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    "id": "1126651",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Presidential Campaign - 1976",
    "description": "This file contains material relating to Ronald Reagan, and the Sunshine Campaign.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1126651",
    "collections": [
        "Benton L. Becker Papers",
        "General Subject Files"
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    "subjects": [
        "Republican National Committee (U.S.)",
        "Presidential campaign, 1976"
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    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1975-06-30",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1975
    },
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        "logicalDate": "1975-05-01",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1975
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{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0238/649853/1126651.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder \"Presidential Campaign - 1976\" of the\nBenton L. Becker Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Benton Becker donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the Benton Becker Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n28\nMEMORANDUM\nTO s\nR. H.\nFROM:\nB. L. B.\nDATE:\nJUNE 17, 1975\nRE 1\nPRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES\nThis is a follow-up memorandum of our conversation\nearlier last week relative to the possibility of President\nFord having mere token or no opposition during the Presi-\ndential Primaries of 1976.\nI believe that the party would be best served\nand the President more highly calculated toward achieving\nre-election in 1976, by avoiding party divisiveness during\nthe Presidential Primaries. The public will receive ample\nservings of internal party squabbles through the numsrous\nDemocratic hopefuls. A working, politically uninvolved\nPresident during this period would demonstrate party unity\n(contrasted with the apparent party disunity of the Demo-\ncrats), and overall Republican support for the Ford Adminis-\ntration (contrasted with the myriad of political philosophies\nand spokesmen for the Democratic nomination). It would add\nan element of sobriety and sanity to presidential campaigning\nin general.\nGERALD AIIVHEIT FORD\nIn order to achieve the objective of token\nprimary opposition, the apparent presidential candidacy\nof Ronald Reagan must terminate. An early ending of that\ncandidacy would, on balance, prove to be helpful to the\nNation at large, to the Republican party, to the Ford-\nRockefeller team and to Governor Reagan himself. I fore-\nsee no present circumstances whereby Governor Reagan could\nwrestle the party nomination from President Ford. I believe,\nthat when viewed objectively, Governor Reagan can be made\nto see his candidacy in the same light.\nWhat the Governor's candidacy can do is to exacer-\nbate friction within the party. It may also prove to be\na personal embarrassment, although not fatal, to President\nFord when, and if, a Reagan-Ford \"head to head\" primary is\nheld in a southern state such as Florida, the second primary\nstate. In such event President Ford may find himself un-\nhappily in a position not unlike President Johnson following\nthe New Hampshire Primary in 1968. Party wounds would occur,\nand counter-efforts would then be undertaken to prevent a\nReagan steam roll effect. All of which could be successfully\ndone and, in the final analysis, Gerald Ford would be the\nRepublican Presidential nomination in August, 1976, but the\ncost would be high and the friction that occurred would have\nto be healed in September and October of 1976. I believe\nit to be prudent to avoid that contingency.\n- 2 -\nFORD R. GERALO LIBRARY\nIf the premises outlined in this memorandum\nare accepted as factual, then an effort should be under-\ntaken to cause Governor Reagan to formally announce his\nsupport for President Ford's re-election and denounce any\n1976 presidential aspirations for himself, leaving only\nthe possibility of mere token (1.e., Ashbrook-MeCloskey)\nopposition to President Ford in the 1976 primaries.\nTo achieve this result, I suggest that the fol-\nlowing program be initiated.\n1. Within 90 days following President Ford's\nformal announcement of candidacy, six (6) key Republicans\nwould come forth and publicly announce their support for\nPresident Ford. These individuals are:\na. Congressman John Rhodes\nb. Senator Barry Goldwater\nc. Former Secretary John Connally\nd. Senator Strom Thurmond\ne. Senator John Tower\nf. Senator James Buckley\nThe first three, I believe, are already supportive\nof President Ford and would be willing to make such public\nannouncement, if asked. Senator Thurmond, in my judgment,\nis the most important individual on the list, but I believe,\nthat he too would join in, if properly approached. Senators\nTower and Buckley would perhaps be the most difficult to\n- 3 -\nFORD R. GERALD LIBRARY LIBR ANY\npersuade, but given the prior public announcement of the\nother four gentlemen, particularly Senator Thurmond, I\nbelieve, they would opt for party unity.\n2. Following the public announcement of support\nto President Ford referred to above, then a overture should\nbe made to Governor Reagan. The overture should not be\nfrom the President himself, nor, preferably from anyone\npresently within the Administration. The source should\nsolicit Governor Reagan's public support for President\nFord's candidacy and a renunciation of any individual candi-\ndacy for himself in 1976. The source should be prepared to\noffer two things in return. They are:\na. A meaningful and significant Cabinet\npost in 1976.\nb. President Ford's promised neutrality\nin 1980. This would import President Ford's\ndual promise not to annoint a party standard\nbearer in 1980 and his promise to support the\n1980 convention choice, whomever it may be.\nThis offer, when viewed objectively, should be\npalatable to the Governor for reasons. They are:\n(1) After the leaders of the Republican\nconservative movement have announced their\nsupport for President Ford, Governor Reagan's\nprobability of success is non-existent,\n- 4 -\nFORD R. GERALO LIBRARY\n(2) It affords him a guaranteed public\nforum from 1976 to 1980 in a role of an\nimportant Cabinet official, and\n(3) It offers him a realistic opportunity\nto achieve the Presidency in 1980, subject to\nhis 1980-primary success. An opportunity that\ndoes not today exist.\nThese thoughts represent my and former Congressman\nH. Allan Smith's. H. Allan believes that given the conditions\noutlined within this memorandum, Governor Reagan will\nultimately accept the proposal.\nI urge that the thoughts contained herein be\nconsidered.\n- 5 -\nGERALD F. FORD\n28\nMEMORANDUM\nTO I\nR. H.\nFROM:\nB. L. B.\nDATE:\nJUNE 17, 1975\nRE :\nPRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES\nThis is a follow-up memorandum of our conversation\nearlier last week relative to the possibility of President\nFord having mere token or no opposition during the Presi-\ndential Primaries of 1976.\nI believe that the party would be best served\nand the President more highly calculated toward achieving\nre-election in 1976, by avoiding party divisiveness during\nthe Presidential Primaries. The public will receive ample\nservings of internal party squabbles through the numerous\nDemocratic hopefuls. A working, politically uninvolved\nPresident during this period would demonstrate party unity\n(contrasted with the apparent party disunity of the Demo-\ncrats), and overall Republican support for the Ford Adminis-\ntration (contrasted with the myriad of political philosophies\nand spokesmen for the Democratic nomination). It would add\nan element of sobriety and sanity to presidential campaigning\nin general.\nGERALD LISHARY FORD\nIn order to achieve the objective of token\nprimary opposition, the apparent presidential candidacy\nof Ronald Reagan must terminate. An early ending of that\ncandidacy would, on balance, prove to be helpful to the\nNation at large, to the Republican party, to the Ford-\nRockefeller team and to Governor Reagan himself. I fore-\nsee no present circumstances whereby Governor Reagan could\nwrestle the party nomination from President Ford. I believe,\nthat when viewed objectively, Governor Reagan can be made\nto see his candidacy in the same light.\nWhat the Governor's candidacy can do is to exacer-\nbate friction within the party. It may also prove to be\na personal embarrassment, although not fatal, to President\nFord when, and if, a Reagan-Ford \"head to head\" primary is\nheld in a southern state such as Florida, the second primary\nstate. In such event President Ford may find himself un-\nhappily in a position not unlike President Johnson following\nthe New Hampshire Primary in 1968. Party wounds would occur,\nand counter-efforts would then be undertaken to prevent a\nReagan steam roll effect. All of which could be successfully\ndone and, in the final analysis, Gerald Ford would be the\nRepublican Presidential nomination in August, 1976, but the\ncost would be high and the friction that occurred would have\nto be healed in September and October of 1976. I believe\nit to be prudent to avoid that contingency.\n- 2 -\nGERAU R. FORD LIBRARY\nIf the premises outlined in this memorandum\nare accepted as factual, then an effort should be under-\ntaken to cause Governor Reagan to formally announce his\nsupport for President Ford's re-election and denounce any\n1976 presidential aspirations for himself, leaving only\nthe possibility of mere token (1.e., Ashbrook-McCloskey)\nopposition to President Ford in the 1976 primaries.\nTo achieve this result, I suggest that the fol-\nlowing program be initiated.\n1. within 90 days following President Ford's\nformal announcement of candidacy, six (6) key Republicans\nwould come forth and publicly announce their support for\nPresident Ford. These individuals are:\na. Congressman John Rhodes\nb. Senator Barry Goldwater\nC. Former Secretary John Connally\nd. Senator Strom Thurmond\ne. Senator John Tower\nf. Senator James Buckley\nThe first three, I believe, are already supportive\nof President Ford and would be willing to make such public\nannouncement, if asked. Senator Thurmond, in my judgment,\nis the most important individual on the list, but I believe,\nthat he too would join in, if properly approached. Senators\nTower and Buckley would perhaps be the most difficult to\n- 3 -\nGEFALD R. FORD LIBRARY\npersuade, but given the prior public announcement of the\nother four gentlemen, particularly Senator Thurmond, I\nbelieve, they would opt for party unity.\n2. Following the public announcement of support\nto President Ford referred to above, then a overture should\nbe made to Governor Reagan. The overture should not be\nfrom the President himself, nor, preferably from anyone\npresently within the Administration. The source should\nsolicit Governor Reagan's public support for President\nFord's candidacy and a renunciation of any individual candi-\ndacy for himself in 1976. The source should be prepared to\noffer two things in return. They are:\na. A meaningful and significant Cabinet\npost in 1976.\nb. President Ford's promised neutrality\nin 1980. This would import President Ford's\ndual promise not to annoint a party standard\nbearer in 1980 and his promise to support the\n1980 convention choice, whomever it may be.\nThis offer, when viewed objectively, should be\npalatable to the Governor for reasons. They are:\n(1) After the leaders of the Republican\nconservative movement have announced their\nsupport for President Ford, Governor Reagan's\nprobability of success is non-existent,\n- 4 -\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\n(2) It affords him a guaranteed public\nforum from 1976 to 1980 in a role of an\nimportant Cabinet official, and\n(3) It offers him a realistic opportunity\nto achieve the Presidency in 1980, subject to\nhis 1980 primary success. An opportunity that\ndoes not today exist.\nThese thoughts represent my and former Congressman\nH. Allan Smith's. H. Allan believes that given the conditions\noutlined within this memorandum, Governor Reagan will\nultimately accept the proposal.\nI urge that the thoughts contained herein be\nconsidered.\n- 5 -\nGERALD LIBRARY R. FORD\n29\nMEMORANDUM\nTO $\nR. H.\nFROM:\nB. L. B.\nDATE:\nJUNE 17, 1975\nRE :\nSUNSHINE CAMPAIGN\nRecently, I have had what I consider to be an\ninteresting thought. I have chosen this devise to put on\npaper and place it within the Hartmann Legion of possible\nthings to do in the near future.\nThe idea incorporates two useable virtues. They\nare, (1) favorable public relations for the candidacy of\nGerald Ford, and (2) openess and candor in presidential\npolitics.\nThat idea is simply this. Following his nomination\nat the 1976 Republican Convention and during the course of\nhis acceptance speech at the convention, nominee Gerald Ford\nannounces that his presidential campaign will be conducted\ndifferently then any other presidential campaign in our\nhistory. Using an idiom employed in Florida politics, for\na different purpose, it might be called a Sunshine Campaign,\nindicating that all things done will be open to public\nviewing.\nFORD\nL/S\nR.\nGERALD\nThe President (or later his campaign manager)\nwould announce that ten (10) members of the media, columnists,\nnewspapers, television, radio, etc., will be selected to\nserve as media \"insiders\" to the Ford Presidential Campaign.\nThese ten (10) individuals will have complete access, at\nall times, to all campaign materials, literature, speeches,\ncontribution lists, solicitations, etc. They will be in-\nvited to attend strategy sessions. No element of the cam-\npaign will be denied them. They will be issued keys to the\noffices that house the campaign headquarters, retain access\nto all file cabinets, and be allowed to view any campaign\nmaterial whatsoever.\nGuiderules reflecting premature disclosure of\nstrategy sessions would, of course, be required, but the\nmedia should be taken at its word to treat this unprecedented\napproach in a fair and unbiased manner. The new Federal\nCampaign Election Law requires full disclosure anyway, so\nthis devise would merely hasten contemporaneous disclosure\nof relevant information in the public interest.\nI believe this approach is both healthy for the\ngeneral political climate of the Nation and serves the best\ninterest of President Ford. This approach coincides with\nPresident Ford's public and private personality of candor\nand becomes even more effective by the fact that it is\nimplimented in the presidential campaign of an incumbent\n- 2 -\n3\nPresident. Its contrast with 1972 is awesome, and likewise,\na contrast will be deduced about the personalities and\nstaff of the past and present Republican nominee.\nTORD LIBRARY & 977479\n- 3 -\n29\nMEMORANDUM\nTO :\nR. H.\nFROM:\nB. L. B.\nDATE:\nJUNE 17, 1975\nRE :\nSUNSHINE CAMPAIGN\nRecently, I have had what I consider to be an\ninteresting thought. I have chosen this devise to put on\npaper and place it within the Hartmann Legion of possible\nthings to do in the near future.\nThe idea incorporates two useable virtues. They\nare, (1) favorable public relations for the candidacy of\nGerald Ford, and (2) openess and candor in presidential\npolitics.\nThat idea is simply this. Following his nomination\nat the 1976 Republican Convention and during the course of\nhis acceptance speech at the convention, nominee Gerald Ford\nannounces that his presidential campaign will be conducted\ndifferently then any other presidential campaign in our\nhistory. Using an idiom employed in Florida politics, for\na different purpose, it might be called a Sunshine Campaign,\nindicating that all things done will be open to public\nviewing.\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nThe President (or later his campaign manager)\nwould announce that ten (10) members of the media, columnists,\nnewspapers, television, radio, etc., will be selected to\nserve as media \"insiders\" to the Ford Presidential Campaign.\nThese ten (10) individuals will have complete access, at\nall times, to all campaign materials, literature, speeches,\ncontribution lists, solicitations, etc. They will be in-\nvited to attend strategy sessions. No element of the cam-\npaign will be denied them. They will be issued keys to the\noffices that house the campaign headquarters, retain access\nto all file cabinets, and be allowed to view any campaign\nmaterial whatsoever.\nGuiderules reflecting premature disclosure of\nstrategy sessions would, of course, be required, but the\nmedia should be taken at its word to treat this unprecedented\napproach in a fair and unbiased manner. The new Federal\nCampaign Election Law requires full disclosure anyway, so\nthis devise would merely hasten contemporaneous disclosure\nof relevant information in the public interest.\nI believe this approach is both healthy for the\ngeneral political climate of the Nation and serves the best\ninterest of President Ford. This approach coincides with\nPresident Ford's public and private personality of candor\nand becomes even more effective by the fact that it is\nimplimented in the presidential campaign of an incumbent\n- 2 -\nGERALD FORD\nPresident. Its contrast with 1972 is awesome, and likewise,\na contrast will be deduced about the personalities and\nstaff of the past and present Republican nominee.\nGERALD & FORD LIBRARY\n- 3 -"
}