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October 10, 1974 - Ford, Schlesinger
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October 10, 1974 - Ford, Schlesinger
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Portugal
Soviet Union
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Military bases
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017734
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
TITLE
Ford, Schlesinger
CREATION DATE
10/10/1974
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400261
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
6
FOLDER TITLE
October 10, 1974 - Ford, Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
October 9, 1974
MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JAMES K. SCHLESINGER
Thursday, October 10, 1974
7:15 a.m. (45 minutes)
First Floor Private Dining Room
From: Brent Scowcroft
I.
PURPOSE
To discuss current issues of Defense policy.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Secretary Schlesinger has requested this
meeting to discuss with you the major Defense policy issues
to be addressed in the months ahead. The Secretary's
foremost interest has been strategic arms policy. His
position and points he may be expected to raise are
summarized below.
SALT
Based on his arguments at the NSC meeting on Monday,
Secretary Schlesinger has modified his previous emphasis
on the necessity for equal missile throw weight (especially
MIRVed missile throw weight) toward a requirement for
an agreement containing the "perception" of equality. This
he defines as equal totals of missiles I and bombers (equal
aggregates).
His earlier concern with MIRVed missile throw weight was
that at higher levels, and especially with a heavy missile
(SS-9, SS-18), it constituted a counterforce threat to our
ICBM force and was therefore destabilizing. On Monday,
as you know, he stated that dealing with the issue of strategic
FORD
&
SECRET/GDS
5/6/04
GERALD
SECRET
2
stability would require a lengthy process of educating the
Soviets. He then argued strongly that equal aggregates
ought to be the key aspect of any SALT agreement. The
level at which equality was set was less significant than the
fact of equality. Throw weight, MIRVs, and warheads were
of much lesser significance than numbers of launchers as a
measure of equality.
It might be useful to have Secretary Schlesinger develop
further his concept of a SALT agreement based on equal
aggregates. Some relevant factors for consideration:
-- Launchers are non-lethal. It is not clear why a perception
of launcher equality should be more significant than one
of warhead equality, since warheads are the killers.
It is not clear why a disparity of several hundreds of
MIRVed missiles or even thousands of warheads is not
a problem, whereas a difference of two hundred launchers
is critical to perceptions of equality.
-- Controlling only launcher numbers permits a substantial
arms race in qualitative improvements -- with obvious
economic, political and military ramifications.
-- The USSR is very unlikely to agree to equal aggregates
at 2000. They may at 2500 (their program). But are
the Congress and the American people likely to find
acceptable an agreement in arms control which does
not constrain the USSR and requires a US force buildup?
-- Would the Congress support the increased costs involved
in a SALT agreement which required a US force buildup?
Inadequate Tank Production Capability
Heavy competition for the use of tank capacity to produce non-
military goods and a major shortfall in the inventory of tanks
in US active forces have led DOD to propose Government inter- -
vention to establish tank production as a program of "Highest
National Priority. 11 If approved, this will allow diversion of
resources and manpower from civilian contracts where required
to assure
SECRET/GDS
SECRET
3
increased and accelerated output of tanks. A recommen-
dation will be forwarded for your consideration shortly.
Secretary Schlesinger may point to the tank problem as
reflective of increasing difficulty being experienced generally
in achieving satisfactory production rates of major Defense
items.
Foreign Aid
As you know, the FY 75 foreign aid authorization has come
under severe attack in the form of restrictive amendments
and serious funding cuts. Floor action will take place in
both Houses following the recess. The Defense Department
can be particularly helpful in lining up support for increased
funding for the MAP program (particularly for Cambodia)
and in efforts to remove restrictive amendments.
One amendment now in both the House and Senate bills requires
the shift of military aid to Vietnam from the Defense Appro-
priation to the Foreign Aid bill. This would inevitably lead
to inadequate funding levels. DOD can be of great help in
urging the Armed Services Committees to insist on retaining
jurisdiction over this program.
Talking Points
1. You know how severely foreign aid has been attacked.
I am committed to standing by our allies in Vietnam and
Cambodia however and believe we must try for restorations
in a supplemental next January.
2.
In that regard it would be disastrous for Foreign Relations
Affairs to get control over aid to Vietnam as both committee
bills propose. Can we count on Hebert to hold out for
continued control and to keep it in the Defense Budget?
Inflation
Since submission of the FY 75 appropriation requests last
January, the rate of inflation has exceeded original estimates.
SECRET/GDS
SECRET
4
It would be useful to receive any preliminary views the
Secretary may have on the impact of less buying power
on force readiness.
Talking Points
1.
Since January I expect procurement costs have risen
faster than we had estimated. Are you able to assess
how much of an impact your reduced buying power will
have?
2. How much of an increase in next year's budget do you
expect as a result of inflation?
B.
Participants: Secretary Schlesinger and Brent Scowcroft.
C.
Press Plan: To be announced; White House photographer.
FORD
SECRET
3
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017735
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
TITLE
Ford, Schlesinger
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's handwritten version
of memcon
CREATION DATE
10/10/1974
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400261
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
6
FOLDER TITLE
October 10, 1974 - Ford, Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG