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National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6849X
January 18, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FR OM:
Jeanne W. Davi
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting,
January 13
Herewith, for your approval, Sam Hoskinson's minutes of the
NSC Meeting on January 13.
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
GERALD LISA FORD $
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09239
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Samuel Hoskinson
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
CREATION DATE
01/13/1977
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200039
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/13/77
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
opened with excisms 6/99 let
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
6849X
not SECPET/SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Thursday, January 13, 1977
TIME:
10: 30 a.m. - 11: 30 a.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway
(Acting for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Other Attendees
White House:
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSC Staff:
Samuel M. Hoskinson, Director for Intelligence Coordination
DOD:
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Intelligence
Community Staff:
Fritz Ermarth, Office of Performance, Evaluation &
Improvement
is LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
XGDS of E. O. 11652 by authority
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category Section 5 (B)(2)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.64
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. X (b) (ie)
3.4
MR 98-39, #66; NSC letter 2/10/99
BERALD FORD LIBRAR
By let NARA, Date 5/25/99
POP SECRET/SENSITIVE
President Ford:
This is the last meeting of the National Security Council
in this administration unless a crisis develops in the next week. I would, therefore,
like to thank each of you individually and as a group for the assistance and
quality of materials and views you have provided. You have collectively and
individually made the system work the way it should. We are meeting today to
fulfill the requirements of the Executive Order (11905) which provides for semi-
annual reviews of foreign intelligence activities by the NSC. First, I would like
for George (Bush) to give us his views on how the Executive Order has worked
out in practice. Secondly, I would like to discuss the quality of intelligence
production.
Director Bush:
Mr. President, the Executive Order has proved to be a
major contribution to reform by putting the Intelligence Community within the
proper constitutional framework. It has not received the proper credit on the
Hill, but there is some realization of its value and the basic concept will probably
not be thrown out.
On the whole, your intentions have been fulfilled. The Committee on Foreign
Intelligence has not been without its difficulties but generally it has worked well.
First we established our procedures and then we systematized resource planning
and looked for resource trade-offs. As a result the National Foreign Intelligence
Plan budget came out well. We didn't get everything
President Ford:
Including your airplane
Director Bush:
I ride commercial alot! Seriously, the machinery has
worked fairly well. We do, of course, still have some problems like counter-
intelligence and manpower levels.
As for the quality of intelligence production my first observation is that there
are an increasing number of users. An example is the economic intelligence
area and I met recently with the Economic Intelligence Board. Generally, we
do things fairly well on such diverse areas as political, military and economic
developments throughout the world, although there are some exceptions like
China. Sometimes intelligence users find that our production priorities don't
suit their specific needs. Others think we should be more alert to short-run
problems and do more multidisciplinary analysis. NIE's are frequently
criticized for lack of relevancy. Unnecessary security compartmentation is
another major criticism. For example downgrading satellite-derived materials.
The semiannual review causes us to examine ourselves and results in a major
internal audit. We are no longer under fire for violating human rights. There
is
FORD
has not been one allegation of wrongdoing proved under the Executive Order.
CIA is today extremely sensitive to possible misdeeds, but at the same time not
GERALD
defensive. Rights are being safeguarded.
Lovern
ONAECRET/SENSITIVE/XODS2
-2-
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
President Ford:
Who will be your successors?
Mr. Hyland:
They are going to do away with our committee structure.
President Ford:
Director Bush:
Secretary Kissinger: George Bush deserves a special commendation. The
Justice Department's role today is a threat to national security. Why it is better
for a foreign government to have its spies in the U.S. caught than free to
operate since if they are prosecuted everything must be made public. Because
of the Attorney General's rules, NSA reports where U.S. citizens conversa-
tions are involved are meaningless to the point of being absurd. You must know
who the U.S. official is by name to get the intercept in the right context. We should
make it a point for the record that the Attorney General's guidelines in this area
be looked at again.
I find no degradation in the quality of intelligence analysis. The opposite is true,
however, in the covert action area. We are unable to do it anymore.
Director Bush:
Henry, you are right. We are both ineffective and scared
in the covert action area.
Secretary Kissinger: Many things are not even proposed these days because
we are afraid to even discuss them much less implement them.
Director Bush:
Secretary Kissinger: We should have done something but I was afraid to even
make a recommendation. It's not the Agency's fault. Our presence is rapidly
eroding in the Caribbean. It's just not risky enough to be an enemy of the
FORD
U.S. these days.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET
-3-
Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree entirely with all that has been said. The
backside of this problem is that we now have a request from the Justice
Department for information from NSA to use in prosecuting one of their cases.
President Ford:
How have things changed so much today? How did we
prosecute and convict in the past?
Director Bush:
Things have changed a lot at Justice and with the Court
system. For example in the Rosenberg case years ago intelligence information
was not regarded as admissable evidence.
we are being forced to give up sensitive information in order to prosecute.
Secretary Kissinger:
It's
absurd!
Brent Scowcroft:
Judges no longer are willing to do things in camera.
Director Bush:
There are other problems as well. We have gone too
far at this business. My greatest frustration--and I didn't intend to say
this today--has been the Justice Department's prevention of my responsibility
to protect sources and methods.
Secretary Kissinger: We should leave a memorandum for the record on
this problem for guidance in the future.
President Ford:
George, would you summarize the problem in writing
and send it to the NSC? I will pass it on to the new administration.
Director Bush:
Yes I will. I am especially worried about things like
disclosure of the SIGINT relationship
Secretary Rumsfeld: There is poor policy guidance in this area. The problem
is that Justice takes the initiative against you in all these cases, rather than
helping, and you are put on the defensive. You need them to help you but
they work against you. The tension works both ways, butit'sa question of
who has the initiative.
Secretary Kissinger: The Justice Department does not understand that
intelligence problems must be treated in a special category. Why it's an
outrage what they are doing to Helms--now I got that off my chest! It has
always been the case in history where vital interests are involved. Lincoln
suspended certain rights, we have had emergency laws. There are many
examples.
TOND
President Ford:
Nelson what do you think? You had experience with
the Commission.
LIBRARY
-4-
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
Y
FOPSECREI/SENSITHE/XGDSZ
POPSECRET/SENSITIVE
Vice President Rockefeller: I had no idea that the situation had become this
serious. Doesn't the NSC have the right and power to order a change?
President Ford:
There is really no experience in the past with this kind
of problem. What accounts for the change in the situation at this time? Is is
the law, the mood in the country?
Vice President Rockefeller: It's the Attorney General himself, basically.
Secretary Clements: The Justice Department treats us like an adversary
rather than a client.
Director Bush:
Yes - we are dealing with an adversary in Justice.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two basic causes. First, there is the Attorney
General himself, his personality. Secondly, the Justice Department bureaucracy
is setting itself up like a Supreme Court to be the ultimate judge of what people do.
They act like a supreme legal body. It won't end when Levi leaves.
Vice President Rockefeller: Can the NSC supersede Justice?
Director Bush:
My problem is more with the institution than with the
Attorney General, although he is a problem also. Their view of the role of
intelligence is different. The Attorney General's departure won't make the
problem go away.
Secretary Kissinger: They believe they have the right to demand total
fulfillment on things like
Classification no longer means
anything or is accepted in law. First you must be able to prove that informa-
tion is really vital to national security and that is frequently not very easy to
do. In the end it means we will not be able to prosecute espionage cases.
Director Bush:
On both this aspect and the leak problem I will send
a recommendation.
President Ford:
What language in the Executive Order creates problems?
Vice President Rockefeller: The NSA name use problem could be changed by
us. Ed Williams got the Solicitor General to admit that he personally didn't agree
to this procedure but had been ordered to impose it.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Bob Ellsworth has had a lot of experience in this area.
Bob, how do you view the problem?
is
TOR SECRET/SENSTTIVE/XGDS2
-5-
FORD
FORDO i SERALD LIBRARY
CHRAED
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Secretary Ellsworth:
When the guidelines were negotiated the Attorney General
attitude was that he was the President's legal advisor and had to protect him
against any charges of tampering with the rights of U.S. citizens. But now the
climate is changing and we must pass on our recommendations to the new team.
Vice President Rockefeller: I think the President has a responsibility to act now.
We already know the orientation of the new administration. Do you think Carter
will do it? We should deal with the problem now.
Secretary Kissinger:
Right!
Secretary Clements:
In the Navy claims problem the Attorney General told me
he was representing the American people and taxpayers. In effect arrogating
the public prosecutor role to himself when he was supposed to be defending the
U.S. Navy's interests.
President Ford:
Bill, you were trying to say something earlier.
Mr. Hyland:
We do have a good damage assessment on the impact of
the Attorney General's guidelines in the electronic surveillance field and that
will be left behind with a good recommendation. Secondly, my observation
is that the Justice Department usually says that it can't win in court without
revealing all the sensitive intelligence involved but in those cases where we
insisted--like the Glomar Explorer and the Moss subpoena--we won.
President Ford:
I would very much like to see the report you mentioned
as soon as possible this afternoon.
Mr. Hyland:
The guidelines of course flow from the Executive Order.
President Ford:
What would the Attorney General say about Henry's examp
General Scowcroft:
He has also prevented us from learning most of what the
Soviets are intercepting of U.S. communications in this country.
President Ford:
I want to read the report right away.
Vice President Rockefeller: If I can I would like to propose an NSC
resolution. It would say that the Attorney General's guidelines issued
under the Executive Order are seriously impinging on national security
and should be modified accordingly.
President Ford:
In deference to the Attorney General, I should look
at the report first. The specific steps can follow.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/XODSE
-6-
BERALD FORD VIBRARY
GERRED
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
President Ford:
I have read the NIE and Team B assessment. George
would you comment for us.
Director Bush:
The competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time
and I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I have been
had. A former general officer has gone public, even before the experiment is
finished. I have to recommend that the approach not be institutionalized.
The Estimate itself presents certain dissents of the Air Force and others whose
views parallel those of Team B.
Basically this was an experiment to see if one viewpoint could stand up factually
and it worked well in some areas like ICBM accuracy. There was no question of
intelligence analysts knuckling under to Team B. The estimators stood their ground.
In short the original concept was valid but failed in practice.
President Ford:
I understand that Allen Dulles made a similar process
work. But now the climate has changed and you get credit for leaks. This
is damned discouraging to me. I endorsed the PFIAB experiment. The leaks
are a disparagement of the quality of those people involved and are unforgivable.
Vice President Rockefeller: The good side is that the American people have
been educated.
Secretary Kissinger: I have no real problems with the estimate. However, I
think an across the board alternatives approach is very risky. I could find
a board of Nobel Prize winners to construct any alternative analysis conceivable.
Unless you construct both the hard and soft lines it can be used by someone for
their own self-benefit. The real problem in the future is not the hardliners.
it'sthe others.
Director Bush:
I am against institutionalizing the alternative analysis
approach. The issue has been caught up in a lot of polemics--some of which
I don't understand--but I recommend that the NSC not institutionalize.
President Ford:
The most discouraging aspect is the character of the
people who leaked. Unforgivable.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Bush's idea of presenting differing views was good
but like Henry says the scope must be more narrow. On some subjects
it is useful to have differing views. The leaks must stop. They inhibit the
whole intelligence process.
President Ford:
In the present atmosphere leakers become martyrs.
There isn't much you can do.
B.
SORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/XGDS2
-7-
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
CERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Secretary Rumsfeld:
The NIE is a good one. The only question I have is
how we tie it to policy judgments or make it a basis for policy rather than
using it as policy. There are some net assessment judgments involved
and they should drive decisions. There should be a very serious live
review of these matters in the future.
General Scowcroft:
We have done a quick comparison with the 1972
estimate and it has turned out to be very accurate.
President Ford:
Are there any other comments?
Vice President Rockefeller: Only to say again that you did a suberb job
last night
Secretary Kissinger:
The average person doesn't understand the turmoil
you faced in the world when you took over. Now we have total tranquillity
in the world and peace!
B.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS2
-8-
in 5080 LIBRARY
GERALD
0884
LICENSE
Document source description
This file contains material relating to attorney General Edward Levi.
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 1/13/1977\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\nINFORMATION\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n6849X\nJanuary 18, 1977\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFR OM:\nJeanne W. Davi\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of NSC Meeting,\nJanuary 13\nHerewith, for your approval, Sam Hoskinson's minutes of the\nNSC Meeting on January 13.\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nGERALD LISA FORD $\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09239\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nSamuel Hoskinson\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nBrent Scowcroft\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 1/13/77\nCREATION DATE\n01/13/1977\nVOLUME\n8 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200039\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/13/77\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nopened with excisms 6/99 let\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\n6849X\nnot SECPET/SENSITIVE\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nThursday, January 13, 1977\nTIME:\n10: 30 a.m. - 11: 30 a.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nSemiannual Review of the Intelligence Community\nPrincipals\nThe President\nThe Vice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld\nDirector of Central Intelligence George Bush\nChief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway\n(Acting for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)\nAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft\nOther Attendees\nWhite House:\nRichard Cheney, Assistant to the President\nWilliam G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs\nNSC Staff:\nSamuel M. Hoskinson, Director for Intelligence Coordination\nDOD:\nWilliam Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense\nRobert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense\nIntelligence\nCommunity Staff:\nFritz Ermarth, Office of Performance, Evaluation &\nImprovement\nis LIBRARY\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nXGDS of E. O. 11652 by authority\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)\nof Brent Scowcroft; Exemption\nCategory Section 5 (B)(2)\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.64\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. X (b) (ie)\n3.4\nMR 98-39, #66; NSC letter 2/10/99\nBERALD FORD LIBRAR\nBy let NARA, Date 5/25/99\nPOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nPresident Ford:\nThis is the last meeting of the National Security Council\nin this administration unless a crisis develops in the next week. I would, therefore,\nlike to thank each of you individually and as a group for the assistance and\nquality of materials and views you have provided. You have collectively and\nindividually made the system work the way it should. We are meeting today to\nfulfill the requirements of the Executive Order (11905) which provides for semi-\nannual reviews of foreign intelligence activities by the NSC. First, I would like\nfor George (Bush) to give us his views on how the Executive Order has worked\nout in practice. Secondly, I would like to discuss the quality of intelligence\nproduction.\nDirector Bush:\nMr. President, the Executive Order has proved to be a\nmajor contribution to reform by putting the Intelligence Community within the\nproper constitutional framework. It has not received the proper credit on the\nHill, but there is some realization of its value and the basic concept will probably\nnot be thrown out.\nOn the whole, your intentions have been fulfilled. The Committee on Foreign\nIntelligence has not been without its difficulties but generally it has worked well.\nFirst we established our procedures and then we systematized resource planning\nand looked for resource trade-offs. As a result the National Foreign Intelligence\nPlan budget came out well. We didn't get everything\nPresident Ford:\nIncluding your airplane\nDirector Bush:\nI ride commercial alot! Seriously, the machinery has\nworked fairly well. We do, of course, still have some problems like counter-\nintelligence and manpower levels.\nAs for the quality of intelligence production my first observation is that there\nare an increasing number of users. An example is the economic intelligence\narea and I met recently with the Economic Intelligence Board. Generally, we\ndo things fairly well on such diverse areas as political, military and economic\ndevelopments throughout the world, although there are some exceptions like\nChina. Sometimes intelligence users find that our production priorities don't\nsuit their specific needs. Others think we should be more alert to short-run\nproblems and do more multidisciplinary analysis. NIE's are frequently\ncriticized for lack of relevancy. Unnecessary security compartmentation is\nanother major criticism. For example downgrading satellite-derived materials.\nThe semiannual review causes us to examine ourselves and results in a major\ninternal audit. We are no longer under fire for violating human rights. There\nis\nFORD\nhas not been one allegation of wrongdoing proved under the Executive Order.\nCIA is today extremely sensitive to possible misdeeds, but at the same time not\nGERALD\ndefensive. Rights are being safeguarded.\nLovern\nONAECRET/SENSITIVE/XODS2\n-2-\nGERALD LIBRARY FORD\nPresident Ford:\nWho will be your successors?\nMr. Hyland:\nThey are going to do away with our committee structure.\nPresident Ford:\nDirector Bush:\nSecretary Kissinger: George Bush deserves a special commendation. The\nJustice Department's role today is a threat to national security. Why it is better\nfor a foreign government to have its spies in the U.S. caught than free to\noperate since if they are prosecuted everything must be made public. Because\nof the Attorney General's rules, NSA reports where U.S. citizens conversa-\ntions are involved are meaningless to the point of being absurd. You must know\nwho the U.S. official is by name to get the intercept in the right context. We should\nmake it a point for the record that the Attorney General's guidelines in this area\nbe looked at again.\nI find no degradation in the quality of intelligence analysis. The opposite is true,\nhowever, in the covert action area. We are unable to do it anymore.\nDirector Bush:\nHenry, you are right. We are both ineffective and scared\nin the covert action area.\nSecretary Kissinger: Many things are not even proposed these days because\nwe are afraid to even discuss them much less implement them.\nDirector Bush:\nSecretary Kissinger: We should have done something but I was afraid to even\nmake a recommendation. It's not the Agency's fault. Our presence is rapidly\neroding in the Caribbean. It's just not risky enough to be an enemy of the\nFORD\nU.S. these days.\nFORD is GERALD LIBRARY\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\n-3-\nSecretary Rumsfeld: I agree entirely with all that has been said. The\nbackside of this problem is that we now have a request from the Justice\nDepartment for information from NSA to use in prosecuting one of their cases.\nPresident Ford:\nHow have things changed so much today? How did we\nprosecute and convict in the past?\nDirector Bush:\nThings have changed a lot at Justice and with the Court\nsystem. For example in the Rosenberg case years ago intelligence information\nwas not regarded as admissable evidence.\nwe are being forced to give up sensitive information in order to prosecute.\nSecretary Kissinger:\nIt's\nabsurd!\nBrent Scowcroft:\nJudges no longer are willing to do things in camera.\nDirector Bush:\nThere are other problems as well. We have gone too\nfar at this business. My greatest frustration--and I didn't intend to say\nthis today--has been the Justice Department's prevention of my responsibility\nto protect sources and methods.\nSecretary Kissinger: We should leave a memorandum for the record on\nthis problem for guidance in the future.\nPresident Ford:\nGeorge, would you summarize the problem in writing\nand send it to the NSC? I will pass it on to the new administration.\nDirector Bush:\nYes I will. I am especially worried about things like\ndisclosure of the SIGINT relationship\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There is poor policy guidance in this area. The problem\nis that Justice takes the initiative against you in all these cases, rather than\nhelping, and you are put on the defensive. You need them to help you but\nthey work against you. The tension works both ways, butit'sa question of\nwho has the initiative.\nSecretary Kissinger: The Justice Department does not understand that\nintelligence problems must be treated in a special category. Why it's an\noutrage what they are doing to Helms--now I got that off my chest! It has\nalways been the case in history where vital interests are involved. Lincoln\nsuspended certain rights, we have had emergency laws. There are many\nexamples.\nTOND\nPresident Ford:\nNelson what do you think? You had experience with\nthe Commission.\nLIBRARY\n-4-\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nY\nFOPSECREI/SENSITHE/XGDSZ\nPOPSECRET/SENSITIVE\nVice President Rockefeller: I had no idea that the situation had become this\nserious. Doesn't the NSC have the right and power to order a change?\nPresident Ford:\nThere is really no experience in the past with this kind\nof problem. What accounts for the change in the situation at this time? Is is\nthe law, the mood in the country?\nVice President Rockefeller: It's the Attorney General himself, basically.\nSecretary Clements: The Justice Department treats us like an adversary\nrather than a client.\nDirector Bush:\nYes - we are dealing with an adversary in Justice.\nSecretary Kissinger: There are two basic causes. First, there is the Attorney\nGeneral himself, his personality. Secondly, the Justice Department bureaucracy\nis setting itself up like a Supreme Court to be the ultimate judge of what people do.\nThey act like a supreme legal body. It won't end when Levi leaves.\nVice President Rockefeller: Can the NSC supersede Justice?\nDirector Bush:\nMy problem is more with the institution than with the\nAttorney General, although he is a problem also. Their view of the role of\nintelligence is different. The Attorney General's departure won't make the\nproblem go away.\nSecretary Kissinger: They believe they have the right to demand total\nfulfillment on things like\nClassification no longer means\nanything or is accepted in law. First you must be able to prove that informa-\ntion is really vital to national security and that is frequently not very easy to\ndo. In the end it means we will not be able to prosecute espionage cases.\nDirector Bush:\nOn both this aspect and the leak problem I will send\na recommendation.\nPresident Ford:\nWhat language in the Executive Order creates problems?\nVice President Rockefeller: The NSA name use problem could be changed by\nus. Ed Williams got the Solicitor General to admit that he personally didn't agree\nto this procedure but had been ordered to impose it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Bob Ellsworth has had a lot of experience in this area.\nBob, how do you view the problem?\nis\nTOR SECRET/SENSTTIVE/XGDS2\n-5-\nFORD\nFORDO i SERALD LIBRARY\nCHRAED\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nSecretary Ellsworth:\nWhen the guidelines were negotiated the Attorney General\nattitude was that he was the President's legal advisor and had to protect him\nagainst any charges of tampering with the rights of U.S. citizens. But now the\nclimate is changing and we must pass on our recommendations to the new team.\nVice President Rockefeller: I think the President has a responsibility to act now.\nWe already know the orientation of the new administration. Do you think Carter\nwill do it? We should deal with the problem now.\nSecretary Kissinger:\nRight!\nSecretary Clements:\nIn the Navy claims problem the Attorney General told me\nhe was representing the American people and taxpayers. In effect arrogating\nthe public prosecutor role to himself when he was supposed to be defending the\nU.S. Navy's interests.\nPresident Ford:\nBill, you were trying to say something earlier.\nMr. Hyland:\nWe do have a good damage assessment on the impact of\nthe Attorney General's guidelines in the electronic surveillance field and that\nwill be left behind with a good recommendation. Secondly, my observation\nis that the Justice Department usually says that it can't win in court without\nrevealing all the sensitive intelligence involved but in those cases where we\ninsisted--like the Glomar Explorer and the Moss subpoena--we won.\nPresident Ford:\nI would very much like to see the report you mentioned\nas soon as possible this afternoon.\nMr. Hyland:\nThe guidelines of course flow from the Executive Order.\nPresident Ford:\nWhat would the Attorney General say about Henry's examp\nGeneral Scowcroft:\nHe has also prevented us from learning most of what the\nSoviets are intercepting of U.S. communications in this country.\nPresident Ford:\nI want to read the report right away.\nVice President Rockefeller: If I can I would like to propose an NSC\nresolution. It would say that the Attorney General's guidelines issued\nunder the Executive Order are seriously impinging on national security\nand should be modified accordingly.\nPresident Ford:\nIn deference to the Attorney General, I should look\nat the report first. The specific steps can follow.\nTOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/XODSE\n-6-\nBERALD FORD VIBRARY\nGERRED\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nPresident Ford:\nI have read the NIE and Team B assessment. George\nwould you comment for us.\nDirector Bush:\nThe competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time\nand I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I have been\nhad. A former general officer has gone public, even before the experiment is\nfinished. I have to recommend that the approach not be institutionalized.\nThe Estimate itself presents certain dissents of the Air Force and others whose\nviews parallel those of Team B.\nBasically this was an experiment to see if one viewpoint could stand up factually\nand it worked well in some areas like ICBM accuracy. There was no question of\nintelligence analysts knuckling under to Team B. The estimators stood their ground.\nIn short the original concept was valid but failed in practice.\nPresident Ford:\nI understand that Allen Dulles made a similar process\nwork. But now the climate has changed and you get credit for leaks. This\nis damned discouraging to me. I endorsed the PFIAB experiment. The leaks\nare a disparagement of the quality of those people involved and are unforgivable.\nVice President Rockefeller: The good side is that the American people have\nbeen educated.\nSecretary Kissinger: I have no real problems with the estimate. However, I\nthink an across the board alternatives approach is very risky. I could find\na board of Nobel Prize winners to construct any alternative analysis conceivable.\nUnless you construct both the hard and soft lines it can be used by someone for\ntheir own self-benefit. The real problem in the future is not the hardliners.\nit'sthe others.\nDirector Bush:\nI am against institutionalizing the alternative analysis\napproach. The issue has been caught up in a lot of polemics--some of which\nI don't understand--but I recommend that the NSC not institutionalize.\nPresident Ford:\nThe most discouraging aspect is the character of the\npeople who leaked. Unforgivable.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Bush's idea of presenting differing views was good\nbut like Henry says the scope must be more narrow. On some subjects\nit is useful to have differing views. The leaks must stop. They inhibit the\nwhole intelligence process.\nPresident Ford:\nIn the present atmosphere leakers become martyrs.\nThere isn't much you can do.\nB.\nSORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE/XGDS2\n-7-\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nCERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nSecretary Rumsfeld:\nThe NIE is a good one. The only question I have is\nhow we tie it to policy judgments or make it a basis for policy rather than\nusing it as policy. There are some net assessment judgments involved\nand they should drive decisions. There should be a very serious live\nreview of these matters in the future.\nGeneral Scowcroft:\nWe have done a quick comparison with the 1972\nestimate and it has turned out to be very accurate.\nPresident Ford:\nAre there any other comments?\nVice President Rockefeller: Only to say again that you did a suberb job\nlast night\nSecretary Kissinger:\nThe average person doesn't understand the turmoil\nyou faced in the world when you took over. Now we have total tranquillity\nin the world and peace!\nB.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS2\n-8-\nin 5080 LIBRARY\nGERALD\n0884\nLICENSE"
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