Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "1552373",
    "label": "NSC Meeting, 8/10/1974",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552373"
}

{
    "id": "1552373",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552373",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "NSC Meeting, 8/10/1974",
    "description": "This file contains no minutes, only agenda.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552373",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)",
        "National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/73/5523/1552373/content/library/document/0312/1552373.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/73/5523/1552373/content/library/document/0312/1552373.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/73/5523/1552373/content/library/document/0312/1552373.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552373",
    "naId": 1552373,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "day": 10,
        "logicalDate": "1974-08-10",
        "month": 8,
        "year": 1974
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "day": 10,
        "logicalDate": "1974-08-10",
        "month": 8,
        "year": 1974
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/73/5523/1552373/content/library/document/0312/1552373.pdf",
    "mediaId": "7f3db55189dbacc7",
    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 8/10/1974\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nPlace\nwith\nFord\nNSC material\nFORD i LIBRARY BERALD\n\\\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nTHE\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nINFORMATION\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nK\nSUBJECT:\nNSC Meeting, Saturday, August 10, 1974\nYou have planned a brief National Security Council meeting following\nthe Cabinet meeting on Saturday morning.\nThe purpose of the NSC meeting will be to affirm your strong interest\nin the continuance and revitalization of the NSC system as a vital aid\nto your decision making in national security matters.\nThe National Security Council, as you know, is supported by a number\nof principal subgroups which review issues preparatory to their con-\nsideration by the NSC and by you:\nThe Senior Review Group--for consideration of major foreign\npolicy issues.\nThe Verification Panel for consideration of major arms control\nissues, e.g. SALT and MBFR.\nThe Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) - - for consideration\nof major defense program issues in the context of their relationship\nwith our national security objectives and national resource priorities.\nThe Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)-- for crisis manage-\nment planning.\nThe Under Secretaries Committee for special studies and actions\nto implement broad policy decisions.\nAs your Assistant for National Security Affairs, I chair each of these\ngroups except the Under Secretaries Committee which is chaired by the\nDeputy Secretary of State, Bob Ingersoll. The membership in each case\nis at the Deputy Secretary level and the core group always includes the\nDeputy Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director, CIA; the Chairman,\nJCS; and myself. In all cases, the principal objective of each group is\nCONFIDENTIAL let 2/25/98\nBREALD FORD\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nto refine and sharpen for the NSC and for you the issues and options,\ntogether with the costs and consequences of pursuing any given course.\nYou may want to stress the importance you place on the presentation\nof options for your consideration and decision. Also it would be well\nto stress that you intend to use the Council and the System more\nfrequently. Lastly, it will be helpful for you to note that you have\ncharged me as your Assistant for National Security Affairs to direct\nthe System in its study efforts.\nI will be preparing early next week for your consideration a schedule\nof NSC meetings on timely and significant issues.\nThe talking points at Tab A would proceed on the foregoing lines.\n163ALD FORD LIBRARY\nCONPIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNSC MEETING, AUGUST 10, 1974\nTHE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS\n--I wanted to meet with you in the National Security Council today for\ntwo basic reasons:\n--to add further evidence of my intention to continue to pursue the\nbasic foreign policy and national security goals which have been\narticulated over the past five years, and\nto emphasize the importance I place on the National Security\nCouncil and the NSC system in the formulation of national security\npolicy.\n--I intend to use the National Security Council as the principal forum\nfor considering policy issues requiring my decisions.\nThe National Security Council system with its principal subgroups on\nwhich all of you are represented will continue to perform their functions\nof developing and refining issues and options on national security issues\nand determining the costs and consequences of pursuing any given option.\nIt is vitally important to me that the alternative approaches to dealing\nwith issues and solving problems in the national security area be presented\nfor my consideration.\nI know that the NSC system has stressed the development of options\nand I will look to it to continue to present them to me.\n--I cannot over-emphasize the point that I do not want \"pre-cooked\"\nsolutions I want to know what my real choices are.\nTo make the best use of the NSC system requires regular and fairly\nfrequent meetings of the Council. This will be particularly true over\nthe coming months as I familiarize myself in depth on the many issues\nwhich will be before us.\nFURD\nCONEIDENTAL\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\n-\n- Accordingly, I have asked Henry Kissinger to plan a fairly intensive\nschedule of meetings both of the Council and of the subgroups to identify\nand explore the issues which will require my decision.\n- - As my Assistant for National Security Affairs, he will be directing\na vigorous interagency program of study and review.\n- - Any suggestions which you might have will be helpful.\n- - Your assistance and cooperation will be vital to the success of this\neffort.\nFURE\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09316\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nTITLE\nNational Security Council Meeting\nMinutes, 8/10/74\nCREATION DATE\n08/10/1974\nVOLUME\n7 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200002\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL\nSECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 8/10/1974\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n06/23/1999\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nopened with portions 7/8/02 exempted\nNSC MEETING\nAUG. 10, 1974\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPRES. TRANSITION\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n09316\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nAugust 10, 1974\nTime and Place: 11:15 - 11:35 a. m., The Cabinet Room\nSubject:\nPresidential Transition.\nParticipants:\nChairman: The President\nWhite House Jack Marsh\nStaff:\nDonald Rumsfeld\nState:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nAlexander M. Haig\nRobert S. Ingersoll\nRobert Hartman\nDefense:\nJames R. Schlesinger\nCIA:\nWilliam Colby\nWilliam P. Clements, Jr.\nNSC:\nL/Gen. Brent Scowcroft\nJCS:\nGen. George S. Brown\nRichard T. Kennedy\nSUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS\n- - That the NSC meet every two weeks during the period\nof transition to familiarize the President with the issues\nand people. After about six months, meetings could be\nless frequent.\n- - Attendance will be decided by the President on the basis\nof a list which he will receive and approve before each\nmeeting.\n- - The next meeting will take up the question of Israeli\neconomic and military requests.\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\n- - Dr. Kissinger will brief the President personally\non the structure and the workings of the NSC system.\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.Q. 12958 See. 3.4 (b)(1)\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMR 01-128,#1 NSC ltr. 9/6/01\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nBy KBH MARA, Date 7/2/02\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATE\nPHOTO COPY\nFROM\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 2 -\nThe President: I want to thank you all for coming this morning. Henry\n(Kissinger) and Jim (Schlesinger), of course, were here earlier for the\nCabinet meeting. This will not really be a substantive meeting, but rather\nto talk about the procedures we should follow, how often we should meet, and\nperhaps to focus in a little on subjects we might want to take up. First, I\nwant to say that the Foreign Policy and the Military Policy have been the\nhallmark of the previous Administration. No Administration in my lifetime\never did better in those fields. I want to congratulate all of you who partici-\npated in that for the work which was done. It was a great accomplishment.\nA good share of my Congressional service was on the Committee on Appro-\npriations, in particular, on the Subcommittees on Defense, Foreign Aid,\nand as you know, Bill (Colby), on CIA. That service was important not\nonly in a substantive way, but also it enabled me to get to know the people\nin the Congress who dealt with these matters, also to get to know the military.\nI want you all to know that I consider the military a very fine group of people.\nI saw the Chairman of the JCS and the Chiefs, and the working level in the\nmilitary establishment, frequently. They are absolutely dedicated and we\nshould all be proud of them. [To General Brown] George, I want you to\nexpress my feelings to our military personnel. [General Brown assured\nthe President that he would do so.]\nThe previous system that was used in the previous Administration produced\nresults and I feel that we should continue it. My general view is that if you\nhave a system that works and produces, you should continue it as in the past.\nI don't have a view, however, on how often we should meet and I would\nappreciate hearing your views.\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I would recommend that, at the\nbeginning, we meet every two weeks to get a clear picture of the issues\nand direction of policy. It also would give you an opportunity to get a feel\nfor the thinking of your principal advisors; then later, after perhaps six\nmonths, meetings could be less frequent.\nThe President: I like that idea. It sounds about right to me. What do you\nthink, Jim (Schlesinger)?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Sir, I believe that is an excellent idea. We do not\nwant to press heavily on your schedule. However, sir, if you feel that this\nmight have the effect of making your schedule too tight, perhaps every three\nweeks would be often enough.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nPHOTO COPY\nFORD LIBRAR\nFROM\n&\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 3 -\nThe President: Well, I will just make the time available. I want to meet\nwith this group. So let us plan to meet, at the beginning, every two weeks.\nLet us program it that way. Are those present today the regular members\nof the Council?\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, these are the statutory members\nand statutory advisors. The Director of the Office of Emergency Pre-\nparedness used to be a member, but that office is now phased out. Actually,\nit had become less and less involved in the important national security issues\nIn any event, President Nixon asked Attorney General John Mitchell to be a\nregular member of the Council and later also asked Treasury Secretary\nConnally, but these were members designated by him and not statutory\nmembers. Others, in addition to the statutory members, can be designated\nat the pleasure of the President.\nThe President: Well, in other words, we could have others here depending\nupon the subject if we want to do so. For now, at least, let's keep it this\nway. I also would like to have the group use both sides of the table for\ncan be\nseating so that we/closer together and facing each other as much as possible.\nSecretary Kissinger: I also should note, Mr. President, that the Deputy\nSecretaries of State and Defense are here as well. They are not statutory\nmembers, but have usually attended because they have a great deal to do\nwith the implementation of decisions which you may take. Also, in the case\nof the Deputy Secretary of State, he acts as the representative of the Depart-\nment of State at the meeting in my stead, since at most NSC meetings I\nserve at the meeting as your Assistant for National Security Affairs.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I would like to be able to bring\nBob Ellsworth with me to the meetings in addition to Deputy Secretary\nClements.\nThe President: Well, I have known Bob for a long time. He is your\ninternational man. Is that correct?\nSecretary Kissinger: One way to decide on the attendance would be to\nhave you decide upon a list of proposed attendees before each meeting.\nThe President: Yes, I will do it that way. I can see that Bob Ellsworth\ncould be helpful in some situations. On the other hand, I don't suppose\nthat he would be involved in discussions of SALT, for example. So we\nmight have some different attendance depending on the nature of the meeting.\nI will plan on approving who should come on the basis of a list which I will\nreceive before each meeting.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPHOTO COPY\nFROM\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nGERALD R FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 4 -\nMr. Clements: Sir, I would like to comment on Deputy Secretary Ingersoll's\nrole and my own. We are members of the principal sub-groups of the NSC\nsystem. Along with Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Colby and General Brown, we\nmake up the core groups of each of those NSC bodies. All of the staff work\nwithin the system is performed under us operating in those bodies. It is\nin that context that we are here and I find it extremely helpful to me.\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes, they have the operational responsibility.\nThe President: I like to have a staff person at meetings in order that I do\nnot have to call staff in after a meeting and pass on to them all of the dis-\ncussions and decisions that have been taken, myself. I agree that Secretaries\nIngersoll and Clements should be here. They could be helpful in getting\ndecisions implemented. Does anyone have any other comment?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Sir, there are two issues I believe you will want\nto focus on in the National Security Council as a matter of priority. The\nfirst involves our nuclear strategy. During the last six months, based\nfrom a NSDM approved by Nixon, we have altered the nuclear strategy of the\nU.S. and our deterrent declaratory strategy. We think it would be very\ndesirable at an early opportunity to discuss this strategy with you. We\nbelieve that it enhances our deterrent capability. The second question con-\ncerns our armament policy toward Israel. We are under great pressure from\nthe Israelis. They have proposed a very large military aid package. If you\nare going to decide upon this, it will be a matter which you will probably\nwant to focus on very early as one of the most pressing decisions. The\npressure on Defense is extremely great, and they will be putting great\npressure on Congress as well. Secretary Kissinger may wish to comment\non this.\nSecretary Kissinger: I had mentioned this briefly earlier, Mr. President.\nThe Israelis want a five-year commitment of $1.5 billion per year. Obviously\nthis involves the most profound foreign policy and military policy issues.\nThe President: Do they want all grant?\nSecretary Kissinger: Well, there would be some mix of cash and credit.\nWe must remember, however, that last year the Saudis imposed an oil\nembargo when we were talking about a package of $2.2 billion in the middle\nof a war. Now we are talking about a package of plus $5 billion. While\nnegotiations are going on this could be a massive problem with the Arabs.\nThere will be, however, great pressures. Jim is right on that. They will\nif they don't get the appropriation.\nbe pushing hard; they want authorization from the Congress this yearoren\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPHOTO COPY\nGERALD LIBRARY\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nFROM\nGERALD R. FORD USPARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 5 -\nThe President: What is the status of the $2.2 billion program? We have\ncommitted all of the funds under that program and also have committed the\n$300 million plan for FY 1975. They are now in the position of having to\ndecide whether to go on with their military program. They should tap into\ntheir own foreign exchange or seek more direct aid from the U.S., and\nthey are pushing for the latter course.\nSecretary Kissinger: If you want to avoid the longer term foreign policy\nissues, which a massive program of this kind would generate, you might\nmake a decision on only one year and at a lower level than they are asking.\nThe impact on the Arabs this year would not be as bad as an agreement for\na large package for the long term impact, but we need to relate whatever\nwe do to the on-going process of negotiations. If we can show progress in nego-\ntiations, the Arabs can swallow military aid decisions, but if we make military\naid to Israel decisions in the context of a stalemate in negotiations, we will\nhave a massive problem.\nMr. Clements: I agree we could have a very serious problem if we are\nnot extremely cautious in dealing with this Israeli aid proposal. We could\nface another oil embargo.\nThe President: Thought also has to be given to this Israeli request in the\ncontext of the $250 million request for Egypt. We just have to recognize\nthe political realities on the Hill. Has the Egypt request been submitted yet?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes sir, I believe it is being marked up now.\nGeneral Scowcroft: It has been marked up on the House side.\nMr. Clements: We also have to be concerned with the question of Egypt's\nmilitary needs. That issue could be a serious one.\nThe President: Well, let us not get involved in that question now. Let us\nconcentrate on getting the economic aid situation straightened out.\nSecretary Schlesinger: There is a shorter term problem in the Israeli\nmilitary aid picture also. They are requesting immediate delivery of much`\nof the material which was in the $2.2 billion package. They see a possible\nwar as early as November when the UN forces are removed. They consider\nthis a very real threat for which they want to be prepared now. To the\nextent we provide some of the equipment that they have asked for, we must\ntake it away from the U.S. forces with the result that those forces will be\nmuch less ready.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPHOTO COPY\nGERALD\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nFROM\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 6 -\nThe President: Do they understand that that is the case?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes sir, but they consider that their needs take\npriority.\nThe President: That certainly is an unselfish attitude.\nSecretary Kissinger: We are studying this entire Israeli aid problem\nin the interagency system and I think we would want to have that study\ncompleted for your consideration.\nThe President: I would like to make that a matter of priority and consider\nthat as a subject for our next meeting in two weeks.\nMr. Marsh: Mr. President, I suggest also at the meeting in two weeks\nyou might like to have a briefing on the various groups that operate within\nthe NSC system.\nSecretary Kissinger: I suggest that perhaps I might be able to go over\nthat with you directly, Mr. President, rather than in the format of a meeting.\nThe President: Yes, I would like to do that, but I think we can do it directly\nas you suggest, Henry. Bill (to Mr. Colby), what is the latest on our ship\nproject in the Pacific?\nMr. Colby:\nPHOTO COP\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nrkOm\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nGERALD R. FORD at\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\n- 7 -\nSecretary Schlesinger:\nMr. Colby:\nThe President: Is this a regular operating submarine?\nMr. Colby: It is a regular submarine, but it has been especially configured\nfor this task. Actually, it is a very old ship and will soon be decommissioned.\nGeneral Brown: I would emphasize, however, sir, that although it is a\nregular operating submarine, it is a very special operation.\nThe President: If its an old one, I wonder if it could be the submarine\nthat Mrs. Ford commissioned.\nGeneral Brown: No sir, it is a different ship.\nThe President: Well, I just wondered because it occurred to me that if\nthey thought we were doing it direct like this with a submarine which my\nwife had commissioned, I wonder how they would view it. They would\nreally think we are up to something. I am glad it is not the same ship.\nGentlemen, if there is nothing else, I suggest we adjourn and I thank you\nall very much.\nGERALD LIBRARY FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPHOTO COPY\nEYES ONLY (XGDS)\nFROM\nGERALD R. CARNT"
}