Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552859
label
November 20, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552859
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
November 20, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
citationUrl
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
China
Japan
Korea (North)
Taiwan
South Dakota
Soviet Union
Vietnam (Republic)
Arms control
Middle East conflicts
Petroleum
Presidential trips
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552859
coverageEndDate
day
20
logicalDate
1974-11-20
month
11
year
1974
coverageStartDate
day
20
logicalDate
1974-11-20
month
11
year
1974
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
e95adb4f46c36e47
ocrText
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
TIME & PLACE:
10:00 a.m., November 20, 1974
Guest House
PARTICIPANTS:
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Deputy Foreign Minister Kiyohiko Tsurumi
Toshio Yamazaki, Director General
American Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Hidetoshi Ukawa, MOFA (Interpreter)
Akitane Kiuchi, Private Secretary to
Prime Minister
The President
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Hodgson
General Scowcroft
Assistant Secretary Habib
James J. Wickel (Interpreter)
SUBJECT:
President Ford - Prime Minister Tanaka -
Second Meeting
DISTRIBUTION:
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRET
MR01-161, # 4: at dept Ur 12/11/01
By
dal NARA, Data 2/19/03
SEGRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET
President: Mr. Prime Minister, our discussion yesterday
impressed me as being constructive and beneficial. I know
we have other subjects to discuss today. I feel that the
frank constructive exchange of views we have had will make
my trip worthwhile.
PM Tanaka: We also found our talks yesterday very helpful.
You have probably already sensed that Japan is different
from other countries in its political division: the LDP is
confronted by four opposition parties, two of which might
be called moderate, and two which are extremely left wing,
the JSP and JCP. Relations between these latter two are
somewhat like U.S. -Soviet relations. Even though the
leaders have changed over the years within the LDP, the
party has maintained its majority for about 30 years, pro-
viding a continuity of philosophy in the GOJ.
President: Governor Minobe called to pay his respects
yesterday, and tried to involve me in a discussion of a
certain subject. But I respectfully said that any discussions
of that subject should be conducted by our government with
the GOJ.
PM Tanaka: Yes, that was reported clearly in the press
this morning.
One important problem in the Far East is the Korean
peninsula. The Koreans are excellent people, and like China
have a history 4,000 years long. Through most of it, however,
they have been under pressures from the continent and
elsewhere, and as a result, in all frankness, have developed
a sense of persecution. Most unfortunately, the peninsula
has been divided into North and South Korea at the 38th
parallel, making Korea one of the four nations divided since
the war, including East and West Germany, North and South
Vietnam, and China and Taiwan. It is difficult for both
Koreas to talk to each other realistically. When I visited
Moscow I proposed to the Soviets that they should not support
SECRET
2
SECRET
one part of Korea, lying under Japan's nose, because a
dispute there could disrupt peace in the Far East. I also
made the same suggestion to the Chinese during my visit to
Peking.
President: Of course, we strongly support our courageous
and strong ally, South Korea. We feel they are doing a
fine job, and have strong relations with them. I am looking
forward to my visit to South Korea. We appreciate the
caution of our allies in dealing with North Korea, and have
no desire ourselves to move closer to North Korea under the
present circumstances.
Secretary Kissinger: I might point out, Mr. President,
that our position is that we will talk to North Korea only
when the Soviet Union and China talk to South Korea, and
will not talk to North Korea if the major communist states
do not talk to South Korea.
PM Tanaka: In that sense, Mr. President, your visit not
just to Japan but to South Korea as well has deep significance.
President: As you pointed out yesterday, there have been
four divided nations since the second World War. We feel as
strongly about another one of them, South Vietnam, as we do
about South Korea, and intend to continue our support for
South Vietnam. Our support is based on the need to have a
strong South Vietnam, which should have the opportunity to
rebuild its own nation, the opportunity to have free elections,
and the opportunity to withstand pressure from North Vietnam.
Therefore we intend to continue our economic and military
assistance to South Vietnam. I hope the Congress would
support this administration's requests for economic and
military aid. At the same time, we believe it is vitally
important for Japan to expand its support for South Vietnam
in our mutual interest.
PM Tanaka: As I said yesterday, we hope to increase our aid
to South Vietnam in JFY 75, to the extent possible; we will
SECRET
3
SECRET
continue to provide assistance to both South Korea and
South Vietnam at teast at the same level as last year.
President: We hope you will expand your aid to the maximum
extent possible, because this will be a critical year for
South Vietnam--if it can get by this year, with its potential
for oil development we are hearing about, South Vietnam
would be well on its way toward economic and military self-
sufficiency.
PM Tanaka: Are American companies drilling for oil on the
South Vietnamese continental shelf?
President: Some American companies are participating in
exploration, but I'm not sure which ones.
Secretary Kissinger: As far as I know, Mr. President, some
American companies are involved in the search for oil, and
others are engaged in discussion with the government of
South Vietnam.
President: We would have no objection to broader participation
in the development of these resources; we feel it would be
more beneficial to have broader international participation,
by American companies and even by companies from Japan.
Secretary Kissinger: We would be prepared to encourage the
GVN to accept participation by others. This year, though,
South Vietnam needs about $100 million more in assistance,
which will help determine whether they could become self-
sustaining or not. If they can get by, in a few years the
anticipated oil revenues will permit South Vietnam to deal
with their economic problem, which we view as a greater
threat than the military threat.
President: With respect to oil, Secretary Kissinger has
just concluded a long trip to the Soviet Union, the sub-
continent and the Middle East. If I could summarize our
reactions to it, we feel that it is of the utmost importance
that progress be made toward resolving the Middle East issue.
SECRET
4
DECRET
We believe the best way to do so, is step by step. The
progress achieved up to now has encouraged us, and we
feel, despite the Arab Summit at Rabat, that there is a
possibility of continuing to make progress in resolving
the issue between Israel and the Arab nations. I assure
you we will continue to push hard to make that progress
because we recognize the damages that could result if no
progress is made.
Secretary Kissinger: One difficulty with the step-by-step
approach is the intense rivalry among the Arabs themselves,
for which reason those leaders who most want to take steps
must make the most noise in public. We saw an example of
this at work on Sunday, when the press carried pictures of
President Sadat meeting with the Egyptian War Council, but
only after Syria and Israel both gave assurances that they
were not going to war.
PM Tanaka: Turning to China, Japan is aware that it was
able to normalize its relations with the PRC, thanks to the
United States. Although China had long viewed the U.S. and
the Soviet Union similarly, as imperialists, and took
identical measures against them, I told the Chinese leaders
I met in Peking that the United States is not an aggressor,
and that it was making a strong effort on behalf of peace,
which of course was demonstrated by its withdrawal of troops
from Vietnam and the Ceasefire Agreement it signed in Paris.
I told the Chinese that the United States returned Okinawa
to Japan--after having taken it at great cost during the
war--and that the United States has no desire to expand its
territory. I also told the Chinese that the United States is
not a threat to them.
The question of Taiwan, however, will take a long time
to resolve, and I made clear to the Chinese leaders in
Peking that it would not be in the interest of the United
States to return to a state of confrontation with the PRC
over Taiwan, nor would it be advantageous to the PRC to make
Taiwan a difficult issue. While the United States does not
have full formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, I
pointed out to the Chinese leaders that each country maintains
SECRET
5
SECRET
a liaison office in the capitol of the other, which perform
the same functions as an Embassy, and that unlike the
Soviet Union they could view the United States as a friend
in view of the genuine friendly relations between them.
The differences between the United States and the Soviet
Union, I said,7 1,S that the former is a force for peace. The
Soviet Union acquired territory equivalent to the size of
East and West Germany combined after the war, but the United
States took no territory after the great sacrifices it made,
which should be the best evidence that the United States is
a force for peace.
President: I wish to express our appreciation for your
comment on the United States' attitude after the second world
war, Mr. Prime Minister. We think our action was constructive,
and a show of good faith, to restore an area to a nation
formerly an enemy in the war. This is the best evidence
of our good faith.
The historical breakthrough in U.S. -PRC relations, we
feel, is one of the most outstanding diplomatic actions of
the post-war era. President Nixon's decision has given great
impetus, we feel, to the enhancement of stability and good
relations in the Pacific area. Our policy continues to be
predicated on the Shanghai Communique. Progress in improving
our relations is being made, and in fact Secretary Kissinger
will visit Peking after Vladivostok. We feel strongly that
step-by-step progress is in the best interest, of not only
the nations in the Pacific but also the world as a whole.
We do not view our relations with Peking as being
aimed against the Soviet Union, nor vice versa. We believe
that improving our relations with both is important to the
world as a whole. A broader detente, and successful con-
clusion of SALT II would be beneficial to all. At the same
time we feel that progress with the PRC can't help but be
beneficial. It is for that reason that I am going to
Vladivostok, and afterward Secretary Kissinger to Peking.
PM Tanaka: It is in the interest of the world as a whole
that China and the Soviet Union, both powerful nations, have
good relations.
SECRET
6
SECRET
President: Very much SO.
PM Tanaka: We appreciate your efforts toward that end.
However, China and the Soviet Union share a 6,000 km long
border, which has been a focus of dispute for more than a
century. Moreover, long stretches of that border are drawn
in the center of rivers, which shift course from time to
time, making the border issue well nigh insoluble.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets claim that the far side of
the river is their boundary.
PM Tanaka: In all frankness, Japan does not assess China
as a major threat to Japan's security. However, the Soviet
military forces deployed in Siberia along the Chinese border
may at the same time also be viewed as a threat to Japan.
Therefore Japan is most sensitive to the Soviet military
build-up in Siberia. Would you be able to give me the
American assessment of the Soviet forces there?
President: Of course, Mr. Prime Minister, it would serve
the best interest of stability on a world-wide basis if SALT II
could be negotiated. We are making an honest effort to do
so, but we have no intention to move at the expense of the
security of the United States and the Free World. We believe
an honest give-and-take will best serve the security of both
sides.
The people in the United States broadly feel that we
should keep our military forces strong. There are elements
in the Congress who feel that perhaps there could be reductions,
but the American people would not accept any reductions below
the level necessary to provide for a strong, flexible response.
I intend to fight any move in the Congress which would under-
cut our military capability.
We feel that the strength of the United States, combined
with the strength of our European allies, is adequate to
SECRET
7
SECRET
main stability between East and West in Europe. There are
signs, however, that some Europeans (for one reason or another)
no longer wish to keep their promise in the manner we think
they should. We are maximizing our efforts to keep NATO
strong, so it can continue to succeed as a stabilizing force
in Europe. We will continue to work for this purpose within
the framework of NATO, although on occasion we have been
bothered by the attitude of some of our allies, when they
criticize the United States publicly. We may understand
their motivation, but we don't approve. The United States,
working through NATO, has helped them by maintaining stability.
Therefore, we don't believe open criticism of the United
States is healthy, and we don't approve. Those who speak
with the loudest voice seems only to wish to take advantage
of the situation.
In summary, Mr. Prime Minister, we intend to keep strong
military forces in the Pacific and Western Europe. This
administration will vigorously oppose any attempt in Congress
to which would undercut our military capability, but on the
other hand we intend to negotiate--at arms length--with the
Soviets to reduce the levels of strategic weapons to help
stabilize the world.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I might describe the
Soviet conventional strength in Siberia, not its strategic
depdbyments. The Soviet Union is making a major effort to
strengthen its forces, and now has 42 divisions in Siberia,
with half of these in the Maritime Province. They have
15,000 tanks, which are being strengthened and modernized
year by year.
PM Tanaka: When I visited Moscow I commented that Soviet
forces in Siberia aimed at China could also be considered
as being aimed at Japan; the Soviets did not respond to me.
With respect to Siberian development programs, I have
informed the Soviets that Japan would not participate in
building a second trans-Siberian railroad, which would reinforce
SECRET
8
SECRET
the Soviet military capability. The Soviet Union originally
insisted that Siberian development could only be considered
on a package basis, but we replied that we would consider
only those separate projects which are economically feasible,
such as coal and gas in Yakutsk, and forestry resources,
and that is the basis on which we have agreed to move ahead.
President: We understand the thinking behind your decision,
and believe it quite wise. To help the Soviets in economic
development, but not help them upgrade their military
potential is wise. What has been their reaction?
PM Tanaka: There is more to it than that. We informed
the Soviet Union that we might not be able to participate
in Siberian development at all ff they insisted on a
"one package" deal, but also said that we would hope to
have United States participation in individual development
projects to diminish the possibility that the Chinese might
view this development as a provocation. Thereupon the
Soviets noted that Europe is too far from the project sites
anyway, and proposed that the resources developed in Siberia
should be shipped to the Far East, for export to Japan, and
with Japan as a "window" to the United States and possibly
other countries which might participate, such as the FRG.
President: We, of course, are interested in Yakutsk, but
there are a number of problems related to Congressional action.
This leads me to a new subject. We hope to get
Congressional action during the waning days of this session
to enact the Trade Bill, and the Exim Bank Credit Authorization
Bill closely related to it. I and Secretary Kissinger have
been trying hard to get the Trade Bill through the Congress,
and to expand the Exim Bank credit authorization without
restrictive provisions. If we get both bills passed we will
be in a better position to discuss this matter.
Secretary Kissinger: Let me note, Mr. President, that we
have heard that Senator Long's Committee hopes to report the
Trade Bill out to the Senate on December 2. (note: PM Tanaka
excused himself from the room for several minutes.)
SECRET
9
SECRET
PM Tanaka: (on his return) Hearing about your visit to
Vladivostok, Mr. President, reminds me that some 35 years
ago, when I was in the Army, I was stationed near the
Soviet-Chinese border, near Vladivostok. Once, from the
top of a mountain I could barely see Vladivostok in the
distance. That was between the Changkufeng Incident (1938)
and the Nomonhan Incident (1939. However, I became
sick and was invalided home without seeing any fighting.
Ambassador Yasukawa: In Russian the name Vladivostok
means "Lord of the East"; the Chinese call it Namako,
meaning "sea cucumber," which abound in the bay.
Secretary Kissinger: In 1941 the Soviets withdrew all their
forces to the German front, and nothing was left in Siberia.
President: There is one other matter of deep interest,
especially to our people in the Pacific Northwest, that is,
the fisheries problem. Our technical people feel deeply
concerned that the north Pacific is being overfished. They
have studied this question, and have reported to me that
restraint should be exercised in the North Pacific fishery.
This ties in with an overall question of great significance,
the Law of the Sea. There are in Congress many members
representing districts along the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard,
who feel that Congress should enact legislation to establish
an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles. We feel this would
be inadvisable at this time, but the pressure from the east
and west coasts is substantial. Therefore, in the interest
of alleviating this problem of possible legislation I would
hope that Japan would exercise restraint in fishing in the
north Pacific.
PM Tanaka: The north Pacific fishery problem is important in
Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore it is essential that both
sides discuss the problem, with good will, in the interest of
seeking a mutually satisfactory solution. Japan derives about
half of its protein from fish, 20% of which are taken in the
North Pacific. Over the years Japan continues to discuss
SECRET
10
SECRET
with the U.S., Canada and the Soviet Union such fishery
problems as conservation of certain species, prevention of
overfishing and even the expansion of fish cultivation. A
particular problem arises from the fact that some fish
(Salmon) spawn in American rivers and then migrate to sea.
To avoid taking these "American fish" on the high seas Japan
has agreed to refrain from fishing certain waters, which
area the United States now seeks to expand. I understand
that this problem is to be discussed by representatives of
Japan and the United States, beginning November 25. However,
we do not wish to announce to the world whatever we might
decide, because it would serve as a precedent for the
Soviets to bring similar pressures against us.
President: We appreciate your willingness to be forthcoming
on this matter. I am encouraged by your response, and urge
you to be as forthcoming as possible, because of the deep
interest in this issue in the United States, which is
related to political pressures which might, if they grow
stronger, undermine our position on the Law of the Sea.
Let us leave the specific talks to the technical people.
I understand that the Foreign Minister and Secretary
Kissinger have agreed on the Joint Communique we are to issue,
Mr. Prime Minister. The Secretary believes it is a good one.
Do you think you and I should agree on the Communique to
authenticate it?
PM Tanaka: We are in basic agreement. Earlier we were
concerned that some of the language might cause us problems,
but Secretary Kissinger has shown great understanding in
working this out. I thank him. I also agree to this Joint
Communique.
Secretary Kissinger: If the GOJ agrees, we plan to release
the Joint Communique at 2:00 p.m., with an embargo until
4:30 p.m.
DECRET
11
SECRET
President: Mr. Prime Minister, I have found our talks
interesting, constructive and enjoyable. Thank you for this
opportunity.
PM Tanaka: These two days of talks have been an unforgettable
experience for me, since you are the President of the most
friendly nation of all those with which Japan has friendly
relations, and also because we met before, once when you were
a Congressman and again this September in Washington after
you became President. Thank you for the opportunity.
James Jane Wickel
November 24, 1974
SECRET
12
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 010741
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Tanaka/Ford et.al.
DESCRIPTION
handwritten version of memcon #010740
CREATION DATE
11/20/1973
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600081
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
November 20, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger,
Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET