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September 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
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1552786
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September 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Cuba
Soviet Union
Arms control
Middle East conflicts
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1974-09-13
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1974
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1974-09-13
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9
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
cia etr ets 5/12/08; osoets 8/15/08
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
mR08-90,#1; state requew 3/9/04
BY dal NARA DATE 9/24/08
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE & TIME:
September 13, 1974
PLACE:
The Oval Office
[The decision was made to let NATO announce Haig.
]
President: Wayne Hays said it is not good to send A1 to NATO. I said I
made a commitment and would stick to it.
Kissinger: Goodpaster hasn't helped or been generous. Wayne Hays will
be okay.
President: How about meeting with that group?
Kissinger: We are going the CRA route.
President: We still can offer credits.
Kissinger: It depends on whether to take on the Turkish aid cutoff. We
brief on the Greek-Turkey situation and say why are you giving a generous
interpretation to hold aid over the Turks. It would be the forthright thing
to do.
President: I think we are sort of committed to the leadership. It would keep
the good atmosphere of yesterday. Let's try to set it up.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT CLASSIFIED FROM BY GENERAL Henry DECLASSIFICATION A. Kissinger
GERALD K.TURD
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(6)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
You also are meeting with the Scott group?
Kissinger: Tuesday.
Dinitz is the only one who really understands the process. I told Dinitz
that Rabin should be trying to establish rapport with you, not just ask for
handouts.
I have decided: They don't want to move; if there is a war, they think it
would be better if it were now. And they want enough arms to get
flexibility. I told them we agreed in principle on lasers, besides the
list.
I told them we need a rough outline of what we are aiming for. If I don't
have something for the Arabs by the time I go to the Middle East, we are
in trouble. I need a concrete proposal on Egypt and Jordan before I go
there. We shouldn't engage in shuttle diplomacy -- it stakes too much
on the personal.
I planned to go the 8th-14th, and maybe to Greece and Turkey also. Then
to the Soviet Union, and India, the last week in October or first week in
November. Then on to Iran, and to Rome for the food conference. Then
to Japan and Peking.
Nothing Rabin says has meaning until it goes through the Cabinet. We
can't keep stalling. If it hadn't been for the change of Administration, we
would be in trouble now.
President: So you need a concrete plan on timing, substance and negotiation
method in October. If he gives this commitment.
Kissinger: You could then say we, in this atmosphere, would look over
the rest of the list in December.
President: I would say we would have real trouble going beyond this.
Kissinger: Giscard wants to meet in December.
President: I would like to be free after about the 18th-19th.
Kissinger: It would probably be about the 15th or 16th.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD FURD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
President: Fine, I could go until the 20th if necessary. Is Schmidt off?
Kissinger: He has his own scandal. Brandt's plus an advisor buying votes
for the Soviet treaty ratification. Much like your problem. Now Brandt
has decided to publish his memoirs. The whole affair is much like Water-
gate. Like the Chile affair.
President: That is not going anywhere, I don't think.
Kissinger: They are hunting in foreign policy. It is now my operation, not
CIA.
President: I probably should have a good question and answer session on the
Chile operation.
Kissinger: Separate the two issues. Describe why covert operations are
sometimes necessary. Refuse to talk about the specifics of this. This
operation followed the procedures that were regularly used.
President: On the Israelis, which is the chicken and which is the egg?
Kissinger: We have to give them this list. Don't put it on a blunt quid pro
quo basis. That could leak to the Jewish community.
The Jackson letter. It is in bad faith. The Soviet Union won't buy it. I
don't even know if these could stick.
President: In the House, one Congress is not bound by the previous Congress.
Kissinger: This procedure means that every year we would go through this.
Javits thinks it should be a regular veto by one House.
President: He told me that. I wouldn't buy that until we have fought for the
other.
Kissinger: We could get up a breakfast or just say it is unacceptable and see.
President: I would want to know that Ribicoff and Javits are okay.
Kissinger: Why don't I call him and meet again before you meet with them.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 4 -
President: We've got to make sure about Javits and Ribicoff.
Kissinger: They are afraid to stand up to him. The Jewish community
looks okay.
President: Can I get the precise language I want before the meeting.
Kissinger: On the UN speech -- - this is pretty good. I may not speak because
most of it is here. Shall I give it to Bob Hartmann?
President: Give it to me. On the guest list from here, I noticed some
Counsellors. I don't want a field list. You and Henry, but rotate the others.
Kissinger: On attendance at SALT, I recommend the same group plus Alex
Johnson.
President: Yes. I like the meetings small.
Kissinger: On the SALT meeting -- the Delegation is going to start talks
on the 18th. We need general guidance. But someone may spring a full
proposal. I would just say we will study it. You will also hear buzz words.
We don't want to freeze the delegation approach, because the Soviet Union
will take that as a hardened position -- but we can float reduction and slow
deployment as principles to discuss. We need to look hard at the trends in
the arms race. The throwweight problem is of our making and can be
corrected by a bigger Minuteman. To ask them to come down to us is to
ask them to redesign their force.
We eventually will give you the equal aggregate options, differentials, and
throwweight options. We will need a Verification Panel and NSC meeting
before I leave so I can take concepts to the Soviet Union. If you want equal
aggregates, the Soviet Union ought to know; ditto with differential and
reductions. If we get somewhere we could have announcement at Vladivostok
and then -- after a helluva negotiation -- sign an agreement here in June.
With Brown you have a great and cooperative man.
President: On the Army Chief, I want three nominees rather than just one.
I think time is of the essence.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
TERRAT
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 5 -
Kissinger: Yes, you need a strong leader.
President: When I get the names I will talk to you.
Kissinger: North Korea has made many feelers to us. I would use them to
get good behavior in the UN but not so as to shake up South Korea.
On the UN, you can go straight in or go to the US mission. It would please
Scali, but I think your first visit should be to the UN. Then if you want to
go to the mission you can do it afterwards.
President: That sounds much better. Let's do it that way. Speaking of
Rogers and Cuba, where are we?
Kissinger: I planned to talk to you soon.
There are two aspects: bilateral and in the OAS. State is preparing a paper
with these guidelines: We are being moved into relations with Cuba, but it
should not appear to the American people as if it is being forced on us. So
I would hold tough in the OAS, using the Brazilians. But we should start ,with
low level talks with the Cubans to see what we can get for it. If we don't we
may be driven by majority votes from one position to another.
President: Let me look at the paper. What price would we want?
Kissinger: Some promise against subversion. Some principle on
expropriation of assets; some foreign policy moves.
President: What would be the Soviet attitude?
Kissinger: It is costing them a lot. We have little to gain from Cuba. There
is nothing Castro can do for us. A little embarrassment in Third World
meetings. We should move slowly.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
LERATE GERALD FORD
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017658
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Scowcroft's notes from September 13,
1974 meeting with Ford and Kissinger
CREATION DATE
09/13/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400224
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
September 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG