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February 1, 1974 - Kissinger, Schlesinger
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1552657
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February 1, 1974 - Kissinger, Schlesinger
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Arms control
Middle East conflicts
Suez Canal
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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1552657
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1974-02-01
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2
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1974
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1
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1974-02-01
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2
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 010685
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Kissinger/Schlesinger/Scowcroft/Wickham
CREATION DATE
02/01/1974
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600065
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
3
FOLDER TITLE
February 1, 1974 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
REDACTED
1/29/10
MEMORANDUM
/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 01-105 # 6
osoetr 6/24/04; state etr 2/15/06; CIA etc 1/29/10
By dol NARA, Date 3/9/10
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, February 1, 1974
8:00 a. m.
PLACE:
Secretary Schlesinger's Office
The Pentagon
Schlesinger: Ten quick subjects.
You talked to Clements about a visit to the Saudis.
1097 UNITED LIBRARY
Kissinger: No, no.
Get a cable out on Korea - -- keep, Habib off their back on their
domestic problems.
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Schlesinger: I want Rumsfeld for Secretary of the Navy. I would
recommend Bruce Clark or Strausz-Hupe.
The Spratleys. Sullivan says we are obligated to the Philippines
on the Spratleys.
Kissinger: I think the Philippines are withdrawing those forces.
Schlesinger: Maybe you should talk to the Chinese?
Kissinger: They are having internal problems, but they reacted
quickly.
I have to testify on the JCS spying business. Symington is pushing.
He wants to know why I was uncharacteristically unenergetic about
finding out what was taken.
Schlesinger: Admiral Robinson did the same, but he didn't take papers -- - -
he just briefed on the material. You should testify after March -- after
the recess. I don't know what the Laird/Buzhardt angle is, but the
Buzhardt report says that it was a two-way spying operation designed
to bypass Laird.
Kissinger: They passed the JCS documents to us as part of official
business. The President ordered it -- because it was a different
relationship than we have. We couldn't find out what Laird was doing.
Were DOD documents taken?
Schlesinger: I gather SO.
Kissinger: It is a morally different position whether the JCS steals from
the President or whether the President steals from the JCS.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GRATO. FORD
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Schlesinger: It may come out that this was a Kissinger-military
conspiracy. Mel and Fred have the fish to fry in this. Moorer is
getting a bum deal.
Kissinger: I have read the Young report. It is a report of a failure
trying to make himself important. It is sick.
Schlesinger: The Buzhardt report is not sick - it may be dirty, but
not sick.
Kissinger: [Described discussion with Laird on his press conference. ]
Schlesinger: Mel has a big set of documents which weave a web which
he says shows the evolution of the statutory role of the Secretary of
Defense. The documents don't show Moorer set it up but that he was
knowledgeable. The report indicates you were getting material to which
you were not entitled.
If it weren't for the climate, we would just say that Welander was
working too hard to please.
How about Diego Garcia?
Kissinger: I haven't heard.
Schlesinger: How about the Carrier into the Indian Ocean?
Kissinger: I would like to have a gap of about two or three weeks.
Schlesinger: I may have a Japanese problem. We are thinking of using
the Midway, home-ported in Japan.
Kissinger: Let me check on that.
Schlesinger: If we are going to have problems on home-porting and put
conditions on it, we should know sooner than later.
What about the Paracels?
Kissinger: There is an internal debate going on. Either the leftists did
it or Chou did it to show he was vigilant against Imperialists.
But North Vietnam is upset and thus it is not entirely to our
disadvantage.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
Schlesinger: I don't think there will be an offensive in Vietnam.
Kissinger: The Soviet Union and Chinese have said that, but we should
still give them what they need.
Schlesinger: We are giving them TOW's, but they are loaded.
Kissinger: Well, we need to use this time to look after their defenses.
Schlesinger: The Hill is afraid about the embargo. They are asking me
if we are giving our fuel to anyone especially the GVN. They have
stopped us from giving fuel directly -- the next move will be to cut off
AID funds which are being used now.
I think we can take out one A-1 squadron from Thailand earlier
than April since there will be no attack.
Kissinger: I don't want to trigger an offensive. Let's wait until April.
Schlesinger: My idea is to signal the DRV that if they behave, we will
continue their withdrawals.
Kissinger: Their strategy is simple. They will attack when they think
it is right. They don't understand good behavior. They understand only
power. A concession is a sign of weakness. When you sell the same
concession five times, you are on their level.
Schlesinger: We need to keep some B-52s in Thailand and why don't we
move some units out and put some back in - to show it is a two-way
street?
I would like to see Dobrynin after the SALT delegation leaves.
I will tell him we support SALT and detente but we must have equity.
Kissinger: On SALT, your figures are your program.
Schlesinger: I believe in essential equivalents.
Kissinger: If you have 4.8, you have to have subceilings or no inspection.
So either they have to build 3.5 SLBM which is ridiculous, or they have
more ICBM throw-weight.
TOP SECREP/NODIS/XGDS
FORD
GERALD
THEREY
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5.
Schlesinger:
are not counterforce.
Kissinger: That is my point.
Schlesinger: We must propose equivalents.
Kissinger: We are looking at a formula for reducing
units.
Another ridiculous idea is the block approach. We are better
having cheating of
than to have all the
Schlesinger: I agree. I earlier proposed to cut back
Can we have only Egyptian warships transit the Canal?
Kissinger: I will talk to Sadat. Contrary to our conversation, Sadat
wants to build a new Canal.
We should freeze Yamani if he comes here again. We should
deal with Saqqaf.
Schlesinger: I am not afraid to have Soviet warships in the Indian
Ocean. It might scare the Arabs.
Kissinger: Yes. Sadat is prepared to open the Canal at the pace we
want.
Schlesinger: I like the Canal open. It gives Egypt revenues and lessens
their dependence on the other Arabs.
Kissinger: What about Georges Guay in Cairo? [Discussion]
Brent, check with Guay.
Schlesinger: Let Porter finish out on the Iceland deal.
Kissinger: Yes. Brent, put in my talker about Iceland and Soviets
cutting off fuel. Put the evidence in my Dobrynin talker.
Can you do a study on how we can help if Egypt breaks with the
Soviet Union and waht we can do in electronic warfare?
Schlesinger: We have to get the SR 7,1 pictures to Cairo.
GERALD
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SECRET
6.
Kissinger: A carrier.
Schlesinger: We will talk to Walters and Colby. Helms destroyed all
his tapes and Colby is getting blamed.
Kissinger: Hold on Galley until we see if Jobert comes over here for
the energy conference.
FORD
CERALD
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 010686
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Kissinger/Schlesinger/Scowcroft/Wickham
DESCRIPTION
handwritten version of memcon #010685
CREATION DATE
02/01/1974
VOLUME
11 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600065
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
3
FOLDER TITLE
February 1, 1974 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET