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    "title": "NSC Meeting, 8/9/75",
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        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
        "Arms control",
        "Middle East conflicts",
        "Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel, 1975",
        "Helsinki Agreement, 1975"
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 8/9/1975\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nVOP ASECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nON SALT ISSUES\nSaturday, August 9, 1975\n9:45 a.m. (one hour)\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Henry A. Kissinger the\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the results of your meeting with General Secretary\nBrezhnev in Helsinki and to agree on a work program for the\nSALT Verification Panel pending the receipt of a considered\nSoviet reply to our latest SALT proposals.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: I have prepared a detailed memorandum at\nTab A which summarizes where we stand on the full range\nof outstanding issues. While the memo tells where we are,\nthere remains the question of how we move to conclusion of\nan agreement for signature at the fall summit.\nThere also remains the problem of bringing the Geneva\nnegotiations more in line with the positions taken by the two\nsides in the private channel. As you know, it was agreed at\nHelsinki to move to the Geneva forum a number of issues on\nwhich the two sides are in agreement.\nIn particular, it was agreed to ban:\n-- Cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range\ncarried on aircraft other than heavy bombers.\nDECLASSIFIED\n-- Intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs).\nE.O. 12356 NSL Sec. letter 3.4. 2/19/99\nMR98-40, #33; State letter 9/25/98\nBy lit NARA, Date 10/21/98,7/11/99\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)\nClassified by the Authority of Henry A. Kissinger\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\n2\n-- Ballistic missiles above 600 km range on\nsurface ships.\n-- Ballistic missiles on the seabeds and inland waters.\nA fifth issue which was discussed at Helsinki, systems for\nplacing nuclear weapons in orbit, has already been taken\nup in Geneva on the basis of the most recent NSDM.\nTo wrap up these issues I have enclosed at Tab B a draft\nNSDM for your approval which instructs Alex Johnson to\nagree to these positions.\nThe purpose of the meeting today is two-fold: to outline\nyour discussions with Brezhnev at Helsinki and to generate\nsome new approaches to the remaining problems of Backfire\nand cruise missiles.\nFollowing your opening remarks, I suggest you have me go\nover the results of the Helsinki meeting.\nB. Participants: (List at Tab C)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will\nbe announced. There will be a White House photographer.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\nAt the Opening of the Meeting\n1. The purpose of this meeting is to give you a readout on the\nresults of my meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.\nWe also need to take a serious look at how we might reformulate\nour approach to the remaining serious problems -- the\nBackfire bomber and cruise missiles.\nAt the Conclusion of the Meeting\n2. It is apparent that we need some new thought on a solution to\nthe problem of Backfire and cruise missiles. I would like\nDefense and the Verification Panel to examine what modification\nwe might be able to make in our positions on these issues.\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\n$ERALE CORD\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n3\n3. In the meantime, we can forward to Geneva appropriate\ninstructions on those issues on which there was agreement\nin Helsinki.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09195\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nCurrent Status of SALT Issues\nDESCRIPTION\n9\nCREATION DATE\n08/1975\nVOLUME\n9 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200023\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 8/9/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\npointized 6/19/03\n8-9-75\nDECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)\nWASHINGTON\nMR 98-40, #34; DODetr 11/6/02\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBy\ndal NARA. Date 6/19/03\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nSUBJECT:\nCurrent Status of SALT Issues\nIn light of your meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev on SALT,\nI have outlined below where the two sides stand on the range of issues\nwhichwntinue to divide the sides; the outline includes a brief description\nof where the U.S. agencies can be expected to come out on the issues.\nI have also enclosed a draft NSDM (Tab B) for your approval which in-\nstructs the Delegation to take up those issues which are either resolved\nor sufficiently close to resolution to warrant shifting to Geneva.\nMIRV Verification. Although the Soviets made a major move on this issue\nby agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as\nMIRVed when deployed, they have linked this concession to U.S. acceptance\nof their position on cruise missiles. In addition, a problem still remains\nwith respect to counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If MIRVs are deployed only\non part of a submarine class, we may not be able to verify that the re-\nmaining missiles on that class are not also MIRVed. Consequently,\nour position has been that all SLBMs in a submarine class should count\nwhen the first submarine in the class is equipped with a MIRVed missile.\nSince the problem of counting SLBM MIRVs involves technical issues\nwhich are probably best dealt with at the Delegation level, we proposed\nin Helsinki to move the MIRV verification issue to the formal negotiations\nin Geneva. The Soviets refused to accept this approach, stating that they\ncould not move any verification issue to Geneva until the cruise missile\nissue is resolved.\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nFORD of GERALD LIBRARY\nSECRET / SENSITIVE -\n2\nHowever, all agencies are concerned about the impact\nin Congress if the agreement is weak on MIRV verification. With the\nSoviet agreement to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single\nRVs as MIRVed when deployed, much of this concern has been alleviated.\nHowever, the agencies still expect to achieve some variant of a rule\nwhich counts SLBMs by submarine class. This issue could be a problem\nwith the Soviets unless they can accept a counting rule tied to the overhaul\nschedule for submarines but which still counts all submarines in a class\nas MIRVed after an agreed period.\nSince the SLBM MIRV issue has not been taken up in your channel and\ninvolves highly technical issues, we should probably attempt to resolve\nthis issue through the Delegation. Even though the Soviets refused in\nHelsinki to refer verification issues to the Delegations, the issue is\nof sufficient importance to try to make some headway in the formal\nnegotiations. Consequently, I recommend that we put forth in Geneva\na modification to our submarine class rule which ties the SLBM MIRV\ncount to an overhaul or conversion schedule. The draft NSDM indicates\nyour approval of this approach.\nCruise Missiles. There has been no change in the Soviet position on\ncruise missiles since it was originally put forth at Geneva in early\nFebruary. The Soviets are continuing to insist that cruise missiles\nof greater than 600 km range should be counted on heavy bombers and\nbanned on all other aircraft and on all sea-based platforms. Their\nproposal on land-based cruise missiles is to ban all above intercon-\ntinental range, i.e., 5500 km.