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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 12/2/1974" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's
NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
To Dick
/
THE WHITE HOUSE
Kennedy
WASHINGTON
not
SECRET XGDS
Photocopy ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
FOR
Monday, December 2, 1974
10:30 a. m. (45 minutes)
for
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger
K.
I. PURPOSE
To provide an opportunity for you and Secretary Kissinger to
brief the NSC members and Dr. Ikle, Director of ACDA, on
Declassified from
Gerald R. Ford Library
your recent trips.
II:
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: It would be highly desirable for the NSC.
members and Dr. Ikle to hear directly from you on your
discussions with the Japanese, Korean and Soviet leaders,
particularly on the strategic arms limitations agreement
reached with General Secretary Brezhnev. Secretary
Kissinger could also brief on his trip to Peking.
B. Participants:
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
Director of Central Intelligence Colby
Chairman, JCS, General Brown
ACDA Director Ikle
Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements
Assistant to the President Rumsfeld
General Scowcroft
C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting will be
announced but not the subject.
TOP
SECRET XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 2/19/99
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
FORD is LIBRARY SENATO
MR 98-40, #9; State letter 9/25/98
By let NARA, Date 10/20/98, 7/21/99
TOP
PRESERVATION
SECRET XGDS
2
III.
TALKING POINTS
GENERAL
-- I think my trip was a significant success on all counts
and I would like all agencies to reflect that in all dealings on
the subject -- with the press, on the Hill, or elsewhere.
-- Let's make certain we all stay thoroughly upbeat.
ORIGINAL
JAPAN
-- Whatever differences we may have had in the past with
Japan have been removed.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
What happened to Tanaka is not important. What is
important is the symbolic getting together with the Emperor.
In Japan, ceremony is indistinguishable from substance, and
the visit shows that our relationship has broken through any
impediments of the past and has been placed on a substantially
new and solid footing.
-- Our success in Japan, while perhaps somewhat difficult
to articulate in precise terms, was very substantial.
-- In the vital area of security, the Japanese told us that they
believed security must now be seen in a wider sense not just
in military terms but in terms of such other requirements as
energy and food.
-- In energy, the Japanese are somewhat exposed because of
their heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, they are
reluctant to commit themselves to our proposals until they see
that we are really determined to make them work. Subject to
these reservations, however, they appeared ready to look
seriously at all our proposals for solving international energy
problems and to play a role more nearly in line with their first-
C.
rank global economic position.
-- I spoke to the Japanese about increasing their aid to
Vietnam, and they agreed to look into this.
TOP
LISEREY BERALD ? 1020
SECRET XGDS
TOP
SECRET XGDS
3
-- They clearly count on us as an important and stable supplier
of food, especially soybeans, and enriched uranium, and we shall
have to make certain that we fulfill our obligations.
ORIGINAL PRESERVATION
-- We also want to make sure that they have confidence in our
ability to sustain a consistent policy.
KOREA
-- I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea.
If I had not gone, the North Koreans might have underestimated
our determination to support our friends as well as our commit-
ment to stability in the area.
The Korean economic progress is astonishing. Seoul looks
like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars and an
obviously thriving economy. My welcome was amazing -- there
must have been two million people lining the streets between the
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
airport and the hotel.
-- I was very impressed by our troops in Korea. Their moral
and their training are very high and I am glad I visited them so that
they know we have not forgotten them.
-- President Park believes he is directly menaced by North
Korean aggression and cited the recently discovered tunnel as
evidence. He is going to want all the military aid that we can
give him and regards the sustained level of our forces as vital,
at least for the near term. He wants us to complete our program
of assistance to the Modernization Plan for South Korean forces
as soon as possible. I reaffirmed our support for the Plan.
-- I told President Park that we will keep our forces in Korea
at present levels and that he can count on our continued military
and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limita-
tions.
-- I also pointed out that we maintain our commitments in an
era of detente and that we will not take actions that affect their
interests without consulting them.
is
FORD
TOP
&
FORD
SECRET XGDS
LIBRARY
GERALD
GERALD
LIBRARY
ROP
SECRET XGDS
4
VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT
ORIGINAL FOR PRESERVATION
-- My summit talks with General Secretary Brezhnev I think
clearly mark a significant change in the international environment.
-- There is absolutely no question about the success of our
efforts in Vladivostok and I want everyone to hit this issue hard
and demonstrate full Administration unanimity and enthusiasm
about the SALT agreement.
-- There is some negative momentum building up and it is
up to us to get across to the American people the deep signifi-
cance of what we were able to achieve. We have put a cap on
the arms race and will be creating a situation of stability which
will greatly facilitate the negotiation of future arms control
agreéments.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
-- Let me first outline the major provisions of, the SALT
agreement and some of the other discussions with Brezhnev in
Vladivostok. Then Henry will give us some of the negotiating
details and background and outline the work we have ahead of
us in the next six months if we are to nail down the agreement
with the Soviets in time for Brezhnev's visit.
-- The details of the agreement are as follows: Each side
will be permitted 2400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1320
missiles equipped with MIRVs. The 2400 limit applies to all
strategic delivery vehicles including ICBMs, SLBMs, and
bombers. It also includes other strategic delivery vehicles
that might be deployed in the future such as land-mobile ICBMs
or ICBMs dropped from airplanes. In this regard, I specifically
agreed that air-launched ballistic missiles with a range greater
than 600 kilometers would count in the 2400 total.
Besides SALT, we had brief discussions on the Middle East,
Cyprus, the European Security Conference, and the Trade Bill
legislation.
-- No new ground was broken in our review of the Cyprus and
Middle Eastern situations; but it allowed me to underscore the
need for restraint and responsible conduct by all parties, including
the Soviets.
VOP
BERALG
FORDS is DERALD LIBRARY
SECRET XGDS
SECRET XGDS
5
-- On the European Security Conference, the Soviets are
anxious to bring it to a summit-level conclusion. I pointed out
that the major issues are those requiring resolution by the USSR
and the Europeans, that we would continue to assist in the nego-
tiating process, and that we had no objection to a summit when
the results warranted it. I underlined that the Soviets could not
expect us to pressure our allies, but that we would assist, with
the possibility of concluding the conference in the spring of 1975.
-- On trade, the Soviets, of course, are distressed by the
continuing lack of MFN and the linkage of trade with emigration.
ORIGINAL
I reviewed the steps I am taking with the Congress on the Trade
Bill.
-- Henry will now describe the recent negotiating history and
go into more detail on the implications of the Vladivostok agreement.
At the end of the meeting:
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Henry, thank you for your presentation. Your points con-
cerning the criticisms we have been receiving are particularly
well taken.
-- It is imperative that everyone in the Administration give
enthusiastic support to the agreement and follow a consistent
approach in public statement. I would like everyone to get out
and support the agreement. Please coordinate with the NSC on
the timing of your briefings, so we don't all do things on the
same day. I think Henry plans a backgrounder tomorrow, don't
you?
-- We want to be positive about the agreement, which represents
a major achievement. The main points the critics have been
making -- aggregate levels too high and no reductions, MIRV
levels too high, no throw weight limits, and negotiations carried
out in haste -- can be dealt with in a logical and persuasive way.
I have told the Congressional leadership that this agreement
sets a cap on force levels, which will bring additional stability to
the strategic arms competition.
The agreement establishes a basis of equality from which
-
it will be easier to make subsequent reductions.
FORD
TQB
SEGRET XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
LIBRARY
TOP
SECRET XGDS
6
-- On the relatively high level of the MIRV limits, we have to
make it clear that these limits were simply the best we could
negotiate. For over a year we attempted to negotiate much
stricter limits, but the Soviets simply would not go along.
-- The present agreement leaves open all our options for
responding to the Soviet MIRV program. If we decide it is
necessary, we can increase our throw weight to the Soviet
level, deploy land or air mobile ICBMs, or move part of our
force to sea. We have not constrained our ability to do any of
this.
-- We should emphasize the impetus this agreement will
Declassified Photocopy from ORIGINAL
give to further negotiations. We have removed the terribly
contentious issues of FBS and third-country forces. This
means we can continue the talks on a strictly bilateral basis,
focusing on U.S. and Soviet forces only. This will make it
Gerald R. Ford Library
much easier to achieve further limits in the future.
-- Finally, the simple fact that we were able to reach agree-
ment significantly reduces the fears both sides will have about
an unrestrained arms race. Letting such fears run unchecked
would have quickly led to a complete breakdown of our relationship.
is
FORD
TOR
GERALD
SECRET XGDS
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-135; #29
Talking Points
NSC letter 6/16/10
By dal NARA, Date 7/8/10
NSC Meeting, December 2, 1974
- - You are all well aware of the internal deliberations we went through
in September and October in analyzing various options for a 1985 agreement.
Therefore, I'll concentrate on our exchanges with the Soviets over the last
six or seven weeks.
-- Prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in October, the President
decided on a proposal which was an amalgamation of several of the approaches
which we had under discussion at that time. This proposal was submitted
to the Soviet Union about a week prior to my visit in October.
The proposal called for a equal aggregates at 2200 by 1985 with
1320 MIRVed missiles on each side.
...
It also included a heavy missile MIRV ban, range limitations
on air-to-surface missiles, and deployment rate limitations for new
systems.
This proposal led to a Soviet counterproposal which was discussed
in detail during my October visit.
The Soviet counterproposal called for a 2400 Soviet versus 2200
US aggregate for the period of the agreement, with the US apparently
entitled to 2400 launchers after 1985. However, British SLBMs were to be
counted against the US total.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Brezhnev accepted the proposed MIRV total of 1320 on each side,
but insisted on no MLBM sublimits.
In addition, a limit of 10 new Trident or Typhoon submarines
would be imposed. Typhoon is the name Brezhnev gave to their future
SSBN, apparently the follow-on to the D-class.
...
They also proposed that ASMs on new bombers be limited to
2000-3000 km with the missiles counted in the aggregate. We clarified
through Dobrynin that they did not intend that SRAMs deployed on the B-1
would be counted.
FORD
a
- - Clearly there were unacceptable provisions in the Soviet proposal;
however, we felt that the Soviets were being forthcoming and that the prospects
for agreement were favorable.
LIBRARY
GERALD
TOP SECRET XGDS
TOP SECRET XGDS
2
At Vladivostok, the President accepted the Soviet proposal for a
2400 aggregate with MIRV total of 1320 on each side. However, in contrast
to the Soviet proposal, our reply called for the 2400 aggregate to come into
effect for the US at the end of 1983, with a US MIRV advantage of 1320 to
1120 balancing a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 in the aggregate prior to
that time.
We also proposed a sublimit of 180 on new heavy missiles (SS-18s)
without specifying whether these missiles would be MIRVed. In return,
we agreed to limit new heavy bombers to 250 and SLBMs on new types of
submarines to 288 -- numbers more than adequate to permit completion
of our B-1 and Trident programs.
At this point, Brezhnev indicated that he would prefer a simple
agreement of 2400 aggregates and 1320 MIRV missiles, dropping the other
provisions, with the exception of limitations on air-to-surface missiles.
We were hesitant to drop our attempts to get limits on Soviet heavy
missiles, but after some deliberation, decided that we could go along with
Brezhnev's proposal if he dropped his demand that air-to-surface missiles
be limited.
The rest of the negotiations centered on air-to-surface missiles.
In the end, we compromised by agreeing to count all ballistic missiles with
a range greater than 600 kilometers within our 2400. Since we always
expected to count intercontinental range ballistic air mobiles, the only
concession this represented was to count "Skybolt-type" missiles.
Of lesser importance, but still of significance, we also agreed
to carry over the Interim Agreement provisions banning the construction
of new silos and the conversion of light ICBM launchers to heavy ICBM
launchers.
Verification and Other Outstanding Issues
Even though we are well on our way to concluding a 1985 agreement,
there are still some technical details which will remain to be worked out.
In particular, there will have to be some collateral constraints to insure
adequate verification of the MIRV limitations.
GERALD R. a FORD LIBRARY
The Verification Panel Working Group has already commenced
analyzing the collateral constraints question. We will be discussing this
question in the Verification Panel prior to the resumption of the Geneva
GER.S.
IBRARY
negotiations in January.
(See Tab B for further talking points on outstanding issues should you
wish to go into more detail. )
TOP SECRET XGDS
3
Criticisms
We have already heard considerable criticism. In particular,
critics have made the following points:
The aggregate total is too high and provides for only trivial
Soviet reductions and a U.S. build up.
The MIRV levels are astonishingly high and force a massive
build up.
There are no limits on throw weight, and, since the Soviet
missiles are two to three times the size of U.S. missiles, this will give
the Soviets a major advantage.
The high MIRV levels, lack of throw weight restraints, and
lack of serious reductions simply mean that the quantitative arms race
will be channeled into a qualitative arms race.
The entire agreement was negotiated in great haste, during
a mere 36 hours in Vladivostok. We should not have given up on more
serious restraints so easily.
It is not surprising that we have heard these arguments, especially
considering that many of them come from people with a built-in bias.
Each point can be easily rebutted; furthermore, it is important that the
many positive aspects of the agreement be emphasized.
There is no need to have to oversell the agreement. Some of the
points made by the critics would be valid except in the reality of the options
available to us. The critics simply overlook the positive aspects and
ignore the negotiating environment in which we are operating. In particular:
While the total force levels are higher than we would have
desired, they are considerably below the potential of both sides. Further-
more, they do require some Soviet reductions a major precedent
setting step. (See Tab C for force projections. )
The MIRV levels are also high. However, the U.S. could
not have accepted significantly lower numerical MIRV limits without
jeopardizing the Trident program, which is a key to maintaining a survivable
deterrent force. Thus, we could have gotten lower Soviet limits only in an
asymmetrical deal on aggregates. It would be inconceivable to expect the
Soviets to agree to MIRV levels lower than those of the U.S. without some
FORD
?
compensation in the aggregate numbers.
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET XGDS
TOP SECRET XGDS
4
Setting limits on throw weight was virtually impossible given
the asymmetrical force structures of the two sides. Furthermore, the
agreement does not prohibit our matching the Soviet throw weight if we
feel we need to.
The criticism that this agreement was negotiated too hastily
is simply absurd. It is the product of all the negotiations which have
taken place in Moscow, Washington, Geneva, and Vladivostok since the
1972 Summit. Furthermore, the basic equal aggregates approach is one
which has played a central role in our deliberations for years now.
Perhaps more important than the specific criticisms, is the
shortsightedness of the critics.
Most of them are, in effect, insisting that we should postpone any
agreement with the Soviets until we can achieve a perfect agreement
solving all problems. It is inconceivable that we could ever obtain such
an agreement.
The critics compare the agreement with their own perception of
the ideal agreement. The proper comparison is with no agreement at all,
since that is the alternative we faced. Compared to no agreement, we
have made a major step:
We have kept the Soviet program considerably below every
intelligence projection. Our intelligence projections showed a Soviet
program of 3300 launchers, including 3100 MIRVed missiles, as a
maximum possibility. Even the most likely program included 2600
launchers and 1950 MIRVed missiles.
By putting the cap on total force levels, we add a major
level of stability to the arms race. Each side can plan its forces against
a much more accurate estimate of the other side's forces, rather than
having to plan against the highest possible threat.
The simple fact that we were able to reach agreement on the
basis of equality should reduce fears on both sides.
Finally, the Soviets had something of a point in their argu-
ments concerning our forward bases and our allies forces. Certainly
one could argue that British SLBMs, supplied by the United States, should
FORD
be counted. Furthermore, we ourselves have admitted that our forward
submarine bases increase the effectiveness of present forces stationed
at these bases by at least 50 percent. Nevertheless, this agreement
GERALD
rord
LIBRARY
removes these terribly contentious issues from our future negotiations
TOP SECRET XGDS
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET XGDS
5
for a 10-year period. This alone is a major breakthrough, and was in-
sisted upon by many of the very critics we are now facing.
-- In sum, Mr. President, I believe that if we explain and support
the agreement, letting the logic of it support our reputation of our critics,
we will have little trouble convincing both the Congress and the American
people that it represents a major step forward in our pursuit of a safer
world.
FORD
a
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET XGDS
SERALD
$
19
3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6091 X
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP\SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Monday, December 2, 1974
Time:
10:40 a.m. to 11:35 a.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject:
SALT
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Principals
ORIGINAL PRESERVATION ORIGINAL RETIRED SERVATION
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency Fred Ikle
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence
William E. Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, U. S.
FORD & LIBRARY 638470
Representative, SALT
RETIRED FOR
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Counselor to the President
Mr. Robert Hartman, Counselor to the President
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
in
NSC:
Mr. Jan M. Lodal
DECLASSIFIED
FORD
E.O. 12958 Sec 3.5
LIBRAL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS XGDS
MR98-39,*11 MR ; NSC 2/10/90
By let NARA, Date 5/24/99
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
2
President Ford: George, did you get caught up?
General Brown: I'm not sure. It was cold up there!
President Ford: It was real cold on our side. But I enjoyed the game.
I guess Notre Dame didn't enjoy theirs.
Secretary Kissinger: Did you see that game on television?
President Ford: No.
Secretary Kissinger: In the first half Notre Dame looked great. I
thought the Rose Bowl was ruined. Southern California looked pathetic.
President Ford: By New Year's I think they'l be okay.
Secretary Schlesinger: Will you be routing for the Big Ten, Mr. President?
President Ford: I will have to give my sympathies to the Big Ten. Woody
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Hayes has his faults, but I like his attitude.
I think the trips to Japan, South Korea, Vladivostok, and China produced
excellent results. The initial reaction when I got back was all positive,
particularly on the agreement in Vladivostok. I was glad that Jim
indicated last Monday when I saw him his full agreement with the
results at Vladivostok.
The initial press reaction was also good, but I had been disappointed in
the last day or two. I was particularly disappointed with the Wall Street
Journal editorial this morning. It is headlined, "Whose Triumph?"
There have been many instances of uninformed and inaccurate statements.
At the press conference tonight, I intend to take a very positive point of
view. I think we obtained an excellent agreement, far better than what
I personally thought we would achieve. I was also pleased with the way
we developed a consensus here, and hope we can make some headway
with Congress. Henry, do you talk to them tomorrow about trade?
Secretary Kissinger: Tomorrow I talk to them about trade, but I may
answer some questions about this. I intend to background a group of
leading columnists tomorrow, and brief the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on Wednesday.
President Ford: I hope everyone in this room will speak out affirma-
tively on this, unless you have questions about it. If so, you should
raise them here. I think it is a good agreement, and we can defend it
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSINVE/NODIS
3
before the Congress, the press, and the public. I understand that the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees may call you, Jim, and
perhaps George and Henry.
Secretary Schlesinger: Jackson's Subcommittee will.
President Ford: I don't know, but if you're not called, I think you
might take the initiative and tell them that you are available. You and
Henry both should talk to them.
In my judgment, it's a good agreement, better than I thought we would
get, and we should not let the nitpickers undercut something that's in
the best interest of the country. Unless I hear to the contrary from
you, I will expect all of you to support it.
Now let me give you my impressions of the trip. First, before I left
many people wondered why I was going. I would like to say that every-
thing that could have been done here during that time was done in
Declassified Photocopy from
advance -- on the economy, the budget, and the state of the Union.
Gerald R. Ford Library
What did we accomplish? First, in Japan, it was vitally important that
an American President go to Japan. To have backed out would have
been disastrous. Our aim was to broaden our relations to cover prob-
ORIGINAL RETIRED
lems such as energy and food. Some have alleged that the Tanaka
resignation undercuts our efforts. We met with him, but we also met
with many other officials. Whether we were meeting with Tanaka,
Fukuda, Miki, or anyone else, we were in effect meeting with a con-
sensus government. We discussed our broad relations, defense, and
other issues. I spoke on the need for Japan to increase its aid to
South Vietnam. I think it was $64 million last year, and I suggested
going to $120 million. They said they would take it under advisement.
I let them know how strongly we feel about this. If they do increase,
it will help our own efforts.
There was some criticism of the visit to South Korea. But to not go
would have been misunderstood by North Korea and questioned by our
allies. George, I went to the Second Division; it was really inspira-
tional. General Emerson is something! He has made it into a first-
class fighting organization with the right attitude and morale. I hope
our other 14 or 15 Divisions have the same attitude.
General Brown: We are delighted when you can find time to visit the
units like that.
TOP\SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS XGDS
LIGHARY GERALD ? FORD
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
TOP SECRET
4
President Ford: They are great kids with a good leader. You can
definitely be proud of them.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Emerson is a good guy.
President Ford: I was forthright in talking to Park and indicated that
we don't agree with some of his oppressive domestic tactics. But on
the other hand, it doesn't hurt to have a strong leader in that part of
the country, with all the problems there.
In Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I established a good
working relationship. He knows I was firm, and I understand his firm-
ness. We were both acting in the best interest of our countries.
The main accomplishment was that we went from non-equivalence to
equivalence. We agreed on a limit of 2400 on the aggregates and 1320
Declassified Photocopy from
ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
on the number of MIRV missiles. There's no compensation for FBS or
the nuclear capability of the French and the British. I think we came
away with a good agreement. George, I think you understand the 600 km
Gerald R. Ford Library
range limitation -- anything more would be counted, anything less not
counted.
We put a cap on the arms race. Sure, we would have liked to have gotten
1700 or 2000, but these were negotiations. I was looking at the estimates
of the intelligence community and when I saw that the minimum, median,
and maximum were all higher than the limit we negotiated, I see that
where we ended up was very good. If the public is given this informa-
tion, I think they will agree. There are people on either side, both the
left and the right, who don't understand the facts.
Mr. Colby: Mr. President, that is equally true on MIRVs (shows chart).
President Ford: Right -- I looked at the figures. How much of this can
we safely let out?
Mr. Colby: Many of these projections are judgmental and might be open
to attack.
Secretary Schlesinger: You can make two observations. First, it is
universally recognized that the Soviet program could go beyond 2400
SDVs, and second, the numbers here are lower than the numbers in
the Interim Agreement.
Ambassador Johnson: We also got a start on controlling MIR Vs.
is
FORD
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITHVE/NODIS XGDS
GERALD
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Secretary Kissinger: You can make an absolutely flat statement that
these numbers are below what the Soviets could have done in the absence
of the agreement and below the numbers permitted in the Interim Agree-
ment. They wanted a thousand MIRVs and a five-year agreement and
we knew that was their minimum program.
Ambassador Johnson: Will you give out the numbers tonight?
Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to see Dobrynin at 2:30, and I am sure
we will be able to give out the numbers, although there are a few other
minor problems being worked out.
Ambassador Johnson: That will be helpful if you can give out the numbers.
President Ford: I agree. We have to go on the attack. I have no qualms
about the agreement; I think it was good. At the end of the first night,
Henry, I didn't think we would come out this well.
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Secretary Kissinger: When we talked the next morning, we thought we
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would have to show more flexibility. I had got in touch with Jim, and
we wanted to protect the SRAM on the B-1 -- nothing else. As it turned
out, we did a hell of a lot better than that. There are many things we
accomplished -- equal aggregates; no FBS compensation; no compensa-
tion for the Chinese or what they have called geographic disparities.
These are all out for a ten-year period. And anyone who talks about
strategic superiority -- our FBS might not be worth much in a second
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strike, but in a first strike, they could do a lot of damage to the Soviet
Union --
Secretary Schlesinger: I hope you will not use that argument publicly!
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are concerned about FBS. Grechko
once showed me a map showing the capabilities.
We would not trade our forces in the 1980's for theirs, and we have
great flexibility. If we want more throw weight, we can deploy a bigger
missile. We can put missiles on aircraft. We have 200 extra launchers
we can play with. We could go heavier on Trident if we wanted to.
Secretary Schlesinger: We shall.
Secretary Kissinger: We know they plan 200 or more mobiles, and these
will now have to come out of their ceiling. We got far beyond what we
thought we could.
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A number of people have argued that this was a quickie deal. That is
nonsense. We had several NSC meetings here. Then the President in
October ordered a combination of the Chiefs position and some MIRV
limits. In Moscow we started with two gory days of battle. Finally,
on Saturday, I took Brezhnev aside and told him that if we had no agree-
ment, we were going to increase our force levels. I also told him that
it was important to agree in 1975 because 1976 was an election year.
I told him the President could go either way. He called a politburo
meeting and came back and proposed equal aggregates in 1985, but un-
equal in the Interim. The U.S. would be limited to 2200. There would
also be a 2000 kilometer limit on ASM range and a limit of ten on the
number of Tridents and "Typhoons".
At one point he proposed a limit on their 160 bomber -- I said we would
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trade the B-3 for that! (laughter)
But this was the state we were in after my trip to Moscow. After our
deliberations here, the President then ordered that we propose to
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accept the unequal aggregates through 1973, but with a MIR Ved differ-
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ential to offset it plus a sublimit on heavy missiles with MIRVs.
We met for six hours the first evening. Brezhnev even cancelled a
state dinner he had planned. He started out insisting that we count
the British and the French submarines and accept a 3000 kilometer
limit on ASMs. He had two generals sitting behind him and every
time he moved, they came up with a piece of paper.
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Secretary Schlesinger: We could arrange that for you also,
Mr. President! (laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: You should have seen how he solved that problem-
He insisted that we continue in a restricted meeting!
Ambassador Johnson: Do you know who they were?
Secretary Kissinger: One was the Deputy Chief of their general staff --
Hyland knows both of them.
In the end, we proposed a limit of 200 on MLBMs MIRVs. Their people
said they were not planning any more, but their generals, and generals
must be the same the world over, would not give up rights to have more.
I think they were stupid. They will have to count all their 18s as MIRVs
or keep the 9 in the force.
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With what we came up with, what difference does it make whether the
ceiling was 2400 or 2200. There's no difference. When people say we
have negotiated to leave a machine gun in everyone's hands, that is
nonsense. An overkill capability exists at any level.
Secretary Schlesinger: We should stay away from that argument publicly.
We are trying to get our defense budget passed, and if we tell them we
have overkill, it won't help.
President Ford: Now that we have set a cap, we have to fight to keep
our forces up to the agreed level.
Secretary Kissinger: If the Congress does not agree to keep our forces
up, they are buying perceived inferiority. All the arguments we made
before on the defense program can be made now.
I would also like to say that I think this could have been done only at the
Summit. Semenov could never have agreed to equal aggregates with no
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compensation.
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Ambassador Johnson: I said right here in this room that it would be very
difficult to get equal aggregates in 1985 -- I made that point at every
opportunity.
President Ford: I remember that.
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Secretary Kissinger: I think our allies will see this as an unbelievable
achievement. We have gotten rid of the FBS problem for 10 years. They
didn't even ask for noncircumvention.
Ambassador Johnson: Is that still open?
Secretary Kissinger: I think we would have to do it if they asked.
Ambassador Johnson: If it's properly framed, it's probably in our
interest so that they can't build up their non-central system.
President Ford: What does this mean?
Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of agreeing not to circumvent
the limits by building up systems not covered.
I think we were able to get the agreement for several reasons. Brezhnev
was dealing with a new President, and wanted to do so in a constructive
way. Detente has been under attack, and he knew he would be dealing
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with the President who could be around for six years and was not a lame
duck. He wanted to strengthen detente. And I think he was somewhat
afraid of an arms race with the U.S. He knew you were making final
plans for your defense budget. Finally, Brezhnev wanted, with the
new President, to get off in the right direction. But this agreement
could not have been made at any lower level.
Without the agreement, the total would have been even higher again and
we would have been less capable of getting an agreement later. On
MIRVs, the only way we could have gotten a lower level was to have a
big program of our own. Once the Russians would see what Congress
was doing, we would never get agreement. If we hadn't done this, we
would have been in the worst possible position -- no programs and no
agreement if we had stuck at 2100.
President Ford: The next Congress will give us even more trouble. I
think one thing that might have helped was that in my opening statement
I told Brezhnev that I had to decide on our defense budget very soon.
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Secretary Kissinger: One of the dangers is that if we try to drive the
defense budget down now, there are a thousand ways to hang up the
agreement between now and the next Summit. If the Soviets really
believe that we haven't a chance of meeting our levels, they could
hang it up. This is why we have to have at least Jim's budget. I'm
opposed to cutting it in the executive branch.
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If this agreement becomes like the trade issue, I think we will see a
massive reversal of the Soviet position on detente. This agreement
will not be easy for Brezhnev. For him, every weapon comes out of
somebody's pocket. The levels permit us to go up.
President Ford: We have even more flexibility than we would have under
the 2200 limit in 1983.
Secretary Kissinger: In China, nothing helped as much as having made
the agreement in Vladivostok. In our first meeting, the Chinese said
"we hear that our relations are not so good. That's not true on our
side; is it true on your side? " On the other hand, the fact that you are
going to go to China will help tremendously with the Soviets. We have
this triangular game going again as a result of Vladivostok. The more
we talk Soviet strategic superiority, the more it hurts us with China.
It's imperative that they not believe we are inferior militarily to
the Soviets. We can make a good case here for this agreement.
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President Ford: Brezhnev started out charging that we had violated the
agreement, talking about covers over our silos. He had his generals
there --
Secretary Kissinger: He kept saying that Kissinger tells us the con-
crete gets soft without the covers! (laughter)
President Ford: We agreed that neither party can build new missile
silos.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets had no objection to counting land
mobiles.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, you can win on this -- you've
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got the high ground. This is an equal agreement. Some will say that
until 1980, it will reduce the incentive for reductions. But you can say
that we want reductions, are prepared for them, and hope to induce the
Soviets to reduce, but we will not reduce unilaterally as long as I am
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President of the United States.
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As you said, we did better than we expected, but don't say that publicly!
In the next round, Brezhnev will not ask how soft your position is. You
held on equal numbers and no FBS. We should come up with the right
position and stick with it.
In the area of violations, you dolhave some vulnerability. People will
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say that even if the agreement is good, how do we know the Soviets will
hold to it if they violate their existing agreements? This has to be
thought out with considerable care. With respect to SALT I, you can
simply say that there are ambiguities and that we are going to discuss
them with the Soviets.
President Ford: And we have a good system of verification.
Secretary Kissinger: You can say that if we are convinced of a violation,
we will take action. There are always ambiguities and we will get clar-
ification. If we don't get clarification, we will take action.
I agree with Jim -- we should be positive about this. But I think it is
equally important that we do not say that this proves what we can get
if we were tough. We should say that both sides looked at the situation
and concluded that this was right. It would not hurt to praise Soviet
statesmanship somewhat. If we say that this proves what a tough
is
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President can achieve, this will simply force the Soviets to be tougher
in the future. We should say that we stuck with a reasonable position
and the Soviets responded in a statesman like manner.
Deputy Secretary Clements: I would like to endorse what Jim said about
reductions. I talked to Brent about this -- we should emphasize that
further talks will start not later than 1980 as agreed. The public wants
some reduction of the threshold. We should emphasize that we had to
first cap off the race, then discuss reductions.
President Ford: I raised this with the Congressional leadership; we can
and will emphasize this point.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree. The point was that with the forces going
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up, we didn't have an agreed base from which to begin reductions. We
should calmly speak about reductions, but not be too anxious on reduc-
tions. First, we have to support our defense budget. And second, we
don't want the Soviets to get the idea that we are so anxious for changes
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in the agreement until we get this one signed and sealed.
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Secretary Schlesinger: We can say that we are prepared for reductions
and that this provides the basis for reductions.
Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.
President Ford: Jim, I want to talk to you about your budget levels. I
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understand you want about $95 billion and OMB wants about $93 billion.
I want to talk to you, George, and Henry about both the substance of
your request and this question of perceptions related to the agreement.
Do you want $95 billion?
Secretary Schlesinger: $94. 6 billion in outlays. But the real problem is
in TOA. We have to make good significant underfunding in our procure-
ment because of inflation. To be frank, we can manage outlay somewhat.
The outlays this year are less serious. We can make $94. 6 billion in
outlays without reducing our programs.
President Ford: For procurement?
Secretary Schlesinger: Total, including procurement. The FY 75 budget
was first projected out to $93 billion, but then we have projected the in-
flation since then. I think Roy has agreed to $94 billion, but I would
like for him to speak for himself.
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President Ford: We should get together and discuss this on both sub-
stance and perception grounds.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is one other question, on throw weight.
On this you can say that throw weight is just one variable. We are
prepared to agree on limits, but it requires unilateral (sic) agreement.
But the agreement you have made does not permit them to outclass us.
There is no limit on throw weight. From an arms control standpoint,
it would be more advantageous for both sides to agree to limits on
throw weight.
President Ford: We have the flexibility to increase our throw weight;
we have the flexibility to deploy a new larger land-based missile or
deploy missiles on aircraft. We can do this if our military decide they
want to go up from our present throw weight to a substantially larger
throw weight.
It was interesting that when this topic came up, Brezhnev drew silos.
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He and Henry got into an argument about whether we are expanding our
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throw weight. Henry pointed out that they were digging their silos
deeper.
Secretary Kissinger: His argument was that to deploy their new missiles
they were making their silos narrower. I said yes, but that they were
digging them deeper. Brezhney said "you were more farsighted -- you
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left room in your silos to deploy larger missiles, and I know you are
doing it. Kissinger keeps trying to tell us that the covers are there
because of the sun and the rain, but he knows it's because you're
deploying larger missiles. !' He said we were increasing our silos by
15% and deploying a new missile up to 200 tons in weight. He said he
knows we can increase 15%, but pointed out that even the existing holes
can take bigger missiles. He said "I don't object, " and said repeatedly
that they were deploying no new silos.
Secretary Schlesinger: If he were smart they would object and accept
restraints on themselves in return for restraints on us.
Secretary Kissinger: If he were smart, but he was taking his military's
position into account.
Secretary Schlesinger: Most of what was in the Wall Street editorial
was nonsense. Mr. President, you can say categorically that you have
not put the U.S. in a position of inferiority.
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Secretary Kissinger: This agreement will not put us in a position of
inferiority. If we are inferior, it will be by our own decision, but I
wouldn't say that publicly.
President Ford: Should we think of a rebuttle to this editorial?
Secretary Schlesinger: We should get the other side out -- these
criticisms are all being fed by the Jackson staff.
Counselor Rumsfeld: Perhaps you could use this exchange of aide
memoires. Since the President has now come out with the details,
they could get off the hook, now that they have the numbers.
President Ford: The editorial says they have 500 medium bombers in
Cuba. George is that right?
Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe they're talking about Backfire.
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General Brown: They have 135 Bears, 35 Bisons, and 35 Backfires.
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Secretary Kissinger: They are talking about bombers going to Cuba
and back?
Secretary Clements: They're talking about the Badgers.
Secretary Schlesinger: Those are offsets to our FBS.
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President Ford: Logistically, they have no armaments in Cuba and
they aren't prepared to operate there.
Secretary Kissinger: If our Air Force saw these bombers heading to
Cuba after launch --
President Ford: If they launch 500 aircraft, we're not going to sit
around and let them have a free ride.
I have another meeting in five or ten minutes so unless there are any
questions, perhaps we should wrap up -- Fred?
Dr. Ikle: On verification, I think it is important if we can be very
forthcoming on the covers. Otherwise, we will lose our argumentation
on that.
President Ford: I'm not sure I understand you --
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Dr. Ikle: The Soviets have argued that we cover our missiles, and if
we don't agree to do something about it, they will argue that they can
cover theirs. We don't want this.
Secretary Kissinger: We scheduled a Verification Panel meeting to look
at both these compliance issues and the whole verification question,
prior to another NSC. We should be prepared for an NSC within a
month.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the attack will probably come
from the left, not the right. The Jackson staff has gone haywire on
this, and I think Scoop will suffer for it. Jackson has always argued
for equal aggregates, and you got that.
Secretary Kissinger: The problem will come from the left. But we can
say we will put a ceiling on. There were two alternatives -- to let the
Soviets increase, only to counter their build-up, and continue to build
on both sides, or the agreement.
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Dr. Ikle: How soon will the negotiations on further reductions be
resumed?
President Ford: We have to get this one signed and sealed first, but
we are flexible. Sometime between 1975 and 1980 we can move for
additional reductions.
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Dr. Ikle: Now that we have this framework, we can add additional
restraints.
Secretary Kissinger: But our major object is to get this agreement
signed. We should not get too cute about further reductions and
restraints until we get this one signed.
President Ford: We will have 4 1/2 years subsequent to getting this
one completed for the other matters.
Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure some of this attack isn't beneficial.
If the whole attack were from the left, you might have even more of a
problem.
President Ford: We need to be unified and forthright. We should make
a maximum effort in the coming days.
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6091X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
December 12, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis OMD
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting,
December 2
Attached are Jan Lodal's minutes of the December22,
NSC meeting for your approval and the President's
file.
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I have kept a copy for the official NSC records.
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