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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 12/2/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09242
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
CREATOR'S TITLE
National Security Adviser
RECEIVER'S TITLE
President
TITLE
NSC meeting on the NSSM 246 Report on
US Defense Policy and Military Posture
and the NSC study on Naval Force
Requirements
CREATION DATE
12/02/1976
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200040
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
santized 4/27/04
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON THE NSSM 246 REPORT ON
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE
AND THE NSC STUDY ON
NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS
Thursday, December 2, 1976
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scowcroft
B
I. PURPOSE
To be briefed on and discuss NSC studies on U.S. Defense Policy and
Military Posture (NSSM 246) and Naval Force Requirements.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A.
Background
1. NSSM 246. In September, you directed through NSSM 246
that the NSC conduct a broad review of U.S. defense policy
and military posture. The study, which was conducted by
the NSC Defense Review Panel, has been completed. It
provides a range of illustrative strategies for both our
strategic and general purpose forces, taking into account
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
2/19/99, oso 4127104
# 2t etr 9/25/98
Date 2/8/05
their military, arms control, and budgetary implications.
In the area of strategic forces, the study highlights the
following issues as central to U.S. strategy:
-- Deterrence Criteria: What criteria for selecting and
sizing U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces
will assure achievement of our fundamental objective
of deterring nuclear attack?
-- Force Diversity: How much force diversity and redundancy
is necessary to provide adequate confidence in performance,
to hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs
or catastrophic failures, and to complicate any Soviet
first strike designs? The study examines the triad of
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
GERALD LIBRARY A. FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
2
of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs and possible
alternatives such as a dyad of bombers and SLBMs only.
Force modernization programs such as the
are
related to this analysis.
Countersilo Capability: Do we need to increase our
capability to attack the hardened Soviet ICBM force?
This issue deals with weapons effectiveness and crisis
stability. It relates directly to the future of the
and
programs.
Defensive Damage Limitation: What level of emphasis
should be placed on U.S. civil defense programs, air
defense, and ABM R&D?
The study points up the growth in the capability of Soviet
general purpose forces and examines alternate U.S. responses.
Among the key general purpose force issues raised in the
report are:
Adequacy of Forward Deployment: What arethe
appropriate levels of forward deployed forces in Europe
and elsewhere?
Assumptions on Warning Time: Should U.S. planning
for initial NATO defense, mobilization, and short-term
reinforcement continue to assume approximately three
weeks of warning time?
Sustainability: How long should U.S. NATO forces be
capable of sustaining conflict, and what is the relative
likelihood of a very short (days or weeks) versus a
longer (months or years) war? Central to the sustainability
factor are the issues of Soviet capabilities, U.S. equipment
stocks, and mobilization and preparedness programs.
Conflict Outside the NATO Central Region: How much
combat capability should the U.S. maintain for conflict on
the NATO flanks and outside the European theater? We
currently maintain land, air, and naval forces for a range
of possible contingencies outside Central Europe. Decisions
on the future nature and size of these forces have major
implications for the Navy and Marines, and are tied to
special considerations such as Mid-East oil supply
continuity and Korean defense.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
GERAID FORD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
Alternative approaches derived from different responses
to these fundamental issues have been combined to form a
number of illustrative notional strategies -- five for strategic
forces and six for general purpose forces. These in turn
are combined into a number of overall strategy alternatives.
These combinations provide a useful framework for examining
each issue in the context of overall defense policy. Two of
the notional strategies approximate current policy, with
alternatives ranging on either side of these base points.
Tentative and extremely rough cost estimates have been
provides for each strategy.
The study lends itself to a number of possible uses. Each
of the Defense Review Panel principals has an independent
view on the utility of the study and on the individual issues
and alternative strategies presented in the report. There
are differing opinions as to the extent to which the study in
its present form provides an appropriate basis for decisions
affecting our national strategies. As Secretary Rumsfeld
points out in his transmittal memorandum to you, there is a
need for additional analysis to reduce uncertainties associated
with the strategy alternatives, the force requirements and the
cost implications of each.
2. NSC Study on Naval Force Requirements. The NSC study
on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements was initiated
early in 1976 and conducted by the NSC Defense Review Panel.
Its early development provided the basis for the May supple-
mental budget request to the Congress for additional shipbuilding
funds. Your FY 1977 budget requested $6.3B for 16 ships.
The supplemental added $1.2B for five more ships and long-
lead funding for an additional carrier (CVN-71). Congress
approved $6.2B for 15 ships and the long-lead funds for the
carrier.
As a basis for U.S. force projections, the study has examined
trends in the growth of the Soviet Navy, its capabilities for
conducting naval warfare in areas more distant from the
Soviet Union, and the increasing willingness of the Soviet
leadership to employ naval forces in support of foreign
policy objectives. The basic questions governing U.S. naval
force requirements as set forth in the Navy study are:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
4
Should we accelerate current shipbuilding plans? The
numerical size of the Soviet Navy has stabilized but
newly constructed ships possess increased capabilities.
Should the force mix of ship types stress expensive,
highly capable ships, or should we concentrate on
numbers, building less expensive ships of lower unit
capability? Within this broad question, the study
addresses such issues as carrier vulnerability and
force levels; a program to modernize the existing
carrier force; the nuclear/conventional power mix;
the qualitative mix of other surface combatants;
alternative methods of providing air power to the
fleet; and the impact of future systems such as V/STOL
aircraft and cruise missiles.
Should the program stress new construction or should
it emphasize the readiness of existing units while adding
more slowly to the size and strength of the fleet?
Based on the projected threat and alternative responses
to these basic questions, the study outlines major naval force
alternatives. The current FY 78 Defense Plan builds an
average of 22 ships per year for a force of 535 ships by 1990
at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977 dollars.
Three other major program options are offered:
Option 1 would build no more large-deck carrier
and would use the funds formerly devoted to carrier
construction to build more surface combatants (an
average of 28 ships per year for a force of 586 ships
by 1990 at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977
dollars).
Option 2 would build one more large-deck carrier,
develop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard a few
smaller aviation ships, and build additional surface
combatants -- stressing numbers over unit capability
(an average of 32 ships per year for a force of 608
ships by 1990 at an average annual cost of $8. 0B in
FY 1977 dollars).
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
LIDRARY
Option 3 would build one more large-deck carrier,
develop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard
more aviation ships, and build a mix of surface
combatants -- stressing unit capability and numbers
of ships (an average of 32 ships per year for a
force of 609 ships by 1990 at an average annual cost
of $8. 4 B in FY 1977 dollars).
Subsequent to the completion of the study, Defense added
a Low-Mix Option. This option falls between Options 1
and 2 in overall Navy size and costs. It does not build
one more large-deck carrier or any strike cruisers. It
develops V/STOL aircraft and deploys them aboard one
aviation ship, and includes additional surface combatants
of lower unit capability and additional support ships. It
emphasizes numbers of ships (an average of 32 ships
per year for a force of 604 ships by 1990 at an average
cost of $7.5 B in FY 1977 dollars).
The study concludes that there is a need to improve our
naval capability and that the current Defense Plan
already includes an ambitious program to raise both the
quality of our ships and overall force levels. The
options presented provide a means to accelerate and
expand the current plan. A choice among the options
centers on the question of whether we should build one
more large-deck carrier and the qualitative mix of
surface combatants necessary to improve the fleet's
anti-air and anti-missile capability.
3.
Relationship between NSSM 246 Strategies and Navy
Study Options.
The NSSM 246 study outlines
alternative defense strategies, and provides notional
force structures, including naval forces, for each. The
Navy study postulates three alternative force structures
designed to implement current U.S. strategy. The
options in the two studies therefore are not strictly
comparable. However, some general correlation is
possible, and a chart illustrating the general
relationship is at Tab D.
B.
Participants:
(List at Tab A)
C.
Press Arrangements:
The meeting, but not the subject,
will be announced. White House photographer only.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD ADHARY
TOP SECRET/S' SITIVE XGDS
6
III. TALKING POINTS
(At the opening of the meeting)
1.
The basic purpose of this meeting is to become acquainted
with the results of two major NSC studies, both of which
could provide important contributions to future U.S. defense
policy and military posture. Don, would you brief us first
on the response to NSSM 246?
(Following briefing and discussion of NSSM 246)
2.
We also now have the final version of the Navy study which
we discussed in a preliminary version last spring. Don,
could we have the briefing on that study?
(Upon conclusion of discussion of the Navy study)
3.
These studies clearly represent a major effort to grapple
with the future direction of our military strategy and force
posture. I want to consider them both in greater detail and
will probably want further NSC discussion of NSSM 246.
Attachments
Tab A
-
List of Participants
Tab B
-
U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,
Response to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976
Tab C
-
NSC Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force
Requirements, November 16, 1976
Tab D
-
Implications of Navy Study Alternatives and
Options for NSSM 246 Strategies
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
ATTENDANCE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
December 2, 1976
Cabinet Room - 9:00 a.m.
Principals
The Vice President
Acting Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown
The Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
The Director, Office of Management and Budget, James T. Lynn
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Other Attendees
Defense:
Dr. James P. Wade
E.C. Aldridge
WH:
Richard Cheney
Brent Scowcroft
William G. Hyland
NSC
Staff:
General Richard Boverie
FORD
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
09244
IMPLICATIONS OF NAVY STUDY ALTERNATIVES AND
OPTIONS FOR NSSM 246 STRATEGIES
Navy Study "Options" 1, 2, 3 and the Low-Mix Option, * each provide
a specific force structure for the execution of current strategy. These
"Options" are variants of Navy Study "Alternatives" B and C, and
roughly describe an increasing force scale from NSSM 246 Strategy
G-2 through G-3. Other NSSM 246 Strategies entail Navy forces
lesser or greater than the three Navy Study "Options. 11 These
relationships are depicted in the following chart:
Navy "Alternative"
Navy "Option"
NSSM 246 Strategy
A
Less than all "options" Europe - 30 days (G-1)
B
Current plan
Current strategy (G-2)
Option 1
Low-Mix Option*
Option 2
C
Option 3
Current NATO/increased
worldwide (G-3)
D
Exceeds all "options" Increased NATO/increased
worldwide (G-6)
E
Greatly exceeds all
Exceeds all NSSM 246
"options"
strategies
*
Not addressed in the Navy Study; added by DOD after the
study was completed.
GERALD ? LIBRARY FORD
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B)(3)
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
NSCJAr2119199, ospetr 4/27/04
(Classified by Brent Scowcroft)
mr 98-40,#63; st.lts 9/25/98
dal NARA, Date 2/8/05
TOP SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
November 30, 1976
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEFENSE REVIEW PANEL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Response to NSSM 246 - US Defense Policy and Military Posture (c)
Attached hereto is the National Security Council Defense Review Panel's
response to NSSM 246. It addresses the current and projected threat, arms
control, and resource considerations associated with our military posture.
It also highlights a number of critical unresolved issues which impact on
present and projected strategies and require further studies and analysis.
Changing military and political considerations identified during the study
make it questionable that our current policies and programs will be fully
consistent with our national security requirements during the 1980s.
We have therefore developed a range of options in the form of notional
alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces, some
of which merit further refinement and detailed analysis. Additional analysis
is particularly needed to reduce the current uncertainty in the elements of
each major strategy alternative, along with the force structure requirements
and cost implications of each. These cost estimates are extremely rough
and the figures are not agreed among your advisers.
2
Attachment
a/s
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD i LIBRARY BERALD
DECLASSIFIED
TOPSECRET
When Enclesure is Baterbal
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
This doesment IS despanded
MR98-40,#62; DOD 6ther 8/24/98
to Confidential
By
let
NARA, Date 10/21/98
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STUDY ON
U.S. STRATEGY
AND
NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS
16 November 1976
Classified by ASD(ISA).
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption
Category 2. Declassify on 31 December 2006
FORD & LIBRARY SERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Authority detumined to be unclassified whensemed
from classifed attachments
By lit
NLF Date 6/98
i
U.S. STRATEGY AND NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS
1. The Political-Military Environment of the 1980s and 1990s
- I
A. Assumptions About the Global Military Balance
- 1
B. Political, Economic and Technological Assumptions
- 1
11. Bases of U.S. Defense Policies
- 3
A. U.S. National Aims
- 3
B. U.S. National Security Objectives
- 3
C. National Defense Policy Guidance
- 4
1. Sources of Policy
- 4
2. Strategic Nuclear Forces
- 4
3. General Purpose Forces
- 5
111. The Soviet Military Challenge and Its Maritime Implications
- 5
A. The Soviet Military Challenge
- 5
B. Soviet Military Trends
- 6
C. Soviet Maritime Challenge
- 6
D. The Challenge of Soviet Naval Forces (Sea and Air)
- 7
IV. Factors in Developing a Maritime Program
- 9
A. Strategic Considerations
- 9
B. Future Technological Developments
-11
C. Vulnerability of Surface Ships
-13
D. Role of the Naval Reserves
-14
E. Maritime Forces for Freedom of the Seas
-15
F. Key Points in a Strategy for Serving U.S. Maritime Interests
-16
G. Controllable and Non-controllable Elements
-18
H. DoD Program Implications of the Maritime Strategy
-18
I. From Strategy to Force Structure
-19
V. Navy Force Requirements
-19
A. The Navy's Mission
-19
FORG i LIBRARY GERALD
ii
B. Conduct of Naval Operations
-20
1. Routine Forward Deployed Posture
-20
2. Transition from Routine Forward Deployment Posture to
Worldwide Conflict
-25
3. Worldwide Conventional War with The Soviet Union
-26
a. Soviet Strategy
-26
b. U.S. and Allied Strategy and Force Employment
-27
(1) Sea Control
-27
(a) Threat Characteristics that Influence the
Campaign
-29
(b) Area Sea Control Operations
-29
(c) Local Sea Control operations
-32
1. The Atlantic
-34
2. The Mediterranean Sea
-34
3. The Pacific
-35
4. The Indian Ocean
-35
(2) Power Projection
-35
C. Operational Employment of Supporting Forces
-36
(1) Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Forces
-36
(2) Allied Contribution
-38
(3) Land-Based Aircraft
-38
C. Nuclear War at Sea
-43
D. Current Net Assessment of Capabilities -- U.S. vs. USSR
-44
1. Force Trends
-44
2. Sea Control
-44
a. USSR
-44
b. U.S.
-45
E. Major Force Alternatives
LIBRARY
-46
iii
;
1. The Five Year Defense Program - Alternative B
-50
)
2. The Reduced Force - Alternative A
-50
5
3. The Intermediate Force - Alternative C
-50
6
4. The Navy's Recommended Force - Alternative D
-52
6
5. The JCS Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) Objective Force -
Alternative E
-52
7
6. The JSOP Prudent Risk Force
-52
7
: Specific Program Options
-52
A. Decision Required
9
-52
1. Issues Related to Force Levels
:9
-54
12
2. Issues Related to the Composition of the Navy
-55
34
a. Qualitative Considerations
-55
b. Carriers and Cost
34
-56
35
C. Nuclear/Conventional Power Mix
-59
(1) Large Deck Carriers
35
-61
(2) AEGIS Cruiser
35
-61
36
d. Qualitative Mix of Other Surface Combatants
-61
36
e. The Future of Sea-Based Air
-63
38
f. New Technology
-64
.38
3. Issues Related to Rate of Growth
-64
-43
B. Program Options for a Decision
-64
Option 1
-44
-65
Option 2
-44
-65
Option 3
-44
-65
-44
Criteria for Decision
-66
-AS
Pace of Modernization
-70
-46
Program Details
LIMBURA GERALD P. FORD
-70
iv
VII. Areas for Further Study
-77
Annex A
A-1
Summary of Allied Capabilities
A-1
Areas for Allied Force Improvement Emphasis
A-3
Specific Naval Forces Recommendations
A-4
FORD is LIBRARY BERALD