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1552616
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October 4, 1973 - Cabinet Meeting
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1552616
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document
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October 4, 1973 - Cabinet Meeting
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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China
Soviet Union
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
Federal budget
National security
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1973-10-04
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10
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1973
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4
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1973-10-04
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10
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED SEC. S.6
E.O. 12058
MR08-132 #1; OSD 2/20/09
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BY dal NARA DATE 3/30/09
SUBJECT:
Cabinet Room
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, October 4, 1973
PLACE:
Cabinet Room
Schlesinger: Let's start with the international environment. This is an
era of detente. Our military posture is geared to Soviet moves. Since
1960 they have increased their manpower, primarily in the Far East.
Their defense budget is expanding at about 3 percent a year. They have
passed us in ECBM's -- thus far they haven't even been able to exploit
their throwweight advantage, but with MIRV's they might. We still have
the advantage in tactical air, but they are now ahead in ships and they are
increasing their divisions. We are down to 12 from 19 1/2; they are
up to 167 from 148. We also have substantial overseas deployments.
In NATO we have a rough balance with the Warsaw Pact. There is an
advantage in tacair which helps counter-balance their advantage in ground
forces, which is slight in numbers.
It is a myth that the U.S. "carries the burden" in NATO. Allies have been
contributing more and more. We are doing less in NATO that the Soviets
are in the Warsaw Pact.
DOD expenditures are down by one third since 1968. It is a smaller
military budget than in the '50's when we were emphasizing massive
retaliation. It is important to maintain a balanced force structure.
The people who objected to massive retaliation in the 50's are frequently now
opposed to conventional strength.
We took the Vietnam dividend before the end of the war. We demobilized
before the cease fire from 3.6 million men to 2.3 million men.
The Department of Defense is not the driving force behind inflation. I
told Symington that the three services get the same percentage of the GNP
that the Air Force did when he was Secretary.
Expenditures are at the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor. The
GERALZ
SHIP
driving force behind government expenditures has not been defense but
social services.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
We must maintain balanced expenditures to be able to move anywhere
in the world.
On SALT II -- we hope to restrain the Soviets' strategic growth, but we
must retain rough parity between the two sides.
Laird: We must understand that while Soviet military expenditures are
about equal to ours their personnel costs about 20 percent of the total;
ours cost about 60 percent of the total. We are falling behind in the strategic
arms area. It will take great leadership to keep us in the ball game with
them.
Our problem with the Congress is this. Other Cabinet members don't
try to dump everything into DOD.
President: These are good points, especially on manpower. The Soviet
Union is moving forward in a number of strategic systems. Our Navy
is still superior, but ours is an old Navy -- the Soviets' is a new one.
Like the Germans going into World War II. What is involved is not
just the U.S. - Soviet balance but the ability of the U.S. to play the role
in the world we must play if we are to have peace. No other state can
play that role. No one fears the United States. If we end up as a number
two, we are unable to keep the peace -- and we are responsible for main-
taining peace around the world. We have a tendency after every war to
turn inward -- it's even worse this time because of the knuckle-headed
professors.
If we don't stay strong, NATO will fall apart, and the Japanese would have
to assert themselves or make a deal with the Soviets. In the Third World,
if we are number two, our influence for peace will go down In the
Middle East, those who want us to reduce defense are in the forefront of
those urging arms to Israel. We can maybe be second in some areas, but
in the Navy we can't afford it.
As a result of our initiatives, we have cut military expenditures. We can
go ahead in mutual arms cuts, but if we cut unilaterally, forget it.
While the goal of our policy is peace, it is ironic that the peaceniks' policy
one that we could tolerate.
Strength by itself is no policy. Neither is negotiation by itself -- they must
be in combination. Disarmament can't be an end in itself. Where you have
the Soviet Union as a threat to the world -- which may be turning in now,
but could break out any time -- disarmament unilaterally would threaten a
peaceful world. That would encourage aggression.
TERRAT GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-3- -
The Chinese -- with the possible exception of the Japanese, the greatest
event will be what happens to China. They have the capability to become
the best and most productive. Right now the U.S. is their best friend.
They hate us, but if they are outside the club in 20 years, we could
be in trouble. We must keep a balance, so the Soviet Union can't feel
it can give up the Chinese and get away with it.
The issue is whether our children will sit here in peace or in fear.
President: With prices and need going up, the development of the Soviet
gas fields may be imperative. We are going like molasses in the nuclear
field let's get moving.
On my decision, energy comes first and environment second.
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018594
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's Handwritten notes of
Cabinet Meeting
CREATION DATE
10/04/1973
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400069
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
October 4, 1973 - Cabinet Meeting
DATE WITHDRAWN
08/19/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG