsomeone of similar competence was not available to replace the\nIV-B-11\nindividual for whom the deferment was requested. Finally, the\nemployer had to show that loss of the individual to the draft\nwould have an adverse effect on the employer's ability to carry\nout essential work. Formal guidelines and interpretations of\nthese criteria varied among the state and local boards, and\nresulted in a lack of uniformity in the identification and deter-\n16\nmination of critical skills, occupations and professions.\nThe hardship deferment was granted only to those applicants\nwhose induction would create \"extreme hardship\" for their depen-\ndents. To qualify, an applicant had to demonstrate that he made\na substantial financial contribution to a qualified dependent,\nand that without this contribution, the dependent would suffer\nextreme hardship. Although the formulation of this test varied\nslightly among the circuits, determinations of extreme hardship\nwere by their nature subjective, and as in the other deferments,\nthere were varying applications of this standard among the local\nboards. Even when the facts were relatively objective, policies\nvaried. For example, a provision in the 1967 Act authorized\n\"fatherhood\" deferments and was duly incorporated into the regu-\nlations, only to be revoked by the President in 1970. Thereafter,\nfathers were not automatically grant such deferments.\nBecause of manpower needs during the war, the Selective\nGERALD\nService and Defense Department revised downward the physical\nand mental standards for service in the military. Physical and\nIV-B-12\nmental exemptions thus became harder to obtain. The prein-\nduction rejection rates for all causes dropped from about 50%\n17/\nin FY 65 to 40% in FY 66 and approximately 35% in FY 67.\nThe Defense Department estimated that these revisions of standards\nincreased the induction or enlistment or previously ineligible\nmen by about 100,000 a year.\nThe exemption status of greatest concern to most of our\ncivilian applicants was that of conscientious objector (I-O).\nWe have evidence that almost half (44%) of our applicants took\nsome initiative to obtain a \"CO\" exemption, and the true proportion\nmay be even higher. Of that percentage, 15% never actually com-\npleted a CO application, 17% applied but were denied, and 12% were\ngranted CO status. Many of our applicants evidenced a great deal\nof confusion concerning the CO exemption. There was no institut-\nionalized method for informing prospective conscientious objectors\nwhen or how to fill out the necessary forms and present their\ncase to the local board. A strinking 26% of our applicants sub-\nscribed to a pacifist religion which would ordinarily entitle\nthem to CO status most (20%) being Jehovah's Witnesses. Because\nonly 10% of our applicants received CO status for religious ob-\njection to war, it appears that the remaining 16% never applied or\nwere denied. Many of our applicants were simply uninformed about\nthe availability of the CO exemption and the procedures which must\nbe followed to obtain it.\nIV-B-13\n(Case # 10768)\nApplicant, a Jehovah's Witness, had his\nclaim for ministerial exemption denied.\nSince he made no claim for conscientious\nobjector status, he was classified 1-A\nand inducted one month later. (He later\nwent AWOL and received an Undesirable\nDischarge.\nSome of our other applicants knew enough about the existence of\nthe exemption to inquire about it, but were subsequently dis-\ncouraged by their local boards.\n(Case # 803)\nIn reply to applicant's request for a\nForm 150, his local board included a note\nstating that a CO classification was given\nonly to members of pacifist-oriented\nreligions. Accordingly, applicant did\nnot bother to return the form.\nIn the midst of the Vietnam War, the substantive law regarding\nconscientious objectors changed dramatically, profoundly affecting\nthe ability of a great number of our applicants to submit C.O.\nclaims with any reasonable chance of success. In June\n1970\nthe Supreme Court clafified\nconscientious objection in Welsh\nV. United States ; supra, stating that this exemption should be\nextended to cover those whose conscientious objection stemmed from a\nsecular belief. Section 6 (j) was held to exempt from military\nservice those persons who consciences, spurred by deeply held\nmoral, ethical or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or\npeace, if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument\nof war. In the later case of Clay V. U.S.\n(\n) the\ncourt stated the three requirements for CO classification as:\nopposition to war in any form, the basis of opposition to war must be\nIV-B-14\nmoral, ethical or religious, and the beliefs must be sincere.\nBased upon these standards, it is surprising that more of\nour applicants did not apply for CO status, receive a CO exemp--\ntion from their local boards, or raise a successful defense at\ntrial. We have found that 66% of our civilian applicants committed\ntheir offense for conscientious reasons. Not all of these appli-\ncants would have qualified for a C.O. classification because many\ndid not object to all wars, as required by Gillette.\n(\n).\n(Case # 2338)\nApplicant's conscientious objector claim\nwas denied by the local board because he\nobjected only to the Vietnam War, rather\nthan all wars.\nDespite this, it is likely that more than the 12% of our applicants\nwho actually received such an exemption would have qualified under\ntoday's standards. Why did this happen? Ninety percent of our\napplicants registered prior to Welsh, SO their first information\nabout the CO exemption was that it applied primarily, if not\nexclusively, to members of pacifist religions. Many of our applicants\nmay have been reluctant to apply for CO status prior to Welsh out\nof recognition that, at the time, their moral and ethical beliefs\nGERALD\nwould not have persuaded their local boards.\n(Case # 1213)\nApplicant did not submit a CO application be-\ncause it was his understanding that his\nlocal draft board would not consider a CO\nrequest unless a registrant were associated\nIV-B-15\n(#1213) con't\nwith a widely recognized pacifist religion\nand his refusal to participate in war\nin any form stemmed from his personal\nbeliefs and general religious feelings.\nHe pled guilty to failure to submit to\ninduction and was convicted one year prior\nto Welsh.\nMany others passed through the Selective Service System be-\nfore the middle of 1970, when Welsh was announced. Fifty-three\npercent of our applicants who applied for a CO exemption did SO\nbefore Welsh, and 35% committed their draft offense before the\ndecision. However, only 13% were actually convicted of their\noffense before Welsh. Many of these individuals could have raised\nWelsh defenses at trial, but a significant percentage of our appli-\ncants (26%) pled guilty to their charges. The most likely expla-\nnation for the small percentage of applicants who sought and were\ngranted CO exemptions is their lack of understanding of what the\nSelective Service standards and procedures actually were. Despite Welsh, th\nSelective Service made no immediate substantial changes in the\nform 150 to reflect this broadening of the CO category. As a result\nthe format of the form 150 misled many applicants into thinking\nthat the non-religious nature of their beliefs disqualified them\nfrom conscientious objector status.\n(Case # 537)\nApplicant initially failed to fill out a\nGERALD\nform to request C.O. status because the\nreligious orientation of the form led him\nto believe he would not qualify. After\nWelsh, the applicant believed he could\nqualify under the Supreme Court's expanded\ndefinition, and requested another Form 150.\nWhen the board returned a Form 150 identical\nto the one he received initially, the applicant\nIV-B-16\n(# 537)\nagain failed to complete it, believing\nthat he could not adaquately express his\nbeliefs on a form designed for members of\norganized religious.\nThis misinformation was often reinforced by the local boards.\n(Case # 2320)\nApplicant failed to complete an outdated\nForm 150 after being told by his local\nboard only members of certain religious sects\nwere eligible. This occurred after the\nWelsh decision.\nThose who did apply for CO status faced a form which asked\nabout the philosophical nature of the applicant's beliefs, their\nrelationship to his religion, and to the manner in which conducted\nhis life. While less-educated persons may have been discouraged from\napplying for C.O. status because of the complexity of the Form 150\nand other factors, the experiences of our applicants who did apply\nreveals no such bias. Of our applicants with college degrees, 28%\napplied for CO status, but only 4% were accepted. Of our applicants\nwith less education, 19% applied, but 10% (more than half) were\naccepted. This may be attributable to the fact that persons with\nmore education usually based their claims on moral and ethical,\nrather than religious grounds, as well as the fact that our appli-\ncants may not have been a representative sample of all C.O. applicants.\nWelsh specifically authorized local boards to grant CO exemptions\nto persons sincerely opposed to war on moral and ethical (i.e.,\nnon-religious) grounds, yet some ( %) of our civilian applicants\nhad possibly valid \"moral and ethical\" CO applications denied after\nIV-B-17\nWelsh. Some local boards may still have relied on a test which\nrequired belief in a supreme being. In one post-Welsh study\nof CO applicants, all those interviewed who failed to express\nbelief in a supreme being had their CO applications denied.\n(Case # 1373)\nApplicant's request for conscientious\nobjector status was denied, partially on\nthe basis that he had no particular re-\nligious training or expreience to establish\nopposition to war. This determination\nwas made after the Supreme Court stated in\nWelsh that such formal religious training\nwas not a prerequisite to conscientious\nobjector status.\nIn contrast, CO applicants who claimed to be members of a pacifist\nreligion enjoyed a 56% success rate throughout the Vietnam era.\nRegistrants associated with recognized pacifist religions - Jehovah's\nWitnesses, Black Muslims, and the Society of Krishna - were also\noccassionally denied CO classification. The basis for denial of\nCO status by Selective Service in these instances was usually lack\nof sincerity. However, in many of these cases, the lack of famili-\narity with the teachings of a particular religion and the lack of\ngeneral acceptance of that religion may have been factors in the\ndenial of CO status. If the local board turned down as applicant's\nCO claim, he could appeal to the state appeals board, However,\nthere were time limits and other procedures which appellante had to\nobserve. Some of our applicants were apparently not advised about\nthese procedures.\nGERALD\nIV-B-18\n(Case # 2317)\nApplicant, a Jehovah's Witnsss, unaware\nof the time limitation on filing notice\nof appeal, continued to gather evidence\nfor his appeal, which was ultimately\ndenied on the procedural grounds of\nfailure to give timely notice of appeal.\nFor many of our applicants, the realization that they were\nconscientiously opposed to war came only after they received an\ninduction notice. This notice often acted as the catalyst which\nled to an introspective examination of the applicant's convictions,\nand a crystalization of his beliefs.\n(Case #3099)\nApplicant stated that \"the induction order\nforced me for the first time to make a\ndecision as to my views with regard to war.\nHowever, when a registrant's request for a change in status came\nafter his induction notice was mailed, his ability to obtain a\nrehearing was considerably limited, because reopening under such\nconditions was prohibited unless the registrant experienced a\nchange in circumstances beyond his control. The question then was\nwhether his \"late crystalization\" constituted a change in circum-\nstances beyond the applicant's control. The local boards were\nsplit on this issue until the Supreme Court spoke in 1971, holding\nin Ehlert V. U.S. (\n) that a post-induction-notice\nclaim for consciencious objector status did not constitute a change\nin circumstances beyond the applicant's control. Accordingly, those\napplicants were left to press their claims in the military after\ninduction.\nIV-B-19\nApproximately one-eight of our civilian applicants did re-\nceive CO exemptions and were assigned to alternative service em-\nployment. Once the draft board recognized that a registrant was\na conscientious objector, it assigned him 24 months alternative\nservice in lieu of induction. Before 1971, there were wide dis-\ncrepancies among states and local draft boards regarding stan-\ndards of appropriate civilian work. One local board might have\nhad a liberal policy of job approval allowing CO's to choose a\nvariety of jobs, while another board might have imposed highly\nrestrictive approval standards. Some individuals had difficulty\nholding alternative service jobs because of personal of family\nproblems. Others decided that they could not, on good conscience,\ncontinue to cooperate with the Selective Service System because of\ntheir opposition to the war.\n(Case # 560)\nApplicant refused to perform alternative\nservice as a protest against the war in\nVietnam, and specifically requested that\nhis probation be revoked for those reasons.\nHowever, most of our applicants assigned to alternative service who\nrefused to accept such assignments from Selective Service did so\nbecause they felt their religion forbade them from cooperating with\nany part of a war effort. These applicants, mostly Jehovah's\nWitnesses, Muslims and Quakers, were prepared to accept an alter-\nnative service assignment ordered by a judge in their sentence upon\nconviction for refusing to perform alternative service. However,\nIV-B-20\nmany judges faced with such a request sentenced them to prison\ninstead.\n(Case # 2336)\nApplicant, a Jehovah's Witness, refused\nto perform alternative service ordered by\nthe Selective Service System, on the grounds\nthat even this attenuated participation in\nthe war effort would violate his religious\nbeliefs; he did indicate that he would\nbe willing to perform similar services\nunder the court's order of probation.\nRather than accept this distinction, the\nJudge sentenced the applicant directly to\nprison for failure to perform alternative\nservice.\nThe Draft Offense\nTo be eligible for the clemency program, our applicants must\nhave committed at least one of six offenses enumerated in the\nExecutive Order. These offenses include the failure to register\n(or register on time), failure to report changes in status\n(primarily changes in address), failure to report for pre-induction\nphysical examination, failure to report for induction, failure to\nsubmit to induction, and failure to perform alternative civilian\nemployment. The Clemency Board could not consider applications of\nthose who had only been convicted of other violations of the\nSelective Service Act making false statements regarding a draft\nclassification; aiding and abetting another to refuse or evade\nregistration or requirements of the Selective Service Act; forging,\ndestroying or mutilating Selective Service documents such as draft\ncards or other official certificates; or failing to carry a draft\ncard or carrying a false draft card. However, because the vast\nmajority of the Selective Service offenses committed during 1964-73\nIV-B-21\nfell within the eligibility requirements of the clemency program,\nmost civilian offenders during that period were eligible for the\nprogram.\nOur typical applicant initially complied with his Selective\nService responsibilities by registering for the draft, submitting\nclassification-requests, and notifying his local board about changes\nin address and other changes in status. Betwwen the ages of 19\nand 21, most of our applicants were classified 1-A. They, like\n350,000 other young men during the peak draft years, were ordered\nto report for induction. Nearly all of our applicants reported\nfor their pre-induction physical examination. It was not until\nthe date of induction, after complying with regulations to the\nfullest extent, that our applicants actually decided to violate the\nSelective Service Law. In fact, of those applicants who received\norders to report for induction, nearly half actually appeared for\ninduction. But, when the time came to take the symbolic step\nforward, these applicants found that their conscience would not\nallow them to participate further in the induction process. At\nthe time of our typical applicant's final decision to violate the\nlaw, he was between the ages of 20 and 22 and the year was 1970-72.\nFor over 95% of these applicants, their failure to comply with the\nSelective Service law was their first offense.\nOur applicants committed draft offenses which fall into three\nbasic categories. The first of these categories, consisting of\nIV-B-22\napproximately 13% of all our applicants, were those who failed\nto register, or to register on time and those who failed to re-\nport changes in status, such as new addresses. Many of these\napplicants did not graduate from high school, having achieved only\nan elementary level of education. In addition, they were often\nraised in economic and family environments which was not likely to\nlead to an appreciation of their Selective Service responsibilities.\nFor example, according to Selective Service regulations and case\nlaw, \"current address\" was the address at which mail would have\nreached the registrant. While use of a false address was a willful\nviolation, forgetfulness was no defense. Furthermore, the local\nboard was under no obligation to find the registrant's current\naddress, and giving the address of a parent or relative was not\nenough to avoid liability.\n(Case # 822)\nThe applicant's induction notice was sent by\nhis local board to his mother. The letter\nwas returned to the local board and sub-\nsequently the mother telephoned a new\naddress to the local board. Local board\nmail still failed to reach the applicant,\nand he was indicted and convicted of failure\nto keep the board informed of his address.\nThe last address his mother gave the local\nboard was correct, but the court did not\naccept the applicant's defense that mail did\nnot reach him because his name was not on the\nmail box.\nHowever, most of our applicants in this category committed their\noffenses because of their unintentional misunderstanding of Selective\nService obligations.\nIV-B-23\n(Case # 3151)\nThe applicant registered for the\ndraft and subsequently moved to a new\naddress. He reported his change of address to\nthe local post office but did not specifi-\ncally notify his local board. He stated\nthat he thought this action fulfilled his\nobligation to notify his local board in\nwriting of address changes.\nThe second category of offenses committed by our applicants\nincludes those who failed to perform required alternative civilian\nemployment, comprising 13% of our civilian applicants. Typically,\nthe applicant received a conscientious objection exemption from\nhis local board because of his membership in a widely recognized\nPacifist religious group as Jehovah's Witness, Black Muslim or the\nSociety of Friends. These applicants complied with all Selective\nService requirements prior to receipt of an order from Selective\nService to report to a designated civilian job for two years work\nof national importance, intended as a substitute for military ser-\nvice these applicants refused to accept employment because they\nbelieved that because of its relationship to the war effort, such\nwork would compromise their religious principles. However, as an\nindication of their acceptance of their continuing responsibili-\nties as citizens, most of these applicants indicated at the time of\ntheir offense that they would perform alternative service, as long\nas it was at the direction of the courts.\nAlmost three-quarters of our applicants fell into the third\ncategory of offenses which relate to the induction process. This\ncategory includes those who failed to report for their pre-induction\nIV-B-24\nphysical examination, failed to report for induction, or failed\nto submit to induction. Applicants in this category represent\napproximately 74% of all our applicants. Following their classi-\nfication as 1-A, these applicants were ordered by their local\nboards to report for pre-induction examinations, which only 4% of\nour applicants failed to do. Subsequent to passing the pre-induction\nexamination, our applicant received orders to report for induction.\nOnce induction was ordered, a postponement of the induction date,\ncould have been sought but would not have invalidated the original\norder to report for induction, even if the inductee passed his\ntwenty-sixth birthday in the interim. Once the induction order\nwas issued and after all postponements were exhausted he had a con-\ntinuing duty to report for induction, although it was often the\npractice of the Selective Service to issue several induction orders\nbefore filing a complaint with the district attorney, and many of\nour applicants received two or three induction orders. Approximately\n38% of our applicants failed to report for induction, but nearly\nthe same percentage decided to appear at the induction station for\ninitial processing Until the final step in this process, the oath\nof induction into the Armed Forces and the symbolic step forward,\nthe inductee is under civilian control. It was at this final stage\nof the process that the remaining one-third of our civilian appli-\ncants broke the law.\nIV-B-25\nNumerous reasons were given by our applicants for their\noffenses. The most frequent of-their-reasons was their con-\nscientious objection to war in either general or particular form.\nFifty-seven percent expressed either religious, ethical or moral\nobjection to all war, and an additional 14% expressed specific\nobjection to the Vietnam War. When other related reasons were\nconsidered, (such as denial of CO status), 81% of our civilian\napplicants committed their offenses for reasons related to their\nopposition to war. Expressions of conscience were found by the\nClemency Board to be valid mitigating circumstances in nearly four-\nfifths of these cases. By contrast, less than one out of six of\nall our civilian applicants were found by the Board to have committed\ntheir offenses for obviously manipulative and selfish reasons.\nOther major reasons given by our civilian applicants for their offense\ninclude procedural errors and denial of CO status (5%), various\nmedical problems (6%) and family or personal problems (10%). In\nevaluating these reasons, we found that both family/personal prob-\nlems and medical problems were determined to be mitigating in\nnearly all the cases in which applicants raised them. Surprisingly,\nprocedural errors and improper denial of CO status were found in\nnearly one fifth of all cases, a far greater proporation than one\nwould expect from the reasons given by our applicants. This large\ndiscrepancy was probably due to the unfamiliarity of most of our\napplicants with either Selective Service procedures or CO requirement\nIV-B-26\nThus, many of our applicants probably were never aware that\nthe disposition of their cases by Selective Service might have\nbeen either incorrect or not according to established procedure.\nExperiences as a Fugitive\nAt one time or another, our applicants faced the difficult\ndecision whether to submit to the legal process or become a\nfugitive. Nearly two-thirds of our applicants immediately surren-\ndered themselves to the authorities. Of the remaining one-third\nwho did not immediately surrender, the vast majority never left\ntheir hometown. Of the 18% of our applicants who left their\nhometowns to evade the draft, slightly less then half ever left\nthe United States. Most of our at-large civilian applicants re-\nmained fugitives for less than one year. Many reconsidered their\ninitial decisions to flee. About one-third surrendered, and many\nof the rest were apprehended only because they lived openly at\nhome and made no efforts to avoid arrest. Over two-thirds of our\nat-large applicants were employed full-time; most others were\nemployed part-time, and only one out of ten was unemployed. Only\na small percentage assumed false identities or took steps to hide from\nauthorities.\nMost of our fugitive applicants who chose to go abroad went\nto Canada. Geographical proximity was one reason why some of our\napplicants chose Canada, and the similarity in culture, history\nIV-B-27\nand language was another. However, the major reason for the large\nemigration of American draft-resisters to Canada was the openness\nof their immigration laws. After 1965, when the Pearson govern-\nment accepted 1,700 American resisters (largely draft resisters)\nas landed immigrants, the Canadian government instituted a liberal\nimmigration policy toward American draft resisters and military\ndeserters. In 1967, Prime Minister Pearson's Parlimentary Secre-\ntary of the Department of Manpower and Immigration told the\nCanadian House of Commons that \"an individual's status with regard to\ncompulsory military service in his own country has no bearing upon\nhis admissibility to Canada either as an immigrant or as a visitor. \"\nThe\npresent policy toward American draft resistors and mili-\ntary deserters was announced by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1969:\n\"Canada will become a refuge from militarism.\"\nThe living conditions of draft-related emigres varied con-\nsiderably. Many existed as transients, at first living in hotels\nand on the road. Others lived in Canadian homes until they were\nable to support themselves. With the average pay close to ten to\nthirty percent less than the income received in the United States\nand the unemployment rates nearly identical, many American emigres\nwere forced to live from donation but some found excellent jobs as\nand\nschool teachers, plumbers A carpenters, and many went back to school.\nOnce settled, the living conditions the draft evader experienced\nin Canada were very similar to those found in the United States.\nIV-B-28\nSince 1964, many efforts were made to tabulate the total\nnumber of civilian draft resistors and military deserters. The\nestimates varied widely,\nranging\nfrom 2,000 to 25,000\nto 100,000\nthe State Department announced in 1970 that there\nwere only 2,000. A list released by the Justice Department in Jan\nof 1975 showed that there remained only 4,400 Vietnam-era draft-\nlaw violators anywhere in the world who were subject to criminal pro-\nsecution.\nThere are several explanations for these discrepancies. For\none, political motivations might have influenced both government\nand private figures during the war cra. In addition, the counting\nmethods used by all sources are certainly not infallible. The\nCanadian exile figures of up to 100,000 were derived by counting the\nnumber of files on newly arrived American emigrants at the aid\ncenters strategically placed near the United States border, many of\nwhich included Americans who emigrated to Canada for reasons other\nthan the draft or AWOL related offenses. A few aid centers kept\nfiles on American draft-age males without asking them whether a\nfile had been previously started at another center. For these reasons,\nmany were counted twice, some even perhaps even more. Speculation\nbased upon our sample of applicants and the Department of Defense's\nsample of its applicants (and assuming that virtually all of the\nDepartment of Justice applicants are Canadian exiles), would indicate\nthat only about 8,000 out of 123,000 persons eligible for the\nIV-B-29\nPresident's program were ever Canadian exiles. There may have\nbeen others against whom complaints were issued but no indictments\never brought, who are now free to come home without penalty.\nExperience with the Judicial Process\nFiling of the complaint. Our applicant began to face court\naction when his local draft board determined that sufficient evidence\nof a Selective Service violation existed to warrant the forwarding\nof his file to the United States attorney. Between 1964 and\n1974, 209,000 cases were referred by Selective Service to the\nDepartment of Justice for prosecution; of that number, only 25,000\nindictments were returned. This startling figure can be par-\ntially explained by the practice of allowing violators to enlist\nrather than face prosecution; another major factor was the\nunwillingness of local U.S. Attorneys to prosecute draft cases\nwhich were increasingly unpopular, weak, and of relatively low priority.\n2. Disposition of Draft Cases\na. Dismissals, After a complaint was filed by Selective Service\nand an indictment returned against our applicant's both the courts\nand the Justice Department determined whether further prosecution was\nwarranted. Statistics from the Justice Department show that a large\nnumber of cases were dropped after indictment because of faulty\nSelective Service processing or recordkeeping. For instance, draft\nrecords were routinely destroyed when a registrant reached age 26.\nIV-B-30\nTherefore, unless the records were separated, his files were\ndestroyed and prosecution rendered impossible.\nThe courts dismissed draft cases for many reasons. Many\ndismissals represent cases involving legal flaws in which the\ndefendants \"committed no Selective Service violation at all, be--\ncause the induction orders they refused were illegal as determined\nauthoritatively by federal courts and U. S. attorneys.' \" Included\namong these defendants are those who were called by their local\ndraft boards earlier than usual or by mistake. In addition, in\ndistricts where careful pre-indictment investigations were the\nexception rather than the rule, cases were dismissed where it was\nfound that the defendant never received his orders to report or where\nthe local draft board never requested that the defendant be pro-\nsecuted.\nAnalysis of the number of cases and the dismissal rate during\nthe years 1968 1974 reveals a continuous increase in both the num-\nber of cases and the dismissal rate (except for 1974). Through\n1968, only about 25% of all cases resolved in dismissal. From\n1969 through 1972, about 55% were dismissed --- and in 1973, over\ntwo-thirds were dismissed.\nGERALD\nOne important element influencing the dismissal rate in par\nticular jurisdictions was the practice of forum shopping. Many\ndefendants searched for judges with a reputation for leniency or\nIV-B-31\na tendency to dismiss draft cases. As an example, the Northern\nDistrict of California was known for its willingness to dismiss\ndraft indictments on minor technicalities. Since 1970, nearly\n70% of the cases tried in that court resulted in dismissal or\nacquittal. At that time, many young men transferred their draft\norders to the Oakland induction center before refusing induction,\nthus enabling them to try their cases in the Northern District.\nIn 1970, this dismiss averaged 48.9 draft cases per 10,000 population\ncompared the national average of 14.1; the Central District of\nCalifornia closely followed with 43.1. Some apparently \"Forum\nShopped in California and other Western states; Five percent of\nthem received their convictions in the Ninth Circuits, even though\ntheir homes were elsewhere.\nJurisdictional inequities in the dismissal rate for draft offenses\nwithin the same state were common during the war era. For example, in\ncontrast to the dismissal rate in the Northern District of California\n(70%), the Eastern District of California dismissed only 40% of\nits draft cases. Similarly,\n.n the Eastern District of\nVirginia 63% of the draft cases were dismissed, versus only 35% in\nthe Western District.\nConvictions and Acquitals\nAfter our applicants were indicted and their motions for dis-\nmissal refused, many indicted draft violations pled not guilty,\nand they next entered the trial stage. Nearly three-fourths of our\nIV-B-32\napplicants pled either guilty or nolo contendre. The emotional\nand financial drain of a protracted trial was certainly a\nfactor in this decision, as was the availability of a plea bargain,\nespecially in those jurisdictions where the U.S Attorney routinely\nbrought multiple-count indictments.\nOf the 21,400 draft law violators who stood trial during the\nVietnam era, 12,700 were acquitted. From our applicants statis-\ntics, it appears that a person pleading not guilty to a draft\noffense stood only a 15% chance of conviction. Not surprisingly,\nnone of our applicants were among the 12,700 fortunate persons\nwho were acquitted of draft charges. There were many reasons for\nthese acquittals. In 1970-71, an increasing number of draft defen-\ndants were acquitted because of irregular or unconstitutional pro--\ncedures used by local draft boards. Many of those acquitted were\nsubjected to deliberately accelerated draft calls because they\nwere regarded as troublemakers. The Supreme Court struck down this\npractice in Gutnecht V. U.S 18, by holding that punitive reclassi-\nfication was \"blatantly lawless. 11 Acquittals often occurred when\nlocal draft boards or state appeal boards failed to consider requests\nfor medical deferments based on disqualifying conditions such as\nAstma. A number of acquittals also were obtained when it was found\nthat the local board did not follow proper procedures, such as failure\nto state reasons for denying substantial claims for conscientious\nIV-B-33\nobjector or hardship status and failure to provide adequate ad-\nrights.\nIn 1970 the Supreme Court in Welsh\nbroadened the conscien-\ntious objection exemption by ruling that strongly held non-religi-\nous pacifist beliefs qualified for the exemption. For some time\nafter this decision, Selective Service gave inadequate advice to\nlocal boards on the effect of this and other decisions. This lack\nof guidance resulted in acquittals for those post-Welsh denials of\nconscientious objection status which were based on pre-Welsh grounds.\nAs described earlier, many of our applicants might have qualified\nfor this type of acquittal.\nAnother significant factor in the increased rate of acquittals\nwas the increased level of activity by competent attorneys in the\nfield of Selective Service law. By 1970, anti-war feelings made\nit respectable for attorneys to represent draft violators. Draft\ncounseling centers were also better able to recommend lawyers well\nversed in Selective Service law.\nOur typical applicant was convicted at the age of 23, nearly\ntwo years after his initial offense. Less than one out of ten of\nour applicants appealed his conviction. An analysis of thse con-\nvictions rates shows clear jurisdictional discrepancies. For in-\nstance, the Southern states had the highest propensity for conviction,\nwith the Eastern states and California having the lowest. In 1972\nIV-B-34\nthere were 27 draft cases tried in Connecticut, with only one\nresulting in conviction. In the Northern District of Alabama\nduring the same period, 16 draft cases resulted in 12 convictions.\nThese different conviction rates apparently occurred because of wide\ndifferences in attitude toward the draft violators. Regardless of\nthe explanation, it is clear that these differences in treatment\nencouraged wide scale forum shooping by our applicants.\nThe conviction rate itself varied considerably during the war\nera. In 1968, the conviction rate for violators of the Selective\nService Act was 66%; by 1974, the conviction rate was cut in half\nto 33%. Apparently, as time went by, prosecutors, judges and juries\nhad less and less enthusiasm for convicting draft-law violators.\nIV-V-35\nSentence:\nThe first aspect of the draft and judicial systems which often\ndealt favorably with our applicants was the sentence of the District Court\nJudge. Only about one-third of our applicants ever went to prison. A\nbreakdown of the length of incarceration for our applicants is as follows:\nNo incarceration - 67%\n1-6months - 15%\n7-12 months - 5%\n13-18 months - 8%\n20-22 months - 5%\nThe sentencing provisions of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967\nprovided for jail terms ranging from zero to 5 years, giving judges almost\nunlimited sentencing discretion. The sentencing dispositions of the courts\nwere inconsistent and widely varying, dependent to a great extent upon year\nof conviction geography, race, and religion. In 1968,\n% of all convicted\ndraft offenders were sentenced to prison, their average sentence was 37 months,\nand 13% received the maximum 5-year sentence. By 1974, only 22% were sentenced\nto prison, their average sentence was just 15 months, and no one received the\nmaximum. Geographic ineqaities were almost as striking: In 1968, almost\none-third of those convicted in the southern-states 5th Circuit received\nthe maximum 5-year prison sentence contrasted with only 5% receiving the\nmaximum in the castern-states 2nd Circuit. During the early years of draft\noffense trials in 1968, of 33 convicted Selective Service violators in\nOregon 18 were put on probation, and only one was given a sentence over 3 years.\nIn Southern Texas, of 16 violators, none were put on probation, 15 out of 16\nreceived at least 3 years and 14 received the maximum 5-year sentence. 21/\nGERALD\nIV-V-36\nOther sentencing inequities occured on the basis of race. In 1972, the\naverage sentence for all incarcerated Selective Service violators was\n33.5. months while for blacks and other minorities the average sentence\nwas 45.1 a disparity which decreased to a difference of slightly more\nthan two months in 1974. The average length of sentence for our black\napplicants were\ncompared to\nfor white applicants.\nSome religious inequities may also have occurred. For the years 1966 through\n1969 incarcerated Jehovah's Witness received sentences averaging about 1 month\nlonger than the average Selective Service violators. During this same period,\nreligious objectors other than Jehovah's Witness received average sentences\nabout 6 months shorter than the average violator.\nAlthough a variety of sentencing procedures were available, the majority\nof convicted Selective Service violators were sentenced under normal adult\nprocedures. If the offender were sentenced to jail, two types of sentence were\navailable: (1) a sentence of definite time during which he might be paroled\nafter serving 1/3 of his term; or (2) an indeterminate sentence during which\nparole eligibility might be determined by a judge on the Board of Parole at\na date before, but not after 1/3 of the sentence had expired. Under the Youth\nCorrection Act, the convicted defendant might be unconditionally discharged\nbefore the end of the period of probation or commitment. This discharge\nautomatically operated to set aside the conviction. Because commitments and\nprobations under the Youth Corrections Act were indeterminate, the period of\nsupervison might have lasted as long as six years. Bureau of prison statistics\nindicate, however, that the Youth Corrections Act was used as a sentencing\nprocedure only in 10% of all violation cases. When it was applied, the six\nyear maximum period of supervison was imposed in almost all cases.\nIV-V-37\nPrison Experience: Over one-third of our applicants received prison\nsentences and were incarcerated, some for periods of up to five years.\nSince very little information is available concerning the treatment of\nSelective Service violators, we relied upon a brief survey of prison officials\nacross the country to provide us with some evidence of the experience of\nour applicants in prison. Although this survey was not scientific and\ncomprehensive, it did reveal the possible lack of uniformity in handling\ndraft violators accross the country.\nDuring the early years of the Vietnam war, Jehovah's Witnesses rather\nthan other draft resisters filled the prisons. Jehovah's Witnesses were\nideal prisoners because of their adaptability and tendency to avoid creating\nsecurity problems. Most officials in our survey stated that Jehovah's\nWitnesses were selective about their associates, either sticking with one\nanother or living alone. Other draft violators with other than religious\nreasons for their offenses experienced greater difficulty adapting to prison life.\nThe first prison in our survey was a Northeastern prison. This prison\nofficial stated that around 1970, as the climate changed on the outside, the\nmen on the inside became more vocal. Stressing unity in numbers, this official\nfound that draft violators were no longer a strange breed. They started\nto meet and socialize with each other and attempt to organize protests,\nwhich usually were not permitted. Draft violators tended to gravitate toward\nthe Inmate Grievance committee and, by 1971, they were less cooperative and\nmore disruptive. While this prison official denied that homosexual attacks\nwere directed specifically against draft violators, he did characterize the\nvast majority of them as \"young, not streetwise, pacifist and intellectual,\"\nthus \"drawing attention\" from hardened criminals.\nIV-V-38\nA prison official in a Midwestern prison admitted that the draft\nviolators were \"not the most popular individuals\" and caused staff resentment.\nHe stated that because most of the other inmates were conservative, \"waving\nthe red, white and blue,\" who tried to isolate the draft violators. While\nhe spoke highly of the Jehovah's Witnesses, he believed that draft violators\ndid not adjust as well to incarceration. The draft violators were placed in\nminimum custody and were neither particularly \"vocal\" nor organized enough\nto make protests.\nA Southern Prison official admitted that both his staff and the surrounding\nresidents were conservative, an attitude reflected in prison life. The draft\nviolators were subject to severe peer pressure. If they tried to expound\non their beliefs, they were subject to ridicule from the other inmates.\nAnyone who spoke out against the war was considered \"weird,\" so draft resisters\nstayed among themselves. They experienced some difficulty adjusting to prison\nlife and, because of their passive nature, required support and encouragement.\nAlthough the prison maintained a work release program, draft violators were\nnot allowed to participate in the 1960's because of adverse community reaction\nto them.\nOur final prison interview was with an official in a Western prison.\nThis official stated that the draft violators located in his prison generally\nposed no threat to security, adjusted well and abided by the rules and\nregulations. Although they had the potential to be influential and disruptive\nbecause of their higher educational level, they were not. This official thought\nthey were more well-liked than draft violators during World War II. Their\nacceptability was attributed to the easygoing atmosphere of the surrounding\ncommunity. Although anti-war ceremonies were not permitted at the prison,\nthis official claimed no punishment or retaliation resulted from criticism\nof the war. He stated that draft violators were not excluded from work release\nIV-V-39\nprograms, but because they showed less need than other inmates, few expressed\nany desire to participate.\nIt appears that the draft violator faced the same pressure, boredom\nand loneliness as other inmates. Most reports from incarcerated draft\nviolators themselves show that their strategy was a typical prison strategy:\nsurvival. This was hardly unique in view of the need for a callous and\nconformist response to a life-style of confinement. Whether a particular\nprejudice was directed toward them seemed to be a problem of locale.\nWhile the Clemency Board has discovered no evidence of wide scale\nmistreatment of draft violators in federal prisons, isolated instances of\nharsh treatment occurred.\nCase #1210\nApplicant was arrested in Arizona and extradited to\nthe Canal Zone for trial (location of his local board).\nPrior to trial, he was confined for four months in an\nunairconditioned four by six foot cell in a hot jungle.\nSome evidence exists that the applicant was denied the\nfull opportunity to post reasonable bail. At his\ntrial the applicant was convicted and sentenced to an\nadditional two months confinement. By the time of his\nrelease, the applicant's mental and physical health\nsubstantially deteriorated and he was confined in a\nmental hospital for several months. The applicant is\npresently back in society but his mental health is still\na subject of great concern.\nSome could not excape the effects of their prison experience even after\ntheir release.\nCase # 0059) Applicant became addicted to herion while serving the prison\nsentence for his draft conviction. Unable to legitimately\nsupport his habit after he was released, he turned to\ncriminal activities. He was later convicted of robbery,\nand returned to prison.\nThe parole grant rates for Selective Service violators, like all other\nprisoners, was determined categorically: it depended primarily on the nature\nof their offense and not on individualized aspects of their personal history\nor their imprisonment. It was the policy of many parole boards that draf t\nIV-V-40\nviolators serve a minimum of two years for parity with military duty, but\nmost Selective Service violators were released after their initial parole\napplication. Jehovah's Witnesses received first releases in nearly all\ninstances. The majority of those serving prison sentences over one year\nwere released on parole whereas the great majority of those with prison\nsentences less than one year served until their normal expiration date.\nMost Selective Service violators were granted parole after serving approximately\nhalf their prison sentences. This is higher than the national average for\nall crimes, including rape and kidnapping. However, in each year from 1965\nto 1974, Selective Service violators were granted parole more often than\nother federal criminals.\nConsequences of The Felony Conviction\nA felony conviction had many grave ramifications for our applicants.\nThe overwhelming majority of states construe a draft offense as a felony,\ndenying our applicants the right to vote -- or, occasionally, just suspending\nit during confinement. Some of the consequences of felony conviction are\nless well known. In some states, for example, a felon lacks the capacity\nto sue, although he or his representative may be sued; he may be unable to\nexecute judicially enforceable instruments or to serve as a court appointed\njudiciary; he may be prohibited from participation in the judicial process as\na witness or a juror. A lesser known consequence of a felony conviction\nmight be that he may even lose certain domestic rights, such as his right to\nexercise parental responsibility. For example, six states permit the adoption\nof an ex- convict's children without his consent. The principle disability\narising from a felony conviction is usually its effect upon employment\nopportunities. This effect is widespread among employers. One study found\nonly one employer out of 25 willing to hire a convicted felon. Often,\nIV-V-41\nthis job discrimination is reinforced by statute. States license close to\n4,000 occupations, with close to half requiring \"good moral character\"\nas a condition to receiving the license; therefore, convicted felons are\noften barred from such occupations as accountant, architect, cosmetologist,\ndry cleaner and barber.\nCase #1256)\nApplicant, a third year law student, was told he could\nnot be admitted to the bar because of his draft conviction.\nEven more severe restrictions exist in the public employment section.\nCase # 2448 Applicant graduated from college, but was unable to find\nwork comparable to his education because of his draft\nconviction. He qualified for a job with the Post Office\nbut was then informed that his draft conviction rendered\nhim ineligible.\nCase #1277\nApplicant qualified for a teaching position, but the\nlocal board of education refused to hire him on the basis\nof his draft conviction. The Board later reversed its\nposition at the urging of applicant's attorney and the\nlocal federal judge.\nDespite this, our civilian applicants generally fared reasonable well\nin the job market. Nearly three out of four applicants were employed either\nfull time or part time when they applied for clemency. In fact, only 2% of\nour civilian applicants were unemployed at the time of their application.\nThe remainder of our applicants had returned to school (13%), were presently\nincarcerated ( %), or were furloughed by prison officials pending disposition\nof their cases by our Board ( %).\n/ HU U\nIV. PCB APPLICANTS\nC. OUR MILITARY APPLICANTS\nIV-C-1\nC. Our Military Applicants\nDuring the Vietnam War, 7,500,000 individuals served in uniform.\nMost served well under difficult circumstances, and 94% received\nHonorable Discharges. One-third of them served in Vietnam, where\n56,000 lost their lives and 300,000 were wounded. Almost one in\ntwelve Vietnam era servicemembers -- 500,000 -- went AWOL (\"Absent\nWithout Official Leave\") one or more times. Almost half of the\nAWOL offenders were absent for less than 30 days. Usually, they\nwere reprimanded or given a minor (non-judicial) punishment.\nMore than one half of these offenders -- 325,000 -- left their\nunits for more than 30 consecutive days, thereby giving rise to\nadministrative classification as deserters;\" over 10,000 never\nreturned. Of those who did return, about one-third (123,000) faced\ncourt-martial charges. Many (55,000) avoided trial by accepting a\n\"For the Good of the Service\"- discharge, while another 68,000\ndid stand trial, with all but 500 found guilty. The majority\n(42,500) of those found guilty were punished and returned to their\nunits; the others were adjudged Bad Conduct (23,000) or Dishonorable\n(2,000) Discharges. The remaining 63,000 had established a pattern\nof misconduct which prompted an administrative discharge: 43,000\nwere given General Discharges for Unsuitability, and 20,000 received\nUndesirable Discharges for Unfitness.\nThe President's clemency program included the 100,000 who\nhad received Undesirable, Bad Conduct, or Dishonorable Discharges --\nA 30 day absence subjects a serviceman to the maximum punishment\nauthorized for an Article 86 UCMJ, absence without leave offense.\nJudicial proof of desertion, however, requires more than proof of\n30 day absence.\n**/ \"For the Good of the Service\" discharges were commonly known to us\nas discharges \"in lieu of court-martial\" described in service regu\nlations. SEE: Army Regulation 635-200, Chapter 10.\nIV-C-2\nplus the 10, 115 who were still at large. Their offenses were often\nvery serious -- some AWOLs were for as long as seven years -- and\nmany were repeat offenders. This group comprised only one-sixth\nof all AWOL offenders and one-third of all desertion offenders\nduring the Vietnam War.\nIn the discussion which follows, we trace the general\nexperiences of our military applicants. In sequence, we look\nat the following:\n1. Background\n2. Induction or Enlistment in the Armed Forces\n3. Early Experiences in the Military\n4. Requests for Leave, Reassignment, or Discharge\n5. Assignment to Vietnam\n6. AWOL offenses\n7. Encounters with the Military Justice System\n8. Effects of a less than Honorable Discharge\n1.\nBackground\nOur military applicants were raised in small towns or on\nfarms (40%), and a disproportionate number (30%) came from the\nSouth. Generally, they came from disadvantaged environments.\nMany (60%) grew up in a broken home struggling to cope with a\nlow income (57%). Most were white, but a disproportionate per-\ncentage were black (21%) and Spanish-speaking (4%). Their average\nIQ was very close to the national average. Nonetheless, over\nthree-quarters dropped out of high school before joining the\nservice, while less than one-half of one percent graduated from\ncollege. Despite the common belief that our applicants resisted\nthe war, our applicants were not articulate, well-educated\nopponents of the war; almost none of them (0.2%) had applied for\na conscientious objector draft classification before entering the\nmilitary.\n2.\nInduction or Enlistment in the Military\nOur applicants began their military careers at an early\nage. Almost one-third enlisted at age 17, and over three-quarters\nwere in uniform by their 20th birthday. Most (84%) enlisted\nrather than be drafted. Our applicants represented the Army\n(63%), the Marines (23%), and to a lesser degree, the Navy (12%)\nand the Air Force (3%).\nThe reasons for enlistment varied from draft pressure to\nthe desire to learn a trade, to the simple absence of anything\nelse to do. Many of them saw the military as an opportunity to\nbecome more mature.\nIV-C-3\n(Case #00148) Applicant enlisted after high school becuase he did not\nwant to go to college or be inducted into the Army.\n(Case #02483) Applicant enlisted to obtain specialized training\nto become a microwave technician.\n(Case #00179) Applicant enlisted at age 17 because he wanted a place to\neat and a roof over his head.\n(Case #00664) Applicant enlisted because he was getting into trouble all\nthe time and felt that service life might settle him down.\nAs the Vietnam war expanded America's military manpower needs, the pres-\nsures on recruiters became very intense. Many recruiters were helpful to our\napplicants by arranging entry into the preferred military occupational speci-\nality and geographic area of assignment.*\n(Case #00356) Applicant enlisted at age 17 for motor maintenance training,\nbut instead was trained as a cook. This action caused him disappointment\nand frustration. His grandmother contended that he was misled by the\nrecruiter.\n(Case #01371) Applicant started drinking at age 13 and was an excessive\nuser of alcohol. He was expelled from two schools after getting into\ntrouble with teachers because of his dislike and disrespect for authority.\nHe was turned down for enlistment by the Air Force. The Naval Recruiting\nOfficer told him to omit these facts from his application for enlistment\nin the Navy.\nPROJECT 100,000\nBefore the Vietnam War, the military generally had not accepted persons\nfor enlistment or induction if they had Category IV scores on their AFQT\ntest, imposing an enlistment barrier at the 30th percentile. Some individuals SC\ning between the 15th and 30th percentiles were brought into the service\nunder project STEP.\nIn August, 1966, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara announced\nProject 100,000 \"to use the training establishment of the Armed Forces to\n*The press for manpower led to improp rieties by recruiters and misunder-\nstandings by enlistees, which some of our applicants claimed were justi-\nfications for their unauthorized absences.\n**The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)\nwas the basic test for\nmental qualification for service in the military, administered at the Armed\nForces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES).\nIX-C4\nhelp certain young men become more productive citizens when\nthey return to civilian life.\" Like STEP, Project 100,000\noffered the opportunity and obligation of military service\nto marginally qualified persons by reducing mental and medical\nstandards governing eligibility. During its first year, 40,000\nsoldiers entered the military under this program. Thereafter,\nit lived up to its name by enabling 100,000 marginally qualified\nsoldiers to join the service each year.\nMilitary studies have indicated that the opportunity for\ntechnical training was the principal motivation for the enlist-\nment of Category IV soldiers. However, over half enlisted at\nleast party because of the draft pressure. Other reasons for\nenlistment were to travel, obtain time to find out what to do\nwith one's life, serve one's country, and enjoy educational\nbenefits after leaving the service. Despite their eagerness for\nvocational training, many Category IV soldiers soon found them-\nselves being trained in the combat arms -- skills of little\nsignificance in the civilian job market. Almost 40% of all\nsoldiers in combat arms positions in 19 had Category IV AFQT\nscores\nHowever, some of our less educated applicants did\nlearn marketable skills, and 13% received a high school equivalency\ncertificate while in the service.\nIVC-5\nAlmost one-third of our applicants (32%) were allowed to join the\nmilitary despite pre-enlistment AFQT scores at or below the 30th percentile,\nincluding one half of 1% whose scores were below the 10th percentile and who\nwere generally statutorily ineligible for military service.\n(Case No. 00847) Applicant had an AFQT of 11 and a GT (IQ score ) of\n61 at enlistment. He successfully completed basic\ntraining, but went AWOL shortly thereafter.\n(Case No. 0229) Applicant had an 8th grade education and an AFQT of\n11. From a broken home, he was enthusiastic about\nhis induction into the Army, believing that he would\nhave financial security and would receive technical\ntraining. His lack of physical agility and difficulties\nin reading and writing caused him to fail basic training\nHe was in BCT for nine months before he was sent to\nAIT as a tank driver. He continued to have learning\nproblems in advanced training. This problem was\ncompounded by the ridicule of his peers who discovered\nthat he required several months to complete basic\ntraining.\nNot all of our Category IV applicants joined the service because of\nProject 100,000. Some had other test scores qualifying them for enlistment\nunder the earlier standards. Nonetheless, we suspect that many of our\napplicants would never have been in the service were it not for Project 100,00\nOur Category IV applicants tended to be from disadvantaged circumstances\nCompared to our other applicants, they were predominantly Black or Spanish-\nspeaking (42% vs. 18%)* and grew up in cities (55% vs. 44%). Their families\nstruggled with low incomes (72% VS. 49%), and they dropped out of high school\n(75% vs. 56%). The quality of their military service was about the same as\nthat of our other applicants; however, they had no more punishments for\nnon-AWOL offenses (53% VS. 52%) or non-AWOL charges pending at time of dischar\n(13% VS. 12%). Despite this, a greater percentage received administrative\nUndesirable Discharges (68% VS. 57%).\n*\nThe first figure is the percentage of the Category IV soldiers, the second\nrefers to all other soldiers.\nIV-C-6\nWe saw only the failures of Project 100,000 -- never its successes.\nIf our applicants were representative of all 100,000 discharged and fugitive\nservicemen eligible for clemency, 35,000 of the latter had Category IV AFQT\nscores. Of all Category IV soldiers during the Vietnam Era,\n% committed\nAWOL offenses and were eligible for clemency. Of all Category I - II soldiers,\n% committed AWOL offenses and were eligible for clemency.\n3. Early Experiences in the Military\nOur applicant's first encounter with the military was in basic training.\nIt was during these first weeks that our applicants had to learn the regimen\nand routine of military life. For many, this was their first experience away\nfrom home and the first time they faced such intense personal responsibilities.\nSome of our applicants did not adjust well to the demands placed on them.\nHomesickness and emotional trauma found expression ranging from commonplace\ncomplaints and tears, to the more unusual conduct:\n(Case No. 02483) Applicant went on aimless wanderings prior to advanced\ntraining. He finally lost control of himself and\nknocked out 20 windows in the barracks with his bare\nhands, resulting in numerous wounds to himself.\nEthnic and cultural differences among recruits posed problems for others\nwho did not get along well in the close quarters of the barracks environment.\n(No. 0309)\nDuring boot camp, applicant, of Spanish heritage,\nwas subjected to physical and verbal abuse. He recalls\nbeing called \"chili bean\" and \"Mexican chili\". His\nineptness also made him the butt of his boot camp unit.\nHe wept at his trial when he recalled his early\nexperiences that led to his AWOL.\n(No. 10125)\nApplicant's version of his various problems is that he\ncould no longer get along in the Marine Corps. Other\nMarines picked on him because he was Puerto Rican, and\nwouldn't permit him to speak Spanish to other Puerto\nRicans and finally they tried to get him into trouble\nwhen he refused to let them \"push\" him around.\nWomen, in particular had unique problems.\n**\nSince 63% of our applicants were Army, our discussion will center (unless\notherwise specified) on Army procedures, which differ in degree from other\nservices, but not in substance.\nIV-C-7\n(Case No. 00704) Applicant was a high school graduate with a Category I\nAFQT score and a GT (IQ test) score of 145. She\ncomplained that other soldiers harrassed her without\ncause and accused her of homosexuality. She departed\nAWOL to avoid the pressure.\nIncidents of AWOL during basic training usually resulted in minor forms\nof punishment. Typically, a new recruit would receive a non-judicial punishment\nresulting in restriction, loss of pay, or extra duty. Seven percent of our\napplicants were discharged because of an AWOL commencing during basic training.\nFollowing basic training, pressures on the average soldier with family\nor personal problems may have increased, incidental to a transfer to another\nunit for advanced or on the job training. Altogether, 10% of our applicants\nwere discharged for an AWOL begun during advanced training. Individual\ntransfers resulted in breaking up units and frequently intense personal friend-\nships. The AWOL rate tended to be higher for soldiers \"in transit\" to new\n/\nassignments.\nMany of our applicants were discouraged by training in an occupational\nspeciality they feared would lead to Vietnam assignments. Others were trained\nin jobs which they found unsatisfying and some of our applicants were given\ndetails which made no use of their newly-earned skills.\n(Case No. 9488) Applicant found himself pulling details and mowing\ngrass rather than working in his military occupational\nspeciality. He then went home and did not return for\nover three years.\n*\nScheduling of schools, formation of units, personnel transfers and other\nadministrative actions may have led to delays, assignments to transient\nbillets, and temporary details of newly trained personnel to duties not\nutilizing their skills. Also, military life, especially for lower ranking\nenlisted personnel, required the performance of certain duties for which\nno training was required, such as kitchen patrol and area cleanups.\nIV-1-8\nOthers were still having difficulty adjusting to the many demands\nof military life. As in civilian employment circles, a daily routine had to\nbe followed, superiors had to be treated with respect and orders had to be\nobeyed. The civilian's or service-member's failure to comply with these\nexpectations could result in his being fired, with attendant loss of pay,\npromotability and status, or transfer. But the servicemen may have violated\nviolated military custom or law which could lead to\ndisciplinary action. Altogether, over half (53%) of our applicants were\npunished for one or more military offenses other than AWOL which would not\nhave been criminal offenses in civilian life. Only 3% were punished for\nmilitary offenses comparable to civilian crimes (such as theft or vandalism).\n(Case No. 14392) Applicant had difficulty adjusting to the regimentation\nof Army life. While he was in the service, he felt that\nhe needed to have freedom of action at all times. He\nwould not take guidance from anyone, was repeatedly\ndisrespectful, and disobeyed numerous orders. His\ncourse of conduct resulted in'his receiving three non-\njudicial punishments and three Special Court-Martial.\nAfter training periods were completed, our applicant morale often\ndeclined. This is probably due to the break-up of units with soldiers moved\nto different duty assignments. Therefore, much of the closeness and camaraderie\nof their early military life was disrupted. Many of our applicants faced more\nloneliness than before, with personal and family pressures leading to numerous\ninstances of AWOL. A majority (52%) of our applicants were discharged for\nAWOL offenses occurring during stateside duty other than during training.\n4. Requests for Leave, Reasignment, or Discharge\nMost of our applicants complained of personal or family problems during\ntheir military careers. Parents died, wives had miscarriages, children had\nillnesses, houses were repossessed, families went on welfare, and engagements\nwere broken.\nIV.C-9\n(Case No. 3289) The applicant failed the first, second and fourth\ngrades, and quit high school in his first year because\nhe was uncomfortable there. He was drafted into\nthe Army and in view of his educational deficiencies,\nwas sent to a Special Training Company. His GT score\nwas 54 and his AFQT score of 14 placed him in Category IV.\nDuring his 4 months and 19 days of creditable service\nhe was absent without official leave on five occasions.\nHe was motivated in each instance by his concern for\nhis grandmother who was now living alone and who he\nbelieved needed his care and support.\nThe military has remedies for soldiers with these problems. They could\nrequest leave, reassignment (compassionate, or normal change of duty station),\nand, in extreme cases, discharge due to a hardship. Unit officers, chaplains,\nattorneys of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and Red Cross workers were\nthere to render assistance within their means. Because of impatience,\nbashfulness, distrust, or misinformation, many applicants never tried to solve\ntheir problems through military channels. Other applicants indicated that\nthey tried some of these channels but failed to obtain the desired relief.\n(Case No. 1244) Applicant's wife was pregnant, in financial difficulties\nand being evicted; she suffered from an emotional\ndisorder and nervous problems; his oldest child was\nasthmatic and an epileptic, having seizures that\nsometimes resulted in unconsciousness. Applicant\nrequested transfer and a hardship discharge which\nwere denied.\nThe Department of Defense discovered that 58% of its clemency applicants\ndid seek help from at least one military source before going AWOL. However,\nonly 45% approached their commanding officer, and fewer yet approached an\nofficer above the Company level.\nOnly 1.3% of our applicants were granted\nleave or reassignment to help them solve the problem which led to their AWOL.\nBy contrast, 8.6% had their leave or reassignment requests turned down.\n(Case No. 74-436) Applicant received information that his pregnant wife\nwas in the hospital. She had fainted and fallen on\nthe edge of a coffee table and had started bleeding\ninternally. Applicant asked his commanding officer\nfor permission to return home after informing him\nIV-C-10\nof his wife's difficulty and of the risk of a\nmiscarriage. This request was denied, so he went AWOL.\nSometimes, the enormity of the problem made one period of leave\ninsufficient for the applicant's purpose.\n(Case No. 01336) While applicant was home on leave to get married, a\nhurricane flooded his mother-in-law's house, in which\nhe and his newly wed wife were staying. Almost the\nentire property and his belongings were lost. He\nrequested and was granted a 21-day leave extension,\nwhich he spent trying to repair the house, However,\nthe house remained in an unliveable condition, and\nhis wife began to suffer from a serious nervous\ncondition. Applicant went AWOL for four days to ease\nthe situation. He returned voluntarily and requested\na Hardship Discharge or a six-month emergency leave,\nboth of which were denied. He then went AWOL.\nRequests for leave or reassignment were matters within a commanding officer's\n*\ndiscretion.\nThe Hardship Discharge offered a more lasting solution to the conflict\nbetween a soldier's problems and his military obligations, without the stigma\nof most other administrative separations. To get a Hardship Discharge, he had\nto submit a request in writing to his commanding officer, explaining the nature\nof his problem and how a discharge would help him solve it. The Red Cross\nwas often asked for assistance in documenting the request. Higher headquarters\nwas required to review the request and had the power to make final decisions.\nNone of our applicants received Hardship Discharges of course -- but\n,\n000 were granted during the Vietnam War to individuals who adequately\ndocumented problems as required by service regulations.\nRequests for leave were matters within the Commanding Officer's discretion.\nHowever, leave is earned at the rate of 30 days per calendar year (2½ days\nper month fo satisfactory service) and individuals often used leave substan-\ntially in excess of the amount they had earned. Commanding. Officers could\nnot normally authorize \"advance leave\" in excess of 30 days, even \"Emergency\nLeave\" was charged against the annual leave allowance. As a general rule\nwas no procedure available to military personnel comparable to \"Leave\nWithout Pay\" or a sabbitical leave as in the civilian sector.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\n-C - 38\nOccasionally, our applicants requested reassignments not\nbecause of their need to be close to home, but because of a\ndislike for their unit or commanding officer. Though reassign-\nments were not always easy to arrange, / a procedure was\nadopted in light of the emerging volunteer army to permit\npersons with similar skills to switch jobs requiring similar\nskills with a willing service member at a different installation.\nThe soldier who was conscientiously opposed to war could\napply for in-service conscientious objector status. Very few\nof our applicants did. Only 1.1% took any initiative to\nobtain this in-service status, and only 0.5% made a formal\napplication. It is likely that the rate of C.O. applications\nand approvals would have been higher if the services permitted\ntheir judge advocates to take active roles in the C.O.\napplication process at no cost to the service member (also\ntrue of Hardship Applications). While the soldier was entitled\nto counsel at the various stages of the proceeding, counsel\nwas not furnished by the Government, and civilian counsel\ncould have been very expensive. Since the C.O. application\nprocess is one of the most elaborate administrative proceedings\nthat an individual soldier may initiate, the average soldier\n7\nReassignment practices varied with individual services; in\ngeneral, members could be transferred within command, with\nminimal difficulty, major geographical reassignments re-\nquired high level authority.\nIV-C-39\nwould likely become confused without proper guidance in the\npreparation of the application, its documentation, and pre-\nsentation before the hearing officer. Moreover without\nsomeone to make appropriate inquiries into the status of the\napplication, the soldier could easily become disillusioned and\nfrustrated by the delays in processing. These delays might\nhave run as long as four months -- and even longer if the\nservice member failed to comply with all regulatory require-\nments or became frustrated and departed AWOL after filing his\nrequest (thereby stopping all favorable personnel actions).\nThere are two types of conscientious objector applications.\nOne resulted in reassignment to a non-combatant activity, while\nthe other provided for a discharge under honorable conditions.\nEach type involves separate but similar procedures. Both\nprocedures put the burden of proof on the applicant, who was\nrequired to submit statements on six separate questions con-\ncerning the origin, nature, and implications of his conscientious\nobjection. The applicant had to \"conspicuously demonstrate\nthe consistency and depth of his beliefs. 11 / It was difficult\nfor the inarticulate person to meet this standard."
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