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    "title": "NSC Meeting, 5/12/75",
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        "National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)",
        "National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration"
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    "subjects": [
        "Cambodia",
        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
        "Mayagüez Incident, 1975"
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 5/12/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n3225-X\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTQPISECRET/SENSITIVE\nMay 12, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER &\nSUBJECT:\nNSC Meeting of May 12, 1975\nAttached are the minutes of the National Security Council Meeting\nheld May 12, 1975.\nAttachment\ncc: General Scowcroft\nSECRAT/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nat 3/28/98\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09178\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nW.R. Smyser\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 5/12/75\nCREATION DATE\n05/12/1975\nVOLUME\n15 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200015\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 5/12/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDate:\nMonday, May 12, 1975\nTime:\n12:05 p.m. to 12:50 p.m.\nPlace:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSubject;\nSeizure of American Ship by Cambodian\nAuthorities\nPrincipals\nThe President\nThe Vice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense James Schlesinger\nActing Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nDeputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll\nDOD:\nDeputy Secretary of Defense William Clements\nWH:\nDonald Rumsfeld\nNSC:\nLt. General Brent Scowcroft\nW. R. Smyser\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12058 Sec. 1.5 (a)(b)(c)\nNSC ltr. 3/19/96 MR 91-20 # /\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nBy KBH NARA, Date 3/20/96\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nPresident:\nPlease date. go ahead, Bill, and bring us up-to-\nColby:\nThe US Seatrain container ship MAYAGUEZ\nwas seized by the Khmer Communists about\n3:15 p.m. local time about seven or eight\nmiles from the Cambodian Island of Poulo\nWei in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship was able\nto transmit at least two messages picked up\nin Jakarta and Manila after the boarding but\ncommunications from the ship were quickly\nbroken off.\nThe ship was enroute to a Thai port from\nHong Kong.\nAt last report the ship was being taken to\nthe port of Kompong Son, about sixty miles\naway, under escort by a Khmer Communist\ngun boat.\nThe Island of Pulou Wei has been claimed by\nboth Phnom Penh and Saigon although it has\nlong been occupied by the Cambodians.\nthe\nKhmer Communists were planning to occupy\nCambodian offshore islands, probably to\nreiterate the Cambodian claim vis-a-vis\nthe Vietnamese Communists. The occupa-\ntion may provide an early test for future\nrelations between the Khmer and Vietnamese\nCommunists.\nA major factor behind the territorial dispute\nin the area is the potential of rich oil deposits\nin this area at the Gulf.\nThe former governments in Saigon and Phnom\nPenh clashed over oil exploration rights in\nthis area last fall.\nWe have no hard information on why the Khmer\nCommunists seized the ship as it was en route\nfrom Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD LIGHAR\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nThe ship was some 60 miles southwest of\nKompong Som, but within 8 miles of the\nisland of Poulo Wei, claimed by the Khmer\nCommunists.\nA Panamanian charter vessel was seized by\nthe Khmer Communists last week in roughly\nthe same area, but was subsequently released\nPresident:\nWhen?\nColby:\nWe are not sure.\nThere is\nevidence that some forces landed on at least\none of these islands.\nPresident:\nWhat is the best estimate of where the ship\nis now?\nColby:\nIt was proceeding under its own steam at\nwhat we estimate to be about 10 miles an\nhour. Considering when it was picked up,\nit would be in or near the port now.\nSchlesinger:\nWhen I left the Pentagon, the ship was already\nonly about 10 miles out.\nPresident:\nWhat are our options?\nSchlesinger:\nWe can have a passive stance or we can be\nactive. We can do such things as seizing\nCambodian assets. We can assemble forces.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n4\nWe could seize a small island as a hostage.\nWe might also consider a blockade.\nAll these options would have to be scrutinized\nby the Congress because, while you have\ninherent rights to protect American citizens,\nyou would soon run into the CRA.\nWe do not have much information on the actual\nsituation. Such information as we have indicates\nthat the main purpose of the Cambodian forces\nin occupying the islands may have been to keep\nthem from their brethren in South Vietnam.\nIt could be a bureaucratic misjudgment\nor a bi-product of an action against South\nVietnam.\nThe Cambodians have already seized three\nships: a Panamanian, a Philippine and now\nan American. They did release the first\ntwo ships. We do not know, in handling this\nsort of thing, how good their communication\nis.\nKissinger:\nHow far from the islands was the ship when\nit was picked up?\nColby:\nAbout 7 to 8 miles.\nSchlesinger:\nIn some information we picked up, they appeared\nto be claiming 30 miles.\nRumsfeld\nIsn't this piracy?\nSchlesinger:\nYes.\nKissinger:\nAs I see it, Mr. President, we have two\nproblems:\n-- The first problem is how to get the ship\nback.\n-- The second problem is how the U.S.\nappears at this time.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALE FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nwe\nActions that/would take to deal with one of these\nproblems may not help to deal with the other.\nFor example, I think that if they can get us\ninto a negotiation, even if we get the ship\nback, it is not to our advantage. I think we\nshould make a strong statement and give a\nnote to the Cambodians, via the Chinese,\nso that we can get some credit if the boat is\nreleased. I also suggest some show of force.\nWhat do we have in the neighborhood of the\nincident?\nSchlesinger:\nWe have the CORAL SEA, which is now on\nits way to Australia for ceremonies.\nPresident:\nHow long would it take to get there?\nSchlesinger:\nAbout two to three days.\nPresident:\nDo we have anything at Subic?\nGeneral Jones:\nWe have the HANCOCK and other vessels,\nbut it would take about a day and a half at\nleast to get them down there.\nKissinger:\nWe may not be able to accomplish much by\nseizing their assets, since they are already\nblocked. Perhaps we can seize a Cambodian\nship on the high seas. But I think that what\nwe need for the next 48 hours is a strong\nstatement, a strong note and a show of force.\nSchlesinger:\nThat would mean turning around the CORAL\nSEA.\nKissinger:\nCan we use any aircraft?\nSchlesinger:\nWe will have aircraft over the island to see\nwhat kind of forces there are.\nKissinger:\nCan we find out where Cambodian ships are\naround the world?\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n6\nClements:\nAdmiral Holloway says he is not sure there\nare any.\nKissinger:\nAre there any merchant ships?\nSchlesinger:\nWe doubt it.\nColby:\nThey may have some coastal stuff, some\nsmall vessels and the like. But that is it.\nClements:\nWe should not forget that there is a real\nchance that this is an in-house spat. In that\narea there have been two discovery wells,\ndrilled by Shell and Mobil. One made a\nsignificant discovery. We are talking about\n600-700 million barrels and perhaps even\n1 or 1 1/2 million barrels. I think that is\nwhat this fuss is all about.\nPresident:\nThat is interesting, but it does not solve\nour problem. I think we should have a\nstrong public statement and a strong note.\nWe should also issue orders to get the\ncarrier turned around.\nKissinger:\nI think we should brief that this is an outrage.\nEven if they quarrel with each other, they can-\nnot use us.\nPresident:\nWe should get the demand and our objection\nto what has happened out to the press before\nthey get the story from elsewhere.\nIngersoll:\nThey may want to hold the ship as a hostage\nto our equipment.\nSchlesinger:\nThat was our first thought, before we looked\ninto it further.\nKissinger:\nDoes the CORAL SEA have mines aboard?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE\n7\nGeneral Jones:\nI do not believe it has any now, but we can\nmake arrangements to get them there.\nKissinger:\nWhat is the minimum period for which mines\ncan be set? I recall during the bombing of\nHaiphong mines were set for 30 days. But\nI wonder if they can be set for shorter\nperiods.\nSchlesinger:\nWe can get the mines in within 24 hours.\nKissinger:\nCan we then have them set for a short time?\nSchlesinger:\nWe can look into that.\nPresident:\nWe should be prepared to do this, using the\nHANCOCK. Do you believe the CORAL SEA\ncannot do it?\nGeneral Jones:\nI doubt it. Different types of equipment and\ndifferent types of mines are involved. I\nsuggest that we get our contingency plans\ntogether as soon as possible and start\nassembling a task force to go in that\ndirection.\nOf course, we have other means. We have the\nB-52's that could do it.\nSchlesinger:\nThe mines are at Subic; the B-52's are in\nThailand.\nPresident:\nI think we should turn the CORAL SEA around.\nWe should get everything organized in Subic\nBay. We should make a strong statement at\nonce before the news hits from other sources.\nWe should also get a full photo run of the\nisland and of the harbor where the ship is.\nVice President:\nMay I say something?\nPresident:\nPlease.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n8\nVice President:\nI think this will be seen as a test case. I\nthink it will be judged in South Korea. I\nremember the PUEBLO case. I think we\nneed something strong soon. Getting out\na message and getting people ready will not\ndo it.\nI think a violent response is in order. The\nworld should know that we will act and that\nwe will act quickly. We should have an\nimmediate response in terms of action.\nI do not know if we have any targets that\nwe can strike, but we should certainly con-\nsider this. If they get any hostages, this\ncan go on forever.\nSchlesinger:\nThey have 39.\nRumsfeld:\nAmericans?\nSchlesinger:\nWe think so.\nVice President:\nNow you can take action before you begin to\nget protests. I believe the authorities there\nonly understand force. There is an old\nChinese saying about a dagger hitting steel\nand withdrawing when it hits steel, and that\nis the impression that we should convey.\nPresident:\nI think that that is what we will do. We will\nturn around the CORAL SEA. We will get the\nmining ready. We will take action.\nKissinger:\nIf it is not released by Wednesday, we will\nmine.\nVice President:\nPublic opinion will be against it in order to\nsave lives. Is there anything we can do now?\nSchlesinger:\nWe could sink the Cambodian Navy.\nClements:\nWe could hit the patrol ship.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n9\nVice President:\nOr we could seize the island.\nRumsfeld:\nWhen did we get word of this?\nIngersoll:\nAt 5:15 at the National Military Command\nCenter.\nKissinger:\nI agree with the Vice President that we should\nshow a strong position. We should also know\nwhat we are doing so that it does not look as\nthough we want to pop somebody. We could\nmine their harbors. This will not get the\nship. Or we could take the ship, or we could\nscuttle it.\nSchlesinger:\nThey will have the ship already. It is like\nthe PUEBLO. Once it got to Wonsan it was\nhard to bring it back.\nKissinger:\nIn Korea, some things might be possible, but\nwith this new group it is very uncertain what\nwill happen.\nPresident:\nHow soon could we take the island?\nGeneral Jones:\nWe have helicopters in Thailand and we could\ndo it fairly quickly.\nKissinger:\nWe cannot do it from Thailand.\nSchlesinger:\nYou know that the reconnaissance missions\nare being flown from Thailand.\nKissinger\nThat we can get away with, but I do not believe\nwe can run military operations from there.\nVice President:\nWhat if we had a series of escalating actions? Some\nwe would take now, others later. We have to show\nthat we will not tolerate this kind of thing.\nIt is a pattern. If we do not respond violently,\nwe will get nibbled to death. We can announce\nthese things to make clear what we are doing.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD is LIBRARY 07V839\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n10\nSchlesinger:\nThe trouble with an announcement of future\nsteps is on the Hill. Anything that we\nannounce, Congress will need to be briefed.\nPresident:\nWe have now looked at the options. We will issue\na statement and we will send a message. We\nwill turn around the CORAL SEA. We will get\na task force assembled at Subic and maybe get it\nunderway. Perhaps we will scramble a force\nto take the island.\nI would like to get something straight now.\nBrent told me at 7:45 that the ship had been\nseized, but there should be a quicker way to\nlet us know this.\nScowcroft:\nI agree. That is when I heard of it.\nRumsfeld:\nI also.\nKissinger:\nI was not told until my regular staff meeting\nthis morning, and then it was mentioned as\nan aside.\nSchlesinger:\nThis is a bureaucratic issue. The NMCC\ndid not become alarmed because it was not\na U.S. Navy vessel.\nPresident:\nThis would be alright in ordinary times but\nnot now.\nColby:\nI will get a wrap-up of the sequence of\nnotification.\nRumsfeld:\nCan we notify merchant ships of the danger?\nGeneral Jones:\nWe will see.\nRumsfeld:\nI do not see the advantage of announcing the\nwarning. We could make a case on either\nside. To the extent we want to be forceful,\nwe do not need to make it public.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n11\nVice President:\nI do not think turning the carriers around is\naction. Congress will get into the act. The\ndoves will start talking. But, unless the\nCambodians are hurt, this pattern will not\nbe broken.\nKissinger:\nThe main purpose of using a statement is that\nwe have no choice. We have to have a reaction.\nBut the statement should be very strong. It\nshould demand the immediate release of the\nship, and it should say that the failure to do\nSO could have serious consequences.\nPresident:\nIt should point out that this is a clear act of\npiracy.\nKissinger:\nThen we should get our military actions lined\nup. My expectation is that we should do it\non a large scale. We should not look as though\nwe want to pop somebody, but we should give\nthe impression that we are not to be trifled\nwith.\nIf we say that it should be released, then we\ncan state that the release is in response to our\nstatement.\nI would relate what we do to the ship, rather\nthan to seize an island.\nColby:\nWe may wish to point out that they released\nother ships. This gives them a way out.\nRumsfeld:\nThey can figure out their own way out.\nPresident:\nBut, if you take strong action, let us say\nnothing first. I would like to get the DOD\noptions by this afternoon.\nSchlesinger:\nThe actions should put them under pressure.\nIf we mine the harbor, they will simply sit.\nWe have got to do something that embarrasses\nthem.\nRumsfeld:\nThat is why I think we should look at other\noptions.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n12\nPresident:\nWe should have some options today.\nClements:\nWe should keep the oil in mind. That is\nan asset.\nKissinger:\nI see a lot of advantage in taking the island\nrather than in mining the port. Let us find\nout what is on the island, how big a battle\nit would be, and other relevant factors.\nSchlesinger:\nWe will have a reconnaissance report by\nthis evening. I am sure it would not take\na large force.\nWhat kind of clarification would you want\nus to use regarding the authority and your\nrelation with the Congress?\nPresident:\nThere are two problems:\n-- First, the provisions of summer, 1973.\n-- Second, the war powers.\nRegarding the military options, I would like\nto know how they would be hamstrung and what\nwe want to do. I can assure you that, irre-\nspective of the Congress, we will move.\nKissinger:\nThere are three things we need to know:\n-- First, what force is required to take the\nisland.\n-- Second, what force is required to take\nKompong Som, and to take the ship and the\npeople. On the whole, I would prefer this.\n-- Third, what it would take to mine the\nharbor.\nVice President:\nDoes it make sense to do this if the boat is\nin it?\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD is LIBRARD 076838 &\nFOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\n13\nSchlesinger:\nYou can perhaps accomplish the same thing\nby quarantine as by mining.\nKissinger:\nI doubt it. We learned in North Vietnam\nthat mines work better. With a quarantine,\nyou have a confrontation and a crisis\nregarding every ship.\nSchlesinger:\nWe would have to be tough in such confrontat ions.\nVice President:\nI agree with Rumsfeld.\nWhy should we warn them? There must be\nplanes that we can use, out of Thailand.\nKissinger:\nIf we bomb out of Thailand, we would be out\nof there within a month.\nPresident:\nLet us review it again. Within an hour or so,\nthere will be a public statement. Let us\nmake an announcement ahead of time, and a\ntough one so that we get the initiative. Let\nus not tell Congress that we will do anything\nmilitarily since we have not decided. I think\nthat it is important to make a strong state-\nment publicly before the news gets out\notherwise.\nKissinger:\nWe will be pressed this afternoon.\nRumsfeld:\nHow about a statement that gives the facts,\nstates that this is an act of piracy, and says\nthat we expect the release. We will not say\nthat we demand the release, because that will\nactivate the Congress. I think you get the\nsame thing without speaking of a demand.\nMoreover, to demand seems weaker.\nSchles inger:\nIt is not weak to say that we demand the release.\nKissinger:\nI would demand.\nRumsfeld:\nPerhaps not publicly, but privately.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n14\nKissinger:\nIf Congress takes us on, I think we have a\ngood case.\nPresident:\nWith the military appropriations bill coming\nup, they would not want to give a picture of\nrunning out.\nKissinger:\nThen we should keep quiet. Let them explain\nabout the three ships.\nVice President:\nHow long does it take to get the carriers\nthere?\nSchlesinger:\nAbout 1 1/2 days.\nKissinger:\nI would overfly with reconnaissance.\nPresident:\nIt should be visible.\nKissinger:\nThat we can get away with, but not bombing.\nVice President:\nAren't those bases being closed anyway?\nKissinger:\nNot necessarily.\nPresident:\nAlright. Let us get a message to the Chinese\nGovernment as soon as possible.\nVice President:\nCould we not ask Thai permission to use the\nbases?\nKissinger:\nNo.\nSchlesinger:\nOnly reconnaissance is possible, but if we\nask, they will refuse everything.\nKissinger:\nLee Kuan Yew has asked us to stay in Thailand\nas long as possible to give him time to work\non getting the defenses of Malaysia ready.\nBombing from Thailand will get us out quickly.\nPresident:\nHow far away is Subic?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n15\nKissinger:\nTo bomb, even from Clark, we would be in\ntrouble. This is a symptom of Vietnam.\nWe can bomb from Guam with B-52's or\nfrom the carriers. But we should know\nwhat we are doing. I am more in favor of\nseizing something, be it the island, the\nship, or Kompong Som.\nPresident:\nThis has been a useful discussion. Thank you.\nI will look forward to seeing the options.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD ?\n/"
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