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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 4/28/1975" of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEMORANDUM 2779-X NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE April 29, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: W. R. SMYSER 8 SUBJECT: Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting, held April 28, 1975 Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council Meeting held April 28, 1975, to discuss Vietnam evacuation. Attachment Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library RETIRED ESERVATION cc: General Scowcroft ORIGINAL TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS Determined to be Administrative Murking Date 2/6/95 By KBH FORD : GERALD LIBRARY ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING April 28, 1975 Roosevelt Room 7:23 - 8:08 p.m. Participants: President Ford Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library RETIRE ERVATION Vice President Rockefeller Secretary of State Kissinger Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown Director of Central Intelligence William Colby Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council ORIGINAL FORD & LIBRARY 195 DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4. MR IR 92-10,#21, # NSCltr. NSC 10/7/94 By KBH NARA, Date 2/6/95 ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION GERALD = 1970 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 2 President: Brent Scowcroft this afternoon brought me the report that two Marines had been lost, so I felt we should convene the National Security Council to discuss the situation in Saigon. Who can bring us up-to-date? Colby: I think I can. What has happened is that the Viet Cong have rejected Minh's cease- fire offer. They have now added a third demand, which is to dis- mantle the South Vietnamese armed forces. Bien Hoa is in the process of falling. The Viet Cong have cut off the road to the Delta and are advancing on Vung Tau. It is a very dangerous situation. The North Vietnamese are bringing artillery within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a. m. they Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library had a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the Marines. This salvo was followed by 130 millimeter artillery fire. Some of this artillery fire hit the American side, not the Vietnamese side like last night. Three aircraft have been shot down. All are Vietnamese. They include a C-119, an A-1, and an A-37 helicopter. The latter was shot down by an SA-7 missile. The presence of these missiles increases the risk ORIGINAL factor greatly. President: Has the rocket and the other fire now stopped? Colby: No. It's continuing. Schlesinger: The latest information is that there is still artillery fire against the airport. A flight of C-130's is going in to take out the DAO (Defense Attache Office). They hope to be able to land, but they can be waved off by a controller on the ground if it is unwise. North Vietnamese ground forces are one kilometer from Tan Son Nhut and advancing. Colby: Those forces are of platoon strength, perhaps one or two platoons. President: We should not predicate our judgments on two platoons. How many people is that? TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS FORD & LIBRARY BERALD F3R0 is LIBRARY TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 3 Schlesinger: About 100. President: When did you get a report that the firing was last going on? Schlesinger: About 30 minutes ago. President: What is the status of the runway? Schlesinger: Landable. President: Do you have air controllers? RVATION Schlesinger: There are some on the ground. President: Are there any C-130's on the ground? Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library Schlesinger: Only one, which had been hit. We are loading weapons and bombs on aircraft in Thailand. Our aircraft are in the air for potential cover, but they are over the water. President: What kinds of bombs are these? Are they the "smart" bombs? Brown: They are regular iron bombs. The aircraft do not carry ORIGINAL "smart" bombs unless they have special equipment. President: How many DAO people do you have at the airport? Schlesinger: About 400, including contractors. President: If the C-130's can land, they should. How many are there? Brown: The plan is for 70 sorties, with each of 35 aircraft coming in twice. President: Who will decide whether they come in? Brown: The controller on the ground at Tan Son Nhut. President: If these attacks continue, would he bring the aircraft in? COND TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS GERALD LIBRARY FORD is LIBRARY 93 & TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 4 Brown: If it is artillery fire, he would wave them off. If it is rocket fire, he would bring them in. He had a message yesterday that one artillery unit was to fire on two targets. They have now hit those two targets, an apron and a gymnasium used for processing. President: For the processing of Vietnamese? Brown: Yes. Kissinger: Was that artillery or rocket fire? Schlesinger: It is not certain. Brown: What worries me more than the artillery fire is the report Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library of an aircraftibeing shot down by an SA-7. Choppers or aircraft are defenseless against the SA-7. The only way to deflect the missiles is to use flares, but I am not sure whether the aircraft we are using are equipped for that. Of course, we have to do our mission, but if the risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift. President: If the risk is too great, the man on the ground has to ORIGINAL judge. We cannot. That means we have to move to get the DAO people out as well as the Embassy. That is one possibility. If they can land, they should carry out the operation as before. But when they find that it is getting toohazardous the last two C-130's have to take the DAO out. I think we have to continue operations if the people on the ground say that conditions are alright, but if it is a question of two remaining aircraft they should be filled by the DAO personnel and not by Vietnamese. Kissinger: I have talked to Graham Martin. I think the DAO should come out anyway. I also think the Embassy should be thinned down. If we have to go to suppressive fire, then we must remove the Americans. Otherwise, it is too risky. Schlesinger: There is no authority now for suppressive fire, only for the chopper lift. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS FORD & LIBRARY GERALD FORD is LIBRARE CENALD TORSECRET/SENSITIVE 5 President: If we do not fire until they do, we are bound to lose some choppers to the SA-7's. Schlesinger: It is a hard weapon to counter. Brown: We cannot do much about them. President: Will there be air cover above? Brown: Whenever you say. Also, tankers. President: Should we not have that cover even for the C-130's? Brown: We can do that, as Jim Schlesinger says. The aircraft and the tankers are ready. President: How much time will be lost before the aircraft come in? Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library Schlesinger: There are two issues. First, once we get to the point where we have to have air cover, we should pull out,anyway. Kissinger: I think if they see air cover, it helps. President: If we have air cover but do not use it, they would still have enough radar to pick up our presence. ORIGINAL Brown: The artillery people do not. Nor do the SA-7 people. I think we should not commit the air cover until we are ready to use it. The risk is such that they should only be used for a job, rather than to be picked up on radar. Schlesinger: They may only be doing this shooting to bloody us. If they see fighters, they may hit us hard. Kissinger: It may, of course, have the opposite effect. Even if some of their local units do not see our aircraft on radar, the high command in Hanoi will know it very quickly. I do not think that they will intensify their attacks. Schlesinger: They may have pre-positioned orders to attack us. Brown: I think they have pulled out the stops. The platoons that we have spoken of are being followed by more. They came in through that same area during the Tet offensive. They are ready for the battle of Tan Son Nhut. TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS DEBALD FORD is LIBRARY DERALD TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 6 President: If we decide on air cover, we have to go for the evacua- tion of Saigon and not just Tan Son Nhut. How soon will we know if the C-130's can land? Brown: Within an hour. We have an open line to Graham Martin. Kissinger: I think we have three decisions: -- First, how long to continue to operate, and whether the C-130's should just pull out Americans or Vietnamese as well. In either event, today is clearly the last day for fixed-wing operations. -- Second, whether you want to have air cover flown over Tan Son Nhut or wherever the evacuees can be picked up. -- Third, when we order suppressive fire. In this connection, I agree with Jim that it should only be used when pulling out Americans. Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library My concern is between balancing the risk to pull out all the stops if they have not yet decided to do so. I think if they see American air cover it would have a good effect. Schlesinger: I think we can go in over the area with less equipment. Clements: If you decided that this is the last day for civilian evacua- ORIGINAL tion, we can proceed on that basis. President: I think SO. This is the last day for the evacuation of the Vietnamese. Kissinger: Then the DAO will go out with them. Brown: Regarding whether our air cover will be seen: We are putting in a Navy CAP above the air cover and Gayler has told them to jam the radar of the SA-2's. President: Can the SA-7 not be jammied? Brown: No. It is heat-seeking. Scowcroft: We have just received a report that the airport is still taking fire. The two North Vietnamese platoons are still in the cemetery near Tan Son Nhut. The C-119 was shot down over the air- port, and the other aircraft elsewhere. We also understand the C-130's are still on the way but are not landing. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS GERALD LIBRARY LIBRUST CERALD FUE! TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 7 Schlesinger: The North Vietnamese have 4, 000 sappers in Saigon. They will hit the Embassy if we attack by fire. Kissinger: I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire Embassy. Maybe we should consider leaving in a nucleus of volunteers, but I would pull everybody out. The North Vietnamese have the intention of humiliating us and it seems unwise to leave people there. President: I agree. All should leave. We now have made two decisions: NOTEVAN -- First, today is the last day of Vietnamese evacuation. -- Second, if we fire, our people will go. Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library Are we ready to go to a helicopter lift? Brown: Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them there within an hour. Kissinger: I understand your orders are that the Vietnamese should go today, and that the DAO and most of the Embassy should go with the rest of the fixed-wing aircraft. ORIGINAL President: I think they should be phased in. Kissinger: A reduced staff should be left at the Embassy. If there is suppressive fire, we go to the plan to evacuate all Americans. If we have to go out, priority will go to the Americans. Schlesinger: We should get Embassy people out today also. Kissinger: Yes. We should not let it out that this is the last day of civilian evacuation. Vice President: Does the press know of the two Marines being killed? Schlesinger: Yes. We will see how the four Chairmen react. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS FORD & LIBRARY GERALD Faxas is LIBRARY CENALD FOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 8 Brown: The Secretary said that Americans should have priority if we have to terminate the lift, but we will not know this. We will not know in advance which is the last aircraft. Schlesinger: We should give them subtle priority. President: We have to leave it to General Smith to phase them into the evacuation. Kissinger: If the Americans get on the first aircraft, the situation will be out of control. We have to space them out. The people who should stay to the end are the team to handle the evacuation of the Vietnamese. The others should go. Gerald R. Ford Library RETIRED PRESERVATION President: We have to mix them. We do not want too many at the end. Declassified Photocopy from Brown: I do not want to see Americans standing there waiting for the last plane. Schlesinger: There is one question, Henry, that we need to think about. When it is known at the end of the day that this was the last day, will it not provoke panic against our Embassy? Kissinger: I believe that, as the new Government comes in, our ORIGINAL obligations are terminated. Even without shelling, we might have a transformation of the Minh Government from a pro-American to a neutralist to an anti-American Government. This could have happened this week. To answer the question, it could produce panic. It could also make the Government turn on us. With 150 people, this would be more manageable. President: They are one hour away. Even later today, if the situa- tion deteriorates more rapidly than we think, we can go. Brown: We are 25 minutes away from a ship to the Embassy. We can go on your orders or Graham Martin's. Schlesinger: There is a chance of a night attack. Kissinger: I think the Embassy is safer from a disciplined attack than the DAO. FORD is LIBRARY GENALD TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 9 I think during the day tomorrow you will probably need to decide whether you want to take out the Embassy tomorrow night. You minimize the panic if you do not take the Embassy to Tan Son Nhut. So you may need the Embassy compound for evacuation. I think we should take everybody we can out today, and then decide on the Embassy tomorrow. President: What if the C-130 cannot land; then we cannot get people out by fixed-wing aircraft. Kissinger: You can then go to an emergency airlift at the DAO and the Embassy, and you have no choice but to evacuate everybody. Then you might also have to go to suppressive fire. Schlesinger: I think we should still try to get the C-130's in. Declassified Photocopy from Brown: We are more ready to get people out at Tan Son Nhut than Gerald R. Ford Library at the Embassy, since at the latter we need to blow up trees and to clear the parking lot. President: We first need to see what happens at Tan Son Nhut. Then we have to use the DAO and Embassy lift. ORIGINAL Kissinger: If they keep up their attacks, it is because they have decided to bottle us up. We should then get everybody. out. President: Who executes? Kissinger: I suggest we draft a message here, clear it with Jim and George, and show it to you. We will then send it to Graham Martin. Jim can send the same message to Gayler through his channels. Then everybody should know what we are doing. Clements: If we cannot get the C-130's in, we will need to make a critical decision at midnight or 1: 00 a.m. President: That decision would be whether to get out. Schlesinger: Should we soften up the artillery first? TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS FORD & LIBRARY GERALD FORD it LIBRARY TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE 10 Brown: I would ignore the artillery for the chopper flight if the artillery is on the air field. But if it is on the DAO or on the Embassy, we cannot go in. In the first case, we would hope that they cannot shift too rapidly. In the second case, we may need to suppress. Kissinger: But you would have air cover any way to protect the lift. President: Where is the air cover now? Brown: I recommend that it come in when we go to a helicopter lift. President: We can await that until we see whether the C-130's can get in. If they cannot, then we go to Option 3. The decision will be forced by whether the C-130's can or cannot operate. Declassified Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library Is that agreed? (All nod. ) ORIGINAL TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD FORD is LIBRARY CENNLE

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 4/28/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\n2779-X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nApril 29, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER 8\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of the National Security\nCouncil Meeting, held April 28, 1975\nAttached are the minutes of the National Security Council Meeting\nheld April 28, 1975, to discuss Vietnam evacuation.\nAttachment\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nRETIRED ESERVATION\ncc: General Scowcroft\nORIGINAL\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nDetermined to be Administrative Murking\nDate 2/6/95 By KBH\nFORD : GERALD LIBRARY\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nApril 28, 1975\nRoosevelt Room\n7:23 - 8:08 p.m.\nParticipants:\nPresident Ford\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nRETIRE ERVATION\nVice President Rockefeller\nSecretary of State Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense Schlesinger\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nDeputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll\nDeputy Secretary of Defense William Clements\nLt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant\nto the President for National Security Affairs\nW. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council\nORIGINAL\nFORD\n&\nLIBRARY\n195\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.\nMR IR 92-10,#21, # NSCltr. NSC 10/7/94\nBy KBH NARA, Date 2/6/95\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nGERALD = 1970\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nPresident: Brent Scowcroft this afternoon brought me the report\nthat two Marines had been lost, so I felt we should convene the\nNational Security Council to discuss the situation in Saigon.\nWho can bring us up-to-date?\nColby: I think I can.\nWhat has happened is that the Viet Cong have rejected Minh's cease-\nfire offer. They have now added a third demand, which is to dis-\nmantle the South Vietnamese armed forces. Bien Hoa is in the\nprocess of falling. The Viet Cong have cut off the road to the\nDelta and are advancing on Vung Tau.\nIt is a very dangerous situation. The North Vietnamese are bringing\nartillery within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a. m. they\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nhad a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the\nMarines. This salvo was followed by 130 millimeter artillery fire.\nSome of this artillery fire hit the American side, not the Vietnamese\nside like last night.\nThree aircraft have been shot down. All are Vietnamese. They include\na C-119, an A-1, and an A-37 helicopter. The latter was shot down by\nan SA-7 missile. The presence of these missiles increases the risk\nORIGINAL\nfactor greatly.\nPresident: Has the rocket and the other fire now stopped?\nColby: No. It's continuing.\nSchlesinger: The latest information is that there is still artillery\nfire against the airport. A flight of C-130's is going in to take out\nthe DAO (Defense Attache Office). They hope to be able to land,\nbut they can be waved off by a controller on the ground if it is unwise.\nNorth Vietnamese ground forces are one kilometer from Tan Son\nNhut and advancing.\nColby: Those forces are of platoon strength, perhaps one or two\nplatoons.\nPresident: We should not predicate our judgments on two platoons.\nHow many people is that?\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY BERALD\nF3R0 is LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nSchlesinger: About 100.\nPresident: When did you get a report that the firing was last going\non?\nSchlesinger: About 30 minutes ago.\nPresident: What is the status of the runway?\nSchlesinger: Landable.\nPresident: Do you have air controllers?\nRVATION\nSchlesinger: There are some on the ground.\nPresident: Are there any C-130's on the ground?\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nSchlesinger: Only one, which had been hit. We are loading weapons\nand bombs on aircraft in Thailand. Our aircraft are in the air for\npotential cover, but they are over the water.\nPresident: What kinds of bombs are these? Are they the \"smart\"\nbombs?\nBrown: They are regular iron bombs. The aircraft do not carry\nORIGINAL\n\"smart\" bombs unless they have special equipment.\nPresident: How many DAO people do you have at the airport?\nSchlesinger: About 400, including contractors.\nPresident: If the C-130's can land, they should. How many are\nthere?\nBrown: The plan is for 70 sorties, with each of 35 aircraft coming\nin twice.\nPresident: Who will decide whether they come in?\nBrown: The controller on the ground at Tan Son Nhut.\nPresident: If these attacks continue, would he bring the aircraft in?\nCOND\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nFORD is LIBRARY 93\n&\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\nBrown: If it is artillery fire, he would wave them off. If it is rocket\nfire, he would bring them in.\nHe had a message yesterday that one artillery unit was to fire on\ntwo targets. They have now hit those two targets, an apron and a\ngymnasium used for processing.\nPresident: For the processing of Vietnamese?\nBrown: Yes.\nKissinger: Was that artillery or rocket fire?\nSchlesinger: It is not certain.\nBrown: What worries me more than the artillery fire is the report\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nof an aircraftibeing shot down by an SA-7. Choppers or aircraft are\ndefenseless against the SA-7. The only way to deflect the missiles\nis to use flares, but I am not sure whether the aircraft we are using\nare equipped for that. Of course, we have to do our mission, but if\nthe risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift.\nPresident: If the risk is too great, the man on the ground has to\nORIGINAL\njudge. We cannot. That means we have to move to get the DAO\npeople out as well as the Embassy. That is one possibility.\nIf they can land, they should carry out the operation as before. But\nwhen they find that it is getting toohazardous the last two C-130's\nhave to take the DAO out.\nI think we have to continue operations if the people on the ground say\nthat conditions are alright, but if it is a question of two remaining\naircraft they should be filled by the DAO personnel and not by\nVietnamese.\nKissinger: I have talked to Graham Martin. I think the DAO should\ncome out anyway. I also think the Embassy should be thinned down.\nIf we have to go to suppressive fire, then we must remove the\nAmericans. Otherwise, it is too risky.\nSchlesinger: There is no authority now for suppressive fire, only\nfor the chopper lift.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD is LIBRARE CENALD\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nPresident: If we do not fire until they do, we are bound to lose some\nchoppers to the SA-7's.\nSchlesinger: It is a hard weapon to counter.\nBrown: We cannot do much about them.\nPresident: Will there be air cover above?\nBrown: Whenever you say. Also, tankers.\nPresident: Should we not have that cover even for the C-130's?\nBrown: We can do that, as Jim Schlesinger says. The aircraft and\nthe tankers are ready.\nPresident: How much time will be lost before the aircraft come in?\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nSchlesinger: There are two issues. First, once we get to the point\nwhere we have to have air cover, we should pull out,anyway.\nKissinger: I think if they see air cover, it helps.\nPresident: If we have air cover but do not use it, they would still\nhave enough radar to pick up our presence.\nORIGINAL\nBrown: The artillery people do not. Nor do the SA-7 people.\nI think we should not commit the air cover until we are ready to use\nit. The risk is such that they should only be used for a job, rather\nthan to be picked up on radar.\nSchlesinger: They may only be doing this shooting to bloody us. If\nthey see fighters, they may hit us hard.\nKissinger: It may, of course, have the opposite effect. Even if\nsome of their local units do not see our aircraft on radar, the high\ncommand in Hanoi will know it very quickly. I do not think that\nthey will intensify their attacks.\nSchlesinger: They may have pre-positioned orders to attack us.\nBrown: I think they have pulled out the stops. The platoons that we\nhave spoken of are being followed by more. They came in through\nthat same area during the Tet offensive. They are ready for the\nbattle of Tan Son Nhut.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nDEBALD\nFORD is LIBRARY DERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n6\nPresident: If we decide on air cover, we have to go for the evacua-\ntion of Saigon and not just Tan Son Nhut. How soon will we know if\nthe C-130's can land?\nBrown: Within an hour. We have an open line to Graham Martin.\nKissinger: I think we have three decisions:\n-- First, how long to continue to operate, and whether the C-130's\nshould just pull out Americans or Vietnamese as well. In either event,\ntoday is clearly the last day for fixed-wing operations.\n-- Second, whether you want to have air cover flown over Tan Son\nNhut or wherever the evacuees can be picked up.\n-- Third, when we order suppressive fire. In this connection,\nI agree with Jim that it should only be used when pulling out Americans.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nMy concern is between balancing the risk to pull out all the stops if\nthey have not yet decided to do so. I think if they see American air\ncover it would have a good effect.\nSchlesinger: I think we can go in over the area with less equipment.\nClements: If you decided that this is the last day for civilian evacua-\nORIGINAL\ntion, we can proceed on that basis.\nPresident: I think SO. This is the last day for the evacuation of the\nVietnamese.\nKissinger: Then the DAO will go out with them.\nBrown: Regarding whether our air cover will be seen: We are putting\nin a Navy CAP above the air cover and Gayler has told them to jam the\nradar of the SA-2's.\nPresident: Can the SA-7 not be jammied?\nBrown: No. It is heat-seeking.\nScowcroft: We have just received a report that the airport is still\ntaking fire. The two North Vietnamese platoons are still in the\ncemetery near Tan Son Nhut. The C-119 was shot down over the air-\nport, and the other aircraft elsewhere. We also understand the\nC-130's are still on the way but are not landing.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nLIBRUST CERALD FUE!\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n7\nSchlesinger: The North Vietnamese have 4, 000 sappers in Saigon.\nThey will hit the Embassy if we attack by fire.\nKissinger: I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire\nEmbassy. Maybe we should consider leaving in a nucleus of\nvolunteers, but I would pull everybody out. The North Vietnamese\nhave the intention of humiliating us and it seems unwise to leave\npeople there.\nPresident: I agree. All should leave.\nWe now have made two decisions:\nNOTEVAN\n-- First, today is the last day of Vietnamese evacuation.\n-- Second, if we fire, our people will go.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nAre we ready to go to a helicopter lift?\nBrown: Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them\nthere within an hour.\nKissinger: I understand your orders are that the Vietnamese should\ngo today, and that the DAO and most of the Embassy should go with\nthe rest of the fixed-wing aircraft.\nORIGINAL\nPresident: I think they should be phased in.\nKissinger: A reduced staff should be left at the Embassy. If there\nis suppressive fire, we go to the plan to evacuate all Americans.\nIf we have to go out, priority will go to the Americans.\nSchlesinger: We should get Embassy people out today also.\nKissinger: Yes.\nWe should not let it out that this is the last day of civilian evacuation.\nVice President: Does the press know of the two Marines being killed?\nSchlesinger: Yes. We will see how the four Chairmen react.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFaxas is LIBRARY CENALD\nFOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n8\nBrown: The Secretary said that Americans should have priority if\nwe have to terminate the lift, but we will not know this. We will\nnot know in advance which is the last aircraft.\nSchlesinger: We should give them subtle priority.\nPresident: We have to leave it to General Smith to phase them into\nthe evacuation.\nKissinger: If the Americans get on the first aircraft, the situation\nwill be out of control. We have to space them out. The people\nwho should stay to the end are the team to handle the evacuation\nof the Vietnamese. The others should go.\nGerald R. Ford Library\nRETIRED PRESERVATION\nPresident: We have to mix them. We do not want too many at the\nend.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nBrown: I do not want to see Americans standing there waiting for\nthe last plane.\nSchlesinger: There is one question, Henry, that we need to think\nabout. When it is known at the end of the day that this was the last\nday, will it not provoke panic against our Embassy?\nKissinger: I believe that, as the new Government comes in, our\nORIGINAL\nobligations are terminated.\nEven without shelling, we might have a transformation of the Minh\nGovernment from a pro-American to a neutralist to an anti-American\nGovernment. This could have happened this week.\nTo answer the question, it could produce panic. It could also make\nthe Government turn on us. With 150 people, this would be more\nmanageable.\nPresident: They are one hour away. Even later today, if the situa-\ntion deteriorates more rapidly than we think, we can go.\nBrown: We are 25 minutes away from a ship to the Embassy. We\ncan go on your orders or Graham Martin's.\nSchlesinger: There is a chance of a night attack.\nKissinger: I think the Embassy is safer from a disciplined attack\nthan the DAO.\nFORD is LIBRARY GENALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n9\nI think during the day tomorrow you will probably need to decide\nwhether you want to take out the Embassy tomorrow night. You\nminimize the panic if you do not take the Embassy to Tan Son Nhut.\nSo you may need the Embassy compound for evacuation.\nI think we should take everybody we can out today, and then decide\non the Embassy tomorrow.\nPresident: What if the C-130 cannot land; then we cannot get people\nout by fixed-wing aircraft.\nKissinger: You can then go to an emergency airlift at the DAO and\nthe Embassy, and you have no choice but to evacuate everybody.\nThen you might also have to go to suppressive fire.\nSchlesinger: I think we should still try to get the C-130's in.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nBrown: We are more ready to get people out at Tan Son Nhut than\nGerald R. Ford Library\nat the Embassy, since at the latter we need to blow up trees and to\nclear the parking lot.\nPresident: We first need to see what happens at Tan Son Nhut. Then\nwe have to use the DAO and Embassy lift.\nORIGINAL\nKissinger: If they keep up their attacks, it is because they have\ndecided to bottle us up. We should then get everybody. out.\nPresident: Who executes?\nKissinger: I suggest we draft a message here, clear it with Jim and\nGeorge, and show it to you. We will then send it to Graham Martin.\nJim can send the same message to Gayler through his channels.\nThen everybody should know what we are doing.\nClements: If we cannot get the C-130's in, we will need to make a\ncritical decision at midnight or 1: 00 a.m.\nPresident: That decision would be whether to get out.\nSchlesinger: Should we soften up the artillery first?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD it LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n10\nBrown: I would ignore the artillery for the chopper flight if the\nartillery is on the air field. But if it is on the DAO or on the\nEmbassy, we cannot go in. In the first case, we would hope that\nthey cannot shift too rapidly. In the second case, we may need\nto suppress.\nKissinger: But you would have air cover any way to protect the\nlift.\nPresident: Where is the air cover now?\nBrown: I recommend that it come in when we go to a helicopter\nlift.\nPresident: We can await that until we see whether the C-130's can\nget in. If they cannot, then we go to Option 3. The decision will\nbe forced by whether the C-130's can or cannot operate.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nIs that agreed? (All nod. )\nORIGINAL\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\nFORD is LIBRARY CENNLE"
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