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This file concerns both the Ronald Reagan challenge and the campaign against Jimmy Carter.
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Belin, David - Strategy Papers
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This file concerns both the Ronald Reagan challenge and the campaign against Jimmy Carter.
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The original documents are located in Box 12, folder "Belin, David - Strategy Papers" of
the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Michael Raoul-Duval donated to the
United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives
collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in
the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are
presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject
to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 2, 1976
Dear Dave:
The President has asked me to coordinate White House
activity concerning the proposed debates between the
President and Jimmy Carter. Accordingly, Jack Marsh
sent me your letter of August 25. I look forward to
receiving your additional thoughts on the debates.
I enjoyed working with you in Kansas City. Again, thanks
very much for all your help and counsel.
Sincerely,
When
Michael Raoul-Duval
Special Counsel
to the President
The Honorable David W. Belin
FORD LIBRARY i GERAL
Herrick, Langdon, Belin,
Harris, Langdon & Helmick
2000 Financial Center
Seventh and Walnut
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
August 30
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO:
FROM: JOHN O. MARSH John JR.
MIKE DUVAL
For Direct Reply
For Draft Response
XX
For Your Information
Please Advise
FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 30, 1976
Dear Dave:
Many thanks for sending me a copy of your
recent letter to the President concerning
the Debates.
I have taken the liberty of forwarding a
copy to others here working on this matter.
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely,
Juh Jr.
Counsellor to the President
Mr. David W. Belin
Herrick, Langdon, Belin,
Harris, Langdon & Helmick
2000 Financial Center
Seventh and Walnut
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
LAW OFFICES
HERRICK, LANGDON, BELIN, HARRIS, LANGDON & HELMICK
2000 FINANCIAL CENTER
SEVENTH AND WALNUT
AUG 3 0 1976
DES MOINES, IOWA 50309
ALLAN A. HERRICK
TELEPHONE
HERSCHEL G. LANGDON
(515) 244-III6
DAVID W. BELIN
CHARLES E.HARRIS
COUNSEL
RICHARD G. LANGDON
August 25, 1976
DWIGHT BROOKE
ROBERT H. HELMICK
LAWRENCE E. POPE
PHILIP C. LOVRIEN
JOEL D. NOVAK
JEFFREY E.LAMSON
EDGAR H. BITTLE
FREDERICK C. BLACKLEDGE
CURT L. SYTSMA
DAVID L. CLAYPOOL
COPY
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
The August 19 acceptance speech at the Convention was superb--and
your delivery was the best I have ever seen.
I agree with the challenge to Jimmy Carter in televised debates.
This offers a major opportunity, but it also entails some great
risks. I will discuss part of these in my September strategy paper
No. 11. In addition, I would like the opportunity to visit with
you briefly in Washington to express to you personally some of
the areas of greatest risk that I see and offer my suggestions as
to how these can not only be refuted but, even more, how these can
be thrown back right into the face of Carter.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
David And W. Belin
DWB:cs
C.C. Richard Cheney
C.C. Robert Hartmann
C.C. Jack Marsh
C.C. Ron Nessen
LAW OFFICES
HERRICK, LANGDON, BELIN, HARRIS, LANGDON & HELMICK
INE
2000 FINANCIAL CENTER
MOIN:
SEVENTH AND WALNUT
JU.S.POSTAGE
1976
AUG26'76 w
DES MOINES, IOWA 50309
E13:
OWA
10.347478
Mr. Jack March
Counselor to the President
The White House
Washington DC 20500
E 9
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 7, 1976
Dear Dave:
Thanks very much for your April strategy
paper that you prepared for Dick Cheney.
Look forward to seeing you when you come
to Washington this week.
Sincerely,
the
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
Michael Raoul-Duval
Special Counsel
to the President
The Honorable David W. Belin
Herrick, Langdon, Belin,
Harris, Langdon & Helmick
2000 Financial Center
Seventh and Walnut
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
LAW OFFICES
HERRICK, LANGDON, BELIN, HARRIS, LANGDON & HELMICK
2000 FINANCIAL CENTER
SEVENTH AND WALNUT
DES MOINES, IOWA 50309
ALLAN A. HERRICK
TELEPHONE
HERSCHEL G. LANGDON
(515) 244-III6
DAVID W. BELIN
CHARLES E. HARRIS
COUNSEL
RICHARD G. LANGDON
DWIGHT BROOKE
ROBERT H. HELMICK
April 30, 1976
LAWRENCE E. POPE
PHILIP C. LOVRIEN
JOEL D. NOVAK
JEFFREY E. LAMSON
EDGAR H. BITTLE
FREDERICK C. BLACKLEDGE
CURT L. .SYTSMA
DAVID L.CLAYPOOL
Duval
Mr. Richard Chaney
GERALD FORD LIBRART
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Dick:
Enclosed is a copy of my April strategy paper. I will be
calling you next week to try and set up an appointment in
Washington.
Best regards.
David Part W. Belin
Sincerely
The
after
DWB:cs
Encl.
LAW OFFICES
HERRICK, LANGDON, BELIN, HARRIS, LANGDON & HELMICK
2000 FINANCIAL CENTER
SEVENTH AND WALNUT
DES MOINES, IOWA 50309
ALLAN A. HERRICK
TELEPHONE
HERSCHEL G. LANGDON
(515) 244-1116
DAVID W. BELIN
CHARLES E. HARRIS
COUNSEL
RICHARD G. LANGDON
April 30, 1976
DWIGHT BROOKE
ROBERT H. HELMICK
LAWRENCE E. POPE
PHILIP C. LOVRIEN
JOEL D. NOVAK
JEFFREY E. LAMSON
EDGAR H. BITTLE
FREDERICK C. BLACKLEDGE
CURT L. SYTSMA
DAVID L.CLAYPOOL
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Enclosed is a copy of my April strategy paper, "Key Highlights
from a Conversation with David Broder." I would like to have
the opportunity to meet with you again sometime in May concerning
some specifics on the Platform and also to discuss the Bicentennial
speech.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
David W. Belin
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
DWB:cs
Encl.
C.C. Richard Chaney
C.C. Robert Hartmann
C.C. Rogers Morton
C.C. Ron Nessen
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 6 - APRIL, 1976
David W. Belin
Key Highlights from a Conversation with David Broder
Last month, after the Illinois primary victory of President
Ford, I met David Broder at O'Hare International Airport. We
flew together to Washington and spent approximately two hours
discussing the current political scene.
There were a number of key comments that he made which are
particularly important to consider in light of the emergence
of Jimmy Carter as the Democratic frontrunner. Therefore, in
this April paper, I will not discuss the selection of a Republican
Vice Presidential candidate, as I was requested to do, but rather
I will save that for the May or June paper, except for some
observations on what Broder had to say.
The three most important comments of Broder can be summarized
as follows:
1. If Hubert Humphrey or Morris Udall is the Presidential
nominee, the sympathies of the working press will be with the
Democratic Presidential candidate. On the other hand, if Carter
or Jackson is the Democratic Presidential nominee, then the
sympathies of the working press will be for the President--unless
he stumbles by trying to "out-Reagan" Reagan or unless he picks
someone as his running mate whom the working press does not trust
(such as Governor Reagan or John Connally).
2. As the economy continues to improve, President Ford
will become a stronger and stronger candidate and tougher to beat
in November.
3. If President Ford is to win in November, he must pre-
empt the middle of the road and his Vice Presidential running
mate should be someone from the "moderate" wing of the Party.
The primary thrust of this April paper will address itself
to the issue of the sympathies of the working press, for I
believe it is a crucial area for consideration.
The nuances of the working press can make a tremendous
impact through the mass media. There is the question of selectivity--
which comments of the President and which comments of the opposition
are used; how the lead paragraphs are written; how the headlines
are selected; which television clip is used; when one of the
candidates stumbles, how and the extent to which that is highlighted.
-2-
GERALD R. LLORARY FORD
In a hundred different ways, the working press can make or break
the candidate.
One of the most vivid examples in recent years is what
happened to Muskie in New Hampshire in 1972.
President Ford must be sensitive to the views and perceptions
of the working press. Often, these views agree with the positions
taken by the President.
For instance, in meeting the challenge of Reagan, the working
press basically agrees with the observations of the President
that the views of Governor Reagan are too simplistic. Comments
on Panama are a perfect example of this. And the President met
these well.
The working press also agrees with the President that in
no sense has he relegated the United States to a secondary position
to Russia. The President has a 25 year record to show that he
believes in a strong national defense.
On the other hand, the working press does not necessarily
agree with the fact that we need a fleet of B-1 bombers or large
nuclear-powered surface vessals in the Navy. However, I am not
suggesting that the President make pronouncements based upon what
the working press does or does not believe. Rather, what I am
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
-3-
suggesting is that in selecting issues and presenting views, the
President be sensitive to how the working press feels about
various issues and the President should emphasize those issues
with which the working press agrees. Where there is strong dis-
agreement, I am suggesting that unless the President feels that
it is of crucial import to discuss that issue or point of view
with the public, or unless he feels the public is in great sup-
port on this particular issue--regardless of how the working
press feels--then the presentation of such a view should be
relegated to a secondary position.
In other words, there is a whole range of points and issues
that the President can discuss. If Jimmy Carter is the Presi-
dential nominee, or if it looks as if he might be the Presidential
nominee, the President should be particularly sensitive to the
fact that at the present time the sympathies of the working
press are with him. He should seek to emphasize those important
issues where the sympathies of the working press are not violently
opposed.
There is another aspect of this which is also very important.
One of the problems of Jimmy Carter is that he is thought to be
"shifty" on issues for the sake of expediency. The press does
not generally trust Carter. The President should avoid under-
mining the trust and confidence that he enjoys with the press. The
-4-
President in responding to Governor Reagan should be aware of
this factor.
Now let me turn briefly to the comments of Broder on
a Vice Presidential running mate for President Ford. Obviously,
in part this will depend on the national ticket of the Democrats.
However, if Carter is on the ticket either as the Presidential
nominee or as the Vice Presidential nominee, it will be very
difficult for a Republican ticket to carry the South. This
underscores the importance of the President himself preempting
the middle-of-the-road and also selecting as a running mate
someone who philosophically will not be to the right of the
President.
Broder also commented on the very successful approach of
Carter of campaigning "against Washington." If Carter is on
the national Democratic ticket, this could compel the President
to select as a running mate someone who is not now connected
with either the Executive or Legislative branches of the federal
government.
Finally, I would like to return to the other major point
mentioned by Broder: The improving national economic scene.
More and more emphasis should be placed on this in the campaign
-5-
for both the nomination and the general election. The President
has an opportunity to go on the attack by undertaking research
on the "gloom and doom" comments that were made by Democratic
political leaders and Democratic-oriented economists last year
who sought to assure the American public that the program of
President Ford would never work.
The programs of President Ford are working and there is a
lot of political hay that can be made on the continuing improve-
ment in the national economy, while we still recognize we have
a substantial way to go to reduce unemployment.
"Don't change horses in the middle of the stream" is sound
political advice to the American public--particularly when that
stream is a steadily-improving national economy and a steadily-
improving confidence on the part of the people in the ability
of President Ford to help lead the country to greater prosperity
at home.
"Peace and prosperity" in the past has proven to be a very
successful political issue. There is no reason to believe it
can't succeed again, particularly if the challenger is someone
who is inexperienced in national government and particularly if
-6-
FORD LIBRARY is SERVID
the President is conscious of the need for the preemption of
the middle of the road.
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
April 28, 1976
-7-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 24, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
RON NESSEN
FROM:
MIKE DUVAL
with
SUBJECT:
WARREN COMMISSION REPORT
I talked this morning with Dave Belin about a Platform Com-
mittee matter.
I told Dave that the Senate Intelligence Subcommittee Report
concerning the Warren Commission was a front page story of the
New York Times. Dave advised me that he has not seen the
Senate Report nor press stories about it.
Dave is still sticking with the position that he took publicly
on Face the Nation last fall, which is, that Congress should
reopen an investigation of the Kennedy assassination in light
of revelations that the CIA and other agencies of government
did not fully cooperate with the Commission. However, Belin
remains convinced that any reinvestigation will simply reaffirm
the findings of the Warren Commission.
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 7 - MAY, 1976
David W. Belin
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
Winning Electoral Votes:
The Marginal Percentage Differential Analysis
I was tempted in writing this paper to quote excerpts from
previous papers going back to November, 1975, because I believe
that a substantial part of the problems which the President
Ford campaign faces arises from a failure to adopt the strategy
discussed in these earlier papers. For instance, I am attaching
to this May paper a copy of the November, 1975, strategy paper
No. 1, which I believe to be just as valid today as it was when
written six months ago.
However, rather than repeating what I have said over the
past six months, no matter how relevant it may be today, I want
to turn to a matter which has been largely lost in the heat
of the primary campaign: A state-by-state electoral vote
analysis to see how victory can best be achieved in November.
In analyzing election results, I categorize states into
categories, depending upon the margin percentage differential
(MPD) that is, the difference in percentage points between the
candidate who won the state and the candidate who lost the state.
For instance, in 1968 in Oregon, Nixon got 53% of the vote and
Humphrey received 47% of the vote, a margin percentage differential
of six percentage points. The switch differential was 3%--in
other words, if 3% of the voters had voted Democratic, instead
of Republican, there would have been a virtual tie.
A relatively safe margin percentage differential (MPD) is
where the difference in percentage is at least 14 points--57-43,
or better. A safe/marginal MPD is wherethe MPD is between 7 and
14 points; a marginal state is where the MPD is less than 7 points
where a state can switch from one party to another by a switch
of less than 3.5% of the vote.
The most relevant electoral vote analysis is to take a
look at the most recent close presidential election, which, of
course, was in 1968 where President Nixon had 302 electoral
votes, Hubert Humphrey had 191 electoral votes, and George
Wallace garnered 45 electoral votes.
-2-
When you categorize the results of the 1968 election and
put the same states that voted Republican in 1968 into either
relatively safe Republican states, marginal/safe, or marginal
Republican states, and adjust for changes in the electoral vote
because of reapportionment after the 1970 census, and do the
same thing with the states that Hubert Humphrey won in 1968,
here is what you find, as shown on the following detailed analysis:
-3-
David Belin
1968 Election
1968
Rela-
President Ford
1976 Electoral Vote Analysis
Electoral Votes
MPD
tively
Strategy Paper
Based on 1968 MPD
No. 7
(Marginal
ferential)
safe
Margi-
Margi-
Margi-
Margi-
Rela-
1968
Percent
age Dif-
nally
nal
nal
nally
tively
Geo.
Rep.
safe
May, 1976
safe
safe
Walla
Rep.
Demo. Wallace
Rep.
Rep.
Demo.
Demo.
Demo.
stat
LABAMA
10
47.2
9
LASKA
3
2.7
3
RIZONA
5
19.8
6
RKANSAS
6
8.1
6
ALIFORNIA
40
3.1
45
OLORADO
6
9.2
7
ONN.
8
5.2
9
ELAWARE
3
3.5
3
LORIDA
14
9.6
17
EORGIA
12
12.4
12
AWAII
4
21.1
DAHO
4
26.1
4
26
2.9
26
GERALD
LIBRARY
4
LLINOIS
NDIANA
13
12.3
13
OWA
9
12.2
8
ANSAS
7
20.1
7
ENTUCKY
9
6.2
9
OUISIANA
10
20.1
10
AINE
4
12.2
4
ARYLAND
10
1.7
10
IASS.
14
30.1
14
IICHIGAN
21
6.7
21
IINNESOTA
10
12.5
10
IISS.
7
40.5
7
IISSOURI
12
1.2
12
IONTANA
4
19
4
IEBRASKA
5
28
5
IEVADA
3
8.2
3
!EW HAMP.
4
8.2
4
!EW JERSEY
17
2.1
17
IEW MEXICO
4
12.1
4
!EW YORK
43
5.4
41
1. CAROLINA
13
8.2
13
:. DAKOTA
4
17.7
3
)HIO
26
2.3
25
OKLAHOMA
8
15.7
7
)REGON
6
6.0
6
'A.
29
3.6
27
RHODE IS.
4
32.2
4
;. CAROLINA
8
5.8
8
;. DAKOTA
4
11.3
4
TENN.
11
3.8
10
EXAS
25
1.3
26
ITAH
4
19.4
4
ERMONT
3
19.3
3
VIRGINIA
12
10.9
12
MASHINGTON
9
2.1
9
EST VA
7
8.8
6
ISCONSIN
12
3.6
11
WOMING
3
20.3
3
)IST. OF COL.
3
63.6
3
302
191
45
46
85
TOTAL:
175
143
20
25
4.
Relatively Safe: MPD is at least 14 pts.; Marginal/Safe: MPD is between 7 and 14
ts.; Marginal: MPD is less than 7 pts. A Marginal state can be changed by a
One hundred seventy-five electoral votes are from states
that are marginally Republican, and 143 electoral votes are
from states that are marginally Democratic. Even more
important is the fact that of the marginal Republican
states, the overwhelming majority lie out of the South. Of the
175 electoral votes, only 27 come from South or border-South
states: Kentucky (9), South Carolina (8) and Tennessee (10).
On the other hand, there are states such as California (45),
Illinois (26), Missouri (12), New Jersey (17), Ohio (25), Oregon
(6), and Wisconsin (11), plus Alaska (3) and Delaware (3) where
a switch in less than 2% of the voters would have changed the
vote in these states.
Toward which bloc of states should the Republican Party in
1976 concentrate its attack: The Southern bloc of 27 or the rest
of the country with 148?
FORD LIBRARY i GERALD
-5-
What about the states that were marginally Democratic
that give the Republicans the best opportunities for 1976?
Once again, the MPD analysis shows which road the Republican
Party must take, for only one of these states (Texas, with 26
electoral votes) could be deemed subject to a Southern strategy
and the remaining states, with 117 electoral votes lie outside
of the South: Colorado (9); Maryland (10) ; Michigan (21) ;
New York (41) i Pennsylvania (27) ; and Washington (9). .
Of course, assuming that President Ford is the Republican
nominee, he will probably carry Michigan, with its 21 electoral
votes. If you take those 21 votes as a starting point, add the
46 electoral votes from the relatively safe Republican states,
you have a total of 67 of the 270 electoral votes needed for
election. Where will the additional 203 electoral votes come
from? Of the safe/marginal Republican states, 43 electoral votes
are from outside the South and 42 lie in the southern part of
the country. If those 43 votes outside of the South are garnered,
that leaves a net remaining goal of 160 electoral votes.
Turning to the marginal Republican states, of those 175
electoral votes, only 8 lie in the South (South Carolina) and
-6-
19 lie in the border-South states of Kentucky and Tennessee,
leaving a net of 148 outside of the South.
If President Ford got all of the marginal Republican states
except those from the South or near-South, he would receive
148 additional electoral votes, putting him up to 258, which
is just twelve votes shy of the needed 270.
Where can those extra twelve votes come from? Either from
those Southern or border-Southern states that are marginal
Republican or safe/marginal Republican-- and all he needs is one
or two of those states--or in the alternative only one or two
of the states that are marginally Democratic--such as Pennsylvania.
The facts speak for themselves. The greatest opportunities
for Republican victory in 1976 lie in a national strategy, and
not in a Southern strategy.
This is particularly true if Jimmy Carter is either a
Democratic Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate. Regard-
less of who the Republican Presidential nominee will be, Jimmy
Carter will effectively claim a majority of the Southern
electoral votes. Republicans have to recognize this fact as
they look toward November. It would be folly for the GOP to
-7-
try and attack the heart of Carter's strength. Rather, the
GOP should concentrate on the heart of its potential, and that
heart is shown on the marginal vote percentage electoral vote
analysis: Basically the Midwest, the Northeast, the Rocky
Mountain States, and the West.
Furthermore, in looking toward November, the GOP must
recognize what has not been recognized enough thus far by the
President Ford Committee that it is absolutely essential for
victory to preempt the middle of the road.
In poll after poll, the major portion of the electorate--
over 80% - categorizes itself either in the middle-of-the-road
category or under the categorization of fairly liberal or
fairly conservative with the remaining balance (less than 20%)
categorizing itself as very liberal or very conservative.
FORD LIBRARY s CERALD
-8-
Clearly, the emphasis for rebuilding a political party
must be directed toward the pre-emption of the middle-of-the-
road electorate. This will act as an umbrella to attract
those voters in the center of the political spectrum as well
as those somewhat to the left who call themselves fairly
liberal and those somewhat to the right who call themselves
fairly conservative.
One of the main problems confronting George McGovern
in the 1972 presidential race was the fact that his campaign
moved away from middle-of-the-road and enabled Republicans to
step into the vacuum. The net result was a Republican land-
slide at the national level.
Unfortunately for the GOP, the landslide did not trickle
down to the Senate and the House of Representatives. The basic
reason is illustrated by what happened in California in 1968
and 1970 and what happened in South Dakota in 1972.
Before the 1968 elections, California was represented by
two senators: Thomas Kuchel, a liberal Republican, and George
Murphy, a conservative Republican. Thomas Kuchel had risen
to the position of minority whip, the No. 2 position behind
the minority floor leader, Senator Dirksen of Illinois.
Despite the fact that Senator Kuchel was an incumbent
Republican senator who had risen to a position of power in the
United States Senate, the Republican Party in 1968 failed to
-9-
LIBRARY GERALD 8. FORD
renominate Senator Kuchel. There was an intraparty fight
with the conservative candidate, Max Rafferty, winning the
nomination. In the fall general election, even though Richard
Nixon carried California by over 200,000 votes, Max Rafferty
lost to Alan Cranston by over 300,000 votes--a spread of
better than half a million votes.
Why did the Republican Party of California fail to re-
nominate a proven winner and a national Republican leader?
The basic reason was that Republicans in California failed to
recognize the necessity of preempting the middle of the road.
Instead, they followed the philosophy of nominating someone with
the greatest appeal to voters in a Republican primary instead
of someone with the greatest appeal to voters in the general
election.
The Republican California blunder of 1968 was compounded
in 1970 when George Murphy was up for re-election. The middle-
of-the-road was pre-empted by John V. Tunney, and in the space
of two years two Republican senate seats were converted into
two Democratic senate seats.
The problem has been repeated time and time again. For
instance, in 1972 the seat of Republican Karl Mundt of South
Dakota was at stake. There was one candidate within the
Republican primary who sought to pre-empt the middle-of-the-
-10-
road: Tom Reardon. He was ignored by Republican leaders
primarily because Reardon had been a "dove" on the issue of
Vietnam. Thousands of Independent voters shared Reardon's
views, but instead of nominating the Republican with the
greatest appeal to the total electorate, the Republicans
nominated the candidate with the greatest appeal to Republicans.
The result was that Democrat James Abourezk won the Senate
race in November.
Rebuilding a viable Republican Party after Watergate will
be far more difficult than the attempted rebirth after the Demo-
cratic landslide of 1964. The major reason for this is that
the Republican Party--the Party associated with American business
and free enterprise--has consistently violated the most elementary
concepts of business success. This fundamental failure is not
a new course of action for the GOP to take. On the contrary, it
is consistent with the course of action taken by Republican Party
leadership over the past 30 years.
Every knowledgeable marketing student, every astute business
executive, knows that when a business organization wants to
increase its penetration of the market, it looks to areas of
potential growth.
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FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
In the 1940's and 1950's, it was obvious to any reasonably
intelligent political scientist that the areas of population growth
in our country were in the urban areas. The areas of population
decline were in the rural areas. Yet, consistently throughout the
United States, the Republican leadership fought against fair
representation for urban areas in state legislatures.
More and more people living in cities and suburban areas became
frustrated with the unfairness of their lack of representation
in government. These citizens turned against the party in power
that was denying them an equal voice in government and went with
the opposition, which in almost every two-party state turned out
to be the Democratic Party.
The net result is typified by what took place in the Midwest--
the place of birth of the Republican Party and its traditional
heartland. The statistics are overwhelming and are vividly
illustrated in the contrast between the Eisenhower landslide of
1952 and the Nixon landslide of 1972.
Here are the facts: In 1953 there were 9 Republican and
3 Democratic governors in the Midwest. In 1973, these statistics
were reversed: 4 Republican and 8 Democratic governors.
-12-
In 1953, there were 19 Republican and 5 Democratic senators
from the Midwest. In 1973, after the 1972 elections, these
statistics were again reversed: 9 Republican and 15 Democratic
senators.
In the House of Representatives, there was a similar trend:
85 Republican and 44 Democratic representatives from the Midwest
in 1953 after the 1952 Eisenhower landslide; 71 Republican and
51 Democratic representatives in 1973 after the 1972 Nixon
landslide. (The difference in total arises because of
reapportionment changes.)
The lack of foresight on the part of the Republican Party
continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps the most
vivid illustration of this occurred after the Nixon-Agnew
victory in 1968, when there were increasing pressures to bring
youth into the political system. It was not a question of
whether or not the voting age would be reduced to 18--rather,
the question was when this would take place--1970 or 1972.
It is a basic doctrine of business to look to potential
expanding markets. Any businessman looking at the electorate
would have readily seen that youth, and in particular high
school and college youth approaching their first election,
was the most obvious area of political party growth. This
fact was compounded by the disenchantment of youth with the
Vietnam policies of the Johnson administration.
-13-
Yet, this fundamental practical business concept was not
only totally ignored, but Spiro Agnew took exactly the opposite
course. He attacked the very group that offered the greatest
opportunity for increasing Republican votes, and succeeded
beyond the wildest dreams of any Democratic politician. Agnew
succeeded in alienating the next generation of voters, so far
as the Republican Party was concerned.
Statistics now show that the Republican Party comprises
less than 25% of the total electorate. And when these
statistics are broken down into age groups, the penetration
of the Republican Party with the younger voter is less than
15%. From a long-range standpoint, nothing could have been
worse for the Republican Party.
More important, from a long-range standpoint, nothing
could have been worse for the future of our political system
in America, for that system is predicated on the concept
of a strong two-party system.
1976 is a crossroads year for the Republican Party. A
Democratic victory in the Presidential election could spell the
end of the GOP as an effective national party. On the other
hand, a Republican victory could spell the beginning for a
-14-
true Republican revival, with strong and capable leadership
from the top as the starting point. Hand in hand with this
must be an overall open, pragmatic and sensitive approach
to the many problems facing our country today--a modern political
philosophy which has as its frame of reference the preemption
of the middle-of-the-road in American politics.
How long will Republican Party workers continue to ignore
the fact that the crucial issue is who can win in November--
not who is philosophically the closest to the relatively small
percentage of voters who cast their ballots in a Republican
primary battle?
Once again, we can analogize to what a sound businessman
would do when his company wanted to expand its penetration of
market acceptance. One approach would be for the president
of the company to turn to the sales force and ask the sales
force what it thinks the market needs or wants. A far better
approach, however, would be for the sales force to actually
go into the market, test it, and find out what the potential
customers need and want.
Unfortunately, the Republican Party traditionally seems to
ignore the business approach to political problems while at the
same time relying on business for a major portion of financial
and other support.
-15-
Perhaps the Republicans could follow this course
if they had the luxury of being the majority party. However,
the irrefutable trend has been the other way. As a matter
of fact, the Republican Party is now not even number two--
really, it is number three behind the Democrats and Independents.
The January 7, 1974, of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT quoted
a recent Sindlinger survey giving the following breakdown
"of how people of voting age regard themselves politically:
Independents - 36.1%; Democrats - 34.5%; Republicans - 18.9%;
No interest - 10.5%." "
In the face of statistics such as these, the Republicans
who want to win must look beyond the confines of Republican
voters. In order to do this, they must support and encourage
attractive Republicans of high capability to campaign for
national office. These candidates must be individuals who
will be able to pre-empt the middle-of-the-road--the umbrella
which is the key to political success in this country.
No one is more aware of this than President Ford. In 1974,
he campaigned for Paul McCloskey--one of the most out-spoken
critics of the Nixon administration. McCloskey was in a battle
for survival in a Republican primary in his Congressional
district in California. Most political experts agree that it
was the help of the then Vice President Ford which led to
McCloskey's primary victory.
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FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
Just as President Ford has recognized the need for Republicans
to nominate candidates who can win in November, regular Party
leaders and workers must also adopt this same philosophy.
There has to be room in the GOP for both the Barry Gold-
waters and the Paul McCloskeys. And above all, if the Republican
Party is to survive, there has to be the kind of leadership in
the GOP that President Ford has shown in his willingness to
support candidates in different areas of the Republican political
spectrum.
1976 is the crossroads for the Republican Party. One of
the roads leads to a Southern strategy. The other road leads
to a national strategy.
An analysis of electoral votes on the basis of marginal
percentage differential shows clearly which of the two roads
the GOP should take, if it wants to win in November. However,
the Republican Party has not been noted in recent years for
its ability to understand and exercise sound practical political
judgment.
Hopefully, for those Americans interested in the revitalization
of the GOP, and for those Americans interested in a strong two-
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party system, Republican leadership will demonstrate better
judgment in 1976 than it has in recent years.
Finally, there must be one added ingredient which has thus
far been absent in the President Ford Campaign: The ingredient
of confidence and idealism and hope and vision that an out-
standing national leader can give.
The primary campaign has been talking about defense
and Panama and detente. What about the hopes and aspirations
of human beings for peace?
There is a lot that can be said--and a lot that must be
said if President Ford is to win the nomination and win in
November. He will have one last major opportunity to come
forward as an outstanding national leader with breadth
and vision: The Bicentennial speech on July 4, 1976.
I have discussed this in recent strategy papers, and I
will go into greater detail in the strategy paper for June.
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
May 5, 1976
-18-
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 6 - APRIL, 1976
David W. Belin
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
Key Highlights from a Conversation with David Broder
Last month, after the Illinois primary victory of President
Ford, I met David Broder at O'Hare International Airport. We
flew together to Washington and spent approximately two hours
discussing the current political scene.
There were a number of key comments that he made which are
particularly important to consider in light of the emergence
of Jimmy Carter as the Democratic frontrunner. Therefore, in
this April paper, I will not discuss the selection of a Republican
Vice Presidential candidate, as I was requested to do, but rather
I will save that for the May or June paper, except for some
observations on what Broder had to say.
The three most important comments of Broder can be summarized
as follows:
1. If Hubert Humphrey or Morris Udall is the Presidential
nominee, the sympathies of the working press will be with the
Democratic Presidential candidate. On the other hand, if Carter
or Jackson is the Democratic Presidential nominee, then the
sympathies of the working press will be for the President--unless
he stumbles by trying to "out-Reagan" Reagan or unless he picks
someone as his running mate whom the working press does not trust
(such as Governor Reagan or John Connally).
2. As the economy continues to improve, President Ford
will become a stronger and stronger candidate and tougher to beat
in November.
3. If President Ford is to win in November, he must pre-
empt the middle of the road and his Vice Presidential running
mate should be someone from the "moderate" wing of the Party.
The primary thrust of this April paper will address itself
to the issue of the sympathies of the working press, for I
believe it is a crucial area for consideration.
The nuances of the working press can make a tremendous
impact through the mass media. There is the question of selectivity--
which comments of the President and which comments of the opposition
are used; how the lead paragraphs are written; how the headlines
are selected; which television clip is used; when one of the
candidates stumbles, how and the extent to which that is highlighted.
-2-
In a hundred different ways, the working press can make or break
the candidate.
One of the most vivid examples in recent years is what
happened to Muskie in New Hampshire in 1972.
President Ford must be sensitive to the views and perceptions
of the working press. Often, these views agree with the positions
taken by the President.
For instance, in meeting the challenge of Reagan, the working
press basically agrees with the observations of the President
that the views of Governor Reagan are too simplistic. Comments
on Panama are a perfect example of this. And the President met
these well.
The working press also agrees with the President that in
no sense has he relegated the United States to a secondary position
to Russia. The President has a 25 year record to show that he
believes in a strong national defense.
On the other hand, the working press does not necessarily
agree with the fact that we need a fleet of B-1 bombers or large
nuclear-powered surface vessals in the Navy. However, I am not
suggesting that the President make pronouncements based upon what
the working press does or does not believe. Rather, what I am
-3-
suggesting is that in selecting issues and presenting views, the
President be sensitive to how the working press feels about
various issues and the President should emphasize those issues
with which the working press agrees. Where there is strong dis-
agreement, I am suggesting that unless the President feels that
it is of crucial import to discuss that issue or point of view
with the public, or unless he feels the public is in great sup-
port on this particular ue--regardless of how the working
press feels--then the presentation of such a view should be
relegated to a secondary position.
In other words, there is a whole range of points and issues
that the President can discuss. If Jimmy Carter is the Presi-
dential nominee, or if it looks as if he might be the Presidential
nominee, the President should be particularly sensitive to the
fact that at the present time the sympathies of the working
press are with him. He should seek to emphasize those important
issues where the sympathies of the working press are not violently
opposed.
There is another aspect of this which is also very important.
One of the problems of Jimmy Carter is that he is thought to be
"shifty" on issues for the sake of expediency. The press does
not generally trust Carter. The President should avoid under-
mining the trust and confidence that he enjoys with the press. The
-4-
President in responding to Governor Reagan should be aware of
this factor.
Now let me turn briefly to the comments of Broder on
a Vice Presidential running mate for President Ford. Obviously,
in part this will depend on the national ticket of the Democrats.
However, if Carter is on the ticket either as the Presidential
nominee or as the Vice Presidential nominee, it will be very
difficult for a Republican ticket to carry the South. This
underscores the importance of the President himself preempting
the middle-of-the-road and also selecting as a running mate
someone who philosophically will not be to the right of the
President.
Broder also commented on the very successful approach of
Carter of campaigning "against Washington." If Carter is on
the national Democratic ticket, this could compel the President
to select as a running mate someone who is not now connected
with either the Executive or Legislative branches of the federal
government.
Finally, I would like to return to the other major point
mentioned by Broder: The improving national economic scene.
More and more emphasis should be placed on this in the campaign
-5-
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
for both the nomination and the general election. The President
has an opportunity to go on the attack by undertaking research
on the "gloom and doom" comments that were made by Democratic
political leaders and Democratic-oriented economists last year
who sought to assure the American public that the program of
President Ford would never work.
The programs of President Ford are working and there is a
lot of political hay that can be made on the continuing improve-
ment in the national economy, while we still recognize we have
a substantial way to go to reduce unemployment.
"Don't change horses in the middle of the stream" is sound
political advice to the American public--particularly when that
stream is a steadily-improving national economy and a steadily-
improving confidence on the part of the people in the ability
of President Ford to help lead the country to greater prosperity
at home.
"Peace and prosperity" in the past has proven to be a very
successful political issue. There is no reason to believe it
can't succeed again, particularly if the challenger is someone
who is inexperienced in national government and particularly if
-6-
the President is conscious of the need for the preemption of
the middle of the road.
FORD & LIBRARY GENALD
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
April 28, 1976
-7-
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 5 - MARCH, 1976
David W. Belin
FORD & 938870 LIBRARY
The Withdrawal of Reagan?
During a March 17 meeting with Ron Nessen, I was asked
to prepare papers on three questions:
1. What would be the best way to encourage Governor
Reagan to withdraw?
2. What are the most important criteria to consider in
selecting a Vice Presidential running mate, what person or persons
might be best considered, and what is the best way to have the
person picked?
3. What specific suggestions do I have for the "Bicentennial
Speech", which I discussed in the January and February papers?
I will discuss the Reagan withdrawal question in this
March paper, and I will turn to the Vice Presidential and Bi-
centennial speech questions in the April and May papers, respectively.
I think the President made an absolutely correct observation
this past weekend when he said that he did not care whether
Governor Reagan did or did not withdraw.
Furthermore, I think any talks of withdrawal of Governor
Reagan are premature. Governor Reagan could still win some
primaries, but as I wrote in my November strategy paper,
our goal is not to win all of the primaries but rather to win
a majority of the votes of the delegates. I disagree with a
strategy whereby ahead of any particular primary the President
predicts he is going to win. Rather, I still stand by my
November strategy paper when I wrote (pages 3 and 4) :
"However, in contrast to Governor Reagan, who is a full-time
candidate, President Ford should point out that the President
must first and foremost discharge the responsibilities of the
Presidency. Accordingly, President Ford will state that he
will not be able to devote a lot of time to primary campaigning,
and there undoubtedly will be some states where he does no
campaigning at all.
"The President should then further state that because Governor
Reagan will be campaigning full time and because the President
will be campaigning on a very part-time basis, Governor Reagan
might very well win primary elections in some states and that
as a practical matter the President should say that he is going
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FORDO & GERALD LIBRARY
to win some primaries, he is going to lose some primaries, but
that ultimately he will win a majority of the votes of the
delegates to the Republican National Convention.
"In addition, the President should publicly state what most
pragmatic political experts believe: Regardless of whether
or not Governor Reagan wins any primaries, President Ford
will be by far the stronger candidate for the Republican Party
in a general election, and to nominate Governor Reagan would
be a repetition of 1964."
[said
Texas is a state that has substantial risks to the President.
mands
I have also predicted that Governor Reagan will run much better
in North Carolina than what the pollsters have recently predicted.
Therefore, I question whether or not there should be any talk
about the withdrawal of Reagan stemming from the White House
or the President Ford Committee, and I underscore again the
President's recent statement that he does not care whether Governor
Reagan does or does not withdraw. In addition, if the withdrawal
of Governor Reagan is a desired goal (and I question whether
it is at this time), the best way to get Governor Reagan to
-3-
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
withdraw is for the President to keep doing what he is already
doing. Neither the President nor his campaign committee should
put a lot of pressure on Governor Reagan to withdraw, thereby
embarrassing him and also painting Governor Reagan into a
corner. There is even the risk that too much withdrawal pressure
could arose public sympathy for Governor Reagan. I believe
there is the possibility of the "underdog" psychology, and
we must be very careful not to let ourselves get in this kind
of a position.
Finally, I would urge that it may not be in the long-run
interests of President Ford to have Governor Reagan withdraw
at the present time. I think a strong case can be made that is
is in the best interests of victory in November if Governor
Reagan stays in the race at least through April and possibly
through May or June.
-4-
At the outset, let us consider the position of the President
on the American political scene today after the first series
of primaries, and compare this with the "gloom and doom" of
political pundits in January, after Governor Reagan announced
his candidacy. It is obvious that there have been many sub-
stantial benefits which President Ford has achieved in winning
the first series of primary victories. The people love a
winning team. The more President Ford wins in the first series
of primaries in February and March, the more likelihood there
is that he will win in the second series of primaries in April
and May. Why change the scenario now?
There is also the issue of "momentum". In addition, there
is experience gained for the President and his team in a primary
campaign and all of the other tangible benefits that arise from
a contest. Every week of primary campaigning puts the Presidential
team in a stronger position.
-5-
There are many other advantages that stem from a Republican
contest, not the least of which is that there will be equal
television time given to Republicans while the Democratic
primaries are being covered. The main disadvantage--"divisiveness"
of the Party, is one with which Republicans are far too concerned.
No Party has been more divisive than the Democratic Party--
and yet they control both Houses of Congress and came within
a narrow margin of beating Richard Nixon in 1968, despite the
vulnerability of the Johnson administration.
We have a winning candidate and a tremendous amount of
momentum and experience that have been gained through the first
series of primary battles. Why break up a winning combination?
The advantages to a primary contest, in light of what has happened
to the President's national standing over the past two months,
far outweigh whatever divisiveness might be caused within the
Republican Party--as long as President Ford and his campaign
organization do not adopt a policy of "overkill" so far as the
Reagan campaign is concerned.
The day after the Illinois primary, I met David Broder at
O'Hare Airport and we flew together to Washington. We discussed
-6-
a number of issues (one of which related to the Vice Presidency,
which I will incorporate in the April strategy paper), and we
both agreed that the primary contest of Governor Reagan had
turned out to be of great benefit to the President. We also
both agreed that it would be to the President's great advantage
if Reagan did not drop out right away.
One of the most analogous political situations in recent
years occurred in Iowa in 1972. Robert Ray decided to run for
a third term as Governor--an unprecedented decision. The then
Lieutenant Governor, Roger Jepsen, was a popular conservative
from the Davenport area--good speaker, energetic, relatively
young, and very popular among the Party regulars. He decided
that he would run against Governor Ray in the primary.
There were immediate cries of "splitting the Party", "you
can't do this against an incumbent Governor", etc. Governor
-7-
Ray and his closest advisors were not among those making these
outcries.
During the course of the primary campaign, the more Roger
Jepsen attacked Governor Ray, the lower Jepsen's standings sank in
public opinion polls. There was increasing talk of putting
pressure on Roger Jepsen to withdraw. But Governor Ray and his
closest advisors stood firm and went about their own campaign,
in a manner similar to that enunciated by President Ford this
past week while campaigning in North Carolina.
The net result was that Roger Jepsen's support sank so
low that he, himself, elected to throw in the cards approxi-
mately three weeks before the June, 1972, primary. In the
meantime, Governor Ray was the beneficiary of the state-wide
interest in a primary challenge and was also beneficiary of
ever-increasing momentum. The attacks that Jepsen made against
Governor Ray had little influence on the November election,
where Governor Ray won a smashing victory (the only Republican
Governor to run ahead of President Nixon. At the same time
Jack Miller, the incumbent Republican senator, lost to Dick
Clark.)
There is a lesson to be learned from what happened in Iowa
in 1972. The same strategy that Governor Ray adopted in 1972
-8-
should be followed by the President: Stick to his case, per-
form the duties of the Presidency, with a limited amount of week-
end campaigning, and let the Reagan campaign start crumbling
as the President gains in delegate strength to an almost
insurmountable lead. New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
should do a lot toward attaining this goal.
Meanwhile, take advantage of all of the media coverage
of the primary campaigns, take advantage of all of the media
victories, win graciously, and above all do not over-estimate
the anticipated percentage of victory or discount the possibility
of loss in a primary campaign.
(Some of the spokesmen for the President Ford Committee
have not been very gracious in their victory statements. I
think this is unwise for a number of reasons, including the
question of divisiveness and also the possibility of giving
Governor Reagan the opportunity to capitalize on the sympathies
of the public for the underdog.)
Under the present course, there is little likelihood that
Governor Reagan can win the nomination. But his continued
campaign against the Presidency, with the continued momentum
of Presidential victories (even assuming the possibility of
one or two defeats) can make a major contribution toward victory
in November. I think this far outweighs the risks of possible
-9-
divisiveness--at least through the month of April, where we
can take another look at the situation.
However, if there is still the belief that it is important
to have an early withdrawal of Governor Reagan, the best way
to reach that goal is to follow the example of the President
this past weekend and not get involved in the question of
whether or not Governor Reagan should withdraw. Let's keep
on doing what we are doing well and let's not paint Governor
Reagan into a corner. His string of losses is bound to hurt
his ability to raise campaign funds. It is also bound to hurt
his ability to attract support from within the Party, and in
the meantime, we can capitalize on the momentum we already have.
David W. Belin
GERALD R. LEGRARY FORD
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
March 22, 1976
-10-
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 4 - FEBRUARY, 1976
David W. Belin
Projecting Leadership and Statesmanship -
Some Major Opportunities
I believe the time has come for the campaign of the President
to go on the offensive. Reacting to the charges of the Democrats
on the one hand and Governor Reagan on the other is not enough.
Moreover, I believe that there are some major opportunities where
the President can project dynamic leadership and statesmanship,
which are vital ingredients for him to win the Republican nomi-
nation and the general election in November.
Before turning to some specific suggestions, it might be
appropriate to list some of the major criticisms that have been
leveled against President Ford in recent months. My purpose
is not to determine whether or not the criticism is valid or
not valid. Rather, my purpose is to pinpoint how President
Fordis perceived by some people and then offer some constructive
suggestions for not just meeting this criticism but rather going
forward in a positive fashion which will make a major contribution
toward winning both the Republican nomination and the general
election in November.
FORD LIBRARY &
There is a feeling on the part of many people that President
Ford has not shown sufficient "leadership." Other people maintain
that the President is not acting like a President should act
(whatever that is) and instead is acting like a Congressman or
like the Republican Minority Leader.
Other major criticisms have been made, including one which
was discussed in the December paper: Perception of the Republican
Party as the Party without compassion.
If President Ford is to win the nomination and the general
election, then he must be cognizant of such criticisms and must
consider possible courses of action to overcome these problems.
As a combination program to project imaginative and dynamic
leadership and statesmanship and also at the same time meet some
of the criticism that has been leveled against the President,
I would like to suggest four specific programs which can be
integrated with key anniversaries providing speaking opportunities
that the President can use as a take-off point. These programs
and speaking opportunities can be used as major keystones in
the campaign for both the nomination and the general election.
Furthermore, they can be all pulled together in the climax, which
I call the "Bicentennial Speech" the speech that the President
-2-
FORD LIBRARY i GERALD
will give on July 4, 1976--an address that could be and should
be one of the most important of this century.
There should be a theme which should tie these major
speaking opportunities together and which should also be used
to help project Presidential leadership and statesmanship.
One theme that I would suggest for consideration is the need
to rebuild confidence in ourselves, recognize the greatness of
this country, recognize unsolved problems that we have, partial
solutions that we have already attained, and opportunities for
the future. There is nothing that is impossible--as long we
have confidence in ourselves and our ability to recongize our
problems and work together to solve them.
With the foregoing as a frame of reference, let us examine
in summary form four specific proposals and key anniversaries
for the presentation of these proposals:
1. The first speaking opportunity that I would like to pin-
point occurs on the 111th anniversary of the assassination of Abraham
Lincoln on April 14, 1976. "With malice toward none, and charity
toward all." This nation is still divided against itself. The after-
math of Vietnam, the aftermath of racial clashes, the aftermath of
Watergate have left the national purpose of this country unsettled.
-3-
This has been compounded by the investigations of the CIA. To
say the least, divisiveness is the order of the day.
Not only is this bad from the viewpoint of moving forward
toward our national goals and aspirations, but it is also bad
from the viewpoint of a strong national defense. When one reads
basic communist political doctrine, he finds that there are
often references to the fall of capitalism as a result of dis-
array and crumbling from within the capitalistic system as
opposed to exterior force from outside the country.
Therefore, I believe that a major national goal from the
viewpoint of both domestic progress as well as strong national
defense must be getting people pulling together again. Within
this context, I think we can turn to the leadership of Abraham
Lincoln who was faced with the problem of uniting a very dis-
united country after the Civil War.
But the words of Lincoln, alone, are not enough. There
must be specific action to demonstrate Presidential leadership
and compassion. A wide number of possibilities should be con-
sidered--even though at first blush some of these may not appear
appropriate at this stage of the campaign. For instance, one
possibility which I believe should be considered (but which I
am not yet ready to recommend) concerns Presidential amnesty or
-4-
pardon for people who fled the United States during the
Vietnamese war. It is not a particularly major issue now,
but could it offer a major opportunity for President Ford on
the anniversary of Abraham Lincoln? As a frame of reference,
I am going to point to the pardon of President Nixon by President
Ford. I did not agree with this at the time it was done. Yet,
many people feel in retrospect that this was a sound decision
because it avoided a continuation of national disarray as an
outgrowth of Watergate.
Another aspect of national disarray concerns the issue of
amnesty for those who fled this country instead of being
drafted to fight in Vietnam. Heretofore, I have wholeheartedly
supported the concept of requiring some sort of obligatory service
as a substitute for the Armed Forces service that was avoided
by those people who fled the United States during the Vietnamese
War. Yet, as I gain perspective, I wonder whether or not we can
get this whole issue behind us by having President Ford not
only use the words of Lincoln but also undertake a specific
action of having a blanket amnesty or Presidential pardon for all
Americans to return to the country, with no conditions attached.
The more I think about it, the more I believe that in the long
range, this could be in the best interests of our country.
-5-
In addition, this could act as an insulating factor against
what will have a major political impact this summer and fall:
The release of the movie about Watergate starring Robert Redford
and Dustin Hoffman and featuring the re-creation of President
Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman, etc. Previews of coming attractions
are already featuring scenes from this movie, and Watergate
will be very much in the mass media this summer and fall.
Necessarily, this will bring back into the public eye the pardon
of President Nixon. A Presidential pardon or amnesty of Vietnam
draft evaders might materially offset the adverse effect that
this movie is bound to have.
Furthermore, in the campaign for the Republican nomination,
there could be some very tangible political benefits, par-
ticularly if Governor Reagan should win some early victories
in the Presidential primaries. (I will discuss in the March
paper some specific course of action which I believe must be
taken in the event Reagan does very well in New Hampshire and
Illinois.)
There is another tangible political benefit and that is
the possibility that Governor Reagan will disagree with this
decision. This is the kind of an issue that after the first
few days has to work to the benefit of the President. In the
-6-
first place, most of the press will be in favor of the decision.
Moreover, the American public by and large is a public that
is willing to forgive, and if the public has to vote on the
side of compassion or non-compassion, the public generally is
going to favor compassion.
Finally, I believe such a stand would help meet the problem
that was discussed in the December paper: Perception of the
Republican Party as the Party without compassion.
On the other hand, there are obvious disadvantages for
the President to offer blanket amnesty or Presidential pardon.
But regardless of whether or not amnesty is the right decision
to make at this time, the fact remains that the nation is still
not together again, and the anniversary of the assassination of
President Lincoln affords a great opportunity for President Ford
to make a major national address steeped in the vision and
idealism of Abraham Lincoln. The country is moving again.
You can feel it as you crisscross the country. We must look
toward the future as we recognize the crises we have recently
gone through.
-7-
I would like to borrow another page from Lincoln and make
a specific suggestion for an April 14, 1976, speech (and this
same suggestion applies to the other specific speeches I am
recommending) : President Ford should strive to make his public
speeches shorter: A target of ten to twelve minutes with a
maximum of fifteen. The Lincoln Gettysburg Address was less
than five minutes. A masterpiece does not have to be long.
There are very few people who do not appreciate a short speech.
2. The next major address I suggest is on May 8, 1976, coin-
ciding with the 31st anniversary of V-E Day in Europe. I believe that
there has been great Presidential leadership in the search for
world peace, and I think President Ford should come forward and
"tell it like it is." We do not have any American troops engaged
in war operations abroad. We opened the doors to China. We
are seeking to make agreements with Russia which will cut down
on the horrible waste of human effort toward building instruments
of destruction.
The specific content of this speech should emphasize the
stupidity of the nations of the world in spending so much money
for instruments of destruction when so much needs to be done and
so much can be done. At the same time, the speech can discuss
the need for national defense as long as there are totalitarian
-8-
nations in this world that do not recognize the rights and
freedoms that American citizens enjoy.
I think there is a fantastic opportunity for President
Ford to go through the budgets that various foreign nations
spend for their armed forces and for instruments of war and
compare these with the expenditures that are made to help relieve
poverty throughout the world. The President can express great
concern for the huge defense budgets that this country has,
while explaining to America that we cannot afford to be second-
best. I would also suggest that the President with particular
reference to the campaign for the nomination can point out how
ill-advised it can be to grandstand and "talk tough." Here,
I believe there is a page of Republican history that can be
borrowed the 1948 campaign for the nomination between Dewey and
Stassen, where Stassen was on the verge of victory until he
met Dewey in Oregon and took the "hard line" position against
communism.
Ronald Reagan has an Achilles heel when it comes to foreign
policy. The President can exploit this while at the same time
coming forward as a statesman and as a leader who is leading the
way in the search for world peace.
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
-9-
There are other possibilities which I would like to
discuss in detail in the near future. The key is that President
Ford has a story to tell. I want him to tell the story as a
statesman, as a leader, and as a man with a passionate concern
for the need to preserve our freedoms on one hand and compassionate
understanding of the havoc that has been caused by both war
and the expenditure of huge sums throughout the world for
weapons and armies.
3. The Flag Day-Commencement speech.
The month of June offers a double opportunity of Flag Day (June 14
and a major address at a college or university. This talk can
be the prelude to the Bicentennial speech on the Fourth of July.
As I envision this address, it would be appropriate at a
college or university to scan the past 200 years of American
history to show what we have accomplished from the idealistic
point of view as well as from the practical point of view.
At the same time, since the talk would be before younger people,
we can look with a vision toward the future to see what can be
accomplished in the years ahead. We can review perspectives of
how far we have gone in relations between races and how far we
can still go. We can take a look at perspectives of the freedoms
-10-
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
we have and compare this with the freedoms that most of the
rest of the world does not have.
There are some great quotations going back to the Founding
Fathers and including quotations from great leaders of Western
Europe which could be sprinkled in this kind of a talk.
The talk in part can also be adapted to the course of the
primary challenge by Governor Reagan. I will have some specific
comments on this in the April or May strategy paper.
4. July 4, 1976, is literally a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
The Bicentennial speech in many respects may be the most important
address that President Ford will ever make. It can make a major
contribution toward winning the nomination. It can make a major
contribution toward winning the election. And it can make a
major contribution in the course of this country's progress for
the rest of this century, and beyond.
Perhaps in this talk more than any other place, President
Ford will have an opportunity to demonstrate that he is a "big"
President a President that deserves to go down in history as
one of the best a President who has the vision and the leadership
to guide this country as it enters its third century.
-11-
I have some specific thoughts and suggestions on this
address. In part, these relate to what I have previously
discussed in this strategy paper. In part, they do not.
Either the April or the May strategy paper will be primarily
devoted to this tremendously important event. However, before
I prepare that strategy paper, I would like to have the benefit
of meeting directly with President Ford and listening to his
thoughts in this area, his disagreements or criticism with the
overall strategy that I have proposed in these strategy papers
to date, and sharing with him some specific suggestions and
observations.
In closing, let me reiterate a comment made in the November
strategy paper: The most important advantage that President
Ford has is that he is the President. Over the past few months,
he has concentrated on performing his job in Washington and
not going out on the campaign trails. I believe this is very
sound strategy. But I also believe that it is now time to take
the next step and go forward with a positive, affirmative,
imaginative program which will emphasize his leadership and
statesmanship as the President of this country.
-12-
There is a story to be told. A story of world peace. A
story of return to domestic prosperity. A story of how much
better off we are than we were a year and a half ago. A story
that it is not fair for the Republican Party to turn its back
on a President who has literally led this country from the brink
of internal disaster, both economically and politically.
There are other aspects of this story such as the fact
that the economy has turned around in barely more than a year-
as compared with an economy that after the 1929 Depression
did not turn around until the advent of a World War.
But the most important aspect is the frame of reference-
a frame of reference that includes vision, idealism, compassion,
and recognition of what we have accomplished, what remains to be
accomplished, and what can be accomplished if we have confidence
in ourselves and work together, looking toward the future.
I have made some specific proposals. There may be disagree-
ment with some or all of these proposals. But if there is dis-
agreement, then I would respectfully suggest that there should
be alternative specific positive programs for projecting
-13-
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
imaginative leadership and statesmanship--qualities that the
President does have qualities that are essential in winning
the nomination and the general election in November.
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
February 13, 1976
-14-
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 3 - JANUARY, 1976
David W. Belin
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Winning Independent Votes -
Major Organizational Considerations
In past Presidential campaigns, candidates have often had
separate organizations directed at persons who were not of the
candidate's own party. For instance, "Citizens for Kennedy",
or "Democrats for Nixon".
For the 1976 Presidential campaign, instead of a "Citizens
for President Ford" or "Democrats for President Ford", I believe
there should be a political organization specifically directed
at the Independent voter and called, "INDEPENDENTS FOR PRESIDENT
FORD"
The word is particularly appropriate because of the emphasis
on the Bicentennial celebration of our country's "independence".
Before getting into specific details concerning the overall
political organization, there is one overriding consideration
of which we must at all times be aware: If the major thrust
toward the Independent voter is purely from an organizational
standpoint, it will fail; policy and issue strategy, where the
Independent voter's views are given major consideration, are
absolutely essential elements of any successful strategy directed
toward the Independent voter.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
The December, 1975, strategy paper, "Winning Independent
Votes--Major Strategy Considerations", discussed public dis-
satisfaction with Congress, which was a major Presidential
advantage, and also discussed a major Republican weakness:
Perception as the Party without compassion, the Party that is
more concerned with balancing the budget than it is concerned
about caring for the needs and problems of the average
American.
In structuring an organization directed toward the
Independent voter, these as well as other basic strategy con-
siderations must be kept in mind. There will be a number of
key opportunities to develop issues which are appealing to
both Republican and Independent voters. For instance, in the
poll attached to the December paper, the Independent voter
expressed almost as strong disapproval of the way Congress was
handling its job in Washington as did the Republican voter.
Ideally speaking, there should be at least two co-chairmen,
one of whom should be a woman and at least one of whom has
in times past supported Democratic candidates for elective office,
as well as Republican candidates.
At least one of the co-chairmen should have national stature
-2-
so far as the press is concerned (but this does not necessarily
mean national name recognition). In addition, at least one
of the national co-chairmen should have a lot of political
"savvy" from the perspective of both the Republican Party as
well as the Independent voter. Other qualities could be
mentioned including the ability to handle public relations,
the ability to organize, and the ability to cooperate and work
with others.
The framework for such an organization should be developed
well before the Republican National Convention. Contact should
be made in each of the fifty states for people to head statewide
organizations of "Independents for President Ford."
The exact timing of a public announcement of the forming
of an organization will depend in part upon the course of the
primary campaigns and may be integrated in some way to tie in
with at least one of a series of four major speeches directed
toward both the Republican and the Independent voter that President
Ford should consider giving in April, May, June and July.
These four speeches will be further discussed in the
February strategy paper. The tentative timing and areas of
concentration in the speeches might be along these lines:
-3-
1. A speech on April 14, 1976, on the 111th anniversary
of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. This talk would con-
centrate on the need to bind up the divisions within the country,
the way Abraham Lincoln sought to bind up our country after the
Civil War. One could even envision a dramatic announcement by
President Ford leading the way. Or, perhaps the speech should
concentrate on what this nation has accomplished in the way of
people of all races and creeds working together, what it has
accomplished specifically for the Black minorities, and what yet
remains to be accomplished.
2. A speech on May 8, 1976, coinciding with the 31st
anniversary of V-E Day in Europe, which would concentrate on
world peace and would emphasize what has been accomplished in
recent years in the search for peace, ranging from the
rapprochement with China to the fact that for the first time
since 1961, no American troops are engaged in war operations
abroad. Further specifics and alternatives will be discussed
in the February strategy paper.
3. The June speech could coincide with Flag Day or might
be a speech given at a college convocation. If given on Flag
-4-
Day, the speech might concentrate on the need for national
defense, including some historical perspectives of the expansion
of dictatorships. This could also be incorporated in a college
speech, where history would be emphasized as well as opportunities
for the future, bringing into focus material discussed in the
May speech. These and other alternatives will be further
developed in the February strategy paper.
4. Finally, what should be the most important speech of all--
probably the most important speech that will ever be given by
President Ford, and what could be one of the most important
speeches of the century--THE BICENTENNIAL SPEECH. This is a once
in a century opportunity, and I would like to further discuss
this in the February paper. The Bicentennial Speech will be
given on July 4, 1976-it should be a speech grounded in the
greatness of American history, with a visionary outlook toward
the future, and could include some dramatic announcements which
could have a major effect not only on the nomination and the
election this Fall but also on the future of our country in
the next several decades.
I have some specific ideas which I would like to outline in
the February paper and then which I would like to discuss in
Washington in late February or early March.
-5-
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Each of these speeches will be directed not only toward the
Republican voter but also toward the Independent voter. They
should afford opportunities for a well-organized "Independents
for President Ford" organization to reach out and help gain
Independent support for the President.
The "Independents for President Ford" organization should
also undertake a review of Presidential appointees who are
not Republicans and who might be available for direct or indirect
campaign help.
The November, 1975, strategy paper, "Defusing the Reagan
Challenge", referred to the need for a strong Republican
organization in each of the fifty states together with a
"parallel organization primarily directed to the Independent
voter." The importance of an effective organization, which I
believe should be called "Independents for President Ford",
cannot be over-emphasized. Plans should be immediately under-
taken to lay out the framework for this organization.
Finally, if this organization proves to be effective,
it could form the fountainhead for broadening the base of the
Republican Party in future years, perhaps culminating in an
-6-
amalgamation of Republicans in a large body of Independent
voters. However, discussion of these opportunities can wait
until after the November election.
In the meantime, as the organizational structure of
"Independents for President Ford" gets underway, President Ford
and his campaign organization must go to the offensive from the
position of the Presidency. There is a story to be told to the
Republican voters and to the general electorate: Our country
today is in far better shape than it was 18 months ago when
President Ford took office. Inflation has been brought under
control, and no American soldiers are fighting abroad.
"Peace and prosperity" must form a major part of the appeal
toward the Independent voter, just as it must form a major part
of President Ford's campaign for the Republican nomination.
GERALD R. FORD
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
January 16, 1976
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 2 - DECEMBER, 1975
David W. Belin
Winning Independent Votes - Major Strategy Considerations
Almost every Republican leader agrees that in order for
Republicans to win elections, they must gain the support of
Independent voters as well as discerning Democrats.
This strategy paper discusses two aspects of this question,
one of which involves what I believe to be a major strength
which already exists for the President and the other of which
involves what I believe to be an existing weakness--a weakness
that has also been a major Republican weakness through the
years.
A. Public dissatisfaction with Congress--a major
Presidential advantage.
In 1948, President Truman won re-election in large part
because of the campaign against the Republican-controlled
Eightieth Congress. He even carried the State of Iowa--at
that time a rock-ribbed Republican state with a Republican
Governor, two Republican Senators, and a solid Republican
Congressional delegation.
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
In contrast, today Iowa is no longer a "rock-ribbed Repub-
lican state" although it does have a Republican Governor who
has been elected four successive times by the people. (In
response to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the
way Robert Ray is handling his job as Governor of Iowa?", the
most recent state-wide Iowa poll shows 78% approve, only 10%
disapprove and 12% have no opinion.) Today five out of the six
Congressmen are Democrats and both Senators are Democrats.
Nevertheless, there exists in Iowa, as I believe there
exists across the country, great dissatisfaction with Congress.
For instance, attached as Exhibit 1 to this paper are the
results of the Iowa Poll conducted by the state-wide newspaper,
The Des Moines Sunday Register, and published on November 30,
1975.
When Iowans were asked, "Who do you think is more to blame
for lack of a definite energy policy in the United States today--
President Ford or Congress?", only 10% said President Ford,
51% said the United States Congress, and the balance were
undecided.
When asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Mr.
Ford is handling the job as President?", 60% approved, 21% dis-
approved, and 19% had no opinion. In contrast, when asked, "Do
you approve or disapprove of the way the U. S. Congress is
handling its job in Washington?", only 26% approved, 54% dis-
approved, and 20% had no opinion.
-2-
With particular reference to the Independent voter, on
this last question, only 23% approved of the way Congress was
handling its job, 57% disapproved, and 20% had no opinion.
This offers a fertile field for the 1976 campaign if
cultivated properly. Furthermore, it is probable that at
least one and perhaps both of the Democratic nominees for
President and Vice President will themselves be members of
Congress. If this should happen, it will make the particular
issue of public dissatisfaction with Congress an even better
one for President Ford, unless his running mate is also a
member of Congress.
However, President Ford cannot just attack Congress with-
out offering positive proposals of his own. He should continue
to make positive recommendations to Congress for legislation.
The energy program is a good example: The President has come
forth with a specific plan and has told Congress in substance,
"If you have a better plan, let's enact it, but at least let's
get some specific legislation for the people."
As the 1976 campaign progresses, President Ford should
adapt part of what Harry Truman did with the Republican Eightieth
Congress, except that it should be on a much "softer" basis.
-3-
There are two basic reasons that I recommend a "softer"
approach. First, I believe the public is getting tired of
all of the bickering that is going on in Washington. Governor
Ray, who I believe is one of the most astute political leaders
in the country, wholeheartedly agrees with this. An attack
against Congress that is too "hard sell" could result in the
public saying, "A plague on both your houses." Therefore,
I would recommend a more indirect approach which would emphasize
what President Ford has done in positive accomplishments and
in positive recommendations to Congress and contrast this with
Congressional performance or lack of Congressional performance
or inconsistencies on the part of Congress.
The second reason why I believe a "soft" approach is
necessary in handling public dissatisfaction with Congress is
that when Harry Truman started a hard-hitting campaign against
the Republican-dominated Congress, he had one major asset which
the Republican Party has not had through these past few decades.
This involves exploitation of what I believe to be one of the
major Republican weaknesses through the years: The failure
of the Republican Party to be identified in the minds of the
average citizen as a Party that cares for people
-4-
B. A major Republican weakness: Perception as the
Party without compassion.
In discussing the failure of the Republican Party to be
identified in the minds of the average citizen as a Party that
cares for people, the issue is not whether a particular
Republican candidate--such as President Ford--actually has
compassion for his fellow citizens. Rather, the issue is how
that candidate, and the Republican Party as a whole, is
perceived.
I believe that relatively few Americans perceive the
Republican Party as a political organization that has compassion
and concern for the lives of the average citizen particularly
people of below-average economic status. I believe this
perception extends to how President Ford is viewed by a great
many Americans. To be sure, they do not know him as an indi-
vidual. Nevertheless, I believe he is perceived by far too
many people as someone who is far more concerned with balancing
the budget than he is concerned about caring for the needs and
problems of the average American.
There is another basic problem which permeates our American
society today: An overall lack of optimism for the future.
-5-
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
Twenty or thirty years ago, an overall frame of optimism
permeated our entire country. In contrast, today we have
almost a fatalistic sense of resignation-- in large part caused
by a multitude of problems ranging from Vietnam and Watergate
to the energy crisis, inflation and unemployment.
If these assumptions are at least in part correct, the
next question to ask is whether or not there is an issue which
would afford the President an opportunity to meet both of these
problems head-on: To kill the proverbial two birds with one
stone.
I submit that there is an opportunity to meet these two
problems which confront America today--and that opportunity
lies in one of the most important basic economic assets of
our country--our natural resources and technological capabilities
to produce food.
First, a few facts: In 1974, American had a net trade
deficit of nonagricultural products of approximately $10 billion.
On the other hand, the net trade surplus of agricultural products
was approximately $12 billion. Were it not for the ability to
produce food in abundance, this nation would have been in
dire economic straits.
-6-
The agricultural trade surplus in 1974 is a harbinger of
the future. To be sure, today we have an energy crisis. But
that energy crisis will be solved--it may be ten years from
now, twenty years from now, or thirty years from now; it may
be energy from the sun, from the wind, from coal, from nuclear
power; but regardless of how the problem will be solved, we can
be confident that technologically America will be able to solve
its energy problems through substitutes for oil.
On the other hand, there is no substitute for food. And
as world population continues to grow, this ability of America
to produce food will become progressively more and more important
through the years.
This fact alone is of tremendous long range economic
consequence and also constitutes a ground for basic long range
economic optimism for the future of our country.
There are a number of specific opportunities arising out
of our food capabilities. First, food can make a major contri-
bution in getting this country economically healthy. Second,
our food capabilities can be of tremendous benefit in helping
us meet potential challenges from international cartels and
in particular the oil cartel. Third, food can be of tremendous
-7-
benefit in overall American foreign policy in American relations
with our adversaries and in particular Russia. Fourth, food
can be of major import in our relationships with friendly
countries of the world as well as the uncommitted countries
of the world and can also have great import in the overall
image and standing of America in world affairs, if properly
handled. There are also other direct benefits that relate
to America's food productivity, all of which go to the question
that many Americans are asking today, "What does it do for us?"
This directly relates to the problem of regenerating confidence
in ourselves and rebuilding an overall outlook of optimism for
the future.
There is another aspect of food which relates to the problem
of how President Ford and the Republican Party as a whole are
perceived by the American people. There are tremendous opportunities
from the humanitarian standpoint of being able to provide food
for others. The starting point has to be food deficiencies
that exist in the United States today. Thus far, the major role
of the government to help America's needy has been through food
stamps. It is a program which is capable of gross abuse.
FORD LIBRARY s 9ERALD
-8-
Certainly, we want to help poor people buy food. But
surely, there must be a better way than food stamps. Can we
make food available to economically-disadvantaged Americans in
ways that are better than current programs?
Another possible alternative pertains to school-age
children. Many schools have hot lunch programs, although
questions have been raised concerning the overall administration
of those programs. On the other hand, many schools do not have
any hot lunch programs at all. Furthermore, even in those schools
with hot lunch programs, children often go to school without
adequate breakfast and leave school without provisions for an
adequate supper. Is there a better way to make food available
to America's children--particularly those of school age?
What about food as an instrument of humanitarian foreign
policy? On the one hand, Americans do not want to continue
to spend billions of dollars of foreign aid annually--aid which
all too often has been unappreciated by the recipients. Yet,
basic American traditions of compassion and charity surely
would not preclude some aid in the form of food given to alleviate
starvation in some of the poorer countries in the world today.
-9-
One of the things that stands out most in the administration
of Harry Truman was the Marshall Plan. It took place at a time
when America could better afford to give away the billions
of dollars annually that it gave. The money not only helped
others, but also in the long run helped this country by main-
taining the freedom of the independent nations of Western Europe.
Although today we cannot afford to give away money in the
staggering amounts given after World War II, I submit that there
is a place for American leadership in helping alleviate starva-
tion in the world today.
A specific program might include a major portion of tech-
nology aid to foreign countries--perhaps particularly stressing
Latin America--to help these countries help themselves. Some
people believe that from a long-range standpoint it is more
important to give this technological assistance than it is to
merely provide food.
At the same time, there could be government programs to
encourage better food technology production methods in this
country and better educational programs and research programs
on the overall aspects of food and nutrition.
-10-
Henry Kissinger in a September speech before the United
Nations brought forward some of the long-range foreign policy
benefits that this country could gain. Secretary Butz in recent
speeches has also come forward with some aspects of this problem
(although I happen to have some substantial differences with
some of the programs of Secretary Butz).
For President Ford to undertake leadership in this area
with particular reference to American citizens and also with
reference to world food problems could have a major effect
on how President Ford is perceived by the American people.
At the present time, most Americans do not know the President,
and they do not fully appreciate the fact that he is, indeed,
a compassionate human being. This inaccurate perception is
perhaps the greatest single weakness facing President Ford in
the 1976 campaign. There must be a way to correct this.
I believe that the best possible way is through food. As
an Iowan, I have vividly seen how Herbert Hoover gained the
affection of America and the world after World War I because he
helped save Western Europe from starvation. There is no doubt
that this played a major role in his road to the Presidency,
although his accomplishments in the area of food have been
unfortunately overshadowed by the 1929 Depression.
-11-
If President Ford were to undertake some major national
and international leadership in the area of food, this would
have an effect on actions that he has already taken. Perhaps
he would have to change his course in several areas. But
surely the fact that a man changes his mind on a major issue
is something that can be admired and will be admired by Americans
if handled in the right way.
I believe that America's preeminence in food offers
President Ford a tremendous opportunity to meet head-on the
problems of how the Republican Party in general and how the
President in particular has been perceived by the great majority
of the people in this country and also the problem of lack of
optimism for America's future.
If there is disagreement about the particular solution
I proposed, surely there can be no disagreement about the
fact that the two major problems that I have outlined do exist.
And if food is not the vehicle to help overcome these problems,
then some other vehicle must be found.
The key conclusion I wish to emphasize is that the demon-
stration of caring for people and compassion for the under-
privileged in this country and throughout the world can make
-12-
a major contribution toward election victory in 1976. There
are a number of collateral benefits ranging from the positive
effect it will have on how the press perceives the President
to the positive effect it will have on the Independent voter
himself in the November election.
In addition, I believe that Presidential leadership in
this area could make a major contribution toward securing the
Republican Presidential nomination.
Finally, and most important of all, there is one additional
element that I believe is crucial: The element of what is best
for the people of this country. It is my firm conviction that
good government is good politics. And to me, I cannot think
of anything that is more important to the government of this
country than to make sure that its citizens, and in particular
its children, are adequately fed.
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
December 12, 1975
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
-13-
IOWANS CITE
An early November Gallup
Poll reported that in the Coun-
DES MOINES SUNDAY REGISTER / 7A
-
try as a whole, 44 per cent
Nov. 30, 1975
CONGRESS FOR
approve of his job perform-
ance, 44 per cent disapprove
Results of Iowa Poll
ENERGY WOES
and 12 per cent have no opin-
ion.
The low regard shown by
Iowans were asked the following October 1-4.
Question: Who do you think is more to blame for the lack
Iowans for congressional ef-
of-a definite energy policy in the United States today-Presi-
By BRUCE NYGREN
forts in the area of energy
dent Ford or Congress?
lowa Poll Stall
may be related to the low
Total
Oct. '75
-Iowans blame the U.S. Con-
rating the legislators receive
Oct. '75
June '75
Rep.
Dem.
Ind.
President Ford
gress more than President
10%
11%
19%
5%
7%
for general job performance.
U.S. Congress
51
57
39
64
50
Gerald Ford for the lack of a
In the latest poll, only 26
Undecided
39
32
42
31
43
definite energy plan in the
per cent approve of the job
The 10 per cent who said President Ford is more to
U.S.
Congress is doing. This com-
blame gave these reasons:
An October Iowa Poll found
pares with 45 per cent who
Total
Ford has had poor energy proposals
25%
approved in September, 1974.
Ford hasn't done anything
that 51 per cent blame. Con-
Copyright, 1975. Des Moines Register
17
and Tribune Company
THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 1 - NOVEMBER, 1975
David W. Belin
David file Belin
Defusing the Reagan Challenge
strategy
From the viewpoint of securing the Republican nomination,
the major risk to the President in meeting the challenge of
Governor Reagan is not the risk of loss in a particular Republican
primary. Rather, the major risk is the ramifications of such
a loss.
From the standpoint of winning the November election, the
major risk to the President in meeting the Reagan challenge is
the risk of losing the Independent vote that is absolutely
essential for victory in November.
From the viewpoint of Governor Reagan, the major risk is
the loss in any primary where the President does not heavily
campaign. This arises from the fact that Reagan will be a full-
time candidate.
When we search for a basic strategy that will best resolve
these three problems, there is an obvious starting point: The
major strength of Gerald Ford is that he is a full-time President.
The major weakness arises if he spends too much time in campaigning,
which in turn undermines that basic strength.
BERALD LIBRARY FORD
(As a matter of fact, I believe that in the past several
months the President may have spent too much time on the campaign
trail, even though in part this has been on behalf of other
Republican candidates or fund-raising events. In some respects,
this has weakened his overall standing and undermines the basic
posture that he must maintain if he is to win both the nomination
and the election: The fact that he is first and foremost, a
full-time President.)
The best possible scenario for Reagan would be to defeat
Gerald Ford in a series of primary elections in states where
Gerald Ford heavily campaigns.
Therefore, it is obvious that it is not to the benefit of
the President to heavily campaign in any state in which the
Republican leadership is strongly committed to Governor
Reagan.
Yet, the President cannot remain completely aloof from the
presidential primaries.
In resolving this conflict, I would like to suggest for
consideration the following basic strategy program:
At an appropriate time after the Reagan announcement, and
in an appropriate forum, President Ford should candidly state that
he will enter every primary.
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FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
However, in contrast to Governor Reagan, who is a full-time
candidate, President Ford should point out that the President
must first and foremost discharge the responsibilities of the
Presidency. Accordingly, President Ford will state that he
will not be able to devote a lot of time to primary campaigning,
and there undoubtedly will be some states where he does no
campaigning at all.
The President should then further state that because Governor
Reagan will be campaigning full time and because the President
will be campaigning on a very part-time basis, Governor Reagan
might very well win primary elections in some states and that
as a practical matter the President should say that he is going
to win some primaries, he is going to lose some primaries, but
that ultimately he will win a majority of the votes of the
delegates to the Republican National Convention.
Furthermore, the President should declare that if he loses
primaries because he is a full-time President and is therefore
unable to campaign extensively in a particular state, so be it.
And if that, in turn, results in Governor Reagan's securing
the Republican nomination, so be it. The President will not
set aside the duties of the office of the Presidency in order
to win primary elections.
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In addition, the President should publicly state what most
pragmatic political experts believe: Regardless of whether
or not Governor Reagan wins any primaries, President Ford
will be by far the stronger candidate for the Republican Party
in a general election, and to nominate Governor Reagan would
be a repetition of 1964.
This strategy has several key advantages:
a. This strategy emphasizes the major underlying strength
of President Ford.
b. This strategy has a basic appeal to the independent
voter. This will be further discussed in the December strategy
paper.
C. This strategy affords a rationale in the event the
President loses a primary and at the same time puts the burden
on Governor Reagan to win primary elections in states where he
heavily campaigns.
d. This strategy puts Governor Reagan in a position of
having not much to gain if he wins a primary election but a lot
to lose if he does not win. Thus, if Governor Reagan wins
New Hampshire when President Ford campaigns only two or three
days in New Hampshire, so what. But if Reagan loses New Hampshire
under such circumstances, he has indeed lost a great deal.
-4-
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
The success of McGovern in New Hampshire was not necessarily
in winning the election. Rather, it was running stronger than
it was anticipated that he would run.
e. This strategy leaves open to the President the option
of picking and choosing states in which he can more heavily
campaign for the primary elections. Obviously, the states will
be in areas where he has a favorable chance to win.
In order to consider adopting the foregoing overall strategy,
the President must sharply reduce the number of his political
trips. Instead of being seen on television screens waving at
crowds, President Ford should be seen with leaders of this
country and international leaders in Washington--conducting the
business of this country. Furthermore, when he campaigns, it
should be in his own behalf and not for others, particularly
since President Ford has never run for national office in his own
right. The real issue is not how much President Ford campaigns,
but rather how he campaigns. And the how must include the candid
statement that he does not expect to win the nomination by ac-
claimation, that he expects in some places to run well and in
some places not to run well.
-5-
At all times, the President must remember that he is the
President and Ronald Reagan is not. He must stick more to his
case--a candid, thoughtful, hard-working, capable President--
a case which will have several other important elements which
I will discuss in the December strategy paper.
The overall strategy I suggest for consideration
has an additional benefit to the President of timing. Sooner
or later, Governor Reagan is going to put his foot in his
mouth. And when he does, the best place to take advantage of
this is not Manchester or Tallahassee. Rather, the best place
is from the White House in Washington. And when this happens,
the President can then adjust his schedule to campaign in the
right states at the right time and defeat Governor Reagan in
those particular primaries with the added advantages of pouncing
on the opportunity of a fumble of the ball by Governor Reagan.
Looking at this strategy from the viewpoint of Governor
Reagan, it presents an insurmountable problem: If the Governor
wins a particular primary where the President has not heavily
campaigned, the President can readily explain that loss, since
he did not heavily campaign in that particular state.
-6-
On the other hand, if Governor Reagan as a full-time
candidate loses a state in which he heavily campaigns, and in
which the President did not heavily campaign, how can Governor
Reagan explain that loss? The President can seize the opportunity
to come forward with one of his basic positions of strength:
The Republican Party must nominate a candidate who will have
the most appeal to both Republican and Independent voters.
If Governor Reagan loses a Republican primary as a full-time
candidate, how can he possibly garner the support of the necessary
Independent vote that is essential for Republican victory in
November?
There is yet an additional overall advantage to the strategy
I suggest: It will enable the President to do a better job in
office, because he will be devoting more time to that office.
As I said at the beginning, the basic strength of Gerald Ford
is that he is the President of the United States. Let us never
underestimate or undermine that strength in seeking the Republican
Presidential nomination in 1976.
Finally, there is one other crucial element in defusing
the Reagan challenge: Organization. There is just no substitute
for a sound, aggressive, coordinated campaign organization. There
are many people who believe that the performance thus far in the
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area of campaign organization leaves much to be desired. Time
is of the essence.
Initially, the organization must be centered around leading
Republicans in each of the fifty states. However, there will
have to also be a parallel organization primarily directed
for the Independent voter. This will be further developed in
the January strategy paper.
In summary, the best way to defuse the Reagan challenge
is to combine a sound strategy with first-rate aggressive
political organization. The key to the strategy is that Gerald
Ford is the President and Ronald Reagan is not the President
and that Gerald Ford as President is going to be doing his
job and will not be devoting a lot of time to primary campaigning.
Therefore, there will be states where he will win and there will
be states where he will lose. His goal is not to win the nomination
by acclaimation, but rather to win a majority of the delegates
to the Convention, and that if he wins the nomination he will be
far the strongest candidate for the Republican Party in a general
election.
The greatest risk to the President is to campaign heavily
and fall prey to the so-called Washington political pundits who
-8-
would write that a 20% or 30% Reagan showing is a psychological
victory for Reagan. This has to be turned so that the burden
is placed on Governor Reagan to win primary elections in states
where he heavily campaigns, and if he does not win those elections,
it is he, the full-time campaigner, who has lost. But even if
he wins some, this has to be expected. And if he wins too many,
the President can pick and choose his own battleground. It
may be Wisconsin, it may be Oregon, it may be in some other state
perhaps even California. But let the President pick his own
battleground and not try to campaign on every battleground.
And wherever the President picks the battleground, he should be
sure that he has a first-rate campaign organization on which he
can rely.
David W. Belin
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
November 4, 1975
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THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD
BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 11 - SEPTEMBER, 1976
David W. Belin
The Ford-Carter Debates: Key Strategy Considerations
The debates between President Ford and Jimmy Carter will
be the single most important events of the 1976 campaign.
What is the best basic strategy to follow?
Six elements will be discussed: (1) Basic advantages
of the President; (2) basic disadvantages of the President;
(3) physical preparation; (4) capitalizing on Democratic
control of Congress; (5) capitalizing on other Jimmy Carter
weaknesses; (6) capitalizing on psychological factors.
1. Basic Advantages of the President.
The advantage of incumbency, coupled with the record
of the President, is the single most important advantage that
President Ford had.
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
As I wrote in my August strategy paper, "The Five Keys to
Victory in November", the President in any debate with Jimmy
Carter can refer to the basic elements of his record in restoring
trust and confidence in government, maintaining peace, cutting
inflation in half, and leading the country into an era of ever-
increasing prosperity.
What I wrote in my first strategy paper in November, 1975,
with reference to the primary campaign is equally applicable
to the fall campaign:
"The major strength of Gerald Ford is that he is a full-
time President. The major weakness arises if he spends
too much time in campaigning, which in turn undermines
that basic strength."
I continued:
"Instead of being seen on television screens waving at
crowds, President Ford should be seen with leaders of this
country and international leaders in Washington--conducting
the business of this country
"
"At all times, the President must remember that he is the
President and Ronald Reagan (Jimmy Carter) is not. He
must stick more to his case--a candid, thoughtful hard-
working, capable President
"
Combined with this advantage of incumbency is an additional
basic advantage: The President has a far better grasp of the
facts than Jimmy Carter. Yet, although this is a basic advantage,
if improperly used, it could turn out to be a terrible disadvantage.
-2-
GERALD ? 1881
The President must be quick to recognize that although he
will debate Jimmy Carter, the winner is not the person who can
score the most points if the debate were to be judged by normal
standards. Rather, this debate is really a jury argumant in
front of tens of millions of Americans, and the ultimate victor
will be the person who best communicates with this jury. Thus,
the President must reinforce his delivery of the concrete facts
with the seasoning of an emotional appeal to the hopes and
aspirations of the American people.
It would be a terrible mistake to drown Jimmy Carter in
a mass of facts without offsetting Carter's emotional appeals
with some equally visionary language. I previously discussed
in earlier strategy papers the general failure of the Republican
Party to address itself to the hopes and aspirations of the
American people and also to understand how to capitalize on
the emotional factors involved in the campaign. President
Ford must at all times be aware that the weight of the evidence
is not necessarily the sole criteria on how these debates will
be judged by the American jury.
In the concluding portion of my January paper, "Winning
Independent Votes - Major Organizational Considerations", I wrote:
"There is a story to be told to the Republican voters
and to the general electorate: Our country today is in
far better shape than it was 18 months ago when President
-3-
Ford took office. Inflation has been brought under control,
and no American soldiers are fighting abroad.
" Peace and prosperity' must form a major part of the appeal
toward the Independent voter, just as it must form a
major part of President Ford's campaign for the Republican
nomination. "
The theme of peace and ever-increasing prosperity must
underlie the position and arguments of President Ford in the
presidential debates. This must be combined with facts, the
seasoning of visionary outlook to the future as we enter America's
third century, and recognition of the basic disadvantage that
the President faces, which will be discussed in the next section
of this paper.
2. Basic Disadvantages of the President.
The basic disadvantage of the President, as I wrote in
my December, 1975, strategy paper, is one of the greatest Repub-
lican weaknesses: Perception as the Party without compassion.
What I said last December is even more applicable for the
November general election campaign:
"In discussing the failure of the Republican Party to be
identified in the minds of the average citizen as a Party
that cares for people, the issue is not whether a particular
Republican candidate--such as President Ford--actually
has compassion for his fellow citizens. Rather, the issue
is how that candidate, and the Republican Party as a whole,
is perceived.
"I believe that relatively few Americans perceive the
Republican Party as a political organization that has com-
passion and concern for the lives of the average citizen--
particularly people of below-average economic status.
-4-
I believe this perception extends to how President Ford is
viewed by a great many Americans. To be sure, they do
not know him as an individual. Nevertheless, I believe he
is perceived by far too many people as someone who is far
more concerned with balancing the budget than he is con-
cerned about caring for the needs and problems of the
average American."
John Rhodes makes a similar observation in his new book,
"The Futile System". Here is what he writes:
"We Republicans have experienced a rather rude awakening.
We have discovered that the image we have of ourselves does
not accord with the image other people have of us. The
realization was not a complete surprise because, after
all, we have heard for some time that we are party
comprised mainly of fat cats who curry favor with big
business. We have heard others charge that special
interests are more important to us than the needs of
the average citizen. But we really never believed
in our heart of hearts that most people think of
us that way. I never did.
"They do think of us that way, however, at least a
great many do. And, frankly, for those of us who
thought all along that our battles on behalf of fiscal
responsibility and smaller government would eventually
be rewarded, the realization that many Americans regard
Republicans as the bad guys has come as quite a
shock.
"We now know, thanks to a survey conducted by the
Republican National Committee, that Republicans are
regarded by many people as hard, callous, cruel and
insensitive. We give the impression of not caring--
and that is the worst possible image a political
party can have.
"Republicans, of course, do not believe that this
negative image is deserved. But in politics, it's not
what you are that counts; it's what people think you are."
-5-
To all of this can be added the hurdles which are an out-
growth of the wreckage of Watergate.
I do not think that the President should be defensive about
these problems. However, I think that there are ways in which
these problems can be very successfully overcome--and they must
be overcome if we are to maximize the opportunities offered by
these debates.
Furthermore, I think that the solution of this major
Republican problem can be combined in looking at another basic
problem which permeates American society today: An overall
lack of optimism for the future. Twenty or thirty years ago,
an overall frame of optimism permeated our entire country. In
contrast, today we have almost a fatalistic sense of resignation--
in large part caused by a multitude of problems ranging from
Vietnam and Watergate to the energy crisis, inflation and
unemployment.
Are there issues which would afford the President an op-
portunity to meet both of these problems head on--to kill the
proverbial two birds with one stone? I think there are very
important issues which should be taken into consideration in
-6-
preparation for the Jimmy Carter debates. I would be happy
to give some specific suggestions in this area. However, the
key element is for the President to recognize a tremendous
disadvantage he has because he is a member of the Republican
Party and because there is a great national perception of
that Party as the Party without compassion.
3. Physical Preparation.
One of the worst things President Ford can do in pre-
paring for these debates is to spread himself too thin along
the campaign trail. For instance, in Senator Dole's first
visit into Iowa after the Republican National Convention, eleven
specific meetings were originally scheduled within a four or
five hour period. Two or three at the most would have done a
far better job and would have also left Senator Dole in a far
better position to project himself well on those occasions when
he spoke.
The President showed top form in his speech before the
Republican National Convention when he had adequate time for
at least
preparation. Similarly, he should give himself two or three
days of adequate preparation, without distractions, to get
each of
prepared for the televised debates.
-7-
One of the worst mistakes of Richard Nixon was to try
and campaign in all fifty states, leaving himself physically
weary, which in turn materially adversely affected his tele-
vision appearances. President Ford should not fall into this
same trap.
In addition, President Ford should undertake as a part of his
preparation a practice "debate" with a stand-in for Jimmy
Carter, the same way a football team scrimmages in advance of
the big game and the same way a first-rate trial lawyer will
prepare a key witness by going through a practice cross-examination
that can be anticipated from the other side.
Finally, President Ford should have some "home run balls"
that he can hit out of the park that are adaptable to anticipated
questioning in the debates and anticipated responses by Jimmy
Carter. For instance, we already know that Jimmy Carter is
fuzzy on issues and that the Democratic Party Platform is calling
for as much as $200 billion of additional government spending,
which must come from taxes or inflation or a combination of both.
It can be anticipated that Jimmy Carter in the first debate on
domestic issues may be asked where the money is coming from and
may respond with his patented answers on cutting defense
-8-
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
expenditures. This can open the door for a major opportunity
for the President to inject a succinct statement on defense
and foreign policy even though the debate itself theoretically
is on domestic issues. Such a response by the President would
have to be carefully phrased to make sure that it is shown as
a response to Jimmy Carter and then the President can openly
state that he will look forward to discussing this in greater
detail in the next debate. Other "home run balls" include
such elements as the Democratic control of Congress, which
will be discussed in the next section of this paper and
which can be a tremendous counter-punch whenever Jimmy Carter
talks about "leadership".
4. Capitalizing on Democratic Control of Congress.
Jimmy Carter is going to attack the President alleging
that there has been a lack of leadership and also alleging a
negative approach through the use of too many vetos. President
Ford will offset that saying that he has given leadership to
Congress in such matters as energy and other areas, but that
Congress has not followed through. He will also say that he
has protected the American people from excessive spending of
Congress which otherwise would bring about massive inflation.
-9-
Who will win the argument? The real crux of the matter
could be the issue of leadership, and there are several "aces
in the hole" that the President should have ready to be played
at the appropriate time.
For instance, on the issue of leadership in Congress, one
can look to the whole question of Congressional reform and the
inaction of Congress in this vital area. The Democrats have
controlled Congress for 39 out of the last 43 years. Congress
has an Achilles heel in such areas as the annual automatic
pay raise tied to the cost of living. It was tacked on to a
bill providing for'a job safety program for postal workers.
Within the matter of a few days, it cleared the Senate and then
the House. Under this automatic formula, a Democratic controlled
Congress voted for pay raises of several thousand dollars in
1975, and it is no wonder that they are willing to have excessive
spending which will lead to inflation, because they have protected
themselves from the consequences of the inflation. That is, so
far as their own personal incomes are concerned.
What kind of Congressional leadership is this?
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
-10-
Then there is the question of the chaotic organization of
Congress. At the present time, more than 30 committees and more
than 60 subcommittees of Congress claim some jurisdiction in
the field of energy research and development. Education is
involved in more than 70 Congressional subcommittees.
Carter talks about reorganizing and simplifying government.
Surely, he cannot be believed when the Democrats cannot even reor-
ganize and simplify the organization of Congress.
The chaos in Congress is symptomatic of the chaos that
would result in an unchecked Congress. In the right time, in the
right place, in a Ford-Carter debate, the President can use his
ace of trumps. And surely no one should know more about how to
use such a high card than an individual who himself has gone
through the frustrations of living under a Democratic controlled
Congressional system.
5. Capitalizing on Other Jimmy Carter Weaknesses.
Perhaps the two biggest weaknesses of Jimmy Carter is
the perception of "fuzziness" on issues and the problems Jimmy
Carter has so far as the members of the working press are concerned.
As I wrote in my April paper, "Key Highlights from a Conversation
with David Broder":
-11-
"The nuances of the working press can make a tremendous
impact through the mass media. There is the question
of selectivity- which comments of the President and which
comments of the opposition are used; how the lead para-
graphs are written; how the headlines are selected; which
television clip is used; when one of the candidates stumbles,
how and the extent to which that is highlighted.
"In a hundred different ways, the working press can make
or break the candidate."
One of these ways will include the questioning that is done
of the candidates by the representatives of the working press.
At the Republican National Convention, several members of the
press commented that there is a basic distrust of Jimmy Carter.
This was highlighted as recently as the CBS evening news program
on Labor Day where samplings of Carter's comments were brought
on the television screen after the CBS commentators stated
that the comments underscored Carter's problems with "fuzziness".
Another basic disadvantage of Jimmy Carter is that he is
debating the President of the United States--the first time
this has ever been done on presidential debates. Jimmy Carter
has a very tight rope to walk: If he tries to strike too hard
at the office of the Presidency, this can create a very adverse
counter-reaction. By the same token, the President has to be
very careful that he acts like a President--a big person--and
-12-
FORD LIBRARY &
if Jimmy Carter stumbles in this area, the President should
plan in advance the best kind of hard-hitting reply--that
would be statesmanlike in approach but yet will drive the
point home without in turn creating public sympathy for Jimmy
Carter.
I believe that there are effective ways that this can
be done and that planning for such contingencies is an essential
part of the preparation for the debates.
This leads into the final element that must be included
in the televised debates--particularly in the first debate and
in the last debate of the series: The recognition of the
natural apprehension of the voter about the unknown.
6. Capitalizing on Psychological Factors--the fear of the
unknown.
In my August strategy paper, I summarized several
elements that must form the backbone of strategy for a success-
ful November campaign. These included the following:
a. The record of President Ford in restoring trust and
confidence in government, the maintenance of peace, control of
inflation, and ever-increasing prosperity. Together with the
-13-
emphasis on the President's performance, there must be an
expression of the President's goals, plans, hopes and
aspirations for the Nation in his first four-year term.
b. The abysmal performance of the Democratic-controlled
94th Congress.
C. The Democratic Party Platform which promises more
taxes, more inflation, and more big government.
d. The tremendous emotional and psychological opportunities
in this campaign, which are elements that Republican candidates
consistently fail to recognize.
Perhaps the most important--at least in the last few days
of the campaign--will be the concern of the voter and the fear
of the voter about the unknown. President Ford is a known quantity.
He came into the Presidency at a time of great national crisis.
There were the seeds of inflation. There was the winding down
of a war. There was the whole question of trust and credibility
in government.
The President can well run on this record of what he has
accomplished: Peace, ever-increasing prosperity, inflation
being cut in half.
-14-
Somewhere in the concluding portion of the first debate,
and also in the last debate--and perhaps also in the middle one--
the groundwork must be laid for what will be a key part of the
media advertising in the last few days of the campaign--an effort
to have the voter think twice before he pulls the lever on the
voting machine or places his mark on the ballot.
When he closes the curtain of the voting booth, he knows
on the one hand that if he votes for President Ford, he is
voting for a person who has proven himself under fire. On the
other hand, if he votes for the other candidate, he does not know
what to expect--particularly when that other candidate has
been inconsistent in some of his statements.
And I think that some of the inconsistencies can be mentioned,
although care should be taken so that this does not become a
personal attack. The key element is that we have to lay the
groundwork to prepare the voter for what we hope to bring across
to him in the last week of the campaign--he should vote for a
known quantity who has performed well rather than voting for
what in substance would be "a pig in a poke".
In other words, "a bird in the hand, is worth two in the
bush", and performance is worth more than mere promises.
-15-
FORO is LIBRARY GERALD
This can be integrated by factors which I discussed in
my April paper, including the following:
"The President has an opportunity to go on the attack
by undertaking research on the 'gloom and doom' comments
that were made by Democratic political leaders and Demo-
cratic-oriented economists last year who sought to
assure the American public that the program of President
Ford would never work.
"The programs of President Ford are working and there
is a lot of political hay that can be made on the
continuing improvement in the national economy, while we
still recognize we have a substantial way to go to reduce
unemployment.
"'Don't change horses in the middle of the stream' is
sound political advice to the American public--particularly
when that stream is a steadily-improving national
economy and a steadily-improving confidence on the part
of the people in the ability of President Ford to help lead
the country to greater prosperity at home.
"Peace and prosperity' in the past has proven to be a
very successful political issue. There is no reason to
believe it can't succeed again, particularly if the challenger
is someone who is inexperienced in national government
and particularly if the President is conscious of the need
for the preemption of the middle of the road."
There are two other basic psychological factors which
should be considered in the preparation for the debates with
Jimmy Carter. The first of these is the natural sympathy of
the American people for the underdog. President Ford should
recognize the fact that he is the underdog. And I believe
-16-
there are ways of stating this so that it is not overplayed and
it is especially appealing to the jury of American people.
Another important psychological factor is the sense of
fair play that the average American voter has. Is it fair for
the American voter to turn his back on a President who has
worked hard and has basically accomplished the major tasks
that confronted him at the time he took office: Questions of
credibility in government, rampant inflation, and leading the
country along the paths of peace with ever-increasing prosperity?
There will be opportunities in any debate in response to
an attack by Jimmy Carter alleging lack of leadership whereby
the President can reply: "I don't think that the American
people believe that would be fair in light of where the country
was at the time I became President and in light of where the
country is today
etc."
The precise words are not what is
important--rather, it is the concept. And I believe this is
an important psychological factor that should be considered in
preparing for these debates.
The foregoing highlights of preparation for the Ford-
Carter debates are a few of what I believe to be the key elements
of a successful campaign. They involve factors of judgment and
common sense two of the real long suits of President Ford.
-17-
I believe that Carter can be beaten- I have long believed
he can be beaten. But I also believe that the President
will have to perform with the same careful planning that he
exercised in the preparation of his acceptance speech at the
Kansas City convention.
This includes recognition of the basic advantages of
incumbency and the record of the President and the fact that
he is the President, recognition of the basic disadvantages
and in particular the perception of the Republican Party as
the Party without compassion. It also includes careful preparation
with some "home run balls" that can be hit out of the park when
the opportunity arises--some of which relate to the weaknesses
of Jimmy Carter, including Democratic control of Congress and
his general fuzziness. Finally, it means being prepared to
capitalize on psychological factors and in particular the
advantage of being the underdog, the traditional concept of
the American people for fairness and the most important factor of
all the fear of the unknown.
September 7, 1976
David W. Belin
FORD is LIBRARY
2000 Financial Center
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
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