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This file includes comments on Daniel Moynihan, Arthur Burns, John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman, and Ronald Reagan.
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1511414
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Sears, John - Interview, 8/26/77
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1511414
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Sears, John - Interview, 8/26/77
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This file includes comments on Daniel Moynihan, Arthur Burns, John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman, and Ronald Reagan.
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A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts
Nixon Administration White House Staff Interviews
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Presidential campaign, 1976
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Antimissile missiles
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1976-12-31
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1976
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1969-01-01
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1969
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "Sears, John - Interview, 8/26/77" of
the A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. A. James Reichley donated to the
United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives
collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in
the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are
presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject
to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
JOHN SEARS (August 26, 1977)
Sears first became acquainted with President Nixon in the Mudge
law firm. Pears joined the Nixon campaign in 1966 at a time before John
Mitchell had joined the Mudge law firm. After Nixon was elected President
he became a deputy counsel in the White House. He carried on liaison
duties with the Republican party and dealt with political matters on the
Hill, also dealt with outside special interests. He was valued or expected
to offer political judgementy The became involved in the decisionmaking
process on investment policyx. One of his major responsibilities was
helping the administration win the vote on the ABM in 1969. Most of his
work involved contact with Congress. He gave advice on the best means
to approach people in Congress and people outside of Congress who could
affect Congressmen in crucial votes. He worked closely with Bryce Harlow.
Practically everybody in the White House was working on the ABM at the time
that that was of crucial importance. He found the White House a highly
highly
competitive atmosphere. On paper it was X structured, but in reality
people pitched in, played jobs that they were able to play, and moved in
where ther interests carried them. Competition he in the White House,
he found, was X not so much ideological as based on differei nug px personalities
or clashes of ambition. Sometimes these clashes of ambition would be cast
in ideological form. It was a tendency once you discovered what a fellow's
views were to identify him with those views and then criticize him on the
basis of the views, although the real rivalry might be simply a personal one.
People sometimes would adopt different ideologies in different contexts in
response to the competitive situation prevailing at the moment. Sears
had the impression that the White House people closest to the President
when they first came into power did not have a clear idea what they wanted
SEARS
2
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
to do. He also felt that they did not know people in the sense of knowing
how people respond politically. Sears felt that it's easy to tell what
a President's prixities are simply by the way he spends his time. If he
spends a great deal of time on something, that means that he gives it a
high priority. People he spends time with are the people who have power
in the White House. One source of power is being able to affect how the
President spends his time. People who are close to him affect what he
devotes time to, which in turn affects the priorities of the administration.
Nixon had relatively little interest in domestic policy. He was deeply
concerned with foreign policy. His highest priority was to reach détente
in foreign policy. He felt that he could not really do much to control
domestic policy. He realized that he had limited control over foreign
policy as well, but in the domestic area he thought the President had really
very little control. Also it must be said that domestic policy tended to
bore the President. He did have some general economic objectives. He wished
to keep the economy sound and growing. His chief objective in domestic
policy really seemed to be to hold his problems at bay to give him freedom
to deal with his foreign policy priorities. He did take some interest in
some aspects of domestic policy such as revenue sharing. The President was
interested in improving the budget=making process and the management process
of government through the creation of the Office of Management and Budget.
The people close to the President had little appreciation of how it is
possible to get control over government and to wield political influence
through the use of patronage- through the recruitment of personnel.
Sears feels that they were to a great extent reacting against the memory
of the spoils system. The Bresident's personal ideology was that of the
SEARS
3
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
problem-solver; he was also personally conservative. Nixon did, however,
cenrer,
realize the political necessity for pushing toward the Senate.
He had the
goal clearly in mind to work toward better working W relationships in the
field of foreign policy. He was also interested in the mechanics of foreign
policy. This was not true under domestic. Sears feels that it is natural
in any administration for personal factions to develop in the White House.
It is also natural to allow a little time for a shakedown in a new administration.
In the early days of the Nixon administration there was lively controversy
in the White House. Sears feels that this was by nomeans a bad thing.
There was, for instance, a controversy X and rivalry between Moynihan and
Burns. People tended to choose up sides in such controversies. Sometimes
the sides people took were not necessarily what one would have expected. On
the basis of philosphy one might expect, for instance, that Finch and
Moynihan would have been fast friends, but this was far from being the
case. In the rivaly between Moynihan and Burns, Moynihan emerged as the
victor in the short run. However, the real ultimate victor was John Ehrlichman,
who rose to a strategic position by being called upon by the President to
mediate between Moynihan and Burns, and behind Ehrlichman was always Bob
Haldeman. There were other natural rivalries in the Nixon administration,
pre-eminently that between Haldeman and Ehrlichman on one side, and John
Mitchell on the other. Sears himself did not get along particularly well
with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Bryce Harlow, Finch, and Sears to some extent
were able to maintain independence from any of the rival factions within
the administration. Many of the people close to Nixon had little appreciation
of how patronage could be used to achieve policy ends. Harlow and Finch
did have this appreciation, but their influence was limited in this area.
SEARS
4
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
John Ehrlichman, who had great influence over personnel, had no sense of
patronage whatever. He, for instance, was the one who was responsible
for the ridiculous plan to send out questionaires to everyone in Who's Who
asking them if they would be interested in a job in the new administration.
vast
This produced a/bax outpouring of applications for jobs when there actually
were not that many jobs available, leading to a lot of disappointed people.
Many of the applications were never even opened. Ehrlichman's great skill
was being able to play the role of referee between rivals in the White House,
which placed him close to the President. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had no
experience in dealing with Congress and little understanding of how Congress
worked. Sears, for instance, relates a xxxx story that he puts on a background
basis: During the ABM controversy, Haldeman and Ehrlichman thought they
could approach Charles Percy on the basis of being fellow Christian Scientists.
They had him down to the White House and thought they had persuaded him to
support the ABM, and were greatly angered when they learned that Percy had
gone against the ABM. The relationship between Haldeman and Ehrlichman
with Percy after that was unfriendly. Sears played a role in setting up
the meeting between five liberal Republican senators and the President on
the ABM. This was a helpful meeting, although it did not produce actual
positive results. In meetings with his close associates Nixon had a tendency
to say whatever came off the top of his head. He ran through ideas in a
casual manner and spoke in a way that Sears frankly would sometimes feel
to be irrational. People close to the President learned to distinguish
between his ideas and not necessarily carry them out in every case. That is,
people who were close to him before he became President. Rosemary Woods,
for instance, while Nixon was still in the law firm, would write down
SEARS
5
reams and reams of material things that he told her to do. When she
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
left the office, she would often throw half of them away; she had a sense
of what should be done and what should not be done. Haldeman and Ehrlichman,
on the other hand, did not have this sense, and tended to do literally
everything that Nixon told them to do. Sears thinks that this was a major
contributor to Watergate. Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and Colson also, did
things for Nixon that they Nixon told them to that they would have been
better off not doing. On the ABM vote Sears had a very accurate count
quite early as to who was going to vote which way. He was not even surprised
when Mrs. Smith voted for the ABM on the second vote. The surprises tended
to come later on the votes on confirmation of Supreme Court Justices. By
that time Sears had left the White House.
Sears found the White House not a very pleasant place. There were
many clashes of personalities. He endeavored to keep his frustration down,
but he found this difficult.
One of the major sources of frustration in the Nixon administration
was that the President would tell people he was very close to them--assure
them that they coild call on him at any time for support and that he would
back them up. He did this, for instance, with Bill Rogers at the State
Department. Often these people later found out that this was not true,
and that of course was very disturbing to them.
Sears did not feel that the Reagan challenge to President Ford in 1976
was an ideological challenge. It is true that Reagan appealed to onservatives
in the sense that he appealed to people who pay their bills on time and do
not like to owe people money. But Sears ******* thinks of himself as centrist
in politics. He thinks that the right and left fragments play a valuable
SEARS
6
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
role in politics, developing news ideas and debating with each other,
but that they are not really the ones who are able to caryy out the essential
function of problem-solving in government. This function is best carried
out by the middle of the political spectrum. Unfortunately, Lyndon Johnson,
Sears feels, gave political centrism a bad name. Me Johnson destroyed
people's confidence in the middle by seeming to associate that with trades
and deals, getting labor and management to get together on a deal which
would seem to be made the disadvantage of the general public. This
induced a cynicism in the country about the political center. The middle
of the road, Sears feels, is now not politically fashionable. Sears feels
that Ronald Reagan, to whom x he is still very close, does not have a dogmatic
political philosophy--he does not insist on his associates toeing the line
on political philosophy. Searsax acknowledges that is it was a mistake
not to draw Drew Louis into the negotiation to bring Schweiker onto the
Reagen team in 1976. He says that this oversight was largely due to lack
of time. They felt they had to move very quickly. He feels that if Drew
Louis had supported the Reagan-Schweiker ticket that they would have been
nominated at the convention.
END OF INTERVIEW