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January 31, 1973 - Nixon, Former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
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January 31, 1973 - Nixon, Former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Peace negotiations
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File-scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Nixon
Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
January 31, 1973
3:05 - 4:00 p.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
Sato: Many thoughts are in my mind, but all are of my gratitude to you.
First, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for the return of
Okinawa and for your sending Vice President Agnew to the ceremony.
Although it was not in the original schedule, we said banzai
to the Emperor and Japan. We should have said it also for the President
and the United States, and I convey my apologies. I have been Prime
Minister for years and I don't make that kind of mistake.
Some may criticize the return of the islands, but in my mind it
was the decision of the century.
My gratitude is deepened further by knowledge not only of the
fighting during World War II, but that Commodore Perry used to stop
at Naha, so it has historic significance.
The President: This was a watershed achievement, signifying that
the old days are gone.
FORD LIBRARY & RALO
33
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
NSC By Memo, let 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
SCHEDULE OF ENECUTIVE ORDER 11652
, NARA, Date 1/18/00
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SACRVY/NODIS
- 2 -
Sato: Perhaps Americans do not know that Perry had to go through
Naha.
President: I didn't.
Sato: I am relieved.
I have just visited Columbia, where I told them what I have just
told you.
President: This was a meeting of the Japan-American Society.
Sato: Yes. It was a dinner at Japan House. It was built on land
contributed by Mr. Rockefeller. Mrs. Rockefeller told me they
have children on both sides, Republican and Democrat.
In the second place, the fact that you have brought peace in Vietnam
is an occurrence of great size. It was not easy to achieve. Had the
announcement been a few days earlier, President Johnson would
have lived to know it.
[Dr. Kissinger enters the meeting. ]
President: [Explained to Secretary Kissinger that Sato spoke of
Okinawa reversion, Commodore Perry, and Vietnam, and that
President Johnson, had he lived, would have known.
]
Mr. Prime Minister, you should know that President Johnson did
know. I told him on the 2nd of January that talks were going to
begin. On January 15, when Henry returned to Paris, I had Henry
call and tell him there was a breakthrough and we had halted the
bombing. Two days later we sent him some papers of the agreements,
so he knew before he died.
Sato: So he died in peace.
President: Yes.
Kissinger: In fact, his widow put out a statement he was so appre-
ciative that he had been told, he was drafting a statement of support.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD & BRAR RALO 30
ECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
Sato: We are relieved that he knew.
President: Dr. Kissinger says the Vietnamese drive a harder
bargain thar the Japanese.
Sato: I recall that we suggested to Dr. Kissinger that since
we had routes to North Vietnam, might we ask to help? You said
no, and I detected your resolve.
In retrospect, had we made an approach, North Vietnam may have
thought they had a friend. Bombing was the final stroke which
brought peace.
President: The problem which many friends in the world did not
recognize was thatitwas essential for the US to end the war in an
honorable way. Many in this country thought that when I came into
office that I, as a political act, would let South Vietnam down the
drain, and blame Kennedy and Johnson, who started it. I was sure that
what we call peace elements in Japan, France, Australia, who were so
quick to criticize when we were trying to bring them back to the con-
ference table and they said peace at any price, would have welcomed
such a move on my part in 1969.
On the other side, more far-sighted leaders -- like Prime Minister
Sato -- have seen that how the US stood by a small ally would show
how the US could be relied upon by a great ally, like Japan.
Sato: It was a difficult situation. There was no declaration of war.
It was a very complicated, difficult situation and the final situation
you have brought about we admire very highly.
There was a considerable number of people engaged in peace activities --
Jane Fonda -- but you couldn't stop the war.
President: The people who had the greatest stake in the outcome were
our allies in the world. If our allies saw we were undependable to a
small ally, big allies would lose confidence in us. That is why it was
essential that we show that strength and dependability.
FORD
lso it was very important for potential adversaries -- particularly
great powers who are geographically closer to Japan than we -- to
30
know that we will stand by our allies and stand by our commitments.
Only that is how we avoid war. Not that we must be belligerent, but
to say we won't do this or that encourages aggression. It is important
SECBET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 4 -
that we and our allies stand together so that potential enemies are
not under the mistaken impression, misapprehension, that we will
not react.
Sato: In addition to bombing, due to your actions with the USSR and
China, they were not in a position to take action. Japan was divided.
There is no consensus within the Japanese people; they support
varying points of view.
It is difficult to obtain consensus within Japan. We are working on
it. Tanaka, on his return from the PRC, said he would keep
security relations. with the US and carry out the Fourth Defense
Plan. If given time, Tanaka will carry out the best for Japan.
I speak as if Tanaka were a stranger, but he has inherited things
which are partly my responsibility.
Needless to say, President Johnson's death was very sad to me.
I feel very fortunate to be able to talk with you and dance with you
at the Inauguration Ball. I am grateful for your kind reference to
me from the stage.
President: The relationship between me and Prime Minister Sato
has been the basis for furthering new relationships between Japan
and the United States. I think it is very important that Mr. Sato
continue to exert his influence in the party and the country because
he understands the necessity of a close relationship between Japan
and the United States.
We must realize that elements of the left in all nations are the same
in attitude toward a system of alliances around the world, of which
Japan is a part. They oppose because they seek changes which even
they have not analyzed adequately,
They are the same wherever they are. Not just the Communists,
but some socialists -- the left in general -- think that the way to
peace is to disarm, disband alliances. A nice dream, if there
weren't other nations with other ideas. My way to peace -- and
Mr. Sato's, I know -- is that we stay strong, not bullying, not
attempting aggression, but strength is the best guarantee of peace.
Strength not only militarily, but through the alliances we have.
That is why the alliance between us is so good for peace in Asia.
FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 5 -
If the US were to become weak, or if "peace at any price" in
either country were to prevail, the danger of war would be
greatly increased.
Sato: What is most important for us is to strengthen even more the
ties between Japan and the U.S. I agree with you, Mr. President.
President: On a personal basis, I want to say that you and your
brother Kishi have always been so kind to me, out of office, and
that these personal bonds have played a significant role in the new
relationship which began at Okinawa and will continue.
Sato: Four former Prime Ministers are still alive in Japan, but
two are not very strong. Kishi and I are still strong, Maybe I
should be diffident in saying we will make a contribution, and I am
sure Mr. Tanaka will. On my return I will encourage him to
strengthen the bonds between us.
I have not sent congratulations on your birthday. According to the
Japanese zodiac, you are at the age where your life is renewed.
President: Tonight we will have an informal dinner of good friends.
I am honored to have you in the White House again and whenever you
come to the country.
Sato: I am visiting the US with two former ministers, the chief
Cabinet Minister and the Minister in charge of Okinawa affairs. I
would like to introduce them and have pictures taken.
[The Ministers were brought in for pictures and farewell.
RALO 8 A. FORD JERAIR
SECREI/NODIS/XGDS
SATO 31 mtg
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FORD A LIBRARY RALD 30
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FORD A RALE LIBRAR 30
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FORD a PA LIBRARY 30
also why injustment for patiential administration
great pamers who and yery User
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FORD & EACH LIBRARY 30
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to Income chick a prace est any price "in
inter conntry are to prevail, damager of
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RALO BE A. FORD CIBRARY
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RALD 18 FV. FORD JORARY