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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/11/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
MEMORANDUM
28138
ved
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETANODIS (XGDS) (3)
May 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
HAL HORAN HH
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the National Security Council
Meeting, held May 11, 1976
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council meeting held
May 11, 1976 to discuss Secretary Kissinger's African trip.
Attachment
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
Let 2/98.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRETANODIS (XGDS) (3)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
May 11, 1976
Time and Place: 6:15 p.m. - 7:15 p.m., The Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject: Secretary Kissinger's African Trip
Participants:
Principals: The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff George S. Brown
The Director of Office of Management and Budget James Lynn
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson
Defense:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Treasury: Deputy Secretary of Treasury George Dixon
CIA:
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
White House: Brent Scowcroft
William G. Hyland
NSC Staff: Harold Horan
SEGRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
SERALD LIBRARY P. FORD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
4R98-39, # 56; NSC letter 2/10/99
By Lit NARA, Date 5/25/99
SECREPANODIS (XGDS) (3)
2
The President: Before Henry went to Africa he gave a quick rundown on
what we were trying to do by this trip and our hopes for the visit. We
recognized that since the fiasco of Angola there was a growing radicalization
of the situation in southern Africa and that if we didn't do something we
would be creating serious problems for ourselves. Henry has now gone to
Africa and he has carried out a good, responsible policy. We got a little
political flack out of the trip; but it was totally without merit. If we are
going to hold our position in the world we cannot have a foreign policy
in limbo in an election year. We will continue to do what is right regard-
less of the primaries. This will sometimes be tough but it is right.
I think that from what Henry has already told me and will expand on further
here, we have halted the radicalization in Africa and opened the door for
movement in a positive direction. I don't want to hold you up for the
ballet, Henry. (Laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: As they say, Mr. President, in foreign policy timing
is everything. (Laughter)
The President: The Queen is a very charming and impressive person.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, let me first explain the situation
with regard to the timing of the trip, the situation in Africa within which
we attempted to make our decision on timing. First of all, it was dictated
by the UNCTAD meeting and also by the fact that Nyerere was leaving for
Europe on April 27. It was important that I see Nyerere before I saw
anyone else, for he holds the key in southern Africa, and it was also
desirable to get him nailed down to a moderate position before he made
too many statements on his European trip. So the timing of my trip was
the most suitable from foreign policy considerations.
The point of view of the situation as the President and I saw it last year
was that a communist victory in Angola would quicken events in southern
Africa, encourage radicalism and discourage moderates. When you added
to that the Cuban troops and the congressional action preventing us from
giving further support in Angola, we left our OAU supporters high and
dry and all trends toward radicalization in Africa were speeded up. Even
Kaunda of Zambia, a moderate, was announcing the beginning of an armed
struggle in southern Africa. With respect to southern Africa, all black
states bordering the area were calling for armed struggle and guerrilla
attacks. The CIA estimate was for a sure escalation over a six-month
period, that Rhodesia would defeat the rebels and that this would result
in outside interference. Such a development would put us in the position
of either acquiescing to another Cuban move in that area and thus
destroying governments on our side or resisting in the name of white
supremacy, and the latter would be impossible to do.
SECRETYNODIS (XGDS) (3)
FGRD is GERALD LIBRARY
SECRETANODIS (XGDS) (3)
3
Africa is important to us, many key products -- coffee, cocoa, cobalt,
chrome, iron ore, diamonds -- come from Africa, thirty to sixty percent
of our consumption; and for our European allies, the figures are even
higher. The radicalization of Africa would turn the Europeans, vis-a-vis
Africa, into commercial enterprises rather than governments.
In the face of this situation we attempted to do the following:
Find a platform on which we could rely that would arrest the armed
struggle in southern Africa, preclude foreign intervention, and give the
moderate regimes something to hold on to and the radicals something to
think about. The strategy was to slow down the struggle and get control
of the process as we did in the Middle East.
I saw Nyerere first, and I told him that if there was Cuban and Soviet
involvement we could stop it and that if he would work with us we would
find some way to make progress on solving the problems of southern
Africa. That was why it was important to make my Lusaka Speech, to give
us a platform on which we could stand. There was really very little
that was new in that speech. We have always supported majority rule --
you have said it yourself many times, Mr. President, -- supported repeal
of the Byrd Amendment, and supported UN sanctions.
In return for our commitments Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, and Khama have
agreed:
1. There will be no call for Cuban troops.
2. There will be no direct dealings by outsiders with the liberation
movements, a decision designed to prevent the communists from
influencing the Rhodesian struggle.
3. All arms shipments are to go through the neighboring govern-
ments.
4. While they could not prevent armed struggle, Nyerere said that
that struggle had to be ended by negotiations.
5. It was agreed that we would deal more actively with South Africa
and that we would not continue to treat them as pariahs. Thus we have
gained more freedom of movement with respect to South Africa.
I talked to Nkomo and he told me that the issue in Rhodesia is that if he
takes over through negotiation there will be civilian rule in Rhodesia,
that if the military takes over through force there will be a regime in
Rhodesia like that in Mozambique. He said that if a negotiated settlement
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRETANODIS (XGDS) (3)
4
does not come within two years he will be destroyed and we will face
another Mozambique. If we are concerned about chrome, dealing with a
military Mozambique would be more difficult than dealing with a civilian
Rhodesia.
The President: What will be our approach as to getting negotiations going
again with Smith, Nkomo, Callaghan and the rest?
Secretary Kissinger: We have to talk to South Africa to give us a hand
to bring Smith to negotiations, which have to end with majority rule and
the protection of minority rights. I have a basic sympathy with the white
Rhodesians but black Africa is absolutely united on this issue, and if we
don't grab the initiative we will be faced with the Soviets, and Cuban
troops.
If the four presidents back out of their understanding with us then we will
be in a better position to resist if Cuban troops show up.
I think we can succeed in getting the Cubans out of Angola and that African
states will help. We have thrown fear into the Cubans and Soviets by some
of the statements we have made. I cannot point to concrete evidence, but
that is my gut feeling. If we succeed in giving the African states a positive
program to rally around, then the moderates would be able to show the
benefit of working with us and the radicals may begin to feel differently.
This was the reason for my suggestions for a reconstruction program for
the Sahel. There was no specific fiscal tag on my suggestion and in fact,
what I proposed would probably cost us less in the long run than the way
we are going now. I'm not suggesting that we should finance the program
ourselves but to lead the Africans into cooperationg with an international
consortium.
When I started on my trip I was getting daily blasts from Uganda and
Nigeria, but by the end, I won't say they were being friendly but at
least they were quiet. Nyerere got the four foreign ministers of
Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania to talk with me in Nairobi,
and we had an understanding. I spoke to Giscard and told him there has
to be a western contribution. He made a speech today proposing that a
group of industrial countries -- I told him it was senseless for each
western country to have its own separate programs -- work with a group
of African countries and the President of the Ivory Coast was to accept
this on behalf of Africans. The African group would be composed of
moderates.
This is the overall strategy that we have pursued, Mr. President, and I
must say that the reaction in Africa has been uniformly favorable,
especially by states like Zaire, that doesn't give a damn about southern
Africa. Our friends in Africa were frightened by Angola, that the US
had withdrawn from Africa, and that they faced Soviet domination.
SECRETANORIS (XGDS) (3)
FORD it LIBRARY CERALD
SBORET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
5
Now, on my trip I did find there are two military problems, Zaire and
Kenya.
In Zaire we have a territory larger than Western Europe. Mobutu told
me that in Angola he faces 350 tanks, 50 heavy lift helicopters, and I
don't know what they face in Congo, Brazzaville, which is just across the
river. Mobutu said he couldn't survive indefinitely unless he can show
his people he has the forces to withstand. I feel that the small scale of
MAP we have been discussing for Zaire is insufficient. Mobutu said he
is being told by the American military advisers he doesn't need tanks,
but if Angola has them, why not him? He needs to show his people he
has the strength.
I don't think, Mr. President, that you want to make decisions here, this
is not the proper time. But if Zaire goes, it will be catastrophic. Next
to Nigeria, it is the richest state in Africa, it is larger than Nigeria and
except for Nigeria's oil, it has vaster resources.
Clements: The Nigerians are also more sophisticated.
Secretary Kissinger: Because of its area, its size, Zaire's collapse would
have a major impact.
Walters: Thirteen states border on Zaire.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, in the Congo, Zaire, we won the war
we lost in Angola. If Zaire goes, every African state will draw the con-
clusion that the Soviet Union (which they don't like all that much) is the
wave of the future. Countries like Senegal, which is closer to New York
than Nairobi and far away from Angola, felt they had to know if the US
was going to be active in Africa, if not they would have to make their
own accommodations And I do not feel decisions can wait for next year.
With every month that passes there is an acceleration of the Rhodesian
situation.
As for Kenya, it borders Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda, and Somalia and
Uganda claim pieces of it. There we have agreed to a $65 million military
program and they seem relatively satisfied.
In these situations there is relatively little money involved except for Zaire.
If we conduct a subtle diplomatic offense I think we can defuse the
southern African situation so there will be no outside intervention. We will
confine the situation to a black/white African war, and we can get black/
white African negotiations.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRETANODIS (XGDS) (3)
6
Those are, Mr. President, the conclusions I drew from my trip. I shared
them with the British and with Giscard, and can count on the support of
the West, moving us closer together.
The President: What, if any, involvement is there on the part of the
People's Republic of China?
Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are playing an intelligent game in
Africa. They are engaged in technical assistance and they are doing it
well. The Zairians told me that the Chinese there refuse to accept higher
wages than their Zairian counterparts and insist on living in the peasant
huts. The foreign country making the biggest impact in technical
assistance in Africa is the PRC. In Tanzania I was told the Chinese have
supported us on Angola. The Chinese Ambassador saw Nyerere several
times on that question. But the crucial thing was Nigerian recognition
of the MPLA. I was told on the trip that the Nigerian switch on Angola
resulted from a $25 million Soviet bribe.
Walters: In Tanzania the Chinese are building the largest overseas pro-
ject, a $600 million railroad.
Secretary Kissinger: The railroad also goes through Zambia and the
Chinese completed it on time. While they are right now more or less on
our side in the long run we can't count on them. Next to us they have
been the most discredited on Angola. But if they gain dominant influence
in Africa it will be almost as bad for us as Soviet dominance. So we can
work with them on a counter-Soviet program, but the longer term trends
of increased Chinese influence in Africa work against us. They have been
opposing us with the Africans in UNCTAD, for example.
Walters: They denounced us today, so did the Russians.
Secretary Kissinger: We have a chance in Africa. One of the problems is
that we have to bring Nigeria around. If the Sahel policy takes hold and
Zaire does well, I think they will come around -- and if southern Africa
does not become inflamed. If we have no position, Africa will unite. If
we have a position, many countries like Senegal, Zaire and the Ivory
Coast/ can go along with us.
The President: Would someone point out to me on the map the exact area
of the Sahel?
(General Walters delineates the area on the map.) Is it ecologically possible
to roll back the desert, or is this just talk?
FORD
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
7
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we have to start a pilot project. After
all, the Sahel was the grain basket of the Roman Empire. To what extent
we can be successful -- we will have to get a pilot project started that
will give us some evidence.
Walters: If we could redevelop Lake Chad that would be a tremendous
source of water.
Secretary Kissinger: There are a number of major rivers in the Sahel
and we have to consider building dams and irrigation systems.
Clements: Have you ever been to West Texas?
The President: Don't go there! (Laughter)
Clements: Come to West Texas. We need help there.
The President: So did I! (Laughter) Does anyone have any questions?
Scowcroft: We have a policy review on southern Africa underway, and
we ought to crank in what Henry has found out, and look at what we do.
Secretary Kissinger: I am not necessarily suggesting that we should take
the lead, particularly financially. We should start with an international
group and perhaps Giscard's plan is the way to do it.
Lynn: Would this be totally outside the UN system?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes
Clements: Are the Arabs in support of this program?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Saudis are and the Egyptians are in support
and I have kept them informed.
Walters: Morocco would help too. It borders on the Sahel.
Secretary Kissinger: I believe Iran would also be helpful. The Shah sent
me a letter supporting my African trip.
Clements: That support is very important.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, because Algeria and Libya are really causing
us problems in black Africa.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
BERALD ? FORD
SECRET/MODIS (XGDS) (3)
8
General Brown: Mr. Secretary, when you talked about the military
situation in Zaire and Kenya, you said that Kenya was reasonably satisfied.
Did you mean to say more about that?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, they are reasonably satisfied but they would
like to have A-4s. They would like attack aircraft. We had only agreed
to give them F5Es. Also Kenyatta asked that we speed up delivery of
these. He said that even if they didn't have pilots trained to fly them,
it would be useful for his neighbors to see the F5Es parked on his airfields.
These countries are like families. They are more like families than legiti-
mate organizations. The leaders are not obeyed because of their constitu-
tional authority but because the whole state is a family structure and there
is one-man rule. Appearance in these countries is as important as reality
and they are basically more oriented toward the West than the East. If we
act we can reduce Soviet influence in southern Africa and break the
penetration of Africa by the Soviets, the Chinese, Algerians and Libyans.
The President: Was it universally agreed in your discussions that no one
wanted Cuban involvement?
Secretary Kissinger: If we can keep the four states together -- Tanzania,
Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana -- then we can use Botswana and
Zambia as a brake on Mozambique and Tanzania will be somewhere in
between. While we have to realize that African promises are not necessarily
for eternity, they did agree to no Cuban troops.
Walters: Seretse Khama is a sick man.
Secretary Kissinger: I didn't meet him.
Walters: He has heart trouble, kidney trouble, diabetes and blood
problems.
Secretary Kissinger: He is coming to Washington. He is a moderate and
so is Kaunda. Nyerere also is not keen on Cubans. They have agreed
to act together and consult with us so that if the Cubans do show up
then we will have a different platform from which to react.
The President: Any questions? Lynn, this did not require you to open
the purse.
Lynn: Yes, but I have a hunch I will have to at the next meeting.
Secretary Kissinger: The first priority is Zaire, if we could send a senior
military officer to Zaire just to look -- if Bill could go
SECRETYNODIS (XGDS) (3)
GERALD FORD LIBRARI
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
9
Clements: -- and General Brown --
Secretary Kissinger: -- a senior military officer, just to look, Mobutu
said it would make a difference. We used to send the Commander of the
Strike Force once a year to Zaire but that has been stopped, and Mobutu
said it made a difference. So a mission there, even though we delivered
nothing immediately, would be important.
Clements: Mr. President, I am willing if those are your instructions.
I agree that this would be a strong signal.
The President: When do you want to leave -- tomorrow? (Laughter)
Clements: I will go and take George.
Secretary Kissinger: Or a senior officer. The programs that our embassies
design are based on what they think we can bleed out of Congress. But
this is usually too little. What we need to consider are major programs
in countries like Zaire, Senegal, Kenya and Zambia and I think it would
be worth dropping some of our third-rate programs in other countries,
even though our Ambassadors would scream their heads off. We have to
look at programs that would make a real difference. In Zaire we could get
the French to do the training. We should try to push Europe and Giscard
has now given us the opportunity to do SO.
The President: Is Giscard's proposal a Development Bank proposal?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is not clear exactly what he intends. I have
not seen the full speech yet but basically it is to create a group of donor
countries that would work together for the development of Africa with
African moderates. Aid would go to Zambia but not Mozambique. To the
Ivory Coast but not Mali and therefore create incentives.
Walters: In other words, an African Marshall Plan with an OECD role.
Secretary Kissinger: We are not really talking about huge amounts. These
countries are relatively underpopulated and are undeveloped. Chuck has
talked with the Arabs about using Arab money for transportation and
irrigation systems and these talks have been encouraging. The beauty
of this is that these countries are so uninformed on Africa that once we
are in there, we can have a major impact. Once we become involved
diplomatically and get the British out in front in Rhodesia once again, I
think we can get the Cubans out.
Robinson: The Saudis have asked us which countries in Africa are good
and which are bad. I am encouraged that the Arabs will be a major
financial resource.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
BERALD R. $
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
10
Clements: All they have is money.
Secretary Kissinger: We can design the programs we have in mind but
we would not want the Arabs to play a technical assistance role in Africa.
I think we have an unusual opportunity.
The President: Is the African study underway?
Scowcroft: Yes, but we will need to modify the instructions.
Secretary Kissinger: If we could speed up the study and by the end of
June have some practical decisions this would be good. Also, if we
could send a mission to Zaire within the next three-four weeks and
within the next two weeks tell Mobutu it is coming, that would give them
an uplift.
The President: (turning to Clements) Why don't you talk to Rummy about
the idea?
Clements: One of the problems we have, Henry, is that as we travel
around the country talking about African policy we need to have ideas
about how to respond to questions about your trip.
Secretary Kissinger: I am testifying at the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee meeting Thursday in public hearings and that should do it. I am
going to make a formal statement and lay out the strategy to assure that
what we are going to do will prevent a bloodbath. The CIA estimate was
that an armed struggle would accelerate in six months and that the
temptations for foreign troops would be overwhelming as Rhodesia resisted.
This is a process we had delayed and can delay further with diplomatic
action. We need South Africa's help and additional support and if Africa
sees that is helping, I think they will go along.
The President: Once again, thank you, Henry, and don't miss the
ballet. (Laughter)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)
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