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    "title": "NSC Meeting, 12/15/76",
    "description": "This file contains comments by President Gerald Ford on the national security.",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 12/15/1976\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\nJen law &\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n6640X\nINFORMATION\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nJanuary 3, 1977\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis\namo\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC, Meeting\nHeld December 15, 1976\nAttached are the minutes of the National Security Council meeting\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nRETIRED E MOMBERSHIP\nheld December 15, 1976 to discuss NSSM 246--U. S. Defense Policy\nand Military Posture.\nGerald R. Ford Library\ncc: Mr. Hyland\nGen. Boverie\nORIGINAL\nAttachment\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS (B) (3)\nlit 2/28/98\nGERALD\n&\nFORD\nTORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n6640X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTORSECREY/SENSVTIVE XGDS\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nWednesday, December 15, 1976\nTIME:\n3:00 p.m. to 4:45 p.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nNSSM 246 -- U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture\nPrincipals\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOX PRESERVATION\nThe President\nThe Vice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld\nDirector, Office of Management and Budget, James T. Lynn\nActing Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Lehman\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown\nDeputy Director of Central Intelligence Enno Knoche\nAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft\nOther Attendees\nWhite House:\nMr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President\nMr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nDr. James P. Wade (Deputy Assistant Secretary for\nPolicy Plans and NSC Affairs)\nNSC Staff:\nBrig Gen Richard T. Boverie\nGERALD\nFORD LIBRARY LIBRARY\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nMR 98- 39, 65; NSCletes 2/10/99\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nBy let NARA, Date 5/25/99\nTOR.SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n2\nPresident Ford: I've looked at the NSSM 246 study. It is obviously a\nvery well done effort, particularly in view of the time pressures. It\nhas been helpful to me, and should be helpful to the next Administration.\nI've looked at the various alternatives. Don, should we start with the\nsix overall strategies, or perhaps go first with strategic forces and\nthen general purpose forces?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We have the strategies on the boards here today.\nWe could start with the strategic forces and then discuss them; then turn\nto the general purpose forces. Or we could take them together at one\ntime and then have our discussions.\nPresident Ford: Let's start with strategic forces, then see if we can\nRESERVATION\nturn to the general purpose forces.\nMr. Hyland: The boards that are up there now show the overall strategies.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: That presumes that we have worked our way through\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nthe strategic forces and general purpose forces issues and strategies.\nDr. Wade: (Briefing from the boards on overall strategies.) These\noverall strategies are notional in character. They are examples only,\nand they are not the only variations which are possible. (Typed copies\nof the charts are at Tab A of these minutes.)\nORIGINAL\nOption A assumes that the major buildup of strategic forces by the Soviets\ncompels the U.S. to improve its strategic force posture substantially\nand rapidly. With respect to general purpose forces, this strategy accepts\ngreater risks, and frees resources for strengthening U.S. strategic forces.\nPresident Ford: Do the figures there mean that we would save from\n$3 billion to $10 billion?\nDr. Wade: Yes.\nDirector Lynn: Over what period of time?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: These are average annual costs over a period of\nfive to ten years, but they are inaccurate and soft, and they work off a\nhigher base than that recently approved by the President.\nDirector Lynn: The only things we should really pay attention to are the\nplus and minus signs.\nis\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n&\nLIBRARY\nGERALD\nTOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nSecretary Kissinger: Is the base the same for all alternatives?\nDirector Lynn: Yes.\nPresident Ford: But all are related dollar-wise to one another.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Right.\nDr. Wade: Alternative B assumes that the priority near-term problem\nconfronting U.S. security interests is the buildup of Soviet forces for\npossible attack in Europe. It also assumes that the growth of Soviet\nstrategic capabilities can be met with acceptable risk by a slower rate\nof modernization in our strategic forces.\nESERVATION\nAlternative C is basically the current DOD program as expressed in\nthe latest FYDP (Five Year Defense Plan).\nSecretary Kissinger: What is the theory behind each of these alternatives?\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nDr. Wade: Alternative A assumes that priority must be given to countering\nthe Soviet strategic buildup. It also assumes a short war in Europe.\nSecretary Kissinger: What does it do that we are not doing now?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: In this alternative, we would have to stop doing\nORIGINAL\nsome things we are doing now.\nSecretary Kissinger: What about in the strategic forces areã?\nDr. Wade: It would accelerate the modernization program. It would\nbring M-X in in 1984. We would move faster on TRIDENT II. There would\nbe a significant improvement in our counter-silo capability. And we\nwould have improved civil defense and air defense.\nGeneral Scowcroft: And basically it would give us a full counter-silo\ncapability.\nDr. Wade: You have some hand-outs in front of you which will help as\nwe go through the strategies. (A copy of the hand-out is at Tab B of\nthese minutes.)\nAlternative D assumes that our conventional strategy is adequate, but\nthat we have to do something about the Soviet strategic forces buildup.\nFORDS is 07VU39 LIBRARY\nTOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARI\n-\nTOP/SECRETYSENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nPresident Ford: What about our supply of stocks in Europe for 90 days?\nDr. Wade: Our plan is for 90 days but we are not there yet. The allies\nare around 30 days.\nSecretary Kissinger: Under strategic strategy S-4, you talk about military\nadvantage. What is this?\nDr. Wade: That at any level of determination, if war breaks out, we\nwould insure that there would not be a Soviet military advantage.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Henry, each term is explained in the NSSM 246\nreport. This one is on page 24.\nRESERVATION\nSecretary Kissinger: I still don't know what it means.\nGeneral Scowcroft: It is hard to say in realistic terms.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nSecretary Kissinger: What about in terms of the SIOP?\nGerald R. Ford Library\nGeneral Brown: This was a hurried study, and there are no hard numbers.\nPresident Ford: It assumes that if we have more, we are better off.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we choose Alternative A, but this is certainly not\nthe DOD preference, nor mine. Unless we can establish overwhelming\nORIGINAL\nmilitary advantages in strategic forces, we are asking for it in Alternative A.\nOption A would magnify every problem we have.\nDr. Wade: In Option E, we would have a moderately increased strategic\nemphasis, today's strategy for Europe, and increased worldwide capabilities.\nFor Option F, we have increased emphasis on strategic deterrence,\nincreased capability in Europe, and today's capabilities worldwide.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Just to refresh your memory, we first analyzed the\nstrategic forces. We came up with about eight key issues, each of which\ncould be addressed in two or three different ways. Then we combined these\nissues in various ways to give us alternative strategies for our strategic\nforces. Then we did the same thing with general purpose forces. The\nimportant thing is not whether we are talking about Option \"S\" or Option \"G,\"\nbut the issues.\nis\nFORD\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nBERALD\nLIBRARIO\nTOP SEGRET/SENSINIVE XGDS\nTOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n5\nPresident Ford: On the chart for Option C, you refer to \"current defense\npolicy. 11 Please relate that to Option E, for example. What is the\ncorresponding line for Option C? Is it consistent with the Navy shipbuilding\nstudy?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We looked at various alternatives for sustaining\ncapability in Europe such as 30 days, 90 days, and so forth and we con-\nsidered other such factors.\nSecretary Kissinger: How was it computed? By German standards? When\nwe say we have 90 days capability, they say we have 50 days. Conversely,\nusing our standards for computation, their 30 days is really 60 days.\nGeneral Brown: We are a long way from solving that problem. It is a national\nproblem.\nSecretary Kissinger: But what way is it computed? Does Haig know what\nhe has got?\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nGeneral Brown: Yes.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Henry, I don't care how we compute it. We\nsimply don't have it over there.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: No. Plus the Middle East has changed our estimates\nfor attrition rates.\nOR'G'NAL\nSecretary Kissinger: This leaves us with other problems. We will be\ndriven by the lowest days of the critical item.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: There are several of those critical items, not\njust one.\nGeneral Brown: This is no secret. It is well known. We took it into\naccount in the FY 78 budget for the first time.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Never before did we have a program to get well. This\ntime we have such a program.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: At least now we are talking about it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: If we don't get well, it lowers the nuclear threshold.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD FIBKAR,\nTOPSECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n6\nDr. Lehman: The Soviet figures don't look that good either. Their\nsituation is not better.\nGeneral Brown: Our knowledge of their situation is limited. It relates\nto how we estimate they fill up their buildings. The estimates are pretty\nsoft in many areas.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: This forces the Services to continue to reassess\nthe situation.\nSecretary Kissinger: I am strongly in favor of that.\nVice President Rockefeller: Mr. President, let me ask two questions, please.\nSERVATION\nWere these plans developed with a budgetary ceiling in mind?\nPresident Ford: No.\nVice President Rockefeller: Then why don't we have an Option G where\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nall three areas (strategic, Europe, worldwide) are improved.\nGeneral Scowcroft: You are right. It stops at Option F.\nVice President Rockefeller: That means Japan has got to go. That is bad.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Not if you take Option E.\nORIGINAL\nGeneral Scowcroft: You have no option that improves strategic forces,\nEurope, and worldwide.\nVice President Rockefeller: That is why we need an Option G.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: What we should do is look at the issues. Why\ndon't we take a look at the issues?\nVice President Rockefeller: I didn't make up the charts.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: An interagency group prepared the charts.\nVice President Rockefeller: Why don't we have an option for improvements\nin all three areas?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Maybe there should be one. We don't have to take\nany of these options that are shown on the chart. We can take a look at the\nissues, and then come up with the strategy we think is best.\nFORD\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n7\nVice President Rockefeller: Then why are we doing it this way?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There are an infinite number of combinations possible.\nThese are only llustrative.\nVice President Rockefeller: But none of them includes all three areas\nfor improvements.\nDirector Lynn: With respect to today's policy, I think we are moving\nfrom S-2 to S-3 for strategic forces. For general purpose forces, this\nassumes that we are trying to do better in Europe with our stockpile and\nthe like.\nSERVATION\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The current general purpose forces strategy is G-2.\nDirector Lynn: That has the United States at 90 days sustainability and\nthe allies at 30 days.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nSecretary Kissinger: What is the rationale for that?\nDirector Lynn: The allies don't get it up there.\nVice President Rockefeller: The plan today is inadequate, based on the\nanalysis in the report.\nORIGINAL\nPresident Ford: Nelson, we had a drawdown in Vietnam. We had a\ndrawdown for the Yom Kippur War. We have had Congressional cuts in\nthe budget over 10 years. It is very easy to say \"let's turn the switch\non and get it right, \" but where are we going to get the money? We have\nproblems with inflation and taxes. It's great to go for all of it, but\ngoddamn it, we can't do everything. We should show these charts to\nMr. Carter, with all his talk.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The strategies are for illustration only. The\nway it ought to be done is as follows. Let's take one of each of the\nstrategic and general purpose options and modify them. Let's keep the\ndifferences in mind. We have to think about what we have now, what\npolicy we have in mind, and what budget plan is necessary for that guidance.\nVice President Rockefeller: But somebody thinks that each of these\noptions is right.\nGeneral Scowcroft: But we didn't put up the minimal option either.\nFORD\nTOP SECRETV/SENSTTVE XGDS\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n8\nVice President Rockefeller: The poor President of the United States is\nresponsible for the defense of the country.\nSecretary Kissinger: The question isn't what the human mind can conceive.\nFirst, the problem is with the Soviet strategic buildup. The second point\nis that it is unlikely for us to be able to develop a decisive military\nsuperiority in strategic forces, of the kind we had in the 1950s. Third,\nwe should not permit perceptual discrepancies; we have to consider what\ndrives the political and perceptual problems. These considerations could\nlead us to an unspecified increase in strategic forces.\nNext, the overwhelming strategic problem we will face over the next 10\nyears is the Soviet capability for regional attack -- in Europe and elsewhere.\nAnd we have to consider what the U.S. position would be with respect to\nperipheral attack.\nTherefore, we should have a strategy to augment our strategic forces,\nplus what is needed for worldwide capability, plus we have the special\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nproblem of Europe since it has a more explicit nuclear threshold.\nFor example, what if the Soviets put four divisions in Damascus in a\nMiddle East war, or in Iran, or real forces in Africa. That is the real\nproblem.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: That is what the Pentagon has concluded and what\nthe Vice President is saying. I think we should go with strategy S-3\nORIGINAL\nwith some elements of S-4, and strategy G-3 with elements of G-4 or\nG-5. This includes worldwide capabilities. We would not add troops to\nEurope, but we would put stocks in, and there would be increases in the\nstrategic area.\nNow the debate is about what pieces to add in. We have discussed most\nof the issues except for civil defense. For civil defense, I think we should\ngo from something which is practically non-existent to some better planning.\nWe have no base for civil defense plans, and I am not talking about going\nback to bomb shelters.\nVice President Rockefeller: There is nothing wrong with bomb shelters.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You're for bomb shelters? (Laughter)\nVice President Rockefeller: I just built one at my home.\nGeneral Brown: We can pick and choose through the charts. As for the JCS,\nwe come out somewhere between three and five in each case.\nTOPSEGRET/SENSTTTVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n9\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Then we have to determine what pace to do it.\nSecretary Kissinger: Then we have the Vice President's question. We\nhave no budgetary figures for the Defense preference. If it's from three\nto five, then the budget would go up.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: This is not a budget exercise.\nVice President Rockefeller: I still don't understand why we have no option\nwhich improves all three areas.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: DOD was acting as the Chairman of an NSC subgroup.\nIt tried to do the work in a reasonably orderly way.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Mr. Vice President, you are right. Ultimately,\nwe must manage all of this, and figure out what it costs.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You can forget some strategies like G-1 and G-2.\nGerald R. Ford Library\nWe ought to think about improving our worldwide capabilities. We can do\nthe studies identified at the end of the study. And we can cost out those\nstrategies which look particularly interesting to us.\nVice President Rockefeller: And explain what the reasons are.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We have another question, Mr. President. Mechani-\nORIGINAL\ncally, given the electoral situation, we must determine physically how\nto handle the study. Would you want to speak to it? Hand it off? Pursue\nit further?\nPresident Ford: I'm reminded of the first debate in the House I attended\nin 1950. The Administration was cutting back on defense following the\npost-war period. Carl Vincent took up the cudgel for DOD. But George\nMahon gave a speech in which he used the following analogy. He said he\nwas for defense. His record for 1950 was good on this. But then he took\nhis son to the Smithsonian. He came to a man in armor surrounded by a\ncoat of iron. His son bumped into it, and it toppled over. His son asked\nhim why it toppled over. And George replied, \"Because it had no bone and\nmuscle inside.\"\nMy point is this. The country can put a coat of iron around it, but if it\nhas no economy and will, it is no good. Sometimes I think we want to put\na coat of iron and steel around us, and let the economy go to hell. The\ncountry would not be worth a damn internally.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nCERALD\nLIDRARY\nTOPASECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n10\nWe must take a rational view to meet the challenge militarily. This has\nbeen a damn good exercise, but we must be realistic. I'm a little fed\nup when I see what we try to do but see what the next generation will\nbe doing. We cannot go through an unrealistic exercise. Let's see what\nis reasonable and go from there.\nVice President Rockefeller: Mr. Carter wants to spend $10 billion on\npublic works; if we want to spend it on the military, I think it would be\njust as good.\nPresident Ford: That is why I vetoed the public works program. I see\nnone of his solutions aimed at military strength. Jobs, cities, public\nworks -- but not one penny for defense of the United States.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: As Mr. Carter was leaving the Pentagon after his\nbriefing, someone asked him whether he still intended to cut the Defense\nbudget. He said yes.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nGeneral Brown: That's not exactly what he said. He said: \"I've seen\nsomething about the Soviet forces but I've not yet seen the U.S. forces. 11\nPresident Ford: He is as inaccurate as I know, but we must be realistic.\nIf we do not have a healthy economy, we can't do anything.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The Mahon analogy would fit if the case were that\nORIGINAL\nthe present burden of defense on society is dangerous. But this is not\nthe case. Defense is the lowest percentage of the federal budget and the\ngross national product in many years. This goes to macroeconomics.\nDoes an incremental increase of defense spending of X percent do damage\nto the economy? No! I believe that. Of course, Mr. President, you\ncould find some economist somewhere who takes the other side. But I\nsay there is no danger of damaging the economy.\nPresident Ford: In keeping programs the way they are.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. You must begin with the fact that the\nUnited States is not an economic enterprise. The first function of govern-\nment is freedom and security of our people. Therefore, it is not a question\nof what spending level we should have, but what is the right policy or\nstrategy.\nI got in this debate in Europe with some of the people after the meeting.\nThey say they can't afford increased defense. But that is false. Look\nat Israel; look at the United States in World War II. It is a matter of priorities.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD is LIBRAR GERALD\nTOP'SECRER/SENSITIVE XGDS\n11\nGeneral Scowcroft: But we have to ask what is politically sustainable\nyear after year after year. We either do that or we have to get into a\nfrenzy with the threat.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Where are we in a frenzy with the threat?\nGeneral Scowcroft: Look at Vietnam.\nGeneral Brown: And in the late 50s when we talked about the missile threat.\nDirector Lynn: I don't really see a lot of changes from the overall strategies\nvice what we determined in the study in 1969. We are looking at how many\ndays we should provide for sustainability in Europe and issues such as this.\nThese should be identified and we are doing this. We have to look closely\nat the idea of fighting for 90 days in light of attrition rates, prepositioning,\nand the like.\nSecretary Kissinger: Particularly when we put our prepositioned stocks\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nall in one depot to save money.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: General Haig is working his can off to fix this.\nDirector Lynn: There are very few things we want to change. We must\nconsider non-exclusive reliance on sea lanes, given the vulnerabilities of\nsea lanes. We are moving that way. If I can convince Congress to slow\nORIGINAL\ndown domestic programs, we ought to also be able to make our case for\ndefense.\nThe strategy should be, Mr. President: (1) Address the problem hard in\nthe State of the Union Address. Put out a very strong signal. (2) We\nshould address it in the Defense Posture Statement, that we are moving\nto strategy S-3. I wouldn't go to S-4, though, if someone paid me.\nPresident Ford: We can't even build three TRIDENTs a year.\nDirector Lynn: Third, we could prepare a draft NSDM. You would not\nhave to sign it; just give it to Mr. Carter. He can then compare his ideas\nagainst that sheet. The turnaround you have made over the past two years\nhas been remarkable. To keep it going, discipline on domestic programs\nmust be imposed.\nAnd then we can do some other things. For example, with Japan, there\nis some room for ASW and air defense improvements on their part.\nFORD\nCERALD\nLIBERTY\nXGDS\nFORD & GERALD LIBRANT\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n12\nSecretary Rumsfeld: And even economic aid in the region.\nDirector Lynn: This is confusing. Current defense policy has words such\nas \"increased, 11 \"improved. 11 We are now moving to S-3, now moving to\ncounter-silo capability.\nGeneral Scowcroft: A partial counter-silo capability.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Right. A limited counter-silo capability.\nDirector Lynn: I am not that sure that Henry would want to signal this.\nI hope the M-X program we have is good enough for the signals we want\nthis year.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: I presume Henry's views are in the study since\nthe State Department has been involved throughout the entire process.\nSecretary Kissinger: I have no quarrel with the study.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nSecretary Rumsfeld: A draft NSDM is being prepared. Lcan give it to\nBrent.\nORIGINAL RETIRED\nGeneral Scowcroft: I am not sure I wouldn't sign it.\nVice President Rockefeller: When the General says sign, that is good.\nAlso, you can give a strong signal and sign the NSDM. You can say\nthese are the details. These are the essential things to say to the\nAmerican people. If you, Mr. President, pull back, he'll pull back from\nthat. We should plant the flag on a field where it is sound and right.\nSecretary Kissinger: The most important thing is to explain this to the\nAmerican people. You can do this, Mr. President, in a valedictory\noccasion, such as the State of the Union Address. You can say that we\nhave been focusing on the long-term problems over 15 years, so it doesn't\nlook like you've neglected anything.\nBasically, in the 1960s we stopped all strategic programs, so we gave\nthe Soviets an opportunity to get ahead. It wasn't until SALT ONE that\nwe did something about it. And about four years ago we got our force\nprograms moving again. These programs are just now coming into the\nforce.\nAlso, we can talk about Vietnam, how we had to draw down the stockpiles\nto support the war in Vietnam.\nFORD\nGERALD LIBRARY\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP'SECRET/SENSHTAVE XGDS\n13\nHowever, this has not been the result of a sudden Soviet buildup. They\nhave been building up at a steady pace year after year.\nAlso, we should worry about the way we allocate our money. We spend\na disportionately large amount for personnel.\nHowever, it has not been a sudden Soviet buildup, but a steady buildup.\nYou were the first President who has had a chance to meet this. We\nwould not just want to be sticking the new Administration, but making\nsure that there is not a chance that they could say that you failed.\nIn 15 or 20 minutes of your speech, you could say this, and how you would\nconduct our defense policy. There should be both some theory and some\nnumbers in the speech.\nPresident Ford: I think that is a good approach. My comments were aimed\nat trying to get well yesterday, and feeling we haven't done the job. We\nhave done the job! What worries me is that they say they will do a better\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\njob with less money. That simply is not possible.\nSecretary Kissinger: We would want to put the necessity in terms of forces,\nnot dollars. We could talk about the need for forces for intervention. Then,\nORIGINAL RETI-\nif stated conceptually, it would be much harder for him to cut.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There is an advantage in stating it that way. Then\nwe could add the next comment: They can cut, but we will slip. This is\nexactly what happened in Vietnam, and with the Congressional budget cuts.\nThe President is left with the tools from his predecessors. If Carter\nmakes the cuts of the kind he is talking about, he will compound the problem\nand we will not get well from the Vietnam and Congressional cuts.\nSecretary Kissinger: You can put this before the American people. You\ncan talk about the problems you see over the next 10 years. You have had\na tremendous record over the past two years.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Right. And only if his record is sustained in the\nfuture will things be right.\nPresident Ford: Let's take a look at Strategy E. It talks about a moderately\nincreased strategic emphasis. Haven't we done that?\nGeneral Brown: Yes!\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOPSECRET/SENSTTIVE XGDS\n14\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Except for civil defense.\nPresident Ford: I don't like the idea of bomb shelters in backyards. It\nreminds me of the time I was in Michigan and some shyster salesman\ntried to sell me one. It was a bunch of crap.\nVice President Rockefeller: The salesman must have been from New\nYork. (Laughter)\nPresident Ford: I am down on civil defense -- not one penny for it. Forget\nit!\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Then you are for S-3 minus civil defense, if I\nunderstand you correctly.\nPresident Ford: Amen. Cross civil defense out. We are going ahead\nstrongly with F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s. We are improving our capabilities.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nSecretary Kissinger: If General Brown would like to give me a going away\npresent, he can give the F-15 a nuclear capability.\nORIGINAL RETIRED\nPresident Ford: We are doing everything we can in Europe. We are going\nto fix up our stockpiles over a six year period. We are increasing our\nworldwide capability. Look what we are doing with the shipbuilding\nprogram.\nGeneral Scowcroft: And we need some airlift.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Right. We need some airlift.\nPresident Ford: On the other issues: We are going to stay in Korea. We\nare augmenting our Navy shipbuilding. If Carter cuts Korea, he is cutting\noff from what I would do. We are going for a responsible worldwide\ncapability that we have endorsed.\nSecretary Kissinger: You can say that in your valedictory, plus you can\nlook four to five years ahead. You can say you see the need for building\nup regional forces against an increasing danger; but this is a 10-year steady\nprogram. We can't go through peaks and valleys. You can say that this\nis your best judgment.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We can emphasize the steadiness of the program.\nTOP SECRET/SENSFTIVE XGDS\nFORD\nBERALD\nLibhary\nLIBRARY\nTOR/SECRET/SENSITNE XGDS\n15\nSecretary Kissinger: You have supported many levels.\nVice President Rockefeller: Where do we go from here now?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We can come up with a paper. You can identify\nareas for further study and direct that these studies be taken. You can\ndraft up the essence of what you have said. We can draft a NSDM. And\nyou can take a draft of your statement from that NSDM. We can erect\nthis in the defense report, and the State of the Union Address or some\nother valedictory. You can plant the flag down the road, so if they deviate\nfrom it, they must admit it.\nPresident Ford: Or they can accept it, and the peril that goes with it.\nSERVATION\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Yes.\nPresident Ford: Let's do this.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nObviously, I favor S-3. I favor today's strategy for Europe. I favor the\nNavy shipbuilding program. I favor keeping forces in Korea. And I favor\na regional capability.\nORIGINAL RETURNS\nSecretary Kissinger: That includes increased worldwide capability.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Are there any other issues we haven't looked at?\nDirector Lynn: NATO.\nGeneral Scowcroft: G-3 is too general for NATO.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, as I understand it, you favor no\nincrease in manpower for Europe but you do want to increase our stocks,\nkeep our modernization program going, and have a war-fighting capability.\nPresident Ford: Yes.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You favor, as I understand it, a more flexible\nresponse concerning warning time. That is, an ability to defend against\nan unreinforced attack with little warning, or reinforced attack with more\nwarning.\nPresident Ford: What about the 90 days sustainability?\nFORD\nTOPSECRET/SENSITNE XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nGENALD\nTOP/SECRETVSENSITIVE XGDS\n16\nGeneral Scowcroft: We can increase our prepositioned supplies.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: Definitely.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We would not give U.S. money to the allies for\nsustainability, but rather prod them to do more. Also, we should look\nat the NATO flanks.\nPresident Ford: I'm not clear on the flanks. What are we talking about?\nTroops? Materials?\nGeneral Brown: Basically, we're doing better. You gave us sealift\nand airlift mobility.\nPresident Ford: If we have the Navy shipbuilding and airlift, we should\nbe able to handle that.\nGeneral Scowcroft: To increase our worldwide capability, we need\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nstrategic mobility.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Yes, we need strategic mobility.\nGeneral Brown: Are we talking about G-3?\nDirector Lynn: We ought to put this in writing.\nORIGINAL\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, where do you stand on civil defense?\n(Laughter)\nPresident Ford: Mr. Carter can put his moleholes around here. (Laughter)\nVice President Rockefeller: Does the study address adequate training?\nGeneral Brown: We're getting better in this, although the O&M dollars\nare still a little thin.\nVice President Rockefeller: Isn't this the guts of the matter? It ought to\nbe here. This is another illustration of the man-in-armor analogy.\nPresident Ford: We are doing what we can to recover from Vietnam and\nthe Yom Kippur War.\nVice President Rockefeller: How much money is involved?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD street R. FORD\nLIBRAR\nTOR SECRET/SENSTTIVE XGDS\n17\nGeneral Brown: I don't know.\nPresident Ford: Approximately $2 billion in O&M. We are up to 18 percent\ngrowth in O&M, which is what you wanted. We are up to 14 percent on\nother accounts.\nVice President Rockefeller: This will fit into Henry's projection for the\nfuture.\nPresident Ford: These things are in the budget, not for five years, but\nover a six-year period.\nDirector Lynn: The reason it is hard to be that final, is that we disagree\nNOLLVAMENT\non attrition rates, strategies the East might use in an attack, and so forth.\nWe can do our best at this time and when further facts are available, then\nwe can always adjust.\nVice President Rockefeller: All the Services are way behind on training.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nBut this is not my business.\nGeneral Brown: You are going in the right direction, but the problem is\na little overstated.\nDr. Lehman: Israeli statistics show a direct relationship between flying\nhours and kills. If a pilot had ten times the flying hours, he had ten times\nORIGINAL\nthe kills.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Henry said to me, jokingly, before the meeting that\nI was going to scare everybody about the Russians ahead.\nSecretary Kissinger: I said that?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Jokingly. But this does affect the pace.\nVice President Rockefeller: I am concerned. I read the intelligence reports\nevery day.\nSecretary Kissinger: I am concerned by statements that the Soviets will\nengage in a Hitler-like attack. What they have done is the same thing\nthey have done all along; that is, increase their budget about 8-10 percent\na year for defense. As their economy increases, their military grows.\nWe have to live with this.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: What I don't like is the impression that this is not\nthat serious. The President's paper must say that it is serious. Had\nGERALD R. FORD TORRITO\nTOP SECRETY SENSINIVE XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY BERALD\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n18\nthe President not demonstrated his concern, we would be in an\nunstable situation.\nPresident Ford: But I don't think you can realistically say that they\nhave all of a sudden done this. The problem is not what they have done,\nbut what we haven't done over a period of years.\nGeneral Scowcroft: We must do this on a sustaining basis.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We can't run a war and drain off our supplies to\nsomewhere else.\nDeputy Secretary Clements: We need to be realistic in a simple way.\nWe have to be steady with this. In the past some have talked about\nCloud 7 plans that we can't meet. We must project this in a simple,\nhonest way. We must say that we can't do it in NATO because of our\nstocks.\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nGeneral Brown: We have talked about two things: our muscle and our will.\nBut there is a third thing. This is our relationships with 'others. How can\nwe talk about a contingency in the Middle East and have no base agreements\nin Turkey? This is true around the world.\nGeneral Scowcroft: One thing that we have overlooked is the depth of\nthe study. It has been a very fine study, but we must consider its depth.\nORIGINAL\nJim Lynn mentioned the coincidence with the 1969 study. There was\nnothing on 90 days versus 120 days. Also, we really haven't addressed\ntheater nuclear war. With regard to strategic forces, we have to consider\nwhat we mean by such things as parity. Don says casualties are important.\nWe talk about people, but our last document said that we should not kill\npeople. Maybe we need a people-targeting doctrine, to show the Soviets that\nthey could not get away with anything if they attacked.\nPresident Ford: How does this compare with the 1969 study in depth?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: This one was done in 60 days. Henry, you ran\nthe last study. How long did you have, six months?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. But the strategic problem today is not all that\ndifferent. In 1969, with Congress cutting the budget, we could only turn\nour doctrine around. However, we eventually went with MIRV, TRIDENT,\nB-1, and other programs but not until 1971 or 72. It is not that amazing\nthat the doctrine is about the same. What is different is the Soviet forces'\nbuildup, as some predicted in the 1950s.\nTOP'SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nFORD TRANS\n-\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n19\nIn 1961, I was a consultant on the Kennedy plan to send a battalion down\nthe autobahn. It was a crazy plan, but we could think about it because we\nhad a clear strategic superiority. We could take out whatever missiles\nthey had very easily. But if the same situation faced us tomorrow, what\nwould we do? Go to nuclear war? Execute the SIOP? Kill 120 million\npeople? What will we send down the autobahn? This is no reflection on\nanybody.\nWhat would we do in the next Middle East War if the Israelis decide to go\nto Damascus, and the Russians drop paratroops in Damascus?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: They have improved their airlift and their tactical\nair.\nSecretary Kissinger: With regard to the future, we are ahead in strategic\nforces and this may last from four to five years. But there is no way to\ndeal with strategic superiority. This is why I want SALT. We could never\nhave enough for an overwhelming capability in strategic forces. This is\nDeclassified Photocopy from\nGerald R. Ford Library\nwhy we should build up our conventional capability.\nGeneral Brown: This is why the JCS are 100 percent for SALT.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: But we are forgetting that strategic forces are not\na big percentage of the budget.\nORIGINAL\nDeputy Secretary Clements: People are the high cost item.\nPresident Ford: Let's prepare to go along these lines.\nVice President Rockefeller: I would hate to leave these options on the\nchart that cut the budget. Carter could say that President Ford gave serious\nconsideration to cutting the budget.\nPresident Ford: Thanks very much.\ni\nFORD\nCRALD\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nSERALD\nORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nOVERALL STRATEGIES\nOVERALL STRATEGY A ( - $3-10B)\nIncreased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence\nShort War (30 Days) in Europe\nReduced Capabilities Worldwide\nOVERALL STRATEGY B\n( - $0 - 5 B)\nToday's Level of Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence\nIncreased Capability in Europe\nReduced Capabilities Worldwide\nOVERALL STRATEGY C (Base)\nCurrent Defense Policy\nOVERALL STRATEGY D (+$2-3B)\nIncreased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence\nToday's Strategy for Europe\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13023(\nSTORE\nToday's Worldwide Capabilities\nNSC Memb 3/33/03, :\nBy dal NARA Low 4/25/12\n09236\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nOVERALL STRATEGIES\n(continued)\nOVERALL STRATEGY E (+ $1 - 3 B)\nModerately Increased Strategic Emphasis\nToday's Strategy for Europe\nIncreased Worldwide Capabilities\nOVERALL STRATEGY F\n( + $4 - 5 B)\nIncreased Emphasis on Strategic Deterrence\nIncreased Capability in Europe\nToday's Capabilities Worldwide\nNote: Korea is a separable issue.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nB\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09237\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nChart\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nDOD\nTITLE\nAlternative Strategies for Strategic\nNuclear Forces\nCREATION DATE\n12/1976\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200038\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 12/15/76\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09238\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nChart\nTITLE\nAlternative Strategies for General\nPurpose Forces\nCREATION DATE\n12/1976\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200038\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 12/15/76\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\nK15L\nan\n16\n7606640X\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SEGURATE\nThus\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT\nY\nSCOWCROFT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\nCODEWORD\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of risc my G\n15 Olee 1976- LA\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA UN\nDATE\nFROM\ndirft\nTO\nSTATUS\n1/3\nQuisioe SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nDUE\nCY TO\nX\n1/10\n1/4\nC\nScript han eeen\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nQERALO FORD IBRAR,\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM a FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nJAN\nIF\nCRJ\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\n6\nNS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN\n1977,\nWH SA FP\nCLOSE\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-220-930\n599-022\n2\nMEMORANDUM\n09234\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOP-SECRI ET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nDecember 14, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nRICHARD T. BOVERIE RTB\nSUBJECT:\nNSC Meeting on NSSM 246, 3:00 p. m.,\nWednesday, December 15, 1976\nThe attached materials are provided for your use at Wednesday's\nNSC meeting on the NSSM 246 study on defense policy and military\nposture. Your meeting memo to the President (TabIII) summarizes\nthe relevant issues and strategies. In addition to the issues and\nstrategies, another major item for discussion will probably be\nalternative ways in which the President might make use of the\nNSSM 246 study.\nAgency Views\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nMR # 09-135 # 30\n6/16/10\nOur informal discussions indicate the following potential agency\nBy dal NARA, Date 7/8/10\nviews:\n-- OSD. Secretary Rumsfeld has apparently decided to suggest\nselecting strategies S-3 and G-3 for our strategic forces and general\npurpose forces, respectively. Strategy S-3 (offset USSR strengths/\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nmilitary gain denial) basically reflects the current FYDP thrust.\nStrategy G-3 continues our current strategy in Europe and improves\nour capability worldwide through greater capability for Unilateral\nMilitary Action (which could involve improved strategic mobility,\namong other things). These strategies do not appear inconsistent\nwith the President's budget decisions for FY 78 and could be cast as\nresponding to an increased global challenge in the future.\n-- The JCS. For strategic forces, the Chiefs reportedly prefer\nS-3, plus some elements of S-4. The idea is to adopt an offsetting/\nmilitary gain denial strategy, while working toward a matching/\nintrawar military advantage concept. For general purpose forces,\nthe Chiefs like G-3 (some improved capability worldwide) plus elements\nof G-5. (increased sustainability on the part of NATO allies, and some\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nGERALD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n2\nimprovement in NATO response capability). -- It is interesting that\nthe Chiefs are opting for relatively realistic goals rather than JSOP-\ntype programs. Their preferred strategies would push the budget up\nsomewhat in the out-years, but apparently are not inconsistent with\nthe President's near-term (FY 78) budget decisions.\n- State. The State staff has recommended that Secretary Kissinger\ncontinue Deputy Secretary Robinson's theme, i. e., that the study has\nbeen useful as a basis for identifying issues needing further analysis,\nbut that no action should be taken at this time to change policies. State's\nposition would not preclude utilizing the study in the State of the Union or\nother public statements, so long as the strategy advocated is basically\nconsistent with present policy.\nACDA. The ACDA staff has suggested to John Lehman (Fred Ikle\nwill not be in town) that the President should use the report to select\nor ratify a strategy (with S-3 and G-3 being likely specific choices) and\nshould reflect this action in the State of the Union address and the\nbudget submission.\nOMB. The OMB staff is recommending to Jim Lynn that he support\nstrategic forces alternative S-2 (Triad/strategic reserve/retaliation\nagainst postwar recovery targets), which is basically our current policy\n(although DOD is moving toward S-3 in its FYDP). For general purpose\nforces, the OMB staff reportedly likes G-4, which improves our NATO\nposture but reduces capabilities worldwide for an average annual\nsavings of $0-4 billion. -- Jim Lynn will likely continue to urge the\nPresident to use the study to state publicly his choices for the direction\nwhich future strategy should take.\nOur Views\nOur views on the use of the study and on strategy alternatives are as\nfollows:\n-- Use of the Study\nThe President can use the NSSM 246 report to do two things --\nindicate the basic direction he would like to see US defense policy\nP\nFORD\ntake, and highlight any of the specific issues treated in the study\nwhich he may wish to emphasize. He could give visibility to his view\nGERALD\nin various documents or speeches over the next month. For example,\nLICRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\n3\nhe could indicate the extent to which his views should be conveyed in\nthe DOD Posture Statement and his State of the Union address. Also,\nif he would like to state his preferences in a much more formal way,\nhe could ask that a draft NSDM be prepared reflecting his dicisions.\nWith respect to documents and speeches, the President could:\n-- State his views as to the appropriate defense strategy for the\nUnited States.\nDescribe the NSSM 246 study and the way in which it examined\nthe central issues underlying the strategy determinations.\nStress the Ford Administration's legacy of increased emphasis\non critical defense issues and programs, noting the close relationship\nbetween our efforts in the past two years to improve US capability and\nthe central issues (sustainability, warning time, deterrence criteria,\netc. ) analyzed in the NSSM 246 report.\nHighlight certain of those central issues of particular importance\nor concern, where increased future attention and analysis are deemed\nnecessary; and\nEmphasize in broad terms the utility of our defense strategy\nin supporting the foreign policy objectives of the United States.\nWe believe that a disposition of the NSSM 246 report along these lines\ncould be useful, would allow the President to leave an important\nand lasting personal mark in the major policy area, and would be accept-\nable to most if not all of the other NSC principals. The only exception\nmight be that some agencies, particularly State, would likely be dis-\npleased if the President indicated an interest in issuing a NSDM.\nStrategic Forces. There are some things we can write off\nimmediately. We do not want to initiate a major defensive damage\nlimiting policy. We think it would be counterproductive to develop\na full counter-silo capability, because of the crisis instabilities such\na capability could introduce. We should not move downward from a\nTriad to a Dyad, because of the loss of assurance in our ability to\nretaliate effectively, loss of time-urgent capabilities, and perceptions\nproblems. With these assumptions, we are left with two strategies for\nconsideration: S-2 and S-3.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nS-2 represents our actual policy today, while S-3 would move us toward\nusing our technology to offset Soviet strengths, insuring military gain\ndenial in a conflict, an ability to attack withheld Soviet ICBMs, and\nenhanced civil defense planning (principally for crisis relocation).\nFrom a purely military standpoint, S-3 is sound, but it has some draw-\nbacks in terms of perceptions, stability, and arms race implications,\nOur preferred approach would be to use S-2 as a basic strategy but add\nselected elements of S-3 which make sense for at least the near-term future,\nsuch as enhanced civil defense planning for crisis relocation, and\npossibly modest improvement in our peripheral attack capabilities\n(which really means cruise missiles). However, we would stay away\nfrom a heavy commitment to large, very rapid M-X deployments because\nof the potential impact on Soviet perceptions and possible contributions\nto crisis instability. (S-2 would deploy about 150 M-X starting in the\nmid 80's; S-3 would accelerate deployments and increase the quantity to\nabout 200. S-4 and S-5 would deploy 300-350 M-X.)\nGeneral Purpose Forces. Again, we can start with those things\nwhich we would write off immediately. We could not reasonably expect\nto obtain the funds that would be required to support a massive increase\nin our NATO and worldwide capabilities as called for by G-6. At the\nsame time, we would not want to reduce our capabilities in Europe or elsewher\nworldwide, which therefore eliminates G-1 and G-4.\nLooking at the individual elements of the remaining strategies, we\nthink we should maintain our current basic strategy in Europe but improve\nour ability for rapid response through improved strategic mobility. By\nimproving our strategic mobility for a better response posture for\nEurope, we would simultaneously be increasing our ability to respond\nworldwide against unforeseen contingencies and a possibly increasing\nglobal challenge. Also, in Europe we would encourage greater sustainability\non the part of the allies, either through their own efforts or, if necessary,\nthrough US assistance to the allies.\nWith respect to Korea, we do not think we should undertake any force\nreductions at this time. For the future, we could think about reducing\n(but not phasing out) ground forces from a division to one forward deployed\nbrigade and selected artillery units. A modest force in Korea would\ncontinue to show US interest and add greater flexibility should additional\nforces ever be needed.\nOverall Strategies. The notional overall strategies (identified\nin the report and the President's briefing paper) represent some of\nFORD\nTOP SECR FT SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nthe possible combinations of strategic and general purpose forces\nalternatives. The overall strategies are illustrative only; other\ncombinations are clearly possible.\nOur views on the strategic and general purpose forces issues tend\nto lead to a modified version of Overall Strategy E. That is, we\nwould moderately strengthen our strategic forces strategy and our\nstrategic mobility capability (which improvesrapid response for\nEurope and worldwide).\nConduct of the Meeting\nDOD will start by referring to the earlier NSC meeting and its\ndiscussion on strategic and general purpose forces alternatives,\nand then make a brief presentation on the notional overall strategies.\nThis format will keep the lead in briefing to a minimum, and permit\nthe principals to start their discussions early in the meeting. During\nthe meeting, DOD may hand out copies of the charts in the report which\nsummarize the strategic and general purpose forces alternatives, in\norder to facilitate the discussions. These charts are at Tab B and Tab C\nof the President's briefing paper (Tab II).\nAlso, there is some speculation that Secretary Rumsfeld may try to\ninitiate discussions on binary weapons. We will keep you informed on\npotential developments.\nYour Book Contains:\nTab I\n-\nTalking Points\nTab II\n-\nDraft Charts on Overall Strategies\nTab III\n-\nThe President's Briefing Paper\nTab A\n-\nList of Participants\nTab B\n-\nAlternative Strategies for Strategic Forces\nTab C\n-\nAlternative Strategies for General Purpose Forces\nTab D\n⑉\nU.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,\nResponse to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nrono\nP\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nMEETING POINTS\nUse of Study\n1.\nThe President's views could be conveyed through the DOD\nPosture Statement and in his State of the Union address.\n2. [If the President prefers a more specific and formal\napproach] -- We could have the working group draft a\nNSDM for the President's review.\nStrategic Forces\n1.\nThere are some things we can probably write off now. We\nwould not want to adopt a major defensive damage-limiting\npolicy at this time. We should not go for a full counter-silo\ncapability, because of the crisis instabilities it could\nintroduce. We don't want a Dyad. Therefore, we are left\nwith two strategies: S-2 and S-3.\n2. S-2 looks our actual policy today. We can stick with it as a\nbasic strategy, but pick up some elements of S-3 that look\nworthwhile, such as enhanced civil defense planning for crisis\nrelocation and some modest improvement in peripheral attack\nforces to offset the SS-X-20 and Backfire.\n3. I like the idea of moving out on a survivable M-X, but I think\nwe should stay away from a heavy commitment to very large,\nvery rapid M-X deployments because of their potential impact\non Soviet perceptions and possible contributions to crisis\ninstability.\nGeneral Purpose Forces\n1.\nOur basic strategy for Europe is sound, but we could improve\nour ability for rapid response through improved strategic\nmobility.\n2.\nBy improving our strategic mobility for a better response\nposture for Europe, we would simultaneously be increasing our\nability to respond worldwide against unforeseen contingencies\nand an increasing global challenge.\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS\nOFFANO FORD CIBRAAT\n3.\nIn Europe, we could also encourage greater sustainability on\nthe part of the allies, either through their own efforts or, if\nnecessary, through US assistance to allies.\n4.\nWith respect to Korea, we should not undertake any reductions\nat this time. For the future, we could -- at the right time --\nthink about reducing (but not phasing out) ground forces from\na division to one forward deployed brigade and selected\nartillery units. A modest force in Korea would continue to\nshow US interest and add greater flexibility should additional\nforces be needed.\nOverall Strategies\n1.\nThe notional overall strategies identified in the study are only\nexamples of how strategic and general purpose strategies can\nbe combined. Other combinations are obviously possible.\n2. I think we could point toward an overall strategy which\nmoderately strengthens our strategic forces posture (crisis\nrelocation planning, some cruise missiles), and improves\nour NATO and worldwide capabilities through improved\nstrategic mobility.\nGERALO FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09232\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nRichard Boverie\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nNSC Meeting on NSSM 246 and the Navy\nStudy, 12/2/76\nCREATION DATE\n12/01/1976\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200038\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 12/15/76\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nON THE NSSM 246 REPORT ON\nU.S. DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE\nAND THE NSC STUDY ON\nNAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS\nThursday, December 2, 1976\n9:00 A.M. (3 hours)\nThe Cabinet Room\nB\nFrom: Brent Scowcroft\nI. PURPOSE\nTo be briefed on and discuss NSC studies on U.S. Defense Policy and\nMilitary Posture (NSSM 246) and Naval Force Requirements.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA.\nBackground\n1. NSSM 246. In September, you directed through NSSM 246\nthat the NSC conduct a broad review of U.S. defense policy\nand military posture. The study, which was conducted by\nthe NSC Defense Review Panel, has been completed. It\nprovides a range of illustrative strategies for both our\nstrategic and general purpose forces, taking into account\n3.3\ntheir military, arms control, and budgetary implications.\n07-98.45\n3/20/09, NSC 10/21/09\n4/25/12\nIn the area of strategic forces, the study highlights the\nfollowing issues as central to U.S. strategy:\n-- Deterrence Criteria: What criteria for selecting and\nsizing U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces\nwill assure achievement of our fundamental objective\nof deterring nuclear attack?\nE.O.\n-- Force Diversity: How much force diversity and redundancy\nBy\nis necessary to provide adequate confidence in performance,\nto hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs\nor catastrophic failures, and to complicate any Soviet\nfirst strike designs? The study examines the triad of\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n2\nof bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs and possible\nalternatives such as a dyad of bombers and SLBMs only.\nForce modernization programs such as the M-X are\nrelated to this analysis.\nCountersilo Capability: Do we need to increase our\ncapability to attack the hardened Soviet ICBM force?\nThis issue deals with weapons effectiveness and crisis\nstability. It relates directly to the future of the M-X\nand Trident II programs.\n-- Defensive Damage Limitation: What level of emphasis\nshould be placed on U.S. civil defense programs, air\ndefense, and ABM R&D?\nThe study points up the growth in the capability of Soviet\ngeneral purpose forces and examines alternate U.S. responses.\nAmong the key general purpose force issues raised in the\nreport are:\n-- Adequacy of Forward Deployment: What arethe\nappropriate levels of forward deployed forces in Europe\nand elsewhere?\n-- Assumptions on Warning Time: Should U.S. planning\nfor initial NATO defense, mobilization, and short-term\nreinforcement continue to assume approximately three\nweeks of warning time?\nSustainability: How long should U.S. NATO forces be\ncapable of sustaining conflict, and what is the relative\nlikelihood of a very short (days or weeks) versus a\nlonger (months or years) war? Central to the sustainability\nfactor are the issues of Soviet capabilities, U.S. equipment\nstocks, and mobilization and preparedness programs.\n-- Conflict Outside the NATO Central Region: How much\ncombat capability should the U.S. maintain for conflict on\nthe NATO flanks and outside the European theater? We\ncurrently maintain land, air, and naval forces for a range\nof possible contingencies outside Central Europe. Decisions\non the future nature and size of these forces have major\nimplications for the Navy and Marines, and are tied to\nspecial considerations such as Mid-East oil supply\ncontinuity and Korean defense.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nAlternative approaches derived from different responses\nto these fundamental issues have been combined to form a\nnumber of illustrative notional strategies -- five for strategic\nforces and six for general purpose forces. These in turn\nare combined into a number of overall strategy alternatives.\nThese combinations provide a useful framework for examining\neach issue in the context of overall defense policy. Two of\nthe notional strategies approximate current policy, with\nalternatives ranging on either side of these base points.\nTentative and extremely rough cost estimates have been\nprovides for each strategy.\nThe study lends itself to a number of possible uses. Each\nof the Defense Review Panel principals has an independent\nview on the utility of the study and on the individual issues\nand alternative strategies presented in the report. There\nare differing opinions as to the extent to which the study in\nits present form provides an appropriate basis for decisions\naffecting our national strategies. As Secretary Rumsfeld\npoints out in his transmittal memorandum to you, there is a\nneed for additional analysis to reduce uncertainties associated\nwith the strategy alternatives, the force requirements and the\ncost implications of each.\n2. NSC Study on Naval Force Requirements. The NSC study\non U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements was initiated\nearly in 1976 and conducted by the NSC Defense Review Panel.\nIts early development provided the basis for the May supple-\nmental budget request to the Congress for additional shipbuilding\nfunds. Your FY 1977 budget requested $6.3B for 16 ships.\nThe supplemental added $1.2B for five more ships and long-\nlead funding for an additional carrier (CVN-71). Congress\napproved $6.2B for 15 ships and the long-lead funds for the\ncarrier.\nAs a basis for U.S. force projections, the study has examined\ntrends in the growth of the Soviet Navy, its capabilities for\nconducting naval warfare in areas more distant from the\nSoviet Union, and the increasing willingness of the Soviet\nleadership to employ naval forces in support of foreign\npolicy objectives. The basic questions governing U.S. naval\nforce requirements as set forth in the Navy study are:\nFORD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nPESECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nShould we accelerate current shipbuilding plans? The\nnumerical size of the Soviet Navy has stabilized but\nnewly constructed ships possess increased capabilities.\nShould the force mix of ship types stress expensive,\nhighly capable ships, or should we concentrate on\nnumbers, building less expensive ships of lower unit\ncapability? Within this broad question, the study\naddresses such issues as carrier vulnerability and\nforce levels; a program to modernize the existing\ncarrier force; the nuclear/conventional power mix;\nthe qualitative mix of other surface combatants;\nalternative methods of providing air power to the\nfleet; and the impact of future systems such as V/STOL\naircraft and cruise missiles.\n-- Should the program stress new construction or should\nit emphasize the readiness of existing units while adding\nmore slowly to the size and strength of the fleet?\nBased on the projected threat and alternative responses\nto these basic questions, the study outlines major naval force\nalternatives. The current FY 78 Defense Plan builds an\naverage of 22 ships per year for a force of 535 ships by 1990\nat an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977 dollars.\nThree other major program options are offered:\n-- Option 1 would build no more large-deck carrier\nand would use the funds formerly devoted to carrier\nconstruction to build more surface combatants (an\naverage of 28 ships per year for a force of 586 ships\nby 1990 at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977\ndollars).\n-- Option 2 would build one more large-deck carrier,\ndevelop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard a few\nsmaller aviation ships, and build additional surface\ncombatants -- stressing numbers over unit capability\n(an average of 32 ships per year for a force of 608\nships by 1990 at an average annual cost of $8.0B in\nFY 1977 dollars).\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n5\nOption 3 would build one more large-deck carrier,\ndevelop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard\nmore aviation ships, and build a mix of surface\ncombatants -- stressing unit capability and numbers\nof ships (an average of 32 ships per year for a\nforce of 609 ships by 1990 at an average annual cost\nof $8.4B in FY 1977 dollars).\nSubsequent to the completion of the study, Defense added\na Low-Mix Option. This option falls between Options 1\nand 2 in overall Navy size and costs. It does not build\none more large-deck carrier or any strike cruisers. It\ndevelops V/STOL aircraft and deploys them aboard one\naviation ship, and includes additional surface combatants\nof lower unit capability and additional support ships. It\nemphasizes numbers of ships (an average of 32 ships\nper year for a force of 604 ships by 1990 at an average\ncost of $7.5B in FY 1977 dollars).\nThe study concludes that there is a need to improve our\nnaval capability and that the current Defense Plan\nalready includes an ambitious program to raise both the\nquality of our ships and overall force levels. The\noptions presented provide a means to accelerate and\nexpand the current plan. A choice among the options\ncenters on the question of whether we should build one\nmore large-deck carrier and the qualitative mix of\nsurface combatants necessary to improve the fleet's\nanti-air and anti-missile capability.\n3.\nRelationship between NSSM 246 Strategies and Navy\nStudy Options.\nThe NSSM 246 study outlines\nalternative defense strategies, and provides notional\nforce structures, including naval forces, for each. The\nNavy study postulates three alternative force structures\ndesigned to implement current U.S. strategy. The\noptions in the two studies therefore are not strictly\nFORD\ncomparable. However, some general correlation is\npossible, and a chart illustrating the general\nrelationship is at Tab D.\nGERALD\nLIDRARY\nB.\nParticipants:\n(List at Tab A)\nC.\nPress Arrangements:\nThe meeting, but not the subject,\nwill be announced. White House photographer only.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n6\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS\nIII. TALKING POINTS\n(At the opening of the meeting)\n1.\nThe basic purpose of this meeting is to become acquainted\nwith the results of two major NSC studies, both of which\ncould provide important contributions to future U.S. defense\npolicy and military posture. Don, would you brief us first\non the response to NSSM 246?\n(Following briefing and discussion of NSSM 246)\n2.\nWe also now have the final version of the Navy study which\nwe discussed in a preliminary version last spring. Don,\ncould we have the briefing on that study?\n(Upon conclusion of discussion of the Navy study)\n3.\nThese studies clearly represent a major effort to grapple\nwith the future direction of our military strategy and force\nposture. I want to consider them both in greater detail and\nwill probably want further NSC discussion of NSSM 246.\nAttachments\nTab A\n-\nList of Participants\nTab B\n-\nU.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,\nResponse to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976\nTab C\n-\nNSC Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force\nRequirements, November 16, 1976\nTab D\n-\nImplications of Navy Study Alternatives and\nOptions for NSSM 246 Strategies\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS"
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