Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552398
label
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552398
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
subjects
Israel
Angola
Soviet Union
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Armaments
Arms control
Foreign aid
Middle East conflicts
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552398
coverageEndDate
day
13
logicalDate
1976-01-13
month
1
year
1976
coverageStartDate
day
13
logicalDate
1976-01-13
month
1
year
1976
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
5d96a9f15efb8014
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 1/13/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09206
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Meeting of the NSC - Middle East,
1/13/76
CREATION DATE
01/13/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
OK
writt
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09207
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Robert Oakley
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, Part I of II,
1/13/76
CREATION DATE
01/13/1976
VOLUME
21 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
EXEMPTED 10/16/00
A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09208
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Briefing Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
George Bush
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
DCI Briefing for 13 January NSC Meeting
- Israeli Military Requests
CREATION DATE
01/13/1976
VOLUME
19 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
B
68
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09209
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Israel Fund Position FY76-80
CREATION DATE
01/1976?
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
C
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09210
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
List
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
High Priority Items Requested by Israel
(September 1975)
CREATION DATE
01/02/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
m
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09211
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Comparison if Illustrative Israeli
Funding Requirements and Availability
CREATION DATE
01/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200027
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
File
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION O
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
23
i
2318
76003438
COLBY, KISSINGER, Cabley W
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM:
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
X
NODIS
SCOWCROFT
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
$
CODEWORD
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC mtg of Jon 13 1976
re USSR / angola / Grall & d nulitary
assistance Part I - LA
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO.
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
1/23
Scroft
CIX
1/28
NSets
Secharft Info appound minutes
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
CRT ID:
SF
CROSS REF W/
OPEN
FOLDER:
BERALD
HP
NS
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
CLOSE
WH
EP
DY
(
NSC 75-22
575-600
343X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
PART II of II
DATE:
Tuesday, January 13, 1976
TIME:
12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, White House
SUBJECT:
SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House: Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
State:
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
LISBARY GERALD ? FORD
Dr. James P. Wade, Jr.
NSC Staff:
Colonel Richard T. Boverie
NOTE:
The following are minutes of that portion of the NSC meeting
which addressed SALT. The NSC meeting had been convened at 10:00
a. m. principally to discuss an Israeli military request. The SALT
portion followed the discussion of the Israeli request.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
20. 12.556, Sec. 3.4.
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
MR 93-45, #1 NSC itr. 11/3/93
KBH Date 2/7/94
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
2
President Ford:
I would like to discuss the negotiating
strategy to follow for SALT. If there is a decision for Henry to go
to Moscow, he will first talk to Dobrynin, then leave for the Soviet
Union the night of the 19th, after my State of the Union address.
At this moment -- this is still related to Angola I would like Henry
to go to Moscow. Henry will probably have his initial meeting with
Dobrynin within the next 48 hours.
Secretary Kissinger:
I will meet with Dobrynin as soon after a
decision as possible.
President Ford:
Two issues were highlighted by the charts
used at the last NSC meeting: Backfire, and surface ship SLCMs.
Option IV counts the Backfire in the aggregate level of 2400. The
option doesn't include surface ships with SLCMs as such.
It seems to me -- and I have made the decision myself that we need
an option which is a little different from IV and III. At my request,
Brent came up with a paper on a new option. Secretary Kissinger
should utilize it in his initial discussions.
This new option has the following features:
With respect to Backfire, for the period between now and the expiration
of the Interim Agreement on October 3, 1977, the number of Backfires
produced would not be counted. Therefore, the Soviets would have 100
to 120 Backfires on hand which would not be counted.
Second, subsequent to October 3, 1977, all Backfires produced would be
counted under the 2400 ceiling.
This gives the Soviets the option to continue production of Backfire. If
they do continue Backfire production, they would then have to eliminate
some of their other missiles or Bisons or other systems.
The other part of the proposal Henry is to submit to the Soviets involves
surface ships with SLCMs. SLCMs with greater than 600 kilometer
range on surface ships would be counted the same as ALCMs on heavy
bombers. They would count in the 1320 MIRV limit.
General Brown:
The ships count?
Secretary Kissinger:
That's right. The ships count as MIRVs.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
GERALD % FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
President Ford:
This is a good starting position. Henry
said that Option IV was not a good way to start. This is not Option IV
but a variant of Option IV.
We do not know what the reaction will be but we will find out. On the
assumption that it is not negotiable, we would thengo to Option III.
My feeling, if we do not get Option III, is that we should explore Option
I as a last alternative.
This approach preserves our flexibility, and gives us our military capa-
bility. I would like George's observations -- now or later if you want
to think it over.
General Brown:
My general and immediate reaction is that
the number of Backfires excluded is not troublesome. This can be
rationalized as an offset against the FB-111. What's new is counting
bombers and surface ships in the MIRV limit. The Chiefs have agreed
with counting bombers with ALCMs in the MIRV limit, but have not
addressed including surface ships. My personal reaction is that this
is a reasonable thing and I will try to be persuasive with the Chiefs.
President Ford:
I believe this approach is a reasonable
position, but the bind is, if the Soviets turn it down, we go to Option
III which has a diametrically opposed position on surface ships with
SLCMs.
General Brown:
The treatment of surface ships in Option
III is not as much a problem as the treatment of Backfire. Not counting
the Backfire will be seen as breaking through the ceiling established
at Vladivostok. This is something the guy in the street understands.
However, by having raised Option IV, or a variation of Option IV as
you have suggested, it will not be as difficult to stand behind Option III
if we eventually wind up with that Option. If we did not try Option IV,
or a variant of Option IV, at the beginning, it would be bad. I can
rationalize in my own mind offsetting the 120 Backfires with the FB-111s.
President Ford:
This approach is similar to that which was
developed by Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger.
General Brown:
But it goes beyond that approach.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
4
Secretary Kissinger:
I would be delighted if they accept this
variant but I don't believe they will. We will give it to them as soon
as possible and they will have a week to study it. But even if they
turn it down, we can in good conscience say that we tried, that we
did not engage in preemptive concessions.
As to Option III, we talk as though it will be easy to get; that is not all
that clear. Option III puts constraints on them. We will have to wait
and see.
I have two other issues I would like to address; these concern the
debate on violations.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
We are not leaving the subject, are we?
Secretary Kissinger:
On this subject, we cannot go to Moscow
unless everybody stands behind me. We cannot afford to have
individuals expressing "private doubts. " We should present
everything as a united front.
I have serious reservations about going under these conditions. If I
could not go, we could present Option IV at Geneva. However, there
are some arguments for my going. Brezhnev may be willing to do
certain things before the Congress that he wouldn't be willing to do
afterwards. Brezhnev can't afford a failure of this negotiation and
also Angola at the same time.
If we cancel the trip because of Angola, Congressional critics will say
we are jeopardizing SALT because of Angola.
Therefore, there is a slight balance in favor of my going to Moscow.
President Ford:
Don, would you like to say something?
Secretary Rumsfeld:
I would like a little time to look this over
a day or so -- and then get back to you, rather than immediately
comment on the approach.
President Ford:
Brent can give you a copy of the paper.
Brent Scowcroft:
I have given a copy to Don.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
GERALD R. FORD
TOP SECREF/SENSITIVE XGDS
5
Secretary Rumsfeld:
I haven't had a chance to read it yet.
Secretary Kissinger:
The announcement of my trip to Moscow
is set for tomorrow. We can't postpone the announcement,
Secretary Rumsfeld:
I haven't read the paper yet and I want
to study it before I comment. I am not embarrassed to say that.
Secretary Kissinger:
The announcement of my trip is set
for tomorrow.
Secretary Rumsfeld:
But you had publicly stated that you didn't
want to go to Moscow until we had our position settled. You are pre-
judging the decision.
President Ford:
Don, why don't you work with George
(Brown) and Bill (Colby) on your view of the approach. This is the
right thing to do, and I want you to do it.
As I have studied the options, this variant is no major shift from
Option IV in original terms. If you can come back tonight, we can look
at this and Angola at the same time, so we will know better where we
stand on Angola and SALT.
Director Colby:
I take a little question on Henry's point.
Brezhnev will not be under great pressure to give in to us -- if anything
it will be just the opposite. There is an incentive to him to be a good
strong leader to his "apparatchiks" before the Party Congress. A little
toughening occurs before the Party Congress.
Secretary Kissinger:
Except he has been pressuring for
this trip. For the trip to fail would not be an easy decision for him.
Mr. Hyland:
As was shown in the case of the ABM
Treaty, the effect of the Party Congress is to wrap something up to
have to present to the Congress. The toughest situation would be one
in which he would have no program to explain.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt:
This is important to Brezhnev since
time is running out.
President Ford:
There is the health factor.
Don, I would like it if you would let me have your paper by 6:00 tonight
giving me your thoughts and reactions. I also want to talk with you and
Henry about Angola.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS