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April 14, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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April 14, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Ed
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 91-16 #12 NSC Its 8/20/92
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
By KBH NARA, Date 9/23/92
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Monday, April 14, 1975
3:30 p.m.
PLACE:
The White House
Washington, D.C.
President: I would hope we could consider this an executive session so
we could have this a free and open session.
Sparkman: We just came from one.
President: We put a great deal of time and effort into the speech. There
was unanimity in the Administration with what I said and the policies I
recommended. I was therefore able to speak with conviction about where
we should go.
Sparkman: I thought the first 30 minutes of your speech, which covered
the world -- I don't know who wrote it but it was the best word structure
I have seen and a great delivery.
I would like to hear from the two Secretaries.
RALD GE R. FORD UBRART
President: Henry.
TOP SECRE
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECREF/SENSITIVE/GDS
2.
Kissinger: Perhaps I should talk about the political situation and Jim
will discuss the military situation and the figures we are requesting.
It is clear the military situation in South Vietnam is extremely
difficult. North Vietnam has the military superiority. They have
occupied much of the territory. It is caused in our view by too little
assistance and incompetent management of the retreat. But whatever
the reason, we are trying to bring about a political situation and a
negotiation which would exploit the new balance of forces. We have
thought that the U.S. should not be a principal agent in these negotiations
but should rely on the South Vietnamese or others such as France. We
are prepared to support negotiating efforts and the elements that are
prepared to negotiate. This is a process which will take a few weeks to
sort out in Saigon.
With respect to the legal situation on evacuation. We want to
reduce the number of American citizens as soon as possible but not so
fast as to precipitate a panic. The Embassy has resisted evacuation, but
we have ordered it to get down to about 250. I would appreciate no
mention of it.
President: We had a similar problem in Cambodia. We started with
over 400 and had reduced it to about 75 when the time for evacuation
came. We were prepared for 600 Americans and 300 Cambodians. We
had few, because the gutsy Cambodians chose to stay and die rather than
leave. So we got it down in an orderly manner to a manageable figure.
Kissinger: We offered the Cabinet members in Phnom Penh a chance to
leave and without exception they stayed even though they were on the
assassination list.
The total list of the people endangered in Vietnam is over a million.
The irreducible list is 174,000. This doesn't mean we could get them out;
it would be just those in overwhelming jeopardy. We would have to
assemble them where we could get to them and have conditions where we
could move them.
There are two Acts of Congress: the War Powers Act and the
Indochina proscription. We think under the War Powers Act the President
has authority with respect to evacuating American citizens; with the
Indochina Act we would appreciate clarification. We think there is no
authority for evacuation of Vietnamese.
FORD & LIBRARY RALE 30
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
3.
Schlesinger: Henry has touched the high points. There has been some
improvement in the past few days. They have been fighting well in
Xuan Loc and the Delta but whether it is temporary depends on North
Vietnam and President's request. In the military area the North
Vietnamese have eight divisions and the GVN seven. They are doing
well but they are dipping into stocks of ammunition. Generally
speaking, if the North Vietnamese bring up their forces they will have
preponderance, but the South Vietnamese know the terrain and have their
backs to the wall.
We have requested $722 million which reflects the results of the
Weyand mission. The difference reflects the hope on the GVN side to
equip four infantry divisions. That is $140 million. To convert the four
ranger groups is $120 million. For general munitions, $190 million. If
you would like more detailed data, General Weyand is here.
President: Let's see what the Committee wishes. The $722 million is
designed to meet the current situation and is totally different from the
$300 million. Fred's report reflects a different situation.
Case: You are very good to see us, especially on such short notice. The
reason for the meeting is that the Moose Mission just came back and
briefed us. We have a consensus on the immediate actions: There should
be urgent action to reduce American personnel to the point where they
could be lifted out in one lift. We feel there is grave danger if this reduc-
tion is not being done in a timely manner. We fear the people on the ground
would panic so we are not moving rapidly. We would go to them frankly and
say this is how we would do it. Stew suggests a sea evacuation.
Kissinger: We waited to press him until the President's speech so it would
not be in the context of pulling the plug. We now have a cable saying it is
underway.
President: Not to be critical, Stew, but 4, 000 on one ship would pull the
plug. We could have taken over 600. I don't know how many more could
be handled.
Percy: Couldn't we give orders for every plane outgoing to be full?
Javits: There are orders and orders. We think you should be sure through
someone other than Martin that your orders are being carried out. Within any
context of aid, the first priority must be to get Americans and deserving
South Vietnamese out. It is your problem, but we think you should be
sure that your orders should be carried out.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
RALO GELL'S FORD VERART
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
4.
President: I assure you my orders will be carried out. This is a two-
way street. We will do our part but we think we have a good schedule
and program and want your cooperation. I think we have an obligation
to do whatever we can for the people to whom we are obligated.
Baker: We felt an evacuation of the American citizens was so urgent
that everything else -- legality, Thieu's incumbency, everything else --
was secondary to that. We appreciate your forthcoming attitude toward
this problem in your speech. We wanted to tell you our concerns and
hear from you your concerns. We hope when we have, we will have
established a new era of negotiation between the Executive and Legislative
branches. We will talk with you on the amounts, which should be designed
to facilitate the evacuation of Americans.
Sparkman: How is the report?
President: I have read it. I don't agree with all of it but it is a forthright
report.
Sparkman: The Cambodian evacuation went well because of planning. We
hope there is some planning going on in Saigon.
Schlesinger: The situations are not parallel. The Viet Cong infrastracture,
the congestion, the high potential levels of violence -- it could be compli-
cated.
Case: We appreciate this. That is why we are concerned.
Percy: Could we get clarification on the 1, 200 -- when they will be there
and could they be pulled in one lift?
Kissinger: I don't have that today. I will have it tomorrow and I will let
you know. On Thursday, the Ambassador was told to take it down as soon
as possible, and to tell Thieu immediately.
Percy: Is 1, 200 the immediate minimum? It sounds like a vast number.
The reason it was easy in Cambodia is that we put a ceiling on.
President: If there isn't some indication of aid, the situation could dis-
integrate rapidly.
Javits: I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for
military aid for Thieu.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
RALOR RALD GEL R. FORD TRART T
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
5.
Church: I would think that if money is required to facilitate getting the
Americans out, that can be worked out. What has not been worked out
is the Vietnamese evacuees. Secretary Kissinger has said maybe there
are 175, 000. Clearly there is no legal inhibition to bringing some out along
with Americans, but 175,000, with American troops involved, could involve
us in a very large war. This raises the specter of a new war, thousands
of American troops holding on in an enclave for a long period.
President: It is not envisaged that this would be for a long period but as
quickly and precisely as possible.
Biden: What concerns us is that a week ago Habib told us we would be
formulating a plan. A week has gone by and nothing has happened. We
should focus on getting them out. Getting the Vietnamese out and military
aid for the GVN are totally different.
Kissinger: The plan for American evacuation is in pretty good shape. But
we had a report that if we pulled out and left them in the lurch, we may
have to fight the South Vietnamese. It was that we were concerned with
and that is why we waited to go to Thieu so we didn't do it in the context
of a bug out. The second problem is getting American citizens out in an
emergency. Third is the Vietnamese to whom we have an obligation. This
is infinitely more complicated and large-scale. It requires cooperation
from the GVN and maybe the No rth Vietnamese.
Biden: I feel put upon in being presented an all or nothing number. I don't
want to have to vote to buy it all or not at all. I am not sure I can vote
for an amount to put American troops in for one to six months to get the
Vietnamese out. I will vote for any amount for getting the Americans out.
I don't want it mixed with getting the Vietnamese out.
President: There are three operations that are intertwined. There is
getting out 4, 500, the last 1, 800 and the Vietnamese. The worst way to
do it is to label it evacuation aid.
Symington: I am very familiar with Vietnam. In 1967 I decided it was
hopeless. My people are asking if we are asking if we are holding
Americans hostage for more aid. We know that is not so, but what worries
me is the feeling we have been wrong so many times. We are all sur-
prised at the collapse of South Vietnam. Why did we leave the 6,000 there
so far? Where are the 175,000 going? Who is going to take them? These
could all be dealt with if we could get the Americans out.
Pell: We could put these people in Borneo. It has the same latitude
same climate, and would welcome some anti-Communists.
GERAL RALE the FORD TBRART
SECREF/SENSITIVE/GDS
6.
President: Let me comment on where they would go: We opened our door
to the Hungarians. I am not saying the situation is identical but our
tradition is to welcome the oppressed. I don't think these people should
be treated any differently from any other people -- the Hungarians, Cubans,
Jews from the Soviet Union.
Clark: Is the request for military assistance primarily to arrest the
situation and bring on negotiations, or for something else?
President: I think I stated it clearly: We wanted the sum to stabilize the
military situation in order to give a chance for negotiations and to permit
evacuation of Americans and deserving Vietnamese.
Sparkman: Do we have any obligations under the Paris Accords?
President: We signed with the understanding we could uphold it. The
means were taken from us.
Sparkman: But our obligations
Kissinger: The Accords had not obligations but authorities, that is,
Article 7. President Nixon and others judged that permitting the United
States to extricate itself would permit the United States to provide aid and
enforce the agreements. Under the Paris Accords we have no obligation.
To the GVN we said that if they let us get our forces out it would enhance
our chances of getting aid for them and enforcing the agreement. It was
in this context, not that of a legal obligation. We never claimed an
obligation; we never pleaded an obligation. But some of us think there is
a moral obligation.
Mansfield: My position is well known and I won't change. The caucus
was concerned about the pace of the evacuation. Also that the witnesses
should be the highest members of your Administration. We are trying to
comply with your request as soon as possible. If Hugh [Scott] agrees, we
will not meet Tuesday and Wednesday so we can process these requests
rapidly. There was concern about humanitarian aid and the desire to
send it through non-governmental agencies and the UN.
Scott: I agree to the proposal. One thing we haven't discussed is the
amounts. I think we need to discuss-a figure.
Biden: I don't want to commit myself to any precise number. How much
money depends on how many we try to get out.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
RALD GE A. FORD TBRART
7.
Kissinger: This is a matter of extreme delicacy. We can't take them
under crisis conditions. No one is thinking of a long period of time to
get people out. We are thinking of ten days to two weeks.
Church: I think we should establish an emergency fund to allow you to
deal with the situation and carefully draw the language about troops so as
to insure there are limits.
President: We are not wanting to put American troops in but we have to
have enough funds to make it look like we plan to hold for some period.
Glenn: The idea here is very different from what I envisioned. I and
most Senators thought of a surgical extraction, not of a ten-day to two-
week operation with a bridgehead. This is a re-entry of a magnitude
we have not envisioned.
I think we have to keep this very quiet. I thought it was a one-shot
airlift.
Case: This was essential to have been said. The only way we could do
an operation of this kind is through negotiations between the North and
South.
Glenn: I can see North Vietnam deciding not to let us get these people out
and attacking our bridgehead. Then we would have to send forces to
protect our security force. That fills me with fear.
Javits: Tell the press we are thinking of $200 million.
President: If this is a meeting to plan an evacuation, this will panic the
GVN totally.
[The meeting ended]
RALD OF A. FORD JBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
P/SFRC/K/SeNving
14 apr 75
P I would hope me cmuld creater this on exce Mosim
socreculd have this a free R you Address
Spartmen we pit care form are,
P
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it cound c world. D out how who worth it heat
hest word stantes I have Lun & grent beliving, I would
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P
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mil superranty They have overyid with ofc an
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to hig about a put sit a west which would explain
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not he a puriound agent in This migot but should
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so is press which will Inh & for whoths to 2nt and in
Sangan
w/reper tt lyal it on line, we want tubue
#'s of US ASAP butway so as To peop. panic
Embassy has visisted has ht me have advad
it drawn to about 12 50. would appreca FORD
RALD GERALD SRART ?
how mentin ft.
P
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w/arn 400 & wherel itto oball > 5 when erone
lme. We more pregared for 600 american $300
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stay ' hi earther them leave. a montagraph figure
K
w e affered the entiret Chmel to home & w/, expten
they stayed eventhether on as lease list,
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wereald have to accemble them where by canld get
to then 1 have conditions where we Came hore an
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think w/p off for US intma ton Inductine and
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ford lays. Home him fighty will in Kuar her + chlta
ht whither it tergeroy depends on NUM t Pergnat
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have preparederance, hit SUM know timorin t
have backs to woll. We home requested 7zz hil
regulating - Weyond insirer The by english
hope on 6 F N eile to equip 4 inf chis. That is
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members $ 190 bril. H details dnta Waysond YOUR
FORD
has
P
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mat consent sit is Crtally wi from c300 mil.
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f helped hs. We have encersive on mind actions:
to riched U1 personal A part they and
be hight in ( fit, We ful then grandamger the
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rapity we would go to them promally + for this is has
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it into way,
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Prey
may more cruddle handled.
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fall
Jonits
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then consume other Am martin that your orders are
long anid ant. W/m any context of and, c/st
previty most he K get am + depening SCN and
IT your purb but Lud think you should be sme
that your shoul / L carred unt
P
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Thise 2 every shut. W ill Ii any pant hut
this we have a pood reland F prog+ creat your
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can % C just to whom are drigated
Buhn
we fult line of US was so urgent every thing ckr-
ligality, Thin every thing
a that. We approvate your pathering
this prob in your aple h. W. evanted a will
you our enumus & him pon you your muris
We hope when sus live are have estate a your
us and atar w/ Jonon
st has fregot hat eper+ byis. outs, designed to
Sparton
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foreshtate home of US
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complainted
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will he you how On Tho, and Dr. to Take it
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#. Renson easy in Currabrid is we put a whing on.
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of discrityeste eaging
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PORT & DEBARY ARE 10
one michel for mil. and pr Thin
Church
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unhilant is UN K has said
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alongo or/ ans, but 175 our, us/ us trops United and
involve is in a very lurge won. This raids c
specter of a new was, 1000's of or Gangos holdring on
enclosed for a lon, period.
P
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but or for n presionly or prosible
Billin
what concerns us is that wish ago Habith Told no
we would formalating a plan. a much has good
by writing has happened. as should forms
on getting then ant. Grthy UNlie ant & mil and for
G UN are totally dif.
K
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buch we very have to fight SUN be. St was
that wh cern enversed w/ + that cirty and hard
write A goto Their so are chelist doit in contract
of a begant. 7rd pub is getting US city out in
indepeny. 3rd is Vists to when ml home an obligation
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Bilen
& ful put upon in hing presented are after nothing
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put vs trough in for 1-6 MR to get VNue MA
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wont it might w/gething UNree ant.
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highers, my people and asking if me are asking if
we an holding any hostorys for name and we know
that not so, but what wheres me is feeling the
h me home urns so may times. W l aM surprised
at cathepsof sure. why did and line Charac charo
there & 10 for where crose c / 75 are going ? who
form to tabe am? Tucke could all he denet w/
if my conldget and and
Peve
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some chinits ,t would walcome some anoth hurts
P
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dror to C H my arims. dent suying it is relectrial
hrt mm tradition is to williams of pressed. I don't
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my often people- Calons, Imoper
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do C injust for and agins formaily to arrest it
bring mayot or for sonsilting Mrs.
P
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to statilize cat mil it in order to geina
Chance to se for negot of to primit more of ans
+ clissing Virge
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GE RAL RALD GERALD BILL ?
P
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K
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2. P.Niy & atters judged that person thing ust
extricute stary would permite us to provide and
& enfore Unler Donis acids an home
75 To Goy and savid spoting Wtno get our
fores mt it would enhaver an homas of getting
ail for them & good enforing capatment. 600 It
wasin this contract, unt that f leyal
We ween claimed an obligation, when planded an
obhyation but not me of vy think thing is
a must
massport
my position is well known I want change.
The cancers was concerned about fram of erac. Also
that untruss should he highest members of your
admin we out are trying to comply w/ your
export ASAP. If Hugh agris are will wrt meet
Tree + wed to we can proup these justs aprilly
Tran was career about and + Lishe D
sand it Than hon-govtal agencis KC UN.
Scott
Rayse to L proposal O me thing and haven't
is C ants. Drad I chick me next to drives a fryine,
Brian
I don't went D cmt unpelf to any pricese #, Hom
much howey depends on how may are ty D getant,
K
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cruditions. hire is thinking for
to long find of trive to yet people ant. are are FORD
\ I TOVEG RALD GERALD 0 ?
boff Church
thinking of 10 drugs -2 who.
then I thin we should estah om loverg find ok
allow you to denl w/c sit + correfulty have C language
about targes so as to insure the an limits.
P
We not writing & put am trops in in But
we have & have erm funds a make it link both and
plan to hold for some prind
Clum
The like his is very dif from what I envisimed. &
+ must Shatus the for jurgical extraction, int
of a 10 day -Zuh opn w/a tredy heard This is a
eventy of a inaquitude am have not envisioned.
& think we have to hey this very ginet. I tht it
was a / short antipt.
Cose
This was essential of han here suid' The only way am
cauld do an open of this buil is them hegot but NA S.
Glann
I can see but NUN diciding but to let us girls
get this proplemt and attacking our hadzehed. Then
we would have to send pries of protict am Remity
face. That fills me w/frar.
Joints
Two the Pus are thinking of 200 mil.
P
If this is a a hutry to plan evac, this will parric
GUN totally.
GENAL