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April 17, 1975 - Ford, Eugene Rostow (briefing paper only - no memcon)
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1553030
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document
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April 17, 1975 - Ford, Eugene Rostow (briefing paper only - no memcon)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Israel
Syria
Egypt
Middle East conflicts
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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17
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1975-04-17
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4
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1975
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17
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1975-04-17
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4
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
2381
WASHINGTON
GONEIDENTIAL (GDS
MEETING WITH EUGENE V. ROSTOW
YALE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR OF LAW
Thursday, April 17, 1975
5:30 p.m. (20 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I.
PURPOSE
A personal discussion with Professor Rostow. The meeting will
provide an opportunity to review the course of our Middle East
settlement negotiations. As President, you have not met privately
with Professor Rostow.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Since his departure from Government service
as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in 1969,
Eugene Rostow has resumed his teaching duties at Yale Law
School. He has maintained his keen interest in international
affairs and has a particular interest in the Middle East.
His past positions have tended to be fairly close to those
of Israel. In an article written for the April 4 edition of
the New Republic, he puts forward his present view of how
a settlement should be achieved. He sharply criticizes
the step-by-step process and any effort to get Israel to
make territorial concessions without prior Arab assurances
of peace. He advocates a comprehensive settlement with
the return to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as
the ultimate framework for the conduct of negotiations
toward a final settlement.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
RALE Ft. FORD JERARY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guide
By
, NARA, Date 1/20/90
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
-2-
He suggests, finally, that a return to Geneva might be
desirable, in that a renewed Geneva Conference would be
squarely based on the Security Council Resolutions. He sees
no sensible alternative to inclusion of the Soviet Union in the
negotiations, and concludes that a primary goal of US policy
should be to induce the Soviet Union to accept peace based on
the Security Council Resolutions for which they voted.
B. Participants: Professor Rostow and Secretary Kissinger
C. Press Arrangements: White House photo session at the beginning
of the meeting.
III. TALKING POINTS
-- I am pleased that we have been able to meet. We share a deep
interest in foreign affairs and a mutual concern about the future
course of the US in the international area.
A. Middle East
-- I would appreciate your views about the course of settlement efforts
in the Middle East.
-- Let me give my own perception. In brief review, our strategy
has been developed against the six years of political stalemate
which preceded the October War of 1973. As you know, the
Israelis sought recognition from the Arabs and secure borders
different from those of 1967; the Arabs refused to recognize
Israel but sought a full return to the 1967 borders and Israeli
recognition of the "rights of the Palestinians. These positions
were irreconcilable, all negotiation efforts failed, and the
ensuing stalemate led straight to the October War.
-- The war changed the power relationships and the perceptions of
Israel and the Arabs. Both recognized that there had to be move-
ment toward a settlement. But they did not know how; the barrier
of a generation of hatred and suspicion was too great to be broken
down all at once and allow an overall settlement. We judged that
the most practical approach was to proceed by a series of small
steps, thereby building mutual confidence and demonstrating that
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
LISRARY
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 3 -
agreements, once made, could be respected. Israel was
strongly in favor of this approach, preferring to set aside
earlier diplomatic efforts based on Security Council Reso-
lution 242 and discussions between the US and the USSR.
-- The initial disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria
convinced the Arabs, as well, that the step-by-step approach
was the best, and that the route to a settlement in the Middle
East was through the United States rather than the USSR.
There was also a substantial improvement in our bilateral
relations with Arab states, while the USSR was losing ground.
The immediate post-war pressures on Israel from the USSR,
Western Europe and Japan disappeared.
-- A certain degree of momentum was required to sustain this
favorable situation, however. We had been in the closest
possible contact with Israel since last July on how this could
best be done and we agreed to their suggestions on tactics
and timing. However, on two occasions Israel's judgment
was that it could not afford to meet the minimal conditions
needed for an agreement: first by Jordan prior to Rabat, and
most recently by Egypt.
-- It may be that Israel did not receive the quid pro quo it desired
in the strict, legal terms of the agreement which Sadat was
willing to accept. But the biggest quid pro quo was outside the
agreement, namely enabling the United States and Israel to
continue to control the negotiating process, keeping Soviet
influence at a low level in the Middle East, and allowing
Sadat and other Arab moderate leaders to dominate the
radicals and continue to work for a peaceful settlement with
recognition of Israel and its right to live in peace. Unfortunately,
there was no agreement.
-- We are now faced with a breakdown of the negotiations and
probably an eventual resumption of hostilities unless further
movement in some context becomes possible. The U.S. is
prepared to go to Geneva, but retaining control of the talks
or protecting Israel's interests, as we have been able to do
thus far, is very problematical in that context. The Israelis
themselves see the dangers of this. They have no wish to have
the Soviets share in establishing the terms of their future
FORD
survival. Yet there is no realistic alternative in view.
LIBRARY
GONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONF IDENTIAL (GDS)
-4-
We have a difficult period ahead. We are now in a period of
intensive policy review, whose purpose is to examine how we
can best protect our own several interests in the area, and to
determine where and how to proceed diplomatically. Any ideas
you have would be very much appreciated.
B. Vietnam
-- The situation in South Vietnam is grim. The losses in the
northern part of the country have badly shaken the confidence
of the Army and of the population.
-- For this reason, the battles now going on around Saigon are
critical. A victory by the Government could give the South
Vietnamese a breathing spell in which to rebuild the forces
they evacuated from Danang and other areas, and restore
much of their lost confidence. I have been greatly encouraged
by the stand being made by the 18th Division at Xuan Loc
(SWAN LOC). This division was attacked by three Communist
divisions but has fought very well and held its ground.
The best hope for the Vietnamese now seems to be for them
to stiffen their defenses and try to achieve a new stalemate.
From there, perhaps some real negotiations could develop.
Additional military aid is essential to accomplish this.
General Weyand pointed this out in his report to me. Without
this aid, he does not believe they can survive, even in the
short run.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
BRAR