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Press Conference of Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State
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Press Conference of Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State
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Digitized from Box 4 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 15, 1974
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
3:02 P.M. EST
MR. NESSEN: Ladies and gentlemen, in response to
your request to talk to Dr. Kissinger about the Far East
trip, here is Dr. Kissinger. This is all on the record
for immediate release, no live broadcast and those are the
only rules.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I had known there was no
live broadcast I wouldn't have come here. (Laughter)
Let me make a few very brief remarks about the
purpose of the trip and then I will take your questions
on that or any other subject.
You will remember that a visit to Japan by
the President was foreseen in a Japanese-American communique
last year. It was announced to take place by the end of
1974 and it was reaffirmed on a number of occasions
afterwards. It will be an historic event in that it is
going to be the first visit by an American President to
Japan, reflecting the great importance we attach to the
relationship with Japan.
In recent years, our relations with Japan have
undergone a series of adjustments brought about by new
conditions in the Far East, the growing strength and self-
confidence of Japan and the emergence of a pattern of
equality. We consider this relationship excellent.
We believe also that the future stability of the
Pacific area depends importantly on a close understanding
between the United States and Japan and which is symbolized by
the visit of the President and by the occasion that this will
MORE
(OVER)
- 2 -
give for full exchanges with Japanese leaders.
The President called in the Japanese Ambassador
on the first afternoon of the day that he was sworn in
as President. On that occasion, in affirming the continuity
of American foreign policy, he also specifically affirmed
that he would meet the commitment of his predecessor to
visit Japan by the end of 1974.
So, this trip was planned as one of the first acts
of President Ford and we consider it essential for the overall
design of foreign policy. While being in Japan, we expect
to review with the Japanese leaders bilateral relations
of Japan and the United States, which, I repeat, we consider
excellent, as well as to review the international situation
and in order to make certain that we understand each other
as to basic principles and objectives.
The visit to Korea is a natural complement
to the visit to Japan. We could not be in that area
and not visit Korea without raising grave doubts that
our commitment to Korea was still what it has traditionally
been. The visit to Vladivostok reflects the necessity
of the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers to be in
frequent touch with each other, a necessity which is
particularly acute after a change of Administration in the
United States, to enable the two leaders to have an oppor-
tunity to exchange views on the whole range of our relation-
ships, on possible difficulties that may arise, but even more
importantly, on how to give momentum to the commitment to
detente that they have both expressed.
This is the basic purpose of the trip, and now
I will be glad to take your questions.
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- 3 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, with respect to the difficulties
that may arise, before you get into the questions on the trip,
I would like to ask what your assessment is of the possibility
of an outbreak of warfare in the Middle East now, in view of
a spate of reports yesterday and today from the area about
possible preemptive Israeli attacks, the unloading of huge
amounts of Soviet armaments in Syria, the visits to the Golan
Heights and that. Could you give us your opinion?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Obviously, we have seen these
reports, and we are checking into them on an urgent basis.
We cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East
would resort to war under these circumstances.
We cannot believe that any major power would
deliberately encourage war in a situation as serious and
as potentially explosive as that in the Middle East. The
United States would certainly oppose any idea that the problems
of the Middle East can be solved by military action and will
use its influence with all parties to prevent this from
arising. It expects that all other countries that are in a
position to do so would exercise a similar restraining
influence.
So, we think that these reports are probably --
if they are not exaggerated as to the facts, we do not believe
that military actions are imminent.
Q
Mr. Secretary, another point on your travels
will be Peking this year, and it has been almost a year since
you were there before. Do you expect this visit to bring
further progress towards normalization of relations or anything
of a substantive sort?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The relationships between
the United States and the Peoples Republic of China are good,
and they are progressing in the manner that has been foreseen
on our previous visits, including the last one.
Every trip is within the context of promoting the
normalization of relationships and to represent a step towards
the normalization of relationships. I do not expect any
dramatic announcements as a result of this trip, but I
expect a continuation of the steady progress that has marked
our previous contacts and a further improvement of our
relationship.
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- 4 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, do you think it is inevitable
that Israel is going to have to deal with Mr. Arafat and
the PLO in subsequent negotiations now that a certain amount
of recognition in stature has been given the organization by
Rabat And by the General Assembly, and if so, under what
conditions would it be possible for Israel to do this?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, I expressed
the view of the Administration, which has not changed,
that the proper negotiation, or the best negotiation
for the future of the West Bank was between Jordan
and Israel, and the United States had used its
influence to bring about such a negotiation.
As to any other parties that might negotiate,
this is entirely a decision for Israel and for any of the
other parties that may be involved, and it is not a matter
on which the United States will give advice as to the
conditions in which such negotiations may be appropriate,
if indeed it is appropriate.
Q
Mr. Secretary, could you give us your
appraisal of the Arab and of the Israeli reactions to the
fact that more than a month elapsed before General Brown
apologized for his remarks at Duke and he was only mildly
reprimanded by the President?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I frankly have no view as
to what the Arab or Israeli reaction to this is. It is
my understanding that the President expressed his opposition
to the views as expressed by General Brown, and this
certainly reflects the view of the Administration.
We don't consider this a subject of foreign policy
decisions, because, clearly, the Administration's view has
been repeatedly enunciated and has been in no way affected
by any remarks that were made by any military leader.
Q
Mr. Secretary, isn't the President taking a
sizeable risk by traveling abroad like this at a time when
there is no Vice-President in place?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: You have to remember that
the President committed himself to this trip on his first
day in office at a time when it was considered incon-
ceivable that a Vice-President would not be confirmed by
this time.
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- 5 -
To cancel a trip because a Vice-President hasn't
been confirmed would give an impression of domestic
instability that would in itself be a foreign policy
factor, and, therefore, the President decided to continue
with a trip, which we consider extremely important in its
own right under conditions which could not be foreseen at
the time the decision was made.
Q
Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that
you couldn't believe -- or words to that effect -- that
any major power would deliberately encourage war in the
Middle East?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct.
Q
I assume you might mean the Soviet Union.
I would like to ask whether you have any information or evi-
war? dence to indicate that the Soviet Union might be encouraging
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have no evidence that the
Soviet Union is encouraging war, and, as I have said, we
are using all our influence with both parties and we are
certainly calling to the attention of all other countries
the importance of restraint in the Middle East.
- 6 -
Q
Is the Soviet Union using its influence
in a positive direction in your opinion, sir?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This recent flare-up has only
come to our attention in the last few hours and it isn't
clear to us yet what it means and I would warn against
over-exaggerating the imminence of any conflict there.
But we are certainly calling it to the attention of the
Soviet Union.
Q
Mr. Secretary, could you give us a more
thorough view of your current appraisal of the Middle
East situation as the President and you are about to
depart for a considerable period of time? Do you have
any special anxiety that there will be a hiatus here during
this period when we are now at a stage of seeing considerable
reports of imminent action? What is your basic view of
the hazard here?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President and I met with
Secretary Schlesinger this morning and we reviewed
contingencies which might arise and mechanisms of how
to deal with them if they should arise. I repeat, this
is a normal precaution. We do not expect the contingencies
to arise. We do not believe that prior to a meeting
between the General Secretary and the President the Soviet
Union would be encouraging military action in the Middle
East and we cannot believe that any of the parties in the
Middle East would be so reckless as to engage in military
action.
So, while we recognize that certain military
precautions have been taken by both sides and while there
is always a risk that precautions could get out of hand,
we do not think a war is likely. If it should occur, we
have made contingency plans for dealing with it. Communica-
tions are, of course, very rapid and we would deal with it
on that basis.
Q
Mr. Secretary, also on the Middle East,
does the United States detect any change or moderation
in the statements made by Mr. Arafat representing the
Palestinians? Does that make any difference as far as the
United States is concerned? And also, what are your plans
on traveling to the Middle East?
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- 7 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the speech
itself, our reading of it is that it called for a state
which really did not include the existence of Israel and
therefore was dealing with a successor state, and we do not
consider this a particularly moderate position.
With respect to my own plans, I have no plans
now to go to the Middle East. This could change but as I
pointed out before, we think that this is now a period
for quiet diplomacy and I do not expect to return to the
Middle East in the near future.
Q
Before, I noticed you used the past tense
in referring to our preference -- "was" -- for negotiations
between Israel and Jordan. Do you think in the current
situation there is a live possibility of negotiating with
Jordan?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is my understanding that
King Hussein has accepted the decisions of the Rabat Summit
to the effect that the PLO should be the principal negotiator
on the West Bank and this explains my reference to the past.
Q
Mr. Secretary, has the Syrian Government
indicated to you, as far as you know, its attitude toward
an extension of the U.N. presence on the Golan Heights
and whether it has or hasn't, how much of any importance
do you attach to its attitude toward that question that
will soon be coming up?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Syrian Government has
not given us a formal answer as to the extension of UNDOF
on the Golan Heights, and to the best of my knowledge, I
do not believe that they have given a formal answer to
anybody. They have, however, indicated on a number of
occasions grave doubts about the extension of UNDOF
and if one were to quote the statements that they have made,
one could construe them as an indication that they probably
will not agree to the extension.
It is our view that failure to extend UNDOF would
cast doubts on the viability of agreements that may be made
in that area and we therefore believe that the extension of
UNDOF is important for the continuation of the negotiating
process and especially for negotiating prospects that may
exist between Syria and Israel and the failure to extend
it would undoubtedly contribute to the tension in the area.
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- 8 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a couple of
questions about your oil speech last night. Why did you
say, "In the meantime, we will face two great dangers. One
is the threat of a new embargo." And secondly, what
kind of a response can you expect from other consuming
nations when the United States, itself, has not yet come up
with a serious program for conservation or developing
alternate sources of energy?
SECRETARY Kissinger: With respect to the first
question, it is obvious that the possibility of another
embargo exists and the emergency program that will be
agreed to next week -- that has been agreed to but will be
formally adopted next week -- provides for precisely this
contingency. We went through an embargo last year and the
possibility of an embargo cannot be ignored. Therefore,
in order to enable the consuming nations to withstand
political pressures, we consider this program is of the first
significance.
Secondly, in my speech which I went over carefully
with the President before I gave it, we stated the goals that
have to be met in order to meet the objectives that
were set in the speech, the objectives being to reduce
dependence on imported oil, to create a situation in which
alternative sources, coupled with conservation restraints
and financial solidarity, bring about a reduction in the
price of oil.
And in any event, the cooperation among the
consumers is essential whether or not the price of
oil comes down. In fact, it is even more essential if
the price of oil does not come down. The goals that I
stated are the Administration goals. The methods by which
they are reached, whether they are done by voluntary
restraints or by other measures will be reflected in Presi-
dential speeches to the Congress.
In any event, the United States has expressed
its readiness in this speech to accept internationally
binding consumption restraints and therefore the question
of whether or not we are now engaged in them is really
irrelevant to the program that has been set forth which
we are prepared to undertake on an international basis.
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- 9 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question
about the wisdom and timing of the Far East trip specifically
with regard to visiting Prime Minister Tanaka and his
problems at home. I would like, if you would, please, to
address yourself to the fact that Mr. Tanaka may in fact
be a lame duck Prime Minister. Also, if you would
address yourself to the fact, please, that President
Ford will be visiting Korea where the Government has come
under severe criticism for being rather oppressive,
contrary to Democratic principles, and if you would, sir,
please address yourself to the site of the meeting place
in the Soviet Union which is either on or close to disputed
territory with the Chinese.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first
question, the visit to any country is to the Government
and not to any particular individual. We don't express
any view as to what difficulties Prime Minister Tanaka
may or may not be in, and therefore, I don't accept
the basic premise of your question.
But the fact of the matter is that the major
figures in Japan with whom we will be dealing, have
shown considerable stability in terms of their participa-
tion in the Government, and therefore, we believe that what-
ever may happen in Japan -- and we do not accept that the
contingency you foresee is inevitable -- that therefore
the trip should go forward.
Secondly, it is clear that the President of the
Republic of Korea is being criticized. We did not think
that this outweighs the consideration that I have mentioned
before, that the failure to visit Korea might be
understood as a reduction in the degree of the American
commitment to the security of South Korea, which could have
serious international consequence.
With respect to the site of the meeting with the
Soviet Union, this is a matter that has been discussed
and we have received no complaints from the Chinese side.
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- 10 -
Q
Mr. Secretary, without disclosing your
contingency plans, we have been reading about alleged
NSC memos and so forth, foreseeing a possibility that
the U.S. might go in this time if there was another Arab-
Israeli conflict. Do you foresee any possibility?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do I personally foresee any
possibility?
Q
Yes, of the U.S. going into a Middle East
war.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I don't fore-
see a Middle East war. Secondly, I don't confirm that
there are any NSC contingency plans for the United States
to go into an Arab-Israeli war. The United States' attitude
will be what it has been in previous wars, and our attitude
is basically to avoid a conflict and to bring it to the most
rapid conclusion possible if there should be one, but we
believe there is every possibility of avoiding a conflict
now and therefore, there is no sense speculating on what
we might do.
But it is clear that the United States intentions,
unless there should be other outside intervention,
would be to confine its role to what it has been.
Q
Mr. Secretary, last night in Phoenix,
President Ford, in answer to a general question on Middle
East policy, mentioned that Israel has been urged to make
peace, to reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab
nations.' He was pressed on the question of whether the
PLO should be recognized and he repeated that Israel should
reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab parties," which
left the answer ambiguous and I wish you would clear it up,
whether or not we regard the PLO as a nation or a party
or in the final analysis, as a negotiating partner, although
I recognize what you said earlier that it is an Israeli
decision.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have to repeat what I
said earlier. The United States is not engaged in pro-
moting any particular set of negotiations. I have stated
what our view as to the most effective strategy has been and
we have not expressed any recommendation to any of the parties
with whom they should negotiate.
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Q
What are your maximum hopes for a strategic
arms achievement at the Vladivostok summit?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The issue of strategic arms
limitation is an extremely complicated one, involving
many weapons systems, many technologies and the fact is,
as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, that the
forces of the two sides have been designed in a different
manner, with different characteristics so that comparisons
are sometimes difficult.
Therefore, it is very hard to foretell any specific
achievement. We believe that progress was made during my
talks with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. We think
that this progress can be continued in Vladivostok. Whether
the progress will lend itself to some formal statement,
or whether it will lead to being transferred to the Geneva
negotiations, or whether some other method will be chosen
and the exchanges will continue, can really not be pre-
dicted until there have been some further discussions
building on the discussions that took place in Moscow.
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- 12 - -
Q 5 Mr. Secretary, in part of your speech last
night, in your proposal to cut oil imports, were you just
referring to Arab nations or were you also proposing to
cut oil imports from Canada?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was referring to cutting
overall oil ;imports, not just from the Arab nations.
Q
Mr. Secretary, given the position of moral-
leadership that the United States undertook in convening
the World Food Conference, why was the decision reached
not to follow the advice of the U. S. delegation and
provide an extra million tons of food.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, as I understand
it, this was not a recommendation of the U. S. delegation,
but was a recommendation of some members of the U. S.
delegation.
But, let me make clear what our position had
been with respect to the World Food Conference. We face
two problems: the basic problem of world food shortages,
which is a structural one, and the immediate, emergency prob-
lem of the shortages this year that cannot be dealt with
by any structural changes.
The United States believes that no matter what
food aid is given this year, structural adjustments in
world agriculture policies are essential. This is why we
proposed the export planning group of the exporting nations
and why we proposed a group to promote the increase in
agriculture in the underdeveloped nations, which is one
of the most essential elements, and why we proposed a reserve
program.
Food aid is one relatively small part of the
overall problem. Now, with respect to food aid, we have
stated that we will do what is humanly possible in order
to give the maximum food aid. The differences in the
government concern tactics and not substance.
The difference concerns the question of whether
we should announce a specific target before we know what
the crop reports are and produce an increase in prices in
this country and contribute to the inflation, or whether
we should continue to operate on a quarterly basis as we
have been on the basis of crop reports and in a manner
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- 13 -
that enables us to make the decisions without having the
undesirable consequences that I described.
As a matter of fact, most of the decisions that
have been taken in the last quarter have been at the high
end of the option, and I personally expect that by the
time that the year is over, we will have increased not only
the dollar amount, but the quantity of the food aid.
But, the President wanted to reserve the option
of looking at it every quarter so that the difference
between those members of the delgation, who ask for a flat
commitment, and the dominant trend in the Administration,
including the view of the President, is really primarily
a matter of how to give food aid without producing
inflationary pressures in this country and, therefore,
maybe endangering the whole food aid problem.
I personally regret that the issue of the World
Food Conference, which really should deal with the structural
problem of food, has been tied up with a one-year allocation
of food aid, which is not going to be decisive in dealing
with the overall issue that we have described.
Q
Mr. Secretary, do you believe that there is
any connection at all between the reports that we have been
receiving now about mobilization in the Middle East and the
fact that the President is about to embark on this trip?
Can there be any linkage?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I consider that extremely
unlikely, and I would have thought that the imminent
meeting of the President with the General Secretary should
have a calming effect on the situation rather than an
accelerated effect.
It must be obvious to the parties concerned that
anyone who wantonly starts a war under these conditions would
be putting himself into a very dubious position inter-
nationally and with its relationship with the United States,
and, obviously, this must be clear to any of the Soviet
leaders whom we do not believe are encouraging the
tensions right now, and we do not believe that a conflict
is imminent.
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- 14 -
Q
It is not possible, you think, that, rightly
or wrongly, that other powers might perceive that the United
States in effect is in a weakened condition?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It would be a very serious
miscalculation.
Q
May I also ask, do these reports in any way
directly contradict assurances you had received, either
from the Soviets or others during your Middle East travels?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not have the impression
on my Middle East travel that any of the parties were planning
imminent military operations.
As far as the Soviets are concerned, it seems
to me to go without saying that prior to a meeting between
the General Secretary and the President that they should
not, and in my belief, are not taking action, to exacerbate
the situation.
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- 15 - -
Q
Mr. Secretary, you said you didn't have the
impression. Did you have specific assurances in the Middle
East about this situation?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have stated my view.
Certainly all of the parties know that the United States
would be opposed, strongly opposed, to the resumption of
hostilities.
Q
Mr. Secretary, do you expect any major agree-
ments to be signed in Japan or should we consider that
trip primarily symbolic?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think a trip can be
substantive without major agreements being signed. In
negotiations with Japan it is very important to permit the
Japanese consensus-building to develop and not to expect
in a three-day visit to accelerate any particular decision.
We believe that there will not be any major
agreement signed, but we nevertheless believe that the trip
will be highly substantive.
If I may make one other comment about all these
Middle East questions. There is a tendency, if I may say
so, to overreact to reports. It was the case after the
Rabat Summit. It seems to me to be the case today.
In our judgment we are not in a situation of
imminent conflict and I do not think that it contributes
to stability go give the impression that we are.
Q
Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
recently that Egypt is now linking the reopening of the
Suez Canal to a further Israeli pullback in Sinai. Yet
during the January disengagement agreement, we were told
that the canal would be reopened as quickly as possible.
Is there a tie-in between the two?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have not received any
formal communication from the Egyptians to that effect.
I have seen statements in the press which allege this,
or in which Egyptian officials are quoted as having said
this. We would consider this inconsistent with the dis-
engagement agreement, but it will be a moot point until the
canal clearance is completed, which is not yet the case.
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- 16
Q
What can you tell us about the likely degree
of Japanese acceptance of the plan you outlined last night,
and would you expect something to come in Tokyo on that?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not expect that in the
period of three days there will be any major decisions taken
on a plan that was as embracing as the one that was put forward
last night. We undoubtedly will have some discussions on that
subject. I think the final decisions will have to be taken in
a multilateral framework and not on a bilateral basis between
individual countries.
I would expect that progress will be made, not
necessarily next week, but in the months ahead, just as
progress was made, after the Pilgrims speech last year, over
a six-month period in implementing both the proposal for an
agency and the proposal for an emergency sharing program.
And we believe, since there is really no realistic
alternative to the major direction that has been proposed
that over a period of months some of the main elements,
or many of the main elements of the proposal will be
implemented.
We are not putting it forward on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Within the framework of the general objectives,
We are quite openminded as to counter proposals. But we
believe this is the direction in which the consuming nations
ought to go and we think this is the direction they will go.
THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.
END
(AT 3:40 P.M. EST)