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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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Lebanon
Africa
Cuba
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Middle East conflicts
United States-Soviet relations
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 4/7/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
MH7YI
THE WHITE HOUSE
File in NSC
WASHINGTON
meeting frien
SECRET (GDS)
MEETING OF THE ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LEBANON
Wednesday, April 7, 1976
2:30 p.m.
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scowcroft
I.
PURPOSE
To review the current situation in Lebanon and its potential
impact upon broader United States interests in the Middle
East: a possible renewal of major Arab-Israeli hostilities
should Syrian and Israeli troops both enter Lebanon; a possible
reversal of the moderate Arab trend we have successfully
fostered over the past two years should Syrian efforts in
Lebanon fail; and possible strongly negative Arab reactions
against the United States should Israel send its troops into
Lebanon. And to consider what further options are open to
the United States should our current efforts, concerted with
those of Syria, fail to bring a political solution.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: In early March, Syria, acting at the request
of Lebanese President Frangie, sent into Lebanon units
of the Palestine Liberation Army in an effort to stop the
fighting by Lebanese left-wing forces, (led by Kemal
Jumblatt and other lesser leaders) supported by the PL
and rejectionist Palestinians, who refused to accept the
LIS8ARY GERALD FORD
ceasefire and political agreement reached with Syrian
help on January 22, and who were demanding the immediate
resignation of President Frangie. Within a week, it was
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Automatically Downgraded at Two
SMCRET (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED
Year Intervals and Declassified on
E.O. 12356, NSC Sec little 3,4. 2/19/99
MR98-40, #54; Stateletter 9/25/98
December
31,
1984.
By ut NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET (GDS)
-2-
only the resistance of the PLA and Saiqa - a Palestinian
organization loyal to Syria - which prevented the Presi-
dential Palace from being occupied and Frangie overthrown
by force.
At this point, Syria asked our advice on deploying regular
Syrian army units to separate the combattants and bring
about an orderly transfer of power from President Frangie
to a new government. We strongly advised Syria against
any direct intervention and urged other governments, in-
cluding Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to warn the Syrians against
such a move. We immediately asked Israel what its response
would be to a Syrian intervention and urged them to remain
calm while the situation was being clarified. Israel replied
that it would move into South Lebanon if Syrian regulars
intervened. In the face of our negative reactions, Syria
turned to a renewed major effort to bring about a cease-
fire and legal governmental succession by political means,
while reinforcing somewhat its irregular military presence
in the form of Saiqa and PLA units incorporating some
regular troops. This has included closing the Syrian border
and key Lebanese ports and airfields to arms supply for
leftist forces. Israel has not indicated any intention of
moving into Lebanon, despite its awareness of a sizeable
irregular Syrian presence.
To reinforce our serious concern at the continued fighting
and our support for an orderly political solution, we sent
Dean Brown to take charge of our Embassy in Beirut.
Units of the Sixth Fleet were moved closer to Lebanon
should the evacuation of American citizens appear necessary,
as well as to impress the parties to the conflict with our
serious concern. Our efforts, concerted with those of
Syria, have produced a ten day ceasefire during which
the Lebanese hope to agree upon the succession to Presi-
dent Frangie. The Lebanese Parliament may meet on
April 8 to tackle this problem. If it fails, the ceasefire
is most unlikely to hold past April 12.
SECRET (GDS)
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
STORET (GDS)
-3-
Should the ceasefire break down again, we would be faced
with an extremely difficult three-way choice: 1) tacitly
accepting intervention by Syrian regular army units
(probably at least a division) and making every possible
effort to prevent an Israeli counter-intervention in South
Lebanon; 2) making every effort to prevent further Syrian
action with the likelihood that this would not only mean
more bloody fighting and eventual leftist domination in
Lebanon, but could very well mean the collapse of the moderate
Syrian regime of Hafez Asad and its replacement by radical
elements sympathetic to Libya, Iraq and the other rejec-
tionists; or 3) witnessing military intervention by both
Israel and Syria with the likelohood that this would produce
a closing of Arab ranks and renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities
on a major scale. The first choice would offer the greatest
hope of protecting our substantial investment in the peace
process and better bilateral relations with the Arab states
but it would be the toughest for us to carry out successfully,
given the very strong Israeli hatred and distrust of Syria,
and would be hard to explain in this country. The second
choice would probably spell the end of present hopes for
the peace process, and would over time be seriously
damaging to our relations with such key Arab states as
Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia who would tend to see
us as having exposed to them a rising tide of Arab
radicalism. The third choice would produce a much
more rapid negative Arab reaction against the United
States as well as killing hopes for the peace process.
It could also produce full-scale hostilities, with all
that implies for the US Soviet relationship in the Middle
East, and another oil embargo.
We are examining what further diplomatic options are
open to us in order to avoid the dangers posed by a break-
down of the ceasefire. Our objective is to generate an
array of moderate Lebanese forces which, togethe 1* with our
support and that of the Syrians and other moderate Arabs,
can move the political process ahead through the Presidential
succession to new elections and basic reforms in the social,
economic and political fields. An essential element in this
will be the establishment of some sort of authority not only
&
FORD
SECRET (GDS)
GERALD
LISBARY
SECRET (GDS)
-4-
to police the ceasefire but also to restrain elements
who might be unhappy with a new political solution as
well as putting an end to indiscriminate revenge killing
and banditry. In order to accomplish this we are consult-
ing other Arab Governments such as Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia as well as the UK and France. We have also
warned the USSR, in response to its note to us of April 2,
that we expect it to use its influence with the Lebanese
left and the PLO to help bring about a peaceful solution
instead of further exacerbating the serious dangers of
the Lebanese situation.
In parallel with our diplomatic efforts, we have under-
taken an urgent review of our contingency planning in the
event there should be another eruption of major hostilities
in Lebanon or on an even broader scale. Existing plans
in the following fields have been reviewed and are being
updated: political/diplomatic contingencies; military
readiness of United States units for either evacuation of
United States citizens or to meet foreign threats; economic
contingencies (oil and financial); and improved intelligence
collection and dissemination.
B. Participants: List at Tab B.
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will
be announced. White House photo only.
III.
TALKING POINTS
1.
Henry and I have been following developments in Lebanon
very closely and have also been in close touch with all other
governments in the -particularly Israel and Syria--
and other interested powers to try to prevent outside inter-
vention, stop the fighting and see what can be done to pro-
duce a favorable political outcome.
2.
The situation is extremely dangerous since failure to end
the fighting and find a moderate political solution could
confront us either with an early renewal of Arab-Israeli
hostilities or a serious setback for the peace process and
the forces of Arab moderation in which we have invested
so much.
FORD is LIBRARY BERALD
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
-5-
3.
We have sent Dean Brown to survey the situation first
hand and be available to the various parties. He has
already met with a wide spectrum of key Lebanese
leaders. We have also moved some units of the Sixth
Fleet to where they would be in position to evacuate
American citizens should that become necessary and
to demonstrate graphically the force of our concern.
4. We consider President Asad's behaviour in the Lebanese
situation to be mo derate and responsible and we believe
he is almost as much the object of leftist attacks as the
traditional Lebanese leadership. For this reason we
are working closely with him. Somehow this picture of Syria
needs to be gotten across to Israel and the American
people.
5.
Henry, will you discuss in more detail just what is in-
volved in the Lebanese situation? After that I hope all
of you will feel free to comment. Your ideas on what more
we could do would be particularly useful.
6. [After others have spoken]. I want all of you to work
together as a team to pull us through this very dangerous
period. Stay in close touch with Brent SO that he can
keep me currently informed -not only as to changes in
the situation but any ideas any of you may have as to
what more we can do. I intend to make every effort to
help the parties directly concerned find a peaceful, moderate
solution and resist pressures from the Arab radicals and
the USSR.
SECRET (GDS)
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
MEMORANDUM
2237X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TORSECRET Atta chment
April 19, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis my
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting
April 7
I attach for your approval Bob Oakley's minutes of the April 7
NSC meeting on Lebanon.
Approve 1104
As amended
Attachment
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD i LIBRARY QERALD
TOP SECRET Atta chment
let 2/48
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09222
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Robert Oakley
RECEIVER'S NAME
William Hyland
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 4/7/76
CREATION DATE
04/07/1976
VOLUME
15 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200031
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 4/7/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
ut 5/99
2237X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Wednesday, April 7, 1976
Time:
2:35 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, the White House
Subject:
Lebanon
Principals
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Admiral James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations (Acting Chairman in
Gen. Brown's absence)
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Other Attendees
Defense:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
WH:
Richard Cheney
Brent Scowcroft
William G. Hyland
NSC:
Robert B. Oakley The
President:
I thought we ought to have a meeting so that everyone
on the National Security Council would be up to date on
the situation in the Middle East, especially the problems
we face in Lebanon. Henry and I have been following the
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority
TOPSECREY (XGDS)
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category Section 5 (B) (3)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6 4
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. )
3.4
MR 98.34, 55
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
LIBRARY
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
-2-
situation on almost a daily basis and analyzing events
and taking actions to ensure that restraint is continued
by all parties. Last week, in the middle of the visit
by King Hussein, we sent Dean Brown to take charge
of our Embassy and talk to all the parties in order to
impress upon them the importance of maintaining the
ceasefire and reaching a moderate solution. He arrived
there Friday, I believe. He has seen everyone.
Kissinger:
Actually, Mr. President, he arrived Wednesday night.
He left right after you approved it, on a special air-
craft. He has been running ever since and is doing
a very good job.
President:
Yes, he has been doing a fine job. The ceasefire is
in effect although the situation is unsettled. It is so
complex that it defies logic. We have been counselling
restraint on both Israel and Syria.
Rumsfeld:
The situation particularly defies logic as Henry tried to
explain it to the Congressional leadership this morning.
President:
They came in confused about the situation, as they
usually do.
Scowcroft:
And they left still confused but at a higher level.
Kissinger:
They need to know just how complex it is and to under-
stand that it is not a simple question of pushing troops
into Lebanon. If the President can stand it, I will go
over again the briefing I gave this morning.
Basically, there are three interrelated levels which
are at work: the strictly domestic struggle to redis-
tribute power, the moderate-radical struggle with the
impact of outside powers, and the inter-Arab considera-
tions. The division of internal power is still based on
a 1932 census which gives the Christians not only the
Presidency but a 6 to 5 ratio for the upper civil service
positions and seats in Parliament. Yet the total population
is not 10 to 15% Palestinian and the rest is probably
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
FORD
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
-3-
60% Moslem. So this big strain has been building up
for a reallocation of power and that is one level of the
struggle.
The second level is the moderate-radical struggle
within the Moslem camp--the Christians are almost
all either moderate or conservative. On the Arab
side there is a moderate faction which basically wants
the status quo, the present system, preserved. The
radical faction wants to secularize the state, thereby
depriving the Christians of their position and safe-
guards. Like Rhodesia and South Africa, the minority
sees the surrender of its position as a threat to its
very existence. These factions are supported from
outside. The Christians are getting arms from Israel,
which we do not oppose since it helps maintain the
balance. The radical group is strongly supported by
Libya and Iraq and the Lebanese Communist Party
with some encouragement from the Soviets. They
are divided, themse ves, into a mo re moderate group--
the PLO if you can call Arafat a moderate. Then there
is the Syrian group and then the Jumblatt radicals. Jumblatt
is getting help from Libya and Iraq and a bit from the
Soviets and to some extent from Egypt because it is so
angry at Syria.
The inter-Arab lineup is stranger. Syria by tradition
would be on the side of the radicals but the situation has
evolved in such a way that Syria is with the Christians
and the moderate Moslems, trying to preserve the
existing system. If Lebanon goes radical, it could get
a larger influx of arms from the USSR and Syria would
find itself squeezed between Lebanon and Iran. Asad
wants to avoid this threat. Syria also wants to control
the PLO thru the Saiqa, to replace Arafat by its man,
Mohsen, and increase its power in the Arab world.
Jumblatt's natural inclination will be to destroy the
Christians. In the short-term, therefore, Syria's
role is very constructive and serves our interests.
But over the long term the Israeli fear of Syrian inter-
vention has merit because Syria could within a couple
of years consolidate its power and achieve the dominant
TOP SECRE (XGDS)
GERALD
LIBRARY
GERALD FORD LIBRAR
TRANSACRET (XGDS)
-4-
position in an arc stretching from Lebanon through
Jordan and pose a major radical threat, in line with its
past tradition. Saudi Arabia has been playing a very
complex role, by supporting the PLO in order to restrain
its excesses but opposing the radicals. It wants to see
a Syrian political victory but does not want to see Syria
move in militarily. Jordan is apparently totally on
the side of the Syrians, at least to judge from what Hussein
had to say while he was here. Egypt has a complex role.
President:
Hussein told us he supported Syrian intervention. He
said Jordan had eliminated the radicals in 1970 and Syria
has an excellent opportunity to finish the job now.
Kissinger:
For a year or two, this would be a good thing. This
would be true with respect to the rejectionists. It would
stabilize the entire situation in the area. But later you
would get too much Syrian influence and then we would
have to contend with a massive problem.
The January 22 settlement which the Syrians had worked
out collapsed when the army disintegrated and the Moslems
went over to the side of the radicals. So Syria sent us
a formal note a couple of weeks ago requesting our advice
about its intervening with regular army units to stop the fightin
and restore order. We approached the Israelis who said
they would move into South Lebanon if Syrian regular units
came in. They said they could tolerate a smaller number-
up to the total of a brigade but this was ambiguous--if
they stayed north of the Beirut-Damascus road. So if
Syria moves into regular troop units, Israel will come
in. This will upset the entire Arab balance and force
Syria to attack Israel. The Syrians could not stand still
and face the charge of partitioning the country to share
it with Israel. They would have to attack. The Saudis
and Jordanians would have to support the Syrians. With
Egypt out of the picture militarily, this would be a calamity
since Israel would quickly overrun and smash Syria. The
Soviets would then come in and we would face an oil boycott.
That is why we have been supporting the Syrian political
plan of January 22, but we are concerned over a Syrian
FORTSPORT (XGDS)
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
TOPSECRET (XGDS)
-5-
invasion. This gives us the opportunity to develop a
relationship of confidence with Syria by helping it meet
its minimal needs. Once again we find that we are the
only country able to talk to all sides and we have the
situation in pretty good shape for the moment, although
it is uncertain as to how it will evolve. We have used
the Saudis to urge restraint on the PLO and we have not
discouraged Israel's resupply of the Christians. We
support Syria's cutting off military supplies to the PLO
by sea as well as land, and Israel has not objected to the
activities of the Syrian patrol boats. We have used our
fleet to worry the Soviets. They sent us a note pro-
testing the fleet so we replied that a country which is
responsible for supporting a faction involved in the
struggle should make all efforts to stop the fighting.
We now learn they are urging a ceasefire. We have
the ceasefire but it is very fragile. We need to keep
it together. Brown is doing a good job. But we can't
get too far ahead of the Syrians.
The big need is to establish a central authority, and there
are three ways of doing that:
one, that the factions will reach agreement among them-
selves. This is very doubtful.
second, that the factions agree to supply contingents to a
central force and put it under the President. This would
require us to talk to the PLO as one of the factions.
third is the seepage of additional Syrian forces into
Lebanon, not the open entry of large numbers of regulars.
We have had close cooperation thus far from the Syrians.
A battalion moved into Tripoli quietly over the weekend.
In Tripoli and elsewhere they have cut off the supply of
arms by sea. They are thus blockading arms to the
leftists by land and sea. We have not discouraged the
Syrian actions, nor have the Israelis. Israel grumbles
when additional Syrians enter Lebanon and we take note
of it to sooth them. Actually, the Israelis are acquiescing
but Syria can't go too far, can't send in regulars in large
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
10P SECRET (XGDS)
-6-
numbers. Right now the Syrians-regulars, Saiqa and
PLA - are one of four factions. The Lebanese left, the
PLO and the Christians are the others. So far the
situation is not out of control but if the balloon goes
up as a result of Syria going in and Israel following
with an intervention in the South, we will have an Arab
war. Israel will not stop just inside the border but
will go the Litani River. And once they go in we will
never get them out. It will be like 1967. And if they
go in and stay, there is a high probability of a major
war. We need to plan for this.
My personal view is that if there is another war we need
to overpower it quickly and use it as the point of departure
to solve the whole Middle East problem. I believe that
in another war, there is a high probability that the
Soviets will come in in some form. They can't allow
Syria to be smashed again. It would be total humilia-
tion for the Soviets to allow Arab countries they arm
and support to be totally defeated for the fourth time.
It would probably be the end of Asad. Jordan would
probably support Syria militarily and be smashed.
Also, Saudi Arabia would support them and there
would be an oil embargo. Egypt would be forced to
come in. The only way to stop it is to demand a
ceasefire in the name of an overall settlement.
Rockefeller:
Not only an oil embargo. The Arabs own twenty billion
in American assets they could dump. The disruption
would be terrible.
Kissinger:
Greenspan says the only way the Western Europeans
can live within their means is thanks to Arab deposits.
If the Saudis and Kuwaitis got out of the British pound,
it would collapse. So if Syria goes in, we should make
a major effort to keep Israel out. We will have to work
out a proposal to keep Syria north of the Beirut-Damascus
Road and a timetable for withdrawal. If Syria moves, our
interest demands that we try to keep Israel out. But it
would be better if we can get a solution and Syria does
not move.
FORD
TOPSECRET (XGDS)
GERALD
LIBRARY
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
-7-
To get a solution we may have to ask for your authoriza-
tion to deal with the PLO, Mr. President. There would be
no change in our position toward the PLO on the Middle
East question but we have no commitment to Israel not
to talk to the PLO exclusively about the situation in
Lebanon. This could also help us with the Middle East
situation.
President:
We have an evacuation group off the coast, don't we Don?
Rumsfeld:
Yes, sir. [Hands the President a chart showing location. ]
Kissinger:
We don't need to face the PLO question now but we may
need to later on. I will come back to you on this.
Bush:
What about the French mediation effort?
Kissinger:
They are a bunch of jackals. They came to us at the
Syria's request to ask us to hold off the Israelis and
they suggested the idea of international guarantees.
We warned that we could not count on stopping Israel
but told them we needed to have specific information
about Syria's intentions if we were to have a chance.
They told the Syrians we had turned them down and
said something entirely different to the Israelis. The
Quai is full of Gaullists who practice cheap Machiavellian
politics. This is not true of Giscard, but it is of many
around him. They have irresponsible Gaullist tendencies.
President:
Do we have contingency plans, Don?
Rumsfeld:
There is a working group which is meeting to work on
these plans.
Scowcroft:
The working group has met and all the plans are being
updated--military, political, intelligence and economic.
Kissinger:
In the event of another war, we will need to pour forces
into the Mediterranean to dissuade the Soviets. My
estimate is that there is a greater probability of a Soviet
move now than ever before.
is
FORD
TQP SECRET (XGDS)
CERALD
LIBRARD
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
TORSECRET (XGDS)
-8-
President:
When will the plans be prepared?
Hyland:
By Tuesday, Mr. President. We will have the plans
updated. Right now we are getting the intelligence in-
puts. We have contingency plans concerning the evacua-
tion of the Sinai and Lebanon. State is working out
political and diplomatic contingency plans but you can't
be sure of what the circumstances will be so that cannot
be too precise. We also have in being an extensive
economic contingency plan covering full and partial oil
embargoes and financial problems. CIA has just com-
pleted an update on free world oil stocks and non-OAPEC
production. We are way ahead of 1973. We have forces
in the area. We are alert. Our contingency planning is
in pretty good shape.
Scowcroft:
We will also have a single coordinated situation report
to eliminate the confusion we have had in the past.
Kissinger:
We have also learned a lat. We know that the Syrians
are scared of the Israelis so the idea of a Syrian attack
can be pretty much ruled out. We exaggerate Israel's
eagerness to enter Lebanon but Syria is not about to
start a war if it can be avoided. Only if they have
to go into Lebanon and Israel also goes in. We have
also learned that the Soviets are not eager for a war.
They are supporting the Lebanese Communist Party and other
local elements, including the PLO, but overall they are
a factor of restraint. The Lebanese Communist Party
is most helpful but the Soviets seem to be counselling
the Syrians against moving. They want to have their
cake and eat it, too. The Soviets are not looking for
trouble but they will be forced to move rather than
lose all their assets in the Middle East, should another
war come.
Scowcroft:
Egypt is in bad shape. It would probably take them a
week to get ready and Syrian would be knocked out by then.
President:
When does the ceasefire in Lebanon end?
FORD
TQP SECRET (XGDS)
CERALD
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TQP SECRET (XGDS)
-9-
Kissinger:
Monday. But things are moving in a good direction so
we have maybe two weeks. We must get some sort
of a force in being, even a force composed of the major
elements, to restore some sort of order. We have
explored the idea of a neutral zone, but there are too
many undisciplined, criminal elements and there is no
one to police them. A buffer zone without a force is
no good.
Bush:
Do you believe what the Israelis tell us about the
Christian military situation?
Kissinger:
Brown has talked to the Christian leaders and our
Defense Attache has talked to their military men. We
believe that they could hold out for three weeks in case
of another attack but there could be a lot of erosion in
their position during that period.
Rumsfeld:
The Lebanese Defense Attache has come to us and asked
for arms and ammunition. We told him to present the
request through diplomatic channels to the Department
of State.
Kissinger:
Let the Israelis do it. They are already supplying the
Christians.
Rumsfeld:
We have the carrier Saratoga which is between 24
and 36 hours away from Lebanon.
Admiral Holloway: They could provide air support within twelve hours.
Rumsfeld:
We also have the Guadacanal which is less than 24 hours
from Beirut. Beyond that we can use civilian or military
airlift or possibly sealift.
I understand the interagency process is working. Plans
are being updated and dusted off. We will see there is
no carrier gap in the Mediterranean. After the inter-
agency group has gone over the plans we will take other
moves.
FORD
TOR/SECRET(XGDS)
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Scowcroft:
We can have the NSC meet again then.
Rumsfeld:
We will have our plans ready for review by next Tuesday.
What about the military probabilities? What about the
role of Jordan?
Clements:
The last time I was out there I felt a pulse bearing on
the confederacy between Jordan and Syria. There are
all sorts of likely indicators. Jordan and Syria are
getting very, very close to each other, to the disadvan-
tage of Saudi Arabia.
President:
My impression from Hussein was that Jordan and Syria
are closer so long as Asad is in charge. If a more radical
individual comes to power in Damascus, then Jordan will
move away.
Kissinger:
Jordan is playing a very dangerous game. They are
telling the Syrians everything so we can't tell them as
much anymore.
Clements:
Henry, you are right. Jordan is playing an extremely
dangerous game. They are walking on eggs. If they
have a full understanding with Syria on Lebanon, it
will be trouble.
Kissinger:
That is a minor question. The Soviets are the big
question if we move into another conflict. Israel will
have no trouble with Syria and Jordan.
Scowcroft:
Now Israel can go around the Golan through Lebanon,
not having to go over the mountains.
Rumsfeld:
There is some question about whether or not our task
force should anchor. It makes about 24 hours difference
in the time needed to reach Lebanon, since they would
have to start the boilers and other things.
Admiral Holloway: There is no real problem now. We can have the
helicopters in for evacuation within 24 hours. The task
force will need to anchor some time to ease the strain
on the personnel, including the Marines, but not right
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away. It is also true that it costs more to steam than
to anchor. There is an anchorage off Turkey, but our
Ambassador has been reluctant to ask the Turks for
permission and we do not need it now. But bear in mind
that an extended period at sea causes some deterioration
in readiness. We will put it to the Secretary, if there is
a need to use the anchorage.
Rumsfeld:
Our plans will be ready by next Tuesday. Shall we meet
again next week?
President:
What is my schedule? Will I be in town?
Cheney:
You will be in Texas this weekend but in town all next week.
President:
Let us have another meeting the end of next week.
Rumsfeld:
In the October War we had a problem with our NATO allies,
who did not want to give us permission to use their territory.
In the worst-case scenario we need to be able to use some
NATO forces yet when
came they were
nervous. We might not be able to count on Italy or Germany
next time so in the contingency plan, we may want to
assign units not in NATO countries, especially those two.
President:
Let us meet no later than Thursday.
Kissinger:
I think we have an improved situation and we have done
reasonably well in keeping it under control. If Syria
does go in, despite our efforts, we should do our best
to keep the Israelis out.
President:
When Hussein was here, he estimated the Christians could
only last for 48 hours. That did not happen.
Kissinger:
I do not believe an all-out attack will be made on the
Christians. We should keep our same posture--not
explaining what E and E means so people will be scared
by the presence of the fleet and not talking about the
Marines going in or not going in. We sent others a threat
as well as giving them an excuse to do or not to do things.
The fleet movements have been helpful.
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Vice President: Don't we have leverage over Israel? With all we are
giving them, why can't we simply tell Israel not to go in.
Kissinger:
We want to keep the Israeli threat alive for now. That
is healthy. But if Syria moves then we must put our
interests first.
Bush:
Rumsfeld:
Bush:
Scowcroft:
******
President:
There is something else I would like to take up briefly--
our contingencies on action against Cuba. Where do we
stand?
Scowcroft:
The plans are not very good. We will meet on Tuesday
to revise them.
President:
Let's get them ready between now and Thursday.
Kissinger:
We can discuss all the contingency planning at once,
Cuba and the Middle East.
Scowcroft:
We will be ready for another NSC meeting the end of
next week.
Kissinger:
We must keep our eye on the stragegic concepts, our
African policy is one thing but the surrogate Soviet
action could come through North Vien Nam as well as
Cuba. If this principle is accepted, it would be very
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dangerous for us. In time, there will be a real problem
if the Cuban presence remains in Africa. It has an in-
hibiting effect on others. In the period 1970-73, we
successfully frustrated the Soviets in the Middle East
so the Arabs finally had to turn toward us. We will
try to identify with the aspiration of the black nations
in Africa, but not in response to Cuban pressure. There
has not been a single criticism by an African leader of
my statement about Cuba. Nyerere, who is a radical, told
our Ambassador he approved of it and wants to talk about
it when I visit there.
President:
When do you go?
Kissinger:
April 23. Bhutto also told me we could not allow the Soviets
to succeed in using the Cubans that way. Our African
policy needs to be discussed in the NSC but we can't be
panicked into it by the Soviets and the Cubans. And we
can't say Rhodesia is not a danger because it is a bad
case. If the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next
and after that South Africa, itself. We must make the
Soviets pay a heavy price. If the Cubans move, I
recommend we act vigorously. We can't permit another
move without suffering a great loss. We must separate
the African issue from Cuba. Otherwise, it will be
seen as Soviet strength and US weakness. We need to
impress others with our will so we need serious military
plans. On my African trip, I will identify with African
aspirations.
Clements:
Are you going to Nigeria? It is the key to West Africa.
Kissinger:
They will not receive me. There is a total lack of
security there, ever since the coup. The regime is too
insecure. They will not allow Robinson to come either,
and he has been there frequently.
Vice President: Do you believe what the French say about Cubans in Algeria?
Kissinger:
I think we ought to separate the issue of Cuban advisers
from actual Cuban units. It is a much more complicated
but less dangerous problem.
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President:
The French are leaving Djibouti. What about the Cubans ?
Bush:
We have an up-to-date study on that and there are no
Cubans yet. There are a few in Algeria but none con-
firmed in the Sahara, either.
Vice President: The French told me they would set up an independent
government in FTAI and support them at their request.
The French will be responsible for security and foreign
affairs.
Bush:
Zambia and Mozambique are exercising restraint where
the Cubans are concerned.
Kissinger:
I may go to Mozambique.
Rumsfeld:
Were-there to be Soviet-supported Cuban activity in
Rhodesia, the President of the United States should not
warn the world and then be blocked by Congress--the
worst thing for the United States would be to appear
to be making hollow threats. We have talked about this
before. The US people and the Congress can be brought
to support the political facts of life about Cuba's shock
troops but they cannot accept them if it seems to be an
African problem. So we must pre-decide to discuss
the issue publicly in the context of the Soviet Union
rather than Cuba and Rhodesia. If it is in the latter
context, the US people cannot accept. In the former,
the people and Congress can decide the right way.
Kissinger:
Yes, in behalf of a positive program and not on behalf
of Rhodesia. It is better to confront Cuba militarily
and let the Soviets decide whether or not to go in. We
can confront Cuba and force the Soviets to back down.
We must prevent it by displaying firmness.
Rumsfeld:
We can't get Congressional and public opinion support
if it is a Rhodesia-Cuba issue.
President:
This is also my feeling. The tactical situa tion pertains
to Cuba but in the strategic sense we must tie in the
Soviets and Cubans.
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Vice President: What are our capabilities against Cuba?
President:
We should include both Cuba and the Middle East.
Scowcroft:
We can meet again next Friday.
Hyland:
We are surveying what we can do about Cuba.
President:
Tactically we should deal with Cuba but strategically it
will be necessary to deal with the USSR. It must be tied
strategically to the USSR.
Rumsfeld:
We should study what military, economic and political
means can be used against Cuba and the USSR, including
such things as wheat.
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