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        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 7/25/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09191\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nAgenda\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nNSC Meeting on SALT Issues, 7/25/75\nCREATION DATE\n07/25/1975\nVOLUME\n5 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200022\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 7/25/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nREDACTED 4/27/04\n09191\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6\nWITH FORTIONS EXEMPTED\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nE.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5(a)\nMEETING ON SALT ISSUES\nstate ets 9/25/98. osoets 4/27/04\nFriday, July 25, 1975\nMR 98-40,#30 NSC Itr 2/19/99\nCIA etr 5/10/05\n4:00 p.m. (one hour)\nThe Cabinet Room\nBY dal NARA DATE 7/20/06\nFrom: Henry A. Kissinger B\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the latest Soviet positions on SALT; to consider\npossible US responses; and to solicit the solidarity and support\nof NSC members for moving in a constructive fashion to complete\nthe agreement.\nII.\nBACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: Following is the status of the major SALT\nissues:\nMIRV Verification. The Soviets have made a major move\nin agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and\nsingle RVs as MIRVed when deployed. However, a problem\nstill remains with respect to counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If\nMIRVs are deployed only on part of a submarine class we\nmay not be able to verify that the remaining missiles on that\nclass are not also MIRVed. With confirmation from Brezhnev\nthat the Soviets are willing to count missiles tested with\nMIRVs as MIRVed when deployed, we will be in a position to\nmove the MIRV verification issue to the formal negotiations\nin Geneva. The problem of counting SLBM MIRVs involves\ntechnical issues which are best dealt with at the Delegation\nlevel. There are no significant interagency disagreements on\nhow to proceed on this issue.\nCruise Missiles. The Soviets have not changed their position on\ncruise missiles. Since our only strategically important interest\nin long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), we may\nTOP SEGREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS (B) (3)\nBy Authority of Henry A. Kissinger\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\n2\nbe able to trade off what we want in this area in return for\nagreeing to the Soviet position on cruise missiles launched\nfrom sea or land.\nThe DOD position on cruise missiles differs from that put\nforward by the Soviets primarily on the issue of ALCMs.\nDefense argues strongly for not counting ALCMs up to 2500-\n3000 km, in contrast to the 600 km limit proposed by the\nSoviets. On land-based cruise missiles, Defense is eager\nto accept the Soviet proposal for a 5500 km limit,\nDOD's principle concern is\nhowever, this can almost certainly be done in the context\nof a 2500-3000 km limit on ALCMs, since,\nThe Verification Panel yesterday concluded that we should\nconcentrate our efforts on achieving our principal objective\nof maintaining the option to deploy long-range ALCMs. To\nthis end, a possible initial approach discussed was to\npropose to Brezhnev a 3000 km limit on ALCMs and a 1500\nkm limit on SLCMs.\nMobile ICBMs. The Soviet position favoring a ban on the\ndeployment of land-mobile and essentially all air-mobile ICBMs\nhas caused some interagency problems; however, a consensus\nis emerging that, on balance, a combined ban on mobile\ndeployment (with development and testing permitted) would\nbe in the US interest. There is general agreement that the US\ncould not deploy a mobile system prior to 1983 and that 1985\nis a more practical date for initial deployment. However, OSD\nis apprehensive about the ability to obtain mobile development\nfunds if deployment is banned. An even greater impediment to\nfunding is the lack of a viable deployment concept for either\nair- or land-mobile ICBMs; all concepts put forward to date\nare either too expensive, require too much land, or only offer\nmarginal improvement in survivability over silo-based ICBMs.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nSince mobile deployment would also generate significant\nverification uncertainties, the weight of argument seems to\nfavor agreement to a mobile deployment ban. There is also\nthe problem of the negative political impact, as well as the\nimpact on mobile development funding, which would result if\nwe rejected the Soviet proposal and the Soviet proposal were\nleaked to Congress. As you know from your meeting with\nthe ACDA General Advisory Council, there is widespread\nsupport for a closing off this area of strategic competition.\nThus, the issue comes down to the impact which a mobile\ndeployment ban would have on the ability to obtain mobile\nR&D funds.\nSoviet refusal to consider the Backfire a strategic bomber\ncould be a major problem, unless Gromyko's failure to explicitly\nreject a tanker prohibition indicates some flexibility on this\npoint. OSD recognizes that the Soviets are not going to count\nall Backfires in the 2400 aggregate; however, the Chiefs still\nhold some hope for such an outcome. OSD has suggested a\nfallback position under which all Backfires above a certain\nsublimit, e. .g., 100, would be counted. In return, we could\nagree not to deploy more than 100 FB-111 medium bombers.\nAlthough we might put forth such a proposal, it is unlikely\nto lead to agreement on this issue.\nThis is a particularly difficult issue since on substantive\ngrounds Backfire has capability which could warrant its being\nclassed as a heavy bomber.\nSince we cannot hope to obtain rigid constraints on Backfire\ndeployment, the real question is tactical. We could try to\nwrap up the issue now by obtaining' some limits on tankers\nand Soviet commitment to deploy Backfire only for peripheral\nmissions, or we could hold to our current position and try\nand obtain further Soviet concessions in the final negotiations.\nHowever, it is unlikely that we could ever get the Soviets to\ngo beyond a commitment on tankers and a peripheral mission\nfor Backfire. Thus, there are strong arguments for trying to\nsettle this issue now.\nHeavy Missile Definition. There has been a breakthrough on\nthis issue in that the Soviets have agreed to define a heavy\nTOP SECREF/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nmissile and have proposed a reasonable parameter--missile\ngross weight, for the definition. Although OSD continues to\nprefer a definition based on throw weight, missile gross\nweight appears to be nearly as restrictive and offers the\nadditional advantage of being much easier to define. Thus,\nwe could probably accept the Soviet proposal; however,\npending completion of further analyses on this issue, we\nshould probably maintain our current throw weight position\nif this issue comes up on Helsinki.\nThe two sides are not far apart on the issues of limitations\non increases in silo size and the timing for follow-on negotia-\ntions. These issues can- be turned over to the Delegations for\nfinal resolution.\nOne final issue concerns your tactical approach with Brezhnev\nat Helsinki. There are probably two main approaches you\ncould take on the remaining SALT issues:\n-- Accept as much of the most recent Soviet proposal as\npossible and try to compromise on the remaining issues.\n-- Pocket what the Soviets have already given us and hold\nfast on the remaining issues.\nIf we hold fast to our basic position, Brezhnev may concede on\nsome remaining issues, particularly if he is anxious to come\nto an agreement and have a Summit. On the other hand, any\nconcessions Brezhnev is likely to make will not change the basic\ncharacter of the agreement which is taking shape. There is\nalso the danger that a lack of movement on our part could\njeopardize our chances of obtaining an agreement.\nOn the other hand, this will be your last opportunity to meet\nBrezhnev before the summit, and if the two sides are to com-\npromise on the remaining issues, it will probably require a\nSoviet decision at the highest level. By demonstrating some\nmovement and a willingness to compromise, you stand a good\nchance of wrapping up the agreement at this meeting. This\nwill then permit the two sides to work out the technical details\nwell ahead of the signing of the agreement at the summit.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\n5\nMr. Colby will be prepared to brief on the latest intelligence\nregarding Soviet strategic forces and the Soviet attitude\ntoward the SALT negotiations.\nAfter your opening remarks, I suggest you ask me to go over\nthe issues reviewed by the Verification Panel.\nB. Participants: (List at Tab A)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will\nbe announced. There will be a White House photographer.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\nAt the Opening of the Meeting\n1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the major SALT issues\nrequiring resolution in light of the most recent Soviet proposals.\n2. I want to reemphasize the importance I attach to the upcoming\ntalks with the General Secretary. This will probably be the\nlast chance I have to see him before the summit, and these\ntalks could be crucial in setting the stage for an eventual\nagreement.\n3. Bill (Colby) is there anything new in the intelligence area we\nshould know?\n4. Henry, will you outline the latest Soviet proposals and the\nresults of the Verification Panel's review of the issues?\nAt the Close of the Meeting\n1. The discussion today has been very helpful in giving me a\nperspective on the major issues. I believe the alternatives for\ndealing with each of the issues are clear.\n2. I will consider the issues we discussed today very carefully.\nIt is clear that the Soviets have put forth a very serious proposal\nand I want to respond in a constructive fashion.\n3. I want to emphasize my determination to do everything possible\nto obtain a good SALT agreement. When I have made my\ndecisions on the issues, I expect the fullest cooperation from\neach one of you in making a thorough success of our efforts.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\nMEMORANDUM\n5272X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOPLSECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nAugust 2, 1975\nAttachment\nMEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER\nNUH\nFROM:\nfor\nJeanne W. Davis\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC Meeting\non SALT, 7/25/75\nAttached for your information are the minutes of the National Security\nCouncil Meeting, held July 25, 1975, to discuss SALT and the Soviet\nUnion.\nAttachment\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nAttachment\nlit 2/98\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09193\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJan Lodal\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 7/25/75\nCREATION DATE\n07/25/1975\nVOLUME\n23 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200022\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 7/25/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\ndeclassified w/excisms w/ 6/99\nlet\n5272x\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nFriday, July 25, 1975\nTIME:\n4:15 p.m. to 5:37 p.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nThe Soviet Union And SALT\nPrincipals\nThe President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger\nDirector of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General\nGeorge S. Brown\nDirector of Central Intelligence William E. Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nDeputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nCIA:\nMr. Carl Duckett\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nWhite House:\nMr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the\nPresident\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.84\nLt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (b)(i)(i) (b\n3.4\nNSC:\nJan M. Lodal\n01648-39,*32,NSC Wer 2199\nSALT\nBy let # NARA, Date 5/25/99\nPresident Ford: I am sorry we were delayed. The suggestion was made that\nI go on national television to explain what the Turks have done and the impact\non us, and to urge the House to make a different decision. I might do it TOORD\nnight, or I might do it from Helsinki.\nGERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nXGDS\nCLASSIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n2\nPresident Ford: Bill, why don't you give us a rundown on where we\nstand\nDirector Colby: Mr. President, let me discuss Brezhnev's concerns\nand his position, on the eve of his meeting with you in Helsinki.\nLast winter, when Brezhnev took a seven-week medical leave, his\nretirement was very much in the air. More recently he himself referred\nvaguely to it when he met with Senators Humphrey, Scott, and others.\nWe think it certain, however, that he means to stay on at least through\nthe Party Congress next February. He knows it is his last Congress -- they\noccur every five years -- and he doubtless sees it as the occasion for\nsecuring his place in Soviet history.\nA health accident cannot be ruled out, but he is pacing himself carefully.\nThe odds are good that he will make it through the Congress.\nOn the foreign policy front, Brezhnev wants to go before the Congress\nproclaiming the success of detente. The calendar is arranged to provide\na crescendo for this theme, with next week's European security conference\nand his visit here next fall as high points along the way.\nBrezhnev's chief claim as a statesman rests on the successful management\nof the Soviet-American relationship.\nAnd SALT, of course, lies at the center of that relationship.\nThis leads straight to the question of, how much room for maneuver\nhe has in defining Soviet terms for an agreement.\nHe has had some recent political troubles. The trade bill was an\nimportant setback. The USSR has slipped further in the Middle East.\nMost important of all, Brezhnev's age and health are bound to make him\nseem a bit of a lame duck. To the extent that his colleagues believe\nthat his days are numbered, they will turn their minds to their own fortunes\nand futures.\nAgainst this, however, Brezhnev still enjoys imposing political strengths.\nDetente, despite the disappointments of the past year, remains un-\nchallenged as the Soviet general line. It is serving a host of Soviet interests,\nand serving them well. There are doubtless recurrent differences over\nspecific issues, but the whole Politburo would be dismayed at the thought\nof a summit failure or cancellation that would bring detente into\nSERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n3\nThere have been notable successes under Brezhnev's leadership in\nthe past year.\n-- There are no obvious challengers since the purge of Shelepin last\nspring.\nA key figure in SALT decisionmaking is Marshal Grechko, the 71-year-old\nMinister of Defense whom Brezhnev elevated to the Politburo in 1973\nIf Grechko vouches in the Politburo for the acceptability of Brezhnev's SALT\nproposals, attesting that they would not impair Soviet security, other members\nwould find it difficult to object effectively.\nAlso, I should note that the Soviets are keenly aware of the growing tendency\nin the US to look critically at detente, and the fact that 1976 is an election\nyear. They are realistic enough to reckon that SALT TWO should best be\nsettled fairly quickly.\nAll this is not to say that Brezhnev is ready to meet our demands on the whole\nrange of issues under dispute in SALT TWO. But the political factors I have\ndiscussed do suggest that, in the face of a firm yet even-handed US position,\nhe will make some concessions to assure the success of the negotiations. This\nconclusion seems to be confirmed by Gromyko's latest presentation in Geneva.\nAssuming that there will be a SALT TWO agreement, one of the problems will\nbe monitoring Soviet compliance. My remarks today on monitoring a SALT\nTWO agreement have to be preliminary. A definitive assessment will depend\non the provisions of the agreement, including measures to aid verification.\nTo put the monitoring problem into perspective, I believe the Soviets will have\nstrong incentives not to violate a SALT TWO agreement.\nWith the ceilings set at Vladivostok, only a large scale cheating effort\ncould be militarily significant as measured by, for example, the potential\nnumbers of Soviet first-strike warheads and the numbers of US warheads\nwhich could survive such a strike. Such an effort would carry high risk of\ndetection and serious political risks.\nNevertheless, I feel sure we will still have to contend with monitoring ambiguities\nand suspicious activities in the SALT TWO era.\nThis board summarizes our evaluation of our capability to monitor the 2, 400\naggregate ceiling. As it shows,\nBERA\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nXGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n4\nAs you know, the Soviets have adamantly opposed including their new\nBackfire bomber in the aggregate. We believe that Backfire is being\ndeployed initially for use in peripheral operations; its use against the\nUS is an open question.\nThe bomber has a range capability comparable to the Bison heavy bomber\nwhich the Soviets have agreed to count in the aggregate.\nThis board shows our current estimate of our ability to monitor the 1,320\nMIRV limit, in the light of Secretary Kissinger's talks with Mr. Gromyko.\nIf the Soviets agree that all missiles of types tested with both MIRVed and non-\nMIRVed payloads -- like the SS-18 -- will be counted as MIRVed when deployed,\na major ambiguity would be removed.\nPO\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTQP SECRE R / SENSITIVE XGDS\n5\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nThere is some potential for covert deployment of MIRVed ICBMs. As I\npointed out earlier, I think such cheating would be unlikely. Nevertheless,\nwe have evaluated our ability to detect it.\nThis potential would be limited if the Soviet strategic force evolves as the\nIntelligence Community has projected.\nOur capabilities to\nmonitor future deployment will depend on the characteristics of the missile\nand on any treaty measures which might be adopted to aid monitoring.\nOur ability to monitor precise numerical limits -- both the aggregate and the\nMIRV sublimit -- depends on measures to aid verification and other treaty\nprovisions such as whether mobile ICBMs and long-range cruise missiles\nare allowed or banned.\nThe uncertainties which will probably exist should raise no questions about\nSoviet compliance with the 1, 320 ceiling until at least 1980, because the\nSoviet MIRV force will be well below the limit until then.\nBy the time the Soviets approach the ceiling, our knowledge of first-generation\nMIRVed systems probably will have improved significantly. But the follow-on\nMIRVed systems we expect the Soviets to deploy before 1985 will introduce\nnew ambiguities and uncertainties.\nIn summary, my judgment is that we will continue to face uncertainties and\nambiguities in monitoring a SALT TWO agreement -- especially the MIRV\nlimit. We can recognize some of the problems likely to arise in this decade\nand attempt to introduce treaty measures to make them more manageable.\nSuch measures are desirable because they can reduce our present monitoring\nproblems, can make cheating more difficult, lessen the chances of controversy,\nand set useful precedents for handling systems of later generations and for\nfollow-on negotiations involving reductions.\nIn the 1980s, as new Soviet weapon systems are introduced, new problems\nwill arise which we cannot yet fully anticipate. Our ability to resolve the issues\nof the eighties will depend on the adequacy of treaty measures to aid monitoring,\nthe effectiveness of the Standing Consultative Commission and -- in a very\nimportant sense -- on our future intelligence collection systems and analytical\ncapabilities.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\n6\nPresident Ford: Could I have a copy of that?\nDirector Colby: You may have this one (Hands briefing script to the\nPresident).\nPresident Ford: Does anyone have any questions for Bill?\nSecretary Schlesinger:\nBERALD R,FORD LIBRAR,\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n7\nMr. Duckett:\nSecretary Kissinger: The problem is the same on the other side if\nyou permit land mobiles - you still don't solve this problem.\nSecretary Schlesinger: You solve it only if you ban all land mobiles,\nincluding the IRBMs.\nPresident Ford: Henry, perhaps you could go over the options, re-\nview the alternatives, and tell us where we are.\nSecretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't think I will go over the\nSoviet proposals since everyone here is familiar with them. As you know,\nwe have had some earlier discussions with Jim and a meeting with the\nVerification Panel yesterday. I will try to synthesize the range of issues\nand add some thinking done overnight which hasn't yet been considered\non an interagency basis.\nOn MIRV verifcation, we believe we can't go much further on your level\nand should now shift that to Geneva. There needs to be a technical dis-\ncussion of how the counting rules are implemented - how to count SLBMs,\nhow to deal with silo changes, and so forth. These are not very suitable\nfor your discussion with Brezhnev. They have accepted our principles,\nand until we see if we differ on the application of these principles, we're\nnot ready for a further political decision.\nThe same is true on silo dimensions. We can carry over the Interim Agree-\nment language prohibiting increases more than 15% in any dimension and\nadd that volume increases must be less than 32%. This doesn't lend\nitself to discussion with Brezhnev either.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Would this include a 32% increase in length?\nSecretary Kissinger: No - the Interim Agreement provisions would be\nretained and in addition a 32% limit on volume. If they went 15% down,\nthis would give them a few percent in width. If they went 15% in diameter,\nthat would be all they could do. They could not go more than 15% deeper.\nIt also avoids the situation where if they narrow the diameter, they could\neven go further down than 32%.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, this has eventually no significance\nmilitarily, but it is a political problem.\nPresident Ford: Ok.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nAgR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n8\nSecretary Kissinger: The Soviets have also proposed to ban ballistic\nmissiles greater than 600 km on surface ships and on the sea beds; this\nis already in another agreement. They have also proposed to ban\nweapons in earth orbit, which is also in another agreement, although\nI don't remember which one.\nMr. Colby: The outer space agreement.\nSecretary Schlesinger: There is still the question of the FOBS.\nFred C. Ikle: The FOBS is being discussed in Geneva now.\nSecretary Kissinger: They want the 2400 to be reached within one\nthe year after the agreement begins. You could accept this in principle\nand shift it to Geneva, with instructions to Alex Johnson to reduce the time\naby as much as he can get.\nThis brings us to more controversial issues. On the definition of a heavy\nICBM, we could accept their principle that the overall launching weight\nbe no greater than the SS- 19 and add to it a limit on throw weight.\nSecretary Clements: There is a vulnerability there not covered when\nyou limit them to the 19 throw weight. As of today, that is a certain\ntechnology. But they could change that technology and improve their yields.\nPresident Ford: Just like we can.\nSecretary Clements: This is a fuzzy area, and I am not suggesting\nanything, I just wanted you to understand.\nSecretary Kissinger: We can't ask them to limit their yield -\nThis leaves three issues - first, the definition of a heavy missile.\nDr. Ikle: There is also the question of the 18. We should insisti on no\nfurther increases.\nSecretary Kissinger: That is better left in Geneva. That leaves the\ntwo biggest issues -\nSecretary Schlesinger: Why should we leave the throw weight of the\n18 to Geneva? It lends itself naturally to a general discussion of throw\nweight by the President. If you get into it with regard to the 19, you\ncould have a paragraph and say that in addition, we have raised at\nGeneva that there should be a limit on the 18 as well.\nFORD & LIBRARY\nPresident Ford: Let's get to the tough ones -\nTOP SECRET \\SENSITIVE - XGDS\nfor SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n9\nSecretary Kissinger: That's cruise missiles and the Backfire. On cruise\nmissiles, the Soviet position was that cruise missiles on transport planes\nare banned. Cruise missiles on bombers greater than 600 km range would\nbe counted. Cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines greater than\n600 km would be banned. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned,\nwhile other land-based cruise missiles short of 5500 km range would be\npermitted.\nI just noted from my notes that the Soviets would permit on transport air-\ncraft cruise missiles less than 600 km, but ban them above 600 km. I\ndon't know what the significance of this is.\nPresident Ford: They are permitted on both bombers and transport air-\ncraft?\nSecretary Kissinger: On bombers, above 600 km, they are permitted but\ncounted. On ships, they are permitted to 600 km, but banned above, and\non land, they are permitted to 5500 km, but banned above.\nI should add that we have massive verification problems with every cruise\nmissile issue. The range could be extended - we have a 50% uncertainty\nabout ranges. At higher range its confidence becomes very uncertain.\nThere is an additional problem in that the cruise missile we are developing\nis the same for ships and aircraft. If we accept a limit on cruise missiles\non ships less than aircraft cruise missiles, they will have to take our\nword for it - but that is their problem.\nThere is a sense of consensus that we could accept their proposition\non intercontinental cruise missiles - to ban those of intercontinental\nrange.\nPresident Ford: That's the 5500 km -\nSecretary Kissinger: Below 5500 km, they would be permitted. Frankly,\nI am somewhat puzzled about this proposition. If we put land-base cruise\nmissiles of 2000 miles range in Europe, we can cover most of the Soviet\nterritory. But they cannot cover our territory. I don't understand quite\nwhy they made this proposal.\nMr. Duckett: The lack of air defenses in China may have figured in here.\nPresident Ford: They can get China with this kind of weapon?\nSERALU\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n10\nSecretary Clements: It works to our advantage in Europe.\nPresident Ford: Is there any disagreement on this?\nSecretary Kissinger: There is no disparity that I am aware of.\nThe air launch cruise missile is needed for penetration purposes\nout to a range of about 3000 km, although George Brown and Jim\nindicated they could go somewhat below that. But this would be\npremature in your first talk with Brezhnev - we could put forward\n3,000 km.\nPresident Ford: We would count anything over 3000 km?\nSecretary Schlesinger: We could ban them over 3000 km.\nSecretary Kissinger: We would be better off if we banned them.\nDr. Ikle: It would be much better for verification reasons.\nPresident Ford: There is agreement on this - not to count but to ban?\nSecretary Kissinger: Counting above 3000 km gets you essentially nothing.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Except a lot of legal problems in the Standing\nConsultative Commission.\nSecretary Clements: Verification if you count is impossible.\nPresident Ford: I would think as a layman that verification would be\nnil. Suppose you went to 2500 km - would you want to ban above that\nrange also?\nMr. Duckett: As a general rule, regardless of the number put on range,\nyou should ban above that range.\nSecretary Kissinger: I can't see how we could handle the verification hearings\nif we counted above the cut off.\nFORD\nLIBRAS & SERVID FORD\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS\n11\nSecretary Kissinger (cont'd): The next question concerns submarine\nlaunched cruise missiles (SLCMs). We have difficulties with the 600 km\nSoviet proposal. With their forces, it is optimal for their needs, but it\nis not enough range for us. They can reach our population along our coast\nfrom 350 km, but we need more range for symmetrical coverage of their\ncities.\nPresident Ford: Their proposal is 600 km?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes -- to ban all SLCMs above 600 km.\nDirector Colby: They see these weapons in part as an anti-ship and anti-\ncarrier force.\nSecretary Kissinger: Yesterday in the Verification Panel we reviewed one\nalternative. If the range were set at 1500 km for SLCMs and 3000 km for\nALCMs, everyone thought we could live with it -- but this was not staffed\nout and I don't know if it survived overnight.\nPresident Ford: The air-launched limit would be 3000 km?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. One advantage is that the Vladivostok Agreement\ncontained no limits at all on SLCMs, so this would be a move. The longer\nrange would give us good coverage of Europe and additional coverage of\nChina, but not much more coverage of the Soviet Union. If we want to go\ninto the Soviet Union, we would have ALCMs and could put our land-based\ncruise missiles in Europe. This may not be our final position, but it seems\nour best beginning negotiating position.\nPresident Ford: So we would go from 600 to 1500 km on submarine-launched\nand stay with 3000 km on air-launched.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We have never yet gone to 3000 km on air-launched.\nSecretary Kissinger: Up to now we have not given them 3000 --\nPresident Ford: But we said that they counted --\nSecretary Kissinger: No, until now we have had a preposterous position\nthat they are not covered by the Vladivostok Agreement.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Our positions have been bilaterally preposterous.\nGERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n12\nTOP SECRET/SENSTTVE XGDS\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Mr. President, we should look at the 3000 km\nproposal for air-launched as an important concession -- as a fall --\nPresident Ford: As a what?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: As a fall -- a limit where before we agreed to no\nlimit at all.\nSecretary Kissinger: While it is something of a concession, they would\nfigure it out in a minute.\nSecretary Schlesinger: It's a bigger concession than any they have made\nto date.\nMr. Duckett: Mr. President, I should point out that on surface ships\nand submarines, the Soviets have 400 launch tubes\nin their\nfleet today.\nSecretary Schlesinger:\nM\nMr. Duckett:\nSecretary Kissinger: The 1500 km range was planned to meet our Navy's\nneeds.\nPresident Ford:\nMr. Duckett:\nSecretary Schlesinger:\n:\nDirector Ikle:\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n13\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nMr. Duckett:\nSecretary Kissinger: Therefore, any ban on certain types must include\na ban on testing of those types.\nPresident Ford:\nTesting\nand deployment --\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. This means we could not try out ours to\nlonger ranges in the same way.\nDirector Ikle: We would not test our sea-based ones beyond the permitted\nrange anyway.\nSecretary Kissinger: This brings us to the Backfire aircraft. To date,\nwe have excluded the Backfire but included the Bison. The problem is\nthat the dimensions are about the same and the capability is probably\nsuperior for the Bison. Bill, do you have the chart? (Colby shows chart\ncomparing Soviet bombers.)\nMr. Duckett: As this shows, the range of the Backfire and the Bison are\nexactly the same, but the Backfire has a refueling capability, whereas the\nBison does not.\nSecretary Kissinger: In the Verification Panel we discussed a proposal\nwhereby 75 to 100 Backfires would not be counted in the aggregate if they\nwere kept in naval aviation and if they retire some of their Bears in\nnaval aviation when they deploy them.\nPresident Ford: Retire their Bears and Bison?\nMr. Duckett: They have a slightly different version of their Bear bomber\nin naval aviation for reconnaissance.\nSecretary Kissinger: We then had the added thought that we would agree\nto keep our FB-111s below 100 to have the agreement written in a symmetrical\nfashion. This is a negotiating ploy since we have no plans for a similar\naircraft as the Backfire.\nPresident Ford: In other words, all our FB-111s would be free and they\nwould get 100 Backfires on the assumption that they replace their Bears\nwith Backfires.\nR. FORD LIBRAR,\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n14\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nSecretary Kissinger: We had thought they would probably get rid of\ntheir Bears anyway because of the agreement.\nPresident Ford: To get down to the 2400 level.\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. We assumed they would reduce their older\nbombers to get down to the level.\nMr. Duckett: Mr. President, it is not my area of expertise, but I might\nmention that under this approach you might receive some criticism that it\nis now possible to get the aggregate raised by 100 over the 2400 level.\nDirector Ikle: You might consider putting Backfire and cruise missiles\nin a separate agreement. They are both borderlinevcases.\nSecretary Kissinger: We would have to explain what we did on Backfire\nin any event.\nDirector Ikle: Putting them separately would simplify the main agreement.\nALD GERALD LISA\n15\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nPresident Ford: Carl raises the point, if it's true we look like we're\nadding 100 to the aggregate --\nSecretary Kissinger: In theory we can make an overwhelming case that\nthese 100 are not strategic bombers. We have a very good case that\nthey are not strategic bombers, but that we were giving them 100 only if\nthe proper collateral evidence was available.\nSecretary Schlesinger: And in addition we required a reduction in their\nexisting Bears.\nDirector Colby: Some of the Backfires are assigned to long-range aviation,\nso you have to deal with those, also.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have not sorted that out. Perhaps they would be\ncounted.\nPresident Ford: The FB-111 are not counted now?\nDirector Colby: No, they don't have the range.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have them free anyhow. We would throw them\nin only for negotiating symmetry.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We have to be careful how we offset the FB-111\nversus the Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: How should we do it?\nSecretary Schlesinger: We should not do it symmetrically since they\nhave different capabilities. If after we have received agreement to not\nput Backfires outside of naval aviation, we might say that the US would\nthen agree to hold to 72 FB-111s.\nSecretary Kissinger: This brings us to the mobile missiles. The Soviets\nhave agreed to ban them, not to deploy them. I am sure the Soviets thought\nthey were meeting our concerns on this, given, the negotiating history.\nThere are really only two alternatives -- we can accept their position, or\ninsist that they be permitted, but counted.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Our preference is that this not be discussed with\nthe Soviets now.\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nTQP SECRET/SENSTTIVE XGDS\n16\nSecretary Kissinger: They would agree not to deploy them, but permit\ndevelopment.\nPresident Ford: Is your feeling concerned with research and development\non mobile ICBMs?\nSecretary Schlesinger: The US should look carefully into that. We have\na limited number of ICBM holes, and given what we're seeing in the\nPhilippine Sea with regard to improved ASW, as their counterforce\ncapabilities increase, we should explore additional basing modes. If we\nban deployment, we increase Congressional problems with regard to\nR&D funding. Preferably, this could be bypassed in Helsinki, while we\nhere in the US could do a careful study before consenting to a ban on mobiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: We could not deploy a mobile before 1983 in any event.\nTherefore, the issue is whether a ban harms R&D. This depends in part\non what happens when once it becomes known the Soviets have offered a ban\nwhich we rejected. The question is which way we can better get R&D funds\nwith a ban, or having rejected a ban.\nSecretary Schlesinger: An initial option might be to ban deployment until\n1980, at which time both sides would agree to review the situation. Until\nwe see the Soviet counterforce threat developing, we should keep our options\nopen. If we want the option to pursue development, we should be careful\nto keep it open. They have completed 25 tests of the SS-X16, many of which\nwere perhaps mobile launchers. Their development program is essentially\ncomplete, so they don't need a development option in order to deploy a system.\nSecretary Kissinger: They specifically propose that development would be\npermitted -- only deployment would be banned.\nPresident Ford: If we went with a ban on deployment plus a ban on R&D,\nwe would not be in good shape, since they are so far down the road.\nSecretary Kissinger: Jim's point is that it would be hard to get money for\ndevelopment.\nPresident Ford: I'm not so pessimistic provided Congress is told the\nSoviets have done so. How much would it cost and how much would it take\nto go through a development program for a land-based mobile system?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, we can throw around some\nunsatisfactory figures -- about $2-$3 billion.\nGERALD FORD LIBRAR\nDeputy Secretary Clements: One reason it is so expensive is because we\ndon't know what system concept we would come down on. We would have\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n17\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nto do several different prototypes to determine.\nPresident Ford: In the 50's, the Air Force had developed some models\nof mobile ICBMs on trains.\nGeneral Brown: We went further than models -- we actually put them in\nthe fields.\nSecretary Kissinger: On trains?\nGeneral Brown: Yes, but as the Secretary says, problems relating to\nthe public became evident.\nPresident Ford: I was talking to Mel Laird about that -- the tests were\nnot encouraging because of public opinion.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Those were random trains moving throughout the\ncountry. Now, we are talking about using public lands in the West.\nPresident Ford: That made some of my colleagues on the Hill wince. It\ndidn't make me wince, but I didn't think they would be taking them to\nMichigan! (Laughter) If you have had trouble with Sanguine, you will have\nsimilar trouble with the environmentalists on this.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We are planning to use desert lands, the salt\nflats west of Salt Lake City. There are some public lands that are unattractive\neven to the environmentalists. But we need to study this further.\nPresident Ford: My quick reaction is that we should go for an R&D program.\nI am not as pessimistic about getting it from Congress. I think we could\nget it and would be in a better position when we bring in their testing of the\nSS-16.\nMr. Duckett: It is at least a basis for argument.\nSecretary Kissinger: Those are the major issues.\nPresident Ford: Thank you, Henry, Jim, do you have any comments?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, it is clear Brezhnev is anxious\nfor this agreement. We would be inclined to give only a little ground, showing\na considerable degree of firmness, responding to their tactics in kind.\nBrezhnev reiterated their Geneva position. The package Henry outlined is\nas forthcoming as they have been.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOR SECRET/SENSHTIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\n18\nWe would strongly urge that 1500 km be the minimum range on SLCMs,\nand that we stick with 3000 km on the ALCM. On Backfire, equal\naggregates were obtained at Vladivostok and everyone recognized that.\nWe must be careful to not appear that they can now escape from that.\nIf it becomes open-ended, we will lose the advantage of equal aggregates.\nThe light versus heavy missile question is very important. With improved\npropellants in the SS- 19, they could have 12000 pounds throw weight under\ntheir definition. This would leave us in a ludicrous position with regard\nto the modern large ballistic missile constraint negotiated in SALT I. If\nwe hold at 7, 000 pounds, that would be the best definition achievable at\nthis point.\nOn mobiles, we prefer to wait.\nBERALD R.FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n19\nPresident Ford: Mobile ICBMs?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes - we should study the options for the US first.\nIf they develop a major counterforce capability which is a threat to our\nsystems, we should not exclude additional basing modes.\nPresident Ford: If we ban mobiles and continue with an R&D program,\nthat will cut out part of the problem.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes. It really becomes a concern in the early or\nmid 80s. We see no possibility of a mobile deployment for 5-7 years.\nPresident Ford: Under any considerations, we need the research and\ndevelopment. It is a matter of how to best get the research and development\nmoney.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Yes.\nPresident Ford: What are your observations, George?\nGeneral Brown: Mr. President, I believe that item is a terribly important\nissue. As a fallback position, provided it is understood as that, we sub-\nscribe to the formula the Secretary put forward. At Vladivostok, you agreed\nto equality: But to give up on equality, that would be very difficult to explain.\nOn cruise missiles, we can accept a proposal to ban intercontinental cruise\nmissiles. We can accept 3,000 km on air launch cruise missiles, and would\nprefere 3,000 km on SLCMs, but came up with 1500 km if we have to go\nlower on SLCMs.\nWe do have a problem concerning the commonality of SLCMs and ALCMs. In\nour program, they are basically the same missile. We put the SLCM in a\ncan which falls off when it is launched. Once it flies out, it is very similiar\nto the ALCM. This is their verification problem, but there is a chance we\nare going to be accused we were cheating.\nPresident Ford:They can't distinguish the one launched from the air from the\none launched from sea?\nGeneral Brown: They have Aviation Week which tells them -\nTOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n20\nSecretary Kissinger: There is also our testing -\nGeneral Brown: That's true, but we can trade warhead weight\nfor range.\nPresident Ford: Like they can.\nGeneral Brown: If we can fly 1500 km, we can fly further. I'\njust don't want you to get in a position where you are accused of\nbad faith.\nPresident Ford: All of this has been in Aviation Week?\nSecretary Clements: There's been pretty much in Aviation Week - the\nengines are the same, the airframes are the same, the guidance is\nthe same, and so forth.\nSecretary Kissinger: I've never understood how Aviation Week gets all\nthat -\nYou should have seen Clements three years ago; he wanted to scrap the\nwhole program!\nSecretary Clements: That's not true ! (laughter)\nSecretary Kissinger: This should go to Geneva where it is their problem\nto raise the verification problem. After all, Minuteman II and Minuteman\nIII silos are the same, and they haven't raised that. So we'll let them\nraise this.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We have a parallel problem. We will not be in\na position to say we have any precision in verification in the cruise\nmissile area. We will be relying pretty much on good faith.\nDr. Ikle: Mr. President, for this reason I think you should consider\nputting the cruise missiles in a separate protocol which could be\nkeptked apart from the main agreement\nPresident Ford: If we don't include cruise missiles, there will be a\nhell of a big reaction.\nSecretary Kissinger: In either event, they will have to be presented\nsimultaneously. In any event, we can't present a SALT agreement that\nlet's cruise missiles run free.\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFORD\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nДОР SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n21\nPresident Ford: We would be laughed out of town.\nSecretary Clements: Absolutely.\nSecretary Kissinger: One thing - George thought he could live with\na limit on the number of cruise missiles on each aircraft. Did you\nsay you could live with that, George?\nGeneral Brown: I could live with it,\nPresident Ford: How many will we have on each aircraft?\nSecretary Clements: The bB-52 - IN will have six on either side, or\n12 altogether.\nPresident Ford: Both on the B- 1 and the B- 52?\nGeneral Brown: More on the B- 1 -\nSecretary Kissinger: You can see why this is a problem for the Soviets\nsince each one has a\nweapon on it.\nSecretary Clements:\nThe commonality of the missiles is\nthe big thing. It's the same missile on the aireraft as is in the torpedo\ntubes.\nSecretary Kissinger: Would you carry them on bombers in lieu of bombs?\nGeneral Brown: I don't think so.\nPresident Ford: What is the problem if we get no SALT II agreement?\nWhat dollars in hardware are we going to have to take to Congress then?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Probably two to three billion dollars increase\nto the budget over a period of years. Until 1977, we are constrained\nanyway.\nPresident Ford: Until fiscal 77?\nSecretary Schlesinger: Calendar 77 - until the 5 year interim agreement\nruns out.\nPresident Ford: Across the board, or only on launchers?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTQP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n22\nSecretary Kissinger: We are constrained on the deployment of land-based\nand submarine based missiles. We are not limited on bombers or cruise\nmissiles.\nDr. Ikle: We couldn't deploy more in any event.\nSecretary Schlesinger: If there were no agreement, we would have to\nincrease our capability.\nPresident Ford: I've asked Henry to get from DOD the figures on the options\nwe would have to face, to get projections of your needs for the next five years\nin terms of money and hardware - what you would send to Congress.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Not by tomorrow morning before you go on the air-\ncraft -\nPresident Ford: No.\nDirector: Colby: I don't want to sound like I'm against cruise missiles, but\nI should point out that they have an air defense and we don't. If they were\ntempted, they might push very hard in the cruise missile area.\nSecretary Schlesinger: That's the reverse of the fact that we have to have\ncruise missiles because of the air defense.\nMr. Duckett: In the last ten years, they have spent about the same amount\non defenses as they have on offensive forces.\nDirector Colby: They have\nsurface to air missiles deployed.\nPresident Ford: Are those effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?\nDirector Colby: No, but it shows their philosophy.\nSecretary Clements: Our cruise missile projects drive them up the wall\nbecause their defense will not protect them from our cruise missiles, and\nthey know it. Cruise missiles cause them plenty of pain and agony. They\ngive us real leverage.\nPresident Ford: How soon will they be operational?\nSecretary Schlesinger: By 1980.\nPresident Ford: I have a technical question - why aren't their present\nFORD\nair defenses effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SECRET + SENSITIVE XGDS\n23\nDirector Colby: Because of low altitude penetration.\nSecretary Kissinger: What speed do they go?\nGeneral Brown: Subsonic- not too fast, but they go very low.\nMr. Duckett: I don't want to debate their vulnerability, but\ntheir radar network in the entire western USSR is now down to\nI would not be willing to depend on the invulnerability\nof air breathing vehicles in the 1980s.\nSecretary Kissinger: In any event, the cruise missile: would force\nthem to spend a lot of money on air defense which otherwise they\nwould spend elsewhere.\nGeneral Brown: There is another point, Mr. President. This is not\nlike a football game, where it is one play at a time.\nDirector Colby: They were very shook up by the Hanoi attack - that\nwas a very heavily defended area.\nPresident Ford: With what?\nGeneral Brown: The B-52 attack.\nSecretary Kissinger: Their entire defense was exhausted at the\nend.\nDr. Ikle: In the end, several years from now, the Russians will catch\nup on cruise missile technology. In the end they may build cMIRVs\neven larger. So we should also look at what we get from limits on\ntheir cruise missiles. In addition, there is the verification problem.\nGeneral Brown:\nYou not only\npenetrate the defenses, but you destroy the defenses. It's not like\nHanoi. It's a very different situation.\nPresident Ford: Well, if there are no other comments, thank you all\nvery much.\nGERALD\nFORD & LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET + SENSITIVE XGDS\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NBR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\n7\nM\n2\n17\n7505777\nX\nDAVIS\nREFERENCE:\nCIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE\nTO: PRES\nFROM: KISSINGER, H\ns/s\nUNCLAS LOG IN/OUT\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nKISSINGER\nCOLBY, W\nOTHER\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nSCOWCROFT X\nSCHLESINGER, J\nC\nEYES ONLY EXDIS\nDAVIS\nST EX SEC\nS\nCODEWORD\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT: Monutes of nsc mtg July 25 1975-LA\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nINFO.\nCY\nADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT\nFOR\nMEMO FOR HAK\n(\n)\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\n(\n)\nREPLY FOR\nFAR EAST\n(\n)\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\n(\n)\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nMID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA\nMEMO\nTO\n(\n)\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n(\n)\nEUROPE / CANADA\nLATIN AMERICA\nJOINT MEMO\n(\n)\nREFER TO\nFOR:\n(\n)\nUNITED NATIONS\nECONOMIC\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\n(\n)\nSCIENTIFIC\nCONCURRENCE\n-\n)\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nNSC PLANNING\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nCONGRESSIONAL\nOCEANS POLICY\nINTELLIGENCE\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nCY TO\n8/2\nHAK\ncix\n8/20\nInfo\nDAVIS\nNoted by HAR\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nDISPATCH\nMICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:\nCY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nNOTIFY\n& DATE\nBY\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nCRT ID:\nFORD\nSF\ns\nCROSS REF W/\nOPEN\nHP\nNS\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:\nFOLDER:\nCLOSE\nSERALDR\nWH\nP\nPA\nY\n(\nNSC 75-22\n575-600\n)\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09192\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nTalking Paper\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nTalking Points (re: Soviet position on\nmajor SALT issues)\nCREATION DATE\n07/1975\nVOLUME\n13 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200022\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 7/25/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nsanitized 6/19/03\nSECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n09192\nTALKING POINTS\n-- Mr. President, as you know, Gromyko discussed with\nme a range of issues and previewed where he thinks Brezhnev might\ncompromise with you when you meet in Helsinki.\n-- By way of summary, the present Soviet position on the major\nissues is as follows:\nOn MIRV Verification, they have agreed to count missiles\ntested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed.\nHowever, there has been no indication of movement on our other\nrules regarding silo changes and counting SLBMs by class.\nRegarding cruise missiles, the Soviets did not indicate\nany movement from their Geneva position. Their current pro-\nposal would count all air-launched cruise missiles above 600 km\nrange if installed on bombers and ban all cruise missiles above\n600 km range if sea-launched or deployed from transport-type\naircraft. The Soviets also proposed to ban all land-based\nDECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\ncruise missiles of range in excess of 5500 km.\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)\nMR98-40 #31; DoDea 11/6/02\nBy dal NARA, Date 6/19/03\nGromyko proposed a ban on the deployment of land-\nmobile ICBMs. In conjunction with the current Soviet Geneva\nposition which effectively bans air-mobile ICBMs, the Soviets have\nin essence proposed a combined ban on air- and land-mobile ICBMs.\nGERALDER FORD\nVORSERET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBy Authority Of Brent Scowcroft\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nAECRNY/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nOn Backfire, there was no Soviet movement. The Soviets\nhave steadfastly refused to count Backfire in the 2400 aggregate.\nRegarding the issue of silo dimension changes, Gromyko\nindicated that the Soviets would be willing to replace the current\n10-15% limitation on silo dimension increases with a single,\nunambiguous limit of 32% on silo volume increases.\nOn the definition of a heavy ICBM, Gromyko agreed to an\nexplicit definition for heavy ICBMs but he suggested tying the\ndefinition to what he called \"launching weight; I believe we call\nthis \"missile gross weight\" rather than \"launching weight. \"\nThe Soviets proposed a 12 month period after the new agree-\nment enters into force for reducing to the 2400 limit, and also in-\ndicated that they would be prepared to convene the follow-on\nnegotiations in the same year the agreement enters into force.\n-- That summarizes where we stand on the major issues. The\nVerification Panel has met to consider the Soviet proposal and to discuss\nalternative responses we might give.\n-- Let me run through the possible alternatives on each of the\nmajor issues.\nMIRV Verification\n-- The Soviet acceptance of our rule counting all missiles tested\nwith both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed is a significant\nstep forward.\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n3\n-- However, this still leaves unresolved the issue of how to\nhandle our other counting rules on silo changes and SLBMs.\n-- There are probably two general approaches we can take on\nthis issue:\nWe can refer the MIRV verification issue .to the Delegation\nin Geneva and try to wrap up the technical language there; in\naddition to addressing our counting rule which the Soviets have\naccepted, the Delegation could put forth modifications to our\nremaining counting rules which might lessen the immediate im-\npact of our rules on the Soviets yet still resolve the obvious\nambiguities.\nWe can pocket what the Soviets have given us on our MIRV\ncounting rules and take a hard line on our remaining counting\nrules.\n-- Moving the verification issue to Geneva would allow the Delega-\ntion to thrash out the technical problems associated with such issues\nas tying the SLBM MIRV count to a submarine overhaul or conversion\ncycle. Because of the complexity of the remaining verification issues,\nthis may be a more suitable approach than discussing the issues directly\nwith Brezhnev.\nH.FORD\nFORD\n)\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\n-- On the other hand, there is the possibility that, in the absence\nof a Soviet decision at the highest level to move on the remaining MIRV\ncounting rules, the Soviet Delegation will have little flexibility in handling\nthe remaining verification issues.\n-- There was a consenses in the Verification Panel that, if\nBrezhnev will agree with this approach, we should shift the remaining\nverification issues to Geneva and have Alex try to thrash out the technical\ndetails.\nCruise Missiles\n-- Based on the Verification Panel meeting, there appear to be\nthree general approaches we could take on this issue at this time:\nCount all cruise missiles above 3000 km range.\nAccept the current Soviet position with the exception that\nair-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on bombers would count\nonly above 2500-3000 km range and sea-launched cruise\nmissiles would be limited to 1500 km range.\nAccept the Soviet position on all cruise missile limits,\nbut in addition insist that land-based cruise missiles above\n600 km range be banned.\n-- The first approach would essentially encompass all US\ncruise missile programs of interest, and would simplify verification.\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\n-- On the other hand, there arc strategic differences among\nthe various types of cruise missiles. Furthermore, there might be\nsome tactical negotiating advantage in accepting as much of the Soviet\nproposal as we can in order to focus our pressure in the areas which matter\nmost to us.\n-- The second approach focuses on the cruise missile option\nwhere our main interests probably lie -- the long-range ALCM.\n-- A drawback of the second approach is that it would limit some\nof our programs, such as the strategic SLCM programs currently under\nconsideration. However, the strategic argument for SLCMs are less\nclear than the arguments for ALCMs. It is hard to see when a sea-\nbased cruise missile would be better than a sea-based ballistic missile.\n-- Our main concern on sea-based cruise missiles is probably\nto avoid interfering with our tactical ship-to-ship programs and to keep\nopen our technical development programs.\n-\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nFORD is GEHALO LIBRARY\n-- The third approach would close a \"loophole\" which currently\nexists in the Soviet cruise missiles position by subjecting land-based\ncruise missiles to the same limits that the Soviets have proposed on\nSLCMs and ALCMs.\n-- Going even further than the Soviet position and rigidly\ncontrolling all cruise missiles could improve the arms control impact\nof the new agreement.\n-- However, the present Soviet proposal on land-based cruise\nmissiles is probably more advantageous to us than to them; we could\ndeploy 5500 km missiles in Europe, but they have no place to deploy\nthem against us.\n-- The Verification Panel also looked at the possibility of a\nseparate limit on SLCMs which would cover 400 obsolescent Soviet\nsystems. However, everyone agreed that this was a negotiating ploy\nwhich would not solve the basis cruise missile problem which we currently\nface.\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY SERALD\n/ SENSITIVE - XGDS\nMobile ICBMs\n-- In light of the latest Soviet proposal on mobiles, there are\nreally only two alternatives:\nLeave open the option to deploy mobile ICBMs.\nAccept the Soviet proposal and ban the deployment of\nmobile ICBMs for duration of the agreement.\n-- There are several considerations which would argue for leaving\nopen the option to deploy mobiles:\nOur silo based ICBMs will become increasingly vulnerable.\nSoviet deployment of SS-16 mobiles rather than SS-19s would\nactually reduce Soviet throw weight.\nIf we eliminate the deployment option it may be harder to\nobtain development funds from Congress.\n-- On the other hand, there are considerations favoring acceptance\nof the Soviet proposal:\nGiven the negotiating history, they probably made this\nproposal in an attempt to be forthcoming.\nTQP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\nIBRAN\nTOP SECRET / - XGDS\n8\nIt may be hard to develop a viable US land mobile system,\ngiven land use and environmental constraints.\nWe probably cannot\ndeploy a mobile before 1985.\nOnce the Russians leak to the Congress that they proposed\na land mobile ban which we rejected, we will not only have a major\npolitical problem, but may also lose our land mobile development\nfunds more readily than we would have under a deployment ban.\n-- A related issue concerns surface ship - based mobile ICBMs.\nThere seems to be no disagreement in the Verification Panel on this\nissue: we can go ahead and accept the Soviet proposal to ban deployment\nof these systems at a tactically advantageous time.\nBackfire\n-- The lack of any Soviet movement on Backfire was hardly sur-\nprising. In light of these developments, the Verification Panel con-\nsidered three alternatives for dealing with the Backfire issue:\nContinue with our current position that Backfire is a heavy\nbomber and should be included in the 2400 aggregate.\nPropose a sublimit on the permitted number of Backfire\nbombers (e. g., 100), together with certain collateral constraints\nwhich would limit Backfire's intercontinental capability.\nORD\nTQR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBLRABD FORD LIBRARY\nTOUSKAREP/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n9\n0 Propose collateral constraints on Backfire operations\nand at the same time obtain explicit Soviet agreement to deploy\nBackfire only for peripheral missions.\n-- Our current position on Backfire has been argued effectively\nby the Delegation; the Backfire is certainly as good a bomber as the\nBison.\n-- However, it seems very unlikely that the Soviets will agree to\ncount all Backfires in the aggregate.\n-- Another possibility would be to propose a sublimit on the permitted\nnumber of Backfire bombers, e. g., 100. Under this approach, all\nBackfires above a specified number would count in the aggregate. At\nthe same time we would try to limit Backfire deployment to certain\ngeographical areas, e.g., Soviet naval aviation bases in the southern\nUSSR; we would also specify that Backfire would count only if deployed\nwith a companion tanker force.\n-- This could still achieve significant limits on the Soviet Backfire\nprogram. However, unless the sublimit included a substantial fraction\nof the programmed Soviet Backfire force, this approach would probably be\nno more acceptable to the Soviets than our current proposal.\nfor SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECANY/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n10\n-- The third alternative would drop the sublimit on the permitted\nnumber of Backfires but retain the collateral constraints on basing\nand tanker support.\n-- While this approach would be the least restrictive on the Soviets,\nand hence probably the most negotiable, it offers no iron-clad\nguarantees against the intercontinental use of Backfires.\n-- On the other hand, without a companion tanker force, Backfire\ncapability against the US would be very limited. If at the same time\nwe obtained explicit Soviet agreement use Backfire only for perpheral\nroles, we would have a very strong case for raising the Backfire issue\nin the SCC if indicators of intercontinental use appeared.\nSilo Dimensions\n-- The Verification Panel agreed that the Soviet proposal in\nits current form is unacceptable. A simple limit of 32% on silo\nvolume increases would permit a depth increase of greater than 15%.\n-- It is important to retain the 15 percent limit on depth, in\nparticular since the Soviets have already increased their silo depth\nalmost this :much on both the SS-18 and SS-19 silos.\n-- A compromise which the Verification Panel considered would be\nto supplement the current 10-15 percent limitation on silo dimension in-\ncreases with the 32 percent volume limit. If such an approach were\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nacceptable to the Soviets, we could turn the issue over to Alex for\nresolution of the detailed language.\nHeavy ICBMs\n-- The Soviet proposal in this regard may have some possibilities.\nTheir willingness to agree to an explicit definition of a heavy ICBM at\nthe very least is a step forward.\n-- However, the Verification Panel agreed that there were some\ntechnical problems with the \"missile gross weight\" approach, and that\nwe should probably do some additional analysis before making a definitive\nresponse.\n-- On a preliminary basis, it appears that we could probably\naccept \"gross weight\" as one criterion for defining a heavy ICBM, but\nwe should probably stick with our throw weight criterion for the time\nbeing pending the results of the Verification Panel's analysis.\nOther Issues\n-- Two final issues concern the Soviet proposal for a 12 month\ngrace period before reducing to the 2400 limit and their proposal to\nconvene the follow-on negotiations in the same year the agreement enters\ninto force.\nFORD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOR SUCRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n12\n-- The Verification Panel felt that both of these issues can probably\nbe handled by Alex. The proposal to reconvene follow-on negotiations in\n1977 substantially meets our proposal. While the 12-month period to\nreach the 2400 limit is probably excessive, our current instructions give\nAlex enough room to negotiate an effective compromise.\n-- Mr. President, that concludes my review of the major issues.\nHowever, there is one final point concerning the overall issue of\nhow to proceed with the Soviets over the next few weeks. There\nare probably two principal approaches:\nWe can accept as much of the most recent Soviet proposal\nas we can and try to reach an effective compromise on the remaining\nissues in an attempt to wrap up the major part of the agreement\nbefore the summit.\nWe could pocket the concessions the Soviets have already\nmade and hold fast on the remaining issues.\n-- The first approach has a reasonably good chance of success.\nThis would also permit the two sides to work out the technical details\nwell ahead of the eventual signing of the agreement.\n-- The second approach may also be successful, particularly if,\nas some think, Brezhnev is anxious to come to an agreement and have\na summit. We might obtain a few additional Soviet concessions,\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD A. FORD LIBRARY P FORD\n/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n13\nalthough these concessions are not likely to change the basic character\nof the agreement which is now taking shape.\n-- An additional consideration regarding the second approach\nis that Brezhnev may react adversely and seriously undermine the prospects\nfor an agreement this year.\nGERATO\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD"
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