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Press Conference about signing of Treaty
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Press Conference about signing of Treaty
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Digitized from Box 26 of the White House Press Releases at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 28, 1976
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
FRED IKLE
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WILLIAM G. HYLAND
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ROBERT BUCHHEIM
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
JOHN KELLY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE COUNSELLOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TED GEORGE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (SALT SUPPORT)
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND
ROBERT DUFF
ENERGY RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
ROOM 450
THE OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
8:36 A.M. EDT
MR. NESSEN: Maybe we can get started here. The
crowd is small but exclusive.
You should all have copies of fact sheets and
texts of the Treaty. There will be a statement by the
President at the time of the signing in the East Room, and
we hope to have the text of that shortly, before the end of
this briefing or before the signing itself. We should try to
break up a little before 9:30 so everyone has a chance to get
over to the East Room and see the signing ceremony.
The ground rules will be just on the record, unless
any of the briefers have any remarks or answers that they wish
to put on another basis.
The President will submit the Treaty to the Senate
for ratification soon.
With those brief opening remarks, let me introduce
your briefers for today. Dr. Fred Ikle, who is Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Bill Hyland, who is
the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs; Bob Buchheim, who is Deputy Assistant Director at ACDA;
Ted George of the Defense Department; John Kelly from State;
and Robert Duff from the Energy Research and Development
Agency. and John Marcum of the NSC staff.
MORE
- 2 -
I think Fred has some opening remarks he wants
to give you.
MR. IKLF: Let me try to explain to you as simply
as possible what this very complicated treaty is all about.
It compliments the threshold limitation on underground
weapons tests which was signed in 1974 limiting underground
tests to 150 kilotons. At that time the Soviets wanted to
have the possibility of continuing the explosion of nuclear
devices for peaceful applications.
The underground weapons test treaty limit weapons test
to particular sites, such as our Nevada test sites, sites
for which the two sides have to exchange a sertain amount of
information on geology and other data to facilitate the
verification of the threshold.
Now, peaceful applications, of course, will not
take place at these weapon test areas. Therefore, additional
negotiations had to take place which started in October 1074
in Moscow and continued, to be concluded early in April this
year.
There were about 18 months of detailed negotiations
leading to this treaty and the protocol governing peaceful
application of nuclear explosives. What does the treaty
do? The central purpose is to prevent the circumvention of
the treaty limiting weapons tests through applications of
peaceful devices for peaceful purposes. It does this pri-
marily by limiting the yield of any device to be used for
peaceful applications to the same yield permitted for weapons
tests. So, there is no incentive for a party to use the
route of alleged peaceful applications, to test weapons
developments because they are permitted to make these tests
at the weapons test sites.
However, there was so much interest in larger
engineering applications involving the simultaneous explosion
of nuclear devices for engineering purposes, group explosions,
and that led to the problem that with our distant measuring
instruments, with our seismic measuring instruments, we could
only determine the total aggregate yield of such a group of
explosions. Hence, we won't know whether there might be
a megaton explosion or half a megaton or whether the devices
in the group are properly below the threshold.
Therefore, we had to get permission for the on-site
observation, and that involved a great deal of complicated
detail. We wanted to be sure that when these observations
would take place there would be no argument as to what the
observers could do, what they could do with their instruments,
how close they could get to the devices. We wanted to make
sure everything was properly agreed to avoid future disputes.
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- 3 -
You will find the painstaking detail in which this has
been worked out in the protocol. Thus, the whole agreement
is really a breakthrough in that we are no longer talking
about whether or not there should be onsite observation, but
we really have walked through the whole problem of what it
really means to have onsite observations and how you can
do it so both sides are satisfied with their security
interests.
Ouite a lot of ingenuity had to be expended on
this. Let me just give you an anecdote or two. There was
the question of the custody of the instruments which have to
be used to determine the yield of the explosives in the
group. Who should have last custody? There was concern on
the Soviet side that these instruments might contain devices
which were not in line with the purposes of the measurements,
some bugs of some kind or what have you. So they wanted to
be able to take the instruments and analyze them.
Then we were concerned this might disable the
instruments and they may no longer do the measurements they
were supposed to do. So, should we have last custody or should
they have last custody? An ingenious solution was found
for this problem. "e have two identical sets of instruments.
The other side will pick one and one will be used and one can
be taken apart and analyzed to make sure there are no bugs
in the instruments.
In addition, there are two sets of recording devices
in both, including the one that will be used. Again, one of
these recording devices will be picked at random for each
party.
Other problems arose. Taking Dictures, photographs,
could we take the pictures in the Soviet Union or should they
take them. If they take them, how soon can Me get the pictuers?
Again a solution had to be found. The solution worked out
is for explosions and peaceful experiments in the Soviet Union,
we would give the cameras -- cameras with instant development
capability, such as Polaroid and now Fastman Kodak -- and
they would take the pictures, so we get the Dictures right
away. They assured that the photographic equipment is not
used for purposes that have nothing to do with the treatv.
What do all these details mean? The details mean
that given the overall framework agreement, it is possible
for us and the Russians to work out provisions satisfactory
to both so that there is not too much observation but the
observations are being made to compliment the arms limitation
that is inherent in thethreshold test ban treaty of 1974.
I think this gives you enough of an introduction of
the elments of the treaty. I would be pleased to take any
questions, and my colleagues may want to handle additional
questions.
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- 4 -
Q
Dr. Ikle, could you expand in simple words
when onsight inspection can be invoked?
MR. IKLE: It is .for peaceful applications, the
aggregate yield of which exceeds the 150 kiloton threshold.
Remember, each device for peaceful applications is not per-
mitted to exceed the threshold. Therefore, such applications
have to consist of several nuclear devices.
Q Let me rephrase my question a little bit.
As I understand it, between 100 and 150 kiltons, inspection
can only be through mutual consent so there is a possi-
bility the Soviets would reject an American request for
inspection in that range. Over 150, do I understand that
there is no right to reject a request for onsite
inspection?
MR. IKLE: That is right. Over 150 kilotons
aggregate yield of a peaceful application, the onsite
verification is mandatory. Between 100 and 150 it is
based on mutual consultation and it is not mandatory.
Q
And under 150 there is no inspection at
all?
MR. IKLE: From zero yield of peaceful applica-
tions up to 150 there are mandatory provisions for the
exchange of information and the information becomes
increasingly more detailed the higher the total yield of
the peaceful application; more detail after 50, after 75,
after 100.
If you read the provisions, the mandatory
provisions for peaceful applications between, for example.
100 and 150 kiloton in yield, still below obviously what
is permitted on the weapons test sites, you find there is
an enormous amount of information, information which now
there is absolutely no obligation for the Soviet Union
to furnish us.
So, you will have a flow of information coming
on their peaceful program, depending of course on the
magnitudes of their program, where we now have nothing.
Q Dr. Ikle, the physical onsite inspection
question, in the protocol there is a formula in Article
5 or 6 there about the numbers of inspectors, but I
couldn't figure it out. Could you illustrate, give us
some examples? Also, could you remind us how long this
onsite inspection issue has been around with us?
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- 5 -
MR. IKLE: The answer to your first question,
it is a very complicated formula determining tie
numbers of observers, let's say American observ ers,
in the Soviet Union. It depends on the number of
devices, the number of implacement holes. I WOI 't go
through the entire formula now. That would take too much
time, but let me give you some examples.
If there was a major peaceful application
exceeding an aggregate yield of 150 kilotons and maybe
going up to one and a half megatons, with let's say
15 implacement holes, it could be up to 22 observers.
For smaller application, they might have about half a
dozen or roughly; another way of summarizing it, it might
range from say half a dozen to perh ps over 20.
The larger the number of individual devices in
the engineering project, the larger the number of
observers. Although observers will serve different
functions, some groups of observers will have to check
on the geology, and other observers will be in charge of
the equipment and check the proper installation of the
equipment.
Again, this was worked out in such detail so
we wouldn't have future arguments as to whether they would
let in two or seven or none or what have you.
Q
My second question was, how long has this
onsight inspection issue been with us?
MR. IKLE: Oh, sorry. Your second question,
since 1945. In a way, arms control proposals ever since
1945, the issue of onsight inspection with us, of course
in this context of nuclear weapons test limitations the
onsight inspection issue came up very much in the late
1950s when the negotiations began on a nuclear test ban.
Q
Dr. Ikle, has the data mentioned in the
Protocol Sections 1 (a), (b), (c) and (d) been exchanged
and have the calibrations been exchanged?
MR. IKLE: No, this has not yet taken place.
Preliminary discussions have taken place recording the
format of the data.
0
Have the Soviets conducted any tests since
March 31, 1976?
MR. IKLE: Well, we have an understanding that
there shouldn't be tests for -- this was reached in a
tentative fashion on March 31, tests which would be con-
trarv to the agreement. This is a temporary understanding.
0
Have the Soviets conducted any tests since
March 31, 1976?
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- 6 -
MR. IKLE: We don't normally go on record on
the entire test program, but there have been no tests
that would create a problem regarding this treaty what-
soever.
0
Dr. Ikle, what are the purposes that the
Soviets have in mind for peaceful explosives, the most
specifically you can say?
MP.. IKLE: Mining projects, fracturing rocks
for mining purposes, putting out oil well fires. There
have also been published articles about diverting rivers.
Mr. Duff, are there any other important
applications mentioned?
MR. DUFF: Yes. One of the places you might
look for a detailed summary of some of this is the IAEA--
International Atomic Energy Authority--in Vienna, which
conducts a regularly conducted panel, a technical panel.
The last was in January 1975. A summary of that panel
has been made public and in those reports, this particular
one went to the United Nations.
The Soviets have made clear that they have in
their view significant things to do in the way of gas
concentrate storage, for example.
MR. IKLE: Underground gas storage. We can make
these available to any one of you.
0
Is there not a process to divert water
into the Caspian Sea?
MR. IKLE: That has been discussed in the
literature and Soviet journal articles, but there is no
official determination as to the --
Q
My final question. Why is it the Russians
are so interested in peaceful explosions and since we
abandoned the idea of doing a Panama Canal with peace
explosions, we don't seem very interested in that.
MR. IKLE: That is right. Our interests have
waned. We have no experiments scheduled for peaceful
explosions. The last were in 1973 in Colorado, experiments
for stimulating natural gas. Our analyses have, at this
time, not shown any applications that would be technically
feasible and economically warranted.
Apparently the Soviet specialists have come
out with different calculations. Of course, they have
a somewhat different situation, different geography,
different environmental interests in their country.
MORE
- 7 -
0
The agreed statement at the end, I would
like to ask a couple of questions about that. One, it
seems to go right to the heart of the whole thing. Why
did it have to be tacked on later as an agreed statement?
Second, I believe it is dated the day after the treaty
itself, when the protocols were initialed. Is this
something which was a last minute correction to an omission
which had been made? Can you explain that whole agreed
statement to us?
MR. IKLE: It is a complimentery provision which
is supportive of the treaty, but it wasn't found
essential to be incorporated in the treaty or the protocol.
I don't know whether Mr. Buchheim wants to elaborate further
on why it was decided to put it in this format --
0
The date is also curious. It is the date
on which originally this whole thing was supposed to have
been signed. Were we still fiddling around trying to
close the loopholes as of that date?
MR. IKLE: We weren't fiddling around, we had
a few more details to finish and rather than doing a
sloppy job, we took a few more extra days and did it.
Now we think we have everything nailed down in perfection.
There was no harm done whatsoever to the arms control
interests or the security interests by going a few days
beyond that deadline.
Q
That is not the point. If the thing had
already been initialed, why did we have loopholes left?
MR. IKLE: We don't have loopholes and when it
was initialed that statement was completed as well.
But, it took a few more days beyond March 31 to work out some
of the details of this entire treaty and protocol.
Q
I am referring to the initialing, which I
believe was May 12.
MR. HYLAND: They were all the same day, all
three documents. The protocols and the agreed statement
were initialed in Moscow the same day.
C
All the same day, the 13th?
MR. HYLAND: I can't remember the date, but it
was all at one time.
MR. IKLE: There is really no significance to
this.
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- 8 -
0
I thought it was agreed to much earlier?
MR. IKLE: It did take us a little longer, as I
recall, than March 31 to finalize the text.
Q
But the significance of it not being part
of the treaty, it seems to go right to the heart of the
problem, and why was it then left off as a separate
agreed statement?
MR. BUCHHEIM: The reason for that particular
approach to the document had to do with the background of
developing the understanding that is in there.
As Mr. Hyland said, this was negotiated some
months ago. In fact, you will notice in the treaty there
are definitions of certain terms. There was a substantial
amount of effort directed at the problem of defining what
is meant by "peaceful application" because that term is
used here and there in the treaty and the protocol.
I am sure both in the news business and in the
treaty writing business people have had a lot of experience
with the great difficulty of defining terms quite precisely.
In the end, it is usually easier in a difficult case like
this to define what something is not, and in our particular
interests it was, to use your term, to go to the heart
of what we were concerned about; namely, to be sure that
developing of an explosive device was not to be defined
as a peaceful application.
There is a certain approach to logic that would
have allowed that to be done. For example, one could
argue that a peaceful application includes developing an
explosive device that is intended to be used for other
peaceful applications.
Now, the practical effect of allowing that would
be to allow explosions away from the weapons test sites
that had no discernible characteristics associated with
them except the development of an explosive device. That
would have been a loophole in the test ban treaty.
Our interest solely was in avoiding the allowance of that
step.
Q
Does this have a different legal status now?
Will this be ratified also?
MR. BUCHHEIM: No, this will go to the Senate
with the other documents.
0
But why not insert it in that area where
you have definitions in the treaty rather than taking it
on at the end?
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- 9 -
MR. BUCHHEIM: The answer to that simply is it
was possible and comfortable to negotiate placement of
this limitation on the term "peaceful application" rather
than as a definition.
0
It also closes the loop to the 1974 weapons
test treaty?
MR. BUCHHEIM: Precisely.
MR. IKLE: Of course, the entire structure, of
course, the treaty, is totally related to the 1974 treaty,
its duration. You will have noted the provision that you
cannot get out of the treaty governing peaceful applications
as long as the weapons test, the threshold test ban treaty
is in force. These are tightly coupled.
Q
Mr. Ikle, I have another question. How do
you explain the Ford Administration's request for
incorporation of $212 million for weapons testing in 1976
and an estimated $256 million for weapons testing in fiscal
1977, how that relates to these treaty documents? What
are your intentions? In other words, what are the Adminis-
tration's intentions in testing?
MR. IKLE: These will be tests, of course, under
the threshold permitted by this treaty. The Soviet Union
we expect will not entirely stop nuclear weapons testing,
but they will stop testing in the megaton range. They
will start testing down to the agreed threshold.
So, our program of testing below the threshold
will continue, and this is what the budget request is for.
Q What are we going to be testing, with all
the hundreds of tests that have gone on?
MR. IKLE: Well, these are tests of lower yield
and a number of other test applications which will be or
have been explained in detail in presenting the budget.
Whether Mr. Duff wants to give a quick summary of the
purposes of these tests as presented by ERDA --
MR. DUFF: I think it could be related to the
Department of Defense request. The Department of Defense
request for weapons systems development will still proceed.
We will still be required in ERDA to conduct tests to
meet those requirements. As Dr. Ikle says, those tests
will be conducted within the terms of this treaty below
150 kilotons.
MORE
- 10 -
Q
If I could try to ask this in a different
manner, in view of the provisions of Article 1, Section 2
of the July 197r treaty, why are we increasing our
testing program by approximately 25 percent in dollars?
MR. DUFF: I think again the thing that you are
referring to is the concept of minimum testing, and I
think you can be assured that in the review of the
budget and developments of the weapons systems requirement,
there will be the principle applied of minimum testing,
but that does not mean we will have to reduce the amount
of testing. It means it will be minimized, as it always
has been.
Q
Yes, but exactly what is meant by the term
"shall limit the number of its underground nnclear weapons
tests to a minimum"?
MR. IKLE: That is a provision on which we have
no more specific detail than is contained in that sentence,
and it reflects an intention to not expand in the long run
the test program but to keep it to the minimum national
security needs on both sides.
Q
In other words, so a short-term increase
would be compensated at some later date by a compensating
decrease?
MR. IKLE: More important is not to go beyond
normal national security needs and begin some massive
new approach to testing here.
Q
Are there any unilateral statements, agreed
statements, unilateral interpretations, agreed interpre-
tations, or anything else, any understandings related
to the treaty of July 3, 1974, and this treaty on under-
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the
protocols thereto contained in United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency Publication 87, anything at all
that is not contained right here?
MR. IKLE: There is a detailed negotiating
record, of course, which defines the terms and the pro-
visions and as we prepared our presentation to Congress,
we will summarize all the essential elements of this
detailed negotiating record and to the extent to which it
gives additional specificity of the definitions or the
intent that goes beyond the text of the treaty. There
will be nothing that will not be presented to Congress.
Q
Will this all be made public?
MR. IKLE: I would imagine most all of it can
be made public or will be presented certainly in Executive
Session to Congress.
MORE
- 11 -
Q
I mean, what is there that can't be made
public? I mean, the Russians know it, we know it.
MR. IKLE: The understanding -- I am guessing
just what we can do -- the understandings would be essen-
tially public. On an assessment of the verification
capability, things like that, of course we might want to
deal with in Executive Session.
MR. HYLAND: There are things about what the
Russian military tests in the past, our own military test
program that might be relevant in a Congressional hearing,
we might go into Executive Session just on something like
that, the yields of various devices and so forth.
But, in terms of the treaty and the record and
how we got there, there would be no need for that.
Q
The test data you are talking about, did
that come out of the negotiating record?
MR. HYLAND: No. I say, the Congress could ask
a question like you might, what was the size of our last
military test? What was the last Russian test of a
multiple warhead, that type of stuff we would probably
want to keep in Executive Session.
Q
You are talking there about data derived
solely by the U.S. intelligence community and not data
that has already been --
MR. HYLAND: Our own national defense data.
MR. IKLE: Our own assessments of our tests,
the design of our weapons and things like that.
Q
You are not talking about the negotiating
record?
MR. HYLAND: Right.
MR. IKLE: Mr. Buchheim may have another example.
MR. BUCHHEIM: I can give you an example of the
very thing Dr. Ikle is referring to in terms of things
that are recited in the negotiating record that did not seem
necessary or appropriate to write down in the already long
treaty document.
For example, toward the end of the negotiating
period the U.S. read into the record and received Soviet
acknowledgement for the record the various things that we
wanted to have under the treaty.
MORE
- 12 -
An example for you is that we read into the
record a statement to the effect that the number of
observers to be allowed on the site of the PNE project is
not to include any U.S. nationals who may be in residence
in nearby cities on a standby basis or something of that
sort.
For example, if a project authorizes ten observers
on the site--for example a given project authorizes ten
observers on the site, in view of the fact that over a
period of a month or thereabouts the work may go on, it
may as a practical matter to exchange individuals. For
two weeks you may want a geologist on the team, two weeks
later you may want an expert technician associated with
some of the implementation.
So, we wanted an understanding that whereas we
would not exceed two specified number of observers at the
site, we consider it a right to have individuals in the
Soviet Union under normal circumstances perhaps residing
in a city 50 miles away. That is an example of an under-
standing.
MR. IKLE: In transit, so to speak.
MR. BUCHHEIM: Or in transit.
Q
And all this will be presented to the
Congress?
MR. BUCHHEIM: These are formal statements
that were read from a text in a formal answer at that
time.
Q
Is it your understanding that things of this
type wouldn't be made public?
MR. BUCHHEIM: Would be.
MR. IKLE: Will be.
Q
Dr. Ikle, have the Russians given any
indication of how frequently numerically they want to go
above the 150 kiloton limit? Is there any mutual under-
standing that although these things are for peaceful
purposes, there may be environmental disadvantages in
conducting these kinds of experiments?
MR. IKLE: No, they have not given any indication
as to how many of these engineering projects they will want
to conduct. My guess would be that they will develop their
program on the basis of further research and development of
their own.
MORE
- 13 -
The environmental aspects were not of concern
in this context of an arms control treaty. Of course,
there is a provision of the 1963 test ban treaty regarding
radioactive venting and that has been reaffirmed in this
agreement.
Q
Mr. Ikle, have you figured out who was
responsible for this apparent snaffu when the Soviets
invited some correspondents to attend the signing that
then didn't take place? Obviously there was some kind of
communications foul-up there. Have you figured out who was
responsible for it?
MR. IKLE: I have been wondering whether I
should blame myself. I had a longstanding speaking engage-
ment in New York, and it was a damned inconvenient day for
me to have the signing because I would like to attend the
signing. Therefore, it was just an inconvenient time, but
maybe you feel responsible, also?
MR. HYLAND: I am not going to volunteer. The
treaty was initialed on the day before a possible day
for signing. As that became obvious, the treaty was
going to have to get back here on an airplane into Kennedy
late at night, been brought down to Washington before a
ceremony like we are having today, a text printed up for
the press, a briefing laid on and so forth, it was
decided that was just getting too cumbersome and too un-
organized and we did not have with the Soviets a final,
what I would say, sign-off. But, that was the date we
were going to see if we could make, and it turned out to be
just too cumbersome. By giving ourselves a little more
time, we have had a chance to print up the treaty text that
you have and to organize some briefings.
Q
It was a technical question.
MR. HYLAND: It was a technical question,
although you have to remember that initialing is not
the final act. It does come back to Washington. Both
sides had the right, if they had chosen, after looking
at the whole record and the whole treaty, the Soviet side
or the American side could have reopened an issue. It
is very unusual, but it can happen.
Q
Weren't there some domestic American political
considerations in the postponement, inasmuch as the Michigan
primary --
MR. IKLE: I would say it was the health of
the protocol officer. Imagine that poor guy standing
there scheduling a ceremony for signing and he wasn't
sure that he would have the treaty to sign, what
embarrassment.
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- 14 -
!
But you are avoiding a question, which is of
great journalistic interest.
MR. HYLAND: I don't think you should be
addressing questions on the primaries to Fred or me.
We are trying to give you the content of the treaty. If
Ron wants to get into it --
MR. NESSEN: I think Bill has given you the
reasons for the treaty being signed today at a time mutually
agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States.
Q
It is avoiding my question is what it
comes down to.
MR. HYLAND: It is not innocuous if you don't
have the treaty in hand to say the President of the
United States will sign it in the morning, and if the
plane is diverted to Newfoundland --
Q
Why wasn't that explained before?
MR. HYLAND: It was.
MR. NESSEN: It was.
Q
Could I ask the question another way? I
mean, were the Russians hurrying you to sign this
treaty? I mean, why did you agree to this date and then
have to change it because the plane left 24 hours before?
MR. HYLAND: We were searching after sometime
in April, late April, after the texts were gone over for
translation and so forth. We had been searching for a
convenient date with the President's travel schedule and
Brezhnev's schedule, and we could mesh it and do it in
an orderly fashion.
Today is the date that was convenient for both
sides. I think the President spoke to that, didn't he,
Ron? He said he was proud of the achievement.
Q
There was no mutual agreement to sign on
the day the Russians called the reporters --
MR. HYLAND: We hadn't finalized it with the
Russians. The Russians were proceeding, as we were, to see
if we could make it by then. Of course, the treaties were
in Moscow, which gave them a substantial advantage -- the
treaty text.
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- 15 -
MR. IKLE: It was an elaborate courier system
and was quite harrowing to wonder, you know, worry
whether it would work or not.
Q
Two questions, please. First, on the
observers, is there any restriction on whether they can be
members of the military?
MR. IKLE: No, there is no restriction.
Q
Second question. How long do you think it will
take you to present all these details to the Senate? How
long for ratification?
MR. IKLE: As Mr. Nessen mentioned, we want to
submit this to the Senate for ratification soon, and I
imagine there will be hearings then, and then it is up to
the Senate, of course, to schedule their hearings and see
how extensive the hearings should be. This is a choice
for the Senate which we cannot make.
We are ready to present it soon. We are just
getting the papers and the testimony in shape.
0
Do you think it would take a substantial
amount of time to explain as much as you think you need
to explain?
MR. IKLE: That depends on the amount of detail
that the Senate or the relevant committees choose to
elaborate in open hearings as against having their staff
or individual members work over it. There are often
differences, as you know, in the way in which the Senate
acquires information on a treaty of this kind.
Q
Dr. Ikle, is there an understanding that
no tests will be held until the date mentioned in the
protocol of the treaty is exchanged?
MR. IKLE: You mean tests that would be contrary
to the treaty?
Q Any nuclear or atomic tests.
MR. IKLE: No, there is no need for any tests
being affected. It would only affect tests that would be
contrary to these agreements.
Q
Are you confident that without this data
you can interpret whether or not a test is above or below
150 kilotons and within or without one of the designated
test sites?
MR. IKLE: For a long-term, we do want to have
the exchange of the geologic information. For the short-
term, we do not expect the fact that the information has
not been exchanged, or the exchange has not yet been
completed. We do not expect that to be a problem.
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Q
When do you expect this would occur, the
data exchange?
MR. IKLE: Certainly there is a specific provision
that upon ratification this will be completed.
Q
Is there a provision -- I really have not
had time to go through the whole thing -- for onsite
inspection of the geological area of the test sites?
MR. IKLE: No, there is not.
Q
So, there is no assurance that the geological
data we are getting -- for instance, whether it is Soviet
soil or hard rock -- is true?
MR. IKLE: This question, of course, relates to
the 1974 agreement, not the one that we will sign today?
Q Right.
MR. IKLE: And there is no provision for onsite
verification of the geological information on the weapons
test sites. So, we have to just use the information that
will be exchanged and additional information that we can
develop as our own national means of verification to try
to verify and cross-check this information.
0
Do we have any national technical means as
opposed to national human means of verifying the correctness
of the geological data provided?
MR. IKLE: I would rather not go into sources
and methods --
Q
I don't want to go into what it is, I just
want to know if we have some system of verifying it.
MR. IKLE: We have, as you know, a system of
national technical means to make a number of observations.
We would rely on cross-checking the information provided
from the information exchange.
Q
You are convinced using our national
technical means we can verify the geological data supplied
by the Russians?
MR. IKLE: We can make cross-checks and try to
determine the validity of the data and we will have further
details on this in our testimony to Congress, some of
which may have to be in Executive Session because it would
touch on sources and methods of our verification systems.
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Q
Do you have any estimate of the confidence
level of these, you know, once you make the determination
with cross-checking?
MR. IKLE: This is an important and very good
question, with how much centainty can you determine the
yield of a weapons test. That is a long and complicated
story, getting into the statistics of the seismic obser-
vations.
Again we will present this in detail to the
Senate in our testimony.
Q
Do you have an expectation there will be
such a test that would invite the attention of onsite
inspection? In other words, you expect this treaty
would be applied?
MR. IKLE: I would think it is quite possible,
given a program that we have heard Soviet experts talk
about or that they have written about, that there would
be these onsite observations. Incidentally, let me remind
you what is permitted under the treaty, which will be
assigned today are not tests. They are peaceful applications
of nuclear devices.
If they are to be tested, as we discussed before,
they have to be tested at the weapons test site. There is
no peaceful nuclear tests. They are peaceful applications.
Now let me get back to your broader question.
In this whole business about onsite observation, about
which we have been talking now since 1945 and never really
worked it out --
Q
To the layman, I think any atomic explosion
is a test, in a sense. You are never really quite sure what
it is going to do.
MR. IKLE: You are quite right. It may be a
test of the effects, the applications, much as our appli-
cations in Colorado were tests as to the peaceful engineer-
ing effects. But the device itself, to develop a device
in and by itself regardless of the peaceful effects
it may have, that development should take place at the
weapons development test sites.
One more point on the verification. The onsite
inspection is not a purpose in and by itself. It is not
th3 end purpose we are trying to go after. What we want
to do is to be able to monitor arms control agreements. If
there are no events taking place which jeopardize our ability
to monitor arms control agreements by national technical
means, we don't want onsite observations, so we are fully
satisfied either way.
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Q
Dr. Ikle, am I right in thinking all these
provisions for onsite inspection would apply to peaceful
explosions in foreign countries?
MR. IKLE: Yes, you are right. if they are
conducted by one of the treaty partners.
Q
Secondly, what happened to the Egyptian
project for digging a canal into the Queretara Depression?
Is that going the way the Panama Canal did here?
MR. IKLE: It might go that way. It is being
talked about and there are some low-level -- I mean small --
studies going on about the project, environmental implica-
tions, what kind of explosives, conventional or nuclear,
might be most appropriate.
Q
The Egyptians didn't want Russian inspectors.
Therefore, the Americans couldn't use the nuclear devices?
MR. IKLE: If you imagine that there was a ques-
tion of U.S. nuclear devices being used in the country
where those would be used, let's say Egypt would refuse
the inspection, then we couldn't do these applications,
you are right. This is spelled out very specifically in
the treaty.
Q
Not at all or not over 150 KTs?
MR. IKLE: Not at all.
Q
You said there have been no peaceful explo-
sions in the U.S. since 1973. Are there none planned now
that you know of?
MR. IKLE: There are no plans now.
Q
What accounts for the fact that 3.4 appears in
Article 1 of the protocol to the treaty?
MR. BUCHHEIM: That is an example of several
additional concerns that were built into the protocol
for a variety of purposes. This particular one is there
to prevent the acquisition of certain weapons effects
data. It was in order to get certain kinds of weapons
effects data which should not be acquired through peaceful
nuclear explosions. It is appropriate to constrain the
depths to a certain minimum figure. That is the purpose
of that provision.
Q
In other words, it has to be that figure
or deeper?
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MR. IKLE: That is correct. If it is less deep
than that, there is a potential to acquire weapons effects
data associated with certain atmospheric explosions which
are, of course, precluded by the intended purpo: es of the
1963 treaty.
Q
You are talking about some kind of
electric magnetic radiation here, the weapons effect?
MR. IKLE: That is one possibility. That is one
type of weapons effect. There are other weapon effects
that are also -- the testing which is also precluded by
writing this depth constraint. In others, some of the
phenomena would be at the surface.
Q
Wouldn't the depth figure vary widely
according to geological conditions? You wouldn't need to
go very deep in rock compared tohaving to go very deep
in soil.
MR. IKLE: It is correct that if it were necessary
to make the matter that collection, if there were some
driving motivation to be able to shoot off shots just as
shallowly as possibly, then that could have turned into a
long, elaborate article in the protocol, as some of the
other things were. Fortunately, it was possible to reach
agreement in this case on a figure that covers all such
media.
Q
Where does this leave canal digging through
rocky areas? For instance, you are trying to collapse
something to make a canal and you have very hard rocky
situations.
MR. BUCHHEIM:This particular constraint is not of
substantial significance in those terms. It is directed
solely at inhibiting the opportunity for weapons effects
testing. However, the question you ask is tied in with the
reaffirmation of the need to comply with the limited test
ban treaty of 1964.
From the standpoint of U.S. knowledge and exper-
ience with the phenomenology, it is not possible to
do sch things under this agreement, and that is very
important to the nuclear ban.
Q
So they can convert this?
MR. BUCHHEIM: That would be our opinion. If they
invent some new scientific principle we would be happy
to listen to them and watch it, but so far as we know it
cannot be done.
Q
Will the provisions for the Joint Consul-
tation Commission under Article 5 be done under several
regulations?
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MR. IKLE: They have to be worked out, yes.
Q
Will all that be released?
MR. IKLE: I would imagine so. I see no reason
why it shouldn't be.
Q
Because there was some agreement that the SCC
rules and regulations are not being released but the
JCC will be released?
MR. IKLE: We haven't really made that decision
yet. As far as I look forward to this contingency, I
don't see any reason why it shouldn't be released.
Q
In Article 1 of the protocol, Section 2,
any group explosion with a planned aggregate yield
exceeding 500 kilotons should not include more than five
individual explosions each of which has a planned yield
not exceeding 50 kilotons. If I multiply five by 50, I
get less than 500.
MR. IKLE: There would be some larger yield in
that gooup and the reason for that provision is that
there shouldn't be a great many small explosions in one of
these large engineering projects because there would be
uncertainty in verifying the yield of the small explosions
so that we create an artificial deficit in the total
yield under which they could hide a large weapons test.
Q
You have withheld nothing about the actual
diplomacy of negotiating this treaty. As I understand it,
the United States is getting a major breakthrough on the
principle of onsite inspection and the Russians are getting
return permission to use these large peaceful explosions.
I mean, was there any understanding -- first, the
Russians refused to negotiate this treaty in order not to
allow onsite inspection. Was their understanding or dis-
cussion that the early 1974 treaty would be made null and
void and you --
MR. IKLE: That was made very clear. We made
very clear from the outset in 1974 that we would not
submit to the Senate for ratification the 1974 threshold
weapons test ban before this treaty had been completed
because they are so completely tied together there would
be an incomplete story and obviously it would have massive
loopholes then.
THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.
END
(AT 9:25 A.M. EDT)