\nAlthough the formal U.S. position in Geneva is still that cruise missiles\nwere not discussed at Vladivostok and are outside the scope of this\nagreement, the U.S. has made major concessions on cruise missiles\nin your private channel:\n-- We have agreed to ban air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)\nwith range greater than 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.\nSERALD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD\nSERALD\nYou indicated to Brezhnev that we could accept a limit of\n1500 km, and possibly as low as 1200 km, on sea-launched cruise missiles\n(SLCMs). The remaining difference in the position of the two sides on\nthis issue (the Soviet position is a 600 km limit) is not significant since\nthe major Soviet concern, elimination of the U.S. strategic SLCM option,\nis satisfied by almost any SLCM range below 3000 km.\nThere is a good chance the Soviets would agree to a SLCM limit\nof around 1000 km.\n-- We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles of inter -\ncontinental range. Defense views this limitation as acceptable; they\nfeel it is advantageous to the U.S. since it gives us the option of deploying\nlong-range land-based cruise missiles in Europe.\nThis leaves only the ALCM limit as a major source of contention on\ncruise missiles. We have insisted on a range limit of 2500-3000 km for\nALCMs on heavy bombers. As you know, the issue with respect to\nALCMs is the need to retain long-range ALCMs as a hedge against future\nthreats to bomber penetration, and in particular as a hedge against the\nuncertainties regarding eventual B-1 deployment.\nFORD A. GERATO LIBRARY\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n4\nOn the other side of the argument is the question of how long-range\nALCMs would affect Soviet bomber capability. With a 2500-3000 km\nALCM, the Backfire and Bison can cover most of the more populated\nregions of the U.S. and recover in the Soviet Union. On the other hand\non one-way missions complete coverage of the U.S. is possible, with\nor without long-range cruise missiles. If Backfire is not classed as a\nheavy bomber, a restriction on equipping aircraft other than heavy\nbombers with ASMs of range in excess of 600 km will prevent extension\nof Backfire capability through the deployment of long-range ASMs.\nIn sum, we should continue to insist on a 2500-3000 km limit on ALCMs\nlaunched from heavy bombers and a 1200-1500 km limit on SLCMs.\nThere is wide bureaucratic support for this position, with Defense being\nparticularly adamant against accepting a lower range limit. Although\nour position on cruise missiles results in different range limits for\ncruise missiles launched from different platforms, we believe that the\nattendant verification problems are tractable.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD LIBRARY P. FORD\nFORD R. GERATO LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n5\nThe enclosed draft NSDM instructs Alex Johnson to put forth those\ncruise missile issues which were resolved by you and General Secretary\nBrezhnev in Helsinki. However, to avoid a potentially awkward\nnegotiating position in Geneva of having Alex maintai n that cruise\nmissiles on heavy bombers and sea-based platforms are unlimited\nwhile intercontinental cruise missiles and cruise missiles on non-\nbomber aircraft are banned, we should probably make some movement\non cruise missiles on all platforms. At the same time, we should\nprobably avoid making a major movement on cruise missiles\nin the formal negotiations without insisting upon appropriate Soviet\nconcessions in other areas. Consequently, I recommend that we\nhave Alex tie the U.S. movement on cruise missiles on heavy bombers\nand sea-based platforms to Soviet movement on the Backfire and heavy\nICBM definition issues. I have included such an approach in the\nenclosed NSDM.\nMobile ICBMs. Although we withheld discussing this issue directly in\nHelsinki, Gromyko indicated at my meeting in July that the Soviets were\nprepared to ban the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs for the duration of\nthe new agreement. Coupled with their present formal position in Geneva\nwhich effectively bans air-mobile ICBMs, the Soviet proposal amounts to\na combined ban on both air- and land-mobile ICBM systems (although a\nlimited air-mobile system might still be permitted.) We withheld dis-\ncussing this issue directly in Geneva to permit time for analysis of the\nSoviet proposal. In the formal talks in Geneva we have continued to\ntake the position that mobile ICBMs should be permitted and counted.\nI believe we should wrap up the mobile ICBM issue once and for all and\nagree to the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs. As\nyou pointed out in the NSC, the mobile ICBM issue really boils down\nto how best to obtain money from Congress for R&D programs for mobile\nsystems. We would probably be in a worse position regarding R&D funds\nif we rejected the Soviet proposal and the Soviet proposal were leaked\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRART\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n6\nto Congress. An additional impediment to R&D funding continues to be\nthe lack of a viable mobile deployment concept for either air- - or land-\nmobile ICBMs; all concepts considered to date are either too expensive,\nrequire too much land, or only offer marginal improvement in surviva-\nbility over silo-based ICBMs.\nConsequently, I recommend that you authorize the Delegation to agree\nin principle to the Soviet proposal for a combined ban on land- - and air-\nmobile ICBMs. The draft NSDM indicates your approval of this approach.\nBackfire\nThe Soviets have continued to hold fast to their position that Backfire is\nnot a strategic bomber and consequently should not be included in the\n2400 aggregate. Although our formal position in Geneva has been that\nBackfire should be counted because it has capabilities comparable to\nthose aircraft which both sides have agreed to count as heavy bombers,\nwe proposed in Helsinki an arrangement under which:\nA separate limit of 100 would be established for Backfire\naircraft deployed for peripheral or naval missions.\n-- Backfire aircraft deployed in excess of 100 would be counted\nin the 2400 aggregate.\n-- A limit of 100 would also be established on the number of FB-111\naircraft.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n7\nWe have always realized that, if the Soviets could convince us that Backfire\nis not to be used as an intercontinental bomber, we would be satisfied.\nThe problem is that we have not studied in detail what kind of assurances\nwe need from the Soviets or what our ability is to verify whether Soviet\nactions are in conformance with their assurances.\nWe may still be able to nail down specific indicators or constraints which\nwould improve our confidence that Backfire was not being used for inter-\ncontinental roles but which still permit the Soviets to exempt Backfire from\nthe 2400. However, even though there are some indications that the Soviets\nmay consider a tanker prohibition for Backfire operations (Gromyko did\nnot explicitly rule out such an approach when we met in Geneva), it is\nunlikely that we could ever get the Soviets to go beyond a commitment on\ntankers and a declaration not to use Backfire for intercontinental missions.\nIn any event, it is clear that we cannot accept the Soviet position that Back-\nfire should be excluded from the 2400 aggregate without collateral constraints\nor assurances regarding Backfire employment.\nFor the time being, in Geneva, we should probably not go beyond our formal\nposition that Backfire should be counted in the aggregate, other than to\nindicate that some other solution may be possible. I have recommended\nearlier that we tie our movement on ALCMs and SLCMs to Soviet acceptance\nof our formal Backfire and heavy missile position. Even though the Soviets\nare unlikely to agree to count all Backfire in the aggregate, we may gain\nsome negotiating leverage which could break loose some Soviet movement\non Backfire in your channels.\nHeavy ICBM Definition. The Soviets made an important concession in\nagreeing to include a heavy ICBM definition in the new agreement. However,\ntheir proposal to define a heavy ICBM on the basis of missile gross weight\n(or launching weight as they describe it) appears to permit too much potential\ngrowth in capability. For example, with a heavy ICBM definition pegged\nto the SS-19 gross weight, an advanced technology missile might have a\nthrow weight of 9, 000-12, 000 lbs as compared to the 7, 000 lb throw weight\nof the current SS-19. If the throw weight could go as high as 12, 000 lbs,\nit would clearly be unacceptable to have a definition based only on gross\nweight.\nGERALD ? FORD\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n8\nThe Verification Panel is making an effort to narrow the current\nuncertainty in throw weight growth potential for a definition based on\nmissile gross weight. Because of this uncertainty, the note passed to\nthe Soviets just before the Helsinki Summit proposed that heavy ICBMs\nbe defined on the basis of both the gross weight and throw weight of the\nSS-19. Until the Soviets respond, there appears to be no reason to modify\nthis position. In the interim, the Verification Panel is examining other\npossible combinations of gross weight, throw weight, and volume for the\nheavy ICBM definition.\nThus, the draft NSDM instructs\nthe Delegation to propose defining a heavy ICBM on the basis of both the\ngross weight and the throw weight of the SS-19. As I mentioned earlier, I\nalso recommend that this issue be tied to U.S. movement on ALCMs and\nSLCMs.\nSilo Dimensions. The two sides are not far apart on an approach for\nresolving this issue. The problem is the ambiguity of whether the 10-15\npercent Interim Agreement limit on increases in silo dimensions permits\nincreases of 10-15 percent in one or both dimensions (depth and diameter)\nof a silo. At our July meeting in Geneva, Gromyko proposed that in the\nnew agreement a 32 percent limit on volume increases should be substituted\nfor the 10-15 percent limit on increases in dimensions. However, since we\nwant to retain an independent 15 percent limit on depth increases, the note\npassed to the Soviets before the Helsinki Summit proposed a compromise\nwherein a 15 percent limit on increases in dimensions would be supplemented\nby a 32 percent volume limit.\nThere is no agency disagreement on this approach, and I recommend that\nwe instruct Alex to propose such a compromise in the formal negotiations.\nEffective Date of the 2400 Aggregate. While we have taken the position in\nthe formal talks that the 2400 aggregate limitation should be effective upon\nentry-into-force of the new agreement, the Soviets have favored a delay\nafter entry-into-force to permit reduction to the 2400 level. Gromyko\nindicated in Geneva that the period during which they will reduce to the\n2400 level would not exceed 12 months.\nThe two sides are not far apart on this issue. We indicated in Helsinki\nthat we could accept a reasonable interval to achieve the 2400 aggregate\nlimitation, and we have already instructed Alex to put forth such an approach\nat the formal negotiations.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD ORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n9\nFollow-On Negotiations. One final issue concerns follow-on negotiations.\nThe U.S. position has been that follow-on talks should begin no later than\none year after entry-into-force of the new agreement while the Soviets\nhad proposed that further negotiations should begin no later than 1980-81.\nHowever, Gromyko indicated in July that the Soviets would be willing to\nhave follow-on negotiations begin \"in the same year that the Vladivostok\nagreement enters into force. \" This essentially meets the U.S. position.\nNon-Transfer. Although it did not come up in Helsinki or in my meeting\nwith Gromyko in Geneva, we can anticipate that the Soviets will insist\non inclusion of a non-transfer provision in the final agreement. Their\ncurrent proposal on this issue would ban the transfer of strategic\noffensive arms, components, technical descriptions, and blueprints to\nthird countries. They have also proposed an additional commitment not\nto assist in the development of strategic offensive arms by other states.\nWe have made no proposals on non-transfer and have told the Soviets that\nwe can not consider any non-transfer provision until the final shape of\nan agreement is clear and we know which systems will be limited. As\na result, there has been no significant exchange on the non-transfer issue\nin Geneva.\nWhile we probably will have to accept some non-transfer provision in the\nfinal agreement, it should be as general and non-restrictive as possible.\nFor the time being, we should probably continue to defer consideration of\nthis issue until the final shape of the agreement becomes clear.\nRECOMMENDATION\nThat you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab B.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY 938470\nFORD R. GERALD LIBRARY\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09196\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nRoger Molander\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 8/9/75\nCREATION DATE\n08/09/1975\nVOLUME\n22 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200023\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 8/9/75\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/25/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nexcised NSC letter 2/10/99\nW 10/99\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE - XGDS\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nSaturday, August 9, 1975\nTIME:\n9:45 a.m. - 11:20 a.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nMiddle East, SALT\nPrincipals\nThe President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger\nDirector of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown\nDirector of Central Intelligence William E. Colby\nOther Attendees\nState:\nUnder Secretary Joseph Sisco\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nCLA:\nMr. Carl Duckett\nWhite House:\nLt Gen Brent Scowcroft\nRoger Molander PM\nBERALD R. FORD 020 LIBRARY\nNSC:\n-\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 304\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nClassified by Henry Kissinger\nE.O. 12958 Sec. ins(b)(6) (6)\n34\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR98-39,*35, NSeletter 2/10/99\nBy let NARA, Date 5/25/99\nTOP SECRENSENSTTIVE XGDS\n2\nPresident Ford: While this meeting was called for the discussion of\nSALT, Henry and I think that because of the situation in the negotiations\nin the Middle East, maybe Henry at the outset for a limited time could\npoint out where we are and then there is one matter I would like your\nadvice on -- a very crucial matter.\nSecretary Kissinger: The main point is that these negotiations have been\ngoing on for several months now revolving around two issues, the Giddi\nand the Mitla passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields. The Egyptian position\nis that the Israelis must get out of the passes and stop working the oil\nfields. The Israelis have gone through contortions too long on these\nissues to sense what really is possible. At one point they were willing\nto give up one half of each of the passes. They even drew a line through\nthe Giddi pass to indicate where they would fall back to.\nThe negotiations are now at a point where it is possible to get an agree-\nment. The Israeli problem is that they will have to agree to get out of the\npasses, although they will be permitted to keep the high ground in\nbetween the passes.\nWe have pretty well negotiated three fourths of the corridor to Abu Rodeis\nbut there is still a little territory which has not been resolved. We\nhave come up with a possible solution but this has not as yet been put\ninto the negotiations.\nThere is also a dispute over the Israeli definition of the end of the\npasses which differs from the Egyptian definition. The Israeli position\nis that the pass ends at the end of the mountains.\nPresident Ford: Plus the burial plot at Parker's Memorial. The\nIsraelis insist on retaining that.\nSecretary Kissinger: No one had ever heard of this burial ground including\nthe Egyptians.\nPresident Ford: We found it on an old map but the Israelis moved it.\nSecretary Kissinger: Where the Israelis claim it is, is not where it is on\nthe only map we' found with it on.\nThe disputed issue is where the passes end. The disputes on the other\nlines are fully agreed to. The Israelis have agreed that the UN zone\ncan go to the Egyptians. But the Egyptians feel that for symbolic reasons\nthey must get at least a few kilometers inside the current Israeli lines.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nThe Israeli line is that they can't show their people that they have given\nup any ground, even if it is only a few kilometers. The Israelis claim that\nit is a matter of principle.\nPresident Ford: I have got to see this few kilometers they won't give up.\nDirector Colby: It's very valuable -- two kilometers of dry sand. (laughter)\nSecretary Kissinger: That's right, it's nothing but dry sand. Sadat says\nhe wants seven kilometers, but he will probably settle for two. The Israeli\nhangup is that they want monitoring sites near both passes. They are\nwilling to accept Egyptian stations so long as they are managed by\nAmericans. The Israeli outposts would be manned by Israelis. The\nEgyptians are opposed to the Israeli request for six American-manned\npositions in the pass areas for tactical warning. They object to having\nAmericans man these positions; they say they have just kicked the Russians\nout and if they permit Americans to man these positions, the Russians\nwill insist on returning. The Egyptians say they will not accept any\nnew posts in the passes but they may be willing to let Americans take\nover existing posts.\nSecretary Schlesinger: There's really nothing that six posts could do\nthat two or three couldn't do.\nSecretary Kissinger: That's now where the negotiations stand; it revolves\naround whether the Egyptians will permit Americans to manage their posts\nin the passes.\nPresident Ford: Bill.\nDirector Colby: Compliance with the agreement will be a problem at\nthose sites which are capable of providing intelligence information.\nIf we provide intelligence from these sites to the other side, it will be\nthe same as letting them poke into the other side's position. One solution is\nthat we would agree to only provide warning, etc. There may not be an\neasy solution to this problem.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Why is that? In 1967 the Israelis had outposts\nbehind the lines in Jordan. It's not a point of the Israelis never having had\nsuch a capability.\nSecretary Kissinger: I believe the Israelis may accept American operation\nof these sites.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nDirector Colby: The capability of these bases permits them to gather\ninformation well into the other side's territories. For example, they\ncan observe aircraft well into Egypt. They are very sophisticated.\nBeyond the question of manning there is the question of the capabilities\nof these bases.\nSecretary Kissinger: I think these problems can be solved. The big issue\nis Egyptian acceptance of American stations for tactical warning and\nhow many. There is also the issue of selling this to Congress. We said we\nwouldn't make any moves in the Middle East without consulting with the\nCongress.\nPresident Ford: The Egyptian station would also be managed by\nAmericans.\nSecretary Kissinger: If the solution is that these stations are run by the\nIsraelis with an American flag and American management it may be\nacceptable.\nPresident Ford: Civilian management.\nSecretary Kissinger: The Egyptians may claim that the military are\nthere somewhere in some unexplained manner.\nPresident Ford: That's their problem.\nDirector Colby: It will be less of a problem if we limit the Americans\nactivity to simply managing the stations.\nSecretary Kissinger: These are really two separate problems. Our\nproblem is to man the posts and make sure both sides carry on only what\nis permitted.\nPresident Ford: It is really symbolic. The total number of Americans\nwould only be 80 to 100.\nSecretary Kissinger: It depends on how many stations we put there.\nThese two stations here (points to map) are only symbolic.\nDirector Colby: We will have little problem if we provide equal information to\nthe Egyptians.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We will use civilians?\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nSERALD\nTOPSECRET (SENSITY\n5\nPresident Ford: Yes, in the zone where the UN now has the responsibility.\nSecretary Kissinger: Next is the tactical warning stations which the Israelis\nwant. They want three in each pass. The check points would be about 10\nkm apart. Sadat keeps referring to having Americans protect the lines.\nThese are really second-line positions. They don't look like warning stations.\nThere is also the problem of the Russian reaction to Americans manning\nthese stations. If war starts, the stations couldn't possibly survive. The\nIsraeli demand for three stations in each pass is outrageous on substance.\nThere is no other part of the front with as many as six stations in so small\nan area.\nPresident Ford: If we did agree to man these stations, we would have\nAmerican hostages in an area which is one of the most volatile in the world.\nSecretary Kissinger: We might obtain agreement to put one station in the\nmiddle of the Giddi Pass which looks both ways. It might be more acceptable.\nIf the Israelis want to put in sensors, they could do it at their end of the\npasses.\nGeneral Brown: Why not man the sensors from some perimeter post? This\nwould avoid the President's point of hostages.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have not been able to generate interest in any\napproach of that type. The Israelis insist that they want six stations. They\nwon't get it. The Israelis won't accept an agreement without some American\npersonnel manning these stations. Maybe if there were only two posts it\nwould be acceptable.\nPresident Ford: Wherever Americans would be in the area, they would be\nhostages. But we must forge ahead.\nGeneral Brown: We could monitor the sensors from any location.\nPresident Ford: I must say the force would be symbolic. We did not try\nand find a technical solution to this problem.\nSecretary Kissinger: Golda Meir is concerned about American opinion if\nthere are Americans in the area. She thinks there will be a nasty debate in\nAmerica. The Israeli cabinet is also concerned about this problem.\nDirector Colby: If a war started, the posts wouldn't last for 10 minutes.\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY GERALD FORD\nTOP \\SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n6\nPresident Ford: It's really a symbolic force. I agree with what you are\nsaying. In talking to Rabin, Sadat, and Dinitz, they all understand that it's\njust a token force. I am more willing than Henry to put Americans into\nthese posts. Unless we are willing to take such a step, it is unlikely that\nthere will be an agreement. If, in the final crunch, if that's what is needed,\nto put some Americans in a non-military context, then I think we should\ndo it. I've checked this out with a number of individuals in Congress. Their\nreaction is that the Congress will go along.\nSecretary Kissinger: We've gotten down to the issue of two positions and\nUm Hashiva, and these 150 Americans.\nPresident Ford:\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Would we need that many people?\nSecretary Kissinger: There would have to be three shifts per day with 15\nmen on each shift.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: How big is the UN force?\nSecretary Kissinger: About 8, 000 now.\nDirector Colby: But none are US.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Under a peace settlement, the UN force would\nprobably be drawn down.\nDirector Colby: But then again it might get larger.\nSecretary Kissinger: This zone (points to map), a hundred miles long, would\nnot be under Egyptian control. It would be a UN zone. It's one of the wrinkles\nthe Egyptians have drawn up.\nGeneral Brown: What would be the US responsibility? Who would the\nAmericans report to?\nPresident Ford: Our own government.\nFURD\nSecretary Kissinger: The US representatives would be unarmed.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERAED FORD LIBRARY\nTOPSECRETVSENSITIVE XGDS\n7\nPresident Ford: We would handle violations just like they are handled\ncurrently.\nSecretary Kissinger: The Egyptians will not agree to having the Israelis\nrun the stations. They won't accept having an Israeli flag over the stations.\nThe Egyptians prefer the UN flag. The Israelis will not accept the UN\nflag since then it could be raised in the Security Council or the General Assembly\nand the posts removed.\nDirector Colby: There will be awfully sensitive material which people will\nhave access to at these stations.\nSecretary Kissinger:\nPresident Ford: Well, let's go on to SALT.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: One question. With respect to the oil deal,\nwill the Israelis look to Iran for oil?\nSecretary Kissinger: They'll look to us -- not to Iran.\nPresident Ford: It will not come out of our own production.\nDirector Colby: Up to now, has Iran demonstrated any willingness to\nprovide oil?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: This is a sticky point.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have assured the Israelis of our help in storing\nand buying oil.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: The Shah is shaky on this. He is not as\nstrong politically as he has been. This gives the Israelis pause.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY BERALD\nTOP SECREY/SENSITIVE XGDS\n8\nSecretary Kissinger:\nDirector Colby: The Israelis have increased their storage capability\nalready.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Do American tankers go into Israel if there is\na war?\nSecretary Kissinger: If there is a war, they will draw on their storage\nfacilities.\nGeneral Brown: What about having tankers with other flags pick up oil\nand deliver it to the Israelis?\nSecretary Kissinger: It is true, the Israelis are not asking that the oil be\ndelivered by American flag ships.\nDirector Colby: How long would the war last anyway?\nSecretary Kissinger: Three weeks at the outside.\nMr. Sisco: If there is a war, the Israelis could take over the oil fields\nanyway.\nSecretary Schlesinger: They wouldn't find any oil producing facilities when\nthey got there.\nPresident Ford: This is a crucial issue.\n(End of discussion on the Middle East).\nBERALD P. FORD\nTQP SECRE /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SENSTTVE - XGDS\n9\nPresident Ford: The main reason for this meeting is to bring you all\nup to date on where we are on SALT. We had two meetings with Brezhnev\nin Helsinki. We made some progress but not a lot. Let me tell you what\nwe have agreed to and then we can talk about those issues which we are\nstill hung up on.\nWe have agreed to ban cruise missiles of range greater than 600 kilometers\non aircraft other than heavy bombers. We have also agreed to ban inter-\ncontinental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of greater than 600 kilo-\nmeters range on surface ships. We have also agreed to a ban on ballistic\nmissiles on the seabeds and inland waterways. We also discussed a fifth\nissue related to weapons in orbit, but I understand that this has already\nbeen taken up in Geneva. We thus come down to the problem of cruise missiles\nair-launch cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles - and the\nquestion of the Backfire. Henry, will you run through the details of where\nwe stand on these issues?\nSecretary Kissinger: Without endorsing what the Soviets say, let me tell\nyou what Dobrynin told me in the meeting I had with him yesterday. He\nindicated that they were having real problems with our position. They\nfigure that the ALCMs would give us 11, 000 free warheads which are not\ncounted under the aggregate. I assume that they are calculating something\nlike 32 missiles on each B-1 with 240 B-1s and 12 on each B-52 with 400\nB-52s. This comes to about 11, 000. He indicated they don't know what\nto do with this sort of situation. He claimed it is absolutely impossible to\nagree to a situation where there are 8, 000 warheads limited in the aggregate\nand 11, 000 warheads that run free.\nThe second point Dobrynin brought up is that they want to have a SALT\nagreement in preparation for the next party Congress. They want to be\nable to go to that Congress and ask for real reductions in military ex-\npenditures. But with our cruise missile position, they say they'll have\nto ask for additional expenditures in two areas. They say they will have to\nspend additional money on increasing air defenses and then also deploy\ncruise missiles themselves, neither one of which they had intended to do.\nThis presents a problem on cruise missiles which is unavoidable since we\nwant to deploy them.\nWith respect to Backfire -- this issue became rather heated at Helsinki\nBrezhnev claimed that the Backfire has only half the capability of the\nBison and the President challenged him on this. This really became\nacrimonious between the President and Brezhnev.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SEOR SENSITIVE XCDS\n10\nPresident Ford: I just quoted your figure, Bill.\nSecretary Kissinger: They consider our position on Backfire to be cynical.\nThey just think we are just bargaining. They say we should know that the\nBackfire is being deployed for use against Europe and China and not against\nthe United States. They claim that they gave up on FBS, which was the\nsame type of issue. They claim that if you count refueling, you have to\ncount all F-111's and F-4's too because with refueling they also can reach\nthe Soviet Union. They say our position on the Backfire gives them a\nproblem which is simply unmanageable.\nIn my conversation with Dobrynin I asked him if the Soviets really wanted\nan agreement. Dobrynin said yes, that it had been in their program for\nthis year.\nThe question now is what to propose on these issues. These are the\narguments the Soviets give. I repeat I am not endorsing these arguments,\nbut these are the ones which Dobrynin put forth. Dobrynin got a summary\ncable from Moscow on the Helsinki discussions which listed the unresolved\nissues. He didn't mention the throw weight issue SO I asked him if the\nsummary cable had listed that. He said that it listed mobiles, cruise missiles,\nand Backfire. I asked him what about throw weight? Dobrynin said it wasn't\nlisted. It's clearly not at the same level as these other problems. Also\nwe didn't get nearly as big a reaction with respect to throw weight as we\ndid on Backfire in Helsinki.\nPresident Ford: Right.\nSecretary Kissinger: Brezhnev didn't explode over throw weight like he\ndid over Backfire.\nPresident Ford: In discussing cruise missiles, we got into a discussion\nabout who was going to move their industrial complexes. We told them\nthey should move theirs closer to their borders to make the situation\ncomparable. We were kidding them about this.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Kidding? That was the next proposal we were\ngoing to make. (Laughter)\nSecretary Kissinger: I thought you were becoming more conciliatory. I\nsaid we would move all our cities inland.\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFOR SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n11\nPresident Ford: If we continue with our position of a 3, 000 kilometer\nlimit on ALCMs and a 1500 kilometer limit on SLCMs and if, in addition,\nwe make no movement on how we want to handle Backfire, then I don't\nthink there's going to be an agreement.\nI previously had a conversation with Jim to try and resolve what our\ncourse of action would be if it looked like there weren't going to be an\nagreement. I asked what military appropriations Jim might come up with\nfor a FY 76 supplement plus a five year program. The figures are\nastounding. George, I guess you've seen these, but I would just like to\nrun through them for you, Bill, and others.\nIn FY 76 -- this is in 1976 constant dollars -- the figure would be\n206 million dollars. Then for the transitional quarter would be another\n114 million. In 1977 two billion, five hundred; in 1978, 2 billion and seven;\nin 1979, 4 billion and five; in 1989, 5 billion and eight; and 1981, 8 billion\nand six. That's not a very good picture to have to go to the Hill with.\nSecretary Kissinger: This is without additional money for ABM.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We will be spending a lot of money on ABM R&D,\nhowever, but no money for ABM deployment.\nSecretary Kissinger: There's another column here that has the price increases\nthat would take place with a reasonable rate of inflation. For example, if\nwe take the last entry under 1981 and crank in an inflation figure, it would\nbe 11. 5 billion. In 1988 the 5.8 billion figure goes to 7.4 billion with\ninflation dollars. This gives you some idea of the magnitude of what we\nwould be up against if there were no agreement.\nI believe the choice is some modification to our current position or this\nalternative which I have just described. Now I think it is important from\nan internal point of view to get an agreement, an agreement that would not\nsacrifice national security. I'm not talking about an agreement that's just\na one-way street, but I believe a two-way street agreement can be achieved\nwhich will be in the national interest and in the world interest. I must\nsay my assessment is that if we don't get an agreement, we will be in\ntrouble on the Hill since we simply won't get the money we need. Getting\nadditional appropriations for defense won't be any less difficult, with or\nwithout an agreement, and the figures we have just gone through are really\nunbelieveable and unacceptable. When it comes to submitting this budget\nis\n1068\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n12\nit won't be believed or accepted. We'll end up further behind. We need\nan agreement to protect our national interest and the world interest as\nwell. What we have to do is find where we can make some modification in\nthe cruise missile and Backfire areas.\nSecretary Kissinger: One other fact, anyone who has dealt with Brezhnev\nrecently must conclude that his life expectency is limited. It's not a question\nof his political survival but after 45 minutes in our meetings he simply ran\nout of steam. The Romanians whose dislike for the Russians is patho-\nlogical if Ceausescu keeps up the way he's going he might trigger some\naction on the part of the Soviets. They feel only Brezhnev can put over a\nSALT agreement with the Soviet military. Grechko is too encrusted and\ncouldn't do it. If the Soviets have a new leader, especially if it is Kirilenko,\nhe will have to play all the party factions. Thus it may be that we will have to worl\naggressively toward an agreement because of the time problem. Brezhnev\nwas like Pompidou was in Iceland when he met with Nixon. Brezhnev could only\nbat the ball back with extreme mental slowness, things had to be explained\nto him two or three times.\nDirector Colby: That's our assessment as well. He only has a short time.\nAfter he dies or steps down he will probably be succeeded by a person of\ncollective acceptability who won't be aggressive in pursuing a SALT agreement.\nThe track record of the Soviet Union is that there is a transition period\nof three to five years before a new leader can be aggressive in international\naffairs. The question of who will be the successor, whether it will be someone\nlike Kirilenko or a military man like Grechko.\nSecretary Kissinger: Everyone in Europe thinks it will be Kirilenko, but\nit might work out that it's someone like Malenkov, who will only last\nfor a year.\nPresident Ford: Let me ask a question. If there is no agreement and\nBrezhnev is out and there is an interim period, their momentum figures\nthey will keep going in all areas -- aircraft, submarines, and ballistic\nmissiles. Everyone will probably try and line up the military on their\nside. Once the momentum gets going it will become even more difficult\nfor whoever succeeds Brezhnev to stop it, just like with us.\nDirector Colby: We have been working out of a triad but now on cruise\nmissiles we're really talking about a quartet. We have the balance in\nstrategic forces that we need. If we have reductions it will mean\nreductions for us not for them. The SALT limits which were agreed\nassure a Soviet buildup. We would have problems with reductions.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP - XGDS\n13\nWithin the next five years the only real danger is that fighting will break\nout in a conventional war not a strategic war. We see no technical\ndevelopments that are likely to give them a strategic first strike against\nus. If we continue the stalemate in strategic systems, it is likely that\ntheir naval buildup and their buildup in conventional forces in Europe will\ncontinue. This will form the basis for competition between us, along with\nthird world military aid. If we have to put money into strategic systems,\nwe'll have to also put money into conventional forces.\nPresident Ford: We can't gamble on our national security. If a deal\ncan be worked which eliminates the Backfire and cruise missile problems,\nthen we should work toward it.\nSecretary Kissinger: One thing Dobrynin said to me was why did we\nintroduce these new elements, cruise missiles and Backfire, into the\nnegotiations. I said we need cruise missiles for penetration of their\ndefenses. He said it was their own estimate that within three years our\nbomber force would have an overwhelming problem getting into the\nSoviet Union. He said if we deploy cruise missiles, they will have to\nincrease their air defenses.\nPresident Ford: George?\nGeneral Brown: I don't share Bill's optimism with respect to the ten\nyear period. Ten years is too long a time. I am worried that the situation\nmight change dramatically through the application of lasers.\nPresident Ford: If they run free.\nSecretary Kissinger: They do anyway.\nDirector Colby: In the ten year period, the Soviets still could not develop\na first strike capability, but they could substantially improve their\noffensive capability.\nPresident Ford: Let me ask a question; assume we get an agreement,\nlaser development is free anyhow, is it not?\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Yes.\nJOHARY\nPresident Ford: Are we proceeding with lasers of our own.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Yes, We have additional money in the current\nbudget. Right now we are spending all we reasonably can.\nTOP SECRETYSENSITIVE - XGDS\nSERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n14\nSecretary Schlesinger: The Soviets have had a more aggressive program\nin the past.\nGeneral Brown: The Soviets would have a motivation to work faster on\nlasers without an agreement.\nPresident Ford: Right, George.\nDr. Ikle: Without an agreement we will be diverted to work on numbers\nfor political reasons.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, with respect to what's agreed,\nwhat is meant by the term \"other than heavy bombers\" -- cruise missiles\non transports?\nPresident Ford: Yes -- on transports.\nSecretary Kissinger: Cruise missiles of greater than 600 kilometer range\nwould be banned on transports.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Tactical cruise missiles carried by tactical\naircraft are not limited?\nPresident Ford: Right.\nSecretary Schlesinger: So we're talking about strategic nuclear-armed\nmissiles.\nAs for the points of issue -- as for Backfire. We may be unable to suck\nout of anybody on the Soviet side what they think about this.\nHowever, we could be wrong about Backfire capability since we still have\nno measure of fuel capacity. It's very complicated, but we always come\nup with the same 3000 mile figure plus or minus five to ten percent off.\nWe have set up a development advisory group on Backfire. It may be that\nour estimates are too high; however, the report is not completed. Never-\ntheless, the Soviets claim that the Backfire range is one half that of\nthe Bison is very unlikely.\nSecretary Kissinger: They said in capability.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nFORD is LIBRARY\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n15\nGeneral Brown: We agree that it is probably designed for peripheral missions.\nSecretary Schlesinger: If Backfire can only attack by overflying the US\non a one-way mission, it is less important substantively versus politically\nterms. Critics on the Hill will argue that if the aggregate is 2400 and the\nBackfire is free, they will be able to do more than us.\nIf the Soviets can give us assurances on the Backfire, the political problem\nwill be alleviated. The question is what will they provide.\nPresident Ford: I believe we should not be adamant on this issue; never-\ntheless, we should take a firm position. We can challenge them as to what\nproof they have.\nDirector Colby: The intelligence community differs on this issue -- not\nthe numbers but on Backfire employment.\nPresident Ford: Jim is right. If the range is 3000 miles, political\nopponents will say the aircraft has a one-way capability to strike the United\nStates.\nSecretary Kissinger: So does the F-111 against the Soviet Union.\nDirector Colby: But the Backfire is not a first strike weapon. Compared\nto ballistic missiles, slow flying aircraft are not useful for first strike.\nDr. Ikle: We seem to have made some progress on throw weight.\nSecretary Kissinger: All they did on throw weight was to not reject our\nproposal. I'm not sure what their position is. Throw weight was not\nincluded in the reporting cables sent to Dobrynin as one of the unsolved\nissues. There's no explanation for this. Brezhnev was not very fast on\nhis feet on this issue. He asked me what we meant by our position. I told\nhim we wanted a definition based on launching weight and throw weight. He\nasked for what missile. I said for the SS-19, and he didn't reject this.\nDr. Ikle: With progress on the throw weight issue, we will be able to halt\nthe expansion of Soviet first-strike capability.\nPresident Ford: Jim, what are your observations on the cruise missile\nproblem.\nSecretary Schlesinger: There is more give on SLCMs; they have a role\nin sub-SIOP missions. SLCMs are one way to do other missions. ALCMs\n1)\nTOR SECRE/T/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALS\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n16\nare a more difficult subject. From the point of view of numbers of\nweapons which the Soviets raised, we could also substantially increase\nthe number of bombs as well as the number of missiles. Because of\ndecisions made while McNamara was Secretary of Defense we have the\ncurrent number of bombs on the B-52s. The B-1 carries\nWe could increase the number of bombs to\nGeneral Brown: We currently have a clip on which there are\nweapons. We have the capability to deploy\nSecretary Schlesinger: We can probably estimate a numerical limit of\nfive to six thousand ALCMs by 1985. This is far less than the potential\nnumber of bombs. For reasons relating to maintaining our desire to\ncontinue to be able to penetrate, we are developing ALCMs. The Soviets\ndon't need ALCMs to penetrate our air defenses. Our interests should be\nin controlling warheads, not missiles. We need a better fix on the para-\nmeters of discussion before we reach a solution.\nSecretary Kissinger: Like what?\nSecretary Schlesinger: For example, the Soviet argument that we are\nexpanding the number of warheads is a characteristic of bombs not just\nmissiles. We are not limited\nA constraint\non the number of ALCMs could be sufficient to satisfy their concerns on\nthis issue.\nPresident Ford: Let me ask you this. Put us in their shoes -- if we limit\nthe number of cruise missiles on the B-52 and the B-1, how will they\nknow if we have not modified these aircraft to carry more missiles without\nverification.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Verification is an important issue.\nPresident Ford: It goes both ways.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we say 5000 to 6000 cruise missiles as a limit\nit will get a horrible reaction from the Soviets. Better to limit the number\nof planes with cruise missiles. Maybe we could bring this into relation\nwith the Backfire. We could still end up with a reasonable cruise missile\nforce.\nis\nFORD\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n17\nSecretary Schlesinger: The B-52 is not worth making into a penetrating\nbomber in the time frame of interest. Comparing the B-52 vs the B-1,\nthe B-52 will be dependent on ALCMs for penetration.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we put a 6, 000 limit on cruise missiles, it will put\na real burden on verification. If only X planes carried cruise missiles,\nit would be much better.\nDirector Colby: This will be hard to monitor.\nSecretary Schlesinger: The Soviets will argue that we will put 24 on each\nbomber.\nSecretary Schlesinger: They can get all the information they need from\nAviation Week. Dobrynin will claim that we will carry them in the body\nas well as under the wings.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Maybe we can arrange to have Aviation Week visit\nthe Backfire factory.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We will only carry them internally on the B-1.\nThey will be carried in pods on the B-52.\nDirector Colby: For once verification is on our side. We should send\nthem a subscription to Aviation Week. (Laughter)\nDr. Ikle: The shoe will be on their foot.\nSecretary Kissinger: How many can we carry inside?\nGeneral Brown:\nDr. Ikle: We have concerns about the way they do some things, and they\nhave concerns about the way we do things. Perhaps this will make them\nmore forthcoming in the future at the SCC.\nPresident Ford: If we limit the number of aircraft, perhaps they will\nmake some concessions on Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we could get SLCMs down to their position and\nALCMs down from 3000 kilometers and then limit the number of cruise\nmissiles carrying aircraft, we could get a hearing. There would be a\nFORD & LIBRARY\nwierd aspect in that these limits would mean next to nothing in terms of\nverification. Both sides would be free to test cruise missiles up to\n5000 kilometer range. Perhaps we could go to 2000 kilometers on ALCMs.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERRTO 6060\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n18\nThe only difference between 2000 and 3000 is with respect to fuel.\nWe could test to the 2000 kilometer limit from aircraft and use\nland-based missiles to test to longer ranges. Even the SLCM limit\nis not that significant. You could juggle fuel and payload there too.\nEven if cruise missiles above 600 kilometers are banned on ships\nand above 2000 kilometers on aircraft, if I understand this technology,\nyou can still do what you want. It is easy to go from 2000 to 3000\nkilometers.\nPresident Ford: Just put in a lighter warhead and add more fuel.\nSecretary Kissinger: Unless I misunderstand the problem, we could\ncome down in distance on the cruise missiles. Perhaps a package\nwhere we go way down on SLCMs, a little on air-launched cruise\nmissiles, and then limit the number of aircraft equipped with cruise\nmissiles. This will give them something to study. They are stuck\non what to do on this issue.\nPresident Ford: I agree.\nSecretary Kissinger: You saw Gromyko jumping up and down to talk\nto Brezhnev when we were discussing this question.\nPresident Ford: George, you had something you wanted to say.\nGeneral Brown: Yes. We could trade fuel for weight, download fuel\nto decrease range.\nPresident Ford: And we wouldn't have to test to longer ranges to have\nthe capability.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We are constantly developing more exotic\nfuels which will drastically increase range.\nDr. Ikle: We have to be careful or maybe we will get into a trap and\nend up fighting among ourselves whether we or they have viloated these\nlimits. We need to nail down a definition of cruise missile range.\nSecretary Kissinger: We haven't agreed to take cruise missiles to Geneva.\nDr. Ikle: Except for intercontinental cruise missiles. Definitions will be\na difficult problem.\nPresident Ford: I think we understand where we are and the dilemma we\nface on this issue. It is far better for us to look at a package which contains\nTOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nAMERIT SERALD P. FORD\nEVERARY\nTQP /SENSITIVE - XGDS\n19\nlegitimate proposals in the cruise missile and Backfire areas. If\nwe're not careful we could end up with nothing. I don't want to\ncompromise our national security, none of us do. We need to come\nup with some modification to our current position.\nSecretary Schlesinger: The Russians need to be more forthcoming on\nBackfire information. SLCMs are not of direct concern as a strategic\nsystem. We might want 50 or 60 SLCMs for peripheral missions, a\nsmall number.\nSecretary Kissinger: 50 to 60? There's no objection if they're under\n600 kilometers.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We are interested in the possibility of sub-SIOP\nmissions. such as in Iran. It's part of deterrence in areas where we have\nno base structure. It's a secure way to deliver nuclear weapons. The\nreal problem is massive deployment of cruise missiles, so a cruise\nmissile solution is probably workable. On ALCMs we don't know yet\nwhat kind of numerical limits we could accept. But we can't back off to\nthe point where bombers cant penetrate.\nGeneral Brown: We are looking at some form of limit such as those\nsuggested by Henry, but we have not found a way to work this out yet.\nWe need to work Backfire in if we modify our position. In any case\nthe Soviets probably will raise the FB-111 issue.\nPresident Ford: Well what is the time frame we ought to establish\nfor something for us to come up with bearing in mind Brezhnev's health\nproblem.\nSecretary Kissinger: We should try and have something in about ten days.\nSecretary Schlesinger: We should have something ready when the President\nreturns.\nSecretary Kissinger: That's on the 25th.\nPresident Ford: Why not say by the 25th we'll have something. Henry\nwill be here to see how things are evolving.\nSecretary Kissinger: Maybe we can talk before then.\nSecretary Schlesinger: Maybe by the end of next week we'll have something.\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n20\nPresident Ford: When you come to see me, Henry, you can bring me\nup to date on where we are.\nSecretary Kissinger: With respect to the first issue, if the only way\nthe Israelis will accept an agreement is to have Americans stationed in\nthe Sinai, how do you think this will be viewed by the American people.\n(End of discussion of SALT)\nPresident Ford: As I indicated, I am more willing than Henry to commit\nAmericans to man these stations. Jim, what's your reaction.\nSecretary Schlesinger: If this is the only way to obtain an agreement,\nthen we should and must be willing to use American personnel. As\nI understand it, this is the only way to impart the required momentum\nto obtaining the agreement. As I understand it there will be two kinds\nof stations, both the Egyptian and Israeli stations would be manned by\nAmericans. Each station would look one way into Egypt and into\nIsraeli territory. In addition, there would be three stations in the passes\nwhich would look both ways. We must be careful not to provide a de facto\nguarantee of American intervention should war start.\nPresident Ford: I agree.\nSecretary Schlesinger: The Israeli stations would be manned by Americans.\nSecretary Kissinger: Exactly.\nGeneral Brown: I have the same concern. We discussed the question\nearlier of who the Americans would report to. We want to avoid the\nproblem of this being an adjunct to the UN force.\nPresident Ford: That's also the Israeli fear. The Israelis want them\nseparate from the UN force. If they are UN manned, there is the problem\nof keeping them there.\nSecretary Kissinger: Clearly there would be a problem if we brought the\nUN in.\nPresident Ford: Bill, what do you think?\nFORD is LIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSTTIVE - XGDS\nFORD ALL BIBRARY MERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n21\nDeputy Secretary Clements: It's a real dilemma. We have a sense of\nresponsibility here, part of our own accountability. We can't walk away\nfrom the situation -- it's not the national interest to do that. Congress-\nmen I have discussed this with think Congress will accept this and that the\nAmerican public will accept this. This degree of involvement is a\npractical real world requirement, but it's not without accompanying issues.\nFor example, the Russian problem.\nGeneral Brown: I agree. Implications of war in the Middle East are\nfar more important than simply having American personnel there.\nPresident Ford: You've put your finger on it. Our involvement\ncould be much more massive. With no settlement there could be a\nsituation in which the Soviets intervene or whatever, and it could be\nfar more serious than the problems of getting some reasonable number of\nAmericans manning these posts.\nDirector Colby: This is more than a defensive move -- it's an opportunity\nfor positive movement to get in there and establish peace. We are really\nfriends of both countries.\nUnder Secretary Sisco: We should play this as an extension of our\nown responsibility in seeing to it that there is a settlement in this area.\nPresident Ford: I agree.\nSecretary Kissinger: There's also the question of the legal setup.\nOn the warning stations this has not yet been agreed. If it is set up\nas an agreement between Israel, Egypt and the United States with no\nremoval without the agreement of Egypt and Israel, then I see no\nunilateral problem. However, if in three year's from now one party\nsays it wants out, we'll be in a hell of a fix. Or if Egypt decides to cut\noff the water, since it is on Egyptian territory, or if the Egyptians\nsimply say get out, we'll have a hell of a decision to make.\nPresident Ford: We should try and tie this down as strongly as possible\nin legal terms. If they tell us and the UN to get out, they will trigger\na war just as in 1967.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORG i GERALD LISKARY\nTOR SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\n22\nDr. Ikle: I think it will be ideal if this is couched as a peace-keeping\nmission. It will have wide appeal in this country.\nPresident Ford: Just a first step in a real peace-keeping effort.\nThank you all for your comments.\nFORD\nFORD\nTOR SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY"
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