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September 6, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller
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1552776
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document
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September 6, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Chile
Israel
Soviet Union
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Middle East conflicts
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1974-09-06
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1974
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1974-09-06
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9
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
DATE:
September 6, 1974
PLACE:
Oval Office
The White House
SUBJECTS:
V isits; 40 Committee; NSC Meeting on Israeli Requests;
Preparation for Rabin Visit
Original filed Scowcroft Memcons.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
HSC MEMO. 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
Wa
MARA, DATE 3/30/04
FORD is 034870 LIBRARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017649
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller, and
Scowcroft
CREATION DATE
09/06/1974
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400214
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
September 6, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger,
Rockefeller
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
sanitized 10/2/02
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Président Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
DATE:
September 6, 1974
PLACE:
Oval Office
The White House
SUBJECTS:
v isits; 40 Committee; NSC Meeting on Israeli Requests;
Preparation for Rabin Visit
Kissinger: On the Schmidt visit: He couldn't come in October and pro-
posed September 25. I suspect French mischief. You shouldn't be
pushed. I think you should go back to the original schedule.
President: We shouldn't interrupt Leone.
Kissinger: That would be very bad taste. If he can't come in October
we will tell him we will try to find a day in December.
About a press conference: If you have one next week, I won't.
President: Next Friday, I think.
Kissinger: I think inviting the cosmonauts to a picnic would be over-
doing it a bit. Dobrynin would make a big deal of it, and this is the
sort of thing the French put in speeches.
SEGREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
FORD
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)(d)
MR 01-4, #78; NSC-eer 9/11/02; Pinochet project
By dol NARA, Date 10/2/02
2
President: I'd kind of like to do it. It wouldn't be similar to the
others.
Kissinger: The problem is not the cosmonauts, it's Dobrynin.
President: Let Dobrynin come if he wants.
Kissinger: Okay.
[Dr. Kissinger then described the projected attendance at the
NSC meeting on the Middle East.
President: No. No on Treasury and OMB. I'd like Hartmann and
Haig there.
Kissinger: The New York Times has a copy of something on 40 Committee
operations in Chile. We will brief the 40 Committee next week. What
happened is this: Johnson put money in the '64 elections. We put
into the '70 elections and spread it out. We then put more in
to influence the Congressional elections and that failed too. After the
elections we put money into opposition parties and newspapers. It was
designed to keep the democratic process going. This was not a regular
covert activity. There was no attempt at a coup. Thoughthere could have been
in '70 if we hadn't failed.
There are two problems: The substance is embarrassing but we can
ride it out. The other is the leaks. The 40 Committee has followed
the same procedures since President Eisenhower.
Rockefeller: I was on it.
Kissinger: All these activities are approved by the Deputies in regular
but secret process. If these things leak, we haven't a government.
President: Who did it
Kissinger: I want to think about that. The Committees are briefed on
these activities. The problem is this is the most secret activity we
have. If there are minutes, we should be able to track it. We might
have Ter Horst make a statement, not on the facts but on the principle.
SECREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS
SEGREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS
3
President: Let me know Monday. If the committees were informed
it shouldn't be a problem.
Kissinger: They were regularly informed.
President: Let's ride it out and we'll see.
Kissinger: We have to have these things. We'll need them more for
Portugal, Spain, and so on.
At our meeting today I will go into the Israeli arms requests, then
CIA will brief, then I will explain the strategy. The CIA will have
charts showing the forces the Arabs can bring to bear.
What is it we are trying to do ? What are the others trying to do ?
What are some of the problems?
We want to guarantee the security of Israel, but we want to prevent
the coalescence of the Arab states -- that would create an unmanage-
able situation for us. We also want to prevent the resurgence of Soviet
influence. We want to prevent an Israeli-Arab war and the consequent
confrontation with the Soviet Union. If negotiations stall, or if there is a
war, there will be an embargo. That would push Europe over the cliff.
The Europeans' response to the Cyprus business shows their mood.
There would be a massive anti-U.S. blow-up. The same will happen
in Japan. The Soviet Union has suffered because they operated too
cautiously in the past. They were too much in the middle. They
won't be caught doing too little again. That makes an Israeli victory
more dangerous than an Israeli defeat. Last time we had a massive
airlift and a massive showdown, and we would have lost the ability to
present ourselves to the Arabs as a means to a solution.
As for the Israelis, another war would result in world pressure for
the '67 borders. It would be tough for the U.S. alone to resist, and
the result would be demoralizing like what was done to Czechoslovakia
in '38.
We have been giving the Arabs the feeling that each of them had some-
thing to gain--Egypt immediately; Jordan in the mid-term, and Syria
somewhat later. The Syrians know that Israel doesn't want to move;
they also know that the more the others are satisfied the more isolated
they will be, so they will work to lump everything together. With
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
4
massive effort we can head it off. We can defuse the Soviet Union with
your Brezhnev meeting.
We are operating at the edge of the margin.with the Arabs. We have
been stalling. The delivery dates on equipment for Egypt are so
late that they are turning to the Soviet Union. The Syrians are
restive because they got nothing. Geneva hasn't met for a year
we held off, because it brings all the Arabs together and it lumps all
the demands, and makes the Soviet Union the protector of the Arabs
and us of Israel. But we can hold that off only with some Arab help.
Israel has an unbelievable domestic structure and a vicious group
of politicians. They have a Jewish community here which vicariously
tries all the time to prove its manhood. The same people who were
doves on Vietnam are hawks on Israel.
President: I know. I saw it in the House votes.
Kissinger: Israel has to give up some territory. What they get in
return is the process, not a specific quid pro quo. Strictly
militarily it is unequal; but in the bigger context it is Israel's
salvation.
The Israelis also have to prove it is being raped by us before they
can yield. They have developed the strategy to state something for
peace which looks very reasonable to Americans. In '67 they wanted
an Arab signature on a piece of paper. They they wanted a direct
negotiation. The only one who dealt directly was Jordan- - who has
done worse than any others. Now they are talking about wanting a
comprehensive settlement. That is unattainable now. But we have
gotten the Arabs off our back on the '67 borders. That is in their
interest
The Israelis figure they can play the President and Vice President
againstme. It didn't work before because of Nixon, and they couldn't
get to him. Also we supported them in order to frustrate the Arabs.
President: They think I am closer to the Jewish community.
Kissinger: Yes, and Nelson also. They also count on me basically.
But we can't risk everything for a suicidal policy -- one which would
bankrupt them, And no President can easily order another airlift.
And while the leadership approved the alert, it was only as long as no American
troops were involved.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
5
President : That was made clear.
Kissinger: We were afraid the Soviet Union was going to put its
troops in, and we were thinking of paratroopers in the Sinai. We
were playing high stakes poker.
President: I don't think the American people will ever stand for
another Vietnam.
Rockefeller: The oil would be impossible in another confrontation.
Kissinger: We might have to take the oil.
Rockefeller: They couldn't ship it if the Soviet Union didn't want to.
Kissinger: We could do it in a consumer confrontation -- that would
be if we were doing it for all of us, but not for Israel.
This isn't an anti-Israeli presentation. I have great sympathy for
them, and I don't think they can go back to the '67 borders every-
where. If they [the Arabs] say they want a peace, they are saying
'67 and that means they want nothing.
We have to push them [the Israelis] to give up half of what they have
in Egypt. That would take Egypt out of the game for five years. If they
moved in Jordan, that would start an inter-Arab fight over the
guerrillas Then only Syria would be left. They probably would have
to give up half of the Golan Heights. That would mean moving Israeli
settlements. The Israelis are mounting a campaign against me, with
DOD -- about what happened last October. They complain we
mentioned disengagement in the Jordanian communique with President
Nixon, but we gave them the substance (the plan] and Arabs get words.
You won't want to approve the whole list because they want to stock-
pile so they wouldn't be dependent on us if another war starts. Also
it would demonstrate pro-Israeli support. It would also polarize
the Arabs--which Israel wants.
We have nine options and you have to give him something. We can
dole out the other parts of the Urgent List as they move. On the
big package I advise making no commitment now.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE /XGDS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
6
President: No, I can be factual about the Congressional situation.
Two billion dollars a year will not be bought in Congress.
Kissinger: Rabin can't leave here without a commitment to a clear-
cut strategy- to move with Egypt probably first and a flat commitment
to move with Jordan. They proposed to Jordan a federation. Hussein
thinks they are crazy. He had already accepted Allon's plan in
principle. If we don't tie Jordan down, they will go with the Syrians.
Israel is acquiescent or maybe eager for a war. They have been very
provocative in their actions. The Syrians have a tough problem
extending the UN. They will probably do it, but probably just hours
before the deadline. Egypt will extend the deadline in October, and
we can get one more in Syria -- but not May. By then you can
either force the Israelis or face the Syrians down. You can't do it
now. The oil will be in shape by then.
President: I agree with you. Let's have another review before
Rabin comes to concert on what we say. I want to say exactly the
right things and be as tough as necessary.
Kissinger: The big talk is on Thursday. It would be good for Nelson
to talk to them, too, after you. Then they know we are all together.
Golda was a warm himan being. She fought hard, but it was in the family,
and she always kept us informed. Rabin is an intellectual general
he wants to repeat the strategy of '71. He doesn't realize that we
supported that then to frustrate the Arabs.
President: I think the Jewish community is not so hot for Rabin.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017650
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Scowcroft's notes from September 6,
1974 meeting with Ford, Kissinger, and
Rockefeller
CREATION DATE
09/06/1974
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400214
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
September 6, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger,
Rockefeller
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG