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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 10/18/1974" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 17, 1974
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Friday, October 18, 1974
3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger HC
I.
PURPOSE
To review alternative SALT proposals for discussion with the
Soviets during my trip to Moscow next week.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Since the last NSC meeting, we have continued
with the analyses of alternative proposals for a SALT
agreement. These proposals form the basis for discussion
at this meeting.
The proposals fall into three basic categories:
1. An effort to achieve nominal parity by the two sides,
by pressing for equal numerical limits on central
strategic systems. Both sides would be free to make
qualitative improvements. This option could result
in a massive technological arms race in unrestrained
characteristics, such as MIRVs.
2.
An attempt to achieve a great degree of parity between
the forces of the two sides, by proposing equal
numerical limits, equal throw weight of missiles and
equal throw weight of MIRVed missiles. This proposal,
with any numbers that would be meaningful, would
require a major restructuring of Soviet strategic
forces. Its negotiability is therefore close to zero.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
DECLASSIFIED
GERALU
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
R 98-40,*5; State letter 9/25/98
By let NARA, Date 10/21/98
SECRE SENSITIVE
2
A variation of this proposal would replace the throw
weight limits with equal limits on MIRVed missiles
and with limits on bombers and heavy missiles.
This would retain many of the advantages of the
original and would be somewhat less obnoxious to
the Soviets.
3.
An effort at balancing our advantages in MIRVs
against the Soviet advantages in throw weight and in
numbers of missiles. This proposal could permit
some progress toward a useful agreement. While
the approach might have the appearance of inequality,
any inequalities would be without strategic significance
if they were properly balanced.
After your opening remarks, I suggest you confirm with
Bill Colby that there is no significant new intelligence infor-
mation and then ask me to present the results of the analytical
work prepared by the Verification Panel. (VP paper at Tab B.)
(The SALT negotiations in Geneva have now been underway
for four weeks, but have made little progress. )
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting, but not the
subject, will be announced. There will be a White House
photographer.
III.
TALKING POINTS
A. At the Opening of the Meeting
1.
The purpose of this meeting is to continue our review of
alternative SALT proposals which we could give to the
Soviets.
2.
Bill (Colby), can we assume there have been no developments
of significance since our last meeting?
3.
Henry, would you give us a rundown on where we stand
on the alternative SALT proposals which have been developed.
FORD i LIBRARY
3
SEGRAT/SENSITIVE
B.
At the Close of the Meeting
1.
Clearly, there are quite different concepts of how to
attack the problem of achieving a reasonable strategic
balance through SALT.
2.
What we need to do is to try as best we can to find
common ground with the Soviets for a mutually
acceptable SALT agreement. We cannot be cynical,
saying we want an agreement but making proposals
which will not work.
3.
Based on this discussion, I will decide how we should
proceed. I may want to present only one proposal,
all of them, or some hybrid combination.
4. Meanwhile, I expect all of you to insure that none of
this ends up in the newspapers.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09159
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Secretary Kissinger's Talking Points,
NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
CREATION DATE
10/18/1974
VOLUME
15 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200006
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
sincerzed 6/19/03
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
TALKING POINTS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
NSC MEETING
MR 98-40, #6; DODer 11/6/02
October 18, 1974
By dal # NARA. Date 6/19/03
Background and Issues
-- Mr. President, as you directed at the last NSC meeting,
the Verification Panel has been refining the basic options which illustrate
the issues we discussed at our earlier meeting.
-- Before we go into the options, however, it might be
useful for Alex Johnson to give a brief rundown of what has happened
in Geneva. The Geneva talks are continuing without a recess, at the
Soviet request, and Alex will be returning to Geneva early next week to
continue his discussion with Semenov.
[After Johnson's remarks:]
- - As you recall, we discussed last week the five major
issues we face in structuring a US proposal.
Equal Aggregates. This is a simple and straight-
forward concept which puts a minimum restraint on US forces. It is
likely, however, to encounter Soviet objections because of FBS, and
it leaves unconstrained the Soviet throw weight advantage and the Soviet
MIRV potential.
Missile Throw Weight Limits. This strikes at a major
Soviet advantage, on the other hand, at the levels we have discussed we
will force major negotiations problems.
BERALD FORD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MIRV Limitations. A major part of our negotiating
effort has been directed toward MIRV limits. But thus far the Soviets
have not been willing to concede us a significant advantage in numbers
of MIRV launchers, even in the context of a three-year extension of
the Interim Agreement.
Balanced Advantages. Under this concept, we would
try to strike a balance between various aspects of the two forces in
which the US advantage in MIRV numbers would be offset by a Soviet
advantage in launcher numbers. This approach might overcome some
of our negotiating problems. However, an asymmetries approach would
depart from the principle of equality and leave Soviet throw weight
advantages relatively unconstrained.
Reductions. Finally, there is general agreement on
the desirability of reductions, but a major problem is that the Soviets
are starting from a higher level than we are, so that equal reductions
will cut deeper into their forces than into ours.
Options
-- Mr. President, with our previous discussion. in mind,
the Verification Panel has spent the time since our last meeting on
reviewing and refining the options in a way that will illustrate the
issues we must address in defining a US SALT proposal. We have
boiled down our analysis to four basic illustrative options.
100
LIBRARY
LIBRANT CERALO P. FORD
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Option A. Equal Aggregates of Central Systems
Key Provisions
1. Aggregate levels
-- Equal initial aggregate level: 2500
-- Reductions to equal aggregate level by 1985: 2000
2. Equal sublimit on MLBMs: 300
3. Other features
No MIRV limitations
-- No direct limits on throw weight
-- No constraints on freedom-to-mix
-- This option is based on the premise that equality in aggregate
numbers of central systems is the most visible and easily perceived
measure of essential equivalence. Equality in the number of central
systems has been an essential element of the US approach to SALT since
mid-1970.
-- The option stresses conceptual simplicity by its proposal of
exact symmetry across a limited number of provisions, and its lack of
MIRV and throw weight constraints and their potential verification problems.
-- The Soviets would have to reduce about 600 from their pro-
jected force of 2600
BERALD FORD LIBRARA
BERRED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
4
-- The US would have to eliminate 54 Titan ICBMs and 250
older bombers (B-52s) -- system we plan to phase out anyway.
The Soviets would presumably MIRV all of their ICBMs,
including 300 heavies. They would also MIRV a large
fraction of their SLBM force.
In total, they could MIRV up to 1800 missiles -- the same
number we project them to MIRV in the absence of an
agreement.
In order to keep pace we would have to MIRV all our ICBM
force, including 250 new ICBMs in the 7000-pound throw
weight class.
We would probably be able to retain our lead in missile
RVs under this agreement but the Soviets would have a
substantial throw weight advantage.
-
As I pointed out at the last meeting, if we proposed an option
like this with no MIRV constraints, the Soviets would probably be very
suspicious of our intentions. They would probably suspect that we were
getting ready for an all-out qualitative arms race.
- An agreement like this would probably also generate con-
siderable criticism domestically; it could hardly be called arms control.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD is SERALD LIBRARY
LIBRANTY GERALD road
#
SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
Summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of this
option:
Simple and symmetrical, easily perceived as providing
basic equality.
Avoids verification problems associated with MIRV and
throw weight limits, and negotiating their collateral
constraints.
Clearly consistent with Congressional concerns for equal
levels of strategic forces.
-- Disadvantages:
Does not constrain competition and buildup of MIRV and
throw weight capability within the numerical limits.
Equality in aggregate number of central systems would
be difficult to negotiate.
Would represent a failure to achieve publicly declared
US and Soviet goals of SALT which have stressed the need
to control qualitative competition.
Major departure from past negotiating record.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
Option B. Equal Aggregates with Equal Throw Weight Limits
Key Provisions
1.
Aggregate levels
-- Equal initial aggregate level: 2500
-- Reductions to equal aggregate level by 1985: 2000
2. Equal missile throw weight at 8 million pounds for each side,
reducing to 6 million pounds by 1985
3. Equal MIRV missile throw weight at 4 million pounds
4. Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus MLBMs),
initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250 by 1985.
- -
This option also provides for equal aggregates at 2000, but in
addition contains a highly restrictive MIRVed throw weight limitation of
4 million pounds, and a similarly restrictive missile throw weight
limitation of 6 million pounds. A sublimit of 250 on "heavy strategic
systems", that is, bombers and heavy missiles, would also be included.
As we discussed at the last meeting, this type of agreement
would have little impact on our MIRV programs.
LIBRARY GERALD R.TORD
GERAL
LISSA
SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
We would have better than a 2 to 1 advantage in RVs
under this option.
Missile throw weight would be equal on the two sides
because of the limitations in the option. However, we
would have a substantial advantage in bomber payload
unless the Soviets deployed a new heavy bomber, which is
highly unlikely.
We would clearly have severe negotiating problems if
we proposed such an agreement since we would be asking
them to make drastic changes in the current force plans.
The Soviets would view this option as a step backward in
our negotiating position since we offered them a better
MIRV force when we were discussing extending the Interim
Agreement to 1980.
In sum, the pros and cons are:
Equal aggregate provides easily perceived equality.
Equal missile throw weight and MIRV throw weight limits
would sharply constrain Soviet programs and reduce or
eliminate Soviet MLBMs, would not seriously limit
current US programs.
FORD SISRAB
GERAL FORD LIBRART
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
Clearly consistent with Congressional concerns for
equal levels of strategic forces.
Would constrain future competition in missile throw weight.
-- Disadvantages:
The equal limits on aggregate numbers, low levels of
missile throw weight, and low levels of MIRV throw weight
would be difficult to negotiate. In fact, it would be seen
as an insult by the Soviets since it would be a tougher
position than President Nixon presented at the summit.
Verification would require several collateral constraints
which might be difficult to negotiate.
Option C. Compensating Asymmetries
Key Provisions
1. Aggregate levels
-- Initial aggregate levels:
US - 2250
USSR - 2500
-- Reductions by 1985 to:
US - 2000
USSR - 2200
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
2. MIRVs
-- MIRV launcher level:
US - 1300
USSR - 1050
-- No MLBM MIRVs
AMERICA
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
9
3. Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus
MLBMs), initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250 by
1985.
4. No increase in number of MLBM launchers.
-- This option is based on the premise that equivalence can
more readily be achieved by balancing existing asymmetries than by
removing them. It is designed to balance a Soviet advantage in overall
numbers of central systems with a US advantage in numbers of permitted
MIRVed launchers.
-- This approach is responsive to the current force plans on the
two sides since the Soviets are projected to have a larger aggregate
in 1985.
Under this option, we could deploy a fully MIRVed SLBM force
of about 736 launchers and 550 MIRVed ICBMs, some of which could
be new Minuteman IV missiles of up to 7000-pound throw weight.
-- The Soviets could deploy their projected force of 600 MIRVed
17s and 19s and 400 MIRVed SLBMs. They would be permitted to
retain their heavy missiles, although MIRVing of these missiles would
be prohibited.
-- We would retain a large advantage in numbers of weapons
to counter the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight.
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
TAILISNGS/L0S
10
-- MIRVed throw weight on the two sides would be roughly
equal if we chose to deploy about 250 Minuteman IV.
-- This option is similar to that which we pursued earlier
this year where the Soviets would have been permitted to retain their
Interim Agreement numerical advantage until 1980 in exchange for
a US advantage in MIRVed launchers.
- - The main argument against this option has been that the
unequal aggregates would lead to a perception of US inferiority. However,
I do not believe the Congress, the American people,
or our Allies have such a simplistic view of the strategic
balance that they ignore all considerations other than the
number of missiles and bombers.
The extra 200 missiles the Soviets would have would all
be low-capability, older, and unMIRVed.
In the absence of an arms control agreement, there is no
question but that we would choose to have relatively
smaller numbers of higher capability systems, rather
than sacrificing quality for quantity. Thus, to argue
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
11
against a disparity in launchers is to argue that we cannot
accept in an agreement what we would inevitably do without
an agreement.
Finally, no one has proposed agreeing to an inequality in
total levels without a compensating US advantage in other
areas, such as a number of MIRV launchers.
-- In summary, the advantages and disadvantages of the offsetting
asymmetries approach are as follows:
Compensating asymmetries may be more negotiable than
equal aggregates since it reflects difference in base line
force levels for the two sides (2500 Soviet vs. 2000 US).
Gives the US a MIRV launcher number advantage, levels
off Soviet MIRV program well below projected numbers.
Would ban MIRVs on heavy missiles and reduce their number,
resulting in ceilings on missile and MIRV throw weight.
Disadvantages:
Unequal aggregates might mean that some would perceive
a Soviet strategic superiority;
Does not directly constrain competition in throw weight or
RVs, does not discourage (and could encourage) new programs
such as M-X, D-5, and Soviet follow-on missiles.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
to
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
12
MLBM MIRV ban could be difficult to negotiate.
Verification would require collateral constraints which
might be difficult to negotiate.
Option D. Equal Deployment Rights
Key Provisions
1. Aggregate levels
-- Initially present aggregate levels on each side
__
Choice of one of two force levels by 1985:
Aggregate of 2000 with 1300 MIRV launchers
Aggregate of 2200 with 1050 MIRV launchers
2. MLBMs and heavy bombers
-- Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus
MLBMs), initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250
by 1985
-- No MLBM MIRVs
3. Medium and light missi les limited to a total of 7.5 million
pounds throw weight and 10, 000 RVs.
-- This option is based on equal deployment rights, giving each
side a choice of emphasizing total number of launchers or number of
FORD
MIRV launchers.
FORD is LIBRARY
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
13
It is also designed to achieve equality in heavy systems
through equal sublimits and a MLBM MIRV ban, and to limit competition
in medium and light missiles through throw weight and RV ceilings.
This option is really just a variant of the balancing asymmetries
approach which incorporates the idea of equal rights in order to give
a clearer perception of equality.
-- There is little question that under such an agreement we would
choose the higher MIRVed launcher number, while the Soviets would
choose the higher aggregate level, so that the outcome would not be
any different than under the third option. However, the equal rights"
might eliminate some squabbling about "perceptions."
-- The force structures under this option would be approximately
the same as those under the third option since the RV and throw weight
limits proposed, 7-1/2 million pounds of throw weight and 10, 000 RVs,
are not very restrictive. The only significant difference would be that
we could not deploy more than about 100 Minuteman IV without exceeding
the RV limit.
Thus, the pros and cons of this option are essentially those
of the previous option, with the following exceptions:
The "equal rights" approach might help with perceptions.
There would be a ceiling on throw weight and RVs, which
could help increase confidence in strategic stability.
FORD LIBRARY
FORD FLBRABY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
14
The RV limit would be hard to verify and the throw
weight limit hard to negotiate.
Conclusions
Mr. President, before asking the group to discuss their views
on those packages, I would like to recall that these options were defined
primarily in order to illustrate the problems we face in devising a US
SALT proposal.
-- Inconsidering the approach you will want to take with the
Soviet leaders, none of these options in its pure form is likely to satisfy
the conflicting requirements put on us by our own force plans, the
structure of Soviet forces and the history of these negotiations to date.
-- It is quite possible that selective approach will be the best
one, incorporating elements from various options into a final package.
I believe an important conclusion which can be drawn from
the Verification Panel's work -- and from the entire history of SALT --
is that it is very difficult to find any single measure or group of measures
which will maximize all our advantages in terms of security, political
and negotiating concerns. The best we can do is to select the goals
that are the most important to us and attempt to achieve them in the
realization that there will be a price to pay somewhere else.
FORD is DERALD LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
15
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- I believe the Verification Panel and the Working Group have
done an outstanding job the last few weeks in refining the analysis in a
way that illustrates the issues in the clearest possible way.
-- At this point, perhaps my colleagues would like to discuss
their own views of the options and the rational underlying them.
FORD & LIBRARY
SECGRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4981X
TOP SECRET
INFORMATION
SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENTS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
just
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting,
October 18, 1974
Attached are Jan Lodal's minutes of last Friday's NSC meeting.
I have kept a copy for the formal meeting record.
Attachment
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
ut 2/98
ATTACHMENTS
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD LIBRARY OTHER
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09160
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, National Security Council
Meeting, 10/18/74
CREATION DATE
10/18/1974
VOLUME
39 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200006
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
1st 32 pages sanitized under NSC letter 2/10/99
at 5/99
REDACTED 12/2/09
4981X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRETSENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Friday, October 18, 1974
TIME:
3:40 p.m. to 5:45 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Mid East Status, SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA:
Mr. Carl Duckett
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the
President
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
NSC:
Jan M. Lodal 1
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 08-60, #21 #21
TOP/ SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
NSC letter 12/2/09
By dal NARA, Date 1/4/10
CERAL FORD KIRRAGA
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
2
MIDDLE EAST
President Ford: It is nice to have you here. In the
last day or so, Henry has filled me in on the results of his
trip to the Mid East, but he might not have had a chance to
do the same with the rest of you. I thought I might ask him
to take ten minutes and give this group the benefit of what
his trip brought.
Secretary Kissinger: The trip was arranged at the urgent
request of Sadat who wanted to try to bring about a cooling off
in the area. He made several appreaches to the President; Asad
finally joined in the request. We had no precise idea where we
would go. But it quickly became apparent that Sadat knew what
he was talking about -- the Mid East was extremely tense and
uncertain. There were many factors -- the Mid East Summit next
week; the unanticipated change of Presidents here, and the
question of whether this change meant a change in U.S. policy;
pressures from the radicals; and the oil problem.
The major purpose of the trip was to try to get a new
round of negotiations started.
I might add that the Israelis also face considerable un-
certainty. They have a new government with a small majority
and events seem to be closing in on them.
As I said, the major purpose was to get a new round of
negotiations started. The secondary purpose was the oil
problem, which I raised only quietly. I didn't want to be seen
as being there primarily because of the oil problem.
In the Mid East, there are three categories of problems:
-- Territorial.
-- The Palestinians.
-- Jerusalem.
I have always told everyone that Jerusalem would have to
come last, that to raise it now would tie up the talks. So
it never came up.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERAL FORD LIBRARY
SERAL FORD VIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
3
On the territorial problems, there is Egypt, which is the
easiest; the West Bank, which is the next easiest; and Syria,
which is the most impossible. The West Bank is next easiest
only if Jordan is the one negotiating. If the PLO negotiates,
the West Bank becomes by far the most difficult problem. Of
course, while we were there, the PLO issue came up in the UN.
President Ford: We were a very small minority -- something
like 4 out of 110.
Secretary Kissinger: That was expected. I told everyone
we would be in a very small minority because we were not killing
ourselves over the issue. Faisal understood this. We paid no
price with the Arabs for our PLO vote in the UN.
The easiest thing to do next is to get negotiations under-
way between Egypt and Israel, if the other Arabs will tolerate
it, and if others don't make demands which undermine the
position of Sadat. Israel wants a political settlement. For
Sadat to negotiate with Israel alone is an unbelievable political
act in itself. But if he has to certify that the talks are
political, the situation becomes impossible.
Sadat has to go to the Summit next week and say there is
no set position yet.
Asad is determined that there not be separate negotiations.
He says this three times a week in his local newspapers. He
says there will not be any movement with Egypt alone if there
is nothing for Syria. His position is that only all Arabs can
negotiate. He believes that all Arabs should negotiate all
territorial problems, that all Arabs should negotiate the Palè-
stinian problem, and then all the Arabs should negotiate the
Jerusalem problem. He and the Soviets have pushed for recon-
vening the Geneva Conference. The Soviets know that in separate
negotiations they will be excluded. In a large conference, they
can maximize their influence.
This is the minefield we have to run through. It is
essential that no impression be given that any particular ne-
gotiating approach has been agreed. All of those who want
separate negotiations have to go to the Summit portraying an
open mind. This is especially true of those taking a moderate
line -- Egypt, Faisal, and Morocco.
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE
GRALD FORD LIBRAST
SIGNARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Syria and Jordan constitute a separate problem. Syria
is trying to line up other Arab support for its position
against separate negotiations.
If we can hold Faisal with Sadat, we have practically got
it wrapped up. Saqqaf made a statement at the airport in which
he said he used to have doubts about Kissinger's negotiating
approach, but he was now convinced that this was the only
route -- to take a step-by-step approach. This is even some-
what further than Sadat has gone.
I am not concerned about Sadat inviting Brezhnev to
Egypt. This will let him look like he is making a slight move
to the Soviets.
We face a difficult week next week with the Summit in Rabat.
Once that is over, we will have to move fast. It is crucial that
before then, we give no indication that we have any agreed out-
line or approach. Once Sadat moves out, he must not look ridicu-
lous in the face of the other Arabs.
President Ford: Dayan seems to be going off on a tangent.
Secretary Kissinger: In Israel, the domestic politics are
absolutely disgusting. A year ago, Dayan was the leading dove;
he has now moved totally to the right. The Defense Minister of
the present government is the second man in the Rafi faction
which Dayan heads, and it is important that the seven from this
group stay in power. If he is out, the government falls.
Secretary Schlesinger: They also have the religious
group.
Secretary Kissinger: That's right, but assuming Egypt
and Israel get negotiations started, talks on the West Bank
must follow shortly. It is important that Sadat is not isolated.
But the religious group opposes any West Bank talks. If it holds
a balance in the Israeli cabinet, the government will be out.
Therefore, the Rafi group is necessary for progress. Rafi seems
more interested in the Sinai than the West Bank.
We are making good progress, but it will require a hell of
a lot of work to keep it together. Last year, I thought we
were playing for time. Now, we have the opportunity for serious
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progress, if the Israelis can recognize the realities of the
situation. Some people think the split between Egypt and
Syria is a game and that they are just faking it. But the
Arabs are too undisciplined to pull that off. You cannot sit
with Asad one half hour and think that he could possibly be
playing a game. All the Arabs see this rivalry -- even Boumediene,
who is usually considered one of the most radical, was saying to
me, "I know how it will end up -- they will go back to the 1967
borders with a few changes, and everyone will quit." If the
Israelis were only smart enough to realize this, I think even
Faisal would go along.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't Faisal's backing of
Sadat a must?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Faisal, who is in some respects
the most reactionary, makes it legitimate for the radicals. He
can keep Syria in line.
With respect to oil, despite what the media here are
saying, I think the speech you gave, Mr. President, has led to
a massive reaction. I received two assurances -- that there
will be no increase in prices, SO that with inflation, this
would mean a decrease in the real price. Second, that there
would be no use of the oil weapon during negotiations, although
it would be used if there were a general Arab-Israeli war.
Finally, I think that at the right moment, there is a
possibility that we would get some reduction in price. Even
Boumediene said some political reduction in price might be
possible. We have to analyze this. I believe we can almost
certainly hold the line at the present prices, and maybe get
a small reduction. But the kind of reduction we are talking
about, from $9.60 to perhaps $8.00, will slow down the producers'
accumulation of funds, but it does not change our fundamental
problem. Our conservation program and the approach discussed at
Camp David remain important.
Above all, it is essential that the Israelis do not
humiliate Egypt. The Israelis can pretend that a political
negotiation is underway, but it cannot be set up so that it is
called a political negotiation.
We will try again in early November to get the talks set
up. I believe that once Egypt moves, the other Arabs will
come along. Syria may try to impose its tough position, but
not if they are all alone.
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Director Colby:|
Deputy Secretary Clements: With respect to the materiel
we have been sending to Israel, we need to bring into the fore-
ground what has been done and how much they have. There is no
question but that the capability of the Israelis to preempt
already exists. We cannot squeeze them to their limit.
Secretary Kissinger: The crucial period will be from
November through January. During that period, there will be
a need for pressure.
President Ford: Are you talking about what is on hand
now, or what we have agreed to as a package?
Deputy Secretary Clements: What is on hand now. This
has come as something of a surprise to us. We have sent the
JCS task force out there, and they found that what the Israelis
have exceeds what they had before the October war.
President Ford: How long can they sustain an offensive
operation?
Deputy Secretary Clements: Eighteen days.
President Ford: On two fronts?
Deputy Secretary Clements: On the same basis as last
year, which was two fronts. To put it another way, they have
three times the capability they had last fall, which was
only six days.
President Ford: Perhaps we should move now to our other
subject --
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Director Colby: One last point on oil prices. One of
the keys is the Shah. Any influence we can use there is
critical.
President Ford: If we could get a reduction from $9.60
to $8.00 or $7.00, it would be a real shot in the arm for the
domestic economy.
Secretary Kissinger: I think a reduction to $7.00 is
very improbable.
Director Colby: They are talking about compensation for
inflation, so if the price just stays where it is, we are ahead.
Secretary Kissinger: I am confident it will stay where it is.
On whether we can bring it down, I am not sure.
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SALT
President Ford: Perhaps we should move to SALT. Alex,
could you give us a rundown on the negotiations in Geneva
so far?
Ambassador Johnson: First, I would like to say the
instructions I received are the best I have ever had since
I have been in my job. They were excellent, and with them I
believe I have laid a base for any direction we might go.
Compared with previous sessions, the Soviets definitely
tried to give the impression of more flexibility than they have
shown in the past. I am not sure how much of this is atmospherics-
the man with whom I deal is obviously under instructions --
or how much was his personal action. I don't believe the
substance of what they said was as important as the fact that
they were trying to show flexibility. Much of what they said
was old wine in new bottles, but there were some changes in
their position.
FBS constituted the rubric for all else they said. They
made more speeches on FBS and stressed it more than anything
else. In the past, they had hoped to convince us to withdraw
all our FBS. They now seem to want only our agreement in
principle to withdraw.
Secretary Kissinger: Alex hopes to make a deal giving
them only principles!
Ambassador Johnson: They are not willing to settle just
for principles! They said they thought they had laid the basis
for settling this issue over the time period through 1985. Their
basic approach was to insist on compensation for what we don't
withdraw. If they don't get withdrawal, they say they are
entitled to more forces as compensation.
They put considerable emphasis on carrying forward the
Interim Agreement numbers, first through 1977, and then on
through 1985. On aggregates, my instructions were to discuss
aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs, with the final aggregate level
to be reached by reductions to a common lower level. The
Soviets accepted the idea that there should be a limit or limits
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on overall aggregates -- whether "limit" is singular or
plural is significant -- and they accepted the principle of
reductions, unlike in their previous position which was that
reductions should be subsequent. But, they were very hedged
concerning the specifics of reductions.
On MIRVs, they proposed that an equal proportion on each
side should be MIRVed. On throw weight, they demonstrated no
enthusiasm as a measure of strategic capability. But, if it
were considered, they insisted that we also consider bombers
and our FBS, including carrier aircraft, at their maximum
payload capability. Thus, their position on throw weight
remained quite far out. I was not authorized, nor did I dis-
cuss, how we might take account of bombers.
Previously, they had pressed for banning the B-1 and
Trident. They have now moved to a proposal to limit the deploy-
ment rates and numbers of B-1 and Trident -- controlling the pace
and magnitude of the program.
President Ford: They are basically talking about the
scheduling of the program --
Ambassador Johnson: The scheduling and the magnitude
of the deployment. They said this would apply to their systems,
but never gave an answer to what systems.
On aggregates and FBS, they insisted on compensation for
our FBS and for third countries. They previously referred to
NATO, but now referred to third countries, raising China.
In the past, they referred to British and French submarines,
but now they implied they included the Chinese submarines also.
President Ford: Were they referring to Chinese sub-
marines, or their land-based missiles also?
Ambassador Johnson: They referred specifically to
Chinese submarines, but seemed to include their ICBMs. They
claimed they needed an allowance to deal with China.
In addition, they have stressed that account needs to be
taken of "geographic" factors. This embraces the differences on
their side of submarines getting out to sea -- having to go
through narrow channels.
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In summary, they showed some flexibility and made some
interesting departures. But they gave no new proposals;
no breakthrough.
President Ford: They offered no counter-proposals?
Ambassador Johnson: No counter-proposals, except on B-1
and Trident, where they offered some specifics. They seemed
interested in talking. They seemed interested in getting
an agreement, but they maintained a forward position -- a hard
position.
President Ford: Do any of the rest of you have questions
for Alex?
Secretary Schlesinger: Are they willing to have 50 percent
of the submarines, but don't care how the other 50 percent are
divided between NATO and the U.S.?
Ambassador Johnson: No.
Secretary Schlesinger: What do they mean by compensation?
Ambassador Johnson: The same thing as they meant in their
1972 Moscow statements -- greater numbers.
President Ford: Thank you, Alex.
Ilknow the Verification Panel has been considering four
options. Henry, would you like to present them to us now?
Secretary Kissinger: At the last meeting, we went through
basic approaches and issues -- aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs,
balancing advantages, and reductions. In the meantime, we have
put these approaches into packages to illustrate the concepts.
We have come up with four major options, and have put them on
some charts. (Chart shown for each option as it is discussed --
see attachment.)
The first option is more or less the JCS option. It provides
for equal aggregates -- initially at 2500 and reduced to 2000 by
1985. My view is that we would have to reach the final level
sometime before then, by 1983. We can't wait until the agreement
is about to lapse to make the final reductions. We need some
time to assess where we are before the agreement lapses. I don't
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know how much it should be --- one year, or six months, but some
time before 1985 -- the negotiators can work out the specific
time. The final level would be at 2000. We would of course be
delighted to have it at an even lower level.
There would be a sublimit on modern large missiles
of 300. There would be no limits on throw weight or MIRVs.
These could be added, but the basic option is intended to remain
simple. It is based on the premise that equality in aggregate
numbers of central systems is the most visible and easily
perceived measure of essential equivalence. Equality in the
number of central systems has been an essential element of the
U.S. approach to SALT since mid-1970.
The option stresses conceptual simplicity by its proposal
of exact symmetry across a limited number of provisions, and
its lack of MIRV and throw weight constraints and their
potential verification problems.
The Soviets would have to reduce about 600 from their
projected force of 2600, probably eliminating about 100 MIRVed
ICBMs, 400 unMIRVed ICBMs, and 100 older heavy bombers. The
U.S. would have to eliminate 54 Titan ICBMs, and 250 older
bombers -- B-52s. I think it is fair to say that these are
systems we are planning to phase out anyway. But whether or not
we plan to phase them out anyway, they are probably the units we
would take out.
take
The MIRVing would be up to each country. The Soviets
could MIRV all their ICBMs, including their 300 heavy missiles,
unless we put in a specific restraint against this.
The main advantage of this approach is simplicity. The
disadvantage is that it gives us no handle on qualitative
improvements.
We would face a difficulty in the negotiations, because
the Soviets would have to conclude that we were on to something,
rightly or wrongly. There would be a hiatus while they studied
what was happening. Alex, don't you believe that if we drop
MIRVs if would produce a careful study on their part?
Ambassador Johnson: Yes. For two years we have argued
about MIRVs.
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Secretary Kissinger: For two years, and they finally
agreed, and now we would be saying we were no longer interested.
This is no argument against this option, however, but it would
produce a hiatus.
Director Colby: You might add a ban on SS-18 MIRVs,
plus a ban on SLBM MIRVs such as they have hinted at.
Secretary Kissinger: They won't accept a ban on SLBM
MIRVs under any circumstances.
Ambassador Johnson: They won't accept it.
Deputy Secretary Clements: It is not necessarily bad
to make them question what we are doing.
Secretary Kissinger: It is not necessarily bad, but I
was just pointing out that the consequence of this proposal would
be to produce a long analysis on their part. We should ask
ourselves the question: What if they conclude we are trying
for some kind of break-out in MIRVs? What would be their
response? I don't know, but I suspect there would be some
response.
Director Colby:
President Ford:
Director Colby:
Director Ikle:
Director Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: We have always assumed that once
a missile is tested to operational status with MIRVs, we would
have to presume any deployment of it was MIRVed. Any deployment
of the SS-17 or the SS-19, given their present state of testing,
we would have to assume was MIRVed. They would have to convert
the silos to deploy them, and we would count all the converted
silos as MIRVed.
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Director Colby: One of the provisions in the collateral
constraints would be no other changes in the silos - no
hardening, for example.
Secretary Kissinger: Any silo once converted would be
counted as containing a MIRVed missile.
Director Colby: They might say they were not converting
them.
President Ford: You are saying that as soon as construction
begins, we would have to count it as a MIRV?
Secretary Kissinger: As soon as they made the silo
capable of accepting a 17 or 19, we would count it as MIRVed.
President Ford: If they allege they are not doing
it for MIRVs, we could not accept that.
Director Colby: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger:
Director Colby:
Secretary Schlesinger:
Director Colby:
Director Ikle: There would be further constraints
required for SLBMs.
Ambassador Johnson: We should remember that they also
have an interest in verifying us. They have brought this up
in the talks.
Director Colby: They would have to agree to this extensive
list of collateral constraints.
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Secretary Kissinger: In the past it has always been said
that they have to modify the silos to deploy MIRVs.
Director Colby: With the collateral constraints.
Secretary Kissinger: These collateral constraints have
not been presented to the Verification Panel. We have seen
pictures which have shown that they have to change the silos.
Once they have made a change, we would have to count the silo as
containing a MIRV. But we have been given innumerable briefings
that they have to change the silos.
President Ford: Is this something that has gotten greater
emphasis from the CIA recently?
Director Colby: No, but I believe the complexity of the
verification problem is a factor in choosing among the options.
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Director Ikle: This should be put in perspective. They
would have to modify the silos,
Secretary Kissinger:
Ambassador Johnson: The problem is that these collateral
constraints have not been scrubbed down.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't the point here that
there would be risks?
Director Colby: When we last made an estimate about six
months ago, we said we would be able to tell the numbers to
about plus or minus 100.
President Ford: Plus or minus 100 17s and 19s in 17 and
19 holes? Or in any other holes?
Secretary Schlesinger: I must share Henry's observation
concerning the importance of this. Bill seems to be saying that
unless we can negotiate very complicated collateral constraints,
we can't detect MIRVing or count the number deployed.
Director Colby: That is correct without the constraints.
President Ford: But with them you could count with a
margin of 100 or so?
Director Colby: Yes. If we said they had 1000, the real
number might be 1100.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill is talking negotiability here.
What is comes down to is what we can let them change in the silos.
We have to scrub down these constraints. We have to consider
do we want exceptions for some modification, such as 45 days
as Jim mentioned. We need to do some more technical work in
the Verification Panel on this.
President Ford: In any event, won't this problem be the
same in any option?
Director Colby: Not in Option 1 -- there are no MIRV
limits rector Co
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Director Ikle: You still need collaterals to count
launchers.
Director Colby: Only for mobiles.
Secretary Kissinger: We would have to define what
constituted impermissible digging up. For hardening, there
would be a gray area. We need more technical work.
Secretary Schlesinger: Some of the difference in MIRVing
permitted in Option C might be lost in the verification noise.
Ambassador Johnson: They have shown an interest in
verifiability on both sides.
President Ford: They have mentioned collateral constraints?
Ambassador Johnson: They haven't discussed that specifically,
but they have seemed sufficiently interested in problems associated
with verifying MIRVs. I think they would be interested in dis-
cussing them.
President Ford: We need to find out ourselves what we
want first.
Secretary Kissinger: We need a list of what we would need
if we wanted MIRV limits.
Ambassador Johnson: My line has been that we would see
what kind of an agreement that we wanted first, before we got
into the details of verification.
Director Ikle: But the kind of agreement you want is
affected by the verification problems, so this is something
of a chicken and egg problem.
Secretary Kissinger: I am worried -- we have gotten
into a tremendous argument about MIRVs while discussing
an option with no MIRV limits! (Laughter) Mr. President,
in the NSC , the behavior follows a very high standard,
compared to the Verification Panel! (Laughter)
Going on to the second option, it also provides equal
aggregates at 2500 initially reduced to 2000. There would be
equal missile throw weight at 8 million pounds for each side,
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reducing to 6 million pounds by 1985, although these figures
are arbitrary, set to suit us, or they could be changed to
fit the negotiating situation. The basic theory is that each
side would be at an equal level, but enough lower to force the
Soviets down. There would be a sublimit of 4 million pounds on
MIRV throw weight.
As discussed at the last meeting, this type of agreement
would have very little impact on our MIRV programs. We could
deploy a fully MIRVed SLBM force of 736 missiles and 550 MIRV
Minuteman for a total of nearly 1300 MIRV missiles. It would
affect primarily our future MIRV force. We could not deploy
additional heavy MIRVs, or go beyond what we now have pro-
grammed. In contrast, the Soviets would have to dismantle
their entire MLBM force. They could deploy only about 400
MIRVed SS-17s and 19s. They could add an additional 500 light
ICBMs or SLBMs, but could not get above about 900 MIRV launchers.
We would have a better than two to one advantage in RVs under
this option. We would also have a substantial advantage in
bomber payload.
The basic issue this option poses, as Jim pointed out last
time, is not just the ceiling it sets on Soviet forces, but that
it brings about a redesign of their force. They would change
their force to be much more like ours -- not an exact mirror
image, but the same in concept -- smaller missiles, lighter
warheads, more bombers and submarines. This would provide an
increase in stability. It would be the most difficult to
negotiate. A variant of this has already been rejected. They
may turn around, but it would represent the most intrusive effects
on their program.
I said that if we presented them Option A, they would need
some months to study it. If we gave them Option B, they could
accept it only by a massive bureaucratic rearrangement. It would
take years to negotiate and require a long educational process
to convince them of its advantages.
President Ford: In the meantime, they would proceed with
their programs.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they will not stop because we
have put forth a proposition they previously rejected.
President Ford: The longer they proceed, the harder it
becomes for them to reverse course.
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Secretary Kissinger: From the point of view of stability,
the end result of the option, a first strike would be most
difficult. But we would change next to nothing, while the
Soviets would have to redesign their force. They would either
have to deploy so many less missiles that the difference in
numbers would be worrisome to them, or redesign their missiles
to make them smaller.
President Ford: In the meantime, we could increase the size
of our own missiles with the R&D we are doing--
Secretary Kissinger: We could continue our own program with
no interruption. Our own missiles are not as threatening to
stability as the Soviet missiles. The Soviets would have to
decrease their land-based missile force, moving to numbers which
would not be a plausible threat, or develop a new smaller missile.
With this approach, we will be turned down flat. I think
Alex will agree. We would have to be prepared to go the long
route. There could be no fallback from this approach. We
would have to develop a plausible breakout for 1977 to make
them worry about what we would do if they don't stop their
program. There is not a chance of doing something with this
option before 1977.
Secretary Schlesinger: I think Henry has put the case
very clearly. This is the toughest option for them. The U.S.
force has been structured to be consistent with arms control
after MIRVs. The Soviet force has not. If we were successful
with this option, it would provide a degree of stability not
attained with other options, particularly with Option A. The
question is whether you want a relatively quick agreement, or
whether you want to push for more arms control.
President Ford: If you were the Secretary of Defense in the
Soviet Union, would you buy this option?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.
President Ford: Dave, would you?
General Jones: I think so. I would have to look at it
long and hard
President Ford: Even though you would have to change your
programs which had been designed for the last ten years?
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General Jones: If I were looking for a stable world, I
would be inclined to accept it, but if I were going for an
advantage, perhaps not.
President Ford: How could a military person or a
Secretary of Defense, after promoting large throw weight for
all these years, shift gears so quickly?
Secretary Schlesinger: The same way we abandoned our
ABM. We should remember that it will cost them $35 to $40
billion just to replace the SS-9 with the SS-18. It has$been
in the ground ten years and will have to be replaced. They
have ancost incentive not to do it.
There are two objectives that members of the Soviet Ministry
of Defense may have. In the past, they have shown little interest
in bilateral stability.
Ambassador Johnson: They have never accepted the theory.
The Soviet military believes that bigger is better.
Secretary Kissinger: There are three factors behind
that. First, the Soviets, rightly or wrongly, feel they are
behind. They are driven by fear of our superiority. Second,
they may not have the technical capability to do what we can do
with smaller missiles.
Deputy Secretary Clements: That is right.
Secretary Kissinger: The issue is their size potential
when coupled with technology such as ours.
Secretary Schlesinger: Which they will have by 1985.
Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying it won't happen.
Third, there are considerations of instability, affecting the
viability of our land-based systems. Fourth, the Soviets' interest
in stability depends on the threat they perceive to their own
force.
What Dave said can be considered as a fair statement only
if the Soviets believe that failure to agree would get us into
increased throw weight missiles which threaten their land-based
force. If we go this route, we will have to start new missiles
that threaten their land-based force. And, I am not talking
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about just jazzing up Minuteman. We could do that within this
option. We would have to start something which we could not
build with the option. With an abstract view of stability,
we will not get it. Our vulnerability does not worry
them.
President Ford: They give up what we see on the chart,
but we give up nothing.
Secretary Schlesinger: Well, we give up something --
President Ford: What?
Secretary Schlesinger: At 4 million pounds, our MIRV
throw weight is less than we are planning with our Trident force.
And we have other programs.
We should also remember that in replacing their SS-9,
they have to spend quite a bit of money. We have our MX
program, which we could not deploy. We have said we will
match them in the absence of a reasonable agreement. This
option would have the greatest arms control payoff, if it
were successful. We should remember that their new missiles,
which they will be deploying by 1975, by our own standards are
in violation of the SALT I agreement. We said that any missile
heavier than the SS-11 would be a "heavy" missile. With these
new missiles, even with no 7s and 8s, they will have 12 million
pounds of throw weight, which is potentially destabilizing. There
will be a threat to Minuteman and to our other forces from their
large RVs. We are concerned about the megatonnage also.
Ambassador Johnson: Do they have more megatonnage if
you include our bombers?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. I believe it is on the order
of two to one.
President Ford: What about the next option?
Secretary Kissinger: The next two options are more or less
the same. They are both variants of the compensating asymmetries
approach, which is consistent with our past negotiating history
and the planned programs of the two sides. The initial U.S.
aggregate would be at 2250 and the Soviets at 2500, reducing to
2000 and 2200 by 1985. We would receive compensation by MIRV
limits of 1300 missiles for us versus 1050 for the Soviets. Thus,
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we would have more MIRV missiles, but they would have more total
launchers. There would also be a limit on heavy delivery systems --
heavy bombers and heavy missiles -- initially at 500, reducing
to 250 by 1985, and no increase in the number of MLBM launchers.
This option is based on the premise that equivalence can
more readily be achieved by balancing existing asymmetries than by
removing them. The Soviets could claim they got some compensation
for FBS, and we could claim an advantage in technology. Under
this option, we would deploy essentially our presently planned
program and we could introduce a new Minuteman IV missile. The
Soviets would deploy their projected force of 600 MIRVed 17s and
19s and 400 MIRVed SLBMs. It would put a cap on the Soviet MIRV
force. We would retain a large advantage in numbers of
weapons to counter the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight.
We could increase our missile throw weight by deploying the
Minuteman IV.
This option is similar to that which we pursued earlier this
year whereby the Soviets would have been permitted to retain
their Interim Agreement numerical advantage until 1980 in
exchange for a U.S. advantage in MIRVed launchers. Thus, it
fits best into the negotiating history. This is no argument
for it, but it provides the most continuity.
Ambassador Johnson: It is consistent with what we have been
discussing with them in the past.
Secretary Kissinger: The main argument against this option
has been that the unequal aggregates would lead to a perception
of U.S. inferiority. What you would have to judge, Mr. President,
is whether 200 older unMIRVed Soviet missiles would give them an
advantage when compared to our advantage in MIRVed missiles.
But this is how we would claim equivalence. A further point is
that if the present agreement ends, we would likely accept an
inequality in the numbers anyway, as a fact, if not as an
agreement.
In summary, the main advantages of the offsetting
asymmetries approach are that it may be more negotiable than
equal aggregates since it reflects the differences in the base-
line force levels for the two sides; it gives the U.S. a MIRV
launcher number advantage; it levels off Soviet programs well
below the 1985 projections; and it would ban MIRVs on heavy
missiles and reduce their number, resulting in a ceiling on
throw weight.
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The disadvantages are that unequal aggregates might mean
that some would perceive a U.S. inferiority. It does not
directly constrain throw weight, the MLBM MIRV ban might be
difficult to negotiate, and the verification would require the
collateral constraints which we just discussed earlier.
One way to solve the perceptions problem --
President Ford: Let me ask as we go through these
options -- A, B, C, and D -- what is the difference in funding
for DOD?
Secretary Schlesinger: The funding would rise as you go
to the right on the chart.
Secretary Kissinger: Why?
Secretary Schlesinger: A and B provide more constraints.
Secretary Kissinger: A provides no constraints on MIRVs.
There would be a MIRV buildup.
Secretary Schlesinger: You are quite right. A, C, and D
would be more costly. B precludes any new systems.
President Ford: B would be least costly, but least likely
to be negotiable --
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.
Director Ikle: In comparing C versus D, D would contain
a limit on throw weight. You would save costs in D compared
to C.
Secretary Kissinger: A would be the most costly.
Secretary Schlesinger: Under C and D, larger missiles
would be permitted also.
Ambassador Johnson: If we could get B only if they saw
us building a larger force, wouldn't it cost more dollars to
get there?
Secretary Kissinger: B would have the paradoxical con-
sequence that we could get it only with a larger missile and
a buildup. Short of a massive buildup, I don't see how the Soviets
could accept it.
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We have talked about going to 2500, and the argument has
been made that we could reach that level cheaply.
Secretary Schlesinger: We could keep B-52s and Polaris.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But if the Interim Agreement
lapses, the Soviets can keep their SS-lls and dig new holes
for their new missiles. We could also keep older systems, but
in a breakout race, they could go faster. At 2500, the price
would be small. But beyond 2500, their price would not go up
much, only the operating costs of the SS-11 force -- but we
would have to get entirely new programs.
Secretary Schlesinger: I beg to differ with you on that,
Henry.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Henry, that's not right.
Secretary Schlesinger: The difference in costs is only
the cost of the silos. The rest is the same.
Secretary Kissinger: They have to pay for new silos in
either case.
Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to pay for a new
silo and they don't. The rest is the same.
Secretary Kissinger: My point is, though, that they have
already paid for the SS-17 and 19. It is in their program.
Secretary Schlesinger: We could add silos and retain
Minuteman IIs.
Secretary Kissinger: But we have no program to do this.
President Ford: We have the missiles?
Secretary Schlesinger: We will have 500 Minuteman II.
Secretary Kissinger: The point is that the Soviets have
already budgeted for their new missiles. Beyond 2500, we have
to get into real money. This has to be assessed in terms of
what we can get from Congress.
Director Ikle: We have never considered agreements which
go beyond 2500.
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Secretary Kissinger: I know that -- I am talking about the
breakout potential.
President Ford: Going back, from a budgetary point of view,
Option A would call for a program for greater throw weight.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Our plan does not have to be
driven by bigger missiles.
President Ford: But by a bigger bang perhaps.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We could increase the Minuteman III
yield with no other changes. On a cost effective basis, this is
the best thing we could do.
President Ford: Maybe on a cost effective basis, but
how much would it cost in dollars?
Secretary Schlesinger: It would cost about $2 billion to
get 2500, or $4 billion a year to go to 3000.
President Ford: B would be the least expensive, the
most difficult to obtain, but the most expensive if we failed.
Secretary Kissinger: It would be the least expensive
after we have it. On the way to getting it, we would have to
increase our budget.
Secretary Schlesinger: That is what we are doing anyway.
President Ford: And C and D would cost about the same
as we are now spending.
Secretary Kissinger: It would probably come down somewhat.
Director Ikle: D would come down, but C has no throw
weightilimit.
President Ford: Under D we would not need a bigger missile?
Secretary Schlesinger: Option D has a 7 million pound throw
weight limit. If we raised our throw weight to 7 million pounds,
we would have to invest in Minuteman IV. Unless the Soviets
agree to restricting their program, we will have to put money
in R&D and it will cost money to retain equivalence.
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Secretary Kissinger: If we feel we have to match throw
weight, we could go either route -- bigger missiles or increasing
yield.
Deputy Secretary Clements: With no ceiling at all, it
would be expensive.
President Ford: The question is, can we get Soviet agree-
ment to one of these approaches --
Secretary Schlesinger: You can mix up the provisions
of the various approaches.
Director Ikle: Mr. President, there are two gut issues
here. The first is whether we simply shift the competition from
one area to another. In Option A, the competition would be
shifted from numbers to yield, accuracy, and so forth. The
second issue is whether we will let throw weight increase,
starting a new competition, getting larger missiles, and
driving up force levels. Throw weight limits, even if not SO
low as in Option B, could cut out this competition, at least in the
next generation. In SALT I we had no MIRV limits, and we are
now seeing a MIRV competition. In the next agreement, we should
avoid a throw weight competition. Hence, we need throw weight
limits such as in Option D, even if not as low as in D.
Secretary Schlesinger: I agree.
Director Ikle: Another alternative is to go to even some-
what lower levels -- perhaps 200 lower than those in Option D
(shows chart). For the Soviets, they would have 200 less
medium missiles. Other reductions would be similar. Stretched
over a ten-year period, this could be achieved. A larger re-
duction would further detente. With controls on throw weight,
it would save dollars and be politically attractive.
We do not want the Soviets to increase in the 1975-1985
period, but to reduce. Increased accuracy and weapon yield
will drive capabilities up. Thus, unless there is a substantial
reduction in numbers, there will be a net increase overall.
Hence, I think a worthwhile goal would be 2000 on their
side and 1800 on our side. If we can't get it, we can always
increase the numbers later. I am not sure the Russians would
be opposed over a ten-year period to lower numbers.
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Under Option C, they would deploy 12 MIRVs for each single
warhead missile reduced. Under Option D, they would deploy only
3 MIRVs for each single warhead missile reduced.
Secretary Kissinger: How do you get those numbers?
Director Ikle: Under C, they would reduce 84 unMIRVed
missiles and deploy 1000 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about
12 to 1. Under D, they would reduce 284 unMIRVed missiles and
deploy 950 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about 3 to 1. Their
MIRVed missile program would be a costly expansion. Therefore,
they may agree to the lower numbers.
Secretary Schlesinger: For the Soviets to replace their
ICBMs alone will cost them $35 billion. They would be giving
up one hell of a cost liability. Their military people will not
include the cost liability in their analyses. But their political
people will see the importance.
Secretary Kissinger: There are several elements in
D which could also be put in C. The essential difference is
not the throw weight limit -- that could be added to either
C or D. It is the concept of equal rights. This would avoid
the perception of inequality. Each side would have the right
to pick either a larger total or a larger number of MIRVs, as
in the ABM treaty. They could pick either 2200 total and
1050 MIRVs, or 2000 total and 1300 MIRVs.
President Ford: Would each side have to designate which
course it chose?
Secretary Kissinger: You would probably want it designated
at the beginning.
Director Ikle: With, perhaps, a review every five years.
Secretary Kissinger: There might be a right to change,
as in the ABM treaty. In that treaty, it is reviewed every
five years, and each side can change once. I haven't analyzed
the effect of such a provision in this case.
Mr. Duckett: Off the cuff, I would say you could allow
them to switch to more MIRVs, but not the other way around.
Secretary Schlesinger: IF the Russians have the same
verification standards we do, they could not accept either
C or D. If they have to assume that any silo which could
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accept a MIRV missile contained MIRVs, they would have to
assume we have 1000 MIRVed ICBMs.
Secretary Kissinger: That is theoretically true, but
they have never raised that problem with us.
Director Ikle: Mr. President, I would like to make one
more point supporting lower levels. It would reduce the
importance of the verification problems. If they took out
200 more SS-lls, that would mean they would have only 250
SS-lls - left. It would be only these we would have to worry
about, which would be no big problem.
Director Colby: That would be to our margin of error.
Director Ikle: If there were further reductions after
1985, we might end up with no verification problem.
President Ford: Could it be possible that both sides
would make the same choice?
Secretary Kissinger: No. But if the Soviets did choose
2000 missiles and 1300 MIRVs, that would be a very interesting
decision. It would represent a drastic cut in their program.
Ambassador Johnson: They will always choose the higher
aggregates. They want a perception of a higher aggregate --
Secretary Schlesinger: Exactly the reason why we want
equal aggregates.
Secretary Kissinger: I think they want the perception
of the higher aggregates more for their own internal bureaucracy
rather than for third countries.
President Ford: We want the perception plus our own
extra capability!
Secretary Schlesinger: I was just talking to Yamanaka on
this -- the Japanese Minister of Defense. He asked me why
we accepted an unequal agreement in 1972. I answered him
that we had a technological advantage. But this is to point out
that the perception is there in third parties. The Japanese are
perhaps stronger than other, but Don can tell you that there is
a problem of appearance in Europe. The agreement is perceived
as unequal.
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Ambassador Johnson: I briefed the NAC just yesterday
on our approach, and got a very good reaction.
Secretary Schlesinger: But our present position is generally
tougher than these options.
Ambassador Johnson: No, I wouldn't say SO. It leaves
open the question of equal aggregates. I told the NAC that we
had to look at aggregate numbers, throw weight, and MIRV
launchers, and that equivalence is the sum of all taken together.
This is essentially the approach taken in C and D. It is the
sum which is of interest.
Secretary Schlesinger: If we had Option D, I would
recommend to you, Mr. President, that we choose 2200 aggregates
for the perception, rather than more MIRVs. So both sides
would be equal even under Option D.
Secretary Kissinger: If the President accepted your
advice -- (laughter)
President Ford: If you picked 2200, what would that
mean to our present MIRV program?
Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to slow it down.
Secretary Kissinger: If we went to 1000 MIRV missiles,
we would have to stop now. 1300 would accommodate our present
program.
President Ford: Under either B or D, we could still
increase our yield --
Ambassador Johnson: One thing we might consider is a
reduction in RVs. The Soviets have emphasized this.
Secretary Schlesinger: Tfetheyuägreerto limits on
throw weight, we could reduce our RVs. We have too many on
Poseidon and Minuteman.
Ambassador Johnson: Too many on Minuteman?
Secretary Schlesinger: We don't need three. We could
go to two. We have a one-megaton warhead under development.
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Deputy Secretary Clements: That is the other side
of the coin --
Secretary Kissinger: They would appreciate a few more
concessions like that! (Laughter)
Secretary Schlesinger: That is precisely the point.
The Soviets, by ignoring throw weight, are increasing instability.
General Jones: There is one more consideration. It is
easier to go from Option B to Option C or from Option B to
Option D, as the negotiations move on, than it is the other
way around. The key is equal aggregates. Once we concede our
willingness to accept unequal aggregates, it would be hard to
go back on it. As to whether we are perceived as equal to the
Soviets, it depends on how seriously you take our new programs --
air-mobile ICBM, the seven-MIRV missiles we are working on,
and so forth. But we have unequal aggregates in Europe, with
a qualitative advantage, and in Europe they ignore qualitative
factors.
President Ford: Our allies?
General Jones: Yes. Our allies count numbers of tanks
and so forth, with no consideration of quality. Whether or not
they would accept equal aggregates depends on how seriously
they take these other programs. But we can move off it later,
if it comes up as non-negotiable.
President Ford: Your point is that to move from D to B
is harder than from B to D.
General Jones: Yes. In both C and D we agree that we
don't need equal aggregates.
Deputy Secretary Clements: It is harder to move to the
left than to the right on the chart. You can start with A,
fill in the MIRV limits and throw weight limits as you come
up to the right. But you should start with equal aggregates
which is simple and understandable.
Director Colby: These options are meant to represent
the end of the negotiations, not the beginning.
Secretary Schlesinger: You want to be fairly tough in the
beginning. If you have a few minutes, I do have a few more
points --
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President Ford: I do have my economic advisors who have
been waiting for thirty minutes --
Secretary Schlesinger: I have one chart which lays out
the basic tradeoffs you will have to make that I worked out
as I was going to bed.
President Ford: How long will it take?
Secretary Schlesinger: Only about ten minutes.
President Ford: Let's do it.
Counselor Rumsfeld: You keep chart materials in your
bedroom? (Laughter)
Secretary Schlesinger: (Talking to chart -- see attach-
ment) -- You have two basic objectives in SALT -- arms balance
and arms stability. If you want to emphasize arms balance, you
have to go for equal aggregates. If you want to emphasize arms
stability, you need control over throw weight, yields, as well
as numbers. In 1972, we achieved both arms stability and arms
balances aUaSavtechnology offset grosser Soviet numerical ad-
vantages, and we had bombers.
On stability, the Soviets had cruder forces and poorer accuracy
The U.S. had smaller yield and throw weight and uncertain accuracy.
But by 1985, we face a different situation. The U.S. ad-
vantage in MIRVs disappears. We face the inequality of Interim
Agreement numbers, and bombers are outside the agreement. On
arms stability, the Soviets are increasing their throw weight
and MIRVing their forces. There will be greater Soviet sophisti-
cation in accuracy.
One possible solution emphasizing arms balance is to move
toward equal aggregates and adjust our forces, increasing their
throw weight or changing their basing, going to land or air-mobile
as necessary. The alternative is to go for arms stability in
1985. To do this, you need control over throw weight, yield,
and numbers.
The relative difficulty of the two approaches is as
follows. Going for arms balance is conceptually easy. It is
easierr to understand and quicker to negotiate than going for
stability. But there is greater future risk in cost. Going
for stability would be more difficult to negotiate. The Soviets
don't understand stability arguments. They have always talked
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strength. Bilateral stability is beyond their grasp, or they
pretend that it is beyond their grasp. It would be a time
consuming process to get them to agree.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree with the chart as a way
of posing issues. I would only add that I see only one way
to get to the last point -- to have a plausible program we
would have to race them. In taking the road we would have to
go to get it, we would have to enhance instabilities in the
short run, in order to convince them of the importance of
stability. The question is how long we could sustain the race.
We could sustain it, if we could get Congress to approve
it.
President Ford: If we have the will --
Secretary Kissinger: We have to have a plausible
program and rapid deployments.
Secretary Schlesinger: I am not trying to advocate
one approach or the other --
Secretary Kissinger: I just raise this as an issue.
Secretary Schlesinger: If you want a relatively quick
agreement, Option B is unattractive. If you want an agreement
in 1975, you don't put stress on arms stability; you have to
stress arms balance.
President Ford: I think this is a good chart -- could
I have a copy of it? But you have to put on the alternative
we would face with nothing. You can't put Congress on the chart
very easily --
Secretary Schlesinger: On the question of equal aggregates,
it is politically and diplomatically crucial. Perhaps, it is
the most critical feature. We can live with an increase in
instability, but it would be difficult not to come up to their level
President Ford: Thank you very much. I would only
hope we could get Congress to agree.
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LIBRASK GERALD R. FORD
LISURATE GERALD ? FORD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09312
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
CREATOR'S NAME
DOD
TITLE
Charts/Tables re: SALT: Options, throw
weights, etc
CREATION DATE
10/1974?
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200006
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/21/1999
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET