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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 1/21/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
NSC 1-21-76
422X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOR/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Talking Points for Today's NSC Meeting
on SALT
I have attached talking points you could use at the NSC meeting
this afternoon on SALT.
The talking points briefly outline the Soviet response to our
earlier proposal and Secretary Kissinger's recommended follow-on
negotiating strategy. They also include a few observations you
may wish to make regarding the relative merits of the various
ideas being discussed in Moscow.
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 2/19/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION By MR98-40, let NARA, #47; Date State 10/21/98, letter 9/25/98. 7/21/99
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
TOP SENSITIVE - XGDS
TALKING POINTS
1. You have all received a copy of the memo reporting on Henry's
first meeting with Brezhnev. I would like to run through the Soviet
response and Henry's recommended approach, and ask you for your
comments.
Soviet Response
2. On ALCMs, the Soviets seem prepared to accept our proposals
to count heavy bombers with ALCMs over 600 km in range in the
1320 MIRV limit, and to ban all ALCMs over 2500 km. However,
they want to count B-1s equipped with ALCMs as three against the
1320 MIRV limit.
3. On SLCMs, they agree with us that SLCMs over 600 km should
be banned from submarines. However, they would also like to ban
SLCMs over 600 km on surface ships.
4. Similarly, they would like to ban all land-based cruise missiles
over 600 km.
5. Brezhnev also emphasized again that the Backfire could not be
counted as a strategic weapon and listed its range as 2200-2400 km.
6. In this regard, Gromyko told Henry that deferral was out of the
question since this would grant us a favor by continuing to consider
how to count Backfire.
Henry's Approach
7. In light of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's remarks, Henry believes
we should explore a modified version of Option III. His approach would
put Backfire and surface ship SLCMs in a separate category for limita-
tions which would run for only five years, from 1977 to 1982.
8. Henry would like to start out by including in this separate category
250 Backfires and about 25 ships with 10-15 launchers each.
9. On land-based cruise missiles, Henry also notes that we could either
ban intercontinental cruise missiles -- and thus permit shorter ranges --
or ban all missiles above 2500 km.
FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
GERALD
LIBRARY
My Observations
10. I would like to make a few observations.
11. First of all, the So viets still appear intransigent on counting
Backfire, and the idea of counting the B-1 as three systems within
the 1320 MIR V limit would seriously constrain our MIRV deployments
and would be extremely difficult for us to live with. On the positive
side, however, they have accepted our ALCM proposal and seem
quite interested in reaching an agreement.
12. Henry's strategy is to avoid directly confronting Brezhnev on
the issue of the number of Backfire. in 1985. His approach would be
to let Brezhnev save face by appearing to leave open the possibility
of eventual full deployment of Backfire. It would limit them to 250
Backfire by 1982. By contrast, Option III would let them have only 50
additional Backfire by 1985.
13. On the other hand, the limitation on the separate category would
expire just about the time our surface ship cruise missile development
program is peaking. This would give us leverage in follow-on negotia-
tions, or put us in a position to expand our deployments if necessary.
14. We would also have the advantage of not limiting our cruise missile
technology. This would be another plus.
15. I would be interested in hearing your comments.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09215
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Richard Boverie
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 1/21/76
CREATION DATE
01/21/1976
VOLUME
17 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200029
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/21/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
let 5/99
REM
778X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECR SENSITIVE XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Wednesday, January 21, 1976
TIME:
5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Acting Secretary of State Joseph Sisco
Acting Secretary of Defense William Clements
Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James L. Holloway III
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Mr. John Marsh, Counselor to the President
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Lt Col Robert McFarlane, USMC, Military Assistant
to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
State:
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
JCS:
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
Lt General Edward L. Rowny, USA
NSC Staff:
Colonel Richard T. Boverie, USAF
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.84
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
E.O. 12958 Sec. 34 X (b )(2)ad(W)
MR 98-39, 48, 2/10/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
2
President Ford: All of you have received a copy of Henry's message.
(Note: A copy of the message is attached at Tab A.) Therefore, I don't
have to go into it in detail with you and read it.
Brezhnev emphasized again that the Backfire could not be counted as a
strategic weapon. Also, through General Kozlov, he gave us more
specific information on its radius -- 2200 to 2400 km.
Brezhnev also proposed a ban on all land-based cruise missiles over 600 km.
Gromyko also told Henry that deferral was out of the question since this
would be a unilateral favor to us, inasmuch as they did not believe that
Backfire should be counted under any circumstances.
In light of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's remarks, Henry believes we should
explore a modified version of Option III. His approach would put Backfire
and surface ship SLCMs in a separate category of limitations which would
run for only five years, from 1977 to 1982.
Henry would start out by proposing the inclusion in the separate category
of 250 Backfires and about 25 surface ships with 10-15 launchers each.
I believe this would permit the number of Backfire we anticipate will be
produced.
Direct or Colby: Approximately. I think they would have about 340 in the
inventory, and 375 in terms of total production.
President Ford: That is not significantly different.
Director Colby: Right.
President Ford: Brezhnev has come up for the first time with an idea to
count the B-1 as three systems within the 1320 MIRV limit. This is a
new gimmick. On the other hand, they have accepted our ALCM proposal.
I think, as I read Henry's suggested approach, rather than confronting
Brezhnev on the issue of the number of Backfire in 1985, this proposal
would not challenge Brezhnev on a position he is solid on, and backed by
the Politburo. I would like to get from all of you your views. I realize
you have not had much time to analyze this. We should explore the five
year agreement.
FORD : GERALLO LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
I know the Navy, Jim (Admiral Holloway), plans around 10 SLCM launchers
per ship -- no reason to go to 15?
Admiral Holloway: We have no surface ship SLCM program at this time.
We have thought about a submarine program, but we haven't even looked
at the figures for modifying surface ships. Our first request for funds
would be in the FY 78 budget. The nuclear cruisers are the only ships
now which can take cruise missiles without substantial alteration of the
ship design. Therefore, we would only have six warships with SLCMs
by the end of 1982.
President Ford: It was my impression that you could fire SLCMs from
torpedo tubes, and that you have a number of surface ships with torpedo
tubes.
Admiral Holloway:
The surface tubes are just a canister to dump the
torpedoes in the water. But SLCMs need considerable initial blast-off
since they go airborne. We can carry more of the SLCMs in the strike
cruiser. We can take our cruisers, formerly nuclear frigates, and put
missile pods on them. The cruiser can handle eight missiles without
degrading ship performance. We could put more on the Spruance class
destroyer but we would have to take something else off, such as 8-inch
guns, or helicopters. This would be difficult without a surface SLCM
program. We have only attempted to be prepared. Putting them on the
Spruance class destroyer would be very difficult.
Secretary Clements: You could make block changes in the production
line.
Dr. Ikle: How many surface SLCM platforms would you have?
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
Admiral Holloway: Six by 1982.
President Ford: This absolutely surprises me. In modified Option IV,
Defense agreed to count surface ship SLCM platforms in the MIRV limit.
How could you put this forth? I am dumbfounded by what you are saying
today.
Admiral Holloway: We have looked at surface SLCMs for the future.
However, the Navy plans are for submarines. We have no plans for surface
SLCMs but we have looked at them to be prepared -- something for the future.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
4
Dr. Ikle: Modified Option IV was for a 10 yearperiod, not five years.
That can affect how you look at surface SLCMs.
Secretary Clements: Same thing is true for land-based cruise missiles.
We have no program for them. We have two programs -- one for sub-
marines, and one for ALCMs.
President Ford: Is there any way to put SLCMs on surface ships -- for
example put better tubes on the decks?
Admiral Holloway: Putting them on the decks would be a problem. They
must be able to take the impulse from zero length launchers.
President Ford: Will you repeat again your program for frigates and DLGNs.
How soon and how many for what purposes?
Admiral Holloway: We have nuclear cruisers which are authorized and
funded. By 1982 we will have six of them.
President Ford: In the 1977 - 1982 span you will have=six?
Admiral Holloway: Yes. We will have a capability the last two years
of the period.
President Ford: What about the Spruance class destroyer?
Admiral Holloway: We have 30 authorized and funded. However, the shipyards
are in trouble and the last one will be somewhere between two to four
years late. We would have to take off the guns to put on SLCMs.
President Ford: Forward or aft guns?
Admiral Holloway: Forward guns. If we put SLCMs on the aft end, the
helicopters would have to come off. I cannot give you a high confidence
estimate on these ships. It would be nip and tuck if we have any of these
ships altered, unless it becomes a program of the highest priority. I
doubt that we could have more than two or three Spruance destroyers
operational with SLCMs by 1982.
President Ford: Therefore, you could have eight to nine ships with a SLCM
capability.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
5
Admiral Holloway: That is probably on the low side. Let's say we
could have 10-15 ships if we give the program the highest possible priority.
Secretary Clements: We could make block changes.
President Ford: You say you would "not have many" with a SLCM capability?
Admiral Holloway: We could put eight SLCMs on a ship. That would be
reasonable. We could strip the ships, but then they would be vulnerable
to attack -- only a floating barge with missiles. The ships need an inherent
fighting capability to defend themselves.
We should also remember that when we talk about SLCMs on 20 ships, only
one-third of those ships would be on station at any time. If we went to blue
and gold crews like we do with our SSBNs, we could maintain perhaps
up to 60 percent on station. Therefore, we might have 12 SLCM capable
platforms on station if we had 20 ships.
In any event they would be limited with a 2500 km range. (Admiral Holloway
takes out a chart and shows it to the President. ) They would be limited in
terms of where they could be stationed to hit the Soviet Union. On this
chart you see one small circle near Crete where the ships could hit the
USSR. There is another small circle near Iceland.
Brent Scowcroft: But that would be if we used the missiles for strategic
purposes.
Secretary Clements: That's right, Brent. But the 2500 km limit also
includes tactical use.
Dr. Ikle: I think this could be a benefit. We could say we would not be
adding to the strategic arsenal -- that these are gray area systems.
Admiral Holloway: If we did this, we would have to have all our ships
committed to a single purpose. They would be single purpose, dedicated
platforms, which would be hard to make available for other purposes.
Secretary Clements: And if we would have to put them out there, they
would be easy to spot and highly vulnerable. I hope we don't attach great
hope to these as strategic platforms.
Brent Scowcroft: This was not addressed in any meeting. We have been
t alking about tactical use.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
TQP SECRET/SENSITVE XGDS
TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE XGDS
6
Secretary Clements: It is different if we talk about attack subs. An attack
sub would have a strategic capability.
President Ford: Back to Option IV as presented, I gathered that we were
equating Backfire with surface ship SLCMs with a 2400 km range. This
means to me that DOD says the Backfire is not a strategic weapon either.
Admiral Holloway: No, that is not our intent ion. If Backfire is strategic
and we address it in a separate compartment, we have to look at our
offsetting capability -- surface SLCMs. If we have 25 ships with 10
missiles each, that gives us 250 SLCMs. If that an equivalent balance
with 250 Backfires? I don't see it as equivalent with the Backfire. The
Backfire could carry four 3. 5 megaton bombs for a total of 14 megatons
per Backfire.
President Ford: You can reload the surface ships, but you can't reload
the Backfire.
Admiral Holloway: No, sir. Eight pods would be it. Only the strike
cruiser might have a reload capability if we develop it.
Submarines would have a reload capability.
Dr. Ikle: How many submarines with SLCMs could you have by 1982?
Admiral Holloway: We could have 70, all SSNs.
President Ford: Are those already counted?
Admiral Holloway: No, they are attack subs.
Secretary Clements: We could change the mission of the SSN 688s. We
have only thought of having 2 to 3 on board for strategic capability. We
didn't want to degrade their original mission.
Admiral Holloway: We have been talking more in terms of options and
flexibility for the future. The planner who looks to the future thinks in
terms of having 24 spaces in an attack sub. He might use 4-8 of those
for SLCMs, and 20-16 for torpedoes. Then in his normal day-to-day
operations, he would have a strategic reserve. It is important to under-
stand that the planner is not looking at intentions, but at capability.
CERALD
BERALD FORD LIBRART
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS
7
President Ford: How many of our submarines count in the 2400 total and
the 1320 subceiling?
Admiral Holloway: Forty-one SSBNs -- Polaris and Poseidon. Trident
will add to that total. We now have approved 10 Trident boats.
President Ford: As the Trident comes in, will you be subtracting from
the 41 Polaris and Poseidon boats?
Admiral Holloway: We will not subtract on a one-for-one basis.
Ambassador Johnson: The missiles count but not the boats.
Admiral Holloway: We will have a shortage of launchers. We will have to
accelerate the Trident or extend the life of the current launchers.
Dr. Ikle: There will be more of a constraint on MIRV counting from bombers
with ALCMs than with the new Trident and Poseidon.
President Ford: What is anybody's reaction to having 250 Backfire in a
five-year agreement, matching them with surface ships with cruise missiles
of 2400 to 2500 km range? This is assuming the ships are reconfigured
or planned and constructed.
Secretary Clements: We could add a class of ships, the FFG, which we
use to call the Patrol Frigate. We will have a large number of them in
production in three shipyards. We could do something perhaps with them.
However, I have been thinking that this is a surprise. This never surfaced
in the Verification Panel. I frankly don't agree with it. It is a very poor
trade. The difference in megatonage is just one gauge. All other gauges
are also in the negative. In addition, the Backfire as a system is much
more flexible, whereas ships are constrained by their environment.
Backfire is enormously more flexible than any ship mode.
Vice President Rockefeller: And the Backfire can be refueled, too.
GERALD LISA FORD
Secretary Clements: Right. I don't know what kind of rationale we would
use to explain the trade. The ten to one relationship is exactly reversed of
what it should be. It should be 250 ships and 25 Backfires. But I defer,
Mr. President, to your position.
What worries me the most is Brezhnev's statement about the radius of
the Backfire. How can he make that kind of statement about the Backfire?
The range is one-half of what we say it is. How can you trade with him
seriously when he gives us such false premise? There is no sense for that.
I don't know what we are trading.
TOP SECR / SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
8
President Ford: Bill (Colby), what do you think?
Director Colby: Brezhnev is saying the Backfire has a 2200 km radius.
Our estimate is that it has a 2700-2900 nautical mile radius. Brezhnev's
figure is startling.
Secretary Clements: Brezhnev's figure is wrong as hell!
Director Colby: If the Backfire radius were only 2200 km, there would
be no problem at all.
President Ford: In Option IV, those Backfire produced after October 1977
would count. We would also count surface SLCM platforms and the MIRV
limit. Let's look at this on the premise that the Backfire has a longer
range. General Brown's memo (Note: Memo to the SecDef, dated 19 Jan
1976) makes the following statements:
"Backfire was loaded as follows:
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
9
In figuring this, it says that you count the platforms in the MIRV limit
the ships under the 1320 ceiling. Therefore, considering everything you
have said, doesn't that change the analysis?
Dr. Ikle: It puts additional pressure on MIRVs.
President Ford: For every ship, a missile comes out.
Director Colby: The 1320 subceiling doesn't hurt them for a long time.
President Ford: But it affects us. If you add all this, and take it out of
the 1320, it changes the charts. You are saying the ships are not as
powerful as thought.
Dr. Ikle: The ships give some pressure on the MIRVed missiles; you
might have to give up some Minuteman III.
President Ford: If you go to the limit for Option IV, you must subtract
something also.
Dr. Ikle: The penalty is that you have fewer than you can MIRV, but you
are not necessarily affecting the megatonnage.
Brent Scowcroft: You may or may not be.
Admiral Holloway: There are an infinite number of variations.
President Ford: The paper doesn't present all the options accurately.
Director Colby: The surface ships are below other systems in megatonnage.
Brent Scowcroft: We are setting aside the Backfire and surface SLCMs
not so much for an equal trade, but we are setting aside the gray area systems.
We don't always have comparability in SALT. You can't compare a fully
loaded B-52 with an SSN-6. There is no comparison, but both systems count.
We have no comparability now.
We all agreed on Modified 4 and Variant 4. This would have given us 235
Backfire by 1985 which would not count -- 115 free and 120 by 1977.
FORD
BERALD
LIBRARY
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSTTIVE XGDS
10
It seems to me that the five-year program gives us a chance to stop the
Backfire where it was. In 1982 we will be ready for maximum deployment
of cruise missiles. This is the advantage of a five-year agreement versus
straight Option III.
Dr. Ikle: I am troubled by the relationship of 25 ships to 250 Backfire.
Inst ead we could propose "gray areas. 11 We could say they are not strategic
forces, and there is some equitability in relating platforms to Backfires.
Also, there is an asymmetry resulting from the verification problem.
Brent Scowcroft: They will have no cruise missiles by 1982.
Dr. Ikle: But they could by 1985.
Vice President Rockefeller: They can do the same thing with cruise missiles
that we can.
Brent Scowcroft: But they can't have cruise missiles on surface ships.
Vice President Rockefeller: But they can have some cruise missiles.
President Ford: No, not on surface ships or on the Backfire.
Dr. Ikle: There will be uncertainty regarding their range. The Soviets
might say their missiles are "600 km" in range, but they could be as much
as 1500 km, simply from using a high profile versus a low profile. Therefore,
there is uncertainty.
The same is true with submarines. For us it would be 600 km, but theirs
would be uncertain. They could be about 1200-1500 km, which would put
them in range of the U.S. from their submarines. Their surface ships
might have somewhat longer range SLCMs maybe.
Brent Scowcroft: I don't see what follows from that.
Director Colby: On verification, we might not be able to obtain precise
evidence of the kind that you could use in the world court, but our total
intelligence collection would let us know if they were undertaking a massive
effort to cheat. We could pick that up.
Dr. Ikle: You mean massive numbers? Or the range of ALCMs on Backfire?
Director Colby: We could detect massive strategic deployments.
BERALD FORD VIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
11
President Ford: They cannot have ALCM on Backfire.
Dr. Ikle: Yes, they can have Backfire up to 600 km. There would be a
constant uncertainty; this would be a corrosive irritant.
Admiral Holloway: The fundamental problem is the question of 250 Backfire
versus 25 surface ships with SLCMs. This is not an equitable solution.
We need special programs in the Navy to modify ships within this time frame.
The 25 ships, if we attempt to make comparisons in megatonnage, we might
have 50 megatons on a ship versus 30 in our ship force versus 3500 megatons
in the Backfire force. In terms of warheads our ships would have 200
warheads and their Backfire force would have 1, 000 warheads.
People would say that we are accelerating our strategic weapons program,
not limiting them, and that we would end up with less than the Soviets.
In addition, at the end of the five year period, we would be stuck with ships
that don't fit into our overall plans -- ships with a degraded general purpose
capability.
President Ford: Well, why did DOD propose Option IV?
Admiral Holloway: We in the Navy didn't think much about SLCMs on surface
ships since they are not that good.
President Ford: Well, you can't have it both ways. DOD proposed
modified Option IV. You have undercut the validity of IV.
Admiral Holloway: We hope that by putting surface SLCMs on the MIRV
limit it would help kill SLCMs on surface ships.
President Ford: Okay. But then you are letting Backfire go free without
any offset. You are undercutting DOD's proposal on Option IV modified.
All I am saying is that I have been acting on the basis that DOD supported
modified Option IV. Your argument raises questions about Option IV.
Dr. Ikle: There is also a question on Option III. If the Soviets do not count
150 Bison variants in the total in Geneva, both the Backfire and the Bison
variants would be outside the total.
President Ford: Let's talk about the suggestions on land-based cruise
missiles. Option III and Option IV modified proposed banning them over
2500 km. Henry discussed this with them.
FORDO i LIBRARY BERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
12
Ambassador Johnson: The Soviets now propose to ban them over 600 km.
This is a new position.
Secretary Clements: The Soviet proposal to ban them over 600 km is new
to us. It destroys part of what safety valve on technology we have. Our
proposal on land-based cruise missiles left us a window on technology,
but now the Soviets have jerked the rug out from under us.
Vice President Rockefeller: When we talk about land-based cruise missiles
I would like to know why the Soviets are so anxious to limit our use of them.
Brent Scowcroft: They are worried about Europe. The 600 km range would
prevent us in Europe from hitting the Soviets.
Ambassador Johnson: And the Soviets are worried about the Germans.
Vice President Rockefeller: They know the Backfire -- they have them.
However, we only have a beginning on cruise missiles. If we limit our
new weapons, we may be hobbling ourselves.
Brent Scowcroft: This is one advantage of the five-year agreement. In
the interim if we find some new use, we can always make adjustments.
Vice President Rockefeller: What happened to the 5500 km range?
Ambassador Johnson: This is a new position. We want to ban them over
2500 km.
President Ford: One proposal was to limit the range to 600 km, which we
have not accepted. Another proposal is to limit range to 2500 km, which
would protect our ability to deploy cruise missiles in Western Europe. Or
we could stick with a 5500 km range, which is approximately 3,000 miles.
Ambassador Johnson: The 5500 km range definition for strategic systems
arises from the Interim Agreement. It is the range from the northeast
United States to the northwest part of the Soviet Union.
President Ford: What observations are there on the three options? We
don't seem to want the 600 km limit, so it boils down to 5500 km versus
2500 km.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
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13
Dr. Ikle: There is a slight advantage to the 2500 km figure with
respect to verification.
Brent Scowcroft: It is not a slight advantage. Once they test them at
that range they can put them on any vehicle.
Dr. Ikle: But verification is easier.
Vice President Rockefeller: Are we about five years ahead of the Soviets
in cruise missiles?
Secretary Clements: More like eight to ten years ahead.
Vice President Rockefeller: What about verification problems?
President Ford: Bill (Colby), can you verify the beginning of a test program?
Director Colby: We may have a little trouble. We have a systems problem.
We may lose our ability to detect cruise missile tests by the early 1980s
unless we get new systems.
If they test at a legitimate range, they still can make longer ranges very
easily.
President Ford: Do we have a land-based cruise missile program?
Secretary Clements: No.
Admiral Holloway: We in the Navy are keeping the Army and Air Force
informed about our cruise missile program, but there is no land-based
cruise missile program yet.
President Ford: Well, if you would go to such a program, it would be
5500 km, not 2500 km except for European deployment.
Secretary Clements: Why 5500 km?
President Ford: For our own purposes; developing a 2500 km missile is
no good.
Secretary Clements: We can give them to our conventional forces in Europe.
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President Ford: That is what I said. If we are talking about strategic
missiles, we are talking about 5500 km.
Dr. Ikle: That brings us to the Backfire. The Russians argue that it has
a theater mission.
President Ford: Well, how do we stand on 2500 km versus 5500 km?
Ambassador Johnson: I prefer 2500 km. It protects us for the five-year
period. And it gives us a small verification gain.
Vice President Rockefeller: But they will have nothing in five years.
Ambassador Johnson: The principle of the single limit for cruise missiles
is good. But if they are to be truly intercontinental, they would need a
much greater range than 5500 km.
President Ford: If we went to 2500 km, how much of a technological jump
would there be to get a true intercontinental missile?
Admiral Holloway: For land-based missiles, not much of a problem. The
greatest demand is on the sea-based missiles because of the 21-inch tube
constraint. There is only a problem of scale after that. With the TERCOM
guidance system, accuracy is good regardless of the range.
President Ford: If we go with the 2500 km technology for the five-year period,
could we at the end of five years extend the range easily?
Admiral Holloway: Yes.
President Ford: Therefore, 2500 km makes sense. And there is a
verification gain.
Secretary Clements: That's okay. This is not a big issue with us.
President Ford: Are there any other comments?
Dr. Ikle: The five-year Option III probably would give us leverage for the
next five years to keep the number of Backfire low. It would also preserve
the concessions on ALCMs as MIRVs and limit the number of launchers per
platform to less than 15.
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Secretary Clements: The 10 to 1 ratio makes no sense. It is an uneven
trade. It is next to impossible to defend.
Brent Scowcroft: One option would be modified IV. Otherwise, we may
have no agreement at all. Therefore, they would have 375 Backfires by
1982, and we would have at least six surface ships.
Director Colby: The megatonnage comparison is one we gave up consciously.
We consciously chose small weapons.
President Ford: We have the capability to increase the megatonnage if
we want.
Admiral Holloway: We can think about Henry's "gray area" and try to find
an offset for Backfire. Possibly we can offset Backfire with all SLCM
platforms -- submarine or surface ship, or the freedom to mix. We want
to find a rationale that relates SLCM platforms and Backfire.
President Ford: That's the right thing to do, bearing in mind the problem
of how many surface ships we would have ready. If an alternate platform
such as submarines makes sense, then it might be a good thing to do. I
had the impression that we could get 25 ships, but you are telling me this
is difficult to do unless we use submarines. Look at this as quickly as
you can.
Vice President Rockefeller: If the U.S. attacked the Soviets, we could only
kill 27 percent of their missiles. What could they do against us? Higher?
Director Colby: I have some figures here.
Secretary Clements: Our fundamental problem is the premise of the range
of the Backfire.
Vice President Rockefeller: If we eliminate cruise missiles as potential
intercontinental missiles, even if it is only a five-year agreement, it may
turn out to a disadvantage to US. I think the longer the range we can get
the better for us.
President Ford: Except technically it is not difficult to add to the range if
we develop a 2500 km technology.
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Director Colby: In any event, we wre projected to continue to have our
retaliatory capability in the years ahead. We will have enough surviving
warheads. Deterrence will still work.
President Ford: How much of total deterrence is represented by the
Backfire and surface ship SLCMs?
Dr. Ikle: Surface ships are vulnerable.
President Ford: With respect to their bombers, we have had the option of
augmenting our air defenses. But there was a decision by us not to do so.
We spent millions of dollars on BOMARC and then we phased it out.
Brent Scowcroft: I would like to make one comment. We have an ongoing
negotiation and we can't sit on this.
Vice President Rockefeller: We could take the front half -- 2500 km versus
5500 km.
President Ford: This is no problem.
Dr. Ikle: I believe we should consider the throw weight limit on the SS-18
and 19. The end result is very important. We have made some agreements.
Brent Scowcroft: We have not agreed to anything.
Secretary Clements: What do we do about their position on Backfire radius?
Accept it? We must face up to this !
Brent Scowcroft: We can't accept it.
Secretary Clements: Then, what is our strategy?
President Ford: If we have separate agreement on the gray areas, we can
offset a gray area system with a gray area system.
Ambassador Johnson: What should we do about it?
Secretary Clements: This is the real issue. If what he says is true about
the Backfire radius, there is no issue.
President Ford: We don't accept their range figure. We will accept it as
a gray area. We can use something else to offset it.
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Director Colby: The 2500 km figure is startling.
Dr. Ikle: There is disagreement on the Backfire range. How do we settle
the cruise missile range?
Vice President Rockefeller: We are limiting ourselves if we limit cruise
missiles.
President Ford: Jim (Admiral Holloway), will you get that study in. If
we have no agreement, we have nothing. They will be able to do what they
want to do with Backfire. The Backfire is in production but the cruise
missiles are not.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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January 21, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
CD
Secretary Kissinger has just sent you the following report of his first
meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.
The meeting with Brezhnev has just ended. Brezhnev led off with a
fairly conciliatory statement emphasizing his interest in concluding
a SALT agreement. I then made an opening statement in a similar
spirit but I hit hard on the consequences of Cuban and Soviet intervention
in Angola, which drew a sharp, prolonged response from Brezhnev, dis-
claiming any responsibility for Angola. At one point, he referred to
the State of the Union and the increase in our Defense budgets as a sign
of the obstacles arising in Soviet-American relations. However, he
calmed dewn somewhat and expressed his appreciation that you and I
were still committed to an improvement in relations despite increasingly
sharp attacks from critics.
At this point, we returned to SALT and I asked Brezhnev to respond to
our latest proposal. He then proceeded to present an item-by-item
proposal of his own based upon our position. He began by calling attention
to their concession on MIRV verification and he emphasized very strongly
that this was organically linked to a solution of all outstanding problems
and stressed there should be no misunderstanding about this linkage.
He then addressed the ALCM problem and said they still preferred to
count each individual cruise missile on heavy bombers. However, they
were prepared to accept our proposal that heavy bombers equipped with
ALCMs over 600 km in range would count as a MIRV against the ceiling
of 1320. But he introduced a new wrinkle by claiming that each B-52
would count as one, but the B-1 would count as three. Second, he accepted
our proposal that all ALCMs over 2500 km in range would be banned.
Third, he addressed sea-based cruise missiles and took note of the fact
that we now both agree that SLCMs over 600 km in range would be banned
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from deployment on submarines. Nevertheless, he said the Soviets
still proposed that all sea-based missiles over 600 km in range should
be banned altogether. On land-based cruise missiles, Brezhnev took
a new position. He claimed that the previous agreement to ban land-
based cruise missiles of intercontinental range was meant to ban all
cruise missiles of shorter ranges as well. In order to clear up any
misunderstanding, he now proposed a ban on all land-based cruise
missiles over 600 km in range. Finally, he turned to the question of
backfire and began by emphatically denying that the backfire bomber
could be considered a strategic weapon. He referred to his previous
statement to you on this matter and said that he could now officially
give us the official range estimate for this bomber and that this could
be made a matter of record in the negotiations. He stated that the radius
of the backfire was 2200 km.
At this point, I interrupted to ask some questions about the backfire
estimate; namely, what conditions of flight altitude, subsonic or sonic,
etc., were assumed in this estimate of 2200. Brezhnev turned the
question over to General Kozlov who said this range reflected an altitude
of 10, 000 meters with a maximum load. I asked what the radius would
be for a subsonic mission at a higher altitude, say 15, 000 meters, and
General Kozlov said it might be 2400 km. Brezhnev then suggested that
we recess to reflect upon what he had said and proposed reconvening at
5:00 p.m. this evening Moscow time.
In addition to the foregoing, Gromyko told me privately last night and
again before lunch today that a deferral option was completely out of
the question. He characterized it as a present to the United States since
they believe backfire should not be counted in any case.
In light of Brezhnev's presentations and Gromyko's remarks, my strong
recommendation is that we not proceed with a straightforward presentation
of Option 3 which would merely challenge Brezhnev on the backfire and
without benefit of some preliminary discussion of the concept behind
Option 3. What I propose to do is to explore with Brezhnev the modified
version of Option 3 which we discussed briefly in the NSC meeting in
which backfire and surface ship cruise missiles would be put in a separate
category for limitations during a five-year period beginning in 1977 through
1982. This has the advantage that the Soviets would not be able to develop
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or deploy sophisticated cruise missiles in this period, while our
surface ship cruise missile program would be approaching an optimal
level for breakout or for putting pressure on the negotiations. More-
over, this approach would ease the verification problem since the
Soviets would not be able to deploy the cruise missile at long range.
In addition, since the Soviets claim that the backfire has a 2400 km radius this
provides an opening to group both the backfire and cruise missiles of a
similar range. I would start out by suggesting a separate limit on backfire
during this period at about 250 and in this way, allow Brezhnev to save
face and to keep open all our significant cruise missile options. As dis-
cussed at the NSC, I would outline a limit on surface ship cruise missiles
at about 25 ships with 10-15 launchers, but my main aim this evening will
be to persuade Brezhnev this is an equitable compromise without yet
committing ourselves to specific numbers. On land-based cruise missiles
I will say that we have two choices, either to return to the original agree-
ment banning intercontinental missiles and therefore permitting shorter
ranges, or to accept our new position of banning above the range of
2500 km.
I anticipate a lengthy evening session but it is also likely that Brezhnev
will have to consider what we say and take it to the Politburo probably
tomorrow, which means we may have a decisive session on Thursday
afternoon. I will report this evening my impressions of what the prospects
for an agreement are. As of now, I am impressed with Brezhnev's deter-
mination to get into the substance of SALT, signified by the presence of
some of his SALT experts and his willingness to respond in detail to our
proposal. Nevertheless, it is clear that on backfire, at least, he has a
tough political problem, and his claim that it is not strategic is being
backed up by official military estimates. Thus, this evening's session
is almost certain to be very tough going.
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