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NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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Portugal
Angola
President (1974-1977 : Ford). Commission on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Activities within the United States. 1/4/1975-6/6/1975
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 6/27/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09185
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Talking Points for Sec. Kissinger
National Security Council Meeting on
Angola
CREATION DATE
06/27/1975
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200020
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
printized; NSC ler 6/12/00
doe 2/28/01
sanitized
09185
SECRET-XGDS
TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ANGOLA
(Friday - June 27, 1975)
1. We have important but by no means vital interests in Angola.
American investment there is presently estimated at $400 million,
of which $300 million represents the Gulf Oil investment in important
petroleum reserves in Cabinda, an exclave of Angola. Angola is rich
in other minerals and agricultural potential. It has a strategic
importance because of its location along the sea and air lines of
communication between the United States East Coast and the Indian
Ocean. Lack of US access to port and airfield facilities in most of
the other nearby countries heightens this strategic importance.
2. In a larger context, instability in Angola would create instability in
neighboring states in which we have important interests, such as
Zaire. Instability in Angola would also increase the resistance to
change by the white southern African states of Rhodesia and South
Africa. A Soviet-dominated Angola could be seen as a defeat for
US policy.
3. Our principal objectives in Angola then are: to contain the present
conflict in Angola and to foster a peaceful transition to an independent
Angola that is stable and that follows a policy of cooperation and
friendship with the United States.
4. In the current situation we are faced with considerable instability
and doubt about the future of Angola. It appears that Neto may have
a distinct advantage at the present by his superior position in
Luanda and certainly he is getting significant assistance from the
Soviets and other communist states.
5. Our current policy is one of observing the situation. Our only active
involvement in recent months has been some political support for
Holden Roberto and we have pending in the Forty Committee recom-
mendations for similar assistance for non-violent purposes for
Jonas Savimbi.
1089
SECRET XGDS
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
sava
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NSC ltr 4/12/00 - mr 98-35#13
By dal NARA, Date 2/28/01
SECRET-XGDS
2
6. I believe, Mr. President, that at a minimum we should engage
in a diplomatic effort on all fronts to calm the situation. We
would seek to:
-- reduce the flow of Soviet, Yugoslav and other foreign arms
to the MPLA and thus strengthen the position of FNLA and
UNITA.
-- encourage Portugal to exert authority in Angola firmly and
impartially; and
-- improve the chances of the liberation groups reaching an
agreement on cooperation,
-- enlist the assistance of, and support efforts by, African
states and others to seek a peaceful solution,
-- encourage cooperation between Roberto and Savimbi.
7. We must recognize, of course, that our leverage is limited
particularly with regard to the Soviets and Portuguese.
8. Some of the steps we might take under this option could include:
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
-- an effort in support of, or together with, interested Africans
(e.g., Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria), to seek to
persuade Portugal to maintain its full troop strength (24, 000)
in Angola until or preferably, beyond the scheduled February
1976 withdrawal date. The Portuguese would, of course, be
difficult to persuade.
-- concurrently support African efforts to assure Portugal's
neutrality towards the three liberation groups and to enlist'
its cooperation in limiting the arms flow into Angola.
-- encourage interested Africans (e.g., Zaire, Zambia,
Tanzania, Tunisia -- all of whom are FNLA and/or UNITA
supporters) to seek Soviet reduction of arms support to
MPLA.
BERALD
-- directly but privately request the USSR to reduce its support
of MPLA, noting reduction of Zaire's support of FNLA and
possibly offering to seek reduction of PRC support of FNLA.
As with Portugal, our ability to bring this off is severely
limited.
SECRET/XGDS
SECRET-XGDS
3
urge Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria and other interested
African states to take the lead in developing an OAU consensus
to seek an end to foreign arms aid to the Angolan liberation
movements, including seeking to persuade Congo to discourage
transshipment of arms through Brazzaville.
9. If these diplomatic efforts fail where do we go? Do we fall back on a
posture of neutrality, or become more actively involved, perhaps,
as President Mobutu has suggested to Sheldon Vance, through a
third party.
10. The implications of neutrality are a possible Neto victory, in-
creased chances for heavy Soviet influence in independent Angola,
continued instability in Angola beyond independence, an unstable
Zaire, and a general destabilization of the area. We would probably
see another country added to the list of those that deny us access to
ports and airfields for our Navy and Air Force. In addition to
enjoying such access, the Soviets might be given military facilities.
11. Neutrality would:
enable us to avoid a potentially risky and expensive involvement
in a situation whose outcome may well be beyond our control.
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
protect us from some international criticism.
be more palatable to Congress and the US public than an
activist approach.
avoid tying us to either FNLA or UNITA, groups whose chances
of success and future policies are in doubt.
avoid further antagonizing the MPLA in the event that it should
play an important role in a future Angolan government.
12. Instead of adopting a policy of neutrality, we could actively support
the FNLA and/or UNITA. At this juncture, we could not realistically
consider any direct, overt military support, such as arms shipments
or commitment. of US personnel. Any assistance would have to be
covert, and military assistance would have to be channeled through
third parties.
13. If chosen, this option could be carried out by the following courses
of action:
BERALO FORD LIBRARY
SECRET-XGDS
SECRET-XGDS
4
-- Provide covert financial support to Roberto.
-- Urge Zaire, Zambia and Tanzania to press Roberto and
Savimbi to resolve their differences and work together to
avoid being vanquished separately by the MPLA.
-- Adopt a deliberate policy of bringing UNITA up to comparable
strength with FNLA and MPLA, while encouraging Savimbi
to develop a close working relationship with Roberto and the
FNLA.
-- Specifically, extend financial support to Savimbi in amounts
necessary to improve: (a) his mobility (e.g., purchase of
vehicles or aircraft); (b) his military strength (e.g., purchase
of weapons, transport, and equipment); and (c) his political
and propaganda capability (e.g., purchase of a newspaper
and/or radio station).
LIBRARY
-- Encourage Zambia, and perhaps Zaire also, to support a
GERALD
policy of building up UNITA.
-- Facilitate availability of non-US and (preferably African, e.g.
Zambian, Zairian) cadres to train recruits for Savimbi's
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
military forces.
14. The Soviet reaction could be an acceleration of its commitments,
and while our support would make the Soviet task harder, we do
not enjoy the same freedom to raise levels of support as do the
Soviets and still keep it covert.
15. Of course, as our support increased in scope, the chances of
exposure would increase. In such event, US support could become
a significant political issue with widespread negative domestic and
international repercussions.
16. One of the most viable options at this juncture, in my opinion, would
be to extend aid to President Mobutu as an offset to enable him to
provide military and other support to Holden and Savimbi. From
his conversations with Sheldon Vance, Mobutu appears prepared to
cooperate with us. An important side benefit would be improved
US-Zaire relations.
17. We would not necessarily want to funnel all our efforts through
Mobutu. Particularly we might want to establish a direct relationship
with Savimbi, as is currently pending before the Forty Committee.
SECRET-XGDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET/XGDS
WASHINGTON
2999
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Friday, June 27, 1975
2:30 p.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I. PURPOSE
To review options for United States policy toward Angola,
particularly for the period between now and November 11, 1975,
when Angola is due to become independent.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. BACKGROUND
The approaching independence of Angola and the struggle for
power among competing groups make it important to determine
with precision U.S. interests and objectives, Angola's political
movements, external influences, and options and issues.
US interests and objectives. The United States has important
but not vital interests in Angola. American investment there is
presently estimated at $400 million, of which $300 million is
in the Gulf Oil investment in important petroleum reserves in
Cabinda, an exclave of Angola. Angola is rich in other minerals
and agricultural potential. It has a strategic importance because
of its location along the sea and air lines of communication between
the United States East Coast and the Indian Ocean. Lack of U.S.
access to port and airfield facilities in most of the other nearby
countries heightens this strategic importance.
Instability in Angola could endanger stability in neighboring
states in which we have important interests, such as Zaire.
Instability in Angola would also increase the resistance to change
by the white southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa.
A Soviet dominated Angola could be a definite threat to its
neighbors.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRET-XGDS
CLASS. AUTH. BY: General Scowcroft
MR 98-35, #12 NSCh. 4/13/99
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
By KBH NARA, Date 7/11/00
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
SECRET-XGDS
-2-
Our principal objectives in Angola then are: to contain the
present conflict in Angola and to foster a peaceful transition
to an independent Angola which is stable and which follows a
policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.
Angola's political movements. There are three political move -
ments in Angola -- the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA).
- The FNLA, whose leader is Holden Roberto, has the backing
of Zaire, and its stronghold is in the north of the country.
The strength of the FNLA continues to suffer from Holden's
refusal to move from Zaire to Angola to take direct control
of FNLA activities.
- The MPLA, whose leader is Agostinho Neto, has a strong
Marxist strain, is provided arms by the Soviet Union and
other communist countries, and enjoys some support from
Portugal. It has had some success in building an image as
a national multi-racial, rather than tribal, organization, and
its stronghold is in Angola's capital of Luanda and its environs.
- UNITA is the least powerful of the three movements but its
leader, Jonas Savimbi, has emerged as the most active and
politically skillful of Angola's nationalist leaders. He is
supported by neighboring Zambia, Tanzania and Zaire, as a
compromise candidate to assume leadership of an independent
Angola. So far, UNITA has made an effort to stay above the
military clashes between the other two parties.
Internally, Savimbi enjoys wide popularity, based on tribal
affiliation, in the prosperous central highlands and the south,
an area constituting about one-third of Angola's population.
In recent fighting, the MPLA has bested its rival, the FNLA, in
numerous clashes in Luanda, northern Angola, and Cabinda. The
result has been a tendency for all three movements to entrench
themselves in the territories where they have majority support.
SECRET-XGDS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
SEGRET-XGDS
-3-
The leaders of the three movements met last week in Kenya in
an effort to halt the fighting and prepare for elections and
independence. The communique from that meeting closely parallels
the original agreement of January 1975 establishing a transitional
government. Initial intelligence reports make it doubtful whether
the peaceful, orderly thrust of the most recent communique will
be implemented. The communique itself implicitly recognizes
there will be continuing problems. There is a proviso that in
case there are difficulties in implementing steps of the agreement
designed to lead to elections, there will be a new summit meeting
in Angola to adopt another means of transferring power. Since
the meeting adjourned, there have been renewed incidents of vio-
lence between the MPLA and the FNLA forces.
External influences.
- Zaire has major interests in the future of Angola. It has a
1500 mile frontier with Angola and there are some 750, 000
refugees of the Angolan tribe of Bakongo in Zaire. Zaire's
important copper ore exports are transported by rail to sea
through Angola. President Mobutu has backed the FNLA
since the latter's formation, and he regards an Angola
dominated by the MPLA's Agostinho Neto as intolerable.
Currently in Kinshasa for discussions of the problems regard-
ing our bilateral relations, our former Ambassador to Zaire,
Sheldon Vance, has, at my instructions discussed Angola with
Mobutu, seeking his analysis and plans.
President Mobutu said he had reached an understanding with
Portugal on mutual restraints with regard to assistance to
the Movements. But he said that the Soviets continue to pour
arms and other assistance into Angola for Neto. His own
ability to continue to aid Holden is restricted by his own low
stock of weapons and a scarcity of money. He explained it
would be very grave for Zaire if the Soviets controlled Angola,
as they would if Neto became master of the country.
Mobutu does not have any confidence that compromise agreements
among the three Movements will work. In his judgment what is
needed is to bring up Holden's and Savimbi's military strength to
balance off Neto's. Holden and Savimbi are now working well
SECRET-XGDS
SECRET-XGDS
- 4 -
well together behind the scenes, but it is unfortunate that
Holden continues to refuse to return to Angola. Savimbi might
prove to be the person to back for the presidency.
Mobutu said it was obvious the US could not help with direct
assistance to Holden and Savimbi, but it might be able to do SO
through Zaire. Alsó, the Angolan refugees in Zaire (who are
Holden's supporters) should return to Angola. This would not
be a difficult operation if Holden could get the kind of assistance
he needs to effect such an operation.
- Zambia, which has interests in Angola equal to those of Zaire,
and Tanzania can be expected to continue to work for a peaceful
settlement in Angola. Both recently have become disenchanted
with Neto and have switched support to Savimbi.
- The Peoples Republic of the Congo has focused its assistance
on the MPLA. It sees the MPLA, with which it shares a Marxist
orientation, as the most sympathetic of the Angolan groups.
- Portugal. The more moderate leaders in Portugal favor
Savimbi; the more radical ones favor the MPLA. The FNLA
has virtually no support among Portuguese leaders. Despite
covert backing of the MPLA in the past, in so far as Lisbon now
has a policy, it is one of impartiality between the factions. This
attitude reflects Lisbon's awareness of its diminishing ability
to affect events and its desire to be on good terms with independent
Angola no matter who is in charge.
- The Soviet Union has backed the MPLA since it was founded.
While we do not know the exact quantity of military assistance
the Soviets are providing the MPLA, this assistance is of major
significance, and the Soviets could be expected to play a major
role in an MPLA-dominated Angola.
-
The Chinese, partly in response to a request from President
Mobutu, began aiding the FNLA in 1974. This assistance has
been relatively small and while the PRC is undoubtedly concerned
about the Soviet presence, it may wish to avoid being drawn
deeper into an uncertain situation where its interests are limited.
SEGRET-XCDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
SECRET-XGDS
- 5 -
- Any OAU or UN interference in Angola are strongly opposed,
at present, by the MPLA and the FNLA. The OAU is divided
in its support of the liberation movements and will be extremely
reluctant to intervene directly. It is also unlikely that the UN
would seek an expanded political role without explicit approval
from the three Angolan parties, and at least tacit approval of
the OAU. Increased UN humanitarian and economic assistance
to Angola always remains a possibility.
The options and issues
- The US might promote a peaceful solution through diplomatic
measures. There is general consensus that at least as a
beginning the US needs to make an effort to promote a peaceful
solution through diplomatic measures. The objectives would
be to reduce the flow of foreign arms to the MPLA, encourage
Portugal to exert authority in Angola firmly and impartially,
enlist the cooperation of African states, and others, to seek a
peaceful solution and encourage cooperation between Holden
and Savimbi.
- If this diplomatic effort were to fail, we would then be faced
with a question of whether we should adopt a neutral attitude
toward the flow of events or step up our involvement by active
support of the FNLA and/or UNITA, perhaps through third parties.
- Neutrality would enable us to avoid a potentially risky and
expensive involvement in a situation whose outcome may well
be beyond our control; would protect us from some international
criticism; and would be least controversial domestically.
Active support of the FNLA and/or UNITA could enable us to
check the momentum of leftist forces and to facilitate assertion
of control by pro-Western moderates but would involve con-
siderable risks. Assistance would have to be covert or
channeled through third parties. We would be involving our-
selves in a match with the Soviets, yet we do not enjoy the same
freedom to raise the level of support as do the Soviets.
In addition to our substantive interest in the outcome, playing
an active role would demonstrate that events in Southeast Asia
have not lessened our determination to protect our interests.
In sum, we face an opportunity -- albeit with substantial risks --
SECRET-XGDS
GERALD
SEGRET-XGDS
- 6 -
to preempt the probable loss to Communism of a key
developing country at a time of great uncertainty over
our will and determination to remain the preeminent
leader and defender of freedom in the West.
Attached at Tab B is a memorandum prepared by an inter-
agency group amplifying the options and issues. At Tab C is
a memorandum from CIA on Portugal's role in Angola. Tab D
presents an analytic summary of the interagency response to
NSSM 224 on United States Policy Toward Angola.
B. Participants: - List is at Tab A.
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will
be announced. There will be a White House photographer.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation on Angola
and the options for US policy, particularly for the period until
independence in November of this year, and immediately thereafter.
2. I want to b+- sure we are clear how the situation in Angola affects
United States interests and objectives there and in the area as
a whole.
3. I would like to start by having Bill Colby lay out the situation
for us.
4. Henry, would you give us a rundown of the principal issues and
options for US policy.
5.
The situation in Angola is complex and our ability to control
or even influence the outcome is obviously limited.
6. We certainly should make every effort diplomatically to bring
about a peaceful outcome which would be in the US national
interest.
7. The outcome in Angola is of importance to us. I will seriously
consider the options we have discussed today and, as the
situation and our ongoing efforts proceed, will be making
decisions as to other actions we may wish to pursue.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET XGDS
SECRET-XGDS
- 7 -
Attachments
Tab A - List of Participants
Tab B - Interagency Group memo on options and issues
Tab C - CIA's memo on Portugal's role in Angola
Tab D - Analytical summary of interagency response to NSSM 224,
"US Policy Toward Angola"
Tab E - Kinshasa Telegram (5605) reporting conversation with
President Mobutu on Angola
Tab F - Kinshasa Telegram (5644) reporting a followup conversation
with President Mobutu on this subject.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET-XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09186
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Harold Horan?
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
CREATION DATE
06/27/1975
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200020
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 6/27/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
sincered MR 98.37. NSC the 4/12/00
due 3/28/01
sanitized 10/22/03
09186
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(2999)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Friday, June 27, 1975
TIME:
2:30 p.m. to 3:20 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Angola.
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
NSC:
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Harold E. Horan.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
GERALOR FORD LIBRARY
me 98.37 # 14; NSC etc 6/12/00
By doe $ NARA, Date 3/28/01
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
The President: Bill [to Colby], will you brief us on Angola and
related problems.
Mr. Colby:
Yes, sir. [Briefed - as attached.
]
The President: Cabinda was a part of the Portuguese territories?
[This was in reference to a point in Mr. Colby's brief as he described
Cabinda.
]
Mr. Colby:
Yes, sir.
The President: What are the white areas within the borders of
Angola?
Mr. Colby:
These are essentially tribal, not military areas.
These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart]
to mention those three. They have different languages and are different
socially.
The President: Did the Portuguese do much in combatting illiteracy?
Are there many educated blacks?
Mr. Colby:
The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The
literacy rate is between 10-15 percent.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese
had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn't organ-
ize them for independence.
Secretary Schlesinger: Most of the educated classes are in Luanda and
support the MPLA.
The President: What is the white population?
Mr. Colby:
Three to four hundred thousand.
The President: Out of a total population of how many?
Mr. Colby:
About 5.7 million.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
The President: Are these mostly white Portuguese?
Mr. Colby:
Yes.
The President: Now, Henry, can you give us the options?
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief.
This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do
question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance.
The history of Africa has shown that a nation's only focal point is
the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international
support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top
is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and
drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain
support of other Africans.
Mr. Colby:
I agree, except to note the importance of the
(Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia's need for it.
The President: What is the name of the city at the end of the railway?
Mr. Colby:
Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility
for fragmentation.
Secretary Kissinger: Soviet arms shipments have reversed the
situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with
Mobutu, who has stressed the change in the balance of power.
Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important
equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto's hands.
Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is
moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition.
An interagency effort has developed options, none of which I am in
wild agreement with. The first is neutrality -- stay out and let
nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involve-
ment in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from
some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid
further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that
Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with
Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction;
FOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-4-
and Zaire would conclude we have disinterested ourselves in
that part of the world and move towards anti-Americanism.
As for the second course, my Department agrees, but I don't.
It is recommended that we launch a diplomatic offensive to get
the Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and others, to lessen arms shipments
to the MPLA, get Portugal to exert its authority, and encourage
cooperation among the groups. We could have direct dealings
with the Soviets or get African states to do it. If we appeal to
the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for
us to police it is next to impossible, and we would be bound to
do nothing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
BERALO
&
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
-5-
The President: Is there a specific proposal from the group
on grants in the arms area? I don't want to make a decision
now, but I didn't see any proposals in the briefing papers.
Secretary Kissinger: The Forty Committee has met twice to dis-
cuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, but
the second included some arms package. I recommend a working
group make a more systematic study of this option and return to
you.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-6-
The President:
At dinner he was very forceful on this. He
said that it was important to get his man in first, and then he
will win the election. I asked him if there were not going to be
elections, and he said yes, and that was why it was important to
put Savimbi in first and then he would win.
Secretary Kissinger: Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in
political science. [Laughter. ]
Secretary Kissinger: But the reverse of that is that if we don't do
something they would be suppressed.
The President:
Once the Popular Mo vement takes over you can
write it off.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-7-
Secretary Schlesinger: We might wish to encourage the distin-
tegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would
mean far greater security of the petroleum resources.
Mr. President, may I follow up -- if we do something, we must
have some confidence that we can win, or we should stay neutral.
Roberto is not a strong horse. The fact that he stays in the
Congo suggests he doesn't have the tenacity to win.
The President: It seems to me that doing nothing is unaccept-
able. As for diplomatic efforts, it is naive to think that's going
to happen, and the proposals on Portugal sound amateurish
Mr. Clements: I agree with this. Doing something now and keep-
ing the two parties afloat may well be encouraging Mobutu. What-
ever happens in November is not final, and it's important to keep
Roberto and Savimbi viable and keep the options open. Give Mobutu
some help and let him channel it.
Secretary Kissinger: In the first instance we could activate Mobutu
and inform Kaunda.
The President: He [Kaunda] was talking at dinner about getting
together with someone. Who was that?
Secretary Kissinger: With Savimbi and Mobutu.
The President: Let's get some options prepared, Bill [to Colby].
When can you have them?
Mr. Colby:
By mid-week.
TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
BERAZO FORD 1188681
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
-8-
Secretary Schlesinger:
::::
The FNLA has a weak capacity to enforce discipline
and we should look to see whether the Congolese (Zairians) can
be used for instilling discipline. And then there's the question
of the degree to which we can bring Roberto and Savimbi together.
The President: Those are some of the things that have to be
in the study. I think we need something for a week from Monday,
so let's set something up.
######
GERAL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC Sec
09187
27 June 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
27 JUNE NSC MEETING
ANGOLA
I. The current situation in Angola is highly un-
stable. Rivalry between contending nationalist
groups has featured increasing violence, with
each group trying to stake out territory and
gain military superiority before independence
on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal
by next February.
A. The fighting over the past few months has
been between the two largest groups, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the
National Front for the Liberation of An-
gola led by Holden Roberto. A third group
in the picture is the National Union for
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956 Sec. 3.6
MR03-12, CIA-ttr 6/18/03
dal NARA, Date 10/22/03
the Total Independence of Angola, led by
Jonas Savimbi.
1. In action early this month Neto's Popu-
lar Movement pushed the National Front
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
BERALD FORD man LIBRARY
out of some areas north and east of
Luanda, thus blocking the Front's sup-
ply lines into the capital.
2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda
this month, the two remain essentially
in a standoff there.
a. Military control of Luanda by either
group would necessarily not determine
control of or influence over the rest
of Angola, particularly in the rich
agricultural areas or along all the
main transportation routes.
3. Roberto's National Front still remains
strongly entrenched in large areas of
northern Angola where it has substantial
tribal support.
B. New fighting can erupt at any time:
--- There is a continuing buildup of the mili-
tary forces of all three nationalist groups;
-- Heavier weapons -- mortars and bazookas --
are being introduced into Angola by the USSR
and Zaire;
-- Armed and undisciplined civilians are in
Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement;
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
- 2 -
-- Neither major group is able or willing
to exercise effective control over its own
forces;
-- All three groups are initiating military
operations in parts of Angola yet untouched
by the fighting where no single group has
an edge; and
-- Politicking for the October elections for
a constituent assembly will increase tensions.
C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinder-
box. The Popular Movement has a slight military
edge there, but both other groups also have
forces active.
1. All three want the enclave to remain a part
of an independent Angola.
2. The picture is complicated by the pres-
ence of a factionalized separatist move-
ment supported by both Zaire and Congo.
3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan in-
dependence, and any intensification of
the fighting there could bring outside
intervention either directly or in sup-
port of the separatists.
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CERALD
II. The transitional government installed last January
has proved unworkable.
A. It is constructed on a system of checks and
balances, but in the current climate members
of the three liberation groups, as government
officials, concentrate on the competition be-
tween them.
1. Portuguese officials are not effective ---
they are caught in the middle.
2. The liberation groups have not honored
their commitment to establish an integrated
national army as called for in the inde-
pendence accord.
B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept
in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting
only to protect the whites.
1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned
most of the countryside to the nation-
alists, and are already crating some of
their heavy equipment for shipment to
Lisbon.
2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to be-
gin withdrawal in October and are to be
totally removed by next February.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
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CONF IDENTIAL
3. There is nothing in the independence ac-
cord to prevent the Portuguese from with-
drawing as fast as possible after October.
C. Lisbon's policy insofar as it has one, is
neutrality among the factions.
1. Portugal wants to protect its important
agricultural and mining interests.
2. The Portuguese also want to be on good
terms with whoever ends up in charge
after independence, but their ability
to affect events is diminishing.
3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders'
major concern is to prevent civil war, which
could have serious political repercussions
in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for ex-
ample, an increase in the number of white
refugees returning to Portugal who would
add to the turbulence there.
4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend
considerable diplomatic effort to reduce
tension in Angola, and would certainly
welcome similar efforts by interested
third countries.
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GLERIO FOUD
CONFIDENTIAL
III. The role of outside powers in supplying military
assistance to the nationalist groups remains a
key factor.
A. The Soviet Union has been a long time sup-
porter of Neto's Popular Movement, providing
both arms and cash during the years of the
insurgency against the Portuguese.
1. We are unable to determine how much So-
viet military aid is now reaching the
Movement, but it helped the Movement
score some of its recent gains.
2. Most of the aid is being channeled through
Congo.
3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are un-
clear, but in the short run Moscow supports
the Popular Movement in a situation
where all three nationalist groups are
viable contenders for power.
B. Peking has had some association with all of
the liberation movements in the past, but
the Chinese are most closely associated with
Roberto's National Front.
1. They have supplied military equipment
as well as some training. Some 100
FORD
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FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
CONF IDENTIAL
Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire
working with the Front.
2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front
to establish its forces firmly in north-
ern Angola.
C. Roberto has had little success in finding
assistance elsewhere.
1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose
family ties with Roberto and has long
supported him and the Front with funds,
arms, and training. He has also allowed
Roberto to maintain his headquarters in
Zaire.
a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut
back his assistance to the Front,
in part because of his govern-
ment's serious financial problems
and because he is cooling toward Ro-
berto.
b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front's
recent setbacks and feels Roberto's
position has been damaged because he
refuses to leave Zaire and go to
Luanda.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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CONF IDENTIAL
C. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi
of the National Union should be
the primary figure in an inde-
pendent Angolan government.
2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious con-
cerns of his own.
a. Zaire is experiencing a severe for-
eign exchange shortage because of the
low price of copper on the interna-
tional market.
b. He has now privately acknowledged
that the US was not involved in a
recent coup plot, as he alleged, but
may remain suspicious for some time.
IV. The prospects for Angola between now and Novem-
ber are poor. Further violence could take place
and edge the territory closer to civil war.
At best, Angola will lurch along and become
independent without a strong leader.
A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be
elected in October is supposed to select a
head of government of an independent Angola,
but new violence could force a postponement.
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GERAL
CONFIDENTIAL
B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi,
Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to
an uncertain truce that merely postpones a
confrontation.
1. They "agreed" to a number of measures,
such as disarming civilians, designed
to prevent new fighting. Similar agree-
ments in the past have failed, however.
2. All three contenders seem to recognize
the inconclusiveness of the pact. They
state that they will meet again to try
another form for the transfer of power
if the elections are not held.
V. After independence, it now appears that no single
liberation group in Angola will have the power to
impose its own ideology as national policy.
A. If civil war is averted and the three lib-
eration groups establish some kind of coali-
tion, the government's policies probably will
be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the
two major groups.
B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign
policy and will seek to maintain some balance
between East and West.
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FORD is LIBRARY GERMAN
CONFIDENTIAL
1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would
establish a high-centralized and authori-
tarian one-party regime with a pronounced
socialist orientation and close ties to
the communist world, with US ties kept
to a minimum.
2. The National Front would probably seek to
establish a highly nationalistic and per-
sonalized regime. Because of the Front's
rather narrow political base, an FNLA state
might be highly coercive. The Front would
likely accept development and/or military
aid from the West as well as the East.
C. Both groups can be expected to nationalize An-
gola's major productive enterprises, but the
Front probably would be more hsopitable toward
selective Western investment than the Popular
Movement.
D. As long as an independent Angola does not re-
strict access to its transportation facilities,
good relations with its neighbors Zaire and
Zambia probably can be maintained.
1. An independent Angola will give moral and
political support to black nationalists in
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LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Rhodesia and South Africa. It would prob-
ably not become immediately involved in
supporting insurgencies there, however,
because of distance and the dominant role
now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and
Mozambique in seeking a settlement with
the Smith regime.
VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops,
Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict.
A. Civil war could also convince either one, or
both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to an-
nex or neutralize the enclave.
B. Continued fighting in Angola would exacerbate
the confrontation between black and white
Africa. It would intensify the fears of
Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black
majority rule.
1. South Africa is particularly concerned
that a communist or unfriendly regime in
Angola might support guerrilla activity
in Namibia.
2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase
South African pressure on us to support its
domestic and international policies. This
GERALD ? FORD
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CONFIDENTIAL
would complicate our efforts to promote
peaceful solutions to Southern Africa's
racial problems.
3. South Africa does not seem to be planning
any action to counter this threat.
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