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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 7/21/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
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of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Final version
SHOKET / SENSITIVE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
/
ON SALT
Wednesday, July 21, 1976
9:30 a.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scowcroft
BD
I. PURPOSE
To review the status of the SALT negotiations and alternative
approaches to take at this stage of the negotiations.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background:
In February we communicated a proposal to
the Soviets based on completion of the Vladivostok Agreement
plus an interim agreement for the period through January 1979
that would: (1) restrict sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)
and land-launched cruise missile (LLCM) testing to 2500 km
and deployment to 600 kin, and (2) limit the Backfire production
level to the current rate. The Vladivostok portion of the
agreement (1.0 last through 1985) included counting heavy
bombers with 600 - 2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 ceiling and
banning ALCMs over 600 km on other aircraft.
The Soviets rejected this proposal in March and expressed a strong
preference for returning to the negotiating situation which
prevailed in January. Their particular concerns were the
continued US insistence that Backfire should be limited and our
movement back from our January position where we offered to
ban deployment and testing of submarine SLCMs over 600 km.
The Verification Panel has been examining alternative approaches
to take at this stage of the negotiation. (The paper prepared for
this meeting is at Tab B.) Two approaches will be presented
for your consideration:
START / SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, NSC Sec. 3.4 2/19/99
MR 98-40, #57; State letter 9/25/98
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION.WT NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
TOP SCORET/SENSITIVE
2
1.
Maintain our most recent position as put forward in
February. Within this approach, we could consider
the following modifications which might improve its
negotiability:
-- Include a ban on all cruise missiles above 2500 km
in the 1985 Vladivostok Agreement.
Include this ban in the Vladivostok Agreement but drop
the interim agreement concept in its entirety.
Extend the period. of the interim agreement through
October 1980 (i. e., allow three years after the new
agreement goes into effect for negotiation of limits
on SLCMs, LLCMs, and Backfire).
2.
The second approach would provide for:
-- reductions to 2150, including reduction of about
100 Soviet heavy missiles (SS-9s).
-- a Soviet statement on their Backfire production plans,
and Soviet assurances and collateral constraints to
inhibit use of Backfire against the US.
-- retention of the ALCM and submarine SLCM limitations
from January proposal; i. e., heavy bombers with
600-2500 km ALCMs would be counted in the 1320,
ALCMs over 600 km would be banned on all other
aircraft, and SI. CMs over 600 km would be banned on
submarines. SLCMs on surface ships would be limited
in range.
At Tab B is the Verification Panel paper.
At Tab C is a copy of my earlier memo summarizing the
current options.
At Tab D is the February proposal.
At Tab E is Secretary Rumsfeld's memo suggesting a message
to Brezhnev.
At Tab F is ACDA Director Ikle's memo suggesting removal
of the Interim Agreement portion of the February proposal.
B.
Participants: (List at Tab A)
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
SSCRET/SENSITIVE
3
C.
Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will
be announced. White House photographer only.
III.
TALKING POINTS
At the opening of the meeting
1.
Before we get into a detailed discussion, I want to re-emphasize
my strong interest in conclusion of a new SALT agreement
building on the basic provisions which we negotiated at
Vladivostok. I consider a sound and defensible SALT agree-
ment to be strongly in the US interest and not simply an issue
of partisan politics.
2.
Wc have a responsibility to consider carefully not only the
provisions currently being negotiated but the long-term
impact of not reaching an agreement.
3.
We have no deadline for reaching an agreement. I think it
is essential, however, to keep in mind that the Interim Agree-
ment does expire in October. It is my view that we should
take a hard look at the current negotiating situation to see if
an agreement that is in the US interest can be achieved over
the next few months.
4.
I understand the Verification Pancl has been looking at several
approaches which we could take at this stage of the negotiations.
5.
Henry, as Chairman of the Verification Pancl, could you
describe the status of the negotiations and the approaches the
Verification Panel has been analyzing.
(Following Kissinger presentation)
6.
Don, I'd like to hear your views on these issues.
(Following the discussion)
7.
I have found this meeting to be particularly helpful in my
consideration of this issue. I want to take the time to carefully
consider the possible approaches we could take at this time.
FORD & LIBRARY
MANAGRET /SENSITIVE
4
S,
I want to emphasize once again my interest in moving ahead
in SALT if at all possible, and I want everyone to devote
their energies to this effort, and I expect full support and
unity of effort on whichever course I feel is in the overall
best interests of the United States.
TYNNPORRE/SENSITIVE
FORD is 93 LIBRARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09226
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Talking Points, NSC Meeting, 7/20/76
CREATION DATE
07/1976
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200035
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 7/21/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
soniticed 7/99 at
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGOS
TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING
Tuesday, July 20, 1976 - 2:30 am
-- Mr. President, the purpose of this meeting is to review for you
the status of the SALT negotiations and to describe two basic approaches
which you might adopt as our reply to the Soviets.
-- First, I think it would be helpful to review our efforts over the
last nin months.
-- Last September, we introduced the idea of treating sea-based
cruise missiles and Backfire as hybrid or "grey" areas: we proposed
a common limit of 300 hybrid systems on the two sides -- for the
Soviets, Backfires and SLCMs up to 2000 km in range, and for us, FB-llls
and SLCMs up to 2000 km. The effect would have been for the Soviets to
forego cruise missiles if they wanted a full complement of Backfire.
- That proposal also included a limit of 300 heavy bombers
equipped ALCMs up to 2500 km in range.
-- Brezhnev flatly rejected that proposal. He specifically complained
about treating Backfire as a "hybrid".
-- In January, we considered four options, ranging from complete
deferral of Backfire and cruise missiles, to counting all of them. Our
initial proposal prior to my January discussion called for:
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (d)
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
MR9840, $58; Stateletter
Nse will 2/19/49
By let NARA, Date 07/21/98, 7/20/99
SEC RET/SENSITIVE
2
- Counting all Backfire produced after October 1977 in the 2400
aggregate.
- Counting heavy bombers with 600-2500 km ALCMs in the 1320
MIRV ceiling.
- Banning submarine SLCMs over 600 km in range.
- Banning land-based cruise missiles and surface ship cruise
missiles over 2500 km.
- Counting each surface ship armed with 600-2500 km SLCMs in the
1320 MIRV ceiling.
-- Brezhnev insisted that Backfire was not a strategic bomber, and
provided some rough figures on the maximum operational radius of
the aircraft to support his contention.
-- - We then proposed a tougher version of the fallback we had discussed
at the NSC:
- it included a five year interim agreement, limiting Backfire to
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
275 aircraft through 1982.
- The number of surface ships equipped with 600-2500 km SLCMs
would be limited to a ceiling of 25 in this same five-year period.
FORD
-- The other provisions of the proposal were as we had originally
GERALD
LIBORY
proposed except that we also proposed reductions to 2300 by 1982.
-- Brezhnev did not reject our position but offered a counterproposal
which remains the present Soviet position:
- He accepted our approach on ALCMs -- to treat them as MIRVed
vehicles with the exception of wanting to count the B-1 as three MIRVed
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
vehicles (this was not serious).
- He accepted our proposal for defining a heavy missile on the basis
of throw weight.
- He offered to give a written commitment that Backfire would
not be given a capability against the US.
- He reiterated their position that all SLCMs and land-launched
cruise missiles should be limited to 600 km.
- He offered to consider reductions to a level even below 2300.
-- Considering the Brezhnev position in February, we decided to try
to defer Backfire and sea-based cruise missiles for a limited period.
-- - We proposed:
- To complete the Vladivostok Agreement along with other
provisions agreed in Geneva: specifically, we added the limitations on
air-launched cruise missiles which included counting heavy bombers
equipped with 600-2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit. (See chart)
- To set aside the Backfire, sea-launched, and land-launched
FORD & LIBRARY
cruise missile issues in an interim agreement to last through January
1979. Backfire production would be frozen, and testing of SLCMs per-
mitted up to 2500 km but no deployment.
-- In March, this approach was also rejected by Brezhnev.
-- He characterized the US proposal as moving backward from our
position in January; in particular, he criticized the withdrawal of our
proposal for a 600 km limit on submarine SLCMs.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
-- - He claimed it was "unrealistic" to think it would be easier to ban
long range cruise missiles after they had been tested and even produced.
-- He proposed that we reconsider the proposal they had made at
the conclusion of the January negotiations in Moscow.
*
*
-- The Verification Panel has been looking at alternative approaches
for resolving the current deadlock.
-- We have come up with two basic approaches to present for your
consideration (refer to chart).
[FYI: There is a chart describing the basic proposals. ]
I.
Maintain February Position
-- The first approach would be to maintain our present position as
put forward in February.
-- The argument for this approach is that the Soviets will not give
it serious consideration unless we stick to our position.
Variations on the February Proposal
-- In light of the flat rejection, however, we might consider some
modification of the terms to make this approach more interesting to the
Soviets.
[FYI: Refer to chart on Variations on the February proposal. ]
A. The first variation we considered was to extend the ban on
ALCMs over 2500 km in the Vladivostok Agreement to cover all cruise
FORD
missiles in the permanent agreement.
FORD & GERALD LIBRAR.
As BECRET/SENSITIVE
5
- This would assure the Soviets that regardless of the outcome
of the follow-on negotiations, there would be a ban on SLCMs and land-
launched cruise missiles over 2500 km.
B. Since adding the ban on all cruise missiles above 2500 km to the
Vladivostok Agreement might reduce our leverage for negotiating
acceptable limits on Backfire, we might consider dropping the idea of an
interim agreement entirely. This would leave Backfire, SLCMs and land-
based cruise missiles entirely free -- but presumably candidates for SALT
III.
C. A third variation is to extend the period of the interim agreement
to October 1980, which would be a period of three years after the entry into
force of the Vladivostok Agreement to negotiate follow-on limitations on
Backfire and sea- and land-launched cruise missiles.
- This would have more of an impact on the US SLCM program
since initial deployment is currently scheduled for early 1980; however,
we could continue to test SLCMs out to 2500 km for the next four years,
thus making a lower range limit almost impossible.
- Even so, the temporary ban risks becoming a permanent one;
especially if Congress continues to cut SLCM funding.
CERAED 7 3
FORD : LIBRARY GERALD
ACREA/SENSITIVE
b
II. Reductions Proposal
-- The second basic approach we considered was to go back to the concep
of solving all the issues in one agreement, by taking up Brezhnev's offer
on reductions. We would propose to include reductions to 2150 by
1982, and to include a reduction of 100 SS-9s on the Soviet side.
- - If they reduced heavy missiles, we would fall off our demand for
strict numerical limits on Backfire; however, we would ask for a Soviet
statement on the total number of Backfires to be produced through 1985.
- We would also take Brezhnev up on his offer to give us
assurances that Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability,
and might also seek other collateral constraints on Backfire refueling,
basing, etc.
-- The cruise missile limitations would be similar to our January
discussion.
-- SLCMs over 600 km on submarines are banned, but permitted on
surface ships and land up to 2500 km in range; ALCMs are counted as
MIRVs, banned on other aircraft.
-- We would also like to get a freeze on SS-18 deployment so that all
of their permitted heavy missiles would not be MIRVed.
- If the freeze were effective as of the end of this year, after a
reduction of 100 they would be left with about 134 SS-18s and about 92 SS-9s,
but in the more likely case of a freeze in October 1977, they
133 SS-18s and about 20 SS-9s.
X i LIBRARD GERALD
FOSECRET/SENSITIVE
7
Assessment:
Summing up, we have to consider where we would be in either of
the two approaches as well as the case of no agreement:
- - If we stick with the last proposal, we would thereby be betting
that after five months of deadlock, Brezhnev will switch his position;
the problem is that all last year we argued that the Soviets would finally
cave on Backfire and they have not.
-- If we want to string out the negotiations, then this probably
guarantees it.
-- It has the virtue of displaying our refusal to budge; if the talks
collapse we could defend it; if we add the 2500 km range limit for all
cruise missiles, particularly through 1980, we have to compare whether
this outcome is better than the reductions option.
-- In the reductions option we could deploy longer range ship-based
missiles but in the interim agreement approach we could not; Backfire
would reach 270 by October 1980, while running free in the reductions
proposal, but the total Backfire in 1980 would be about the same, because
production will not increase until late in 1980.
In short, the interim agreement may not buy us much. Thus, we
could consider dropping it altogether -- but this approach is likely to
be strongly resisted by the Soviets; Backfire runs free; but all we obtain
compared to the reductions option is the freedom to deploy SLCMs, on
is
FORD
submarines.
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SEC RE/F/SENSITIVE
8
The reductions option has what most critics have wanted for
SALT III, namely low level reductions, and throw weight reductions.
-- Our forces would not be severely affected at the 2150 level, but the
Soviets would have to take down over 400 missiles and bombers; CIA
estimates they would reduce about 225 ICBMs, 128 SLBMs and 70 bombers.
-- To be realistic, however, we should recognize that the Soviets
might accept reductions, but will resist specific reductions of heavy
missiles.
-- This approach has the advantage of picking up the main thread
of the negotiations, as the Soviets suggested in their last reply, and it
would be defensible in terms of meeting SALT objectives, but would
be criticized for dropping Backfire and eliminating cruise missiles
on submarines.
#*******
[Optional]
One way to handle these options is to reaffirm the interim agreement
approach, but tell the Soviets if they want to go back to the other options.
we would then propose reductions to 2150; this way we might smoke out
the Soviet fall back, and you could decide later how to handle the details of
reductions if they accept the idea in principle.
FUND
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD