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    "description": "This file contains material relating to Sihanouk.",
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        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
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        "Vietnam War, 1961-1975"
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 3/28/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09172\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nAgenda\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nMeeting of the NSC, 3/28/75\nCREATION DATE\n03/28/1975\nVOLUME\n3 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200011\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 3/28/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\n09173\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\nTALKING POINTS - MIDDLE EAST\nOpening Remarks\n1.\nBefore I ask Henry to give us a rundown on what has gone\non, where we are, and some thoughts on where we might\ngo from here, I would like to make a couple of points.\n2.\nIn my opinion, Israel has acted inflexibly and has created\na genuine crisis of confidence. We have been telling them\nconsistently for eight months what was required for move-\nment in the Sinai. As you all know, we have been pouring\nin military equipment since November 1973 in response to\ntheir urgent requirements, to enable thein to deal with the\nnegotiations from a position of security and self-confidence.\nAt no time did they tell us they simply could not go along\nwith what we said was the irreducible minimum they would\nhave to give.\n3.\nAs a consequence, we are now faced with a very difficult\nsituation. Henry, why don't you explain how we got where\nwe are, and what are some of the implications of the present\nsituation.\nSumming-Up Comments\n4.\nIn the past we have had a unique relationship with Israel. Our\nexpectation has been that this special relationship would produce\nsufficient trust in the U.S. that Israel would respond positively\non issues which were for us of overriding national and mutual\ninterest, such as the second Sinai agreement. This expectation\nhas proven unfounded.\n5.\nWe must try to get across to the Israelis that if we are expected\nto run the risk of war for them, they must be willing to run the\nrisks of peace for us. We have no choice but to put ourselves\nin a position to protect our own interests.\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nMR # 08.60, #22\nLIBRARY CERALD R. FORD\nNSC letter 12/2/09\nBy dal NARA, Date 1/4/10\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS\n2\n6.\nWhat has happened, as Henry has said, is that the Israelis\nhave blown up a Middle East policy conducted over 18 months.\nAs you know, I have directed a reassessment of our entire policy\nand strategy in the Middle East, covering all aspects of our\nrelationship with all countries in the area, as well as the\nimpact of our Middle East policy on our relations with\ncountries outside the area. The results should provide us\nwith a basis for determining where we go from here.\n7.\nAt least until we have completed the overall policy review, I\nwould like all Government agencies to adopt a new attitude in\ndealing with Israeli requests and officials: treat them in the\nsame correct, courteous fashion and with the same priority\naccorded officials of other very friendly governments -- but\nno more than that. This should be done in such a way that\neach agency, on its own, and not as if in response to a\ndirective from me, holds back so as to accord only standard\nfriendly bureaucratic treatment to Israeli requests. I also\ndo not want Israelis wandering about freely in your agencies.\nI want a single point of contact, or at most two, designated,\nthrough which Israeli embassy officials and others will deal.\nIn the past, the Israelis have had too much freedom, almost\nas much as our own people.\n8.\nAn important, immediate issue is how we handle the pending\nIsraeli request for $1.5 billion in new arms and $2.59 billion\nin financial assistance. I want these two requests to be very\ncarefully examined by appropriate agencies in terms of their\njustification, just as if they were routine requests from\nanother friendly country.\n9.\nAs for specific agencies, I want to see the following actions:\nState -- I want State to control and cut back on all contacts\nwith the Israeli Embassy.\n8ECREF/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\nBERALD R. FORD LIBRARA\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\n3\nDefense You have the trickiest problem. Pending the\noutcome of our policy reappraisal, I would like you to delay\non the several items which are of unusual sensitivity - - the\nF-15 team, the Lance missile, and the Laser-Guided Bomb.\nI also want to hold action on co-production agreements. You\nshould cancel the planned visit to Washington by Israeli Defense\nMinister Peres. I also want a list of all the arms we have\nsupplied Israel since November 1973; please compile also a\nlist of major arms sales already approved for Arab countries.\nAgain, all this should not look like orders from the White House.\nTreasury Drag your feet on the meeting of the US-Israeli\nEconomic Committee and the projects already approved; we\ndon't want to pyramid more and more deals.\nCIA and DIA Cut out intelligence exchanges with Israel\nexcept tactical intelligence that might prevent a surprise attack.\nEach agency must take the responsibility on itself and not blame\nthe White House. This has to be a team effort. The situation\nis very serious.\n10.\nIn order to ensure that we have properly coordinated policy and\nadequate centralized control over arms agreements and ship-\nments, I want the sale and the delivery dates of arms deals\nover $5 million with any Middle East country, whether Israel\nor an Arab country, to be approved in advance by the White\nHouse, using the procedures recently set up for all sales of\nover $25 million.\n11.\nFinally, I want to ask all of you to see to it that your staffs\nunderstand that we do not now consider ourselves in a crisis\nsituation with respect to the Middle East. We are, however,\nfaced with a new situation of potentially serious consequences.\nTherefore, we must review all aspects of our policies and\nplanning relating to the Middle East and tighten up certain\nprocedures right away in order to protect U.S. interests.\nThe changes in procedures which I have asked be carried out\nshould be described in that perspective. In response to press\nqueries, you should stick to the usual practice of saying\nnothing about NSC meetings and holding as closely as possible\nany specifics about our review of policy or changes in procedures.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\nFORD & LIBRARY\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\n4\nTALKING POINTS - SOUTHEAST ASIA\n1.\nThe situation in South Vietnam has reached a critical stage.\nThe entire northern half of the country could be lost if South\nVietnamese forces are not soon able to mount an effective\ndefense. There also could be up to a million refugees to be\nrelocated from Danang and many more if Danang cannot be\nheld. There are reports that the Communists may even be\nplanning attacks against Saigon itself.\n2.\nI have sent General Fred Weyand out to Vietnam for a first-\nhand personal assessment of the situation and of South\nVietnam's immediate needs. We will know more when he\nreturns with his report.\n3.\nI am also concerned about developments in Cambodia, where\nthe Communists appear to be stepping up their offensive\nagain.\n4.\nIt is vitally important at this time to assure our friends of\nour solid support, and that we will do everything we can\nto get them what they need.\n5.\nI, for my part, intend to do everything I can to help our\nfriends to cope with this crisis and to stabilize this\ndangerous situation.\n6.\nI count on all of you and on your agencies to help in every\nway you can.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS (XGDS)\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nB\nreig\nADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n3\nAttendance at NSC Meeting\nFriday, March 28, 3:00 p.m.\nThe Vice President\nState:\nRobert Ingersoll\nTreasury:\nWilliam Simon\nDefense:\nJames Schlesinger\nWilliam Clements\nJCS:\nGeneral George S. Brown\nCIA:\nWilliam Colby\n-- Mideast Portion\n-- Vietnam Portion (Stand-by)\nWH:\nDonald Rumsfeld\nHenry A. Kissinger\nLt. General Brent Scowcroft\nNSC:\nRobert Oakley -- Mideast Portion\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09174\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nRobert Oakley\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nBrent Scowcroft\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 3/28/1975\nCREATION DATE\n03/28/1975\nVOLUME\n21 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200011\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 3/28/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nMEMORANDUM\n2195X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nApril 9, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis mo\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC Meeting,\nMarch 28, 1975\nHerewith for your information are Bob Oakley's minutes of the\nMarch 28 NSC meeting on the Middle East, Vietnam and Cambodia.\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDate:\nFriday, March 28, 1975\nTime:\n3:15 p.m. to 5:15 p.m.\nPlace:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSubject:\nMiddle East and Southeast Asia\nPrincipals\nThe President\nThe Vice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of the Treasury William Simon\nSecretary of Defense James Schlesinger\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nDeputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll (only for\nVietnam portion)\nUnder Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nWH:\nDonald Rumsfeld\nNSC:\nLt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nRobert B. Oakley TSO\nXGDS - 3\nDECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.\nBYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n(4)$(b)\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR 92-10, # 18 NSC H. 10/7/94\nBy KBH\n2/6/95\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 2 -\nPresident:\nThis is the first of the steps, and a very important\nstep, which we must take following the extremely\ndisappointing results of Henry Kissinger's long and\narduous trip to the Middle East. I told Rabin that\nunless there was a settlement, we would have to\nreassess our policies toward the Middle East,\nincluding Israel. I don't know if they understood\nwhat I was saying but I think they do now. Since I\nhave been in office, we have worked with Israel to\ntry and get a settlement. We acted in good faith and\nI assume they did, also, but when the chips were\ndown they showed a lack of flexibility which was\nneeded for an agreement. What I said to the Hearst\npapers about more Israeli flexibility being in the\nbest interests of peace is true. But there was no\nflexibility. I will catch flak for my position and\nHenry is already catching it. The time has come\nfor a good hard look.\nI will tell you briefly about my record in Congress\nwhere Israel is concerned. It was so close that I\nhad a black reputation with the Arabs. I have always\nliked and respected the Israeli people. They are\nintelligent and dedicated to the causes in which they\nbelieve. They are dedicated to their religion, their\ncountry, their family and their high moral standards.\nI admire them and respect them. And I have never\nbeen so disappointed as to see people I respect unable\nto see that we are trying to do something for their\ninterest as well as for our own. But in the final\nanalysis our commitment is to the United States.\nVice President:\nHear, hear.\nPresident:\nWe could have been together but now I do not know.\nThe reassessment will take place and we will see.\nWe cannot afford to have our position in this country\nundercut but I must tell you what I think. We will be\nfollowing a firm policy of reassessment. It will not\nbe decided today. Everyone will take a close look\nfirst. But in the meantime, keep everyone at arm's\nlength.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 3 -\nHenry, do you want to tell us about your mission\nand where we are now?\nKissinger:\nLet me describe some of the issues which we will\nface in the reassessment of a Middle East policy.\nFirst, what have we been trying to achieve?\nIn November 1973 all the Western Europeans, the\nJapanese and the USSR were solidly united on an\nimmediate Israeli return to the 1967 lines. If the\nsituation had been allowed to continue, given the\neconomic problem in the West, all the pressures\nwould have been on us. And at Geneva everyone\nwould have been united against Israel with the US\nacting as Israel's lawyer. Our policy helped abort\nthis sort of Geneva Conference, even though we\nwent along with the idea in order to keep the Russians\ncalmed down. We had the willingness of Sadat to\nplay a constructive, cooperative role and the active\nencouragement of Feisal for the step-by-step\napproach. This held off the radicals and enabled\nus to create a situation in which all the Arabs were\nturning to us, while Israel had a situation which it\ncould handle politically since it had to deal with only\na small piece at a time. We also neutralized the\nWestern Europeans and Japanese who are anxious to\nreplace us in the Middle East. Objectively, there\nis little to distinguish the effect of their policies\nfrom those of the Soviets. This process which we\ninstituted proceeded well and met Israel's interests\nas well as our own. The two were compatible in\nthe step-by-step approach.\nSo the big issue with Israel during my last trip was\nnot lines on maps. By the way, the leaked maps in\nthe New York Times and elsewhere are inaccurate.\nThey only showed us a map after the negotiations\nwere over. But lines are trivial compared to\nwhether or not the moderate Arab leaders are able\nto say the US has delivered something. And this is\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD i LIBRARY CERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 4 -\nfully in line with the survival of Israel, really\nthe best way to ensure Israel's survival. The\nUSSR was completely out of the game and on this\nlast trip Feisal came to the point where he told\nme he trusted me to proceed as I judged best even\nthough he would have preferred another approach.\nAnd Asad told me he wanted separate negotiations\nwith Israel rather than Geneva.\nSo our disappointment is that Israel did not under-\nstand. They could have been shielded and their\nonly friend, literally their only friend in the world,\nwas in control of the process, dealing with the Arabs\nsingly and keeping the USSR out. Even Iraq was\nbeginning to move out of the Kurdish orbit. I do not\napprove of the brutal way in which Iran and Iraq\ndisposed of the fate of the Kurds, but it created a\nsituation whereby the Iraqis no longer had such need\nfor the Soviets. I was hoping that in such a situation\nwith all the Arabs turning to us and away from the\nUSSR, someone in the Kremlin would have gotten\ndiscouraged and said, \"Let's stop pouring so much\nmoney and effort down a rat hole. \" That was the\nsituation we had one week ago.\nOn the whole, in the negotiations, I think Egypt\nwent further and Israel not as far as I had expected.\nBut our role and the whole strategy we had followed\nfor eighteen months, putting us in the key position, has\nbeen disrupted. Now that the parties are face to face\nwith it, they are not so eager for Geneva.\nA unilateral US effort now would be a mistake, would\nmake it look as if we were more anxious than the\nparties. If they came to us, we could think about\ndoing something but there can not be any more\nshuttles. The pressure on the Arabs is likely to be\nagainst cooperating with us. Sadat will have to move\ntoward the other Arabs in order to protect himself and\nalso a bit toward the Soviets and Western Europeans\nand Geneva. Moreover, tensions in the area will\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n5 I I\nbuild up. UNEF is due for renewal on April 26\nand UNDOF a month later. Sadat told me he\nwould renew UNEF for three months, not six.\nI would expect UNDOF to be renewed for two\nmonths. Both would thus expire simultaneously\nby the end of July and by August we could have a\nflash point on both fronts.\nSchlesinger:\nWill the Soviets veto a renewal?\nKissinger:\nNot if the parties are for it. I expect we will have\nsome violations of the agreement soon. The\nEgyptians already have some SAM sites across the\nCanal and there will probably be more. Syria and\nthe PLO will get back in the game, perhaps with\nguerilla raids from Lebanon. The Secretary General\nis already in the game, trying to arrange Geneva.\nI am trying to slow him down a little. If Geneva\nmeets, things will happen. Israel will have to deal\nwith all of its neighbors and all of the final issues\nat the same time. Up to the present, thanks to our\nstrategy, we and Israel were able to avoid this.\nPresident:\nWhen would Geneva meet?\nKissinger:\nLet's not rush into it. We must act as if we were\nready to go all-out to head for Geneva but not\nactually set a date. That will have a good effect on\nthe parties. I think we can wait until June but we\ncan not appear to stall or hang back. Even though\nthe Soviets are now in a good tactical position, we\nstill have the chips because everyone is still counting\non us to move Israel. We can get the benefit of this\nbasic situation if we can deliver. This is true\nbilaterally or at Geneva. If we do not deliver, the\nArabs will conclude that only force can get anything\nfrom Israel. For the moment Egypt and Saudi Arabia\nstill have some confidence in the US, judging from\nwhat was said to the Vice President.\nVice President: And also affection for the US and for Henry.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 6 -\nKissinger:\nThere will now be a more active Soviet role and\nif the Arabs do not think they can get enough\nprogress they will ask that the UK and France\nparticipate at Geneva. We have an interest in the\nsurvival of Israel but we also have broader interests\nwith the Western Europeans and Japan and the Arabs.\nIf there is another war we run the risk of antagonizing\nthe Arabs definitively and of pushing them into the\narms of the Soviets. We will also risk a direct\nconfrontation with the Soviets. At Geneva we will\nconfront the basic issues of final frontiers and\nPalestine and guarantees and demilitarization. We\nmay have to draw up a comprehensive US plan for\nthe Middle East so as not to be empty-handed.\nA big question is to what degree we will want to\ncoordinate with or dissociate ourselves from Israel.\nWhat kind of economic and military aid should we\nprovide and what should the timing be? What kind\nof military supply policy should we have for the\nArabs? As I see it, the only remaining Soviet\ninfluence in Egypt is the latter's need for spare parts\nand other military items from the USSR. What about\nour energy policy and the Joint Committees? What\nabout the PLO?\nEven if we decide to do nothing we must have a policy.\nWe need a diplomatic strategy for Geneva and a\nstrategy for bilateral relations, with the Arab states\nand Israel, economically and militarily. There are\nalso some tactical questions concerning Geneva:\nShould we go for a stalemate with a subsequent\nresumption of our bilateral efforts, or go to Geneva\nwith a US plan and force a settlement? We need a\ncarefully worked-out strategy for another war. The\nlast time we came out very well without an advance\nstrategy but the next time we can not improvise.\nAnother war will produce very heavy casualties- I\nthink Bill Colby's estimate is for 7000 Israeli dead--\nwith more Arab countries joining in and a greater\nrisk of Soviet involvement!\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 7 -\nThe Soviets will be a much bigger threat than in\nthe past. In 1967 and again in 1973 they stood aside\nwhile their Arab allies were humiliated. The cumu-\nlative resentment is building up and is likely to push\nthem to be less cautious this time in showing their\npower. This is all the more true since they see the\nUS as weak and unwilling to stand up for its commit-\nments anywhere in the world.\nThat is why we need a total reassessment. Joe\nSisco will be in charge of a special working group\nto consider all of these questions. It should take\nabout three weeks.\nWe need to keep the immediate situation under\ncontrol and then recapture control of the long-term\nsituation. We can do this since the Arabs know they\nstill need to come to us to get progress. But we\nmust be absolutely certain that we can deliver\nprogress the next time.\nPresident:\nThank you, Henry, what do the others have to say?\nSchlesinger:\nI think Henry's presentation was very accurate.\nOur position could be one of dignified aloofness.\nWe are in the cat-bird seat. We can go to Geneva,\npoint out we have already done our best but did not\nsucceed, so we will just sit and wait to see what\ndevelops.\nVice President:\nDo you mean aloofness from Israel?\nSchlesinger:\nYes, I do. There should not be full policy coordination\nwith Israel as in the past. We should look forward,\nnot to the past. United States policy has been\nfrustrated to the extent we hope to be successful in\nthe years ahead. We can not allow Israel to continue\nits relationship with us as if there were no problems.\nWe can not let them conclude that they can upset the\nU.S. applecart but the Administration can do nothing\nabout it. The military balance from the Israeli stand-\npoint is much better than the last time we met (in the\nNSC) to discuss this problem. We overestimated\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nGERALD LIBRARY\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n00 1 I\nbadly the amount of Soviet arms which Egypt had\nreceived. So the balance for Israel is reasonably\nfavorable and we need not be concerned over our\naloofness.\nSimon:\nWhat about the Joint Economic Commissions?\nPresident:\nThis is a crucial question. Joe Sisco is coordinating\nour reassessment. It is not aimed at tilting toward\nor against Israel or toward or against Arabs. It is\naimed at the best interests of the U.S. Jim\n(Schlesinger) used a good word, \"aloof, \" and I think\nthis is the posture we should adopt at least during\nthe period of our policy reassessment. As an\nexample of this, it would be better if Peres did not\ncome on his visit as originally planned. And as for\nthe F-15, I think we should hold up the visit by the\nIsraeli team which was coming to make an assess-\nment. Bill (Simon), you should be aloof with the\nJoint Committee.\nSimon:\nWe have Joint Commissions with several countries,\nincluding Iran and Saudi Arabia. How shall we\nhandle this?\nPresident:\nThe Iranians and Saudis are in a different category.\nThey were not involved in the negotiations.\nSimon:\nWhat about Egypt?\nPresident:\nWhat are we doing there?\nSimon:\nWe have several projects, particularly helping them\nrebuild the area along the Suez Canal.\nPresident:\nAs I recall, we were slow in getting started with\nEgypt so we can afford to be more forthcoming than\nwith the Israelis.\nThere is no pique on our part but we are\nreassessing so we will be restrained.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD LIBRAFT\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 9 -\nColby:\nPresident:\nAs I recall my own experiences as a Congressman,\nthe Israeli representatives float very freely on\nCapitol Hill. Now we can't do anything about that\nwith Congress. But I have the impression the\nIsraeli representatives are almost as free in many\nDepartments as they are with Congress. You must\ntry to control that.\nSchlesinger:\nWe have\nIsraeli representatives.\nIt is very difficult to handle.\nPresident:\nTry to do\nChannelize the relationships with Israeli represen-\ntatives. The proper relationship should be business-\nlike but arms-length and aloof. Jim, what did we\ndo about that Israeli shopping list last fall?\nKissinger:\nThe NSC recommended that we give them two out\nof eight slices but we ended up by giving them four\nout of eight.\nPresident:\nI decided to include the Lance and the LGB because\nI thought they needed it. In retrospect, bearing in\nmind what I believed we were going to do together\nand what has actually happened, we were probably\ntoo generous. Jim, hold off on delivering those high\npriority items if there is a way to do it.\nSchlesinger:\nWe have a commitment to deliver the Lance.\nVice President:\nI thought they had a commitment, too, on negotiations.\nClements:\nWe can prolong the Lance training in order to delay\ndelivery.\nPresident:\nStay within the guidelines. How you implement it\nis your business. When we have reassessed, then\nwe can proceed. For the moment, I would like to\nlook at the four slices of arms we gave them and\nwhat we have delivered already.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 10 -\nSchlesinger:\nHaig was here last week complaining about the\ndrawdowns on NATO stocks in Europe. I told\nhim he knew all about it.\nPresident:\nI would like to see those four slices. Did we go\nso far as to increase their offensive capability,\nnot only improve their defensive capability? I\nwant to see everything that has been delivered to\nIsrael. I want to be able to show Congress just\nhow much we have done militarily for Israel. Also,\nI would like to see what we have delivered to the\nArabs in the way of military hardware.\nGeneral Brown:\nThere is the question of when the stocks we have\ndrawn down for Israel will be replaced for our own\nforces. You can use this with Congress.\nPresident:\nThat would be useful. Get me a list of what we\nhave done since I have been President. If challenged,\nI want the record.\nKissinger:\nIt would also be valuable to know what we have\ndelivered since November 1973 when our major\nre-equipment program began.\nPresident:\nThat will be useful for background but the stress\nshould be on what has happened since I came to office,\nso show where the cut-off is. We have drawn down\nour own capability.\nClements:\nWe have even drawn out of our own stocks.\nPresident:\nI want to look at the facts. Bill (Colby), do you want\nto talk?\nColby:\nA. major factor is the increased chance of war. We\nput out a Special National Intelligence Estimate yesterday.\nThe armies of Egypt, Syria and Israel are all in a\nstate of alert and there is a substantial chance of\nhostilities breaking out either deliberately or by\naccident at any time in the next few weeks. If it does\nnot happen quickly, then there will be negotiations\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFOGO\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 11 -\nat Geneva and if there is no progress there by early\nsummer there are high odds that Egypt and Syria\nwill launch a coordinated attack and even higher odds\nthat Israel will attack first. Israel probably sees\nwar as inevitable and may decide to hit now. Com-\nparatively, they are well off. They can probably\nbeat Egypt and Syria both in 7-10 days.\nKissinger:\nWe told Asad this was our estimate of how the war\nwould develop, not Israel's estimate but our own.\nAsad told me we did not understand: \"We learned\nin 1973 that Israel can not stand pain. We will lose\na lot but we will not give up and we will use the\nstrategy of inflicting casualties and fighting an\nextended war. We will lose territory and men but\nbleed Israel and draw the Soviets in. \"\nSchlesinger:\nIf Israel strikes first, they will not behave rationally.\nThey are likely to strike through Lebanon.\nKissinger:\nThey may be able to hit quickly but the Syrians\nare determined to hold out.\nColby:\nWe project 7, 000 Israeli killed, three times as\nmany as in October 1973. But we believe they can\npunch through.\nSisco:\nThe Arabs will not stick their necks out. This is\na very critical judgment. It can determine the\noutcome of the war. The Arabs will fight on the\ndefensive and drag it out as long as possible.\nKissinger:\nThe Arabs think of prolonged war and an early oil\nembargo.\nSchlesinger:\nBefore the US resupplies? That would be crazy.\nWe won't stand for it.\nKissinger:\nWe must think of it. Also, our contingency planning\nneeds to assume higher risk-taking by the Soviets.\nPresident:\nDid the Soviets go further in 1973 than before?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 12 -\nSchlesinger:\nThey threatened the British and French in 1956\nwith nuclear attack.\nKissinger:\nOnly after we had dissociated ourselves from our\nallies and told them to pull back.\nSchlesinger:\nThe Soviets were all bluster.\nClements:\nThe priority problem is that Israel may decide\ntheir position will worsen so they will preempt.\nThey already had before April 1st enough to preempt\nand as their situation worsens, they could decide\nto go now. Also, as we became more aloof, this\ncould aggravate the situation. It could push them\nto this kind of decision.\nKissinger:\nWe must weigh many factors. I agree with Bill\nthat if there is no progress by summer, there will\nbe war within one year or maybe this year. We have\nsix months to produce something. For Israel to go\nto war at the known displeasure of the U.S. would\nbe a monumental decision. We must keep the Arabs\nfrom becoming too upset but show Israel they can\nnot ignore us. The next time we must be in a position\nto get results from Israel.\nSchlesinger:\nMaybe the word aloof is not a good one. We can\nsay to the Israelis that we have made an honest effort\nand our well is temporarily dry. Whether it will be\ntemporary or permanent depends on you. We are\nhere.\nPresident:\nRocky, what about your talks with Sadat and the\nSaudis?\nVice President:\nMr. President, your thought of sending someone to\nthe funeral of King Feisal and your letters made a\ndeep impression and I believe really helped the Saudis\nget through a very difficult period. Saudi Arabia\nwants to follow the policy of cooperation of King Feisal,\njudging from my talks with Khalid and Fahd. I told\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nBERALD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 13 -\nFahd we want his advice. He said that Feisal had\nstood up to Nasser on radicalism in the Arab world\nwhen it appeared that Saudi Arabia was all alone\nbut by the time of his death Egypt had come around\nto seeing that Feisal was right. Fahd said, however,\nthat unless there is a \"just, equitable and lasting\npeace within one year\"--and those are his exact\nwords--the Soviets will move back in, the radicals\nwill be reinvigorated and rearmed by the Soviets\nwhile the moderates will move away from the US\nand establish a close relationship with Western\nEurope. The Europeans have arms they want to\nsell, we have the money to buy and we can learn\nto fly the planes and drive the tanks. The Arabs\nwill keep building their military strength as long\nas it takes from the USSR and Western Europe and\nin time we will crush Israel. That is what Fahd\nsaid to me. He is right about the Western Europeans.\nThe French sent their Defense Minister to the\nfuneral with a list of items for sale and models of\naircraft and tanks. This offended the Saudis.\nSimon:\nIsrael might strike first. Is Egypt fully resupplied?\nI gather they are not and Israel is militarily superior.\nThey won't allow the Arabs to fight a war of attrition.\nAlso, if there is too much uncertainty about our\nsupport, it could lead Israel to conclude it must hit\nfirst.\nKissinger:\nOur problem would be the same if Israel hits soon\nor later on. Even if Israel destroys the Arab armies,\nwe will face the same problems in our relations with\nthe Arabs, Western Europeans and Soviets. We\nwould be obliged to step in, tell Israel that is enough\nand impose or try to impose a settlement along the\n1967 line. There is a physical limit to what three\nmillion people can occupy and sooner or later we\nwill have to stop this process.\nPresident:\nExactly. How many miles of territory and how many\ncities can Israel occupy?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n14 I I\nKissinger:\nAnd would the Soviets stand by while that happened?\nColby:\nWe think the Soviets are freer to support the Arabs\nthan they have been before. It would take them only\na very few days to fly in defensive support such as\nSAMs and aircraft. Their airborne troops could\nprobably be beaten by the Israelis because they\nwould only be lightly armed, but they could reinforce\nthe air defense around Cairo and Damascus and other\ncities.\nKissinger:\nI am not sure Israel would directly attack Soviet\ntroops.\nBrown:\nWhen I was reading the Special National Intelligence\nEstimate, I had the impression of hearing an old\nrecord over again. We made a mistake about the\nArabs in October 1973. What Sisco had to say is\nvery important. We must keep our minds open.\nSchlesinger:\nIsrael will certainly win another round.\nBrown:\nIsrael's army is very good. We know that. But\ndon't count out the Arabs.\nVice President:\nThink what another war would mean for us. The\nOPEC countries would stick together in an oil embargo,\nparticularly since the Latin Americans are already\nunhappy with us. This could cause paralysis of the\nEast Coast of the United States.\nPresident:\nI told Morton to put together a contingency plan on\nwhat would be likely to happen if there were another\noil embargo, what measures we can take, and what\nthe probable result would be. We need to follow up\non this.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n15 I I\nSimon:\nI don't believe Venezuela will shut off exports\nto the U.S.\nVice President:\nVenezuela is leading the movement of Latin\nAmerican solidarity in standing up to the U.S. on\neconomic matters. Would you like to take the risk\nif you were Governor of New Jersey?\nClements:\nI agree with Nelson.\nColby:\nWe would have two or three months of grace due\nto our stockpiles.\nClements:\nThere is the geographical dislocation problem.\nWe are just not set up to transfer our production\nand stocks rapidly enough from one part of the\ncountry to another.\nPresident:\nI told FEA and others to get some contingency plans\nready. I have decided that when Congress comes\nback on the 9th or 10th, I am going to speak to a\nJoint Session on foreign policy. I am going to lay\nit on the line, Far East, Middle East, National\nSecurity and Defense, and other topics. The\nPresident has to speak out strongly and positively.\nSend your suggestions to Brent for incorporation\nin the speech. We will announce it tomorrow and\nI will spend a lot of time in California on this. Henry\nwill come out and help. By the time I get back on\nthe 7th we will be in shape for the speech. The\nAmerican people want to know where they are and\nCongress needs to know what to do. The State of the\nUnion message had nothing on foreign policy so it\nhas been a long time since a major address on this\nsubject.\n(At this point the discussion turned to Southeast Asia; Deputy Secretary\nIngersoll joined the meeting.)\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD & LIBRAR GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 16 -\nPresident:\nBill, what is the situation on the ground in Vietnam?\nColby:\nThe Vietnamese Government has enough to control\nthe area around Saigon and the Delta for this dry\nseason but they are likely to be defeated in 1976.\nThieu tried to extract his troups from the highlands\nin time but his ploy failed. He was so afraid of\nleaks to the Communists that he told no one in\nadvance, not even his own commanders who were\ncaught by surprise. There was really only one\nbattle. Thieu was aware of the superior comparative\nstrength of the North Vietnamese in the highlands\nso he wanted to pull out of Pleiku and Kontum. He\nwanted to fight at Ban Me Thuot, but he could not\ndo it. Among other problems, his C-130s were\nsidelined. So the move to the coast became a\nroute instead of an orderly withdrawal. Then they\nwere attacked in Quang Tri and Thieu was indecisive\nabout Hue, first he was not going to fight and then\nhe was and then he finally decided not to. This\ncaused the commander of I Corps to become confused\nand angry. And now the airborne, their best troops,\nare being taken out of Danang to Nha Trang and\nSaigon. Thieu also wants to bring the Marine\nDivision out of the perimeter around Danang. If so,\nDanang will surely fall. Originally, Thieu wanted\nto defend the enclaves, like General Gavin.\nKissinger:\nColby's estimate indicates that Thieu's pullback was\ndesigned to put him into a position to cut his losses\nand stagger through until 1976. He decided to do\nthis because he was not getting enough support from\nthe U.S. It was due to a lack of spare parts and\nammunition. The idea of pulling back was not bad\nbut when the move began, the refugees clogged the\nroad and the troops did not know how to move anyway.\nThieu was trying to get ready. His estimate and\nours was the same; an all-out attack next year\nwould finish him unless he got more support. So\nhe wanted to stagger through this year and hope\nfor a change.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nBERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 17 -\nClements:\nHe did not tell us anything at all and did not tell\nhis own commanders.\nKissinger:\nThe move could only have been carried out by\nsurprise.\nColby:\nThe refugee figures have fluctuated up and down,\nwith the highest point coming after the Tet offensive.\nNow we are back up to over one million refugees.\nPresident:\nCan the Vietnamese be economically self-sufficient\nin the smaller area?\nColby:\nYes, the Delta is the big rice area. This would\nhave been the first year of economic self-sufficiency\nhad it not been for the suddenly deteriorating\nsituation. The refugees are placing a big burden\non the government but it is interesting to note that\nthey are all fleeing toward the government. That\nshows clearly how they really feel about the Communists.\nClements:\nBut the army may leave some $200 million in arms\nand military equipment in Danang alone.\nColby:\nAnd there is some grumbling about Thieu in the army\nas well as in political circles. We may hear more\nabout this.\nPresident:\nYou are not optimistic about Danang being held?\nColby:\nIt should fall within two weeks even if the Marine\nDivision stays instead of being pulled back to protect\nSaigon.\nPresident:\nWhat about the evacuation of civilians?\nColby:\nThere have been terrible mob scenes, both at the\nairport where they stormed loading aircraft and at\nthe port where they jammed aboard ships. Some of\nthe military have even shot their way on to the ships.\nA small number has been loaded but law and order\nhas broken down completely and it is almost impossible.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 18 -\nIngersoll:\nReportedly 6, 000 refugees got off on one ship this\nmorning and another one is loading now.\nPresident:\nWhat are these rumors about Ky coming back?\nKissinger:\nKy is a boy scout, a flamboyant pop-off; he can\nnot do the job.\nColby:\nChief of Staff Vien and Prime Minister Khiem are\npossible candidates to replace Thieu.\nKissinger:\nThieu has shown himself far and away the most\ncapable of all the Vietnamese leaders I have known\nsince 1965. No one else could do as well. He holds\nthings together. He made a mistake in ordering\nthe withdrawal from the highlands but he had no\ngood choice. We were unable to give him the support\nhe needed.\nColby:\nI agree with Henry. No one else is up to Thieu.\nKhiem would probably be the next best bet but he is\nsome way from being up to Thieu.\nGeneral Brown:\nI agree with Colby's estimate about Danang. It will\nbe hard to hold 10 days. We have gotten all the\nAmericans out. A second ship is loading. There\nare two airfields, the main one at Marble Mountain\nand a small one. There is an ARVN battalion\nprotecting the small one from the mobs and some\nC-47 flights are getting off. The mobs took the main\nfield and may take the second one.\nColby:\nThere is little fighting in the Delta and around Saigon.\nUnless the North Vietnamese move their reserve\ndivisions into the Delta from the North, Saigon and\nthe Delta can probably be held militarily but the big\nproblem will come when the stories about Danang\nstart to circulate in Saigon.\nConcerning Cambodia, Lon Nol is going to leave for\nIndonesia on April first. But there is no hope of\ntalks with the Communists. They will see Lon Nol's\ndeparture as weakness and will push harder. The\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 19 -\nnew Communist proposal for a government would\nleave Sihanouk with no base at all, even if he was\nostensibly the President.\nKissinger:\nThe war is now being conducted against Sihanouk.\nIf it were a question of Lon Nol leaving and then\nour dealing with Sihanouk, it would be easy. But\nthe Khmer Rouge want to erase all possible political\nbase for Sihanouk and bring him back only as a\nfront for themselves. The French told us at\nMartinique that Sihanouk wanted to negotiate but\nwas unable due to the Khmer Rouge.\nColby:\nThe Cambodian airlift is suspended. The Communists\ncould make the airfield unusable. The Government\nis losing ground east of the capital and also down\nalong the river. The wet season starts in late May\nbut the river will not come up until late July and\nby then it will probably be too late.\nSchlesinger:\nWe are getting the first reports that the Cambodian\ntroops are beginning to lose their drive. They are\nworried about U.S. support and losing their commanders.\nWith adequate resupply they would have lasted through\nthe dry season. But the morale is no good. The\ndebate in Congress has hurt them badly. It is likely\nto collapse in two weeks.\nKissinger:\nWe have to make an evacuation decision. Ideally,\nfrom the political viewpoint, we should hold on until\nafter your speech and after Congress makes a decision\non our aid request. But if we wait it could collapse\nall at once before we can get our people out. But if\nwe pull out, we will surely provoke a collapse. There\nare about 1100 people of all nationalities to be\nevacuated. We may need to decide next week.\nGeneral Brown:\nThe situation has changed. The outlook is bleaker.\nWe need to decide now to take them out or we could\nhave a major problem. There is one brigade of\nMarines in the Pacific. We could use U.S. forces\nto take out the residents and try to beat the mob\nout with helicopters.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 20 -\nPresident:\nHow long will it take to get them out?\nGeneral Brown:\nIf we have to use helicopters downtown, it would\ntake one day to get 1200 out. If we have the airfield,\nit would take less time. They can get there on\ntheir own. This is a very difficult operation.\nVice President:\nThe Marines might have to shoot civilians and that\nwould create a huge uproar.\nGeneral Brown:\nThe mob will be hard to control. We might have to\nshoot refugees in front of the press.\nPresident:\nIf you decide to use the airport, will you need to\nclear out the enemy?\nGeneral Brown:\nWe may need air cover. If there is any firing on\nour people on the ground at the airport, we will\nattack. We will have aircraft in the air.\nClements:\nWe can't tell whether or not the Khmer Rouge\nwill fight us.\nKissinger:\nWe need a joint estimate about the unravelling in\nCambodia. If they can't hold, you need a chance to\nlook at the situation. We need an estimate as to\nhow long it can hold so we can decide on whether or\nnot to order fixed wing aircraft in for evacuation.\nVice President:\nThere is also the symbolism of Lon Nol leaving.\nThis will have a bad effect on morale.\nKissinger:\nThe Khmer Rouge will negotiate only unconditional\nsurrender. They could get a negotiated settlement\nanytime but they refuse it. When Lon Nol leaves,\nit will demoralize the country. Long Boret will try\nto carry on but will fail.\nSchlesinger:\nHow long do we keep the Americans there after\nLon Nol leaves?\nKissinger:\nWe are pressing them to get out. Lon Nol wanted\nto stay but we had to press him to get out also, to\ncalm the situation.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nBERALO\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\n- 21 -\nGeneral Brown:\nWe need a decision now on improving our intelligence\ncapability. We can not wait for the Forty Committee,\nMr. President. Will you authorize us to preposition\nintelligence collection aircraft now for us over North\nVietNam if we need it?\nPresident:\nYes, that is okay.\n[Meeting ended at 1715.]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nFORD is LIBRARY BERALD"
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