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September 26, 1974 - Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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September 26, 1974 - Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Scowarts
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIP ANTS:
The President
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Congressman Thomas O'Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen
L/General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, September 26, 1974
PLACE:
Family. Dining Room, The Residence
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES Stateleview 3/9/04
SUBJECT:
Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President
The President: I appreciate Mike's holding the Foreign Assistance Bill so
NARA, DATE 5/5/04
we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill and the Trade Bill.
Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
Congressman Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.
The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike helped
get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain the situation
we are in.
BY
SECRET
FORD Listinity & GERALD
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FUND
SECRET
- 2 -
GERALD
LIBRARY
Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things -- explain the diplomacy and then
the legal situation.
The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis is caught
between anti-US forces on the left and right. There is Papadopoulos on the
left (who was strong enough in '67 to stimulate a coup); and on the right are
the military types from the junta.
Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-US. They talk differently, however,
for public consumption.
Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?
Secretary Kissinger: We got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did
Makarios. We earlier had had some rumors which we passed to him.
The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964
situation. But in 1964 there was a strong Cyprus government and a popular
Greek government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed never would they
let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world -- in the early days
after the coup it wouldn't give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.
Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right before the
November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO -- Karamanlis
is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really done a minimum.
Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign minister called on in
New York. He thought it wouldn't look good back home.
The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15. Any conceivable
outcome before the elections would have to be of a character which would hurt
them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in other issues with Turkey. It
was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done which would have
stopped the second Turkish offensive.
Immediately after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers
here or offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were
all rejected.
We told Karamanlis that we understood the need for some anti-US propaganda,
but there was danger it would prevent us from helping them. He quieted it
down thereafter. Then Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. We sent
Tyler. Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask
far too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations
and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by with
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
in direct negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved at all --
so he wouldn't have to accept the responsibility. He could accept a communal
talks outcome which he couldn't accept if he were directly involved.
At the same time, we took the foreign assistance legal interpretation to the
Turks and told them we would have to implement it if there were no progress
in the negotiations and on poppies. (They have now agreed on the straw process.)
The Turks have now agreed that when the Greeks give the signal, they will
make some concessions. That would be used to elicit a statement of principles and
would permit communal talks, plus some refugee returns. This would be in
October. Then, after the November elections, the talks would be broadened.
The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly with me and
asked for economic and military aid -- but publicly he has had to make some
troublesome statements. He told me he would get Makarios under control.
He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring back a concession, but they
are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this is tactics. Both the Greeks
and Turks substantially agree on this general process.
In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition wanted
annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be willing to
negotiate with Greece.
Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks are willing
to reduce their holdings to 33%. Somewhere in between will work.
We are ready to use leverage on Turkey (whatever you think of our policy),
but if we cut off aid ahead of time we will lose that leverage. If we are tough
beforehand, the Greeks -- who will be tough negotiators anyway -- would have
leverage over us. With an aid cutoff, the Greeks would expect concessions
no one could get them. These restrictions would lose us the Turks without
helping the Greeks and destroy this process I have been describing. It is
going pretty well really -- but it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off
aid doesn't help the Greek moderates because it cuts their maneuvering
room - they can't point to objective necessities for compromise.
The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid.
We could avoid the cutoff by the following (read from talking paper):
-- Find the Turks not in substantial violation
-- Self-defense
&
-- Treaty of 1960 creates doubt
-- Law applies to future, not past action
GERALD
SECRET
SECRET
- 4 -
The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation without
talking with you. Even if we cut off, does it apply to pipeline, and how about
the $50 million grant exception? A cutoff without the pipeline cutoff would
infuriate the Turks without leaving any effect for a year.
The negotiations timetable can't be speeded. All of this represents the nature
of our problem and why we don't want an automatic cutoff but rather to use the
threat of it for leverage.
The President: This is why the amendment of yesterday is good.
Senator Fulbright: What is it?
Secretary Kissinger: The CR Amendment required "substantial progress."
This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time there isn't any.
The language in yesterday's ammendments call for "good faith efforts by the
Turks. 11
Congressman Morgan: You saw the POST editorial?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is not accurate. I haven't done anything about
the legal opinions.
Senator Aiken: How do we respond to our Greek friends?
Secretary Kissinger: I spoke with AHEPA a while back and while they were
good in private, they went right out to lobby for a cutoff.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: The fight isn't over. Brademas will continue to
fight. His argument is the amendment was designed to get some troops moved
off Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger: We could make a shyster interpretation -- pull out 5, 000
troops and declare substantial progress. We don't want to do it that way.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: The whole thing is a PR move to pacify feelings.
Secretary Kissinger: Once the Turks know we are playing games like pulling
out a few troops, we will lose our leverage with them.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: How do we get out of complying with the act?
FORM
SECRET
&
SECRET
- 5 -
Secretary Kissinger: The minimum compliance would be to cut off credit
and all grants above $50 million, and have the pipeline alone. But this
would force the Turks to a nationalistic posture in which no Turk could give
concessions -- and the Greeks wouldn't want to make concessions in such
a situation because they would want to wait to see what effect the cutoff
was having.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don't have an ideal solution and the
House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.
Congressman Rhodes: Brademas told me not to make him roll us again --
because he can and will. What we need is a Senate action on CR first so we
can bring something in conference.
Secretary Kissinger: Our lawyers say the House Committee action would
override the language in the Foreign Assistance Act.
We should have some action going by the time the recess is over.
Congressman O'Neill: Could you talk with the Greek Congressmen?
Senator Mansfield: We have the amendment now and will try to hold it as is
for conference.
Congressman Rhodes: That is what we need.
Secretary Kissinger: If we had the House language on the CRA there would be
daily arguments about what was "substantial" progress and the Greeks would
gain great leverage.
Congressman Rhodes: How about stressing the effect on NATO. We need
both Greece and Turkey.
President Ford: Sure. Turkey could take the same NATO action as the Greeks.
Secretary Kissinger: The potential for the Turks getting out of NATO is
greater than Greece. There is no sympathy with Americans in Turkey and
there is always the possibility of a Qaddafi-type coup. If the Turks should
throw in with the Arabs, we would be in trouble.
Senator Humphrey: We have a problem of cosmetics: There must be some
action showing something is going on that we can point to. We can make a
case if we have something to point to. Remember, there is a US election in
November, too.
SECRET
GERALO
SECRET
- 6 -
Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is that the Turks are willing to grant
some concessions, but the Greeks have asked that we don't do it now because
they want it close to their election and not so far in front they have to deliver
something else by November.
Senator Humphrey: Can we say within 30 days?
Secretary Kissinger: If the Greeks think we are under pressure, they may
back off.
Congressman Rhodes: But the Turks are mad now about the Congressional
action. If they make concessions now, it looks like they are caving under
pressure.
Senator Humphrey: We have already gone through a period in this country
where we have ignored the law. It just won't work. We need something.
Senator Mansfield: I would be prepared to go with the Brooke Amendment.
Senator Fulbright: I prefer to put the amendment on the authorization rather
than the CRA. Of course I am opposed to the whole bill. This Cyprus
negotiation is a British problem. These amendments would get us into
another dispute where we don't belong. Let the UN handle it. They can't
do any worse than we.
Senator Humphrey: It's not a UN problem. It's a NATO problem.
Senator Fulbright: The problem is we are using foreign aid to get us involved
in every dispute around the world.
Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all sorts
of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I want to support
our diplomacy.
Senator Fulbright: I oppose doing it through the CRA. Afterall, the bill has
more money, but it does have a number of restrictive amendments.
Congressman Rhodes: Hubert has identified the immediate problem. Can
we tell the Turks the law is such, and that we will have to comply by a certain
time.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: I don't think the Brooke-Hamilton approach
will be accepted unless we do something with the Turks.
SECRET
GERAID
rund
SECRET
- 7 -
LIBRARY
Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is the Greeks don't want it now.
Senator Scott: It will be as much trouble after the election as now.
The President: There are two bills: the authorization tomorrow and the
CRA Monday.
Senator Fulbright: Why not take it to the UN. Then we wouldn't have all
of the responsibility.
The President: The Greeks and the Turks both trust us.
Secretary Kissinger: Giving it to the UN is a pro-Turk move because the
UN can't do anything and the situation would freeze as it is. If we move away
from the Turks, the Soviet Union will probably move toward them. Turkey
is more important to the Soviet Union than Greece.
Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union. They
wouldn't turn to them.
Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union
and the Arabs.
The President: The Greek government won't publicly acknowledge to the US
Greeks they don't want movement now. We both have elections and they must
understand if they don't call off the US Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.
Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turk reduction of 2, 000-3, 000 now
and another nearer election?
Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the Authorization
to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of the CRA.
Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.
Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization and
if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not on the CRA,
then we can negotiate a good CRA.
The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some
progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.
Senator Aiken: To summarize -- all this maneuvering must be kept from the
public.
SECRET
SECRET
- 8 -
Congressman Rhodes: How is the US Greek Community divided?
Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the
demonstrators are for Papadopoulos.
Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos met with the President and then
made a good statement.
Congressman O'Neill. Before the coup the Greek Congressman were out of
touch with tue US-Greeks -- who supported the junta. Now they want to get
back in touch with their constituents by being tough.
The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and
keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess,
progress would get us off the hook.
So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.
Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough
amendment on the Senate bill.
The President: Let's spend just a minute on Jackson-Vanik. I met with Scoop
last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the end of the year the
Soviet Union hasn't performed, I would kill MFN. The Soviet Union has agreed
they wouldn't interfere with applications and any applicant could leave,
except for security cases.
Secretary Kissinger: That's about 1 or 1-1/2% of the total.
The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so certify
and MFN would continue. We propose to Scoop a procedure like we had on the
pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress under a complicated
system he says will ensure the Congress will act.
Senator Fulbright: That won't work.
Senator Scott: No, it won't.
The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know
it can be circumvented.
Why we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.
FORD
Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this.
a
SECRET
GENALD
LIBRAHY
FORD
SEGRET
- 9 -
GIRALD
LIBRAY
Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets
have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they claim
emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably
something to that (described Belgian action on re-emigrators). We would
communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would
answer back with his clarifications.
Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?
Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands 60, 000
is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree
to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every
detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example
to scream bad faith. (Described how we couldn't require typed applications.)
No government could or shouldlive up to this intrusion.
Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.
Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network
of systematic violations. And Brezhnev sort of has promised personal
attention individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60, 000
and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do
not accept his specific number.
[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.
]
Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks
have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get the top Jewish
leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad
case on this.
Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The
Israeli Government has to
(interrupted).
The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can't buy it.
So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to
go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.
Senator Mansfield: I couldn't vote for the bill as Henry has described the
process.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop's letter unanswered?
Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view --
a waffle. But he would always claim trickery.
SECRET
CORD
SECRET
- 10 -
Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to-Scoop?
I am mean too. We know the President won't let non-compliance turn into a
political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild
in 1976. The President should spell out the understandings -- or Henry,
but not to Scoop.
Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders
think.
Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.
Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to
Scoop.
Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices -- if we write a letter to the
leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and
he replies, it is part of the legislative record.
Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.
Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then, anyone can send a
letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain
ambitions will want one.
The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this
problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope
Scoop won't feel we undercut him.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can't accept MFN if affirmative
action is needed every year.
The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.
Secretary Kissinger: Based on our oil speeches, we have called a Big Five
meeting.
What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic and therefore
political power in history. Italy, for example, can't meet its deficit.
Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control over the industrial world --
by pulling out the investment they could cause economic chaos. Some have
said let the Arabs take over the foreign aid programs from the developed
countries. If the Arabs take over foreign aid -- they haven't shown that
inclination yet -- they could buy up the whole Third World. Libya, for
example, literally buys up countries.
SECRET
SECRET
- 11 -
We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to them and
some possible approaches:
(1) Consumer restraint.
(2) Explore a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax.
(3) Build on emergency sharing agreement -- from selective to general
boycott.
We must realize we face a serious change in world political structure.
Senator Scott: The industrialized world won't tolerate strangulation at the
hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.
Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer without
war. European attitudes are now changing.
If this trend continues, Japan, for example, will build a military force to
take action.
Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You need
to announce something. We need really to get going.
No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.
We should tell the Arabs we will pay $7 a barrel and no more.
We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell them
cold turkey.
Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to settle Jerusalem as part of
the package?
Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like that. I
have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey that you have.
The President: You have been great to come and take all this time. Thank
you very much.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the
President -- Wednesday, September 26, 1974
ATTENDEES:
President Ford
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Congressman Thomas O'Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons
state view 3/9/04
SUBJECTS:
Turkish Aid; Jackson Amendment; Energy
Cooperation
Turkish Aid
Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
NARA, DATE 5/5/04
The President: I appreciate Mike's holding the Foreign Assistance
and the Trade Bill.
Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.
FORM
Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.
&
GERALD
ADDRESS
SECRET
BY
TOP SECRET- XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET
2
The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike
helped get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain
the situation we are in.
Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things -- explain the diplomacy
and then the legal situation.
The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis
is caught between anti-American forces on the left and right. There is
Papandreou on the left, who was strong enough in '67 to stimulate a coup,
and on the right are the military types from the junta.
Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-American. They talk
differently, however, for public consumption.
Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?
Secretary Kissinger: In spite of what you may read, we got no high-level
warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had heard some
rumors, which we passed to him.
The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms
of the 1964 situation. But in '64 there was a strong Cyprus Government
and a popular Greek Government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed
that never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream
world; in the early days after the coup, they wouldn't give concessions to
keep the Turks from invading.
Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right
before the November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO --
what he's doing is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really
done the minimum. Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign
minister I called on in New York; he thought it wouldn't look good back
home.
The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15.
Any conceivable outcome before the elections would have to be of a
character which would hurt them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in
other issues with Turkey.
FORD
&
SECRET
GEPALD
SECRET
3
It was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done
which would have stopped the second Turkish offensive. Immediately
after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers here or
offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were all
rejected.
We told Karamanlis that we understood his need for some anti-
American propaganda, but he had to remember there was a danger it would
prevent us from helping them. He quieted it down thereafter. Then
Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. So we sent Ambassador Tyler.
Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask far
too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations
and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by
with in indirect negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved
at all so he wouldn't have to accept the responsibility. He could accept
an outcome from the communal talks which he couldn't accept if he were
directly involved.
At the same time, we took the legal interpretation of the foreign
assistance legislation to the Turks and told them we would have to
implement it if there were no progress in the negotiations and on poppies.
(They have now agreed on the straw process. )
The Turks have now agreed that when the Greeks give the signal,
they will make some concessions. That would be used to elicit a statement
of principles and would permit communal talks, plus some refugee returns.
This would be in October. Then, after the November elections, the talks
would be broadened.
The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly
with me and asked for economic and military aid -- but publicly he has
had to make some troublesome statements. He told me he would get
Makarios under control. He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring
back concessions, but they are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this
is tactics. Both the Greeks and Turks substantially agree on this general
process.
In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition
wanted annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be
willing to negotiate with Greece.
FORD
?
SECRET
GERALD
SECRET
4
Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks
are willing to reduce their holdings to 33%. Somewhere in between will
work.
We are ready to use leverage on Turkey -- whatever you think of
our policy -- but if we cut off the aid ahead of time, we will lose that
leverage. If we are tough beforehand, the Greeks -- who will be tough
negotiators anyway would have leverage over us. With an aid cutoff,
the Greeks would expect concessions that no one could get them. These
restrictions would lose us the Turks without helping the Greeks and destroy
this process I have been describing. It is going pretty well really -- but
it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off aid doesn't help the Greek
moderates because it cuts their maneuvering room -- they can't point to
objective necessities for compromise.
The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut
off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following [reading from the talking
paper]: we could find the Turks not in substantial violation, on the basis
that it was a kind of self-defense of the Turkish Cypriotes; that the Treaty
of 1960 gives them the status of guarantor, which at least creates doubt
that their action was illegal; and that the law applies to future, not past
action.
The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation
without talking with you. Even if we cut it off, does it apply to what is in
the pipeline? And how about the $50 million grant exception? A cutoff
without the pipeline cutoff would infuriate the Turks without having any
effect for a year.
The negotiating timetable can't be speeded. All of this represents
the nature of our problem and explains why we don't want an automatic
cutoff but rather to use the threat of it for leverage.
The President: This is why the amendment of yesterday is good.
Senator Fulbright: What is it?
Secretary Kissinger: The CRA amendment required "substantial progress,"
This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time that there isn't any.
The language in yesterday's amendments call for "good faith efforts by the
Turks. "
FORD
R
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
5
Congressman Morgan: You saw the Post editorial?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is not accurate. I haven't done anything
about the legal opinions.
Senator Aiken: How do we respond to our Greek friends?
Secretary Kissinger: I spoke with AHEPA a while back, and while they
were good in private, they went right out to lobby for a cutoff.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: The fight isn't over. Brademas will
continue to fight. His argument is the amendment was designed to get
some troops moved off Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger: We could make a shyster interpretation -- pull
out 5,000 troops and declare "substantial progress.' 11 We don't want to
do it that way.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: The whole thing is a PR move to pacify
feelings.
Secretary Kissinger: Once the Turks know we are playing games, like
asking only for them to pull out a few troops, we will lose our leverage
with them.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: How do we get out of complying with the Act?
Secretary Kissinger: The minimum compliance would be to cut off
credit and all grants above $50 million, and leave the pipeline alone.
But this would force the Turks to a nationalistic posture in which no Turkish
leader could give concessions -- and the Greeks wouldn't want to make
concessions in such a situation because they would want to wait to see
what effect the cutoff was having.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don't have an ideal solution, and
the House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.
Congressman Rhodes: Brademas told me not to make him roll us again - -
because he can and will. What we need is a Senate action on the CR first
so we can bring something in in conference.
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6
Secretary Kissinger: Our lawyers say the House Committee action
would override the language in the Foreign Assistance Act. We should
have some action going by the time the recess is over.
Congressman O'Neill: Could you talk with the Greek Congressmen?
Senator Mansfield: We have the amendment now and will try to hold
it as is for conference.
Congressman Rhodes: That is what we need.
Secretary Kissinger: If we had the House language on the CRA there
would be daily arguments about what was "substantial" progress and the
Greeks would gain great leverage.
Congressman Rhodes: How about stressing the effect on NATO? We
need both Greece and Turkey.
The President: Sure. Turkey could take the same NATO action as the
Greeks.
Secretary Kissinger: The potential for the Turks getting out of NATO
is greater than with Greece. There is no sympathy with Americans in
Turkey and there is always the possibility of a Qaddafi-type coup. If the
Turks should throw in with the Arabs, we would be in trouble.
Senator Humphrey: We have a problem of cosmetics: There must be
some action showing something is going on that we can point to. We can
make a case if we have something to point to. Remember, there is an
American election in November, too.
Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is that the Turks are willing to grant
some concessions, but the Greeks have asked that we don't do it now
because they want it close to their election and not so far in front they
have to deliver something else by November.
Senator Humphrey: Can we say within 30 days?
Secretary Kissinger: If the Greeks think we are under pressure, they
may back off.
FORD
Assuan
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7
Congressman Rhodes: But the Turks are mad now about the Congressional
action. If they make concessions now, it looks like they are caving under
pressure.
Senator Humphrey: We have already gone through a period in this
country where we have ignored the law. It just won't work. We need
something.
Senator Mansfield: I would be prepared to go with the Brooke Amendment.
Senator Fulbright: I prefer to put the amendment on the authorization
rather than the CRA. Of course I am opposed to the whole bill. This
Cyprus negotiation is a British problem. These amendments get us into
another dispute where we don't belong. Let the UN handle it. They can't
do any worse than we.
Senator Humphrey: It's not a UN problem. It's a NATO problem.
Senator Fulbright: The problem is we are using foreign aid to get us
involved in every dispute around the world.
Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all
sorts of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I
want to support our diplomacy.
Senator Fulbright: I oppose doing it through the CRA. After all, the
bill has more money, but it does have a number of restrictive amendments.
Congressman Rhodes: Hubert has identified the immediate problem.
Can we tell the Turks the law is such, and that we will have to comply
by a certain time?
Congressman Frelinghuysen: I don't think the Brooke-Hamilton approach
will be accepted unless we do something with the Turks.
Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is the Greeks don't want it now.
Senator Scott: It will be as much trouble after the election as now.
The President: There are two bills: the Authorization tomorrow and
the CRA Monday.
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8
Senator Fulbright: Why not take it to the UN? Then we wouldn't have
all of the responsibility.
The President: The Greeks and the Turks both trust us.
Secretary Kissinger: Giving it to the UN is a pro-Turk move because the
UN can't do anything and the situation would freeze as it is. If we move
away from the Turks, the Soviet Union will probably move toward them.
Turkey is more important to the Soviet Union than Greece.
Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union.
They wouldn't turn to them.
Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet
Union and the Arabs.
The President: The Greek Government won't publicly acknowledge to the
American Greeks that they don't want movement now. We have both
elections. They must understand that if they don't call off the American
Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.
Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turkish reduction of 2, 000-3, 000
now and another nearer election?
Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the
Authorization to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of
the CRA.
Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.
Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization
and if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not
on the CRA, then we can negotiate a good CRA.
The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some
progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.
Senator Aiken: To summarize -- all this maneuvering must be kept from
the public.
Congressman Rhodes: How is the American Greek Community divided?
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9
Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and
the demonstrators are for Papandreou.
Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos met with the President and
then made a good statement?
Congressman O'Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressmen were
out of touch with the American Greeks -- who supported the junta. Now
they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.
The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization
and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the
recess, progress would get us off the hook.
So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.
Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a
tough amendment on the Senate bill.
Jackson Amendment
The President: Let's spend just a minute on Jackson-Vanik. I met
with Scoop last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the
end of the year the Soviet Union hasn't performed, I would kill MFN.
The Soviet Union has agreed they wouldn't interfere with applications
and that any applicant could leave, except for security cases.
Secretary Kissinger: That's about 1 or 1-1/2% of the total.
The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so
certify and MFN would continue. We proposed to Scoop a procedure
like we had on the pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress
under a complicated system he says will ensure that Congress will act.
Senator Fulbright: That won't work.
Senator Scott: No, it won't.
The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but
you know it can be circumvented.
4
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10
Why, we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.
Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this?
Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets
have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they also
claim that emigration is down because of the Middle East situation.
There is probably something to that. There is a problem in Western
Europe already with people wanting to go back. We would communicate
all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back
with his clarifications.
Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?
Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands
that 60, 000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets
will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union
to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use
every isolated example to scream bad faith. The Soviets could ask for
typed applications. No government could or should live up to this sort
of intrusion.
Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.
Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish
network about systematic violations if there are any. And Brezhnev has
promised to give his personal attention to individual cases. But the
Soviet Union has not agreed to 60, 000, and Jackson at the end of the
waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific
number.
[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.
]
Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the
Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get
the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President
has an ironclad case on this.
Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community.
The Israeli Government has to
(interrupted).
FORD
a
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11
The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can't
buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration.
The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.
Senator Mansfield: I couldn't vote for the bill as Henry has described
the process.
Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop's letter unanswered?
Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your
view -- which is a waffle. But he could always claim trickery.
Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to
Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won't let non-compliance
turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics
will be wild in '76. The President should spell out the understandings --
or Henry - - but not to Scoop.
Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the
leaders think.
Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have
described.
Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not
to Scoop.
Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices: If we write a letter to
the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write
him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.
Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.
Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then anyone can send
a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have
certain ambitions will want one.
The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard
on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation.
I hope Scoop won't feel we undercut him.
&
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Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can't accept MFN
if affirmative action is needed every year.
Energy Cooperation
The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.
Secretary Kissinger: Based on what the President and I have said in
our oil speeches, we have called a meeting of the Big Five to concert
our policy.
What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic
power and therefore political power in history. Italy, for example,
can't meet its deficit. Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control
over the industrial world. By pulling out investment, they could cause
economic chaos. Some have said, "Let the Arabs take over the foreign
aid programs from the developed countries." If the Arabs take over
foreign aid -- they haven't shown that inclination yet -- they could buy
up the whole Third World. Libya, for example, literally buys up
countries.
We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to
them and discuss some possible approaches: One element would be
consumer restraint, or conservation. Second, we would explore
establishing a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax.
Third, we would build on the emergency sharing agreement and strengthen
it for the range of threats, from selective to a general boycott.
But basically we must realize that we face a serious change in
the world political structure.
Senator Scott: The industrialized world won't tolerate strangulation at
the hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.
Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer
without war. European attitudes are now changing. If this trend continues,
Japan, for example, will build a military force to take action.
Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You
need to announce something. We need really to get going.
SECRET
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13
No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.
We should tell the Arabs we will pay $7 a barrel and no more.
We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell
it to them cold turkey.
Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to sell Jerusalem as
part of the package?
Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like
that. I have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey, than you have.
The President: You have been great to come and take all this time.
Thank you very much.
?
GERALD
SECRET
- DECLASSIFIED
3
Leadership Buckfast
E.O. 12968, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE BEPT. GUIDELINES state leview 3/9/04
26 Sept.
BY Salos
, NARA, DATE 5/5/04
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Internation China
P- Them twits haped get c home into
0'will Returns, alhort only and who
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bont yes
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Hemp- I com yes why S crup higher it. He
them byd setnation
lucks like a clow compand.
Greek drunke it x trace bring anyelve.
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certuff haveling,
force. Papartment (arho strong any enough
that about Ray time hand.
in 67 to stringlate a (mp). Octon
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510 miles of Itah
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They say other trip for put.
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Karn is trysing to stral sugget from
to crok for two much. He your hs
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a smoker list of charames advice he
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huchd in indict angot. Then he
Thing home milly done a inining.
daid he rather not be involved at Ml-
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so woulden't hurrt accept usp. He
one 2 called on inHY.
could accept a consumeral telhs
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July 15. am artionse hyere ehiting world
onterns which he comldn't if he
he such as to first them. They hope
christry invistred.
to urap in other effend w/Tnuckey.
at some trim, one task FA hyal inter-
pritation h the Times + Trild than
It was and july- writing me could have
dme more. would home stopped ' 2 200 Trunkish
somet implayment it if no progress
in myotrations + on pospies. (They
fth 2 nd smoking began
have mer agreed an shaw proces).
we invoice brth PM is here n K send
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anti -Us pings but too much
form correpsions. That he used
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for statement of principh & phinit
through Them Kara ashed for prints
patiential informal tacks, phus Jours
energy -Tylen. Hard said that
upagee Mr inter. This in
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tasks world he handred.
ant off and am lose Chanage. are
Garch pur is presentations. Moverns
tommy Cres whing c Grabs who will
mos every framily w/ me 1 athed for
be tomps anyung- - mount Q have Grange
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our us, we and whops, Gassbas would
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would get mak control H l
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a emussim, but they substant R are
ashid that d go to turking to hing bn k
w/o helping C cruhs + bothery this proups.
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me publicy. But this is ta this. Both
Gubs + Times apres on this
starts. hulting off and drisn't help J
gent puress.
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into their manewing your
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thaind legal interpretation w/o
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by Tourk.
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wont to wait to see what effect
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Friling Bent me dnit have intial
well both Green 6 Tonkey.
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that me don't dr it canse thry mut
krenge. progress + umilging balls
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something lbs by has
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got no involved in every
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they may birth off.
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word where we get us into aurth dispute
we en something w/c Tunks.
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dnit thereg. fort C
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unit it mer
them and
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Scott Go much ps harbli often section
of nmo
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P Two hills- anth +
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CRP monday
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one pr Paymber
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Supplar Jahons mettal/
would Bill MFN, so and
Person + then mock good statement
thing mmlchit ar/ applications t
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gramanter a specific figures +
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Unite. - I withit with for hill
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for Me good minut him
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