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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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Cambodia
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Mayagüez Incident, 1975
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/14/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
file use folder
GENALD FORD CIRRACT
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
MEMORANDUM
3754-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE
let
May 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting of May 14, 1975
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council meeting
held May 14, 1975.
Attachment
cc: General Scowcroft
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
let 2/98
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09180
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 5/14/75
CREATION DATE
05/14/1975
VOLUME
27 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200018
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 5/14/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Wednesday, May 14, 1975
Time:
3:52 p.m. - 5:42 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, the White House
Subject:
Seizure of American Ship by Cambodian
Authorities
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones, USAF
The Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Admiral James L. Holloway
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
John Marsh
Robert Hartmann
Philip Buchen
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
NSC:
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
W. R. Smyser
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12338 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)(b)(c)d)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MR 91-20, #4 rise ltr. 3/19/96
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By KBH NARA, Date 3/20/96
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
President:
Bill (Colby), can we have your report on the
latest situation?
Colby:
Mr. President, we have some new informa-
tion on the status of Khmer Communist
forces in the Kompong Som - Koh Tang
area.
The most recent reconnaissance concerning
naval craft indicates that there are 24 armed
ships in the vicinity of Kompong Som -- 13
coastal patrol boats, 10 riverine patrol boats,
and one submarine chaser.
In addition, there are 3 utility launching
craft (LCUs) at Kompong Som, and one LCM
at Ream.
As for air strength, our preliminary analysis
of 12 May
showed three T-28
fighters and a total of six transport aircraft
at Kompong Som airfield next to the port.
There is also a substantial remaining number
of some 100 T-28 aircraft left at Pochentong
Airfield near Phnom Penh when it fell.
For air defense, the Communists have
apparently deployed antiaircraft artillery
near Kompong Som and Ream. Preliminary
analysis of 13 May photography shows that
there is one 37-mm antiaircraft position just
south of Kompong Som, and two 37-mm posi-
tions southeast of Ream.
These weapons are some threat to aircraft
flying within 3 nautical miles of their location,
and under 14, 000 feet.
In ground strength, KC combat forces at Kom-
pong Som total some 2, 000 troops. This force
could be quickly augmented by the remaining
14, 000 troops scattered throughout southwestern
Cambodia.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Photoreconnaissance of 13-14 May identified
a probable 105-mm howitzer position and a
possible coastal artillery position of unidentified
caliber just south of Ream.
We have now observed one more large landing
craft (LCU) at Kompong Som than reported in
last night's briefing. This ship could trans-
port 800 troops. This gives the KC the
ability to move about 2, 400 troops simultaneously.
These landing craft, if unopposed, could reach
Koh Tang Island in a little over 4 hours.
The Cambodians have apparently transported
at least some of the American crew from Koh
Tang Island to the mainland, putting them
ashore at Kompong Som port at about 11: 00
last night, Washington time.
Kissinger:
How do you know that?
Colby:
From observation.
President:
Of the boat last night?
Clements:
That would be just the pilot report.
Colby:
There is some more information.
Bringing at least some of the crew ashore
suggests that the Cambodians appreciate the
value of the American crew as hostages,
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
4
offering hope that they will be kept alive by
their captors to preserve their usefulness
as bargaining chips.
The Americans taken ashore may have been
transported further inland by the Cambodians,
and at present there is no way of telling
where they may be.
Of the five Cambodian gunboats that were
deployed as of last night (Washington time)
around Koh Tang Island, three have been
sunk by American aircraft.
At latest report, only one gunboat remained
a little over a mile south of the island.
Around midnight (Washington time), a U.S.
tanker enroute to Bangkok reported that a
Swedish-registered refrigerator ship near
Panjang Island, well south of Koh Tang, had
been attacked and shot at by a Cambodian
boat. At 5:00 a.m. a U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft observed the ship. It showed no
sign of distress, and now appears on its
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
normal course to Bangkok. A small boat,
not believed to be a gunboat, was sighted
3 miles away, following the ship's same
course and speed. According to press
reports from Thailand, a Panamanian
freighter was detained for about two hours
in the same area today.
President:
Is the HOLT there now?
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
Jones:
Yes. The WILSON is there too.
President:
Is this also a destroyer or a destroyer escort?
Admiral Holloway:
This is a destroyer. It will be on station by
1750 Eastern Daylight Time. That means we
will have two ships on station before we begin
our operations.
Kissinger:
Why are we not sinking the boats?
Jones:
The report we have did not indicate it.
Kissinger:
What mission has been given to the HOLT and
to the WILSON?
Jones:
The WILSON is just coming on station. We will
instruct it.
Kissinger:
Is the HOLT instructed to stop ship movement
to the island?
Jones:
The HOLT is now about 12 miles out beyond the
island. It is not able to stop movement to and
from the island. The reason it is that far out
is that we did not want to tip our hand to the
operation.
President:
I had the impression that the HOLT would
station itself between the ships and the land.
I am amazed at this.
Jones:
It is night, Mr. President. I do not recall any
specific instructions to this regard.
President:
It does no good to have the destroyer 12 miles
out. It can't stop a boat. Why did we hurry to
get it there if it is going to stay that far out?
Jones:
We got it there because we wanted it to help
in the operations we will conduct.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
Rumsfeld:
How about the T-28's that are now at Phnom
Penh airport? Could they help oppose our
operation at Kompong Som?
Colby:
Yes, but they could not remain in the air for
long at that distance from their base.
Jones:
They are not a real factor.
Rumsfeld:
I am thinking of the airport. If they could use
it, then we would have a stronger argument to
hit the airport.
Jones:
Theoretically they could, but they would not
have much time on station.
President:
When does the CORAL SEA get there?
What
about the HANCOCK or the OKINAWA?
Admiral Holloway:
CORAL SEA aircraft are now within the range
of the objective area. So it's on station.
The HOLT is also on station. She stayed out
beyond the island because of the plan to put
Marines on her. That is why she is over the
horizon.
The CORAL SEA is within the range of tactical
air and can put them in. The HANCOCK could
arrive on the scene around noon of the 16th,
D. C. time. She is loaded with helicopters.
The WILSON will be on station this evening.
President:
So, as of now, the HOLT is there, the CORAL
SEA is ready, and the WILSON will be there
soon.
Admiral Holloway:
In two hours.
President:
What is the recommendation of the Defense
Department now regarding operations?
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
FOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
Schlesinger:
Dave (Jones), please give it.
Jones:
(Showing a chart) We recommend that we land
tonight on the island and on the ship. We can
do it with high assurance of success. We have
the B-52's on alert but we do not recommend
using them. From the targeting standpoint,
it represents overkill. We might use them for
political or diplomatic reasons, though that
would seem mixed.
President:
Are all the chart numbers in our time?
Jones:
Yes.
We would send people as follows:
The Marines to recapture the boat and to
dismantle any explosive agents.
The helicopters can go at first light. They
can get people onto the Holt. It would take
two hours for people to get organized and cross
to the MAYAGUEZ. They could start out with
riot control agents. This probably would not
incapacitate them long, perhaps for about 10
minutes. The HOLT would then come along-
side and all the Marines would come over and
hopefully seize control of the vessel. Our
Marines would inspect it, so would an OD
team. Then it would be moved out.
President:
The helicopters come from where?
Jones:
From Utapao.
Next, the tactical air. We have tactical air on
the scene now. We have gunships, fighters, etc.
We can suppress fire. We have instructions to
minimize fire in case the Americans are there,
but to protect the people who are landing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
9
Eight helicopters with 175 Marines aboard
will land on the island around sunrise. There
is a four-hour recycle time to Utapao. The
next wave of 235 or more would then come to
give us over 600 Marines on the island by dark.
The 175 can secure themselves, with gunships
and tactical air. When the second group
arrives, we can cut off the neck of the island
and move out.
President:
I understand our time for this is 1845, but that
it is already the 15th over there. Is that 0645
or 0745 over there?
Jones:
It is about 0545. It is around sunrise.
Here is a picture of the island. The Marine
in charge has reconnoitered it.
A close check indicates an open area with
trails leading into the woods. This is the
preferred landing zone. Also, they might
land on the beach. It is wide enough. It is
the only opening on the island. Later, we
would want to cut the island in two.
With somewhat over 600 Marines by nightfall,
we should have a good feel for what is there.
We can perhaps withdraw the next day. We
could bring the Marines out to the CORAL SEA.
This gets them out of Thailand. Or, of course,
we could go back by Thailand.
Tactical air based in Thailand would provide
most of the cover. It has the gunships and the
riot control agents.
That is the operation as we recommend it, as
a joint recommendation from all the Joint
Chiefs.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
10
President:
What about the CORAL SEA and B-52's?
Jones:
There are three targets:
-- First, the ai rfield at Kompong Som.
-- Second, the naval port.
-- Third, the regular port.
There is not much to hit on the airfield. There
is not much around the naval port. Greater
targeting is around the other port. We have
found two ships of unidentified registry, with
other craft around also. There are about 10
boats there. Eight of them look like fast patrol
craft; one is unknown; one other is a medium
landing craft.
President:
Where are they located?
Jones:
They are along one dock.
There are buildings, POL, and other things in
the area.
If we choose to apply the B-52's, we could put
three on one target, three on the other, and six
on a third. This would cover the area of the
targets.
President:
Does this include the breakwater also?
Jones:
We would cover the breakwater in one portion
of the target area. But it would be very difficult
to damage it. You would have to have a direct
hit.
The B-52's would take about six hours from
Guam. They fly at a high altitude so there is
no threat to them.
Vice President:
I thought they would be on their way by now.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
11
President:
No.
Schlesinger:
No. We just put them in readiness.
With a unit of three aircraft, there would be
about 125 weapons. The concentration is in
the center. They would probably not hit the
breakwater.
Jones:
As for the CORAL SEA, it has about 48
aircraft. About 100 smart bombs are
available, such as laser guided or Walleyes.
They could be used with great precision. We
would first send armed reconnaissance and
then go for heavy targets like construction,
POL, the warehouses, etc.
Admiral Holloway:
We have 21 F-4's, 24 A-7's, and 6 A-6's.
There are 81 guided munitions on the CORAL
SEA. They are about halfway split between
laser and the Walleyes.
President:
What will be the extent of the damage from the
CORAL SEA as compared with the B-52's?
Jones:
With the bombs from the carrier you could
take out key targets. With the B-52's, you
get more bombs, interdiction of the runway
and of the port, etc. We would get additional
buildings, including collateral damage.
The key targets you could get from the CORAL
SEA. With B-52's, you will get mass.
President:
What would be the altitude?
Admiral Holloway:
About 6000.
Kissinger:
How is the weather?
Admiral Holloway:
It is now suitable. It might be cloudy from time
to time, but not for long.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
12
Jones:
The prediction is for patchy areas.
With the CORAL SEA, we would have a
continuous flow shifting from target to
target.
Kissinger:
How long will the operation continue?
Jones:
From about 2250 tonight until the end of the
day (6:00 a.m. tomorrow).
Kissinger:
How many aircraft?
Jones:
About 70 percent of the aircraft. We would
use a lot at first, and less later.
President:
They could reload and come back.
Jones:
That's right. They could recycle.
Rumsfeld:
What is the purpose of having it go 8 hours?
Jones:
To hit all the targets. It could be less.
Kissinger:
Would we keep it up while the Marines are
on the island?
Admiral Holloway:
The operation on the island is being supported
from Thailand. We would have, from the
CORAL SEA, a number of aircraft and targets.
You would have, with those aircraft, enough to
hit all the targets?
Jones:
Not the breakwater or the runway, but every-
thing else.
Vice President:
But they would have time to get all the ships into
action. As it stands now, the B-52's would not
get there until later.
Jones:
We could start from the CORAL SEA earlier.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
13
Kissinger:
I have a question. You are landing on the
island at 6:45 a. m. and on the ship at
8:45 a. m. ; could they not sink the ship?
Jones:
As for the island, our timing decision is
based on the capacity of the helicopters and
on the cycles we need to run. It is already
sliding slightly.
Kissinger:
This helps you with the bombing.
Schlesinger:
That has already slid.
Vice President:
Then you won't get all the Marines from
Thailand?
Schlesinger:
We cannot. There are 1200 of them.
President:
Is this your recommendation on how it should
be handled, and is it just a matter of time?
Jones:
We would need to get the order out as soon as
possible.
President:
They should launch both operations as quickly
as possible.
Admiral Holloway:
At first light.
Jones:
That's right. But that may be a moot question.
We will have good communications in order to
be able to follow everything.
Clements:
On the HOLT, let's be specific. We are supposed
to have real time voice, as well as two-minute
interval coded communication.
President:
How soon do you estimate that the three heli-
copters, with 63 Marines, will be airborne?
Jones:
It should be within an hour.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
-
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
14
President:
They are about 40 minutes behind your schedule.
Jones:
They should still make it.
Kissinger:
They are leaving simultaneously.
Jones:
The HOLT is first.
(At this point, Admiral Holloway leaves the
room to communicate instructions.)
President:
Now, regarding the B-52's and the CORAL SEA.
Jones:
There are various possible times on this.
Marsh:
Are you taking the island to get it or the people?
Schlesinger:
Because of the people there.
Rumsfeld:
We will plan to take off from the island in
24 hours.
Kissinger:
I would not answer how long we will stay there.
We should say that we will try to find our people.
We are not sure how long it may be.
Rumsfeld:
Privately, we should say we will not stay long
enough so that we would lose face and have to
get off too late.
Kissinger:
There is no point in staying on the island after
we have searched it for our men. But I think
we should not assure anybody ahead of time when
we will leave. We will move at our own pace.
Schlesinger:
What about any prisoners we take?
Kissinger:
I would keep them.
Colby:
Remembering what happened at Son Tay, I
would say that we are planning to look for people
who might possibly be there. We should not be
too positive that they are there.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
15
President:
The point is that we are going there to get
our people, not the island.
Jones:
With the CORAL SEA, one suggestion that
has been made is to issue an ultimatum that
would say that within so many hours, unless
you tell us you are releasing the Americans,
there would be air strikes. We could also do
that with the B-52 strikes.
Rumsfeld:
Regarding the ultimatum, I think there are
three ways to do it:
-- First, publicly.
-- Second, privately or diplomatically.
-- Third, you can get into a taffy pull with
the people on the scene.
I think one and three are bad ideas. The best
is the second. It must be specific and must
have a diplomatic initiative.
Kissinger:
We sent a message to the Secretary General
today. We could not get a better way to
communicate with the Cambodians.
That message was delivered at one o'clock.
We thought of giving an ultimatum in Peking,
but it is too complicated in terms of the time
involved.
Schlesinger:
How about a local ultimatum?
Kissinger:
I have no objection. But I do not believe that
our action should be dependent on an ultimatum.
Fundamentally, the purpose of our strikes is to
protect our operations. I could be talked into
taking out the 100 aircraft at Phnom Penh, but
I do not want to upset people too much.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP-SECRE/SENSITIVE
16
But we should move massively and firmly.
We should say that we are going to protect
the operation to get out our people.
Buchen:
I do not agree. If they are not there on the
island, you then issue the ultimatum.
President:
Supposing we do not find them all? If the
operation is carried out in proper time
sequence, they will land on the island at
1845 and on the HOLT earlier. (Points to
General Jones' chart) On the schedule you
have there, the CORAL SEA is about two
hours after the HOLT, and about 4 hours
after the island operation. In that space of
time they can find out whether the Americans
are on the ship or on the island.
Kissinger:
The first group cannot search.
President:
No, but it can perhaps find out if the Americans
are there. That gives us some flexibility.
But I do not think we should delay. I think we
should go on schedule. Then, whether or not
we find the Americans, you can strike.
Buchen:
But an ultimatum may be the only way to get
the Americans out.
Kissinger:
Rather than have an ultimatum, I would advance
the strikes.
I think it is essential in situations of this kind to
make clear that it is we who define the hazards.
We can argue that we are doing this to protect
our operation. What we have to get across to
other countries is that we will not confine our-
selves to the areas in which they challenge us.
So I think we should do the strikes at the time
of the operation. Then, if we have not found
our people, we can mine or do other things.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
s GERALD AMERICA FREE
TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
17
We can also issue an ultimatum. We can say
that the 100 aircraft was a protective operation.
Of course, we would have some difficulties
with people on the Hill and with others.
Colby:
The problem is that the KC could put 2, 400
people on that island within 4 hours, if they
are not blocked.
President:
So we have two reasons to speed up the CORAL
SEA operations, so that its first attack coincides
with the attack on the island and on the ship.
If we use the CORAL SEA, you are then using
it to protect the people on the operation. Second,
if you use the CORAL SEA with the smart bombs,
you are hitting military targets and you will not
possibly do harm to Americans.
Rumsfeld:
There are only 80 smart bombs.
Jones:
But we have other armaments.
Buchen:
You have two neutral ships. With an ultimatum,
they have a chance to get out.
Jones:
I suggest we expedite the CORAL SEA as soon
as possible. It cannot go before the other
operations, but at the same time. It would
go after mobile targets at first, and other
targets later.
Rumsfeld:
The logic is to protect the operation.
Buchen:
But we should avoid the neutral ships.
President:
If they are Cambodian ships, we should sink
them.
Schlesinger:
The leak regarding the B-52's is not too bad.
It shows that the President will use them if
necessary.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
/ FORD LIBRARY GEBALO
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
18
President:
I think you should reexamine the CORAL SEA
operation with the expectation to keep it going.
Henry, what do you think?
Kissinger:
My recommendation is to do it ferociously.
We should not just hit mobile targets, but
others as well.
Schlesinger:
We will destroy whatever targets there are.
President:
And they should not stop until we tell them.
Buchen:
You have the requirement for consultation with
Congress. If you hit buildings, you might hit
Americans.
Schlesinger:
I think they would have moved the Americans
20 miles inland as soon as possible.
Admiral Holloway:
If we now go to use the CORAL SEA it will hit
before we take the ship. The first wave will
hit targets connected with the operation. Later
waves will hit other targets, including the three
that we have discussed: the airfield and the
ports.
Schlesinger:
They cannot fracture the runways.
President:
Can you get the boats?
Schlesinger:
That is possible.
President:
I think we should hit the planes, the boats, and
the ships if they are Cambodian.
Schlesinger:
We will make a positive identification that they
are Cambodian.
Admiral Holloway:
On the first operation, the fighters will come
back and report. First, you can go for the
runways; second you can come back with the
required strikes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
19
Schlesinger:
How soon?
Holloway:
Three hours.
Schlesinger:
That would be about 7 o'c lock.
Kissinger:
They should not strike at the mainland before
the HOLT can get to the ship.
Schlesinger:
So we will go with a 2045 time.
Admiral Holloway:
O.K.
(Admiral Holloway leaves again to pass on
instructions.)
Schlesinger:
Is there any change in our estimate regarding
the forces on the island?
Colby:
No.
Hartmann:
Do we have any estimate of American casualties?
Jones:
It is very hard to make a precise estimate. We
do not know what there is. Saying that there would
be ten people killed would be too precise.
Schlesinger:
It might be 20 to 30.
Clements:
Sooner or later you will get a linkage with the
23 already lost at NKP.
President:
Any other questions?
Schlesinger:
We are in position to do the SAR operation.
If we hit again Kompong Som, will our people
go in over land if they are hit?
Jones:
We will have SAR aircraft. They could go down
over land. It is conceivable.
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President:
What is the distance between the targets and
Kompong Som itself?
Colby:
About 15 kilometers.
Jones:
About 10 miles.
Rumsfeld:
Did you say that the Marines could be recovered
on the CORAL SEA? Is this an option?
Jones:
No plan is yet finalized.
Kissinger:
They could go on the HANCOCK.
Rumsfeld:
Our preferred option is not to have them return
to Thailand.
President:
According to the schedule, the HANCOCK will
arrive at 0400 on Friday. It could be the
recovery vessel for the Marines being taken
off.
Schlesinger:
Augmenting the B-52 picture of being ready is
that we are continuing to amass forces.
Rumsfeld:
We should not announce the termination.
President:
Will the WILSON link with the HOLT?
Jones:
Yes; also the CORAL SEA. The HANCOCK
may be delayed. Even so, we will not take
the Marines back to Thailand.
Rumsfeld:
Did you decide on an ultimatum after the
strikes?
Kissinger:
We could use bullhorns to inform the Cambodians
on the island. They should not negotiate. They
should just state our demands. I think that once
we start we should finish and get out.
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Ingersoll:
Shouldn't we remove the Marines out of
Thailand once the operation has been
launched?
Schlesinger:
It is not necessary.
Ingersoll:
We will have riots tomorrow.
Jones:
We have 1200 at Utapao. I suggest we under-
take an airlift to get them out, once we decide
we do not need them.
Kissinger:
Then we can announce that we have withdrawn
them.
Buchen:
I have not understood how Henry (Kissinger)
is planning to proceed.
Kissinger:
I think it will not work unless we hit. Then we
can give an ultimatum that is credible. We
have many things we can still do later. We
can mine, or we can take out the planes at
Phnom Penh. Then we will be in a long test.
We will not have gained by not hitting Kompong
Som.
Rumsfeld:
Tomorrow Congress is back in session.
President:
We have a lot of activity going. Let's see it
then.
Kissinger:
We should not give the impression that we will
stop.
Hartmann:
How will the Cambodians know what to do if they
decide to let our people go?
Jones:
We will have a bullhorn. We can tell them what
to do.
Kissinger:
The odds are that the people of the island have
no orders and will sit tight.
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Clements:
I don't think the Americans are there anyway.
Kissinger:
They could be. We do not know.
President:
We are speculating on how many there were
in the ship that got away.
Colby:
The pilot said he saw eight or so. He said
there were others in the HOLT. He speculated
it might be the full 39.
Jones:
We should word our release carefully so we
say that we want to remove the Americans and
get information on their whereabouts. There
may also be value in capturing Cambodians.
Kissinger:
The problem is that we do not know that they
are not there. Taking the island if they are
not there is easier to explain than failing to
take it if they are.
Hartmann:
Could a gunboat carry 39 people?
Colby:
Yes.
Jones:
We should say that we wanted to get the
Americans. Even if we did not get them,
it would be useful to talk to the Cambodians
to find out what they know.
Kissinger:
We should have one clear line of this.
Colby:
We need to be braced against that pilot.
Schlesinger:
We have an obligation to get the Americans
or to see if they are there.
Rumsfeld:
We need to make plans on press handling
between now and midnight.
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Hartmann:
We should talk a little about Congressional
consultation.
Last night, we gave the leadership information
on your actions. They agreed. They said that
they were advised, but not consulted. We
reported the attacks to them. Again, they
supported you. Today, in the House, people
are saying that there was no consultation
under the War Powers Act.
I have a summary of the Congressional response.
I also have a summary of the House and Senate
responses to our statements. During the after-
noon, it was agreed to provide limited briefings
to the House and Senate Foreign Affairs
Committees. They want more information.
We are sticking to the leadership. We have
not expanded on the earlier material.
The question now is what notification and consul-
tation should proceed. There is a suggestion
that you call Mansfield and Albert, but then
others will be mad.
We can bring the people over here,
or we can call them.
President:
What does the law say?
Buchen:
The law says to consult before the introduction
of forces and then to consult regularly. There
is also a requirement for a report 48 hours
after an action. We have to get that report
in tonight.
Kissinger:
When did this action start, from the legal
standpoint?
Buchen:
When you got the gunships in.
Kissinger:
Maybe you should get the leadership in tonight.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
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Buchen:
That is what the Congress really wants.
President:
How soon could they be down here?
Marsh:
By 6:30 p.m.
Rumsfeld:
As I understand it, consultation means telling
them in time so that they can oppose the action.
But we cannot worry about it, though they will
complain that it is not consultation.
Kissinger:
I think we should give them the history of the
diplomatic effort. We should tell them that there
was no response and that we had to go ahead.
I do not think we should give them details on
our strikes.
President:
We should say that we will land on the ship and
on the island.
Rumsfeld:
From the political standpoint, we should get
your friends and brief them, so that they can
stand up and fight for you.
President:
Jack (Marsh), can you ask them to come down
here? Whom would you ask?
Marsh:
I would ask the leadership, such as the Speaker,
the Floor leaders, the Whips, and others. I
would also get the Foreign Affairs and Armed
Services Committee leaders and ranking Minority
members of both Houses.
Rumsfeld:
I would do Anderson separately, perhaps at
7 o'clock.
Schlesinger:
The plans regarding air strikes should be
presented to show that the targets will be
carefully selected. We should not just talk
about "a few" strikes, but about "selective"
strikes.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
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I would recommend that the Republican leader-
ship be among the group you are briefing.
Kissinger:
But we must ask them to keep quiet. They
will be briefed before the operation starts.
Vice President:
Perhaps 10 o'clock would be better.
Kissinger:
How about 10 o'clock?
President:
Would it be to our benefit to delay?
Buchen:
I would not.
Marsh:
The statute says to consult before initiation
of action.
Vice President:
You have already done that.
Marsh:
But we have not yet told them that we are
executing.
Vice President:
What if the group is opposed? What should
the President do?
Kissinger:
He would have to go ahead anyway.
Vice President:
I was asked today by a business group when
you would react. They applauded when I said
that you would be firm.
President:
I have had similar reactions.
Kissinger:
What about informing the public? Should we
use national television?
Hartmann:
Perhaps after it's over.
Kissinger:
Let us do the beginning low key, and then go
to a fuller description. Perhaps we should
just do a brief announcement at first.
(To Schlesinger) I thought your statement
read well.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
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TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
26
Rumsfeld:
You do not want to look as if, in being firm,
you are being crimped by the Congress.
Regarding the B-52's, the Congress would
say you should not use them. Then you stand
them down, as if in response to Bella Abzug.
Should we perhaps stand them down now?
Kissinger:
I would ignore Bella and then explain the B-52's.
If it works, it will not matter. If not, we will
have other things to worry about. You will
look implacable and calm and in control.
Perhaps you should give a ten-minute speech.
Hartmann:
How about other countries?
Kissinger:
That is a good idea.
Rumsfeld:
You should let NATO know, for once.
Hartmann:
Are there any press on board?
Kissinger:
(To Ingersoll) We should get Sisco to organize
messages. We should not use SEATO.
Vice President:
I think that's good.
President:
What do we want when the leadership is here?
Kissinger:
I think we should have no military men, but just
Jim and myself. I could brief on the diplomatic
steps. You would say what you have ordered.
Schlesinger:
What should we say?
Kissinger:
We should tell them about the island, about the
ship, and about the related strikes on military
targets to make the operation succeed.
Rumsfeld:
The first question will be, will the Marines
land on the island.
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TOP SECREF/SENSITIVE
27
Kissinger:
We should not say yet.
Vice President:
They will know about the ship three hours in
advance. They can scuttle it.
Kissinger:
Is it better to wait until 10 o'clock?
Buchen and
No.
Rumsfeld:
President:
You go ahead.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
5090 LIBRARY STATES
DOC
RECD
LOG NDR
INITIAL ACTION
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6
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19
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REFERENCE:
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