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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 1/19/1976\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTOASECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nON SALT\nMonday, January 19, 1976\n9:45 a. m. (45 minutes)\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Brent Scowcroft\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the U.S. position on SALT prior to Secretary Kissinger's\ntrip to Moscow.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: At the NSC meeting on Tuesday, January 13, you\nannounced your decisions regarding an opening position on SALT\nfor Secretary Kissinger's trip to Moscow. You indicated that\nthe initial U.S. position would be a modification of Option IV\nwhich exempts those Backfires produced prior to October 3,\n1977 from counting in the 2400 aggregate and includes surface\nships equipped with long-range SLCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit.\nYou indicated that if Option IV as modified proves non-\nnegotiable you had decided on Option III (an upper limit on\nBackfire) as a fallback, with Option I (deferral) as a possible\nfurther fallback. (The options are summarized in the tables\nat Tab B.)\nSecretary Kissinger met with Ambassador Dobrynin Wednesday\nevening (January 14) and passed him a note (Tab C) containing\nthe initial U.S. position. Ambassador Dobrynin reacted very\nnegatively to the proposal for counting those Backfires produced\nafter October 3, 1977 in the aggregate.\nB. Participants: (List at Tab A)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject will\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nbe announced. There will be a White House photographer.\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nDECLASSIFIED\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nE.O. 12356 Sec.,3.A. 7/21/99\nMR 98-40, #45; State letter 9/25/98\nRv let NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n- 2 -\nIII. TALKING POINTS\nAt the opening of the meeting\n1. I wanted to have a brief meeting before Henry leaves for Moscow\nto review where we stand.\n2. Henry presented the modification of Option IV to Dobrynin last\nThursday and the Backfire position got a very negative reaction.\n3. Nevertheless, I think we have to make our case for modified\nOption IV to Brezhnev in forceful terms and get his considered\nresponse.\n4. I have considered a possible \"sweetner,\" for Option IV, which\nmight improve our proposal: namely, we could offer to drop\nour proposal to count all Soviet bombers that are configured\nas tankers, and for reconnaissance, and ASW roles. There are\nabout 115 of these, and that would actually permit a smaller\nSoviet reduction to get to 2400. I am authorizing Henry to offer\nthis if he thinks it would be useful in getting Soviet acceptance\nof Option IV.\n5. As I indicated at our last meeting, I believe Option III is an\nacceptable position from a substantive point of view. I think\nwe can sell it to the Congress and the American people; it\nlimits Backfire, and gives us flexibility on surface ship cruise\nmissiles.\n6. I think it would be particularly helpful if we could get the aggregate\nreduced to 2300 -- in which case the upper limit on Backfire\nmight go to 400. In the event Option IV is not negotiable, I want\nOption III offered as a fallback.\n7. I believe we all agree that Option I would be an acceptable out-\ncome if we could get Soviet agreement to the MIRV verification\ncounting rule and the heavy ICBM definition. However, Dobrynin\nhinted that the Soviets are likely to want some handle on cruise\nmissiles even if the issue is basically deferred.\n8. (To Secretary Kissinger) Henry, would you describe your meeting\nwith Dobrynin and give us your views on where we stand now.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nAt the Close of the Meeting\n9. To sum up, I want to proceed as follows:\n-- After Henry has discussed Option IV with Brezhnev on\nWednesday, he will report to me his recommendations\non the next steps; if there is a deadlock, I plan to have\nhim present Option III.\n-- If time permits I may convene an NSC, at this point, but\nin any case I want to send Henry instructions on Wednesday\nevening, so that he can put our views to Brezhnev in time\nfor a politburo meeting on Thursday.\n10. I believe that we are within reach of an agreement that is in\nour net interest as a nation as well as in the interest of the world\nas a whole.\n11. The important thing at this point is that we present a unified front.\nI have already seen leaks in the press about various elements of\nour position and various attitudes around town. We can't afford\nthat, and I want total support as we move forward in this vital\nenterprise.\nTOP/'SECRET/SINSITIVE/ XGDS\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09213\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nRoger Molander\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 1/19/76\nCREATION DATE\n01/19/1976\nVOLUME\n23 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200028\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/19/76\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nexcised NSC letter 2/10/99\nht 5/99\n1404X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nDEUN\nTOP SECRE TVSENSITIVE XGDS\nMens\nMINUTES\n@ JwD\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nMonday, January 19, 1976\nTIME:\n9:57 a. m. to 11:40 a.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nSALT\nPrincipals\nThe President\nVice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown\nDirector, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft\nOther Attendees\nWhite House:\nMr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President\nMr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nState:\nAmbassador U. Alexis Johnson\nMr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nDr. James P. Wade\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nCIA:\nMr. Carl Duckett\nNSC Staff:\nDr. Roger C. Molander\nTOP SECRET / SENSTTIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nDECLASSIFIED 9 E.O. 12958 Sec. 354\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 See. 15(6)(1)(6) (b)\n3.4\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR 98-39, #46; NSC letter 2/10/99\nBy let NARA, Date 5/25/99\nTOP SECRETISENSITIVE XGDS\n2\nPresident Ford: This is the last meeting before Henry goes off to\nMoscow after my State of the Union Address and I want to review the\nsituation as we have laid it out and insure that there is no uncertainty\nabout our position. Henry described our position to Dobrynin last\nWednesday or Thursday, the modification of Option IV, which brought\nfrom Dobrynin a negative reaction. Nevertheless, they have the position\nand Henry will go there and start from that position and do his utmost to\nargue for that position. Nevertheless, he is in a position to go from\nModified IV to Variant IV which gives them the right to leave out the 2400\n120-130 Bisons and Bears as I understand it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: It's 115.\nPresident Ford: I won't argue the numbers, whatever it is. Anyway,\nafter Henry negotiates on Wednesday on the basis of Modified IV and\nVariant IV, and gets a feel for their attitudes and reactions, under our\nagreed procedures, he will communicate with me Wednesday evening our\ntime. From those comments I will get Bill Clements, Admiral Holloway,\nFred Ikle, and Bill Colby together to discuss the content of Henry's com-\nmunication. Following that meeting, we expect to go to Option III. We\ncan't be definite, but that's the plan. It would be particular helpful if we\ncould get an aggregate of 2300, in which case the upper limit on the\nBackfire could be raised to 400 under Option III. I have talked to General\nBrown and it seems to me that Option III with 300-400 on Backfire and an\nequal aggregate on surface ships makes a good tradeoff. It is my im-\npression that this will be a good position if we can't get the Soviets to\nagree to either of the other two options. If the Soviets say \"no\" on all\nof our first three positions, then we would go to Option I. Several variants\nof this option have been suggested. Some have suggested an October 3,\n1977 deadline for negotiating Backfire and cruise missiles, but those\nthings will have to be discussed with the Soviets. With those brief re-\nmarks, I'd like to ask Henry to offer his comments.\nSecretary Kissinger: I presented the Modified Option IV to Dobrynin.\nHe, of course, had no instructions, and thus, his reaction was on the\nbasis of what he knew about their basic position. He said that in his\njudgment, there was no possibility of their counting Backfire -- that this\nwas a major policy issue. He didn't reject it; however, he thought that\nbefore I got there, it might be rejected; however, this has not happened,\nso he was wrong about that. He said that Option IV, in any variant which\ncounted Backfire in the 2400, was simply not doable. Thus if we are going\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\nSERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nto stick with a variant of Option IV, then we would be better off to get\nAlex Johnson to propose it in Geneva, since we will not be able to pene-\ntrate the top leadership of the Soviets with such a proposal. We would be\nproposing to count Backfire, even though they have already rejected the\noffer I gave Gromyko in September, which was more generous. However,\nI suppose it's entirely possible that they might accept a proposal like\nVariant IV, since I've never heard any official comment on their position\non the Bear and Bison variants.\nAmbassador Johnson: We've had considerable discussion on that issue.\nThey've countered our position by proposing that there be equal aggre-\ngates on tankers and a provision that bans conversion of tankers to heavy\nbombers, but I don't know how high that went in the Kremlin.\nSecretary Kissinger: Anyway, I had no problem putting forth such a pro-\nposal to Dobrynin and as I indicated, he said he thought it would be rejected.\nI then proposed Option I as a way out to Dobrynin. Dobrynin said that\nthere was no possibility that they would accept the MIRV counting rule\nwithout cruise missile limitations and that they made acceptance of any\nMIRV counting rule depending on such limitations.\nPresident Ford: You mean on ALCMs and SLCMs?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes, they had made it dependent on those limita-\ntions when they initially put it forward. I asked Dobrynin whether a com-\npromise was possible on a different basis. He said that, in his judgment,\nthey might possibly agree to deferral if Backfire were out and if we could\nsettle on the ALCM part of our proposal, then we might be able to leave\nSLCMs out.\nAmbassador Johnson: We might find a compromise between their pro-\nposal and our proposal if we set a fixed time for the agreement within\nyour term, say January 15 or January 1.\nSecretary Kissinger: It would be a hellish price to write such an agree-\nment that says that we'll settle on January 1. Dobrynin spoke without\nauthority; I can't believe the Soviet Ambassador really speaks with\nauthority of the leadership. I had tried deferral before and it had been\nrejected the first time. This appears to be some give, but I don't believe\nthat they would go for a long deferral.\nXGDS\nEQRO & LIBRARY RERALD\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nPresident Ford: Any comments, Nelson?\nVice President Rockefeller: Henry did not mention land-based cruise\nmissiles. In a meeting of one of your advisory groups, one of the\nmembers said that he was worried about their capability being different\nfrom ours. In particular, with respect to civil defense,\nThey are equal to us in ballistic missiles, but in cruise\nmissiles, which are based on electronics only, they are way ahead. They\nalso are developing the SS-20 and the SS-16 and have in the work mobile\nICBMs. I feel, and I have talked to Henry about this, that we should\nhave the right to substitute for ICBMs cruise missiles which can reach\nthe Soviet Union.\nwe\nwould be able to reach the Soviet Union with cruise missiles in five years.\nWe could use mobile launch from highways and confuse their air defenses;\nthis does present us with the only real possibility of a breakthrough. I\nread the notes prepared for you for the meeting and on page 2, paragraph\n6, it recommends that we move to a lower range on land-based cruise\nmissiles. I don't think we should retain the right to substantial deploy-\nment in this area. I know this is a later arrival, but I think that it's\nimportant that we save this program.\nI could not get an estimate from the Joint Chiefs on our own intercon-\ntinental kill capability to compare with the figures I've just given.\nGeneral Brown: Both the CIA and we have calculated this capability and\nwe have different numbers since it's done on a different basis. However,\nthere are numbers given in the NIE on which there is general agreement.\nPresident Ford: It's an interest point.\nBrent Scowcroft: If we worry about the Soviets increasing their capability,\nthey might very well add intercontinental cruise missiles. It's really\nnot in our interest to permit intercontinental cruise missiles. We need\nmore ICBM capability, not cruise missile capability, to change the force\nratios.\nVice President Rockefeller: I am only passing on the views of Teller and\nhis associates who are looking down the road. They are not recommending\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nAMERIT\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n5\nthat the Defense Department start a program; however, they feel that\nthis is the most exciting and significant development to emerge recently\nand an area in which we have a real advantage over the Soviets.\nPresident Ford: How long will it take for a 5500 kilometer cruise missile\nto reach its target?\nSecretary Kissinger: Eight hours.\nVice President Rockefeller: With the swing-wing, we could cut the time\nin half. It would cost a few million dollars for each missile, compared\nto tens of million for ballistic missiles.\nPresident Ford: George, as you envision the development of the inter-\ncontinental cruise missiles, would you want to substitute cruise missiles\nfor ballistic missiles?\nGeneral Brown: We have not talked about this; however, we see a real\nproblem in going from subsonic to supersonic flight for intercontinental\ncruise missiles. It would be hard to know whether it would be practical\nuntil we have completed advanced development. There could be advantages\nto a mobile system in a great deal of situations; for example, they land-\nbased in Europe. However, we have not ruled out other deployment areas.\nIf the Soviets are willing to bring down the range limit to 2500 km, we\nwould still be able to get a land-based cruise missile program in Europe.\nSecretary Kissinger: I think a land-based cruise missile program in\nEurope will be limited by the ideology of people who don't want nuclear\nweapons in Europe, not by SALT. I agree that we should look ahead in\nour thinking but I question what land-based cruise missiles could be used\nfor, except possibly for accuracy in the attack of hard targets. But they're\nnot good for hard targets which you want to hit in the first hour or half\nhour, not in four hours. They don't have a first-strike capability if they\ncan only get there in four hours. It would also certainly push the cost\nup if they were supersonic and highly accurate. You would then have\nbasically pilotless aircraft, not the type of cruise missile that we now\nhave. I think that we should bring down the range limit on intercontinental\ncruise missiles if we can get it. We would be better off if we could get\na lower range limit rather than keeping open an option which has no appli-\ncation other than attacking hard targets.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD R. FORD.\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n6\nGeneral Brown: I agree with the point that Henry made. You really\nwant to attack hard targets in the first 20 minutes. In addition, the\ncost of going supersonic will be four to six times the cost over subsonic\nbecause of the severe structural problems.\nPresident Ford: To go 5500 miles supersonically would be a tough\nmechanical burden.\nMr. Sonnenfeldt: It would be like trying to build an airplane.\nVice President Rockefeller: I only mentioned this because PFIAB thinks\nit's attractive.\nGeneral Brown: You say Ed Teller is pushing it?\nVice President Rockefeller: I only mentioned this because Teller sug-\ngested the atom bomb and he was right about that and the posture we are\nin now is far more serious.\nDirector Colby: With respect to the comment the Vice President made on\ncivil defense, we have been watching this quite closely. They are making\npreparations to protect their command structure. There are no indica-\ntions right now that they are doing more than that; however, but with\nrespect to the discussion earlier, they could go to even more evacuation.\nIf there is a buildup in the amount of the population that can be evacuated\nand if they have considerable warning time, then it could be accomplished.\nIf they send all these people to the country, they would have to be organized\nwith stocks of food, etc.\nPresident Ford: They're not as far along as the Chinese.\nDirector Colby: It's hard to tell.\nVice President Rockefeller: They have 40 flag officers and 45,000 troops\nworking on civil defense.\nDr. Ikle: But none of the civil defense will be able to protect their\nindustrial plants.\nVice President Rockefeller: Even the industrial plants can be protected.\nWhen we studied this 20 years ago, we found that you could rehabilitate\n&\nFORD\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTORSEGAE/AVSENSTTIVE XGDS\n7\nif you mothballed your used machinery tools and have them available\nto bring back. The Germans were very successful at this.\nPresident Ford: Let me ask this question. As I understand, it's the\nquestion of a range limit on cruise missiles. If the range limit is 5500\nkilometers on land-based cruise missiles, won't we then have a verifica-\ntion problem on the range limits on ALCMs and SLCMs and cruise mis-\nsiles on surface ships?\nDirector Colby: Yes, Mr. President. There is already enough of a veri-\nfication problem on cruise missiles anyway. If long-range tests were\npermitted from land-based launchers, it would be difficult to tell if long-\nrange cruise missiles are deployed on other launchers.\nPresident Ford: Where do we stand now on land-based cruise missiles?\nSecretary Kissinger: They have proposed 5500 kilometers. With such\na limit, we could test with a heavier warhead within the 5500 kilometer\ntest limit and still have an inherent intercontinental capability.\nAmbassador Johnson: We have accepted 5500 kilometers in Geneva.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we stick with that position, Ed Teller's problem\nis settled. However, if we go to 2500 kilometers, we could put 2500\nkilometers cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, in Europe, in Guam,\nand in Alaska and cover the Soviet Union.\nVice President Rockefeller: I think your argument's wrong; we would be\nbetter to have them in the U.S.\nBrent Scowcroft: We could saturate the Soviet Union from the forward\nlaunch areas.\nSecretary Kissinger: Brent's right. We could saturate the Soviet\nUnion. I personally favor cruise missiles for penetration and for the\nland-based European option. With the 2500 kilometers under Option IV,\nwhich has not yet been accepted, we could cover all of European Russia\nfrom Western Europe and they would have no equivalent system.\nDr. Ikle: The question is what the Soviets would tolerate under SALT.\nThey have made a point about U.S. systems deployed in Europe.\nTOPSECHET/SENSITVE XGDS\nFORD LIBRAR\nTOP/SECRET/SENSTLIVE XGDS\n8\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The dilemma is not a question of technology where\nwe are clearly ahead in an important new area. Human beings tend to\ndeal with problems in the abstract. We become ahead and then we want\nto restrain the other side as much as possible. The defense of the agree-\nment will be much easier with parallelism on range. Ratification will be\na son-of-a-gun on the Hill in any case. Because of the interchangeability\nof cruise missiles, it will weaken our case on the Hill if we have different\nrange limits.\nPresident Ford: On one side, verification argues for a range limit of\n2500 km, but on the basis of developing weapon systems, it would appear\nthat 5500 km would be desirable.\nSecretary Clements: 5500 km would not provide substantial capability.\nFive-eighths of 5500 is only 3, 000 nautical miles which is not substantial\nfor an intercontinental missile. The second thing, Mr. President, is\nthat there is no way we can anticipate 1990-2000 and know what the tech-\nnology will be like then. With respect to the ALCM and SLCM, these\nboth fly this year, but they will be obsolete as the dodo by 1985. By 2000,\nwe don't know what the technology will be like at supersonic speeds. We\ncan't anticipate looking from the ground up what the limits of technology\nwill be in a whole new field. Cruise missiles is a whole new frontier.\nVice President Rockefeller: And it's the best one we've got.\nPresident Ford: We want to be sure that we can accept counting surface\nship cruise missile platforms in the MIRV limit.\nGeneral Brown: It's the ship itself which carries cruise missiles of\ngreater than 600 km which counts?\nPresident Ford: Yes, we would count every ship of that type as a MIRV.\nGeneral Brown: Count every ship?\nPresident Ford: In other words, a ship which carries cruise missiles\nbetween 600 and 2500 km would be counted. How many cruise missiles\nof 2500 km range could such a ship have?\nSecretary Kissinger: We would have to limit these cruise missiles to\nsome number, say 15. Then the ratio of cruise missiles to Backfire\nwould be something like 1.5 to 1.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRANA\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n9\nSecretary Clements: We haven't yet discussed the specific number.\nSecretary Kissinger: In our last discussion, we discussed 15. There's\nno sense going any higher. They will not bet increased beyond that.\nAt the last VP, 12 cruise missiles per ship was mentioned. We might\nestablish a ratio of 2:1. It stands to reason that we would not get the\nSoviets to agree to an unlimited number of surface ships in return for\na limit on Backfire.\nPresident Ford: If we give them 300 Backfire, and if they do not have a\nstrategic bombing capability, then we will have a marginal system and\nthey will have a marginal system which will be equivalent.\nSecretary Kissinger: In Option III, surface ships would not count as MIRVs,\nbut there would be a ceiling on the number of ships and on the number of\ncruise missiles. In this case, we might have to count 75 FB-1ll's as well.\nIf they have 400 Backfire, we would then get 75 FB-111's.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Where did this come from?\nGeneral Brown: I urge not to do that. We're being double-dipped on that\none.\nSecretary Kissinger: There's no reason why they couldn't be in our\ncount. We should stick with what we told them before. Our proposal\nin September was 300 Backfire and we would count 75 FB-111's.\nSchlesinger agreed to this. The idea was that we would count one SLCM\nfor each Backfire.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The missiles would not be counted?\nSecretary Kissinger: What was proposed was worked out with Schlesinger.\nHe said he was willing to let Backfire run free if they would promise\nnever to raise FBS again. The proposal in September called for 225\nheavy bombers with ALCMs. We would be permitted 200 SLCMs on ships\nand we would count 75 FB-111's. Now we are talking about a proposal\nthat really gives nothing to them. We would be permitted two SLCMs\nper Backfire; thus we have changed the balance in our favor on the SLCM\ncount.\nPresident Ford: (Pointing to a piece of paper.) There is the September\nproposal.\nTOP/SECRET/SENSTTVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nXGDS\n10\nSecretary Rumsfeld: I'd like to see a copy of that sometime.\nSecretary Kissinger: (Reading from the paper provided by the President.)\nIt was a limit of 300 heavy bombers with cruise missiles and it was to be\na limit of 300 on Backfire and SLCMs as I said.\nGeneral Brown: Including the FB-111?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. We have offered that to them two or three\ntimes. It's really a minor problem.\nGeneral Brown: We do have some slack in the 2400.\nSecretary Kissinger: In Option III, they would not be in the 2400. They\nwould be hybrid systems. The 75 FB-111's would apply only under the limit\nof three or four hundred. I am saying this is a possibility. If the Soviets\nget 300-400 Backfire, and we get SLCMs up to 2500 km on ships at some\nratio, we could offset 75 Backfire with FB-1ll's and offset the others with\n650 SLCMs up to 2500 km range.\nGeneral Brown: I don't know what the right SLCM ratio to Backfire is.\nIf I'm offsetting those systems, it would be hard to say how many SLCMs\noffset how many Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: But there's an equal number of cruise missiles\nin the aggregate as Backfire.\nGeneral Brown: If there were a limit of 300 on the platforms, then there\nwould never be a question of the balance.\nSecretary Kissinger: I disagree with that; we'll never have 300 ships.\nGeneral Brown: As currently envisioned, we would have to strengthen\nthe ship in order to put SLCMs on it and we couldn't put them on the\nships with topedo tubes. I don't know how many launchers we could\nactually put on each ship.\nPresident Ford: It's my impression that we could offset 300-400 Backfire\nwith SLCMs. By cutting the number of ships on which we put cruise\nmissiles of a certain number, we could improve the ratio.\nTOR/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRART\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n11\nGeneral Brown: Better than 1:1?\nPresident Ford: 1:1 or 2:1 or whatever ratio. It's my impression that\nwe could offset Backfire with cruise missiles in this manner.\nMr. Hyland: That's what the Verification Panel option was -- a choice\nbetween cruise missiles or Backfire for the Soviets. Two problems came\nout which led us to that. If the Soviets were permitted the choice, they\nmight deploy 275 Backfire and 25 surface ships. For that reason, it was\ndecided that it would be best if they were forced to choose between the two.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You're referring to the Working Group, not the\nVerification Panel.\nMr. Hyland: This was the option developed in the Working Group and\npresented at the VP.\nPresident Ford: It was my understanding that if they go to 300 Backfire,\nthey are precluded from surface ship deployment.\nDr. Ikle: The choice was one or the other. It's really a question of the\nratio a question of what rationale you would give. Payload is not the\nonly differential.\nSecretary Kissinger: We give the B-52 10, 000 pounds and the Backfire\n20,000 pounds.\nGeneral Brown: It's the question of how it's loaded.\nPresident Ford: As a practical matter, how many surface ships do we\nnow have in mind would be deployed with cruise missiles?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, there's no way of answering that\nquestion. As we have indicated, the technology is very new. There's\nno way to get anyone to come with 50 or any other number. As for an\nanswer to your question, we will know in five years.\nGeneral Brown: There are no more than 200 ships today that could take\nsuch cruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: I can't believe we'd have 200, that we would deploy\ncruise missiles on all 200.\nTOP SECRE /SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & SERVICE LIBRARY\nSCIDX 401\n12\nGeneral Brown: I agree, but I'd have to go back to Bill's point about\nfuture capability.\nSecretary Kissinger: We are in an ever-never land here. No one has\nthe foggiest idea what kind of cruise missile program we would have on\nsurface ships. The agreement will end in eight years at the end of 1985.\nIf we agree to 50 ships, the only serious criticism people will make will\nbe that there will be no way that we can achieve 50 ships if the IOC is\n1982. In any case, if we drop the surface ship platform limit from Option\nIII, there will be no basis for an agreement.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: How many cruise missiles are carried on the Backfire?\nBrent Scowcroft: There's not any now.\nGeneral Brown: I go back to the question of the ratio between Backfire\nand SLCMs. They could have as many as eight bombs on each Backfire.\nBrent Scowcroft: My impression is that with 50 ships and 15 launchers,\nwe would have 750 launchers to offset the Backfires.\nPresident Ford: How does this SLCM deployment compare with 300\nBackfire in military capability?\nGeneral Brown: I think it would be less, Mr. President, since you could\nload each Backfire with eight bombs.\nSecretary Kissinger: That SLCM limit would be on the number of launchers.\nBrent Scowcroft: There would be no limit on the actual number of SLCMs.\nSecretary Kissinger: I'll make one flat prediction: without SALT, the\nnumber of Backfires will be much greater than 300, whereas the number\nof SLCMs on surface ships will be less than 50.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Are we talking launchers or missiles?\nMr. Hyland: We'd want to fudge that to avoid a limit on the number\nof missiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: Theoretically, we could have more than one ICBM\nmissile per launcher.\nTQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n13\nAmbassador Johnson: We have agreement on ICBM reload capability --\nit is banned.\nSecretary Kissinger: In SALT II, but not in SALT I.\nAmbassador Johnson: That's correct. There are no limitations on re-\nload capability under SALT I.\nMr. Hyland: Mr. President, the loading on each Backfire is\nGeneral Brown:\nDirector Colby:\nThe last chart leaves out those Backfire in\nnaval aviation. Under normal use, these actually would be left out of any\nSoviet attack. As the Soviets would look at it, it would be as in the last\nchart.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Bill, if you look at the question of launchers versus\nSLCMs, doesn't this raise the question of \"nuclear-armed\" versus \"armed? 11\nDirector Colby: If we counted all possible launchers, we could really\nhave a bundle. We have to guess at the load for Backfire and we assume\nGeneral Brown:\nPresident Ford: Do ALCMs of range up to 2500 km obviate the need for\nSRAM?\nGeneral Brown: No, we will still need SRAM. When we get ALCMs, then\nwe will have to develop the tactics to go with it. SRAM gives a defense\nR.\nTQP/SECRET/SENSTVE XGDS\nFORD & FOR LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n14\nsuppression capability for the bombers. The cruise missile does help\nme, but it helps the guy behind me more.\nALCMs would not set aside the need for SRAMs.\nSecretary Rumsfeld:\nmissiles?\nGeneral Brown:\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Would any SRAM launcher capable of launching a\ncruise missile be counted?\nSecretary Kissinger: You would not count the launcher but the airplane.\nDr. Ikle: Mr. President, there is a serious verification problem on all\ncruise missiles. We should look on this as a limit on us to get an agree-\nment. We should not claim that it will limit the Soviets except in a weak\nmanner. You can get lost in a morass in cruise missile verification.\nWe need to look at cruise missile limits as a buy to get an agreement.\nThe Russians look at verification differently; they are much less concered\nabout it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There are other things which also cause arguments\nin the ratification of the agreement.\nBrent Scowcroft: If the Soviets are five years behind us in cruise mis-\nsiles, then when the agreement expires, they will have none.\nDirector Colby: What is important is the verification of a strategically\nsignificant add-on. Our chance of picking up a strategically significant\ncruise missile deployment in violation of the agreement is very good.\nWe would be able to use both agents and photographys for this purpose.\nVice President Rockefeller: I totally agree with Henry on the difficulty\nof obtaining Congressional support in financing the cruise missiles pro-\ngrams in the absence of an agreement. My only concern is the limita-\ntions on land-based cruise missiles. I am concern that some hard-line\nscientists will oppose a SALT agreement which has such limitations. My\nonly thing is this limit on land-based cruise missiles.\n&\nFORD\nB.\nTOP SECRET /SENSTTIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCERALD\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRETSENSITVE XGDS\n15\nPresident Ford: You are saying that on Option I or on any option, you\nprefer no ban on any intercontinental cruise missiles?\nSecretary Kissinger: The only difference is the addition of a fuel tank.\nDr. Ikle: But that's not legitimate. We couldn't have such a program.\nSecretary Kissinger: We could go to 3000 km and then have the capability\nto build up to 4000 or 5000.\nSecretary Clements: There would be no limits on technology.\nSecretary Kissinger: If you could do unlimited testing at 3000 km range,\nthis would leave open all options for deployment in the late-1980's. The\nextrapolation for cruise missiles is better than with ICBMs. We accepted\nthe ban above 5500 km several months ago without any objections from\nanyone. If we want to open up possibility of intercontinental cruise mis-\nsiles in the future, this might be done, since this agreement will only\nlast until 1985.\nDr. Ikle: Mr. President, it is not clear why we would want cruise mis-\nsiles on land-based launchers anyway. Ships or submarines are much\nbetter platforms, since they would be more survivable.\nVice President Rockefeller: But the intercontinental cruise missiles\nwould be mobile land-based.\nPresident Ford: Well, I think that the procedure that we outlined is the\nproper one.\nSecretary Kissinger: I want to be candid about this. I will not be the\nfall guy for this group. We must be specific about what we have agreed.\nAre we going to propose a limit of 40-50 ships?\nGeneral Brown: I think that's reasonable and can probably be defended\nwith whatever formula we come out with.\nSecretary Kissinger: If I talk to Brezhnev, I've got to give him some\nfigures. If not, the trip will just abort and he will think that I will have\nbeen sent just to give us an excuse to toughen relations. If I go in a mode\nof stonewalling, he'll think its to give us an excuse to go back and say\ndetente has failed. By this discussion, if I say to him that the numbers\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIBRARY GERALD R. FORD\nTORSECRET/SENSVTIVE XGDS\n16\nwould be agreed later, then it would be better if it were done by Alex in\nGeneva and not me with Brezhnev. Rather, the numbers must be agreed\nupon if I am going to go to Moscow. Otherwise, Brezhnev will go to the\nPolitburo and they will say what's the ratio and if he can't answer them,\nthey will oppose the agreement.\nThe Politburo will probably also ask why if they don't count FBS in the\nagreement, why Backfire should be counted.\nGeneral Brown: Hopefully, we will be able to count two cruise missiles\nfor Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: I concluded from this session last time that the\npreference was for 15 cruise missiles per ship up to 2500 kilometers\nwith unlimited cruise missiles below 600 km. This could be translated\ninto a formula for the Soviets.\nGeneral Brown: The point is that we would have 2:1 ratio between SLCMs\nand Backfire. However, we should note that we do not have enough SLCMs\nauthorized to fill our options.\nPresident Ford: What confuses me is that when you go to Option IV, you\ncount the platforms in the MIRV limit. If the platforms are the ships, are\nthe number of cruise missiles also limited?\nSecretary Kissinger: Only the number of launchers.\nPresident Ford: On surface ships, Option IV would appear to me to be\nmore restrictive than Option III.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: This is probably true.\nPresident Ford: If you count each surface ship with SLCMs as a platform\nin the 1320 limit, then there are weaker limits on surface-ship SLCMs in\nOption III as compared to Option IV.\nDr. Ikle: That's probably right.\nMr. Hyland: However, Option IV is tougher on Backfire. They are asked\nto count each Backfire after October 3, 1977 in the 2400, whereas in Option\nIII, we would pull back from that position and establish a general ratio be-\ntween Backfires and cruise missiles or an upper limit on the number of\nBackfires.\nSECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n17\nPresident Ford: On the basis of actual military capability, if this were\nstaffed out, from this aspect, would Option IV be more restrictive on\nour military capability than Option III?\nGeneral Brown: But as Bill said, in Option IV, the Backfire is counted in\nthe aggregate.\nPresident Ford: After October of 1977 which I understand would allow the\nfirst 120 to be free.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we throw in the Bear and Bison tankers and other\nvariants, there would be, in effect, 235 Backfire free. If we give them\n235 Backfire free in Option IV by not counting the variants, then there\nis not that much difference between the Backfire limits in Option III and\nOption IV.\nDirector Colby: Don't we already have an understanding on the variants?\nSecretary Kissinger: No, but I'm just trying to give an explanation of the\ndifference between Option III and Option IV. We should keep in mind that\nif I raise the \"variant\" issue with Brezhnev, he will not understand it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: I'm amazed if that's true. These aircraft have been\nextensively discussed in Geneva.\nSecretary Kissinger: That's true, but you can't assume that Brezhnev\nwill have heard about it. What I'm trying to say is that on the basis of\ncounting the variants, the Soviets are permitted only 65 more Backfire\nin III. Under Option IV, you will, in effect, give 235 free Backfire; 115\nbecause we would not count the Bear and Bison variants which could be\nconverted to bombers as easily as it would be to use Backfires in inter-\ncontinental missions.\nPresident Ford: But in IV, we would count the surface ships which would\ntake away from the 1320 missiles and bombers; thus, Option IV would\nappear to be less advantageous to us militarily than Option III. It has\nto work out that way.\nSecretary Kissinger: Our basic problem is pure public relations. No\nU.S. programs will be limited by this agreement. The problem is how to\npresent it. There would be more Backfires without SALT than under\nthese limitations. We would not have 50 surface ships with cruise mis-\nsiles by '83 or '84. George's point is how do we present it.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP/SEORET/SENSITYE XGDS\n18\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Your point's valid. The presentation for Option IV\nmodified would be different from that for Option III. There are other\npieces and other considerations, such as what may be the implication for\nfuture SALT agreements. We should discuss how we handle Backfire in\nterms of it being a \"grey area\" system and the precedent that it sets for\nfuture negotiations -- especially under Option IV, although it would be\neasier to defend than the other options.\nSecretary Kissinger: It would be easier, but the problem is how to get\nthe Soviets to accept it. We need to analyze the programs affected in\nterms of strategic situation and where we would be without SALT for\nevery option.\nGeneral Brown: We give on some of our options by including heavy\nbombers; we'll probably be up to 1320 by 1985.\nSecretary Kissinger: But you don't like Poseidon anyway.\nGeneral Brown: You're right; we prefer Trident to Poseidon.\nSecretary Kissinger: There would be only one year in which you would\nprobably be squeezed and you could probably stretch the Trident program\nfor one year to accommodate this.\nGeneral Brown: I don't assume we'll be in a position to go over 1320\nbefore 1985.\nSecretary Kissinger: We should have plans developed on the presumption\nthat there will be new negotiations on what happens after 1985.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There's another question which is raised if we re-\nserved the right to deploy mobiles. The impact would depend on the size\nof the aggregate.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we leave the mobile ICBMs option open, then there\nis nothing in the agreement which would constrain our programs. From\nthe standpoint of SALT, then the decision for the President is whether\nthere is a military advantage to banning or permitting mobiles. Since\nthe Soviets used to favor permitting mobiles and are now arguing that\ntheir deployment should be banned, we must conclude that they are willing\nto give up mobiles in an agreement, at least through 1985.\nTOP SECRETYSENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n19\nPresident Ford: Is it our view that we want mobiles?\nGeneral Brown: If we want to protect our ICBMs, yes.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we kill mobiles on surface ships and leave the\nothers open, the Navy will be the ones who scream.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We should leave the option open for mobiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: We really don't have to discuss that now. I think\nthat the question of mobile ICBMs should be deferred at this time and left\nout of all of the options.\nVice President Rockefeller: And we should also leave open the option of\nland-based mobile cruise missiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: In my view, we could accept the 5500 km and when\nthe agreement lapses, retain the option to deploy after 1985 if we need it;\nhowever, there is no need to retain this option through 1985. The 5500 km\nrange would allow as much technology to go forward as is needed.\nVice President Rockefeller: Because they're guided missiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: Another option is to modify the Soviet idea of deferral --\nthe thing Dobrynin proposed to me. We could make a five-year agreement\non Backfire and cruise missiles say, until 1982. We could allow the\nSoviets 275, and maybe 250 Backfire while we would agree to have no more\nthan 25 surface ships with launchers. This constrains us not at all since\nour IOC is not before 1980 at the earliest, and we would not have 25 ships\nby 1982. This would give us maximum leverage in the follow-on negotiations.\nVice President Rockefeller: What about land-mobile cruise missiles?\nSecretary Kissinger: This would be no problem up to 2500 km.\nPresident Ford: When will their cruise missiles become operative?\nSecretary Kissinger: They would not have long-range cruise missiles for\nat least five years.\nDr. Ikle: A five-year agreement on cruise missiles would also have the\nadvantage of allowing time to see how difficult cruise missiles verification\nis going to be.\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nFORD\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\nways\nFOR SSCRETYSENSATIVE XGDS\n20\nSecretary Kissinger: We would then have a starting point from which to\ntrade constraints on their cruise missiles for constraints on our cruise\nmissiles.\nPresident Ford: Let me make this request. Take Modified IV, every\noption seeks in some way to exchange Backfires for cruise missiles on\nsurface ships. We need a military estimate of the impact of the 115\nBackfires difference between IV and III versus counting platforms on ships\nin the MIRV limit. We need a military estimate of the difference between\nIII and IV where you would in III compare the permitted Backfire versus the\nsurface ships cruise missile limit using 50 platforms and 15 launchers per\nplatform.\nSecretary Clements: Then we should also do an option with 100 ships and 250\nships.\nPresident Ford: This is a question that will be raised in any justification\nof the agreement. What is the military difference between these two\nproposals? My non-technical visceral feeling is that IV Modified is less\ndesirable from a technical standpoint than Option III.\nSecretary Kissinger: My analysis of the Foreign policy situation is the\nfollowing. The trip is being made at the request of the Soviets; we have\nchanged the date on them three different times and have made a public\nstatement that we would be willing to make a major effort to settle the out-\nstanding issues. They must assume that we are going there to settle the\nissues, not just to discuss them or to nit-pick. Otherwise, we could just\nas well have the proposal put forward in Geneva. However, the way their\nsystem works, is in order for them to accept Option IV modified, which I\npersonally have no problem putting forward, would require an enormous\nchange in their current position.\nBrent Scowcroft: They made their last statement after we had given them\nModified IV.\nSecretary Kissinger: In that case, if they accept Modified Option IV,\nthere would be no problem. But if they don't accept it, then we could give\nthem the variant of Option IV and on Wednesday night, they would be able\nto have time to translate it into Russian and have a Politburo meeting on\nThursday. But there's no way that we would get anything done unless it\nfollows that sort of program, nor do I really know what they are likely to\ndo after they reject Option IV as they are likely to do. As I always do,\nTOR SECRET/SENSTTIVE XGDS\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n21\nI will cable back at the end of the day what happened on Wednesday. There\nmust be some flexibility to go to a variation of Option I or a five-year agree-\nment or Option III. There must be some latitude or it will be a very strained\nsituation. They are certain to draw conclusions about our performance;\nif they conclude that I was only sent there to stonewall, they will conclude\nthat we are in a new phase in our relationship. They can have Angola fail,\nbut they can't have a SALT stalemate on their plate simultaneously. If they\nare in a condition of maximum readiness to settle, then there's a question\nof what they will do to reach an agreement. I don't know what it will be.\nGeneral Brown: The only thing they know is Option IV or Modified Option I.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There's a possibility that they could offer us a counter-\nproposal.\nSecretary Kissinger: In the whole history of the arms control negotiations,\nthey have never made a reasonable counterproposal. When a decision is\nmade by the Politburo, that decision is cast in concrete. They are much\nmore likely to give us a variation of our own proposal. If they accept\nOption IV in principle but propose different numbers, what do I do then?\nSuppose they come back and say they will want 250 Backfire and are willing\nto count all Backfire above that. At that point, what do I say? Nothing?\nBut I really can't give you any idea what their response will be.\nPresident Ford: Well, Henry, I think you have to have some flexibility.\nWe've put forward Modified IV and we can go to Variant IV next -- and you\nknow that you can always to to Option I with, say January 1, 1979 as a\ntarget date, or to a five-year agreement. We know that Option III is a\npossibility and as you proceed, we can start back here moving to a decision\non what kind of flexibility you might put forward. You should communicate\nto me your recommendation on the best way to proceed.\nYou are going there, not for a stalemate, but for the purpose of getting an\nagreement. If we don't get an agreement, that is the worst of all. If\nwe don't have an agreement, both strategic and conventional requirements\nwill strain the defense budget and there's no assurance that we can get the\nrequired budget to Congress if we ask them for more funds. The worst of\nall would be no agreement in my judgment. You have to have some flexi-\nbility without prejudging yet where we will go. With flexibility and commun-\nication and judgment from here, I think we can do it. The trip is needed\nand desirable. There isn't any question about it; no agreement is the\nworst possibility.\nBERALD FORD VIBRARY\nTORSECHET/SENSTPVE XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SEMSITVE XGDS\n22\nVice President Rockefeller: I agree, and in that agreement, I think we\nshould maintain the flexibility to keep the Soviets at 5500 km on land-\nbased cruise missiles.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: No agreement is the worst option -- if you mean within\nthe scope of those options which we are considering. However, a worse\noption is a bad agreement. As far as what Henry said goes, the only fall\nguy in this is you. It's your judgment which will be called into question.\nThis discussion is not nit-picking; to the extent that our relationship with\nthe Soviet Union is to be durable, we have to be sure that we get a good\nagreement thus we are not nit-picking, but demonstrating our serious. -\nness of purpose.\nThe level of deterrence suitable for Brezhnev is not necessary the level of\ndeterrence suitable for us. We can now see the difference between these\noptions. The position we take must be fashioned in a manner which can\nbe sold to Congress. It would be more damaging to go with a bad position\nthan to delay in going forward with a proposal to the Soviets. We must\nkeep in mind the problems that we will have in the Congress. It will be\ntough to get any agreement through.\nSecretary Kissinger: I want to emphasize that we must be precise in what\nwe are proposing to the Soviets. I can't tell Brezhnev that we want to limit\nBackfire to a level of 300 in return for a limit on the number on surface\nships which will be agreed later. We must give him our side of this issue.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: One of the things that serves us well is our ability\nto discuss these issues in a forthcoming manner. I don't know whether\nit will be disasterous for the detente if the key details are not worked\nwhile you are in Moscow. But if we can fashion a package that's accept-\nable on both sides, then we can come back and work further on the details.\nSecretary Kissinger: I'm not saying everything has to be agreed. But\nBrezhnev has to sell it to the Politburo. You can't tell him that you'll\nlet him know in 72 hours what the number on our side is or to tell him\nthat we'll do it in Geneva. That's just not doable. It all goes to Geneva\neventually for working out the details. I was there three times before\nVladivostok. If we are approaching each other, then there will be no\nproblem. But if they perceive that I'm stonewalling, then they and we\nwill have to draw the obvious conclusions. In that case, we would be\nbetter off to give them a proposal in Geneva than to have me to go to\nMoscow.\nBERALD FORD\nTOR/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTORSECRET/SETSITIVE XGDS\n23\nPresident Ford: Let me just make some concluding comments. Substan-\ntively, we should try and get the best agreement we can. If we can get an\nagreement that can be substantively defended, then we should do it. It\nwill be a tough political atmosphere and some people will be inclined to\nplay politics with it; but if we can defend the agreement substantively, then\nwe can win. I want to emphasize the substance, not the political aspects.\nIf we can get a good substantive agreement, then we should do it.\nSecretary Kissinger: What I resent these days is that they're saying that\nSALT I was not carefully considered. They're claiming that it was not\nworked out in Helsinki, but rather by me in Moscow, which is a myth. I\nconsulted with the JCS on all of the major issues and no American program\nwas stopped, but in fact, they were acclerated. All American programs\nwere left intact. The forces that were in being in 1972 were the results\nof decisions made in the 1960's. There is a myth that there was great\nWhite House pressure on the agencies to accept the agreement -- but only\nin the last few weeks did the White House really get involved.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You agree, however, Henry, that in the environment\nthat we're in the public will always have 20-20 hind sight.\nSecretary Kissinger: But if all the departments are behind it, it will be\naccepted.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Yes, but this agreement will be nit-picked and fly-\nspecked.\nSecretary Kissinger: This is, in part, due to no one in the Defense Depart-\nment taking a strong position defending the SALT I agreements. The JCS\nsupported it, Admiral Zumwalt supported it; I talked to Admiral Moorer\nseparately about this agreement, and he asked that we go for the submarine\nlimits which we did. That fact, and the fact that no American programs\nwere stopped, and that some American programs were accelerated, are\nbeing lost sight of. There was no example of White House pressure in the\ncourse of negotiating the agreements. I defy anyone to produce one cable\nin which we pressured for something that was not acceptable to the rest of\nthe community. I don't know if Wade was here then, but until 1972, it was\nthe Delegation that was pushing us for an agreement.\nPresident Ford: Let me reiterate. It is not in our interest to have no\nagreement, but we want a good substantive defensible SALT agreement.\nIf we can't go to other people and say that this is a good agreement, then\nwe shouldn't accept it; but it's up to us to defend it. Thank you all.\nTQP SECRET/SENSIVE XGDS"
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