Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1553018
label
April 10, 1975 - Kissinger, TV Network Representatives
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1553018
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
April 10, 1975 - Kissinger, TV Network Representatives
citationUrl
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Vietnam (Republic)
Foreign aid
International relations
Speeches, addresses, etc.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1553018
coverageEndDate
day
10
logicalDate
1975-04-10
month
4
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
10
logicalDate
1975-04-10
month
4
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
8148bfba005a40d8
ocrText
Scewinttttle
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
KISSINGER/NETWORKS BRIEFING
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Marvin Kalb, CBS-TV
Tom Jarriel, ABC-TV
Ted Koppel, ABC-TV
Richard Valeriani, NBC-TV
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 10, 1975
6:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: President's Foreign Policy Speech to the Congress
Kissinger: Let me explain to you what we are trying to do and why we
have made these particular recommendations.
We have two problems: The tragedy of Vietnam and the conduct
of United States' foreign policy in the face of the difficulties of Vietnam.
There are two problems -- the management of Vietnam and keeping our
foreign policy so that it is carried out with design, conviction and
purpose. We cannot avoid the tragedy of Vietnam by denying that it has
any foreign policy importance. But we can assure that the basic structure
and conduct of our foreign policy remain strong.
On Vietnam we have several concerns.
On the domestic scene we are aware of the polls, but the President
feels he will be judged by history, not just by the polls. There is the
impact of the speech in Vietnam itself, which he has to consider. Also,
there is an international audience. Each has its own requirements and
consequences. Then there is how a country conducts itself in a crisis.
There has been a military disaster in Vietnam caused by many factors
in which it is idle to deny that our action played a role. That is not to
blame us; there was also the massive attack and the faulty execution of
the withdrawal.
FORD A LIBRARY RALD 30
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
- 2 -
South Vietnam now faces a large North Vietnamese force whose
intentions are uncertain.
The President's judgments don't rest on legal commitments or any
secret commitments -- which we never tried to assert. The commit-
ment results from a decade of close cooperation with tens of thousands
of people who committed themselves to us.
Weyand thought that there was a chance that the situation could
be stabilized. The President had to look at the broader picture, and
knowing the military estimate from Vietnam, they have been in enormous
proportion. If he asked for anything, it had to be for something which
made some rational sense.
The President is aware it is within his power to trigger the collapse
in Saigon. He is aware that if he reflected what most Americans want,
he would trigger that. If he did, even those who were in favor would
recoil. We have a deep moral obligation -- not based on secret commit-
ments, but on the whole character of our relationship.
This is the analysis the President went through. What could he do?
He could stop everything and bring about an immediate collapse and with
profoundly tragic consequences. Or he could take a figure between zero
and $722 million -- and any one is as good as any other. He chose the
figure he could justify concretely, in terms of:
--
(1) a chance for stabilizing,
-- (2) what gives the best prospects for negotiations,
-- (3) what gives the best chance for extricating Americans, and
-- (4) what gives the best chance to make an effort to save some
of those tens of thousands of Vietnamese who relied on us.
We are not seeking a national blame, or a scapegoat. We want to
get on with our business in the world, so we want to lay it out honestly
in a way which makes sense. Vietnam will not paralyze the policy of the
United States.
The President thought that the figures he was asking for were best
suited to the objectives of all groups in the country. It also avoids the
moral decision that people elsewhere no longer have the right to fight.
We have given Congress deadlines. We have no intention of starting
a debate on who lost what. It is a statement of a serious man on how TO
FORD
handle a tragic situation.
GERALD
RALD
LIBRARY
- 3 -
In the second part of the speech he is setting out an agenda for
our foreign policy which will be carried out whatever happens in Vietnam.
Vietnam will have an effect, but if we come together, we can accomplish
our goals of moving the world toward a global and lasting peace. That
is the philosophy and background of the speech.
Jarriel: Does the figure represent Congressional consultation?
Kissinger: The President met with the leaders yesterday and outlined
his proposal. He didn't bargain; he set forth what he thought was right.
He did consider consulting, but decided it was impossible, whether
they were close to him or far off. In the latter case they would then be
affronted if he went ahead against their view; if they were close, he would
have to negotiate. The military situation may make any amount moot,
but he wanted to do what was right in any case.
Koppel: Is there any appraisal that Congress will grant anything near
this or within the deadlines?
Kissinger: The judgment was that a deadline was required if this is to
make any sense. And not to repeat the Cambodian situation which dragged
on without end.
Kalb: Is the nine days how soon Congress can act or how long Saigon can
hold?
Kissinger: Both.
: What is this evacuation?
Kissinger: No, it is just a thinning out.
: How many are you talking about if there is an evacuation?
Kissinger: This is a heartbreaking problem. The optimum list would
be over a million. Those whose lives are clearly in danger are between
100, 000 and 200, 000. I am not saying this will happen, but we can't plan
that it won't.
: How about next year?
Kissinger: I have not made an independent assessment of the amount.
The Department of Defense thinks $1.2 billion is probably about right.ORD
RALD GERALD L'BRARY
4 -
Kalb: How about the French negotiation proposal?
Kissinger: The French proposal is not new. The political framework
in Saigon is not for us to determine. And a negotiation is up to the
Vietnamese parties.
Koppel: How about an evacuation? If there is a deterioration, and
fighting to get aboard?
Kissinger: It is a nightmare. We are thinking about a deterioration.
But we can't even rationally discuss the subject with the Government of
Vietnam without doing what we are doing.
Koppel: ARVN won't fight a rearguard action while the leaders get on
the aircraft. Will you use Marines?
Kissinger: The President is asking for that authorization. We are
planning to do it under the best possible circumstances. We will do what
we can.
: Isn't asking for $700 million and a vote in one week an
attempt to blame Congress?
Kissinger: The amounts of money have not affected the intensity of the
debate. We should get it done in a hurry because we do have other heavy
responsibilities in our foreign policy.
Valeriani: Do you think there is any chance of getting $1 billion?
Kissinger: I think there is a chance Congress will work with us to get
a substantial amount. We are not trying to saddle Congress with anything.
There is an emergency in Vietnam. We can't go through the Cambodian
experience. The funds are needed now. We aren't after a negative vote
just to get it over with. We are saying this approach is best whether you
want to get out, negotiate, or stay in.
: How can Congress clarify the restriction?
Kissinger: There are two laws involved. We think it is legal to go in to
extract Americans. We have no authority to evacuate Vietnamese.
Kalb: Would we have to fight the ARVN?
Kissinger: There are many scenarios: a Vietnamese feeling of betrayal
FORD
or a cooperative effort. How it comes out will be partly determined by
our actions.
GERALD
RALD
130
- 5 -
Valeriani: How about the reactions around the world?
Kissinger: If a statesman was worried, the last thing he would want to
get in his press is stories which would help confirm his fears, anyway.
What can be achieved will depend importantly on the military
situation, and on how one behaves. The prospects obviously are not
brilliant.
I won't speculate on the political evolution in Saigon. Some sort
of negotiation is probable as the situation evolves and it will depend
significantly on the military situation.
RALO of R. FORD <> BRART
K/ networks Burfing
5/5 Pus julyousents don't vat 020 legal has or 20120
enstruto - which we news tritel t assert, The untime
10 april 1975
results from duack of else crop cu 100
THE WHITE HOUSE
connection specific
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON
3 any that = it a Channel c sit
what but an trying & do + crty these
could he
@ thinken open this,
Pass had to brok at to bronk + known
00 have c pers: of VIVI
su
with it est. from VAI have have * be in
corpenet of is FP. inc fars ofc differenting and
VN, Eprold Pcarious of
Inn. Birs he had * of it
I anything, it had for
w a emert around C Craperly of UN by
formething what bal rational a senar.
design c at has any FN import between
can assmethat basic struture
consequence
Pus anount w/ in aware. his to
indusion. BANK if be
organism F P united story.
host J.S-nant, he world triggen that. of
On UN are have notherl concerns
he chil, even these who area in form world
may andrews
sicond. we hmr deep moral Abhyatio-
hot losed ore sent croduct intonc
Dowstn. are are orester of pollo, but
C Preo ful he in he judged by hirth
who Character over selationship
This is awalysis a Procedurt the
not prot by Karls. Three impart
What cruld K do ? Hedorld stop everything
Each dro
of youh in N. Then have
t
bing smined entloper - proporally tragie
ementy conducts stalf in a cirsis
conseptiones O2 he could (15th CL fugure
bet yero & 1224 any and is as good as 7 other
Than has here mil. charth in Vill
He chose J frying he could protify Crimor
Emised by many facts in which he ide
as a chance for
to liming and did motalog a esle. That
FORD
(2) Bist conjute for eright
not to home also massive atta k
&
& fundy excontrar of w/ drmual.
RALD
LIBRARY
(3) But chome for extrectly
(4) Bist chance to more effort to 200ml there
SUN haw for is a large NVM lak
&
where interetuins are
10's of (No, of VMeae who rebert on us,
W l and not seeking a watt blame, a scaregont.
we want to yet w/ am business inc world 120
WM want a long it ant howalty in a way which makes
Land, UN will -not parabysis C policy of VS.
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
30
WASHINGTON
pes that friging he was orting for and best
have to congertine. he brial sit may
smited to the L yethir of all and grouping C
mash any annt mot but hn wants to in
country. go also avoid renal eleasion
with do what was ught in any case
that prople elsewhe no bryer have
Koppel- Is there ary approvil that long will
current mything more This or w/inc deadhing
hight k fight.
K Judgernat was dradhine required ip this smoke
W I have givin Cms deadhies. we have
any sense, and not & repente Contraction
Go intestrin of Whate on who lost what,
sit whichdrags an w/o and.
25 stutement of a Lines momore honst
Kalb Sc c and days how form Lovy cannot 02
handle a tragic it
how long Sanjor can hold?
In 2 at part hn is sitty ant are
Buth.
whitesthis evacuating
—
which will be carrid int whaterer happens
K Zw, it just a Chining ant,
in AM, VN will have am effect, batting
- How may are you taking about if am was
use can Trgether, and cen accomplined over
K This to heartbreing pirth, The optime
goais enroning would toward glumal & exating
list would be onha muthin how whose
spreh. That is the phologoly
birth elearly in danger bet cod, Wrt
&- aprach.
boying This will won't happy but wecan't
Dear fight upreast Cmg.
folm that it
K Finst leadus furthering + outbried his
- 18 ow about next nexto your?
propers. He didn't hargin, he
Kg wrt made and assessmentac ant
HRT parth what he the ught. the and emsign
Do Thinks 1.2 is per
coesulting but diddl it imposite, whitter
they were alosets him as Pan off the eather
Kalb Howevhart Free h right proposal
thing would them be affirmation close become
K The Fr, proposal not her. The publical
(9 & FORD JIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON
forevork in Sunjam is wrt for us
We are having this opproach is best whether
to letter and wegot is up the to c
you want a fet ant, wigotiate, stylin.
K-3pyrl How about has distination t foughty
— Hum com emg clarifig c restruction
K Three are 2 lms- we - think it by of
to get about
extract american use have we anotherity to
K It is a enghthere. are are thinking of distribution
havenett UNiss.
But are count even returnally chaines c
Kall would inc homes 8 fight AR nor?
subject W/GVN w/o dming what are all dring
K Threase many devicing
a WN fabing Whayed
Koppel ARUN wrat fight vargeral action which
(2) a englished effort
C leaders get on c deft. CV in you use maints,
Hamm am it activis. onnes and will be parth dittrained by
K Pashing for that anthingation we outforming
Valuen - Am about No him armund world.
to do it reader best possible circurstrues-
K- of a statisens ares would, c last thing be would
we will do what and can.
- Isn't asking Pn700 mil of work in wish are attempt
wont to get in his juss is storis which world
to become english
help congin his fews onyang.
K Dr. The crunts of only have not affected
C interisity of abote. w & & hould get it chen
in on hurry france we do lane artur
beeny responsibilities in FP.
Valuen Do you Think thurs is any chance of getting
life
K 2 think them a chance Cary will work w/ve
to get 02 sub, ant. w 1 not trying to saddle
cary w/ onyching. There is an bridgency in UN,
count go their c expirience. The
funds one weded am. We artut aftha negotics
both first A gst over w/.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
what c am he a huved will abgund
requestantly on c unil sit, the and on at how
one whome. The are not withint.
I want specubate one pol. evolution in Sargin.
Service snty exent is probations sit evolve and it
will abpaired big -on c mil. sit.