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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 1/29/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09167\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nAgenda\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nMeeting of the NSC, 1/29/75\nCREATION DATE\n01/29/1975\nVOLUME\n5 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200009\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/29/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nREDACTED 4127104\n09167\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWednesday, January 29, 1975\n4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. (90 minutes)\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Henry A. Kissinger HR\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the status of SALT preparations prior to the resumption\nof talks in Geneva this week.\nII.\nBACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: The US Delegation will return to Geneva to fesume\nthe SALT negotiations on January 31. Since your meeting with\nGeneral Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok, we have analyzed\nseveral issues which must be settled to obtain a SALT agree-\nment based on the Vladivostok Aide Memoire. The four major\nissues are:\n1. Verification of MIRV limits.\n2. Limitations on cruise missiles.\n3. The definition of a heavy bomber.\n4. A possible ban on air and land-mobile ICBMs.\nAt this meeting we will discuss these four issues. Although there\nis general agreement on how each should be handled, we will dis-\ncuss alternative approaches SO that you will then be in a position\nto make your decision on the overall negotiating approach.\nDECLASSIPTED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6\nWITH PORTIONS EXEMP TED\nE.O. 12908 SEC. 1.5 (d)\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nstets 9/25/98, OSD etc 4/27/04\nLIBRARY GERALD ? FORD\nMR98-40#15 NScettr2119/99 NSC\nCIA 5 110/05\nBY dal MARADATE 7/20/06\nOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nMIRV Verification -- On verification of the MIRV limits, the\nVerification Panel now agrees that even the most elaborate rules\nfor ensuring adequate verification cannot fully guard against the\ntypes of problems which could arise in the 1980s. Thus, the\nVerification Panel is in agreement that we should initially take\na flexible approach toward MIRV verification by simply explaining\nto the Soviets the various verification problem areas we see. We\nwould try to draw out the Soviet delegation by presenting a series\nof verification problems we might expect to encounter and discuss\nin general terms various \"MIRV counting rules. 11 Once we know\nwhat the Soviets want from us and we see how flexible they are\non the issue of MIRV verification, we should be in a much better\nposition to formulate a precise verification package than we are\nnow.\nThe Verification Panel has considered several \"MIRV counting\nrules\" and has divided these rules into three categories:\n(a) those which are highly desirable, (b) those which are\ndesirable but of lower priority, and (c) those which probably\nwould cause us more problems than they are worth. Each of\nthe counting rules will be discussed in detail at the meeting.\nOne further issue which will probably come up concerns the\ndeployment of MIRVed\nOur plans call for deployment of\nleaving the remaining\nunMIRVed\nThe difficulty is that if we proceed with this plan but decide at\nsome point in the negotiations to agree to count MIRVs by\n\"complex\" (one of the \"desirable but lower priority\" rules\nmentioned above), we will have to count all\nas MIRVed, although only\nwill actually be MIRVed.\nThis would seriously impact our\ndeployment program in\nthe 1980s.\nDOD estimates that it would cost about $3 million to hold up the\ndeployment for the 4-5 months it will take to complete\nthe SALT negotiations. I would recommend that we do this;\nhowever, I understand that Secretary Schlesinger may offer a\ndifferent opinion at the meeting.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nCruise Missiles -- As you know, we anticipate difficulties on the\nissue of limitations on air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets\nwill claim that under the provision of the Aide Memoire, air-\nlaunched cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km should\ncount as delivery vehicles within the aggregate of 2400. It was\nthe US understanding that the air-to-surface missile limitations\nwould apply only to ballistic missiles, not to cruise missiles.\nThe Verification Panel generally agrees that it is important for\nthe US to retain the option of deploying long-range air-launched\ncruise missiles (ALCMs). We may end up having to propose\nalternative limits in other areas in return for Soviet agreement\nto permit deployment of long-range ALCMs (up to 3000\nkilometers).\nDefinition of a Heavy Bomber -- The Verification Panel agrees\nthat the US should initially define the Backfire as a heavy\nbomber. However, the Soviets will be certain to reject this\napproach. The US could fall off designating the Backfire as a\nheavy bomber if the Soviets gave us adequate assurances that\nthe Backfire would not be used for intercontinental roles. Our\nmilitary might be reluctant to endorse this approach, since they\nare skeptical that effective guarantees which would inhibit\nintercontinental operation of the Backfire can be negotiated.\nMobile ICBMs -- Regarding air and land-mobile ICBMs, there\nis agreement that we should let the Soviets take the lead on\nthis issue. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-\nmobile ICBMs we could propose a combined ban on both air and\nland mobiles.\nBased on the results of this meeting, I will prepare a NSDM for\nyour approval which gives detailed instructions to the Delegation\non raising these issues with the Soviets.\nMr. Carl Duckett is prepared to give a briefing on the status of\nthe new Soviet strategic programs. He will also be prepared to\nbrief on the latest intelligence projections of Soviet force\ndeployment within the limits agreed upon at Vladivostok.\nAfter your opening remarks, I suggest you ask me to present the\nresults of the analytical work prepared by the Verification Panel.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD WERRANT\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\nB. Participants: (List at Tab A)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be\nannounced. There will be a White House photographer.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\nA. At the Opening of the Meeting\n1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the major SALT\nissues requiring resolution and to go over our general approach\nto the negotiations prior to their resumption in Geneva. We\nmade considerable progress at Vladivostok toward concluding a\nsuccessful ten-year agreement limiting strategic offensive arms,\nbut there are still several major issues which need to be resolved.\n2. I want to reemphasize the importance which I attach to these\nnegotiations. Recent developments in our relations with the Soviet\nUnion make it clear that these negotiations could be an important\ntest of our efforts to build a stable relationship with the Soviets.\n3. I think we all have to remember the context of our relations\nwith the Soviets as we enter these negotiations. Given our\ndifficulties in areas such as trade, there are probably fairly\nrigid limits to how far we can push them in other areas. We\nmust protect our basic security interests, but at the same time,\nwe must demonstrate as much flexibility as possible.\n4. We will begin today by having Mr. Duckett give us the latest\nintelligence on the new Soviet systems and then Henry will give\nus a rundown on where we stand.\nB. At the Close of the Meeting\n1. The discussion today has been very helpful in giving me a\nperspective on the major outstanding issues. I believe the\nVerification Panel has come up with an effective negotiating\napproach that will get us started toward resolving these issues.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTIENARY GERALD FORD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n5\n2. I would like to reemphasize the point Henry raised on overall\nUS-Soviet relations. Our first priority in the negotiations must\nof course be the protection of our vital security interests, but\nin our approach to these negotiations, we want to be generally\nflexible. We don't want to give the impression that we are going\nback on our word, and in particular, we don't want to give the\nimpression of reopening the Vladivostok agreement.\n3. Alex (Johnson), we will get instructions to you within a few\ndays.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09168\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\n....\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nTalking Paper\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nTalking Points, NSC Meeting, 1/29/75\nCREATION DATE\n01/29/1975\nVOLUME\n16 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200009\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/29/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nREDACTED 4/27/04\n5/10/05\n09168\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\nTALKING POINTS\nNSC Meeting\nWednesday, January 29, 1975 -- 4:30 p.m.\n- Mr. President, our objective in this round of the SALT nego-\ntiations will be to transform the Vladivostok agreement into a new SALT\nagreement which will cover the period until the end of 1985.\n-- You and General Secretary Brezhnev resolved the major\nissues for this new agreement in Vladivostok. However, there are\nstill other issues to be resolved. I will review the analysis we have\ndone in the Verification Panel on these issues.\n-- Underlying our basic approach to these negotiations is the\nmore general issue of overall US-Soviet relations. This argues for a\nflexible approach in the negotiation of these remaining issues.\n-- In my view, the Soviets will be particularly sensitive to any\nUS effort to modify what they perceive to be agreed provisions or any\neffort on our part to broaden the scope of the new agreement.\nMIRV VERIFICATION\n-- The first issue which has been under study is MIR V verification.\n-- There are good arguments for obtaining some understanding\nwith the Soviets on how MIR Ved missiles will be counted.\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6\nWITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nGERALD FORD\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\nE.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5 (a)(c)\nstate\n3/31/05,\nOSD\n4/27/04\nMR -40 NSC\nCIA its 5/10/05\nBY dal NARA DATE 7/20/06\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n2\n-- The Verification Panel initially considered a very extensive\nlist of potential problems and associated rules for counting MIR Ved\nmissiles. But since even the most elaborate counting rules cannot\nfully guard against all types of problems that could arise near the end\nof the ten-year period, all agree that we should take a more flexible\napproach on MIRV verification in the upcoming talks, emphasizing the\nmajor problem areas.\n-- The approach we would propose to take in Geneva on this issue\nis to first describe the problems which we believe could arise and solicit\nthe Soviet views on possible solutions. In some instances they may be\nable to give us explicit assurances, eliminating the necessity for\ncomplicated negotiations.\n-- In several cases, as I will describe, we will need Soviet agree-\nment on explicit counting rules for the number of deployed MIRVs.\n-- We have divided the counting rules into three categories:\nhighly desirable, desirable but lower priority, and finally, those which\nprobably cause us more problems than they are worth.\nHighly Desirable Rules\n-- I will start with the highly desirable rules.\nFORD & LIBRARY\n1. Definition of a MIR Ved Missile\nAn ICBM or SLBM booster of a type flight tested as a MIR Ved\nmissile will be counted as MIR Ved when deployed, even if a\nsingle warhead version of the booster has also been developed.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\n-- One fundamental problem is how to define what constitutes a\nMIR Ved missile. The basic question is how many MIRV tests should\nbe permitted before a missile must be counted as MIR Ved.\n-- The Verification Panel concluded that a single MIR V test\nshould be the criterion for defining a MIR Ved missile. Even though\n15 to 20 flight tests would be required for a full MIRV development\nprogram, there seems to be no reason to permit a small number of\ntests, such as five.\n-- If either side plans an unMIR Ved missile, there is no reason\never to test it with MIRVs. Insisting that even one test qualifies a\nmissile as MIR.Ved avoids problems which could arise if a small number\nof MIRV tests were permitted.\n-- For example, even if as few as five MIR V tests were permitted,\none side might be able to fully develop a MIRV system through a test\nprogram where the MIR V bus dispenses only one warhead on most tests,\nand a multiple number of warheads on the permitted five MIRV tests.\n- To protect against this scenario, it would be necessary to\nhave a definition of a MIRV test which included tests where the MIRV\nbus only dispenses one warhead. To avoid such complicated definitional\nproblems, the Verification Panel concluded that a single MIRV test\nshould be the criterion for defining a MIR Ved missile.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\n-- One problem which could arise is that the Soviets may want\nto deploy both MIR Ved and unMIRVed SS-18s.\n-- We do not see how we can distinguish between silos which contain\nMIR Ved and unMIR Ved versions of the same missile. But under this\ncounting rule, since the SS-18 has been tested with MIRVs, all SS-18\nsilos will be counted as containing MIR Ved missiles.\n-- If the Soviets balk at this approach, we feel it is incumbent on\nthem to come up with some other acceptable solution. Whenever it is\nfeasible, we will adopt this type of flexible approach; we will encourage\nthe Soviets to propose alternative solutions when they find our proposals\nobjectionable.\n2. Counting Changed ICBM Silos as MIR Ved\nCount under the MIRV limit all ICBM launchers of types modified\nfor the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIR Ved missiles.\n-- Our basic means for verifying the number of MIR Ved Soviet\nICBMs is to observe modifications to existing silos. We believe all\nof the new Soviet MIR Ved ICBMs require silo modifications which we\ncan identify.\n-- Thus, we would tell the Soviets that if they change any silos in\nthe manner they are now doing for deployment of the SS-17, 18, and 19,\nwe will have to assume that those silos contain these new missiles.\nFORD\nWe will seek an explicit counting rule to cover this situation.\nLIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n3.\nCounting MIRVed SLBMs by Class\nCount under the MIRV limit all SLBM launchers on a submarine\nif any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.\nFor MIRVed SLBMs, we anticipate that the Soviets will\ndevelop a MIRVed SLBM which fits in the existing SS-N-8 launch tubes on\nthe Delta-class submarines. Once the Soviets start to deploy such a\nMIRVed SLBM, we will have to assume that all the SS-N-8 launch tubes\non Delta-class submarines could contain MIRVs.\n-- For this reason it would be highly desirable to obtain a\ncounting rule whereby MIRVed SLBMs are counted by class. We would\nprefer to count immediately all the launchers in the class once the first\nMIRVed SLBM is deployed. However, we could permit some phased counting\nrate such as 200 per year after deployment of a MIRVed SLBM begins.\n4. Replacement of MIRVed Launchers\nICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIRVed will always\ncount as MIRVed unless dismantled, destroyed, or converted to\nunMIRVed launchers under mutually agreed procedures.\n-- A difficult verification problem could arise in the future if\neither side wants to deploy an unMIRVed missile in a launcher which\npreviously contained a MIRVed missile. For example, near the end of\nthe ten-year period the Soviets may choose to decrease their number of\nMIRVed ICBMs in order to deploy MIRVed SLBMs and still stay within\nthe 1320 limit. Strict procedures for such replacement of MIRVed\nFORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n6\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nlaunchers would have to be negotiated in the SCC; however, currently\nwe see no way that such replacement can be done without destruction\nor dismantling of the ICBM silo.\n5. Interference with National Technical Means\nNo interference with national technical means of verification\nincluding means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions.\n-- We would also expect to include in the agreement an explicit pro-\nvision banning interference with national technical means of verification of\nthe MIRV limitations. However, we would not bring up the issue of telemetry\nencryption in Geneva.\nDesirable Rules, but Lower Priority\nThere are several other problems for which counting rules would\nbe desirable but of lower priority.\n1. Changes to unMIRVed ICBM Silos\nCount under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers whose length or\ndiameter are changed.\n-- The Soviets may wish to modify unMIRVed silos to increase their\nhardness. Such modification could make these unMIRVed silos compatible\nwith the new MIRVed missiles. In particular, an increase of only a few\nfeet in silo depth may make the SS-11 silos compatible with the SS-17. The\ngeneral requirement to count silos modified to permit MIRVs would cover\nthis, but we might wish to tighten up the rule by banning increases in\nthe depth or diameter of unMIRVed silos.\nSECULA FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n7\n-- We could go further and seek a ban on all modifications to\nunMIRVed silos. However, this would impact on our\nfor\nsince we add\n- - Given these complications, we believe that the best approach\nis to defer a decision on further constraints on unMIRVed silo changes\nuntil we have heard the Soviet proposals.\n2.\nChanges to SLBM Launchers\nCount under the MIRV limit SLBM launchers which are modified to\npermit the deployment of MIRVed missiles, including launchers\nwhose length or diameter are changed.\nAs I indicated previously, we expect the Soviets to deploy\na MIRVed SLBM. which fits in the launch tubes on the Delta-class\nsubmarines. However, launcher modifications might also permit MIRV\ndeployment in Yankee-class submarines.\n-- To improve verification in such a situation, it would be\ndesirable, but not necessary, to have a counting rule where all modified\nSLBM launchers are counted as MIRVed. This would also insure that\nthe launch tubes on the Yankee submarines are, not modified to accept\na MIRVed SLBM without being counted.\n3.\nCount MIRVed ICBMs by Complex\nCount under the MIRV limit all launchers at an ICBM complex\nif any launchers at that complex are MIRVed.\nLIBRARY GERALD ? FORM\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n8\n-- There is also the possibility that the Soviets could covertly\ndeploy MIRVed missiles in unMIRVed silos. This would be of particular\nconcern at complexes which contain a mixture of MIRVed launchers and\nunMIRVed luanchers.\n-- For this reason, it would be preferable to count MIRVed\nICBMs by complex.\n-- However, we think that from a tactical standpoint, it would\nbe prudent if we did not initially raise the issue of counting MIRVed ICBMs\nby complex since this may be the solution to the problem of\n-- - The Soviets are certain to raise this problem in any discussion\nof MIRV verification. The\nThe Soviets can correctly claim that national technical means\nare inadequate for insuring that\n- If the Soviets push hard on this issue, we could try an\nasymmetric approach whereby MIRVed ICBMs are counted by complexes\nfor the United States and on the basis of silo modification for the Soviet Union.\n-- - An additional problem concerns the deployment of\nWe plan to deploy\nin only\nof the\nsilos.\nAs a consequence an approach where MIRVed ICBMs are counted by\ncomplex would lead to excessive counting of the number of MIRVed ICBMs\non the US side.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n9\nTOP SECEET/SENSITIVE\n- If all\nlaunchers are counted as MIRVed, we\nwould exceed the 1320 limit when the\nsubmarine is\ndeployed. This would take place in 1981 under the current schedule.\n- At that point, we could either stop the\nprogram or\ndismantle\nsilos\nwhich are being counted\nas MIRVed. Neither of these alternatives is attractive. In particular,\nloss of\nwould put us even farther from the 2400 overall\nlimit.\n- Another approach would be to try and get Soviet agreement to\ndesignating a portion of\nas a MIRVed complex. This may\nbe possible since the squadron where the\nare being\ndeployed is geographically separable from the rest of the\nsilos\nIn either case, I believe we should do nothing with regard to\nthat deployment until we have a better feel for the outcome of the\nnegotiations on MIRV verification. The cost, as I understand it, would\nbe only $3 million to put a hold on the deployment.\nCount launchers as MIRVed if operating procedures and ground\nGERALD R. FORM\n4.\nsupport equipment are changed\nCount under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers at complexes at which\ncurrent operating procedures and ground support equipment have\nbeen changed.\n- If the Soviets attempt to covertly deploy MIRVed missiles in\nunMIRVed silos, it would probably require changes to existing operating\nprocedures and ground support equipment.\nPOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n10\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n-- To inhibit this cheating scenario, it would be desirable to\nhave a counting rule whereby ICBM launchers at complexes where\nprocedures and equipment are changed are automatically counted as\nMIRVed.\n- - The Soviets will probably object to such a rule on the basis\nthat they should have the freedom to modernize equipment and procedures\nfor unMIRVed missiles.\nRules Either not Needed or Undesirable\n-- The third category of potential problems and counting rules\nincludes those of least priority. These would generally be more trouble\nthan they are worth, either from the standpoint of negotiability or\nimpact on US programs.\n-- However, I will briefly describe each of the problems.\n1. Changes in Test Ranges\nNo relocation of ballistic missile flight test ranges except as agreed.\n-- However, it is very unlikely that the Soviets would agree to such\na proposal, and it might also hamper our future testing.\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n11\n2. Count all Launchers Compatible in Size with New MIRVed Missiles as\nMIRVed.\nIf new types of MIRVed missiles are developed and flight tested,\nlaunchers which are compatible in size with such missiles will\nbe counted under the MIRV limit.\n-- We have some concern that the Soviets will develop a new\nMIRVed ICBM which fits in unmodified SS-11 silos.\n-- A counting rule which included in the MIRV limit all launchers\ncompatible in size with a new MIRVed missile would cover this possibility.\n-- Unfortunately, this would require all US silos to be counted as\nMIRVed when we develop the new\nwhich is designed to fit in\nthese silos. In addition, with such a counting rule, we would be hard\npressed to defend not counting all\nsilos as MIRVed since\nthere already exists a MIRVed missile,\ncompatible\nin sizë with these silos.\n3.\nModified MRV Systems\nCount new or modified MRV systems as MIRVs.\n-- An additional concern is that the Soviets may covertly attempt\nto improve their multiple RV systems to give them true MIRV capability.\nAt present the Soviets have three such systems which cannot independently\ntarget their RVs. They are variants of the SS-11, the SS-9, and the\nSS-N-6.\nFORD & GRAVED LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n12\n-- However, the probability of the Soviets pursuing this approach\nto improved MIRV capability is SO unlikely that we don't feel that it is\nnecessary to seek a counting rule to cover this situation.\n4.\nMIRVed IRBMs Similar to Mobile ICBMs\nCount under the MIRV limit, any type of mobile launchers compatible\nwith existing MIRVed ICBMs.\nThe last problem that the Verification Panel analyzed was\nthe possibility of Soviet deployment of a MIRVed mobile intermediate\nrange missile which would be indistinguishable from a MIRVed mobile\nICBM. This is a problem that could arise if the new MIRVed mobile\nIRBM which the Soviets are developing uses the same launchers as the\nSS-16 ICBM. However, this problem is unlikely to emerge and we do\nnot feel it is necessary to bring it up with the Soviets at this time.\n- That summarizes the status of our analysis of the MIRV\nverification issue. As I indicated, the approach we propose to take\nin Geneva is initially to describe and discuss the major problems with\nthe Soviets, in particular those in the first two categories. We would\nthen push hard to get Soviet agreement on explicit counting rules to cover\nthose problems in the first category.\nCruise Missiles\n-- We anticipate problems with the Soviets on the air-launched\ncruise missile issue.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n13\n-- They are certain to insist that the Aide Memoire applies to\nboth ballistic and cruise air-to-surface missiles, even though I told Dobrynin\nthat in our interpretation only air-launched ballistic missiles were\nincluded in the agreement.\n-- We have a strong interest in retaining the option to deploy\nlong-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as a hedge against\nimprovements in Soviet air defenses in the 1980s, in particular, the\npossibility of Soviet deployment of a barrier defense which would\nengage US bombers several hundred miles outside the Soviet border.\nSuch a defense would consist of transport aircraft equipped with radars\nsimilar to our AWACS and long-range interceptor aircraft.\n-- We are confident that the B-1 could penetrate such improved\nSoviet defenses. However, such a defense could have a significant\ncapability against the B-52.\n-- We have some flexibility on this issue since we can accept\nsome limitations on air-launched cruise missiles and on other cruise\nmissiles as well.\n-- In our initial position in Geneva we can continue to insist that\nALCMs aren't covered in the Aide Memoire, but we could offer to count\nall ALCMs of range greater than 3000 km in the aggregate.\nLIBRARY GERALD FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n14\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n-- We could also offer to count ALCMs and ballistic ASMs\non transport or tanker aircraft, which are not explicitly limited in the\nAide Memoire. The Aide Memoire only cites ASMs on heavy bombers.\n- - In addition, we could offer to count or ban all cruise missiles\nof range greater than 3000 km, including sea and land-launched.\n-- We see no reason to go beyond this position in the early\nstages of the negotiation. However, eventually we may wish to\nconsider other limitations on cruise missiles, such as counting SLCMs\ndown to 600 km, in order to obtain Soviet agreement to a higher range\nlimit on ALCMs.\nHeavy Bombers\n-- The most important aspect of this issue is whether the Back-\nfire will be classed as a heavy bomber.\n-- We have a strong basis for an initial position that Backfire\nshould be counted. It's capability is equal to that of the Soviet Bison,\nan acknowledged heavy bomber.\nThe Soviets are certain to contend that the Backfire is for\nnaval and other peripheral missions rather than for intercontinental\nmissions. Our intelligence indicates that the initial Backfire deployment\nis consistent with this point of view.\nLIBRANT GERALD FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n15\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n-- Our principal concern would be deployment of a tanker force\nto give the Backfire extended range capability. Thus, we will see if the\nSoviets are willing to give us assurances that they will not deploy such a\ntanker. force or that Backfires with tanker support will be counted.\n- The Soviets may respond that FB-111s should also be counted.\nA trade of counting the\nFB-111s for counting Backfires would be in\nour interest, but the Soviets would probably insist that the 450 F-111s\nalso be counted.\nMobile ICBMs\n-- The Verification Panel also looked at the possibility of\nproposing a combined ban on air and land-mobile ICBMs.\n-- The Soviets have expressed an interest in the past in banning\nair-mobile ICBMs. However, they strongly resisted limits on land-\nmobile ICBMs in SALT I and appear to have a land-mobile ICBM program\nin the advanced development stage.\n-- - The Verification Panel felt we should defer on this issue until\nwe see what the Soviets propose.\nHeavy ICBMs\n- - Since the Interim Agreement provision limiting heavy ICBMs\nis being carried over, we will probably want an explicit definition of a\nheavy ICBM.\nFORD 3\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE\n16\n-- We could propose that any new ICBM with throw weight greater\nthan the SS-19 should be classed as a heavy ICBM.\n* *\nIn sum, our basic approach will be:\n-- To discuss the MIRV verification problem with the Soviets\nand attempt to obtain their agreement to specific counting rules in the\nareas of principal concern.\n-- To explore the cruise missile issue with the objective of\nparlaying additional limitations into a longer range limitation on air\nlaunched cruise missiles.\n-- To include the Backfire as a heavy bomber until the Soviets\nprovide assurances that it will not be used for intercontinental missions.\n-- To defer on the mobile ICBM issue unless the Soviets raise\nit.\n-- - - To propose that the SS-19 be the upper limit for light ICBMs.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n742X\nTOPSECRET/\nFebruary 7, 1975\nSENSITIVE\nATTACHMENT\nMEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis mo\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC Meeting on\nSALT, January 29, 1975\nHerewith, Jan Lodal's minutes of the January 29 NSC meeting\non SALT. A summary memorandum for the Vice President is\nbeing prepared and will be ready today or tomorrow.\nAttachment\nTOP SECRET / let 2/98\nSENSITIVE\nATTACHMENT\nFORD & LIBRARY CERALD\nFORD is LIBRARY\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09169\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJan Lodal\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nBrent Scowcroft\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 1/29/75\nCREATION DATE\n01/29/1975\nVOLUME\n29 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200009\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/29/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nexcised NSC letter 2/10/99\nat 5/99\n742X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTDP SE CRET/SENSITIVE\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nWednesday, January 29, 1975\nTIME:\n4:39 p.m. to 6:19 p.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nSALT\nPrincipals\nThe President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense James Schlesinger\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown\nDirector of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nUnder Secretary of State for Politico Affairs\nJoseph Sisco\nAmbassador U. Alexis Johnson (SALT Delegation)\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nSERA\nBRARY\nCIA:\nDeputy Director of Science and Technology\nCarl Duckett\nWhite House:\nMr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President\nNSC:\nLt General Brent Scowcroft\nJan M. Lodal AmL\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nDECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12958 Sec.\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nFORDO ; LIBRARY 336 .\nE.O. 12958 Sect.3,4(b) (i) ond()\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nMR98-39,217; Nselite 6.1(a) 2/10/99\nBy let\nNARA, Date 5/24/99\nTOP VSENSITIVE\n2\nPresident Ford: It's good to see all of you. The meeting today is to\nreview the major SALT issues and go over our general approach at\nGeneva. First, I would like to say that all of you know how strong and\naffirmative I think we should be about the Vladivostok Agreement. I\nthink the negotiations were most successful, and I was pleased at the\nreaction we got at the first meeting with the Congressional leadership.\nI am thankful for the help I got from all of you.\nThe problem we face is to get through next June or July. So in this\nmeeting, we will go over, after Carl has said a few words about the\ncurrent situation, the various issues -- verification, cruise missiles,\nMalmstron, etc. Carl?\nMr. Duckett: Bill will do the briefing -- I will assist him as needed.\nMr. Colby: Mr. President, the Soviet repudiation of the 1972 trade\nagreement and Brezhnev's physical ailments have generated questions\nabout possible changes in Soviet foreign policy with respect to detente\nand the Soviet attitude toward SALT.\nMoscow has provided copious assurances -- both private and public\nthat, despite the difficulties over the trade agreement, other aspects of\nthe US-Soviet relationship should go forward. Premier Kosygin was\ndecidedly upbeat on detente, particularly on the importance of arms\nlimitation agreements with the US, when he talked with Prime Minister\nWhitlam earlier this month. The Soviet press continues to say favorable\nthings both about the arms limitation agreements reached at Vladivostok,\nand about you personally.\nOn the specific issues of Most Favored Nation, export credits, and\nemigration, the signs thus far suggest the Soviets hope for another round\nof bargaining on these issues -- although we believe they may be even\ntougher bargainers.\nJust how fast the Kremlin moves ahead on detente-related policies may\nwell depend upon Brezhnev's political and physical health when he emerges\nfrom the hospital -- where he has been since December 26.\nWe don't know exactly what put him there, but he has a history of heart\ntrouble, has become easily subject to fatigue, and suffers from severe\ndental problems that may have required surgery.\nIn the meantime, other Soviet leaders appear to be carrying on normally,\nand we detect no atmosphere of political crisis in Moscow.\nis\nFORD\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nShould Brezhnev's health force him to step down, the odds are that his\nsenior colleagues would monopolize the subsequent decisionmaking.\nKirilenko would probably be the nominal leader, but the leadership\nwould be collective until age began to take its toll among the seniors,\nand the juniors began to inherit -- and contend over -- power.\nThe seniors, all in their late 60s and early 70s, are not likely to want\nany substantial changes in established policy directions. But they might\nslow down the pace in a few areas. In particular, Brezhnev's departure\nmight reduce the Soviet incentive to complete SALT II this summer.\nIn any case, the Soviets are continuing to develop new strategic weapons.\nAll four of their new ICBMs are at or near the end of their development\nprograms. Two of them -- the SS-18 and SS-19 are being deployed\nand the SS-16 could now be ready for deployment. They are also flight\ntesting a new intermediate range ballistic missile -- the SS-20 -- which\nappears to be an outgrowth of the 16.\nORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nFORD is LIBRARY CERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\nThere are three other developments in Soviet weapons related to SALT\nthat I would like to discuss. First, a new intermediate range missile I\nhave already mentioned -- the SS-20\nSecondly, the new Backfire bomber may now be entering service with\noperational medium bomber units. This aircraft can cover the entire US\non a one-way mission from the Soviet Union. Since July, we have photo-\ngraphed it at both Long Range and Naval Aviation bases.\nA total\nof about 40 Backfires have now been produced. By the end of 1975 the\nSoviets will probably have a regiment of Backfires -- 25 planes -- fully\noperational, and another partially up to strength.\nCruise missiles may also impact on SALT, and since the mid-fifties\nthe Soviets have developed an extensive inventory.\nMost of these missiles are tactical, however, and the Soviets do not now\nappear to be developing the kind of long-range ones being considered\nby the US for strategic use. But they are capable of deploying strategic\ncruise missiles in the next decade.\nPresident Ford: With nuclear payloads?\nMr. Colby: Yes.\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD is LIBRARY CERALO\nTOPSECRET/SENSINVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET \\SENSITIVE\n5\nMr. President, the events at Vladivostok and since have reaffirmed our\nbelief that the USSR will press a vigorous strategic arms competition,\nwith emphasis on qualitative force improvements. These events provide\nno reason for altering the basic judgments of NIE 11-3/8, which was\npublished just before the Vladivostok meeting.\nThe agreements reached at Vladivostok did, however, alter our \"best\nestimate\" of Soviet forces as presented in the NIE, and we have formulated\na new one. It assumes that the Soviets take a balanced approach requiring\nonly minimal changes in ongoing programs to upgrade their forces. We\nare also, of course, looking at other Soviet options.\nIn developing the rationale for this new best estimate, we concluded that\nthe Soviets would continue to stress MIRVed ICBMs and emphasize\nqualitative improvements. They would also strike a balance between\ntypes of systems, and between survivability and counterforce capability.\nFinally, they would allow a slight relaxation in the pace of MIRVing from\nthat projected in the NIE best estimate, to reduce costs and improve\nprogramming efficiency.\nThe new best estimate concludes that, to stay within the 2, 400 limit the\nSoviets would deploy fewer mobile ICBMs than we projected in the NIE,\ndismantle silo-based launchers at two SS-11 complexes, and retire\nBison bombers. We do not believe that the Soviets would be willing, in\nthe current round of negotiations, to discuss further reductions.\nMr. President, I would like to illustrate, with a series of charts, how\nour new best estimate differs from the NIE in its projection of Soviet\nforces.\nIn these charts, the US force is based upon the January 75 Five Year\nDefense Program, with the FB-111 excluded. It contains no long range\ncruise missiles, or other US programs under development but not yet\nprogrammed for deployment.\nThis chart shows Soviets delivery vehicles. The Interim Agreement limited\nfixed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, but not land-mobile ICBMs or\nbombers. The projection reached around 2, 600 in the 1980s, compared\nto the Vladivostok limits of 2,400 delivery vehicles.\nIf the Backfire were included -- as illustrated on this overlay -- the\nSoviets would be required to make significant reductions in their\nprojected ICBM and SLBM forces, since as many as 250 Backfire\nFORD\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRAKY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n6\ncould be deployed in Long Range Aviation units by 1985. Including\nBackfire might also mean counting the 70 US FB-111.\nThe next chart, of MIRVed delivery vehicles, shows some 500 fewer\nMIRVed missile launchers under the Vladivostok limits than in the NIE\nprojection. You will note that there is little difference between the\n\"Vladivostok best\" projection and the \"NIE best\" until 1979, when the\nnext generation of Soviet weapons -- about which we know little -- is\nexpected to appear.\nThe intelligence community disagrees on the most likely mix of MIRVed\nsystems in the 1980s. The majority believes that the Soviets would\nMIRV fewer SLBMs than we projected in the NIE, opting instead for\nICBMs with qualitative improvements beginning in 1983. Others believe\nthe Soviets would place more emphasis on submarine launched ballistic\nmissiles than in the majority view, projecting some 200 more MIRVed\nSLBMs and fewer improved ICBMs. Under this projection the Soviets\nwould have more total MIRVed missile launchers in the early 1980s, as\nshown by the shaded area on the chart.\nIf, however, the majority of our community is correct, and the Soviets\ndo plan to slow the pace of MIRVing in the early 1980s -- as indicated by\nthe flattened portion of the curve there might be an opportunity to\nnegotiate reductions in MIRVed missile launchers as well as total delivery\nvehicles. The US presumably would have to reduce the number of deployed\nMIRVed missiles, while the Soviets refrain from further deployments of\nMIRVs in SS-11 silos.\nFinally, this chart shows the total warheads in the forces. Here we see\nthat the total number of weapons in the US programmed forces remains\nabove either estimate of the Soviet force throughout the next 10 years.\nThis includes bombers, where the US comes higher.\nIn conclusion, Mr. President, I think we can make, with considerable\nconfidence, some statements about the strategic situation in the next ten\nyears.\nThe Vladivostok agreement, if implemented, will remove one worry: that\nthe Soviets might achieve a numerical edge -- in launchers and delivery\nvehicles -- which, while not changing the basic strategic situation of mutual\ndeterrence, could have given them a politically useful image of superiority\namong those who focus primarily on quantity.\nFO\n,RD\nFORD\nGERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRETYSENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n7\nDuring the next ten years of numerical balance, Soviet attention will turn\nmore and more to qualitative competition with the US. Moscow will\nachieve substantial improvements in counterforce capability, flexibility,\nand, in the near term, survivability. Soviet agreement to the Vladivostok\nterms may stem in part from their pessimism about the prospects of\nachieving dramatic advantages through numbers alone, and their con-\nsequent desire to focus resources on qualitative improvements instead.\nThis means that each side will continue to have many more than enough\nstrategic weapons for assured retaliation after a first strike, or for\n\"limited option\" scenarios. At the same time, we expect the Soviets to\nbe searching for better -- and possibly quite different -- strategic arms\nin the decade of SALT II and beyond.\nThe Soviets will, accordingly, pursue a vigorous R&D program. But we\ndo not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the\nstrategic balance in the USSR's favor during the next ten years.\nPresident Ford: Thank you very much Bill is that the conclusion?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Bill, I have one question -- does it look as if the\n17 will not be deployed, and that they will concentrate on the 19?\nMr. Colby: No, they will deploy both.\nMr. Duckett:\nWe expect a mixed force of\n17's and 19's.\nMr. Colby: They are testing both missiles.\nMr. Duckett: It looks like we were wrong earlier when we felt they\nmight stop the 17 program and deploy only the 19. Recently, there have\nbeen more 17 tests.\nSecretary Kissinger: They may have a morale problem with the SS-17s\ndesign bureau (laughter).\nMr. Colby: The testing programadoes not indicate any priority given\nto either one.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD is CERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRE T SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n8\nMr. Duckett: It seems clear that both will be deployed.\nPresident Ford: The failure rate appears to be higher on the 17 program.\nMr. Colby:\nSecretary Schlesinger: Maybe we will see a token deployment of the 17.\nMr. Colby:\nPresident Ford: Henry, would you like to sum up where we stand?\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, the Verification Panel has\nconcentrated principally on the verification of the limits agreed to in\nVladivostok and limits related to the definition of various types of\ncruise missiles.\nGiven the sensitive state of US and Soviet realtions, we should concentrate\nduring the present phase of the talks on describing a number of problems\nwhich we believe could arise and attempting to elicit the Soviet position.\nWe should reveal our own position only gradually, and not nail ourselves\ndown to hard and fast position at the beginning. The Verification Panel\nhas grouped the possible county rules into three categories: highly\ndesirable, desirable but of low priority, and finally, some proposals\nmade by various agencies which would be either undesirable or\nunnecessary.\nI will begin with the desirable rules. For these, the Soviets would have\nto come up with a very strong alternative before we would abandon our\nposition. The first rule concerns the definition of a MIRVed missile.\n\"An ICBM or SLBM booster of a type flight tested as a MIRVed missile\nwill be counted as MIRVed when deployed, even if a single warhead\nversion of the booster has also been developed.\"\nThis rule applies to the SS-17, 18, and 19. Any missile in the MIRV\nmode, we will consider MIRVed once it is deployed. I see no problem\nwith the 17 and 19, but there will be problems with the 18. They have\ndeveloped a single warhead version. As you remember, Mr. President\nBERALD FORD\nLIBRARY GERALD FORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n9\nat Vladivostok, they resisted restraining MIRV deployment of the 18;\nthey will now resist any proposal on all 18's deployed counting as\nMIRVs.\nPresident Ford: In Vladivostok, we talked about limiting deployments\nof 18's --\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes, but unless the Soviets come up with a new\ndevice, any 18 deployed must be counted as MIRVed. Even on-site\ninspection would not help as much. We will tell them that if they come\nup with something, we will examine it with respect to the 18. For the\n17 and the 19, no single warhead version exists; by definition, once the\n17 and 19 are deployed, they will be counted.\nLater on, the question will arise when to consider a weapon to be MIRVed.\nSo we adopted the rule that after a single MIRV test,\nthe missiles count as MIRV.\nPresident Ford: Whether the test is successful or otherwise --\nSecretary Kissinger: A single MIRV test would count. There's no reason\never to test a missile with MIRVs if one has no intention of deploying it\nwith MIRVs. If the Soviets make a fuss over this, we may have to come\nback to you on it. We may have to go up to no more than five tests. But\nthere's no reason why they should need this. For new MIRV missiles,\nthere's no excuse -- once tested, we'll count it in the MIRV total.\nI came reluctantly to this view. At first I thought we could permit mo re\ntests.\nPresident Ford: How many MIRV missiles do they have -- the 17 and the 19?\nSecretary Kissinger: The 17, 18, and 19.\nMr. Colby: How about the 16?\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n10\nMr. Duckett:\nPresident Ford:\nMr. Colby:\nSecretary Kissinger: If they have a MIRV program for it, they will\ntest it more than once. Only if they're trying to cheat, would they\nobject to counting it after the first test.\nSecretary Schlesinger: It's not our current assessment that the 16 is\nMIRVed.\nSecretary Kissinger: This is a question of fact. If the Soviets present\na counter argument, we will come back first to the VP and then to you.\nThe second rule concerns counting changed ICBM silos as MIR Ved,-\n\"Count under the MIRV limit all ICBM launchers of types modified for the\npurpose of permitting the deployment of MIR Ved missiles.\"\nIn my estimate, we will not have too much trouble with this rule except with\nregard to the 18. We know they plan to deploy the 18 with both single war-\nheads and with MIRVs. We know they plan a single warhead deployment\nfrom their extensive testing program, and we know that they plan a MIRV\ndeployment from the Vladivostok arguments they gave. But I don't think\nthey realize we've established these counting rules. I don't think they have\nfocused on them, despite the fact that I have explained to Dobrynin on many\noccasions how we plan to proceed.\nMr. Duckett: I might point out that the 18's we have seen deployed so far\nwe believe to be single warhead versions; I can't imagine given their state\nof testing, they have deployed the MIR Ved version yet.\nDr. Ikle: Is it possible they will replace the single warhead SS-18s with\nMIR Ved versions before they reach the 1320 level, in which case this\nproblem would go away?\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nTCP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n11\nSecretary Kissinger: They have a long way to go to get to 1320, so I don't\nknow. But for now, I believe we will have to count the 18 as MIR Ved.\nWe'll have problems with the 18, unless as Fred has\nsuggested, they have decided the limit is so high that they can live with it.\nMr. Duckett: Frankly, Mr. President, we guessed wrong on this program.\nThey seemed to be going quite slow on their MIR Ved 18 testing, and we thought\nmaybe this might be a signal that they would be willing to limit the MIRVed\nversion.\nSecretary Kissinger: At Vladivostok, their military seemed ready to go\nalong with limits on the MIR Ved 18, but Gromyko was not. He made it an\nissue of principle not to have sublimits. It reminded me of some people\nI knew! (laughter) They refused to give up what they weren't going to do\nin any event.\nTo go on to the next counting rule, it deals with counting SLBMs with MIRVs--\n\"Count under the MIRV limit all SLBM launchers on a submarine if any\nSLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.\"\nPresident Ford: That is, if they only MIRV- one out of ten?\nSecretary Kissinger: The problem is that they have two kinds of submarines--\nthe Y-class, and the D-class. We believe they may be having problems\ndeveloping a MIRV for the D-class, but when it's completed, it will be\ncompatible with all D-class submarines. We will have then to count all\n420 D-class launchers as containing MIRVs. We have come up with a form-\nulation to ease the problem somewhat which would permit them to count only\n200 per year --\nDeputy Secretary Clements: But that helps only with the production problem --\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes -- We don't believe they can deploy 420 in the\nfirst year. Our intelligence and our conversations with Brezhnev have both\nindicated that they do not have much confidence in their SLBMs. Personally,\nI do not believe they will want to MIRV 420 SLBMs. But it's hard to tell. We\ncan start out with this rule in Alex's instructions, and he can ask them to tell\nus how they plan to reassure us if they don't like the rule. They're developing\na stretched version of the D-class, and maybe we could count only that, but\nI don't know how we would tell the difference.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFORD :- LIBRARY\nTOP SEGREP/SENSITIVE\n12\nMr. Duckett:\nSecretary Kissinger: Brezhnev tells me that in his perception, their SLBMs\nare not very good. So they will probably want to deploy less than 420 MIRVs.\nPresident Ford: How much testing have they done on SLBM MIRVs?\nSecretary Kissinger: None. Last June, Brezhnev said he doesn't expect\nto have an SLBM MIRV until the late seventies. At that time we were\ndiscussing a five-year agreement with Brezhnev, so that implied he would\nhave no SLBM MIRVs through that period.\nMr. Duckett:\nBut even this\nwould mean that it would be well toward 1980 until this system were ready.\nPresident Ford: But they have single warhead SLBMs operational?\nMr. Duckett: They have both a single and a double warhead version,\nSecretary Kissinger: They will have a large number of SLBMs to be counted\nin their 2400 total, but no MIRVs in their 1320 total until the late seventies --\nthat's when we will have a problem.\nGeneral Brown: If we propose this rule, we will penalize ourself because we\nwill have to count our Polaris submarines. There are 180 missiles on ships which\nare the same as Poseidon and we will have to count them until we phase\nthem out.\nPresident Ford: How long will that be?\nGeneral Brown: They will have to go out in '83 so we can deploy the Trident.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I don't believe I agree with you on that. The Polaris\nmissile is completely different, and it fits into a smaller tube.\nAmbassador Johnson: But they can't distinguish --\nSecretary Schlesinger: They can distinguish the difference.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: If we try to put the shoe on their foot, the\nwill turn around and put it on our foot.\nFORD is LIBRARY\nBERALD FORD LIBRES\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n13\nSecretary Kissinger: Our problem is with Minuteman, not with Polaris. As\nlong as the missile tube is different and we have no MIR V to fit in it, we're\nokay. It's like the distinction between their D and Y class.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Their D-class is somewhere between our\nTrident and Poseidon.\nSecretary Kissinger: We intend to deploy Trident missiles on Poseidon, but\nthey already count as MIRVs. Our problem is only with the 550 Minuteman III.\nIn our best judgment, they have to change their silos to deploy MIRV. But\nthere are no external differences between the Minuteman II and Minuteman III\nsilos. They will want some restrictions on us, due to the fact that our silos\nare the same.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Ultimately, I think we will have to fall back on this\nissue and perhaps count only their stretched D-class, but Alex's instructions\nshould be to hold fast initially.\nSecretary Kissinger: In each case, Alex should argue that this is our position,\nbut if they have another way, we will listen to it. I agree with Jim I\nbelieve they have no intention of deploying 420 SLBM MIRVs, so we will\nprobably have to fall back, but not until Alex comes back for further\ninstructions.\nThe fourth rule is \"ICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIR Ved\nwill always count as MIR Ved unless dismantled, destroyed, or converted\nto unMIR Ved launchers under mutually agreed procedures. \" There will\nhave to be a commitment that once a launcher is counted as MIR Ved, you\ncannot say you are putting an unMIR Ved missile unless this is done through\nagreed-on procedures.\nThe fifth rule is \"no interference with national technical means of verifica-\ntion, including means for verifying the limitations of the MIR V provisions. \"\nThere is some question concerning how exactly we would interpret this.\nThere is one school of thought which believes we should call attention to\nthe incompatibility of encrypted telemetry with verification. Personally,\nI believe we would have to explain too much about our intelligence to do\nthis we would have to tell them what we know.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We all agree on that.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We think we might be able to come with some\nLIQUARY GERALD ? FORD\nphraseology, such as no changes in flight test procedures, which would\nnot require us to say much, but might give us some leverage on the\ntelemetry.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n14\nSecretary Kissinger: The next rules are in a different category of\ndesirability -- still desirable, but of lower priority.\nThe first is to \"count under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers whose length\nor diameter are changed.\"\nThe problem is that if the Soviets attempt to modify their SS-11 silos to\nincrease their hardness, it will be difficult to figure out if the change is\nto convert to an SS-17 silo, or is devised strictly to increase the hardness\nof an unMIR Ved silo. We could go further and seek a ban on all modifica-\ntions to unMIR Ved silos, but this would presentimmeasurable problems to\nus, so we will oppose deepening the silos.\nPresident Ford: They' re permitted a 15 percent increase in dimensions,\naren't they?\nSecretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, they are under the Interim\nAgreement. But if they increase the diameter, we would have to count\nthe silo as containing a 17 or a 19. We may be able to accept some\nhardening, but if they start digging, we'd have to count it.\nAmbassador Johnson: This is really just a tougher version of the second\nrule in the first category.\nSecretary Kissinger: The problem will come up if they want to increase\nthe hardness of their 11 silos.\nAmbassador Johnson: Then we will have to make a judgment whether it\nwill hold a MIR V or not.\nMr. Duckett: Of course, with the MIRV numbers so high, there is really\nno motivation for them to cheat like this under this agreement. But if you\ngo for reductions, then the problems change.\nSecretary Kissinger: Since there is less incentive for them to cheat, it\nought to be relatively easier to get them to agree to hard rules.\nThe second rule in this category relates to changes in SLBM launchers --\n\"Count under the MIRV limit SLBM launchers which are modified to permit\nthe deployment of MIR Ved missiles, including launchers whose length or\ndiameter are changed. \"\nThe third rule is to \"count under the MIR V limit all launchers at an ICBM-\ncomplex if any launchers at that complex are MIR Ved. \"\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD 2\nFORD is QERALD LIBRARY\nTOPSECREP/SENSITIVE\n15\nThis makes it easier for us because if we see any silos compatible with\nMIRVs, we would count the whole field. I think that none of us had any\nexpectations that the Soviets will possibly agree with this -- since all the\nothers apply only to them and none to us, I suspect that's why the Chiefs\nwent along with it. (laughter)\nBut it may be something they want, since any missile we have or are thinking\nof having, including the MX, will be compatible with existing silos. We have\nplayed around with the idea of designating for the Soviets which fields have\nMinuteman III in them and letting them inspect on-site at Minuteman II silos.\nPresident Ford: This is related to the problem at Malmstrom --\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. If we deploy the first 50 there, all 200 would\nhave to be counted. We would be giving up 150 MIRVs. Therefore, after\nthe sixth Trident is deployed, we would have to get rid of some Poseidon\nor Minuteman III's.\nPresident Ford: The plan is to put in 50 Minuteman III now, and more later?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. We have 500 at other fields, plus the 50 at\nMalmstrom would complete the planned 550 deployment.\nGeneral Brown: (passes out chart) I have a chart here which shows the\nMalmstrom deployment (see chart attached).\nSecretary Kissinger: If the deployment by complexes is not an issue, there\nwill be no problem. If it is, we can try to separate the 50 missiles into a\ndifferent area. If not, we could look for another field. But this is not a\nquestion of unilateral restraint.\nDr. Ikle: If this does not cost too much, it would gain us some flexibility\nin sorting out this issue.\nSecretary Kissinger: We don't want to lose 150. We may be able to find a\ndifferent way of accounting for 550 -- for example, by inspection -- but I\ndon't believe they will accept on-site inspection -- Do you Alex?\nAmbassador Johnson: No, they won't.\nDr. Ikle: But proposing it may make them stop pressing the issue.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we could wait 4 to 6 weeks, we would see how this\nissue arises.\nR.\nFORD\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRATE\nTOP SENSITIV\n16\nMr. Duckett: We can often tell their MIRV deployments by seeing their\nsupport base. If they deploy by complex, when the support base shows up\nthis is a helpful tool in verification.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I am disinclined to allow our logic to carry us too\nfar. The Soviets have never been that interested in this -- they have other\nmeans of verification, including our Congressional testimony. At Malmstrom,\nwe have prepared to open up the balance of the silos to inspection. That leads\nto a deeper issue. Third, we would hold up our program, and this would\nreduce the pressure on them to agree.\nSecretary Kissinger: That would be true if we were trying to get something\nfrom them, but we don't want anything from them. It would be true if we were\ntalking about numbers.\nDr. Ikle: It is irreversible once we start. If it's not too costly, we can\nalways go back and put them in later.\nPresident Ford: How far have we gone so far?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Three Minuteman II have been removed -- and two\nMinuteman III are at the site. An erector is at the site. The ground support\nequipment is already in. We are pretty pregnant, but we have terminated\nfurther action as of now as we agreed last week.\nPresident Ford: What was your schedule if you had not stopped?\nSecretary Schlesinger: We would have started this week.\nGeneral Brown: We would have completed Minuteman III deployments this\nJune.\nPresident Ford: In about six months. As Fred mentioned, the cost is\nimportant -- What is the cost of the delay?\nGeneral Brown: It's nominal -- We did an estimate and went over it this\nmorning, and for one month, it would be only about $150,000.\nPresident Ford: What would be the monthly cost after that?\nGeneral Brown: Up to three months, only about an additional $6,000 a month.\nIt's so inexpensive I don't believe it.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: It's the contractor's expenditures.\n1032 in LIBRARY CERALD\nTOP,SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n17\nGeneral Brown: But we are doing most of it in-house.\nPresident Ford: How soon will we know where we stand with the Soviets?\nAmbassador Johnson: In about 30 days, hopefully.\nSecretary Kissinger: My guess is that if Brezhnev wants an agreement by\nJune, they will put their cards on the table by mid-March at the latest.\nTheir position will be substantially different than ours on a whole range of\nissues. But we will know at the latest by mid-March. If they don't raise\nthe Minuteman III problem, and we don't accept, we can go ahead.\nSecretary Schlesinger: But what if they do accept -- then what do we do?\nSecretary Kissinger: We would find a smaller field with only 150 silos.\nGeneral Brown: It would cost half a billion dollars to put the missiles in\nanother field. There's a lot of sunk cost at Malmstrom -- guidance systems,\nsilo preparations, and so forth -- which would be wasted.\nDr. Ikle: We also have the option of separating the 50 silos.\nGeneral Brown: One indicator they might look for is the MIRV support\nbuilding, and we could move it over with the silos.\nPresident Ford: At the Shelby complex?\nGeneral Brown: It's now at the base. But if we move it to the complex, it\nwould put the identifier at the complex. This would be something of an\nisolated location.\nSecretary Schlesinger: That's no good in any event. You have the facility\nat Malmstrom anyway. Their judgment would be if they want to be suspicious,\nthey would have to count 200.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: If we start we can always pull them out later.\nPresident Ford: Except one of the other rules is that once you have it\nMIR Ved, it has to count --\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We could negate that and take them out.\nPresident Ford: But under one of the highly desirable rules, once they're\ndeployed, you can't pull them out --\n&\nFORD\nFORD & LIBRARY DERALD\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n18\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Oh, I see what you are saying --\nSecretary Schlesinger: Of course, the building is already there.\nSecretary Kissinger: They will start counting a thousand Minutemen.\nThey will apply every one of these rules to us. If so, we will lose a\nthousand. Probably, after some groaning, they will accept only 550,\nbut it will cost us somewhere else. The SS-18 problem is identical to\nthis.\nSecretary Schlesinger: If I might interrupt, I'm not sure the price will\nincrease. My feeling is that if we maintain the program until such time\nas we get an agreement, we're better off. Otherwise, the negotiations\nwill just stretch out.\nSecretary Kissinger: They won't stretch out. They want an agreement by\nthe time Brezhnev gets here. If this agreement blows up, he's in trouble,\npolitically.\nMr. Colby: We would have two options -- count the 50 as a separate area,\nor count all of them, if it's irreversible once they've been deployed.\nSecretary Kissinger: It's not yet irreversible, but we can't pull them out\nonce we start.\nPresident Ford: They will probably go by the hard rule.\nDr. Ikle: If we look at the 80's, they may wish to pull out some MIR Vs and\ndeploy mobiles.\nSecretary Schlesinger: For them to push us on this would just be part of\ntheir negotiating strategy.\nSecretary Kissinger: So far they haven't used verification at all to push us --\nPresident Ford: Do we have mixed Minuteman II's and Minuteman III's else-\nwhere?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: No.\nSecretary Kissinger: George, do we have your paper -- You were going to\ncheck whether you want the Russians running around our ICBM fields?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: This would be an opportune time to raise\nsite inspection -- - this could bring us several good effects.\nFORD LIBRARY\nTOR SECRET, SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD\nTOP SECRET (SENSTTIVE\n19\nSecretary Kissinger: But suppose they accept it -- Are we willing to let them\nrun around?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Sure.\nPresident Ford: That's certainly a change!\nGeneral Brown: We wouldn't let them look just anywhere.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: They're not going to be running around like\nHenry makes it sound.\nPresident Ford: This would give them a lot more freedom of movement\nthan anything I've heard before.\nGeneral Brown: We could set up a program that would let them tell whether\nthe missiles are MIR Ved are not. But we are concerned about what they\nmight see on some of our other equipment -- the electronics, and so forth.\nSecretary Kissinger: How do you keep them from seeing that?\nGeneral Brown: We would have to limit their movements.\nPresident Ford: How do we know this will satisfy them?\nSecretary Schlesinger: It should.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: It would be the beginning of agreements on on-\nsite inspections --\nSecretary Kissinger: They will not accept it.\nSecretary Schlesinger: It will put the burden on them.\nAmbassador Johnson: Even proposing unilateral on-site inspection will give\nthem problems.\nSecretary Kissinger: So far, we haven't seen one specific Soviet verification\nproposal. They may say that each side should designate what it wants to\nMIRV, and verify the other with national technical means.\nAmbassador Johnson: They may not even propose designations, but national\ntechnical means only.\nis\nSecretary Schlesinger: I have not been able to learn what we gain by stopping\n1020\ndeployment.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SENSITIVE\n20\nDr. Ikle: We gain the flexibility to respond to the evolving negotiations. If\nthey are upset with our Minuteman II - Minuteman III problem, we can\nrespond by moving support equipment, and so forth.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Moving the support equipment would not help.\nSecretary Kissinger: We could at least move to another missile field -- -\nThis would give us two more Tridents.\nSecretary Schlesinger: You think we could agree to count 650 if we had only\ndeployed 550? That's not possible --\nSecretary Kissinger: I don't know, but we're not at that point. This would\ngive us some elbow room to delay by 4 to 6 weeks to permit the Delegation\nto see what it could come up with. I believe there's a 50-50 chance that they\nwant an agreement badly, so it may go easier than we think.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure that the cost of the delay is not greater\nthan the cost of going ahead. If we are already pregnant, it's somewhat like\nthe Spartan missile, where we were already pregnant.\nPresident Ford: I don't see what a six week delay hurts. If we put them in\nnow, and are obliged to count all of them, we lose. If we hold up, and there\nis no problem, we can proceed.\nSecretary Schlesinger: If we move, it costs an additional half a billion dollars.\nIf they respond favorably, we can give only an embarrassed response --\nPresident Ford: What embarrassed response?\nSecretary Schlesinger: If they say yes we agree, we will have to say that we\nwill have inspection at Malmstrom. We are better off going ahead with the\ndeployment in the first place.\n8.\nFORD\nTOP SECRE SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD i DENALD LIBRARY\nCERALS\nLIBRAST\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n21\nPresident Ford: This is a judgment factor, and there's no way we can tell.\nBut the odds are better if we hold up at least six weeks, or maybe we will\nknow quicker.\nAmbassador Johnson: I can't make any predictions.\nPresident Ford: Let's go on to the next issue.\nSecretary Kissinger: There's one other rule in the desirable category -- - -\nSecretary Schlesinger: The last rule on the chart? I have some problems\nwith that. We may wish to change our ground support equipment. This\ncould be so prohibitive that it might not be desirable.\nSecretary Kissinger: I was going to list it in the next category -- it is\ndesirable if applied to them, but the problem is if it is applied to us.\nWe have to decide what we want more.\nDr. Ikle: It doesn't even buy as much with them.\nSecretary Kissinger: Going on into the next one, there would be no changes\nin test ranges except as agreed.\nTo con-\ntinue getting this data, we would prefer to prohibit changes in test\nrange locations.\nPresident Ford: Do they have fixed test ranges now?\nSecretary Kissinger: They have been to date, but we don't want to be\nconstrained by this ourselves.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I don't understand the rule.\nSecretary Kissinger: We considered it, but we don't want it.\nThe next rule is that \"if new types of MIR V missiles are developed and\nflight tested, launchers which are compatible in size with such missiles\nwill be counted under the MIRV limit\". The problem we have is with\ntheir SS-11 silos -- we don't want them to develop a new MIRV missile\nwhich fits. But any new missiles we would develop would be compatible\nwith our existing silos. So if Alex can get this applied unilaterally --\n(laughter).\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRAGY BENALD\nGERALD B. FORD LIBRANA\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n22\nDr. Ikle: We may want a softer rule -- such as a requirement to discuss\nall new missiles in the SCC. This way we might be able to walk the line\nbetween the MX and the follow-on to the 11.\nMr. Duckett: I'd like to add that we agreed that this one should come out.\nWe just said initially that we should take a look at it, but now believe it\nshould come out.\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't believe there is any need\nto cover these other rules. No one here wants you to approve any of them.\nPresident Ford: And they wouldn't want them.\nSecretary Kissinger: There's a long list. We could go down these last\nfour, but we decided --\nPresident Ford: We either did not want them, or they were undesirable --\nSecretary Kissinger: They would be OK for them, but not for us.\nDr. Ikle: Except that we might want to require that the discussion of new\nmissiles take place in the SCC.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Could we go back to Category I for just a second?\nThe emphasis of the fourth rule must be on the agreed procedures in the\nSCC. If later on we wish to remove Minuteman III and deploy more MIRVs\nat sea, we may not want to destroy the silos. So the emphasis should be\non SCC agreed procedures. We should not put emphasis on destruction of\nthe silo.\nPresident Ford: If we moved from the silo to sea, we don't want to be\ncommitted to dismantling it --\nSecretary Kissinger: I suspect they would not agree to the procedure, but\nI agree with Jim --\nThe next set of issues deal with cruise missiles. The Soviets will\nundoubtedly say that the Aide Memoire applies to both ballistic and cruise\nmissiles, even though we say only ballistic missiles. From the record,\nthere is some legitimate ground for confusion. In Vladivostok, we're not\nsure the interpreter always interpreted the word ballistic. We have a\nTOR SECRET (SENSITIVE\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nLIBRATA SERALD ? FORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n23\nstrong interest in retaining the option to deploy long-range air launch\ncruise missiles -- I might say that I have some proprietary interest in\nthem! (laughter) Alex could begin by saying that the Aide Memoire\napplies only to ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Aide Memoire\nspeaks only of heavy bombers -- other vehicles carrying cruise missiles\nare free, such as ships and transport aircraft. This is a perfectly\nlegitimate interpretation of the Aide Memoire -- more legitimate than\ntheir interpretation of including cruise missiles. We could also propose\nthat cruise missiles be counted above 3,000 kilometers. In return, any\nother aircraft carrying cruise missiles would be counted in the bomber\ntotal, and we would count them on any other vehicles. This closes a\nloophole in their favor. But Alex can go here from saying initially that\nonly ballistic missiles are included. If they want to get bloody on the\nVladivostok agreement, we'll just tell them that we'll put ALCMs on\nthe cargo planes. That has its problems, but it bothers them --\nPresident Ford: Where do we stand on the development of cruise\nmissiles?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We plan to fly the first one in one year.\nPresident Ford: What range will it have?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: 1500 miles.\nPresident Ford: How big a warhead?\nDeputy Secretary Clements:\nGeneral Brown:\nWith the accuracies\nwe can get, it will be a very significant weapon.\nPresident Ford: Could you repeat the progression, Henry -- our position\nat the start will be that only ballistic missiles are included?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes -- starting with ballistic missiles only, we\nwould first agree to count ALCMs only above 3000 kilometers. Then we\ncould agree to count any other aircraft with cruise missiles under a\n2400 total, or even ban them on other aircraft.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRAST GERALD R. FORD\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE\n24\nPresident Ford: How would we verify them on other aircraft?\nSecretary Kissinger: The verification of ALCMs is in any event mind\nboggling. If you say they count only if they are hanging on the aircraft,\nthey can avoid the limit by not hanging them. If you apply the MIRV\nground rules, any type of aircraft seen carrying them would have to\ncount. We would verify by never flying them on tankers.\nPresident Ford: Can you verify 1500 versus 3000 kilometers?\nMr. Colby:\nMr. Duckett:\nGeneral Brown: Of course, we'll tell them through our publications.\nPresident Ford: That would permit us to verify if they were under 3000\nkilometers within the limit. Do we have any information as to their\ndevelopment program?\nMr. Duckett:\nPresident Ford:\nMr. Duckett:\nMr. Colby: They have an extensive program, but not the same kind as\nours.\nMr. Duckett: Right. They have a lot more experience than we have,\nbut of a different type.\nSecretary Kissinger: They had long-range cruise missiles, but abandoned\nthem when they went to ballistic missiles.\nMr. Duckett: In the early sixties, they had two programs, which they\ncancelled when we cancelled ours.\n&\nFORD\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n25\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Our technology is such that they can't build\nthe same thing for the next ten years. Our cruise missiles will be\ninterchangeable -- on aircraft, ships, or submarines. It will be made\nthe same size to fit on all of them.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have a trade off we can make over launch\nmodes -- tankers, ships, and so forth. We can get the Soviet reaction,\nbut in this case, their reaction is totally predictable. They will insist\nthat the Aide Memoire counts cruise missiles. But we can offer as a\nsolution a longer limit -- counting over 3000 kilometers, together with\ncounting them on other vehicles.\nAmbassador Johnson: It's a fine point, but the Aide Memoire doesn't\ncount ballistic missiles on other aircraft either.\nSecretary Kissinger: That's right. We could put ballistic missiles on\nthe C-5. We have enough loopholes that we could get somewhere.\nPresident Ford: We're not in a totally defensive position.\nSecretary Kissinger: It is in our own interest to close all of these loop-\nholes; we want cruise missiles on bombers for penetration, but we don't\nwant an arms race in cruise missiles on ships, submarines, and so forth.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We need to be careful not to foreclose our tactical\ncruise missile options.\nSecretary Kissinger: But those would be within the 600 kilometers.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure 600 kilometers does the job. We\nare thinking about deploying some of them in Europe.\nPresident Ford: What range would those be?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Probably 1200 kilometers.\nGeneral Brown: There's the sea case also --\nAmbassador Johnson: Jim, are you talking about land based, or airborne?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Airborne.\nR.\nFORD\nCERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY BERMLD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n26\nAmbassador Johnson: ALCMs up to 3000 kilometers wouldn't be covered,\nso airborne would be okay --\nSecretary Kissinger: In any event, it's clear that now the Aide Memoire\ncovers cruise missiles only on heavy bombers. There's a big area in\nwhich Alex can negotiate.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We have good leverage on this.\nDr. Ikle: In the long run, the verification of cruise missiles will be\ndifficult, and we may want to take them out and put them in a separate\nagreement.\nSecretary Kissinger: A stalemate on this is totally predictable --\nDr. Ikle: The verification problem of cruise missiles is so severe that\nit might contaminate an overall agreement.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I think that's right. There's no way to distinguish\ncruise missiles from drones, for example. We have drones on our C-130\naircraft. You probably want to put cruise missiles in a codicil to the\nagreement.\nSecretary Kissinger: Brezhnev will be back in 1977! (laughter)\nThe other problem we have concerns heavy bombers. Bill, could you put\nup the chart with the bombers? (Colby shows chart)\nThe main issue is the Backfire. It's bigger than the F-111, but smaller\nthan our B-1. It has identical range/payload characteristics with the\nBison, which we have always counted as a heavy bomber. Thus, there's\na good case that it should be counted.\nWe can expect the Soviets to strenuously resist this position. Most of\ntheir deployments so far have been with naval units, and our intelligence\nindicates that it is intended for peripheral missions.\nMr. Colby: There's some difference within the intelligence community,\nbut our basic intelligence indicates that it is for peripheral missions,\nalthough it can cover all of the US on one-way missions.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD is LIBRARY BERALD\nFORD & OERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\n27\nMr. Duckett: It is also refuelable, and that gives us some leverage, since\nit will be hard for them to explain why it's refuelable if they don't intend\nto use it except for peripheral missions.\nPresident Ford: I don't understand the peripheral missions --\nMr. Colby: These are theater missions and naval aviation uses.\nMr. Duckett: It's important to remember that they built 1000 Badger\nmedium aircraft in the 1950s. This is their largest single program\never undertaken. Thus, they may have a great incentive to get a new\nmedium bomber, since they obviously see a considerable need for a\nmedium bomber. But the question is why refueling --\nSecretary Schlesinger: We may have to eventually fall back on this one\nalso. But our initial position should be hard nosed. If we fall back, we\nstill need ancillary agreements that if they deploy it with tankers or on\nArctic bases that it would have to count.\nPresident Ford: In other words, if they expand the bases and make them\noperational --\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes.\nSecretary Kissinger: Or deploy tankers.\nPresident Ford: Do they have tankers now?\nMr. Duckett: A few that are really cludged up. They have put tanks in\nthe Bison aircraft. They have limited experience with tankers, and\nlimited equipment.\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, those are the major issues. There\nare others, such as mobile missiles, where they have an intermediate\nrange missile which could cause problems. But we can come back to\nthat later. This should not arise initially. Also, the Verification Panel\nwas unanimous that we need to draw a limit on heavy missiles, since\ntheir new light missiles are considerably heavier than their old ones,\nso they don't keep creeping up.\nR.\nCERALD\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY BERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE\n28\nPresident Ford: Defined in throw weight?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. We want them to agree that any ICBM greater\nthan the SS-19 would be counted as a heavy ICBM.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We may also want to get them to agree to define\na category of \"medium\" ICBMs between 2500 and 7000 pounds throw weight.\nWe are beginning to lose the concept of a light missile, and this might set\nthe basis for some eventual limits on throw weight.\nPresident Ford: Well, gentlemen, thank you. My impression is that we\nare making some headway in understanding these problems. Alex, when\ndo you leave?\nAmbassador Johnson: Tomorrow.\nPresident Ford: When's your first meeting?\nAmbassador Johnson: Friday, but that should be only exploratory. The\nfirst substantive meeting will be on Monday.\nPresident Ford: Can you estimate any rate of progress?\nAmbassador Johnson: I see. two alternatives -- first, they may come\nback with a full-blown agreement.\nPresident Ford: And want you to sign it! (laughter)\nAmbassador Johnson: They won't want me to sign, but they may lay it\non the table. The other possibility is that they will want to feel out our\nposition. In either event, within a few days, or a few weeks, we will\nknow their position.\nSecretary Kissinger: We should then put our position forward. There\nis every indication that they want an agreement before Brezhnev's visit\nhere in June. I think it may go faster than Alex expects.\nSecretary Schlesinger: I would like to make one last point. Subsequent\nto SALT I, on every ambiguity, such as the 15% increase in dimensions,\nthey pushed us to the limits. They will exploit every ambiguity so we\nshould tie this down as much as possible.\nR.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\nSERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRAST\nTOP SECR (SENSATIVE\n29\nPresident Ford: I agree. But your general thrust, Alex, is that we want\nto achieve success. We should aim at an understanding that will culminate\nwhen Brezhnev comes.\nSecretary Kissinger: We need to get Alex out of town, before he starts\nmeeting with the Murphy Commission to tell them how to beat the NSC\nsystem. He did it for four years when he was Under Secretary of State !\n(laughter)\nPresident Ford: Have you been up there to testify, Alex?\nAmbassador Johnson: Not yet, but Bob and I play golf together every\nso often.\nPresident Ford: I heard he has not been as staunch as we would like.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Relative to the rest of the Commission, he has\nbeen very, very steadfast! We heard the rest of them on the intelligence\nbusiness, and they were really off base; but he has been bringing them\naround.\nPresident Ford: I had heard otherwise, but I am glad to hear I may have\nbeen wrong.\nSecretary Kissinger: I believe he is coming around.\nPresident Ford: Well, thank you all once again.\nFORD & OERALO LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY"
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